CEU Political Science Journal Vol. 2, Issue 1 (Febr. 2007)

Volume 2, Issue 1 February 2007

CEU Political Science Journal The Graduate Student Review

Central European University Department of Political Science

TABLE OF CONTENT

1 FOREWORD Advisory Board S.M.Amadae 3 NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS Anil Duman Carol Harrington ARTICLES Carsten Q. Schneider 4 UKRAINE AND BELARUS – (UN) LIKELY Editorial Board TRANSITIONS? Stela Garaz Silva Kantareva Sergiu Gherghina Arpad Todor 27 DEMOCRACY (DIS) CONNECTED – DISCOURSES OF DEMOCRACY AND OF THE Managing Editors INTER-WAR PERIOD AS (MIS)GUIDING LIGHTS IN THE HISTORY TEXTBOOKS IN THE Sergiu Gherghina REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND ROMANIA Arpad Todor Stefan Ihrig

Editorial assistants 44 THE RUSSIAN IDEA AND THE DISCOURSE OF Bartlomiej Baryla VLADIMIR PUTIN George Jiglau Gavin Slade Oana Lup Joszef Matyasi 58 DOMINANCE AND SECURITY IN THE POWER Petar Popadic DISCOURSES: SID MEIER’S CIVILIZATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF DISCOURSES IN POWER- GAMES

Margus Valdre Department of Political Science, WORK IN PROGRESS SECTION CEU Budapest ISSN 1818-7668 72 BORDERLINE DISPUTE BETWEEN SLOVENIA AND CROATIA IN THE POST YUGOSLAV ERA: SOLUTIONS, OBSTACLES AND POSSIBLE THERAPY Mitja Durnik and Marjeta Zupan

90 BOOK REVIEWS

CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

FOREWORD Discourse Analysis and Critical Political Science example, Mitja Durnik and Marjeta “The categories of perception, the Zupan’s article in this volume shows schemata of classification, that is, how political leaders on both sides essentially, the words, the names which mobilise their supporters through a construct social reality as much as they discourse of conflict over the border express it, are the stake par excellence between Croatia and Slovenia. Durnik of political struggle, which is a struggle and Zupan argue that this conflict could to impose the legitimate principle of easily be resolved but politicians vision and division”.1 discursively perpetuate it to serve their short term electoral interests. Thus, Politics necessarily involves struggle their article puts forward a reasoned over the meaning of events, over how alternative to the border conflict we categorise people, and over how we discourse which they see as destructive name and draw borders around places. and misleading. Political leaders need to mobilise people behind their vision of how to While some analysts, such as Durnik divide people and space by providing and Zupan, oppose an irrational answers to questions of who are “we’, discourse with strong claims about the where do we belong, and who are our truth of the situation others avoid such friends and enemies. Discourse analysts claims. Stefan Ihrig analyses the stories seek to uncover the assumptions and told in Romania and Moldova about processes underlying such visions of democracy and their democratic history. political reality. The discourse analyst However, he does not present these asks questions about the authoritative stories as distorting a more accurate knowledge that supports existing version of history. Rather, he is political relations, about how governing interested in comparing state text book authorities categorise populations, and narratives of past experience of about the political consequences of democracy and considering the possible particular forms of discourse. Thus, effects of these narratives on present discourse analysis is part of the democracy building efforts. He points tradition of critical social science. out that while the text books discuss historical experiences of democracy as Many discourse analysts want to expose periods of normality they are short on the irrationality of political conflicts as specifics as to what exactly democracy based on lies and distortions. For or normality might be and argues that this lack of specifics provides students with few resources for critical thinking about problems of democracy. 1 Pierre Bourdieu. In other worlds: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, 134. 1 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Gavin Slade also analyses the narrative because of their interactive nature. He of a state and its relation to society questions the vision of security offered through close analysis of Putin’s by this game given that winning Millennium Manifesto. Slade argues requires global military and cultural that Putin established a new unifying domination. discourse on state society relations for Russia at the turn of the century. Finally, Silva Kantareva’s article does Through a close analysis of this not use techniques of discourse analysis significant text he shows how Putin has but certainly shares the critical agenda blended historic notions of “the Russian of the other articles in this issue. idea’ with liberal constructions of Kantareva critiques contemporary individual responsibility. He argues that political analyses that discuss Belarus the discursive efforts of Putin’s regime and Ukraine as part of the post- contributed significantly to the communist “transition’ or the “fourth strengthening of the Russian state. This wave of democratisation’. She argues article provides an excellent example of that since these countries lacked the textual methods of discourse analysis in structural pre-conditions necessary for concert Migdal’s theory of state and democracy such labeling of society as mutually constitutive.2 developments has, at worst, obscured an authoritarian reality. Her article Moving beyond the level of individual compares developments in Belarus and state politics, Margus Valdre considers Ukraine offering an explanation of how a famous computer game Ukraine’s recent pro-democracy naturalizes a particular vision of global movements while remaining pessimistic security. Winning the game requires about democratic prospects for Belarus. operating according to particular historical, economic and political Thus, all the articles in this edition “laws’. Thus, the game subtly presents reveal the importance of critical a particular view of how the world political analysis even if this may not works and engages players in an lead us to optimistic conclusions. enjoyable experience of operating Discourse analysis in particular according to these rules. Drawing upon provides an important tool that enables the Althusser’s concept of the analysts to expose and question our “interpellation’ of subjects, which naturalized assumptions about political stresses the importance of bodily relations and realities. Such a critical practices, Valdre suggests that stance toward political discourse forms computer games may be powerful an essential component of rigorous mediums for political ideologies political science.

CAROL HARRINGTON 2 (Department of Political Science, Joel Migdal. State in Society. Cambridge: Central European University) Cambridge University Press, 2001. 2 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS The Journal proposes, besides articles, a CEU Political Science Journal “work in progress” section, designed publishes scholarly research of merit mostly for Ph.D. researchers that have focusing on the topics promoted by the not yet finished their work but are Journal and meeting the standard interested in making it public. The requirements for academic research in section from this issue includes a terms of conceptualization, research with potential, which takes a operationalization, methodological lot of time to be finalized and whose application and .analysis of results. We authors are more than pleased to receive strive to promote those works that any comments at the provided e-mail approach a significant research problem addresses. and answer research questions of general interest in political science. Due Starting with the first issue in 2007, to the fact that the Journal addresses a CEU Political Science Journal wide range of academics we encourage encourages contributions in the form of presentation of research to be made at a book reviews. There are two standard level where it is understandable to the requirements for the reviews: they vast majority most of the target group. should not exceed 1,200 words and should address books that are In our attempt to promote original considered of general importance in works, we do not accept articles that are political science and the related fields. under review at other publications or If you are the author of a book you wish articles that have parts that were to be considered for review, please send published or are forthcoming under the us an e-mail and we can arrange the same form in other places. details concerning the mailing of the Contributions using statistical analysis book. If you are interested in reviewing have to make the proof of the data books for our Journal please send your available in order to allow replicability. CV to the e-mail addresses indicated in Formal requirements are found in “the the “contact” section of the website. paper requirements” section of our webpage: www.ceu.hu/polccijournal SERGIU GHERGHINA Any paper that does not meet these ARPAD TODOR requirements may be rejected.

Manuscripts should be no longer than 6,000 words (for exceptional cases please address the Editorial Board), and footnotes should provide references and should not including supplementary text. The appendix must be a maximum of 5 pages. 3 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

UKRAINE AND BELARUS - (UN)LIKELY TRANSITIONS? they are quite relevant for the overall Silva Kantareva experience of the former Soviet bloc. MA Candidate, Yale University Therefore, examining them closely can [email protected] teach us a lot about the ingredients necessary for a successful transition in Abstract the context of the former communist states. This paper will explore the post- communist paths and political 1. Introduction developments of both Ukraine and Belarus after their official break from The course of development of the the Soviet Union in 1991. Since both countries from the former Soviet bloc is have often been labeled as transitional often referred to as transitional, alluding countries, my objective will be to assess to the countries’ expected transition to if their socio-economic situation was democracy. Analysts have often indeed transient or, rather, one of attempted incorporating those stable decay. I will look at the political transitions into either the third or fourth choices that Ukraine and Belarus made waves of democratization. However, it in the aftermath of independence and is questionable whether these argue that as a result of their political transitions can be incorporated under a and socio-economic structural single common taxonomy at all. conditions, they could not have Moreover, despite the temptation to cast mimicked the democratization of them into the category of democracies, “exemplary” Central European states the majority of those countries can be such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary or characterized at most as quasi- the Czech Republic. I will also examine democracies, feckless pluralities, or Ukraine’s democratic path and explain even electoral authoritarian states. After the emergence of Ukraine’s democratic more than a decade of “reform and impetus in 2004 instead of 1991. I will reconstruction”, many still suffer from seek to explore why Ukraine undertook chronic social and economic illnesses the path of revolution and, hopefully, that render the very use of the term democracy, whereas Belarus is still “transitional” irrelevant. In the words of struggling after disputed and chaotic Strobe Talbott, the former Soviet bloc elections. Useful as empirical data and got “too much shock and too little econometric analysis is, there is much therapy.”1 If one were to plot the that is overlooked, and therefore those case studies are especially useful as far as democratization is concerned. While 1 both cases are peculiar in many ways, Moises Naim. “Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?” Foreign Policy Magazine. October 26, 1999. 4 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 relative success of the various IMF vehemently advocated the latter, transitional stories of Eastern Europe, also known as the “big bang” approach. one would see a wide spectrum of Ukraine and Belarus did not pursue results. On one end, a group of either option whole-heartedly. Yet, it is successful forerunners includes Poland, worth enquiring whether these states Hungary, Slovakia, and Czech had the “option” of genuine Republic, along with a subgroup of this democratization at all. In fact, most category, consisting of Lithuania, democratization theorists predicted that Latvia, and Estonia--countries that were Ukraine and Belarus would be doomed not as successful, but nevertheless to fail in their first attempts to reform. joined the EU with the first group of It is therefore surprising that they have Central European states. Next, one finds been subsequently criticized for their Bulgaria and Romania, whose limited failure, and begs the question of what success was marked by recent EU had changed in Ukraine by 2004 and accession. On the less favorable end of why Belarus has failed to follow. the spectrum one finds Georgia and Kyrgyzstan along with the laggards of In general, theorists have underscored transition—also referred to as electoral different conditions for the emergence dictatorships—including Azerbaijan, of democracy. For example, class-based Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, models of democracy, such as the one Armenia, and Belarus, where old put forward by theorist Barrington authoritarian regimes seem to have Moore emphasize the significance of “resolidified”. This paper will focus class struggles and predict political primarily on comparisons between regimes depending on the groups that Belarus and Ukraine on one hand, and emerge triumphant. Applying this the successful forerunners on the other. model to Ukraine and Belarus, it is easy While useful insights can be achieved to understand why the nomenklatura by comparing Ukraine and Belarus with prevailed in the class struggle and states from any station on the above precluded the possibility of an easy spectrum, the sharp contrast between transition to democracy in 1991. On the transition in some cases and regression other hand, modernization theorists in others provides the best means of have identified a critical threshold discussing the viability of Belarus and income level and industrialization as Ukraine according to more than one prerequisites for democracy.2 When criterion. compared the Central European states, After the collapse of the Soviet Union both Ukraine and Belarus were lagging and the fall of the Berlin wall, the under each of these indicators at the newly-emerged states were confronted with two options: piecemeal reforms or revolutionary changes to bring about 2 democratization. The international Adam Przeworski and F. Limongi. community, the World Bank, and the “Modernization—Theories and Facts.” World Politics, (49(2, 1997): 155–183. 5 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 start of the transition period. On yet a power structures, a general lack of a different track, scholars such as vigilant civil society or strong Dankwart Rustow have emphasized the democratic traditions—all factors that importance of political pacts as a did not allow for an easy and painless resolution to significant social conflicts transition. Other common symptoms on the basis of which democracies were the omnipresent corruption and emerge. While Ukraine had many areas economic malaise. There are a number of social conflict, no such pact was ever of parallels that can be drawn to prove established, even though some attempts that the post-Communist experiences have been made to cast the Orange and challenges to Ukraine, Belarus, or Revolution into that category. any of other former Communist Meanwhile, Belarus’ direct transition to countries for that matter, were not authoritarianism was not marked by unique. However, such arguments either social conflict or a pact. cannot be extended indefinitely and when extrapolated, often prove This paper will address the viability of inaccurate. As experience has proven, each of these theories in turn; yet states did not enter the transitional theoretical discussion may obscure the period on equal footing. In many ways fact that both Ukraine and Belarus the CEE was visibly better prepared to lacked the most basic condition of all embrace democracy and market for the emergence of democracy—a economy; the subsequent pages will strong and functioning bureaucratic reveal the extent to which Ukraine and state. This reason above all others may Belarus occupied a different “transition help us understand why Ukraine and tier” than Central Europe. Belarus failed to become full-fledged democracies in the post-Soviet period, 3. A modernization story? and why Belarus has been unable to match recent Ukrainian success. Scholars of modernization theory, such as Adam Przeworski and Firmo 2. An equal start? Limongi, have established a positive correlation between economic To criticize Ukraine and Belarus for not development, social transformations, having democratized in the manner of and the consolidation of democracy. the Central European states (CEE) such Albeit tentatively, they have argued that as Poland, Hungary, the Czech economic constraints “play a role for Republic or Slovakia relies on the the survival of democracy.”3 They premise that Ukraine, Belarus and the propose a mean income threshold level Central European states began from the of $4,115 that, in their judgment, is same starting point in 1989-1991. It is critical for the emergence of true that any assessment of the post- Soviet transitional experiences usually presents similar results—monolithic 3 ibid., 159. 6 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 democracy. Thus, Poland emerged as industry.7 This was true in Ukraine and the dream case of modernization Belarus, despite their natural theorists. It “developed under a endowments. Even today, Ukraine’s dictatorship, became wealthy, and economic structure is inherently threw [the] dictatorship” at the expected flawed—about 12% of total output is income level. According to these produced in the traditionally strong criteria, Poland reached the threshold of agricultural sector while the democracy in 1974 and in 1985.4 While overwhelming source of production data is unavailable for Ukraine prior remains in heavy industry such as 1991, its income per capita in 1991 was machine-building and steel.8 less than $2,000, clearly disbarring the possibility for consolidating this new Prior to independence, Ukraine was of “democracy.”5 Interestingly, however, strategic importance for the neither Ukraine nor Belarus have since development of heavy industry in the gone beyond the mean threshold level rest of the Soviet Union. In 1989, it of income. Ukraine’s GDP per capita produced 34% of the Soviet Union’s for 2005 is $1,768 while for Belarus it steel and 46% of its iron ore and is $3,163.6 contributed over 40% of the industrial and 30% of the agricultural “net Another key factor for modernization material product” of the USSR.9 theory is the level of industrialization. Modernization theorists have argued that industrialization is essential for the emergence of middle class, civil 7 society, and economic growth—factors Nevertheless, even at the time when they embarked on economic transitions in the that are all crucial for democracy. In 1990’s, the Central and Eastern European general, most communist states states had more balanced economies—a big underwent similar periods of part of their output was concentrated in the industrialization that had a negative services sector which, on average, covered impact on their economies as central around 45% of GDP. planners skewed their economic 8 Classification by sector in 2004 showed structures toward the heavy sectors of that only 30-40% of the population is employed in the services sector. By way of comparison, in Bulgaria, one of EU’s lagging membership candidates, services account for about 2/3 of the national GDP. 4 ibid., 161. Because of the heavy emphasis on heavy- 5 For more information, see the industry during the period of planned “Environmental Information Portal”, economy, the telecommunications and high- available at tech industry sectors are significantly http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/economics- underdeveloped in Ukraine. business/country-profile-187.html, accessed 9\Hugh Hinton, “Explaining Policy Choices 11/05/05. Also, Table 3. in Transition Economies: Models of 6 See Appendix—Tables 1 and 2. Economic Policy in Ukraine,” International 7 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Belarus, too, specialized in heavy The Central European states were industry—primarily machine building similarly burdened by Communist and military production. After the total economic planning, but nevertheless destruction of its industrial base during found themselves at an advantage.10 For WWII, Belarus began renovation that example, Polish agriculture was never allowed it to sustain higher labor collectivized and as a result only 6% of productivity than many other former Polish farms are larger than 15 republics of the Soviet Union. hectares—the communist tendency for However, soon after the collapse of the gigantism was somehow resisted.11 The Soviet Union, the two states, having Czech Republic underwent inherited a great number of the industrialization prior to the Communist deficiencies of Soviet economy, faced period; thus even the location of Czech serious problems. The cycles of industrial enterprises was advantageous production dictated by the USSR compared to other Communist states imposed an economic interdependency where factories were built with little among the republics. In other words, regard for the proximity of raw any good produced in a given republic materials or transportation costs.12 could not be completed without using Moreover, after the uprisings of the the products or facilities of other 1950s and 1960s, Communists in CEE republics. What is more, Russia was no tried shifting the grounds of their longer an indispensable market for their products. Suffering from the protectionism of the European Union, 10 Ukraine and Belarus could hardly find For comparison, see Table 3 of Appendix, markets for their production. While the which shows division along the lines of industry and the behavior of various quality of their products was economic indicators since 1990. decreasing, costs increased because of 11 A massive 38% of Polish population the obsolete technology used. remains rural while agriculture accounts for Moreover, heavy industry was largely almost 26% of all employment. See dependent on imports of electricity and Crawford, Beverly. Markets States and energy-carriers such as natural gas and Democracy. (San Francisco: West view Press 1995). oil from Russia, which made their 12 economies vulnerable to external Overall, Czechoslovakia scored better in shocks and fluctuations in the value of such socioeconomic indicators as life expectancy and school enrollment, and had the dollar—the major currency in the the most liberal foreign trade regime and the energy sector. best stabilization performance between the world wars. See also Ham, J. Svejnar J. Terrell, K. Unemployment and the Social Safety Net During Transitions to a Market Economy: Evidence From the Czech and Slovak Republics. The American Economic Journal of Economic Development. (2, Review, (Vol. 88, No. 5. Dec., 1998): 1117- 2000): 67–108. 1142. 8 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 legitimacy from the ideological to the transition of the Central European economic. No longer able to justify states.14 Moreover, even though there their rule as the dictatorship of the are grounds to conclude that Central proletariat, the party justified its rule by and Eastern Europe had a marked claiming it was necessary to achieve economic advantage when compared to steady growth of production and other states from the Communist bloc, welfare. In Hungary, the reform process there is not a consistent economic began as early as the 1970s when the criterion or indicator in which the Communist party launched a gradual Central European states uniformly had economic reform to introduce some free an advantage vis-à-vis the rest. Before market elements to the economy. Both the transition, the three states differed in Hungary and Poland experienced their democratic traditions and levels of tremendous foreign investment drives economic development.15 A further fueled by the import of technology and problem is presented by the cases of capital through foreign loans.13 Both Bulgaria and Romania, where success Poland and Hungary engaged in was achieved, eventually, despite no significant trade relations with Western precedent of liberalization prior to the Europe. Even though they found fall of the Soviet Union. themselves in the difficult position between its Com-econ partners and the The key to this dilemma lays in the European Community, this marked a presence—or absence—of strong state first step of gradualism towards a bureaucracies states, required to shift market economy. the outcome of the class struggle and

In spite of the fact that Ukraine and Belarus shared many of CEE’s inherent economic problems, they had larger 14 It is still useful to consider that former foreign debts and did not experience Czechoslovakia had the second lowest level even the early stages of the capitalist of foreign debt—a great advantage that transition seen in Poland and Hungary allowed it to not assume drastic stabilization had. However, the fact that plans in the very short run. 15 Czechoslovakia as well did not have Every state followed a path of economic market socialism begs the question of transition that was suited to its needs— whether this was the key to the easy Poland resorted to shock therapy, Hungary successfully continued its gradualism and after dissolution, both Czech Republic and Slovakia tailored their economic policy to the relative level of development of their 13 For more information, see the Glenn E. economies. See also, Paul Leo Dana. “The Curtis, ed. Poland: A Country Study. hare and the tortoise of former Washington: GPO for the Library of Czechoslovakia: reform and enterprise in Congress, 1992 at Czech and Slovak Republic.” in European http://countrystudies.us/poland/50.htm, Bussiness Review. (Bradford; 2000. Vol 12, accessed on 11/3/05. Issue 6): 337. 9 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 allow for economic development once sharp contrast to the Central European transition begins. Modernization theory states, neither Ukraine nor Belarus does not do a good job of explaining the formed dissident movements during the democratic impetus in Ukraine in 2004, Brezhnev era nor were they as but it does points to a very interesting responsive to Gorbachev’s glasnost and trend—namely how the time and perestroika as other members were.16 In fashion of industrialization impact the addition, there were other societal chances for democracy. I will later factors working to the favor of the return to this point since Central European states. Thus, industrialization in Belarus and Solidarity was aided by the strong Ukraine, seen as a blessing of presence of the church which, communism, affected the attitude and historically, has acted as a vigilant outlook of the political class and during the dark years of repression.17 ordinary people. Overall, the strong position of the Catholic Church, the emergence of 4. Class Structure independent trade unions, and the survival of private agriculture made In terms of class structure and civil Poland a special case in the socialist society, Ukraine and Belarus were, once system.18 While Communism in Poland again, fairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis was brought down by the powerful push Central Europe. In general, democratic of Solidarity, in Hungary reformist reforms are carried out by discontented Communists played a major role in elites who, from ideological or material toppling the regime. The most orthodox motivations, are resolved to change the regime in the region— status quo. Poland’s Solidarity, for Czechoslovakia—simply collapsed example, was one such forum of discontented elites, a bulwark against repression to which neither Ukraine nor Belarus had any analogue. In fact, it is 16 Contemporary Belarus—Between often argued that the CEE countries are Democracy and Dictatorship. Ed. Elena quite distinct from the rest of the Soviet Korosteleva. (Routledge, NY, 2003), 12. 17 bloc. Positioned between the East and While the influence of the Orthodox West, they share the common imprint of Church in general was severely curtailed the Habsburg Empire and thus have a during Communism, Ukrainian church was further disabled by being under the strict common cultural background associated influence of Russia. with Western Christianity. This shared 18 It has to be acknowledged that neither sense of common identity was further Czechoslovakia nor Hungary possessed such reinforced by Soviet oppression during a genuine counterforce as the Solidarity the Cold War. The red bureaucratic movement even though Czechoslovakia had strata were seen as an imposition of a sizeable and politically conscious working communism while communism itself class and bourgeoisie. See Attila Agh,. The was detested by the average citizen. In Politics of Central Europe. (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1998). 10 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 after giving up its last hope of survival. of whom did not stand a feasible chance In Ukraine and Belarus, however, that of running for office due to their ethnic was not the case. In fact, it has been or political profile), the old argued that Ukraine and Belarus did not nomenklaturchiki ensured the financing have a legitimate aristocracy in the of their future political campaigns from early 1990’s nor were their political this emerging class of new “elites,” also classes reformist. Regardless of whether known as oligarchs. one counts them as genuine elites or not, in both Ukraine and Belarus it was Calling themselves new democrats, the nomenklatura that “won” the class nationalists, and reformed socialists, the struggle in the political vacuum of old bureaucrats were the ones expected 1991. to lead the country on the road to market economy and progress. In both Ukraine and Belarus, the However, the old elites had no interest nomenklatura—the outdated and overly in creating a system of checks and convoluted Soviet regulatory system balances or a strong bureaucratic state and the bureaucracy—were, and still once the old system collapsed. remain, a major obstacle to establishing Stripping state assets and privatizing a functioning civil society. Ironically, it state enterprises at little or no cost is the closest that Ukraine and Belarus seemed a far more attractive option. have ever had to elites. During Soviet Consequently, joined in their efforts by times, the nomenklatura had undue the oligarchs, they led their countries on influence over the life of the average the road to catastrophe. Unlike the elite person. Even after they gained factions in Poland, the new Ukrainian independence, the bureaucratic “elites”—many of whom came from the apparatus remained an active player on underground circles of Ukrainian the political scene. “The fact that the mafia—did not confront the totalitarian [collapse of Communism] occurred bureaucracies.20 Neither did they reform without violence allowed the former themselves like Communists in Soviet elites to remain in place”.19 The Hungary. Rather, the two factions old elites, needless to say, were highly sought to collaborate more. They unwilling to relinquish their power. In entered into comfortable relationships Ukraine, however, the nomenklatura with one another, rearranged was further accommodated by the themselves under new party lines and burgeoning underground world. platforms, and divided the state assets. Similarly to the way matters evolved in Russia, by extending capital and political protection to “outsiders” (most 20 Alexander Motyl, “Structural Constraints and Starting Points: The Logic of Systemic Change in Ukraine and Russia” 19 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine—A History. (Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No 4, Jul. (University of Toronto Press, 2000), 632. 1997.): 433-447. 11 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

connections and other machinations, Even though the emphasis of reforms which ultimately gave rise to the so- fell on state building, soon after its called patrimonial or crony capitalism independence, Ukraine undertook a where actors, “Utilize political power or series of economic reforms. Prices were clientelistic access to finance regularly liberalized and privatization legislation to secure opportunities for profit or was passed. expand their businesses.”23

[P]rivatization, by creating ample scope The profitable relations between the for those with such ties to mobilize oligarchs and the executive branch resources to centralize dispersed excluded the general population and citizen-shares, makes such activity resulted in the relentless much more likely. Such quick impoverishment and misery of the privatization also creates owners with 24 very little experience, knowledge, or people. What is more, the government ability to monitor from managers. This adopted inappropriate economic makes successful restructuring much policies—loose monetary initiatives less likely, which makes actors more such as covering budget deficits by likely to act exclusively in their private printing money, increasing money interest, and pursue parasitic satellite supply, and “emitting currency in the 21 strategies. form of budgetary and off-budget credit subsidies to state-owned and other large The political and economic vacuum that enterprises”.25 As a result, the country came as a consequence of large-scale descended into a vortex of privatization allowed for the emergence hyperinflation in 1993. By 1999, of clientelistic networks between the Ukraine had lost 60% of its 1991 output politically and financially empowered groups. In such environment, “shaped by the old bureaucratic elite, the country will very likely not experience a successful transition.”22 Rather, some of the most often recurring practices 23 Ibid. that emerged involved funneling out 24 Not only did the oligarchs invest in state reserves, exploiting political buying off politicians, but they also started running for parliament. Having turned into business moguls, the above mentioned oligarchs became powerful to the extent 21 Ibid. they came to control good parts of the 22 Lawrence King. Making Markets: “A political, economic and public life. Comparative Study of Post communist 25 Robert S. Kravchuk, “Budget Deficits, Managerial Strategies in Central Europe.” In Hyperinflation, and Stabilization in Ukraine: Theory and Society: renewal and critique in 1991-96” available at social theory, Vol. 30 http://www.huri.harvard.edu/workpaper/kra (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publication, vchuk/mon_trends.html Also see Figure 1 2001). in Appendix. 12 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 and the better part of the population Not only do Belarus and Ukraine lack descended into poverty.26 any tradition of democracy, but they also had no substantial tradition of The reason why things devolved in such statehood. In fact, with the exception of fashion is that, unlike Central Europe, Russia, after the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine did not have a strong Weberian none of the former Soviet republics had state on the basis of which to build civil society, rule of law, or democracy. It did not have a autonomous culture. Each one of them bureaucratic state to provide regulatory “emerged without bona fide states, leeway for the benefits of economic genuine elites…genuine cultures and opening.27 As Lawrence King has hence without genuine nations.”30 argued, “privatization and markets While Russia or any of the CEE states themselves do not lead to efficiency and could use as a base and expand upon development in the post-communist the state-structure they had inherited, economy. Rather, their effects are Ukraine and Belarus did not have such dependent on the local social structure an option.31 The question remains, of the societies they impact.”28 Because the spoils of Communism were of such nature that they could not be divided through social pacts and because the indirect rule of Marshal Pilsudski—the hero nomenklatura held the balance of power of the Polish- Russian war. Hungary went in 1991, Ukraine missed the path to through a chaotic period after WWI when democracy. Another reason why the the short lived Soviet Republic was red bureaucracy managed to “win” the followed by two attempts by the last class struggle was the absence of Austrian-Hungarian Emperor to regain his 29 throne. She eventually managed to establish genuine democratic or state traditions. a democratic system, weighted towards conservatism, but it gradually shifted to authoritarianism under the Regent admiral Horthy, especially after 1932. 26 Country profile—Ukraine. Economist 30 Alexander Motyl, “Structural Constraints Intelligence Unit. Data accessed from and Starting Points: The Logic of Systemic http://www.eiu.com/ at 3/3/06. Change in Ukraine and Russia”, 27 The Freedom House index is another (Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No 4, Jul. good measure of how Ukraine fared among 1997.): 433-447. other transitional states for the periods both 31 Not surprisingly, most of the newly- preceding and following the collapse of independent states, including Ukraine under Communism. See Appendix. Kravchuk, engaged in intensive state- 28 King. Making Markets. 2001. building. While Western observers have 29 Czechoslovakia came closest to making blamed Ukraine’s governing elite for the democracy work and the democratic process unusual stress they laid on state-building as was interrupted by external, rather than opposed to rebuilding the economy, it is internal, forces. Poland made an attempt at worth questioning how feasible it is to try to parliamentary democracy, but after 1926 it establish market economy without the reverted to an authoritarian regime under the foundation of a state. 13 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 however, if those issues had been medical equipment, and information resolved by 2004. technologies.33 A big boost of GDP owed to sectors such as metals and 5. Ukraine in Orange chemicals in response to a growing demand in Russia and Asia. In addition, If Ukraine had remained an underdog in there was a surge in steel exports to post-Soviet Eastern Europe, the saga of China. The government, with Viktor the 2004 elections revealed renewed Yushchenko as Prime Minister, initiated prospects for fruitful transition to several policies aiming at stimulating democracy. Despite the cataclysmic those sectors by forgiving tax arrears in nature of the Orange Revolution itself, the metals sector and by reducing Ukraine’s reversal of fortune was more railway transport costs.34 In 2002, trade directly related to a series of political had almost doubled and GDP growth developments which had coalesced had reached 5.2%; the next year, it slowly after 1991: a developed middle increased 9.6%; and in 2004 it grew by class, an empowered civil society, and 12.1%.35 Growth was sustained through more diversified industry; all of which strong domestic demand and growing acted to tip the political balance when consumer and investor confidence. the forces of liberalism were brought Although the oligarchs took most into conflict with the old regime—and advantage of the economic growth, it all of which remained stunted in nonetheless also helped build on a new Belarus. In the following section, each middle class and stronger civil society. of these dimensions will be explained in turn. Civil Society and Freedom of Speech: As arbiters of the strategic interaction Economy: Despite many precedent between government and opposition, shocks, by 2004 the Ukrainian economy the citizenry had clear-cut and had managed to progress and diversify significantly. For example, public services and the non-profit sector underwent significant growth and stood 33 Fore more information, see US for more than half Ukraine’s GDP in Government Export Portal. Available at 2004.32 There was substantial progress http://www.export.gov/comm_svc/press_roo in telecommunications, the production m/marketofthemonth/Ukraine/ukraine.html, accessed 3/3/06. of drugs and pharmaceuticals, food 34 Economist Intelligence Unit. Data processing and packaging equipment, accessed from http://www.eiu.com/ at 3/3/06. 35 See Table 4 in Appendix. Ukraine's annual economic growth increased from 6 % 32 See Appendix—Tables 1 and 4. Despite in 2000 to 9 % in 2001 and was steadily solid economic growth in 2004, high oil above 4 % in 2002. Economist Intelligence prices and political unrest led to an Unit. accessible at www.eiu.com, accessed economic slowdown for 2005. 4/2/06. 14 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 pronounced preferences in 2004. The military became forces in the Orange proliferation of foreign-funded NGO’s Revolution. Viktor Yushchenko helped tremendously for the emergence received public support from several of a vigilant civil society. Reportedly, prominent religious figures who spoke between 13 and 67 million US dollars out against the “immoral regime.”38 were pumped in Ukraine through Meanwhile, the Ukrainian military and NGOs, the number of which reached security services decision not to use 40,000 in 2004.36 In addition, Ukrainian force against protestors, despite media had become more independent as demands from Yanukovych and other measured by the Media Sustainability hard-liners, proved crucial. According Index (MSI), accounting for to New York Times correspondent independence, plurality of news sources C.J.Chivers, “after the Interior Ministry and free speech. Consequently, ordinary unilaterally marshaled troops to attack people had a greater awareness of the the demonstrators, SBU leaders made it endemic corruption, and realized the clear that they would use force to importance of 2004 elections. An protect the protesters”.39 attestation of this was the emergence of local, youth activist organizations This made Ukraine’s push for similar to Serbia’s “Otpor” and democracy in 2004 far more feasible Georgia’s “Kmara.” Likewise, than in 1991. Coupled with the Ukraine’s “Pora” (“It’s time”) was significant international pressure to organized along Leninist agitacni ensure the legality of the elections, it is principles and sought to uphold the a safe assumption that the balance of revolution, by acting as a “spearhead of power in this case was tipped on the disaffected youth, holding side of the democratic forces. Another demonstrations, policing rock concerts revealing feature in 2004 was the fact and, all the time, demanding that Ukraine’s political institutions—the accountability from the regime.”37 presidency, the parliament, the Supreme Court, and the political parties—had Even the Church—formerly suppressed acquired political legitimacy, which under Communist rule—and the became obvious during the crisis:

Even Yanukovych, after losing the presidential run-off of 27 December, proceeded to challenge Yushchenko’s 36 Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution”, Foreign Affairs, (March/April. 2004). 37“Ukraine's Clockwork Orange Revolution,” British Helsinki Human Rights 38 Economist Intelligence Unit. accessible at Group, at http://www.bhhrg.org/Country www.eiu.com, accessed 4/2/06. Report.asp?CountryID=22&ReportID=241 39 Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange &ChapterID=731&next=next&keyword=, Revolution.” Foreign Affairs, (March/April. accessed 12/4/05. 2004). 15 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 victory in the central election relate the extent to which Belarus, commission and the supreme court. adhering more strictly to Russia’s Ukraine had acquired formally “super-presidentialist” model, escaped democratic rules of the game under the oligarch curse but also precluded Kuchma, but it became clear during the revolution that these rules had stuck the possibility of any cracks for and were beginning to function as real political and economic transformation. democratic institutions.40 6. Monopoly of power: Is Belarus Clearly, in 2004, the balance of power authoritarian? in the class struggle had tipped in favor of the emerging middle class, supported A different spin on the traditional class by the military and the church.41 While based models of democracy is provided failing to fully explain the Orange by theorist Michael McFaul who, Revolution, these factors provide mimicking Weber, argues that the additional insight as to why this outcomes of transitions depend democratic impetus emerged in 2004 primarily on who holds the monopoly 42 instead of 1999 and why Belarus could of power. After the 1991 coup in not repeat this feat. Belarus in 2006 had Moscow, the communists in Belarus achieved little progress on its way to were in disarray, allowing liberals and 43 democracy. In fact, the country was nationalists to take advantage. A moving further toward authoritarianism. founder of the faction Communists for Despite meager attempts to produce a Democracy, Lukashenko came to power “color” revolution of their own, after the hasty elections in 1994, Belarussian demonstrations proved following the short rule of Stanislaw insufficient for the Lukashenko regime Shushkyevich. The factors that impeded to be toppled. The following pages will democracy in Ukraine were valid in the case of Belarus, too. However, instead of simple nomenklatura-oligarchy collaboration, the result of class 40 Alexander J.Motyl. “Democracy is Alive struggle in Belarus was an in Ukraine” available at entrenchment of authoritarianism and http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy- super-presidentialism. This has proven ukraine/alive_2822.jsp, accessed 11/24/05. 41 The growing independence of media in Ukraine has been measured by the Media Sustainability Index (MSI). According to it, Ukraine has moved progressively up on the 42 Michael McFaul. “The Fourth Wave of charts measuring independence, plurality of Democracy and Dictatorship: news sources and free speech. In contrast, Noncooperative Transitions in the Belarus is still in the bottom of the charts. Postcommunist World.” World Politics, (54, For more information, see the International 2002):212–244. Research and Exchanges Board database 43 Contemporary Belarus—Between available at Democracy and Dictatorship. Ed. Elena http://www.irex.org/msi/2005/summary.asp. Korosteleva. (Routledge, NY, 2003), 24. 16 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 no more successful in political and inflation as monetary practices such as economic terms, and has stunted the the printing of money were regularly development of any sort of subterranean used to finance deficits. Inflation is the civil development similar to that which highest in the region, despite falling to enabled Ukraine to reverse course. 18% in early 2004.46 Belarus has the lowest levels of FDI in the region and Politically, Belarus has become little has firmly rejected Western economic more than a quisling to Moscow. assistance.47 The Swedish furniture firm Lukashenko has not hid his strong pro- Ikea and Russian beer producer Baltika Russian orientation, sealed with a series have decided to withdraw their business of pacts giving significant political because of “unrealized government concessions to Russia in exchange for commitments or unwelcome economic support and preferential interference”.48 prices in the energy market. The political rapprochement of the two Ever since coming to power, Alexander countries was marked by a succession Lukashenko has sought to maximize of treaties that envisioned and centralize presidential authority. harmonization of policies with respect Through a referendum in 1996, widely to citizenship, monetary policy, defense denounced as non-democratic, and foreign policy.44 In economic Lukashenko managed to amend the terms, things did not take a happy turn 1994 constitution and extend his term in either. Even though Belarus has office. Not facing any censure for his reported some economic growth for the actions, in 2005 Lukashenko attempted, last few years, “peculiarities in official once again, to use referendum in order Belarussian statistics” have put into to amend the constitution and allow question the reliability of this data. himself to run for president unbound by Over 40% of enterprises and a majority term limits.49 The parliamentary and of collective farms are on the verge of bankruptcy and currently operate at a loss.45 Lacking an independent central bank, Belarus became easy prey for 46 Country Profile—Economist Intelligence Unit. accessible at www.eiu.com 47 In 2004, Belarus rejected a World Bank loan to assist it fight AIDS and TB. 48 Data from the Economist Intelligence 44 Treaty on the formation of a community Unit, accessible at www.eiu.com of Russia and Belarus (1996), the treaty on 49 Throughout his presidency, Kuchma, too, Russia-Belarus union, the Union Charter attempted amending the electoral system to (1997), and the treaty of the formation of a his advantage by looking to extend the Union State (1999). Economist Intelligence number of terms the president is allowed to Unit, accessible at www.eiu.com serve. However, more worrisome was his 45 Contemporary Belarus—Between plan to transfer the election process from the Democracy and Dictatorship. Ed. Elena general populace to parliament by allowing Korosteleva. (Routledge, NY, 2003), 24. the Rada rather than the people to have the 17 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 presidential elections, held in 2000 and former Minister of Internal Affairs Iuryi 2001 respectively, were marked by Zakharenka and others are just a few opacity and blatant violations of examples. These facts speak not only to democratic principles. Human rights the authoritarian nature of the violations and election fraud in 2006 Belarussian regime, but to the obstacles was documented by the Organization that systematic authoritarianism for Security and Cooperation in presents to any endogenous move Europe's Office for Democratic toward liberal development. Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), and even captured on 7. The Background Condition camera.50 The European Union and the United States were unwilling to A crucial element that proved an recognize the 2006 election results and obstacle for both Belarus and Ukraine threatened to impose sanctions on was the so-called “background Belarus. condition” postulated by Dankwart Rustow as a vital component of Human Rights Watch has released democracy-building. The background several reports condemning the condition asserts that for a democracy government for its repressive measures to emerge the “vast majority of citizens aiming to curb civil rights and liberties, in a democracy-to-be must have no including caps on foreign funding, doubt or mental reservations as to limitations on access to newsprint and which political community they belong printing presses, censorship, suspending to”.51 It is important to note that the independent and opposition periodicals, background condition does not relate to and even detaining dissenting ethnic homogeneity but rather, in this individuals. The outright imprisonment case, to the requirement that most of MPs has become a disturbing fact of Ukrainians or Belarussians associate Belarussian political life, while others politically with their respective states have been forcefully exiled. Former instead of having a mixed loyalty to Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir, both their governments and Russia. opposition leader Zianon Pazniak, Thus, the ethnic homogeneity of Belarus is not a guarantee that the citizens will direct their loyalty towards the Belarussian state. While it is constitutional right to elect the president. Not surprisingly, his approval ratings fell to important to keep in mind that people 7%. Fortunately, international pressure and can often times have multi-layered fierce opposition paid off and these attempts were frustrated. 50 The video and the report that ensued can be found at: http://www.media- 51 Rustow, D. Rustow. “Transitions to ocean.de/2006/03/26/does-youtube-video- democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model.” proove-election-fraud-in-belarus/. Accessed Comparative Politics, (2, 1970):337–363. 5/1/06. 18 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 identities, and that does not necessarily sway in Ukraine's ten southern and preclude the emergence of democracy, eastern regions.52 These disparities the background condition is become even more obvious when nevertheless a good measure of a comparing media reactions to the country’s social cleavages and a good elections in the east and the west. predictor of class struggle. Whereas in eastern Ukraine Yushchenko and his team were While it is questionable to what extent castigated as “ultranationalists and CIA it satisfies this condition presently, agents,” they enjoyed significant there is no doubt that Ukraine has support in western Ukraine. For historically been torn by factionalism example, TV stations UT 1, Inter, and and regionalism. It has been remarked 1+1 showed extensive pro-Yushchenko that geography is destiny, and in no campaign ads while having little or no case does this seem more relevant than coverage of Yanukovych’s campaign.53 in the case of Ukraine. For most of its In contrast, ICTV and other eastern history, the territories of Ukraine had local channels heavily leaned toward been parts of various multiethnic Yanukovych. political empires. Those historical divisions have their contemporary The absence of crosscutting cleavages expression in Ukrainian political life in Ukraine was a serious impediment today, divided between the Russofied for the country’s transition to East and the distinctly Ukrainian West democracy in 1991. Clearly at no point which was not part of the Soviet Union in its post-Soviet life did Ukraine until 1945. Despite the fact that it has satisfy the background condition. Even avoided civil war or partition, unlike though the 2004 election results were a other formerly communist states such as good measure of how relevant regional Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, small- disparities still are, it has to be scale ethnic tension has been a problem accounted that institution building in in Ukraine since independence. Political the last 14 years has helped divisions coincide with the language substantially to alleviate them. In fact, split; Russian is primarily spoken in the the argument has been made that the East, whereas Ukrainian predominates in the West. These regional disparities in Ukraine become obvious when analyzing the 2004 election results, 52 Adrian Karatnycky, “Ukraine’s Orange despite their questionable authenticity. Revolution”, Foreign Affairs, (March/April. Variations were quite revealing: 2004). Yushchenko carried 17 regions in the 53 “Ukraine's Clockwork Orange western, central, and northeastern parts Revolution,” British Helsinki Human Rights of the country, and Yanukovych held Group. For more information, at http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryReport.asp?C ountryID=22&ReportID=241&ChapterID=7 31&next=next&keyword, accessed 12/4/05. 19 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 revolution itself emerged as the greatest industrialized and developed a middle cross cutting cleavage in Ukraine. If class and elites. The red bureaucratic nothing else, this “transformation of strata were seen as an imposition of Ukrainians from a passive populace into communism while communism itself a self-conscious citizenry” may be the was detested by the average citizen. single most important legacy of the While far from it being the rule, Orange revolution. Communism was detested by important layers of society and perceived as a The above-mentioned clash between the strange imposition. Whether one pro-Slavic Russian identity and the pro- embraces the “background condition” European sentiments are a characteristic or not, the above-mentioned of Belarus as well. After an extensive comparison has two key implications: Russification campaign through the first, the majority of Belarus’ twentieth century, only a small portion population still embraces the of Belarussians speak their native Communist idea and favors a language. Some scholars go as far as rapprochement, if not a union, with describing the above-mentioned Russia; second, the masses in Belarus phenomenon as a “lack of history.” will be difficult to unite in a struggle Even Belarus “pundits” such as Vital against Lukashenko. Thus, it becomes Silitski and Jan Zaprudnik argue that easy to understand why Belarus did not without “sufficient nationalist feeling, it opt for democracy in 1991 and why the is difficult to create a cohesive modern so-called “Denim Revolution” was not state.”54 Perhaps this is related to the a genuine revolution. fact that Belarus, in addition to being a weak state, never perceived the Soviet 8. Democracy-Traggers leadership as oppressive like Czechs or Hungarians or Poles did. In fact, in A common theme among all theories of 1991, over 82.7% of Belarussians democratization, despite their supported the preservation of the Soviet differences, is the emphasis on political Union.55 However, this is not that actors and “causers” of surprising since for Belarus the Soviet democratization. This “requirement” era brought industrialization, albeit helps explain why the Orange inefficient, cultural development, and Revolution occurred in 2004 and not in rule of law, which gave a silver lining 1991. In 1991 Ukraine lacked a to communist rule. In contrast, the determined and ambitious leader to Central European states had already voice the discontent of the people and the opposition. That leader emerged in the mid 1990’s as Viktor Yushchenko, then chairman of Ukraine’s Central 54 Contemporary Belarus—Between Bank, rose in rank. The occasion that Democracy and Dictatorship. ed. Elena brought him to prominence was the Korosteleva. (Routledge, NY, 2003), 76. Russian financial crash in 1998, which 55 Ibid., 21. 20 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 led to Yushchenko’s temporary the failed “Denim Revolution.” appointment as a prime minister and Milinkevich attempted to portray his Yulia Timoshenko, one of the former campaign in terms similar to gas oligarchs, as energy minister. Yushchenko’s in 2004, relentlessly Yushchenko and Timoshenko helped touring Belarus and Western Europe but deregulate the economy, abolished failing to spur sufficient momentum in countless decrees that granted tax the public. exemptions to the oligarchs, preferential trade agreements, and subsidies. 9. Conclusion Drafting a balanced budget and targeting inflation led to a healthy GDP The demise of Communism presented growth of 7-8% per annum and a 12% Eastern Europe with a myriad of aggregate growth in industrial output.56 opportunities, but various pitfalls as Inflation reached weighted average well. With it came the hasty expectation annual rate of 7.52%, down from the that the old Warsaw camp would 18.88% from 1992 to 2001.57 Feeling quickly catch up with the rest of their interests endangered, the oligarchs Europe. However, the leaders of these united with the communists to oust newly-emerged countries faced a Yushchenko and to install puppets from daunting and unprecedented task – the civil service instead. Ironically, Introducing a market economy and removing Yushchenko from power democracy in countries whose markets transformed him from a technocrat into were ravaged by decades of planned an opposition leader. The emergence of economics and whose societies were Yushchenko as someone who was deeply affected by Communist rule. willing to lead and invigorate the Despite Western commitments to help, opposition made the push for no one was willing to underwrite the democracy in 2004 much more viable enormous costs of liberalization, than 1991. In Belarus, however, no such privatization, and stabilization—the leader has emerged. Alexander neo-liberal mantra. Few people seemed Milinkevich did not prove to have the to remember that the few times in charisma or the political agility to lead recent history when a market economy and democracy were introduced simultaneously when imposed by an external hegemonic power--post-WWII 56 Ukraine's annual economic growth increased from 6% in 2000 to 9% in 2001 Japan and Germany. This clarifies the and was steadily above 4% in 2002. general challenge facing the former Economist Intelligence Unit. Communist states; some, such as 57 2004 Index of Economic Freedom. Marc Ukraine and Belarus, were A. Miles, Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., disadvantaged even further. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, and Ana I. Eiras available at It is an interesting fact that following http://cf.heritage.org/index2004test/country2 the frameworks of several .cfm?ID=Ukraine retrieved 07/31/04 21 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 democratization theories, Ukraine and this fragile civic movement will fail, Belarus were doomed to fail in their political reform will be futile, and the first attempt for democracy in 1991. economy will remain stagnant. Having emerged as an independent state Meanwhile Belarus shares no similar tremendously burdened with its Soviet cause for optimism. The antiquated past, Ukraine and Belarus had, forces of authoritarianism appear realistically speaking, little or no sufficiently entrenched to prevent the chance in making a successful leap to flourishing of foundations for a liberal democracy in the first years of the political society. Only time will fully decade. The absence of revolutionary reveal the prospects for success of any elites, civil society, a functioning such transition. bureaucratic state or economy, among other factors, made that impossible. Bibliography Both states lacked democratic traditions and were most heavily “injured” by Agh, Attila, The Politics of Central Soviet hegemony. It is illogical to have Europe. Thousand Oaks: SAGE expected them to transform following Publications, 1998. the pattern of Central Europe. British Helsinki Human Rights Group Report on “Ukraine's Clockwork However, if Ukraine’s post-Soviet Orange Revolution,” accessible at descent was inevitable, its future seems http://www.bhhrg.org/CountryRepo less pre-ordained. In fact, a great deal of rt.asp?CountryID=22&ReportID=2 it lies in the hands of Ukraine’s West- 41&ChapterID=731&next=next&k European neighbors and in the hands of eyword= Ukrainians themselves. The EU has to Crawford, Beverly, Markets States and assume a proactive position in Democracy. San Francisco: encouraging political and social reform Westview Press 1995. in the country, while providing Curtis, Glenn E., ed. Poland: A Country substantial financial support for the Study. Washington: GPO for the modernization of its economy. Of Library of Congress, 1999. course, it is naïve to lay all Dana, Paul Leo, “The hare and the responsibility to the EU or other tortoise of former Czechoslovakia: International organizations. However, reform and enterprise in Czech and now that Victor Yushchenko has Slovak Republic.” European managed to mobilize a strong Business Review. (Bradford; 2000. opposition or something resembling Vol 12, Issue 6). civil society, it falls to the EU and the Economist Intelligence Unit, Data can international community to give be found at www.eiu.com. Ukraine a helping hand in the form of Ham, J., Svejnar J., Terrell, K., political and economic support. “Unemployment and the Social Otherwise, if left alone to cope with the Safety Net During Transitions to a remnants of a discontented oligarchy, Market Economy: Evidence From 22 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

the Czech and Slovak Republics.” McFaul, Michael, “The Fourth Wave of The American Economic Review, Democracy and Dictatorship: (Vol. 88, No. 5. Dec., 1998). Noncooperative Transitions in the Hinton, Hugh, “Explaining Policy Postcommunist World.” World Choices in Transition Economies: Politics (54, 2002):212–244. Models of Economic Policy in Motyl, Alexander J., “Democracy is Ukraine.” International Journal of Alive in Ukraine.”(Open Economic Development 2 (67–108, Democracy, 2005). 2000). Motyl, Alexander, “Structural Karatnycky, Adrian, “Ukraine’s Orange Constraints and Starting Points: Revolution.” Foreign Affairs, The Logic of Systemic Change in (March/April. 2004). Ukraine and Russia.” Comparative King, Lawrence, “Making Markets: A Politics, (Vol. 29, No 4, Jul. 1997). Comparative Study of Post Naim, Moises, “Fads and Fashion in communist Managerial Strategies Economic Reforms: Washington in Central Europe” in Theory and Consensus or Washington Society: renewal and critique in Confusion?” Foreign Policy social theory, Vol. 30. New York: Magazine. October 26, 1999. Elsevier Scientific Publication, Przeworski, A. and Limongi,F., 2001. “Modernization—Theories and Korosteleva, Elena, Contemporary Facts.” World Politics, (49(2), Belarus—Between Democracy and 1997): 155–183. Dictatorship. Routledge, NY, 2003. Rustow, D., “Transitions to democracy: Kravchuk, Robert S.,“Budget Deficits, Toward a Dynamic Model.” Hyperinflation, and Stabilization in Comparative Politics, (2, 1970): Ukraine. Public Budgeting and 337–363. Finance (18.4, 1998). Subtelny, Orest,Ukraine—A History. Miles Marc A., Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., University of Toronto Press, 2000. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, and Ana I. Eiras, 2004 Index of Economic Freedom, accessible at http://www.carniola.org/theglory/2 004/04/the_index_of_ec.htm.

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APPENDIX

Table 1: Ukraine: Economic Indicators 2001–2005 Ukraine 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 GDP at market prices (HRN bn) 204.2 225.8 267.3 344.8 423.4 GDP (US$ bn) 38 42.4 50.1 64.8 82.6 Real GDP growth (%) 9.2 5.2 9.6 12.1 2.1 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 12 0.8 5.2 9 13.5 Population (m) 48.2 47.8 47.4 47 46.7 Exports of goods fob (US$ m) 17,091 18,669 23,739 33,432 35,278 Imports of goods fob (US$ - m) -16,893 -17,959 -23,221 -29,691 36,630 Current-account balance (US$ m) 1,402 3,174 2,891 6,804 1,626 Foreign-exchange reserves excl gold (US$ m) 2,955 4,241 6,731 9,302 19,040 Total external debt (US$ bn) 12.7 13.5 16.3 20.6 22.5 Debt-service ratio, paid (%) 10.8 13.8 12.6 12.4 12.1 Exchange rate (av) HRN:US$ 5.37 5.33 5.33 5.32 5.12 1.7687 GDP Per Capita 0.78838 0.88702 1.05696 1.37872 3

Table 2: Belarus: Economic Indicators 2001–2005 Belarus 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 GDP at market prices (BRb bn) 17,173 26,138 36,565 49,445 62,728 GDP at market exchange rate (US$ bn) 12.4 14.6 17.8 22.9 29.1 Real GDP growth (%) 4.7 5 7 11 9.2 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 61.1 42.5 28.4 18.1 10.3 Population (mid-year; m) 10 9.9 9.8 9.8 9.8 Exports of goods fob (US$ m) 7,334 7,965 10,073 13,917 16,083 Imports of goods fob (US$ -8,141 -8,879 -11,329 -15,983 -16,319 24 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

m) Current-account balance (US$ m) -394 -311 -424 -1,043 852 Reserves excl gold (US$ m) 391 619 595 749 1,215 Exchange rate (official; av; BRb:US$) 1,390.00 1,790.90 2,051.30 2,160.30 2,153.80 GDP Per capita 2.638298 2.92 2.542857 2.081818 3.163043 (c) Economist Intelligence Unit 2006

Figure 1:

* Courtesy of Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute.

25 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Table 3: Ukraine: Composition of Trade Main composition of trade—Ukraine (US$ m; fob-cif) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Exports fob Non-precious metals 6,468 6,720 7,126 8,492 13,051 Machinery & equipment 1,859 2,340 2,631 3,634 5,661 Fuel & energy, incl ores 1,273 1,614 2,086 3,293 4,066 Food, beverages & agricultural products 1,378 1,824 2,389 2,732 3,473 Total exports incl others 14,573 16,265 17,957 23,080 32,675 Imports cif Fuel & energy, incl ores 6,419 6,590 6,940 8,341 10,665 Machinery & equipment 2,625 3,379 3,791 5,723 7,794 Chemicals 1,647 1,959 2,218 1,771 2,248 Food, beverages & agricultural products 908 1,126 1,114 2,174 1,908 Total imports incl others 13,956 15,775 16,977 23,021 28,997 Source: Ministry for the Economy and European Integration.

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DEMOCRACY (DIS)CONNECTED - DISCOURSES OF DEMOCRACY AND OF THE INTER-WAR PERIOD AS (MIS)GUIDING LIGHTS IN THE HISTORY TEXTBOOKS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND ROMANIA.

Stefan Ihrig traumatic times where questions of Research fellow at the Georg Eckert victimhood, guilt and suffering are Institute for Intern. Textbook Research, involved. Much of the literature on Braunschweig Germany; lecturer at the remembering is connected to WWII and Institute for Turkology, Free University the holocaust or is referring to the Berlin, Germany; [email protected] broader logic of history politics (Geschichtspolitik), propaganda and the nation-state. Now, historians have Abstract begun looking at how Communism is remembered in post-socialist societies, Debates about what societies should but this period of time perhaps still remember abound; usually these figures within the negative and involve somewhat traumatic histories. traumatic paradigm.1 Yet, what about However, for the relatively young times and contexts which are neither of democracies of Eastern and these? Time and aspects, which are Southeastern Europe, the question of neither negative or national? What how democracy and societal experience about the tradition, memories and with it are remembered might prove narrative of democracy? How do important for the future. This article democratic societies remember their will analyse the history textbooks of path towards and their experience with Romania and the Republic Moldova democracy? according to their representation of the inter-war period, which amounts, As a typical case for memory questions arguably, to the only “tradition” for in relation to democracy, the Weimar Romanian and Moldovan democracy. This article will thus attempt to uncover the implicit meaning and historicization of democracy in Romania and the 1 Cf. Andreas Helmedach (ed.) Die Zeit des Republic of Moldova. Sozialismus in deutschen und tschechischen Schulgeschichtsbüchern/ The socialist 1. Introduction period in German and Czech history textbooks (Hannover: Hahnsche Remembering and forgetting are both Buchhandlung: 2004 [Internationale Schulbuchforschung/International Textbook vital activities of the individual and, research 4 (2004)]; Catalina Mihalache. arguably, the societal psyche (if “Communism in post-Communist history something of the like exists). Usually, textbooks. What to be remembered?” they are discussed in relation to highly Xenopoliana 2-4/XI (2003): 123-142. 27 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Republic assumes a special role in belonged to Greater Romania.5 German history. As the German Regardless how we view this time in historian Hagen Schulze writes in the history, it is proposed here that it is a introduction to his history of Weimar crucial time, because it establishes and that the history of the Weimar republic in fact is the “tradition” for present-day will always to some extent be a political Romanian and Moldovan democracy. history.2 The prism is clear: How could The inter-war years were, arguably, the German democracy fail? How was first and only experiment in democracy National Socialism possible? How was, (in the Western style) here before the then, Auschwitz possible? Clearly, revolutions of 1989 and 1991. There are Greater Romania is not Weimar some societal actors which suggest a Germany. Yet, looking back the history clear continuation of inter-war of Romanian democracy might as well democracy in the time after 1989/1991; offer some insights. But what exactly indeed, in the Moldovan context we are we to learn from it? Edward H. Carr find actors which set the interwar years writes that: “[t]he function of history is in some way parallel to the time after to promote a profounder understanding 1991: they use it as a guiding light, of both past and present through the describing what is an attainable goal for interrelation between them.”3 Although, Moldovan society. While history is some historians noted, there has been a much more politicized in the Republic tendency to learn the “wrong” lessons of Moldova than it is in Romania, there from history.4 are also some aspects connected to inter-war history like the “Antonescu That the inter-war period is something cult” or the discussions surrounding the of a critical time in the history of the Romanian holocaust which warrant Romanian and the Moldovan state special attention to the Romanian becomes constantly clear again. It does experiment in democracy just the not need such statements as that of same.6 Moldovan Premier Voronin (in 2005) that in fact Basarabia was under “Romanian occupation” when it 5 “Ce final va avea epidemia aceasta de revolutii? (Fragmente dintr-un interviu cu Vladimir Voronin)” Contrafort 1-2 (ianuarie-februarie 2005). [http://www.contrafort.md/2005/123- 124/795.html]; cf. “Nu asteptam un raspuns 2 Hagen Schulze, Weimar. Deutschland imediat din partea presedintelui Putin 1917-1933 (Berlin et al.: Siedler/BTB (Interviu cu Traian Basescu)” Revista 22 2000), xi. 781 (februarie-martie 2005). 3 Edward H. Carr, What is History? 2nd ed. [http://www.revista22.ro/html/index.php?nr (London et al.: Penguin 1990), 68. =2005-02-25&art=1540]. 4 Cf. the discussion in Evans, Richard J. In 6 Cf. Mariana Hausleitner, „Das Ende des Defence of History (London: Granta, 2000). Antonescu-Kultes? Zum Verhältnis von 28 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Romanian and Moldovan history It will be analysed, if the inter-war textbooks are analysed in relation to period is really a guiding light, i.e. if their representation of inter-war history this period of time is contextualised as as well as the interpretations and the only previous time of democracy connections they offer. The role of and thus its shortcoming, faults and history textbooks and history teaching successes are appreciated. Accordingly, in general as a transmitter and identifier it will also be analysed, what the of tradition, morality and identity is guiding qualities are, i.e. what the beyond question. A specific focus will content of ”Romanian democracy” is in be given to the narrative setting as well this context - what does democracy as a as the narrative role the inter-war period telos means? The deficiencies and assumes; it will not focus on factual shortcomings of Romanian inter-war errors or “misrepresentations”. The democracy have been analysed article will introduce the textbook elsewhere and are well documented;8 it situation with some general background is not the aim of this analysis to remarks on their role in the two measure discourse against some societies. The analysis itself will start “historical reality”. Instead, an with the discourse of the Romanian analytical re-construction of the time textbooks and then proceed to the and the connected concepts is attempted periphery: the Republic of Moldova. - in its own right and with its internal The Republic of Moldova is a special implications. case in many regards; here two discourses will be discussed: the 2. History, historiography and the Romanianist and the Moldovanist one.7 significance of the past in the Republic of Moldova and Romania

If we analytically group Romania and Geschichte und Politik in Rumänien nach the Republic of Moldova together, the 1990,“ Südosteuropa 7-9/51 (2002), 412- inter-war period enters quite different 430; Vladimir Solonari, „Review of Achim historiographical and political contexts. and Iordache’s România si Transnistria: In Romania, questions about national Problema Holocaustului,“ East European Politics and Societies 2/20 (2006), 373-377. 7 On the general developments in the Republic of Moldova and the identity conflict cf. Wim P. van Meurs. “Carving a Geschichtsschulbüchern der Republik Moldavian identity out of history”, Moldova, 1991-2006. (Stuttgart: ibidem- Nationalities Papers 1 (1998): 39-56; Wim Verlag: in print) [Soviet and Post-Soviet P. van Meurs. “Moldova – nationale Politics and Society]. Identität als politisches Programm”, 8 In addition to the literature cited elsewhere Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 4-5 (2003): 31- in this article cf.: Hans-Christian Maner, 43; Stefan Ihrig, Wer sind die Moldawier? Parlamentarismus in Rumänien (1930 - Rumänismus und Moldowanismus in 1940): Demokratie im autoritären Umfeld, Historiographie und (München: Oldenbourg, 1997). 29 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 dignity, perhaps of resistance to a Although political Moldovanism has deconstruction of national historical been in power since 1994, truths became obvious in the so-called historiographical Romanianism was Mitu-controversy evolving around the able to leave its imprint in the experimentally textbook authored by textbooks, which appeared in the time Sorin Mitu.9 Here the influence of from 1996 until 2003. Hence these nationalism theory was harshly rejected textbooks will be referred to as by the critics, who defended an “Romanianist textbooks”. Moldovanism essentialist reading of the nation’s has been remarkably unable to imprint history. While this conflict can be its own historiographical world view on labelled “progressive vs. conservative”, history teaching as well as textbooks the historical background is somewhat and thus to disseminate its views different in Moldova. Here, we are through a school system. According to faced with at least two opposing traditional nationalism theory, however, identity-political movements - we would expect the political Romanianism vs. Moldovanism - trying hegemonist to wield an absolute power to shape the destiny of the state through over the education system. This cannot their reading of history. Moldovanism be explained here in detail,11 but suffice proclaims the separateness of it to say, that history has become one of Moldova’s ethnic Romanians as a the prime goals as well as arenas of Moldovan nation; and Romanianism conflict in the Republic of Moldova. claims that the ethnic Romanians are Only slowly and most poignantly in part of the wider Romanian nation, 2006 has ruling Moldovanism been able making national unification the logical consequence of their discourse.10

need for unification, like Igor Casu, the logic of unification is very much inherent in 9 Cf. Dan Pavel, “The textbooks scandal and their discourse as my broader analysis has rewriting history in Romania - Letter from shown. Igor Casu, “Some Considerations on Bucharest,” East European Politics and Ethnic Identity and Nationalism in Societies 14/2 (2000), 179-189; Razvan Bessarabia in the 19th – 20th Centuries” in Raraianu, “National prejudices, mass media In memoriam professoris Mihail Muntean - and history textbooks: The Mitu Studii de istorie moderna, ed. Valentin controversy” in Nation-Building and Tomulets (Chisinau: CE USM 2003), 253- Contested Identites - Romanian and 259, here: 257; Ihrig, Wer sind die Hungarian Case Studies ed. Balázs Moldawier. Trencsényi, Dragos Petrescu; Cristina 11 Stefan Ihrig, “Attainment nationalism vs. Petrescu, Constantin Iordachi and Zoltán maintenance nationalism – The case of Kántor (Budapest: Regio Books; Iasi: Moldova and nationalism theory”, In In Polirom, 2001), 93-117. Search of a Common Regional History - The 10 Although some historians from Moldova Balkans and East Asia in History Textbooks have argued that espousing Romanianist ed. Nobuhiro Shiba (Tokyo: University of discourse does not necessarily imply the Tokyo: 2006): 173-209. 30 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 to assert its power and has introduced the first period of time, when pupils the so-called integrated history studying history will have the chance to textbooks. Although again not all of the see what democracy in their own authors or views expressed within these society has meant in the past; where books are necessarily “Moldovanist”, they study the history of Romanian the representation of the inter-war democracy. In order to illustrate the role period follows closely the Moldovanist the interwar period plays in the various discourse presented in other discourses, I will re-construct the publications, some of which where also presentation of it according to each of distributed in schools for use.12 the three main discourses: Whatever the differences might be - 1. Romanian textbook historiography; history seems to be important in both 2. Romanianist textbook historiography societies and in fact Peter 3. Moldovanist textbook Niedermüller’s analytical reading of the historiography.14 While they have to be historians in post-Socialist countries somewhat typologized for such a comes to mind. He described the role of representation, attention to the details of a historian in such societies as that of an discourse will be paid. The Romanian archaeologist, who has to renovate, textbooks used are those published after reconstruct and (re-) nationalise history 1991; in all three samples I am offering from the rubbles of the communist a sample analysis, paying special past.13 Such are the heightened attention to the newest available ones. responsibilities conferred upon the historian by and assumed by him in 3.1 Romanian textbook historiography such societies; Moldova and Romania hardly seem to differ in this respect. All The Romanian textbooks reconstruct a the more the essence of what is biography of the nation that stretches “restored” and what it may mean to back to the ethnogenesis of the contemporary Romanian and Moldovan Romanians. The modern nation is societies is important. In the last resort, bound to the nation-state and thus the the inter-war period is, chronologically, modern narrative begins with the foundation of the Romanian nation- th 15 state in the 19 century. The narrative 12 So for example Stati’s monograph: Vasile Stati, Istoria Moldovei (Chisinau: Vivar - Editor 2002); although government officials claim this never happened. Anton Moraru, 14 Only examplary reference to textbooks Stiinta istorica în contextul intereselor will be made. For broader referencing cf. politice (Chisinau: Pontos 2003), 52-53. Ihrig, Wer sind die Moldawier. 13 Peter Niedermüller, “Zeit, Geschichte, 15 Cf. Mihaela Selevet, Ecaterina Stanescu, Vergangenheit – Zur kulturellen Logik des Marilena Bercea, Istorie. Manual pentru Nationalismus im Postsozialismus,“ clasa a X-a (Bucuresti: Corint 2005), 36; Historische Anthropologie 5 (1997): 245- Giurescu, Dinu C., Anisoara Budici, Mircea 267, here: 253-254. Stanescu, Dragos Tigau: Istorie. Manual 31 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 then rises to the union of 1918, which is not entirely clear. We can only the natural conclusion of a process speculate that this is also levelled which began with the union of against Hungarian claims to Walachia and (Western) Moldova; Transylvania and possible claim to the while some narratives stress that union invalidity of the declarations of union. was the prime goal of the Romanians The textbooks narrative claims that since 1848,16 it is narrated with these followed closely the principle of remarkably little euphoria.17 Implicitly, “self-determination”. This is then, later it becomes clear that the union of 1918 in the narrative, used to justify why was a liberation of the other Romanians local autonomy was destroyed and a as the previous times within the “unitary Romanian state” was created.20 Hungarian and Tsarist Empires are described as “foreign occupations”.18 One of the most striking similarities of The usual narrative further pays the Romanian textbooks in relation to particular attention to how the union is the inter-war period is the presentation presented from a legal perspective. of the minority-majority relations. First, it is stressed that the provinces Many of the textbooks feature a chapter declared independence. Only in a entitled “Unity and diversity in Greater second step they decided in favour of Romania” (Unitate si diversitate în union. The plebiscitary character of the România Mare).21 Yet, both aspects - decision is stressed in each case.19 This unity as well as diversity - receive micro-narrative is repeated for each almost no further qualification. case: Transylvania, the Banat, the Diversity is, when at all, clumsily Bukovina and Bessarabia. What goal described by such sentences relating, the narratives have here, however, is that there were other ethnic groups, “yet the majority of the population were ethnic Romanians.”22 It seems as if “diversity” is seen as a threat and a pentru clasa a X-a (Bucuresti: Editura problem that the political system Sigma 2005), 46. somehow had to deal with. While it is 16 Selevet et al., Istorie, 37; Such narratives probably true that ethnic and religious are backed up and completed with chapters diversity will need different actions by on the Romanians outside the borders. Cf. a political system than a relatively Nicoleta Dumitrescu, Mihai Manea, Cristian homogenous society would call for, Nita, Adrian Pascu, Aurel Trandafir, Madalina Trandafir, Istoria Românilor. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a (Bucuresti: Humanitas 2005), 90-92. 17 Giurescu et al., Istorie, 86; Ovidiu 20 Dumitrescu, Istoria. 2005, 134. Bozgan, Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a 12-a 21 So for example in: Dumitrescu, Istoria. (Bucuresti: 2000). 2005; Bozgan, Istorie. 18 Dumitrescu, Istoria. 2005, 134. 22 „Totusi, majoritatea populatiei era 19 An explicit assumption of this: ibid., 131; reprezentata de români: 71,9%”, Bozgan, Istorie, 89. Dumitrescu, Istoria. 2005, 134. 32 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 what “diversity” might imply and what series of publications,26 and what it the benefits of it may be, are not actually meant for the minority explained, not even hinted at. That in populations it was targeted against, are fact diversity is a “normal” aspect of not discussed at all27 - as if every society, and that diversity exists “Romanianization’ logically derives not only in relation to ethnicity and from the “problems” posed by religion but also in relation to political “diversity”. and moral beliefs, values, sexual orientation, economic interests etc. The period in which a democracy escapes the textbooks totally. It is all existed is limited by most Romanian narrowed down to a clear assumption: textbooks to the time up to 1938.28 we will need to “solve ethnic diversity” Afterwards a dictatorial monarchy was (i.e. the problems arising from it). An introduced - one textbook explains: the exemplary chapter heading for this kind internal and external circumstances of approach would be that of Bozgan’s were difficult.29 Other textbooks textbook “Ethnic diversity, religious acknowledge that democracy in diversity and political solutions”.23 Romania was on a downhill slope in the

When taking a closer look of how the problems of the inter-war period are described, it becomes clear that the primary lens of the narrative is the 26 Mariana Hausleitner, Die Rumänisierung nation. Its secondary lens is that of der Bukowina – Die Durchsetzung des “minority problems”. For example nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs when the urban-rural relationship is Großrumäniens 1918-1944 (München: R. Oldenbourg, 2001); Mariana Hausleitner, discussed, it is mentioned that the Deutsche und Juden in Bessarabien 1814- ethnic population ratio was 1941. Zur Minderheitenpolitik Russlands 24 “unfavourable to the Romanians”. In und Großrumäniens (München: IKGS, the context of economic and urban life, 2005); Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in it is remarkable, that in the Romanian Greater Romania - Regionalism, Nation textbooks we sometimes find the term Building and Ethnic Struggle 1918-1930 “Romanianization’.25 The wider (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press,2000). implications for democracy and civic 27 rights posed by Romanianization, which One textbook describes at lengths what the „integration“ of the provinces meant in have already received the attention of a an administrative way; yet remains very technical. Stelian Brezeanu, Adrian Cioroianu, Florin Müller, Mihai Sorin Radulescu, Mihai Retegan: Istoria Românilor. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a. Editia a II-a (Bucuresti: Editura Rao, 2000), 23 Bozgan, Istorie, 97. 162-3; cf. Bozgan, Istorie, 93. 24 Ibid., 140. 28 Ibid., 89. 25 Ibid., 140, 164. 29 Ibid. 33 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 whole Thirties.30 The time from 1940 to present how urban life improved in this 1944 is described in one textbook as a time.36 “war regime” (regim de razboi).31 While there is room for disagreement The compartmentalisation of narrative when democracy ended, Romanian and discourse37 in these textbooks textbooks most agree that what existed achieves the feat that “democratic before was a democracy proper.32 Some regimes” and “totalitarian regimes” in mention that the relationship between the inter-war time are described totally legislative and executive was reversed apart; the one has nothing to do with the in the constitutional system following other.38 The textbooks paint a wholly the constitution of 1923, but that still positive picture of the time between qualifies as a normal “democracy” for 1918 and 1938. Their main lens is the them; the problems flowing from such a nation. Yet, they remain somewhat relationship is not discussed. Some superficial on the meaning of the inter- textbooks admit that the functioning of war years. Unification, they stress, democratic mechanisms was complex concluded the Romanian struggle for and difficult.33 The only instances, emancipation.39 That emancipation can when it is discussed what democracy mean more than just to live together in might have meant to the ordinary one state does not become clear. They citizen, is when the books refer to their narrate national emancipation, not newly granted rights. However, here a political emancipation. mere reference to the text of the constitution seems to suffice, the reality of the law and the rights in the time escapes the books.34 It is only stressed that the Romanian state after 1918 set out to achieve the total political equality 35 in all spheres of society. In other 36 Burlec, Liviu, Liviu Lazar, Bogdan respects as well, the narrative of Greater Teodorescu: Istoria Românilor. Manual Romania is one of success. Especially pentru clasa a IV-a (Bucuresti: All, 1997), the progress in the social and economic 94. 37 sphere is mentioned; some textbooks Compartmentalisation of historical periods rendering them isolated and disconnected times has already been uncovered in relation to Communism, cf. Mihalache, Communism, 140. 38 Cf. Valentin Balutoiu, Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a XI-a (Bucuresti: : Editura 30 Dumitrescu, Istoria. 2005, 151. Didactica si Pedagogica 2000). Just some 31 Brezeanu, Istoria, 21. stress that the battle between democracy and 32 Dumitrescu, Istoria. 2005,137. authoritarianism was the main theme of the 33 ibid., 156. inter-war period; without explaining what 34 Bozgan, Istorie, 97. this meant. Dumitrescu, Istoria. 2005, 135. 35 Ibid., 97. 39 Bozgan, Istorie, 97. 34 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

3.2 Romanianist textbook Romanianist textbooks of the Republic historiography in Moldova of Moldova stress that there was progress and positive development in The Romanianist narratives of the all parts of Romanian society - which is textbooks of the Republic of Moldova contrasted against the backwards and published between 1996 and 2003 offer, retarding Tsarist regime in Bessarabia. broadly speaking, a similar narrative as Here, and in the following, it becomes the textbooks of Romania.40 Yet, in clear that the prime lens is the nation as comparison to Romanian textbooks, the well. Romanianist textbooks of Moldova pinpoint the beginning of the modern The union of 1918, however, is history of the Romanians almost represented with enormous joy and exclusively to the union of 1918. When euphoria. Almost all of the textbooks the developments in the Romanian feature illustrations of “unification principalities up to the union is horas” (meaning “unification dances”). described, Romanianist texts offer While arguably for all the textbooks of solely a very dry and factually oriented Romania and of Moldova the inter-war account. More attention is given to the years are of a high importance, in the struggle of the Romanians outside both Romanianist case it is the single most Walachia and Western Moldova; important time in the whole narrative of especially those in Transylvania, the the nation and of the books from its Bukovina and Bessarabia. If pre-WWI- beginnings until today. In other places I Romania is described at all, then the have argued that the inter-war years assume the function of the “golden age” for the Romanianist textbooks and indeed for the Romanianist discourse in 41 40 Indeed after 1991 for a time textbooks Moldova. While chronologically from Romania were also used in the distant times are important as well, for Republic of Moldova. There is also some example the time of Stefan cel Mare or overlapping in authorship between the two Mihai Viteazu, the inter-war time is the states: Ion Scurtu for example is author of only time which is constantly re- textbooks in both Romania and Moldova. referenced to across time; it is the Ioan Scurtu, Gherghe Dondorici, Vasile “functional golden age” of the Ionescu, Istorie, (Târgoviste: Editura discourse. Stefan cel Mare’s time is Gimnasium, 2000); Ioan Scurtu, Marian Curculescu, Constantin Dinca, Aurel described in much glorifying detail as Constantin Soare, Istoria Românilor. Din well, but it does not play a referential cele mai vechi timpuri pâna astazi. Manual role again in most discourses; the inter- pentru clasa a XII-a (Bucuresti: Editura war period, however, does. When the Petrion, 1999); Ioan Scurtu, Ion Siscanu, time after 1989/91 is narrated, we find Marian Curculescu, Constantin Dinca, Aurel Constantin Soare, Istoria Românilor – Epoca contemporana. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a (Chisinau: Prut International, 2001). 41 Cf. Ihrig, Wer sind die Moldawier? 35 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 constant back-referencing and even the imply that all problems were solved attempt to set both times parallel (cf. with Union, which was administratively below). This is achieved by the completed by 1922; problems resulting ascription to the Romanians of their from the union are non-existent here.45 main national characteristic: The The Romanianist textbooks of Moldova textbook claim that the main convey the impression that progress and characteristic of the Romanians liberty can only be found in the union throughout history has been to strive with all co-nationals; further political towards the unity of all Romanians. The questions and improvements are not a union of 1918 is the most natural and topic: democracy, liberty and progress successful conclusion of the history of are embodied and fulfilled within the the Romanians - only to be spoiled by united nation in its nation-state.46 The the Soviet Union and WWII. inter-war period, it follows logically, is Accordingly the story of the inter-war the only period in Moldovan history years is presented as a unique story of that is singularly - encompassing all success; even more than in the aspects of societal life - portrayed as a textbooks of Romania.42 Above all the positive time.47 economic and cultural progress of Bessarabia within Greater Romania is 3.3 Moldovanist (textbook) stressed time and again in the historiography in Moldova narratives.43 Problems are almost completely absent in the narratives; that This high value of the time within the in fact there was growing resentment Romanianist narrative is mirrored in the among some of the Bessarabian elites historiographic Moldovanist discourse48 with the treatment by Bucharest is not a topic at all.44 In fact the narratives

Parliament, that Bessarabia shall not be treated like an „African colony“. 42 Cf. Scurtu, Istoria Românilor – Epoca Hausleitner, Deutsche und Juden, 103. contemporana, especially page 14; Nicolae 45 Cf. Enciu, Istoria, 6. Enciu, Istoria Românilor – Epoca 46 Cf. Ion Varta, Igor Sarov, Istoria contemporana. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a Românilor – Epoca moderna 1850-1918. de liceu (Chisinau: Civitas, 2003), 34. Manual pentru clasa a VIII-a (Chisinau: 43 ibid., 62; Boris Vizer, Tatiana Nagnibeda- Cartdidact-Reclama, 2003), 61. Twerdohleb, Istoria Românilor – Epoca 47 Cf. especially Scurtu, Istoria Românilor – contemporana. Manual pentru clasa a IX-a Epoca contemporana, 33. (Chisinau: Stiinta, 2003), 18, 28; Gheorghe 48 Historiographic exponents of post-Soviet Palade, Igor Sarov, Istoria Românilor – Moldovanism are: Stati, Istorie; Moldovan, Epoca contemporana. Manual pentru clasa a Petre P. (=Vasile Stati), Moldovenii în IX-a (Chisinau: Cartdidact-Reclama, 2002), istorie (Chisinau: Poligraf-Service, 1993), 3, 16, 28. Andrusceac, V.E. et al., Istoria Republicii 44 Cf. the famous exclamation of Moldova din cele mai vechi timpuri pîna în Bessarabian deputies in the Bucharest zilele noastre (Chisinau: Elan Poligraf, 2003 36 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 and in the so-called integrated history sphere”.52 The Moldovanist discourses textbooks by a portrayal of a dark time; stress the problems of Greater Romania. the inter-war period as the negative This culminates in the judgement that defining time of the Moldovan nation. the Greater Romanian state was hated The Moldovanist narratives start by by the Moldovans.53 highlighting the fact that the union with Romania was an unjust act of 4. New old-regimes? - The revolutions aggression and manipulation. The of 1989/1991 and the connections back evolution from the initial Sfatul Tarii in in time 1917 to union is re-narrated with a stress that when it had declared The revolutions54 of 1989 and 1991 independence, this was the re-birth of were changes in political regime and Moldovan statehood.49 It stresses the system. Notwithstanding a variety of negative aspects of the time within critical evaluations by political Greater Romania, frequently calling it scientists and historians, these events occupation.50 In general, the social and ushered in a new political system in economic stagnation of the province both countries. The history textbooks of under Romanian rule is stressed.51 both Romania and the Republic of While the textbooks differ from the Moldova include these times in their general Moldovanist discourse in as far narratives and convey their own sense as they stress that the Moldovans were of the post-1989 period. These spared the horrors of Stalinism - being evaluations could not be more different: under Romanian occupation at the time In the Romanian textbooks the time -, the general outlook of the period is after 1989 is a continuation of pre-war still bleak: the Moldovans were times; it is a return to democracy and to “degraded in the social and economic normality. The Romanianist of the textbooks of Moldova present a time which is parallel to that immediately following the founding of the Sfatul Tarii - it is now the second historical chance to re-unite with the motherland [1997]); Victor Stepaniuc, Statalitatea poporului moldovenesc. Aspecte istorice, politico-juridice (Chisinau: Tipografia Centrala, 2005). 52 Nazaria, Sergiu, Alexandru Roman, Mihai 49 Cf. the state-centred Moldovanist histories Sprînceana, Sergiu Albu-Machedon, Anton by Andrusceac et al. (Istoria) and Stepaniuc Dumbrava, (Statalitatea). Ludmila Barbus: Istorie. Manual pentru 50 Cf. “Noile manuale moldovenesti de clasa a IX-a, (Chisinau: Cartea Moldovei: istorie sustin ca romanii ocupau abuziv 2006), 47. Basarabia”, Curentul (25. Sept. 2005). 53 Ibid., 31. 51 Stati, Istoria, 309 -311; Andrusceac, 54 Both perhaps not revolutions in the fullest Istoria, 225-229. sense of the word. 37 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Romania. Finally, the Moldovanist political pluralism”57 or a “re-activation discourse presents the time after of old parties”.58 Sometimes it is also 1989/91 as that of freedom and described as a re-introduction of progress; the re-affirmation of ancient democracy.59 Democracy is thus bound Moldovan statehood. backwards in time to the inter-war times. What is re-turned to and re- In the Moldovanist discourse, the inter- introduced is not even stated, other than war period receives its meaning by the by the term “democracy” itself. times framing it historically: that of the region under Tsarist and Soviet rule. 5. Conclusion: The periods are described more Democracy (dis)connected positively: The inherent national characteristic of the Moldovan nation It became clear that the textbooks build (i.e. the ethnic Romanians of Moldova) up their description of democracy; this is the struggle for independence; the is at times explicit, but mostly implicit. main aggressor is Romania and the only The Romanian textbooks do not hesitate friend is Russia. Accordingly an to put clear labels on the different “Eastern road to development” is periods of Romanian statehood, thus for proclaimed. In the Moldovanist example describing the early Romanian discourse no re-connecting to inter-war state in the 19th century as an experience is possible in a positive way. authoritarian state, 60 the regime The “development towards between 1940 and 1944 as a war- democratization” the integrated regime and that of the inter-war years as textbooks speak of is, within its well as post-1989 as democracy. While narrative logic, the first and the original some give extended definitions of such development in Moldova.55 democracy and stress that post-1989 is a “return to democracy”, in fact a While each discourse can be explained “return to normality”, what inter-war in its own context, democracy remains democracy and “inter-war normality’ an empty capsule in all of them. meant is not elaborated upon except for Romanian textbooks stress that what two aspects: inter-war democracy is happened after 1989 is a “re-birth of primarily defined through its national plural party politics”,56 a “return to

57 Iulian Cârtâna, Gheorghe Dondorici, Elena Emilia Lica, Octavian Osanu, Emil Poana, Rela Stoica, Istorie. Manual pentru 55 Nazaria et al., Istorie, 66-67. clasa a XII-a (Pitesti: Carminis, 2000), 176. 56 Maria Petrescu, Nicolae Petrescu, Istoria 58 Ibid.; Scurtu, Istoria Românilor. Din cele Românilor din cele mai timpuri pâna astazi. mai vechi timpuri, 154. Compendiu pentru clasele a VI-a a VIII-a 59 Petrescu, Istoria, 216. (Bucuresti: Editura Fiat Lux, 1996), 216. 60 Selevet, Istorie, 36. 38 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 characteristic, its problems by reference cannot even use the inter-war period as to the minorities. Why it failed, except reference. Where it is used - in the for references to external influences and Romanian and the Romanianist international situations, and what its discourses - it is mostly filled with a institutional and societal deficiencies national(ist) reading; alleviated at best were, remains unclear. Most of the by a legalistic reading of rights and problems of inter-war democracy are procedures. not mentioned; if they are indeed mentioned, they remain largely The repeated reference to minorities unexplained and un-contextualized. If also sheds light on another aspect of the inter-war democracy was a discourse of democracy: neither in “democracy” in the fullest sense of Romania nor in Moldova are the word at all and what a definition of minorities perceived as part of a civic democracy could encompass, is not nation; they are national minorities, debated here. In this case, the difference belonging to some other nation beyond between historiographic developments the state’s frontiers and accordingly are and textbook discourse is immense.61 all their interests vis-a-vis the Romanian state described as arising out Inter-war democracy takes up a of their connection to another nation. different role in each narrative: In the Democracy is described in all Romanian narrative, it is part of a discourses as a system which has no broader evolutionary continuity; it historical bearing or tradition. It is establishes the background notion of indeed a rather monolithic system as “normality”. In the Romanianist well, as there are no specificities narrative, it is the golden age, which highlighted; especially not in reference sets the standard and goals of what has to Romanian experiences. This Analysis to (or shall be) reached again today or has proceeded in a re-constructive in the future. And finally, in the fashion; the implications of its findings Moldovanist narrative, it is a negative may be assessed differently. For defining time, which yields value to example, could we conclude that the other times and is the negative example variance of interpretation of their of what shall never happen again. common past will have repercussions Interestingly enough, the term on the relations between Romania and democracy remains remarkably empty the Republic of Moldova? Let us, in all three discourses. Perhaps, the however, focus on the internal biggest void is that left by the consequences. One such consequence is Moldovanist discourse, because it the fact that the narratives spoil their audience (the pupils) of the merit of learning from past problems and solutions of their own democratic 61 Cf. for example Lucian Boia, Romania - precursors. The deficiencies of inter- Borderland of Europe (London: Reaktion war democracy as well as the large Books, 2001), 102-107. 39 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 constitutional differences between the “democracy’ and “normality’ merely systems of post-1918 and post-1989/91 exposes a high level of uncertainty are largely ignored in the textbooks. about what democracy and normality in While it may be perhaps debatable their own country actually meant, whether democracy is bound to be a means and could mean- for the past, the different “system” in each state it is at presence and the future. work, some authors, like Ivan Katchanovski for example, advance the V. Bibliography argument that the main defining aspect of how societies cope with problems, V.1 Textbooks Romania transition and conflict is their political culture.62 This political culture, Balutoiu, Valentin: Istorie. Manual however, is historically grounded; it pentru clasa a XI-a. Bucuresti: evolves and is contingent upon the Editura Didactica si Pedagogica, experiences of these societies. There 2000. exists a strong internal discrepancy in Bozgan, Ovidiu: Istorie. Manual pentru all three discourses: On the one hand, clasa a 12-a. Bucuresti: All, 2000. the inter-war period serves as the Brezeanu, Stelian, Adrian Cioroianu, background definition of normality and Florin Müller, Mihai Sorin what is to be attained as well as Radulescu, Mihai Retegan: Istoria maintained (and inversely so for the Românilor. Manual pentru clasa a Moldovanist discourse); on the other XII-a. Editia a II-a. Bucuresti: the period as well as the connected Editura Rao, 2000. concept of democracy remain largely Burlec, Liviu, Liviu Lazar, Bogdan empty capsules. The implications of Teodorescu: Istoria Românilor. these discrepancies, again, may be Manual pentru clasa a IV- manifold. A cautious interpretation a.Bucuresti: All, 1997. suggests that the founding myth of Cârtâna, Iulian, Gheorghe Dondorici, indigenous Romanian and Moldovan Elena Emilia Lica, Octavian democracy rests upon an insecure Osanu, Emil Poana, Rela Stoica: footing in the Romanian and Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a XII- Romanianist history textbook narrative. a, Pitesti: Carminis, 2000. The attempted confidence trick of an Dumitrescu, Nicoleta, Mihai Manea, obvious self-referentiality regarding Cristian Nita, Adrian Pascu, Aurel Trandafir, Madalina Trandafir: Istoria Românilor. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a, Bucuresti: 62 Ivan Katchanovski, Cleft Countries. Humanitas, 2005. Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Giurescu, Dinu C., Anisoara Budici, Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. With a Mircea Stanescu, Dragos Tigau: Foreword by Francis Fukuyama (Stuttgart: Istorie. Manual pentru clasa a X-a. ibidem-Verlag, 2006) [Soviet and Post- Bucuresti: Editura Sigma, 2005. Soviet Society and Politics; 33]. 40 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Manea, Mihai, Bogdan Teodorescu: Palade, Gheorghe and Igor Sarov: Istoria Românilor de la 1821 pâna Istoria Românilor – Epoca în 1989. Manual pentru clasa a contemporana. Manual pentru XII-a. Bucuresti: Editura Didactica clasa a IX-a. Chisinau: Cartdidact- si Pedagogica, 1997. Reclama, 2002. Mitu, Sorin, Lucia Copoeru, Ovidiu Scurtu, Ioan; Siscanu, Ion; Curculescu, Pecican, Liviu Tîrau, Virgiliu Marian; Dinca, Constantin; Soare, Târau: Istoria Românilor. Manual Aurel Constantin: Istoria pentru clasa a XII-a. Bucuresti: Românilor – Epoca contemporana. Editura Sigma, 1999. Manual pentru clasa a XII-a. Petrescu, Maria, Nicolae Petrescu: Chisinau: 2001. Istoria Românilor din cele mai Varta, Ion and Igor Sarov: Istoria timpuri pâna astazi. Compendiu Românilor – Epoca moderna 1850- pentru clasele a VI-a a VIII-a. 1918. Manual pentru clasa a VIII- Bucuresti: Editura Fiat Lux, 1996. a. Chisinau, 2003. Scurtu, Ioan, Gherghe Dondorici, Vizer, Boris and Tatiana Nagnibeda- Vasile Ionescu: Istorie. Târgoviste: Twerdohleb: Istoria Românilor – Editura Gimnasium, 2000. Epoca contemporana. Manual Scurtu, Ioan, Marian Curculescu, pentru clasa a IX-a. Chisinau: Constantin Dinca, Aurel Constantin Stiinta 2003. Soare: Istoria Românilor. Din cele mai vechi timpuri pâna astazi. V.3 General literature Manual pentru clasa a XII-a. Bucuresti: Editura Petrion, 1999. Andrusceac, V.E. et al., Istoria Selevet, Mihaela, Ecaterina Stanescu, Republicii Moldova din cele mai Marilena Bercea: Istorie. Manual vechi timpuri pîna în zilele noastre. pentru clasa a X-a. Bucuresti: Chisinau: Elan Poligraf, 2003 Corint, 2005. [1997]. Boia, Lucian, Romania - Borderland of Europe. London: Reaktion Books, V.2 Textbooks Moldova 2001. Carr, Edward H., What is History? 2nd Enciu, Nicolae: Istoria Românilor – ed. London et al.: Penguin, 1990. Epoca contemporana. Manual Casu, Igor, “Some Considerations on pentru clasa a XII-a de liceu. Ethnic Identity and Nationalism in Chisinau: Civitas, 2003. Bessarabia in the 19th – 20th Nazaria, Sergiu, Alexandru Roman, Centuries,” in In memoriam Mihai Sprînceana, Sergiu Albu- professoris Mihail Muntean - Studii Machedon, Anton Dumbrava, de istorie moderna, ed. Valentin Ludmila Barbus: Istorie. Manual pentru Tomulets. Chisinau: CE USM, clasa a IX-a. Chisinau: Cartea 2003, 253-259. Moldovei, 2006. 41 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Evans, Richard J., In Defence of Geschichtsschulbüchern der History. London: Granta, 2000. Republik Moldova, 1991-2006. Hausleitner, Mariana. Deutsche und Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, in print Juden in Bessarabien 1814-1941. [Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics Zur Minderheitenpolitik Russlands and Society]. und Großrumäniens. München: Katchanovski, Ivan. Cleft Countries. IKGS, 2005. Regional Political Divisions and Hausleitner, Mariana. Die Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine Rumänisierung der Bukowina – and Moldova. With a Foreword by Die Durchsetzung des Francis Fukuyama. Stuttgart: nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs ibidem-Verlag, 2006. Großrumäniens 1918-1944. King, Charles. The Moldovans: München: R. Oldenbourg, 2001. Romania, Russian, and the Politics Hausleitner, Mariana. “Das Ende des of Culture. Stanford: Hoover Antonescu-Kultes? Zum Verhältnis Institution Press, 2000. von Geschichte und Politik in Livezeanu, Irina. Cultural Politics in Rumänien nach 1990,“ Greater Romania - Regionalism, Südosteuropa 7-9/51 (2002): 412- Nation Building and Ethnic 430. Struggle 1918-1930. Helmedach, Andreas ed., Die Zeit des Ithaca/London: Cornell University Sozialismus in deutschen und Press, 2000. tschechischen Mihalache, Catalina, “Communism in Schulgeschichtsbüchern/ The post-Communist history textbooks. socialist Period in German and What to be remembered?” Czech History Textbooks. Xenopoliana 2-4/XI (2003): 123- Hannover: Hahnsche 142. Buchhandlung, 2004 Meurs, Wim P. van, Carving a [Internationale Moldavian identity out of history. Schulbuchforschung/International Nationalities Papers 1 (1998): 39- Textbook research 4 (2004)]. 56. Ihrig, Stefan. “Attainment nationalism Meurs, Wim P. van. “Moldova – vs. maintenance nationalism – The nationale Identität als politisches case of Moldova and nationalism Programm,” Südosteuropa- theory.” in In Search of a Common Mitteilungen 4-5 (2003): 31-43. Regional History - The Balkans Maner, Hans-Christian. and East Asia in History Parlamentarismus in Rumänien Textbooks, ed. Nobuhiro Shiba. (1930 - 1940): Demokratie im Tokyo: Tokyo University, 2006, autoritären Umfeld, München: 173-209. Oldenbourg, 1997. Ihrig, Stefan. Wer sind die Moldawier? Moldovan, Petre P. (=Vasile Stati), Rumänismus und Moldowanismus Moldovenii în istorie. Chisinau: in Historiographie und Poligraf-Service, 1993. 42 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Moraru, Anton, Stiinta istorica în Solonari, Vladimir, “Narrative, identity, contextul intereselor politice. state – History teaching in Chisinau: Pontos, 2003. Moldova,” East European Politics Niedermüller, Peter, “Zeit, Geschichte, and Societies 2 (2002): 414-445. Vergangenheit – Zur kulturellen Solonari, Vladimir, „Review of Achim Logik des Nationalismus im and Iordache’s România si Postsozialismus,“ Historische Transnistria: Problema Anthropologie 5 (1997): 245-267. Holocaustului,“ East European Politics and Societies 2/20 (2006): Raraianu, Razvan, “National prejudices, 373-377. mass media and history textbooks: Stati, Vasile. Istoria Moldovei. The Mitu controversy,” in Nation- Chisinau: Vivar -Editor, 2002. Building and Contested Identites - Stepaniuc, Victor, Statalitatea Romanian and Hungarian Case poporului moldovenesc. Aspecte Studies, ed. Trencsényi, Balázs; istorice, politico-juridice. Chisinau: Dragos Petrescu; Cristina Petrescu; Tipografia Centrala, 2005. Constantin Iordachi and Zoltán Kántor. Budapest: Regio Books; Iasi: Polirom 2001, 93-117. Pavel, Dan, “The textbooks scandal and rewriting history in Romania - Letter from Bucharest,” East European Politics and Societies 14/2 (2000): 179-189. Schulze, Hagen. Weimar. Deutschland 1917-1933. Berlin et al.: Siedler/BTB, 2000.

43 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

THE RUSSIAN IDEA AND THE DISCOURSE OF VLADIMIR PUTIN

Gavin Slade University of Oxford, Graduate student 1. Introduction at the Centre for Criminology, [email protected] How can discourse and ideology analysis be used as an approach for Abstract studying post-communist states? During the transitions of the 1990s, in many Ideology analysis is important for cases in the former Soviet Union, the understanding how weak states stay in state went through processes of plunder tact and strengthen themselves. During and predation having been captured by the chaos of the 1990s Russia had lost a rent-seekers of varying stripes. This coherent ideology and unifying created an archipelago of weak or discourse of state and society. Vladimir dysfunctional states. In the event of Putin sought to begin his reign as state weakness and a lack of capacity, president by recreating one. His state-building projects must utilise a Millennium Manifesto is deconstructed vital remaining, yet very powerful, here to show a process of re- resource – the symbolic and the mythologizing the Russian state by psychological. The state can become an overcoming the political divisions internalised part of consciousness as within society. The historical much as it corresponds to some conception of the Russian idea, based objective structure in reality. “Where on the concepts of Russian uniqueness states have tapped into the creation of (samobytnost’), statehood shared meaning in society, they have (gosudarstvennost’), and community become naturalised and the thought of (sobornost’) form the basis of Putin’s their dissolution or disappearance narrative of the Russian state. This is unimaginable”.1 An established order is mixed with aspects of Western liberal maintained not by rational calculations ideas, borrowed from Gorbachev’s of state and subject but through a “New Thinking’ era. The result is to naturalising process where the create a rich inter-textual discursive recognition and prestige, or symbolic episteme that forms an ideological capital, endowed in state institutions backdrop to Putin’s first term state- and figures makes for an embedded and building reforms. The Millennium internalised orthodoxy in the perceiving Manifesto was a basic building block in of the social world; this is essentially filling out the dimensions of an ideology that Putin has expounded throughout his time in office and which is crucial to understanding the resurgence of the 1 Joel Migdal, State in Society (Cambridge: Russian state today. University Press, 2001), 167. 44 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 symbolic power. Thus, in post- “The Russian idea” was first coined by communist regimes facing a crisis of Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyev capacity where the state has started to in 1889. It was a Slavophilic break down in its major function of conception emphasising Russian culture distributing public goods, the discursive as occupying a special place in the and ideological aspects of state-building history of civilisation and a unique can be crucial factors in whether a state Russian identity that could lead Russia survives or goes into meltdown. on a separate path to the modern world. It was particularly anti-Western and Here, I apply discourse analysis to emphasised ideals and practices that partially explain the resurrection of the were the antithesis of Europe’s Russian state under Vladimir Putin. individualistic, formal modernising Below, I give some background to the project. It has comparisons in other publication of a manifesto written by cultures in the world at this time that Putin on the eve of his taking the role of also felt threatened by the expanding acting president of the Russian empires emanating from Europe - in the Federation; I then go on to do a Arab world it was Islamism, in China discourse analysis of four extracts of Confucianism, and in Japan kokutai3. this text before drawing some And this was still the backdrop for the conclusions. discursive field in the 1990s as Russia sought to find its identity and re- 2. Background to the Millennium establish its place in the world. That Manifesto this concept was explicitly invoked by Yeltsin in 1996 shows the position On the 12th July 1996, following a Russia was in at that moment. Its closely fought election victory, Boris economic reforms had failed - it had Yeltsin called his advisors to him. “In tried to follow the West in modernising Russia’s history in the 20th and democratising but the country was century…each epoch had its own now disintegrating along the fractious ideology. [But] now we don’t have one. lines of diametrically opposed political And that’s bad,’ he said2. The goal was visions, breakaway territorial set to have a unifying “Russian idea’ boundaries, and diverging ideals. developed before the next election in Russia’s political discourse was framed 2000.

3 See McDaniel, T, 1996, The Agony of the 2 Boris Yeltsin quoted in Urban, M. 1998, Russian Idea, (Princeton University Press, “Remythologising the Russian State”, in 1998) for a full description of the Russian Euro-Asia Studies 50/6. (University Of idea’s main features and its modern Glasgow: Routledge), 969. relevance. 45 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 in black and white, good and evil.4 the internet and published in Izvestia Elections were “plebiscites on the newspaper a day later. The author was nature of the system”.5 There was little one Vladimir Putin who was just about compromise or synthesis. What Yeltsin to assume the role of acting president of realized was that a common political the Russian Federation following the language was urgently needed. He was sudden resignation of Boris Yeltsin. aware that “the historical changes and crises of legitimacy experienced by communist and post-communist Extract 1: The Post-Industrial regimes in Russia are linked to a Society positional conflict within the 1 “Humankind lives under the sign of community of discourse,’6 and that two signal events: the new th “collectively [this conflict] create[s] an millennium and the 2000 intolerable situation…and anticipate[s] anniversary of Christianity. I think the general interest for and some moment at which victors and attention to these two events means vanquished in the struggle for state something more than just the power will be declared along with the tradition to celebrate red-letter acceptance and/or imposition of a singe dates. definition of the Russian nation.’7 I 5 suggest here that this declaration was It may be a coincidence – but then made on the 29th of December 1999 in it may be not – that the beginning the Millennium Manifesto, placed on of the new millennium coincided with a dramatic turn in world developments in the past 20-30 years. I mean the deep and quick 4 For example, Communist leader Gennady changes in the life of humankind in Zyuganov, during the 1996 election connection with the development of campaign, told a stadium-full of supporters what we call the post-industrial how the devil was trying to destroy Russia. 10 society. He had sent two beasts of hell, anti-Christs, who wear the mark of the devil. He Here are its main features. suggested that it was prophesised that one would come bearing the mark on his head Changes in the economic structure followed by another, more destructive, of society, with the diminishing wearing the mark on his hand. This was weight of material production and referring of course to Gorbachev’s the growing share of secondary and prominent birthmark and Yeltsin’s mutilated 15 tertiary sectors. little finger! 5 Sakwa, R. 2004, Putin: Russia’s Choice The consistent renewal and quick (New York: Routlegde, 2003), 23. introduction of novel technologies 6 Batygin, G.S., ‘The Transfer of and the growing output of science- Allegiances of the Intellectual Elite.’ in intensive commodities. Studies in East European Thought 53 (Springer: 2001) 20 The landslide development of 7 Urban, M. 1998, 969. information science and 46 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

telecommunications. consumption-oriented society.’8 Thus this from the outset frames the explicit Priority attention to management discussion of the Russian idea later on. and the improvement of the system Yet in the speech there is a complete of organisation and guidance of all 25 spheres of human endeavour. blurring of the universal and the And lastly, human leadership. It is particular so that we are unsure if any man and the high standards of his of these post-industrial features actually education, professional training, pertain to Russia as yet. business and social activity that are becoming the guiding force of Lastly, on line 23, Putin brings in the progress today.” ultimate factor of human leadership. This in effect brings Putin himself in as We observe in the beginning (lines 1-4) the new acting head of state, this last a clear narrative framing the discussion factor being a crucial aspect of post- to come. Here the starting point is the industrial society; the need for a leader. birth of Christ and the start of the new It is also evident here that Putin, of millennium – both are given equal necessity, employs a liberal discourse in importance. This narrative leads to the the sense of placing the responsibility post-industrial society, an important for progress with the individual. With concept for understanding Russia today. statist discourse discredited, new forms This is framed almost metaphysically of power emerge in discourse of by the suggestion that the onset of the liberalism as the state withdraws. post-industrial society exactly now may Society should be controlled through not be a coincidence (6). This invokes the self-regulating rational individual. Marxist ideas of historical determinism Foucault defined the art of statehood and unavoidability. The narrative that creates self-regulating individuals building that this engages sets the frame as “governmentality”. This neo-liberal for defining the problem in this conception seeks to govern not through introductory part of the text. The society (as in the welfare state) but description of post-industrial society directly through autonomous, free (12-25) seems to emphasise what “is’ agents. Nikolas Rose warns: “the but in fact implies what “ought.’ Putin freedom upon which such modes of is in fact describing an ideal civilisation government depend…..is no “natural” here that is a Russian goal. Within property of political subjects, awaiting intellectual circles it is the post- only the removal of constraints for it to industrial society which is seen as the flower forth in forms that will ensure alternative for Russia today. “The the maximization of economic and Russian idea today is the idea of construction of a post-industrial society as an alternative to the Western-style 8 Bazhanov, V.A., ‘A note on Panarin’s Revansh Istorii’ in Europe-Asia Studies 51/4 (University of Glasgow: Routledge, 1999) 47 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 social well-being.9 The self-regulation 5 Bolshevist experiment. required of the subject in a liberal, capitalist society is a historical one, What is more, it would be a mistake moulded out of a legacy of various not to understand its historic futility. Communism and the power modes of government. When the state of the Soviets did not make Russia a semi-abdicated in Russia in 1991 the 10 prosperous country with a individual was to bear a responsibility dynamically developing society and for law, order, stability and progress free people. Communism vividly that she was not ready for. Here (23- demonstrated its inaptitude for 25), Putin clearly states that it is the sound self-development, dooming individual in the abstract “man’ that can our country to a steady lag behind only bring Russia forward. As we see economically advanced countries. below, there is constant blurring of It was a road to a blind alley, which is far away from the statist discourse with a liberal politics mainstream of civilisation. of the individual which characterises the tensions at the heart of the Russian 15 Russia has reached its limit for idea. political and socio-economic upheavals, cataclysms and radical After producing figures and statistics reforms. Only fanatics or political meant to indicate Russia’s weaknesses, forces which are absolutely Putin goes on to identify “the lessons apathetic and indifferent to Russia Russia has to learn’ in order to and its people can make calls to a new revolution. transform itself into the post-industrial society: Be it under communist, national- patriotic or radical-liberal slogans, Extract 2: The Discursive Field our country, our people will not 1 “For almost three-fourths of the 20 withstand a new radical break up. outgoing century Russia lived The nation’s tolerance and ability under the sign of the both to survive and to continue implementation of the communist creative endeavour has reached the doctrine. It would be a mistake not limit: society will simply collapse to see, and even more so, to deny economically, politically, the unquestionable achievements of psychologically, and morally.” those times. But it would be an even bigger mistake not to realise Putin positions himself within the field the outrageous price our country of discourse here. Firstly, he frames his and its people had to pay for that narrative with reference to the new millennium and the communist period (1-5). There are three sentences here, the first neutral, second positive, third 9 Rose, N, ‘Government, authority and expertise in advanced liberalism’. in negative. This is a key feature of Economy and Society 22/3 ( Routledge, Putin’s discourse. He does not frame 1993), 94. the opposing ideology of communism 48 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 as wholly negative. Putin is careful not a reformulation of lines 15-17. There is to paint the political picture in black a clever use of “metadiscourse,’ or and white. Yeltsin used up the discourse semantic engineering here where these of anti-communism, effectively “indifferent political forces and devaluing the Soviet past and making fanatics’ (15-17) become indirectly this an ineffective discursive tool to identified (19-20) according to their establish hegemony of the field.10 ideological creed. Putin goes on to Instead Putin understates his anti- negate all these through an apocalyptic communism through the metaphor (4-5) prognosis. All three ideological stances of price paying and the labelling of are equated with a future annihilation communism as an “experiment.’ (19-23) which is grammatically stated Furthermore, Putin again makes use of as a real possibility denoted by the the idea of historical determinism to modal auxiliary verb “will’ (budet’) frame Russia’s communist past (7), and instead of a hypothetical conditional once more a hidden liberal equation of construction which takes “would’ (bi). economic development with the Putin is effectively trying to establish a development of free individuals is discourse focused on unity and stability present (9-11). knowing that the binary oppositions of Communist rhetoric and of that used by The metaphor of the road and the blind Yeltsin had created a situation where alley (11-12) is one that Putin often “the state [was un]able to muster a makes use of. At another point he talks critical mass of leaders who of the “highway that the rest of articulate[d] one or another political humanity is travelling on’ and these discourse that resonate[d] in political types of metaphors are becoming society…as Yeltsin himself…co-opted equated with him. The United Russia progressively more of his opponents’ party, that has a majority in the Duma political rhetoric.’11 Putin is and is supported by Putin, has a youth establishing autonomy in this extract, movement whose members wear t- rejecting all worldviews on offer in shirts bearing Putin’s face and the order to create a new discourse for the slogan “Everything is on the Way,’ state itself intended to suture the rifts of (Vsyo Putyom) in the sense of “coming political society, to “assuage the more along’ or “developing’ towards some liberal communists and traditional goal. It is a clear play on Putin’s name nationalists and pre-empt the extremist and the word for “way’ or “path,’ Red-Brown ideologues….to heal or (put’). pacify the whole nation.’12

Putin refers explicitly to the Russian discursive field (19) but this is actually 11 ibid., 981. 12 Hoffman, E.P. ‘Conceptualising State- 10 Urban, M. 1998, 982. Society Relations in Russia in Brown,’ G 49 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

holds Russia “as a Extract 3: Unifying the Field - civilisation…[representing] a world in Russian Uniqueness itself, a microcosm that follows its own 1 “The experience of the 90’s shows destiny and develops its own rules.’13 vividly that our country’s genuine The “Unique Russia’ idea is one that renewal without any excessive costs has been around since the nineteenth cannot be assured by a mere century. It is a powerful emotive experimentation in Russian conditions with abstract models and discourse, as Tim McDaniel puts it, “no schemes taken from foreign matter how complex and plural the textbooks. The mechanical copying cultural and political undercurrents of 5 of other nations’ experience will Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union, not guarantee success, either. until Gorbachev the victory was always to those who advocated a special Every country, Russia included, has Russian path.’14 Once more the to search for its own way of metaphor of the road is invoked (7 & 9) renewal. We have not been very here as if Putin is very aware of successful in this respect thus far. 10 Only in the past year or the past McDaniel’s observation. Interestingly two years we have started groping neo-liberalism finds itself interlocked in for our road and our model of a hybrid with the Russian idea (11-12). transformation. We can pin hopes But this mixing of Western ideas with on a worthy future only if we prove Russian ones is also a dominant capable of combining the universal discourse that Putin is borrowing from. principles of a market economy and Baranovsky suggests that, “combining democracy with Russian realities.” in a unique way a traditionalist mentality and an openness to innovative This follows the logic of presenting thinking – Russia may represent an Russia as a special, unique case to be ideal laboratory for developing a viable saved by a coming together of the alternative to…values associated political community, the state and respectively with the West and East.’15 society. It displays aspects of inter- We have a unifying discourse discursivity as it borrows the then which avoids using binary philosophy of Eurasianism, a school of oppositions and instead sets up a thought popular with many political reference point around which the groupings on left and right, that political community can unite. This Russia’s special geographic position reference point is also the end point of requires a special policy direction with a view to expansion towards Asia. It also smacks of the similar ideology that 13 Baranovsky, V. ‘Russia: a part of Europe or apart from Europe?’ in International Affairs 76/3 (Chatham House, 2000), 444. (ed.) State-Building in Russia. The Yeltsin 14 McDaniel, T, 1996, 30. Legacy, (Armonk NY: Sharpe, 1999), 134. 15 Baranovsky, V., 2000, 444–445. 50 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Yeltsin’s project – a new Russian idea People value the fact that they can that emphasises Russia’s uniqueness have property, be engaged in free whilst accommodating a certain 20 enterprise, and build up their own acceptance of Western values in wealth and so on and so forth. creating a post-industrial society. Another foothold for the unity of Russian society is what can be Extract 4: The Russian Idea as the called the traditional values of Solution to the Problem of Ideology Russians. These values are clearly 1 “I am convinced that ensuring the seen today. necessary growth dynamics is not 25 only an economic problem. It is Patriotism. This term is sometimes also a political and, in a certain used ironically and even sense, I am not afraid to use this derogatively. But for the majority word, ideological problem. To be of Russians it has its own and only more precise it is an ideological, an original and positive meaning. It spiritual and moral problem. It is a feeling of pride in one’s seems to me that the latter is of country, its history and particular importance at the accomplishments. It is the striving current stage from the standpoint of to make one’s country better, 5 ensuring the unity of Russian richer, stronger and happier. When society. these sentiments are free from the tints of nationalist conceit and … 30 imperial ambitions, there is nothing reprehensible or bigoted about 10 Russians want stability, confidence them. Patriotism is the source of in the future and the possibility to the courage, staunchness and plan it for themselves and for their strength of our people. If we lose children not for a month but for patriotism and national pride and years and even decades to come. dignity, which are connected with They want to work in a situation of it, we will lose ourselves as a nation peace, security and a sound law- capable of great achievements. based order. They wish to use the opportunities and prospects opened 35 Belief in the greatness of Russia. by the diversity of the forms of Russia was and will remain a great ownership, free enterprise and power. It is preconditioned by the market relations. inseparable characteristics of its 15 geopolitical, economic and cultural It is on this basis that our people existence. This determined the have begun to perceive and accept mentality of Russians and the policy supra-national values which are of the government throughout the above social, group or ethnic history of Russia and this cannot interests. Our people have 40 but do so at present. accepted such values as freedom of expression, freedom to travel But Russian mentality should be abroad and other fundamental expanded by new ideas. In the political rights and human liberties. present world the might of a 51 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

country as a great power is in Russian society. The majority of manifested more in its ability to be Russians are used to connecting the leader in creating and using improvements in their own advanced technologies, ensuring a condition more with the aid and 45 high level of people’s well-being, support of the state and society than reliably protecting its security and with their own efforts, initiatives upholding its national interests in and flair for business. And it will the international arena than take a long time for this habit to military strength. die.

Statism. It will not happen soon, if 70 Do not let us try to answer the it ever happens at all that Russia question whether it is good or bad. will become the second edition of The important thing is that such say, the US or Britain, in which sentiments exist. What is more, liberal values have deep historic they still prevail. That is why they 50 traditions. Our state and its cannot be ignored. This should be institutions and structures have taken into consideration in social always played an exceptionally policy first and foremost. important role in the life of the country and its people. For 75 I suppose that the new Russian idea Russians a strong state is not an will come about as an anomaly which should be got rid of. amalgamation or an organic Quite the contrary, they see it as a unification of universal general source and guarantor of order and humanitarian values with initiator and main driving force of traditional Russian values which any change. have stood the test of time, 55 including the test of the turbulent Modern Russian society does not twentieth century. identify a strong and elective state with a totalitarian one. We have Here the Russian idea is giving a full come to value the benefits of and clear exposition. Yet this is set up democracy, a law-based state, and as a question of ideology (3), there is a personal and political freedom. At the same time, people are alarmed clear example of manifest by the obvious weakening of state intertextuality (2-3) where through power. The public looks forward to negation (2) Putin anticipates some the restoration of the guiding and future criticism of him for employing 60 regulating role of the state to a the concept of ideology. Furthermore, degree which is necessary, that Putin might be afraid to use this proceeding from the traditions and word is a reference to the Russian present state of the country. Constitution which outlaws the implementation of any state ideology. 65 Social solidarity. It is a fact that a striving for cooperative forms of It seems that Putin is directly activity has always prevailed over addressing Russian society in this individualism. Paternalistic passage as opposed to any political sentiments have struck deep roots elite, and he employs the negation 52 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 technique later on (70) as if to pre-empt collectivity (“we’) who at times is the future discussion arising from the presented as absent (“they”) and Putin speech. would appear to be addressing a different audience (11-12). Furthermore However, it is evident that despite his there are clear examples of indirect audience, Putin’s discourse on the representation where what this micro-level is not a democratic one. collectivity wants, says, or thinks is The sentence construction shows attributed to them by Putin (10, 17-20, processes emanating from a distinct 25-26, 57-60, 65-66). Again these are group in the position of the subject, examples of iconic distancing where the Putin constructs this group abstractly consumption of the text and the identity and impersonally as “Russians’ (10), established by the consumers is at issue. “people,’ “modern Russian society,’ What is more, the identity of the group (56) “the public,’ (59) “the majority of is at times defined negatively (52, 56- Russians,’(65) and “they’ (11-12). 57) and on lines 36-40 the invocation of Sometimes this group appears as the historical inevitability and determinism indirect object of a sentence again further creates an essentially negative showing some possession or feature of construction of identity. Through this the group (e.g. 27 & 52). At times the negation, it is possible that Putin is collective pronoun “we’ or the trying to preserve two distinct possessive “our’ is used which appears identities, that of the ruler and the ruled, to close the distance between the as opposed to one shared identity; this speaker and the audience (33-34). is common in despotic discourse.17 The However this is not necessarily the Russian citizenry take both case; there is no usage of the word informational meaning about the social “you’ which in Russian has a universal world from this text and also relational form (vy as opposed to ty). Also meaning; such text cues the missing from this extract is a “deictic understanding of whether they share an centre,’ at no point is the self, I (Ya) identity with the elite or not. By telling used. “The more a speaker avoids the the narrative of the great state first-person singular in favour of other (Derzhava) (48-61) it seems plausible pronouns, the more distancing the that Putin wants to keep some distance speaker becomes.’16 Instead of an I- between state and society and future Thou relational meaning between developments since this speech have people and elite, a dialogue of sorts is borne this out. Mass survey data shows constructed amongst an abstract that mass behaviour in Russia is very much influenced by elite behaviour, showing that a clear dividing line between rulers and ruled is a social 16 Anderson Jr., R, 2001, ‘The Discursive Origins of Russian Democracy,’ in Post- Communism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton University Press), 116. 17 Ibid., 101. 53 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 feature in Russia.18 In any case there is discourse, the nationalist Eurasianists a definite reification and emphasise samobytnost, and while the essentialization of a group which is then liberal-democratic rhetoric tends to given a role to be played out according negate such ideas by borrowing from to its qualities. Western discourses, Putin still makes allusions to Westernising concepts (16- This extract displays overt features of 21) that had not been part of the inter-discursivity also. The central Russian idea in the past. In this way, it concepts of the Russian idea build the seems that Putin is establishing narrative for achieving social accord. hegemony through a certain amount of These concepts are samobytnost” - the co-optation of the competing idea of Russia’s originality and ideological visions, whilst leaving the independence (e.g. 23-24); and style and rhetoric of the producers of Gosudarstvennost which means literally these discourses well alone. “statehood” but with an emotional sense of Russia’s spiritual collective interests Overall, this is a centralising and (48-61). Gosudarstvennost is a socio- unifying discourse which seeks to deny psychological phenomenon – collective “the abyss between elite and mass and individual characterisations of interests and ideologies, the amorality Russia’s physical and spiritual essence of the new elites and the alienation of and assessments of its accomplishments urban and rural masses”.21 Hoffman and potentials.”19 And lastly sobornost suggests that the idea of a “national – collectivity, or more expressively, a interest” was “virtually inoperable” in “symphonic unity among individual, 1998, and it is with this in mind that we family and society in which all can understand Putin’s purpose in elements [contribute] to the bringing in a new Russian idea. And it development of each other,”20 (63-68). is new through its cooptation of liberal These pillars of Russian identity are discursive features. Putin borrows from exactly the sort of reference point that the 1980’s and the glasnost “New Yeltsin needed. These concepts were Thinking” era which has been called an borrowed by players across the “ideology of renewal”22, the latter a discursive and ideological field, all word Putin cites throughout his text. three are present in Communist Lines 42-46 are revealing in this inter- discursive respect, Putin is manipulating and transforming the concept of statehood and “great power” 18 Levada, Y. of the Russian Centre for the within the structure and circumstances Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), of the present day, it is a re-working to ‘Russian Double-Think’ in Brown A. (ed) Contemporary Russian Politics – A Reader (Oxford University Press, 2001), 319. 19 Hoffman, E.P., 1998, 139. 21 Hoffman, E.P., 1998, 138. 20 McDaniel, T. 1996, 41. 22 ibid., 129. 54 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 fit within the framework of a discourse 3. Conclusion of human rights and universal values. Compare those lines with these from In summary, I have shown here that 26th of April 1990 when Soviet Foreign Putin employs a discourse of renewal in Minister Eduard Shevardnadze made moving Russia towards what he calls the following speech: the post-industrial society, where this is understood as change and development “The belief that we are a great country towards a distinctively Russian and that we should be respected for this modernism. His text is rich in inter- is deeply ingrained in me as in discursivity, appropriating elements everyone. But great in what? from competing ideologies in order to Territory? Population? Quality of win the war of position within the arms? Or the people’s troubles? The discursive field, in regard to this it is individual’s lack of rights? In what do also a discourse of unity and stability, we, who have virtually the highest creating “an all-national spiritual infant mortality rate on our planet, take reference point that will help to pride? It is not easy to answer the consolidate society, thereby questions: who are you and who do you strengthening the state”.24 want wish to be? A country which is feared or a country which is respected? Deconstructing the text presented above A country of power or a country of shows the interlinking of discourse with kindness?”23 social practice. It is possible to see many aspects of the changes in Russian Whether Putin is really dedicated to society in the discourse here. The Western values is subject to much tightening of state power, the creation debate, but certainly they find inclusion of a power vertical, and the removal of in this new conceptualization of the some democratic freedoms make sense Russian idea and there is no absolute in the undemocratic constructions of break with the discursive changes Putin’s text. The unification of elite brought on by the Gorbachev and groups around the President is also Yeltsin eras. understandable from the changing perceptions and relational meanings created by the cues in this text as to the position that the new President would adopt. Lastly, the text is clearly aimed 23 Shevardnadze, E. quoted in Herman, at certain interpellations of subjects Robert, "Identity, Norms and National who would consume it. It seeks to Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy create answers to deep questions of Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in identity and meaning in a post- Peter Katzenstein, Editor, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), chapter 8., 320. 24 Hoffman, E.P. 1998, 135. 55 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 communist world in which the Bibliography economic traumas of liberalisation had left the nation facing the questions put Anderson Jr., R, “The Discursive by Alexander Solzhenitsyn: “what Origins of Russian Democracy”, in exactly is Russia? Today, now? And – Post-Communism and the Theory more important, tomorrow? Who, of Democracy (Princeton Uni. today, considers himself part of the Press: 2001) future Russia? And where do Russians Baranovsky, V. “Russia: a part of themselves see the boundaries of their Europe or apart from Europe?” in land?”25 International Affairs 76/3 Finally, a comment on the legacy of the (Chatham House, 2000) Millennium Manifesto: In the years Batygin, G.S., “The Transfer of since it was written Putin has remained Allegiances of the Intellectual rather consistent in expounding the Elite”. in Studies in East European components of what has become a Thought 53 (Springer: 2001) distinct ideology. As Russian power Bazhanov, V.A., “A note on Panarin’s and influence increases on the world Revansh Istorii” in Europe-Asia stage Putin’s values and vision for Studies 51/4 (Uni. Of Glasgow: Russia have become all the more Routledge, 1999) pressing to understand. The Millennium Herman, Robert, "Identity, Norms and Manifesto is instructive on this point: National Security: The Soviet Putin accepts some of the basic tenets Foreign Policy Revolution and the that ground Western values yet these End of the Cold War," in Peter must be understood in terms of Russian Katzenstein, Editor, The Culture of realities and in the context of the National Security: Norms and historical narrative of the Russian Identity in World Politics (NY: nation. With elections in 2008 Columbia University Press, 1996) upcoming we might expect the heir to Hoffman, E.P. “Conceptualising State- Putin’s throne to be the one who best Society Relations in Russia” in personifies Putin’s adapted version of Brown, G (ed.) State-Building in the Russian idea and his vision for a Russia. The Yeltsin Legacy, strong Russian state. (Armonk NY: Sharpe, 1999) Levada, Y. “Russian Double-Think” in Brown A. (ed) Contemporary Russian Politics – A Reader (Oxford Uni. Press, 2001) McDaniel, T, 1996, The Agony of the Russian Idea, (Princton Uni. Press, 1998) 25 Solzhenitsyn, A. ‘Rebuilding Russia’, Migdal, Joel. State in Society quoted in Theen, R., ‘Quo Vadis, Russia? (Cambridge Uni. Press: 2001) The Problem of National Identity and State- Building’ in Brown, G (ed), 1999, 41. 56 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Putin, V.V., “Millennium Manifesto”. State-Building” in Brown, G (ed), in Vital Speeches of the Day 66/8 State-Building in Russia. The (City News Publishing Co., 2000) Yeltsin Legacy, (Armonk NY: Rose, N, “Government, authority and Sharpe, 1999) expertise in advanced liberalism”. Urban, M., “Remythologising the in Economy and Society 22/3 ( Russian State”, in Europe-Asia Routledge, 1993) Studies 50/6. (Uni. Of Glasgow: Sakwa, R. 2004, Putin: Russia’s Choice Routledge, 1998) (New York: Routlegde, 2003) Theen, R.,”Quo Vadis, Russia? The Problem of National Identity and

57 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

DOMINANCE AND SECURITY IN THE POWER DISCOURSES: SID MEIER’S CIVILIZATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF DISCOURSES IN POWER-GAMES

Margus Valdre MA Central European University, [email protected] cultural, social and economical capital – and the power and rush for Abstract hegemony.

This paper brings upon securitization The ultimate answer of how to win the studies, views to domination and “long run” is to spread your cultural, discursive practices in theoretical national and military influence all over framework and links them into the the world and this is the insurance- legendary computer game to show how security that the player creates a the concept of the world in the game civilization that will stand the test of follows the theories and understanding time. The following work tries to offer of the world in social sciences. The approach to analyze social processes claim is that the player playing the with civilization will get used to concepts of different theoretical tools and ask questions about computer games and If we use here the term of Althusser1, their influence to social practices and we can call computers and computer learning processes in modern societies. games part of the ideological state apparatuses. As these “things’ take part 1. Introduction in the socialization process, they reproduce the way of thinking and No one questions the influence of the understanding of the word. Even more, mass media on the people and their some computer enthusiasts – perception of the world. Media is not cybertarians already define PC as the just entertaining or informing audiences essential part of the person. As stated in - it is normalizing people into the the Estonian leading computer magazine: society. We can say that a lot of scholars in contemporary media, cultural, and anthropological studies already consider so called new media the most important influential factor 1 Louis Althusser. [1970] 1993. Ideology that transforms societies and leads the and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes socialization process in developed towards and Investigation). Essays on countries, western democracies. Ideology. London: Verso, 1-60.

58 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

That’s why we can without overstating “real” world to use this medium as a name the computer as the mirror of the tool of spreading ideology. person’s soul. (…) It is natural that The question of this paper is not youngsters interested in cars prefer to connected to the question whether play the Need for Speed and gentleman interested in politics spend hours in the people are influenced by computer Civilization World.2 games or not. It is rather interested in the question how the game looks like Computer games are no longer a new and how it fits into the real life. As phenomenon in society, the generation Miller (2006, 8) stated, when one under 30 has been greatly influenced by researches computer games he or she computers and computer games, could ask several different questions: because they have grown up in the who makes the games, who profits from environment of information technology them, how they target audience, what and the era of development of games look like, what they are like to computers and games. If we look at the play, and how they fit in with social generation between 15-20 years the life. main media used is computer oriented and consists of all features related to This paper searches for the answer as to information technology. how one of the world’s most legendary simulation and strategy computer Here is the answer as to why we should games – Sid Meier’s Civilization - pay attention to the computer games creates the perception of the world and and discourses created and mediated by state security through discourses in the the games. If people spend more time in game. The research is more interested gaming than watching TV or other in discursive practice and also in social forms of entertainment then this new practice that emerges in the game not in media has more influence on them than the textual construction in the micro traditional media that has been level. We could ask how the game researched. If we take a certain game looks like, how it fits into the “real and find discourses in that, we can ask world” and how it maybe reproduces questions whether these discourses are society and understanding about the really there in the society and if they are world processes. reflecting reality and power relations in the game or is the game creating new In order to reach previously mentioned discourses that can be brought into the goal the paper opens different approaches to the social systems and concepts of domination and power struggles. In the second part different thoughts about security are introduced. 2 Laur, Valdek 2005. Hingede Peeglid Into this somehow triangulated (Mirrors of the Souls) Arvutimaailm (The framework (social theory and security World of Computers) 10/05. 51 issues combined), the case study is

59 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 fitted. The goal is to analyze the game create dominant discourses and through concept, the power of “world creation” it new social practices. In the next few and development of the game concept paragraphs we discuss the process how from 1991 to 2005. Sources are game media becomes a helpful tool for manuals, computer magazines and creating dominance and repetitive forums on the Internet and the case power relations. study is based greatly on the paper that has been written for the Discourse The media could be seen in many ways; Analysis class in Central European in this research we take two perceptions University in the fall semester of mediation given by McQuail (1994, 2005/2006. This analysis brings 65-66): (i) filter or gatekeeper, acting to together discourses over power and select parts of experience for special power relations and elaborates it into attention and closing other views and the security sphere. Power means voices, whether deliberately or not; (ii) hegemony, and a struggle is about a screen or barrier, indicating the changing power relations and securing possibility that the media might cut us your own nation. We look at the game off from reality, by providing a false as a social construction, which has a view of the world, through either close relation to the “real” living world. escapist fantasy or propaganda. One could ask why we do not consider Also, the paper addresses to the media as a place of discussion or question of how the game is used in “fourth” power-“watchdog”. In this education. We try to show that this context computer games carry already computer game has close connections to undisputable discourses and practices, world history and it is a tool for which are already written by producers learning and creating a certain ideology and there in no place for discussion and programmed into the game and that is questions. This narrowing of the why this game should be researched in concept clarifies the role of games as order to identify the discursive practices media. emerging from the game. We can now move further to the next 2. Theoretical approaches that bring important concept which is framing. It all together is a dynamic process by which producers and receivers of messages Questions of dominance and ruling the transform information into a nation or the whole world have been meaningful whole by interpreting them points of interest for many scholars in through other available social, almost every field of social and psychological, and cultural concepts, humanitarian science. In the field of axioms and principles (Fischer 2003). communication, the concept of Frames are tools to define problems, dominance is introduced with the help diagnose causes, make moral judgments of framing and “master frames” that and suggest remedies. Speaking about 60 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 frames we must remember that frames the research of discourses and social highlight some bits of information in practices in the game. order to elevate them in salience. An increase of salience enhances the In the next chapter we look at the probability that receivers will perceive security issue as an indicator to the information, discern meaning and illuminate the game’s role in creating thus process it, and store it in memory.3 discourses and understanding about Now we can see that in the media, such domination through the broad concept as computer games are, the power of of security. framing is even more crystallized than in other media branches, because 3.“New security” and securitization as players are acting in the frames they a social change have already accepted and their social practices in the game are already After the ending of the Cold War the determined by the “master frame”, the main and the central problem of game concept. It will be explained in security studies has been the inability to the next paragraph why this is a very agree what is security. In his book important point in the argumentation. Buzan brings out twelve different definitions of states’ security (1991, 16) We can claim that Norman Fairclough’s that has been used by different scholars theory of social practices as discourses4 and shows that security is a very is applicable to the game concepts that ambiguous term and there is even no can be viewed as texts in the broader opportunity to agree upon the sense and these texts are the sources of definition. Buzan5 claims that the most creating discourses and practices. If it is important is not the definition itself, but so, the dominant frame with the the process where actors try to get rid of dominant discourse reproduces the threats. For policy making the most same power relations and social order. important factor is the understanding It means, if we study the world of the that security is usually connected and game we could see how it constructs interlocked with the survival of the and reconstructs the “real” world and people, state or organization and this how the “real” is framed in the gives the way and legality to the simulated environment. Here lays the theoretical argumentation to justifying

3 Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor. Social Cognition. (New York: McGraw Hill, 5 Barry Buzan. People, States and Fear: An 1991). Agenda for International Security Studies in 4 Norman Fairclough. Discourse and Social the post-Cold War Era. (New York: Change. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 18.. 61 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 extraordinary measures to deal with the of extraordinary measures to deal with certain threat.6 the threat. In the game, the speaker is the gamer who can make some issue in The previously-named approach is the game (strategic natural resource, based on the two concepts: (i) geographic location, neighbor, securitization and (ii) speech act. (i) technology, diplomatic agreement etc.) Securitization is, according to Buzan, an issue of security and start war or the extreme version of the some other “abnormal” forceful actions. politicization. In theory every public As we can think further, how certain question or public issue can be on the issues or threats become a matter of spectrum ranging from non-politicized national security. It is not only the (state does not deal with it and it is not question of the type of the threat but in any other way made an issue of also the question how state, people or public debate and decision), through even mass media perceives the threat politicized (the issue is part of public and also how it is framed and brought policy, requiring government decision into the agenda. Taking to account the and resource allocation, or more rarely, previous two paragraphs we move some other communal governance) to closer to the securitization studies. securitized (the issue is presented as an Framework of securitization allows us existential threat, requiring emergency to move beyond the state and military measures and justifying actions outside power that is very important in the normal bounds of political contemporary security studies. Buzan procedure).7 In theory, any question describes five security sectors where could be on any level on this spectrum threats influence human collectivities: depending on environment and military, political, environmental, timeframe. societal and economic.8

This question could be answered and In this point I would like to refer to clarified by the concept of (ii) speech Fairclough who states that discourse is act. In this framework questions a practice, not only the reflection of become the security issues through the social practice and representing the speech act. In matters that concern state world but signifying the world, security, the speaker is usually the constituting and constructing the world government or political leaders. State in meaning. For this analysis it means securitizes certain issues and gives to that we do not search for the “real” the state’s institutions the legitimate use threats, as understood in traditional security studies. Our aim is to bring

6 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for 8 Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Analysis. (London: Boulder, 1998), 21. Agenda for International Security Studies in 7 Ibid., 24-25. the post-Cold War Era. 1991. 62 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 together more constructivist and critical Through the accumulation of these security thinking combined with textual capitals one reaches to the level where analysis that is used in media studies it has the symbolic power to create and political science. As described social order. before one can look to the securitization process as a social change where one In the broad security framework and issue is moved from publicly debated dynamic approach of securitization we questions to the field of security and can see the pattern to securitize issues recognized as a threat to the actor.9 It that influence (usually decrease) the means that state or other actors can use amount of certain capitals. It means that methods that are not usually “normal”. the security struggle is actually about If we treat the securitization process as the capital to convert to symbolic a social change – the change of the power. It leads to the domination, meaning of the security through the because who controls symbolic power change of the security discourse in the has capability to produce “master key texts, then we can use methodology frames” with discourses that will used by Fairclough. reproduce power relations needed for the domination. We can add here one One could ask how it relates to the remark from Niklas Luhmann’s theory media and especially to the computer about self reproducing social systems game discussed earlier. In the next and we have conceptualized the idea for paragraphs we give the possible way to “broad security”. It is about system link security, securitization to the reproduction, in other word about concept of domination through securitizing factors that are needed for symbolic power. accumulating resources (either economical or cultural or social) for Bourdieu’s theory about three capitals keeping system capable of self and everlasting struggle over symbolic reproduction (gaining symbolic power power is the connecting bridge in this and constituting social practices). discussion. He distinguishes three capitals that are possible ways to Now we have presented theoretical getting symbolic power – the world “tools” and connections between media constituting power. These capitals are system performance, games, economic, social and cultural.10 securitization and domination. At this point the paper will continue with the analysis of the game concept and its usage in the educational system.

9 Fairclough. Discourse and Social Change. 1992. 10 Pierre Bourdieu. “The Forms of Capital”. in John Richardson, ed. Handbook of Theory Education. (New York: Greenwood Press, and Research for the Sociology of 1986), 241-258. 63 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

of computer games we can assume that the 4. Sid Meier’s Civilization – “the game number of actual players is much higher. that stands the test of time” 11 5. The build-up of the "reality" in the The first release of the civilization was Sid Meier's Civilization in the U.S. in 1991 by MicroProse Software and the main designer of the We start looking into the game from the game was Sid Meier whose name is very first idea of the civilization and now a trademark of so called “reality” move through the time to the year 2006 strategy games. The inspiration of the where the Firaxis game Civilization is game was board games and this was III is used as a "stealth" education one huge step in developing games on material and discussed at educational 14 computer that converted simulation of conferences. the world and mixed board game features. Sequel of the game, Sid The first passage manual of the Meier’s Civilization II was released in Civilization I tells us that: 1996. III part and IV part were released by Firaxis Games respectively in 2001 Civilization casts you as the ruler of an and in 2005. All games have got superb entire civilization through many generations, from the founding of the ratings almost in every computer game first cities 6,000 years ago to the magazine and the last version, part IV imminent colonization of space. It released in October 2005, took almost combines the forces that shaped history 12 all the awards. According to the and the evolution of technology in a figures provided by 2Kgames, the competitive environment. You have number of copies sold before releasing great flexibility in your plans and the IV part was over 6 million.13 If we strategies, but to survive, you must take into account the high rate of illegal successfully respond to the forces that 15 software and the download of illegal copies historically shaped the past.

As we see, the gamer is put into the place of the ruler and his or her mission is to lead their own civilization/nation 11 Firaxis Games, the company that released to the victory using different "tools" as last part of the Civilization, fourth one, uses military, science, luxuries, diplomacy slogan “Games that stand the test of time”. Lots of users on the web have used different variations of this slogan to describe the Civilization game concept. 14 Firaxis Official Webpage, Teacher 12 Firaxis Official web page. Game reviews: Features www.firaxis.com/games/awards.php?id=GA www.firaxis.com/community/teacher.php MCIVIV (5.January 2006) (5. January 2006). 13 2Kgames Official web site 2005. 15 Civilization I manual 1999: www.2kgames.com/civ4/home.htm www.civfanatics.com/civ1/txt/civ1_man.txt (4 January 2006) (5. January 2006) 64 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 and economy etc. And what is framework discussed about dynamic important for discourse is that the game securitization processes. refers directly to history and historical forces that shaped the past. The game’s First release of the Civilization I offered reality is created with the connection to quite simple view to the world and the past (World history) and we can not player could win the game by crushing separate this game from the so-called all the enemies or launching the space "reality". If we continue reading the ship first, which means figuratively manual, it can be called the "Holy technological and industrious book" of the "religion" of civilization superiority. But the question remains of we find suggestions as: how to rule the empire? The player could choose a different government to Successful wars can be very useful. rule the state and every type had Capturing cities is much easier than different traits and influence on building them up from nothing, and economy, military and corruption. may provide loot in stolen technology Civilization I offered six government and cash. Weakening rivals reduces the threat they pose (…) The fundamental types: Despotism, Anarchy, Monarchy, concepts for a successful civilization Communism, The Republic, and are the expansion and growth of your Democracy cities, and acquiring new technology. In a word, you must grow (…) You must As shown, we can use the manual as press forward on all three fronts: spread superficial encyclopedia which is rating your cities out to claim a significant different types of governments from share of the world, increase the size and most undeveloped and not "for people" production of each city, and strive to to the best (more democratic and acquire the latest technology".16 developed) and most beneficial (in

economic sense). And these After reading these paragraphs we governments show the "negative could find similarities to a Marxist correlation" between the government thinking about the world order type and eagerness to wage war because consisting capital (resources in the of "people's decisions”. But if we look world), knowledge (latest technology) for players’ comments on different and struggle to convert it into the power governments we can find out that small with the goal to have hegemony in the wars could be waged if players have a world and securing your own nation. It huge state. It is possible because is also important to look at the words "game's reality" calculates unhappy threat, growth, dynamic etc. these citizens per city and in the case of huge words are linkage to the theoretical empire certain amount of military could be sent out from homeland to fight the "defensive wars".

16 Civilization Manual 65 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

All these governments could be chosen culture and the second that closely as “game reality” developed and the relates to a culture is a nationality. player could make decisions inside the government frame about tax rates, Culture is a very important component amounts of money he spends to luxuries of Civ III. It is the general social (to keep people happy) or invest to cohesion of your civ, as well as the science. In some sense these impact of your nation's philosophy and arts on the world” government types are just frames in Culture's effects are most visible in the which player can use state ideological expansion of borders, but it also affects and repressive apparatuses. It sounds how other civs interact with you in like perfect world where only question diplomatic sessions (…) One of our is how to divide revenue from labor and goals in developing the culture system reproduce knowledge and labor force. was to provide a powerful alternative to war and conquest. Now we have described the basics of As borders expand around your cities, Civilization that have been there in the they can eventually join to create a unified national border. Culture also game for almost 15 years. Next helps decide border disputes. Civilizations added more features to the Finally, a smaller city bordering a "world" in order to make this game larger city with a substantial culture more "real" than ever. will sometimes be assimilated into the Civilization with the more dominant 6. Culture, nationality and religion in culture. the Sid Meier's Civilization In Civilization III, each citizen in a city has nationality (…) the citizens in the As social scientists moved from pure conquered city will retain their nationality, even as new citizens are Marxist theory - "economic capital born with the nationality of the equals power" to more broader concepts conquering civ. of power, also Civilization moved a These "foreign nationals" may "resist" huge step forward when Firaxis for many game turns, depending on the released the Civilization III and cultures of the conquering civ and the introduced lot of new features allowing conquered civ. player to feel more real when deciding In extreme cases, a city with substantial over the fate of his or her empire. culture can actually fight off its conquerors and return to its original nationality, but in most cases, resisters As we are interested in the practices will eventually rejoin the rest of the concerning discursive and social population. practices in the game we have to search for the indicators that reflect the understanding about the world and power. One of the most important new features that are relevant to our topic is

66 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Finally, over time, foreign nationals can But the development of the Civilization assimilate into the culture of the city in has not been stopped. Firaxis released 17 which they live. new version of the Civilization and the most crucial add-on was bringing the This introduction of culture and religion concept to the game. As Barry nationality brings to the Civilization a Caudill, Civilization IV Senior new dimension and understanding Producer on Religion stated: about world order. It is not only economic resources and military that Religion has always played a critical are needed for domination and ruling part in human history. Through the world, culture as a thing itself in the religion, man has sought to make sense game is one very important factor to of the universe around him.19 focus on. Cultural hegemony is a victory condition in the game and we One interesting thing is that religions can draw parallels to Bourdieu's three are important game features to make capitals (1986, 1994) mentioned before. alliances and peace. Civilizations in the In the game his theoretical thoughts same religion are more likely to co- about the social system is brought to operate. But no differences are made reality - social, economic and cultural between religions. We can ask why capital should be converted into these seven religions have been chosen. (symbolic) power to achieve victory - Why not some ancient tribal religion to dominance in the world. One could ask be added to the game? Interesting how social capital is represented in the explanation to the problem is answered game. Social capital is the diplomacy in the Civilization game manual. concept in the game. If you have network of civilizations that support We know that people have extremely your initiatives you could achieve a strong opinions about religions – in victory just through networks: fact, many a war has arisen when these beliefs collide. We at Firaxis have no desire to offend anyone (All religions in The diplomatic victory condition is the game have the same effects, the enabled after the United Nations only difference being their wonder has been built. Once built, the technological requirements). UN will meet periodically to vote on When determining which seven to a leader. Any civ that receives a include, we picked those religions that majority of votes from the U.N. we thought would be most familiar to council wins the game.18 our audience. We do not mean to imply that these religions are more important, better or worse than any other religions. We offer no value judgments on religion; we mean no disrespect to 17 The official Civilization III web site: 2002. 18 Ibid. 19 Apolyton Civilization Site 2005. Civ 4. 67 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

anyone’s beliefs. We’re game understanding by taking pieces of 20 designers, not theologians. different concepts and mixes all this together in the so called “real” but Lots of reviews have mentioned also simulated world. this "problem" with the religion in the game, which tries to reflect the reality 7. Sid Meier's Civilization as a tool for and be the most real strategy game in education the world. Many comments are derived from the assumptions that religion is a “You have to balance war and touchy subject. This disclaimer shows diplomacy, and resources,” says again that this game is dependent on the Kimberly Weir, an assistant professor real world and on our perception of the of political science at Northern world. Notions as "most familiar", Kentucky University who had several "better or worse than any other students keep logs — including the one quoted above — while playing Civ3”. religion", "no value judgments on “Students felt they better understood religion" show that in order to be what it takes to balance a country,” selling the game all over the world Weir adds” issues of religion can not be raised, “Squire has studied middle school kids even if it is "just" a game. who played Civ3. He found that some students who were able to spend the We can say that in Civilization IV the hours needed to learn the game began game concept has reached the level to identify “rules” by which history where we can analyze the game as progressed; rules that apply to such issues as resource allocation, the social systems with economy, culture, tradeoff between aggressive military social/diplomatic relations and religion. expansion and diplomacy, and But still the question could be raised is technological exchange among this the reflection of the reality or is this societies” game is creating new perception of the “Several professors said that world among the players and not Civilization I and II were too warfare- society around us teaches about the oriented to be useful in class, but that the diplomacy options have been social interaction but the game creates 21 behavior to be transferred into the real ramped up in the third edition”. world. From here we reach to the . question to be raised, of how this game These samples are just some pieces of could be used in educational work in information from the Internet to show the learning process. As we saw the that in the U.S. the practice in the game is not reflecting the history as a higher education enterprises is to use continuum, it creates new

21 David Epstein, “Not Just Child’s Play”, Inside Higher Ed. 28.11.2005 20 Civilization IV game manual; Republic www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/11/28/ of T. 2005 civ (6. January 2006) 68 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 simulation computer games to explain could be still raised who controls the the history, geography or other resources and “Gods” who create these phenomena. Games are treated as worlds and discourses over world. We schoolbooks that contain information can see that these games are not that is needed to deliver to students. reflections of the reality - these games Firaxis has even created a special live their own life and create new section “Teacher features” on their web knowledge about life. As Firaxis page. participates actively in the conferences to promote his games it would be Teachers have found that some games necessary to follow the steps and look in particular have a remarkable ability deeply - into the games that are to keep students engaged and teach produced in order to promote “stealth them at the same time. The basic learning”. Questions that should be requirements for a "stealth" teaching game is that it be fun, that in order to answered are related to the concept of succeed in the game the student needs religion thus Civilization IV includes to learn about "real w orld" topics, . . . these features and would be interesting Much to our surprise, teachers around to see how this game is taken as a the world have been using Firaxis model of the world order. games for these purposes. Sid Meier's Civilization III, in particular, is now One conclusion can be made from this widely being used to teach students chapter. Civilization games have really about history, geography, politics, and stood the test of time and they have got the like — though we in no way intentionally designed it to be used as even more attention. These games are such.22 not only for “freaks” who spend free time playing the “World creation”. The As we see from their page Firaxis more sophisticated and real these games Games has understood the huge market become, more and more they start to for these games in recognizing that influence teaching and studying. This is these games have influence over the one certain thing when we look the students. If we remember the concept of discourses that are related to the ideological state apparatuses, computer Civilization as a game concept. We can games get more and more role in the say that we can analyze this game equal learning process and through those to the schoolbooks, because it is used as carriers of ideology. And we saw that the true reflection of the world and these “real” worlds are following the international relations. And at this point logic of theories of social sciences and we have shown that this game has the try to simulate worlds. But questions potential to bring to near reality an ideological state apparatus that reproduces certain values and understandings about the social system 22 in the “real world”. Firaxis Official Webpage, Teacher Features. 69 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

8. Conclusion do not want to admit, but we want people to believe and take it normal. This paper brought upon securitization, domination and discursive practices in a Is it really so that under the democracy theoretical framework and linked them war is possible to wage if you have inside the legendary computer game to enough luxuries to spend to keep people show how the concept of the world in happy? War is sometimes the best way the game follows the theories and to rapid development? War is the understanding of the world in social measure to continue diplomatic actions? sciences. If we look at the game, it has Spreading your religion and culture more and more features in the virtual turns people to make revolts in their game world and this brings it closer to homeland and more eager to join your our “real world”. This in not any more empire? Economic, social and cultural just an oversimplification of the life, growth is the measure of the success? this is the environment to simulate People are just resource as any other? lessons in international relations Domination is the only solution? lessons. These are just rhetorical questions and One still can ask how these discursive lot of questions can not be answered practices influence our social practices easily. This paper tried to offer different in the real world where we have more approach to analyze social processes different variables than influence our with different theoretical tools and ask life. But some interesting thoughts have questions about computer games and risen from this discussion for further their influence to social practices. analysis. We can say that the player playing the civilization will get used to Bibliography concepts of cultural, social and economic capital – power and rush for Althusser, Louis. [1970] 1993. Ideology hegemony in all these areas. It is the and Ideological State Apparatuses ( dominant ideology in this game. The Notes towards and Investigation). ultimate answer of how to win is to Essays on Ideology. London: spread your cultural, national and Verso, 1-60. military influence all over the world Apolyton Civilization Site 2005. Civ 4. and this is the insurance-security that stand the test of time. How this will (5. January 2006) influence the next generation that will Bourdieu, Pierre 1986. The Forms of make decisions in the future in the “real Capital. In John Richardson, Ed. world” is not the question here, but in Handbook of Theory and Research the sociological viewpoint the influence for the Sociology of Education. of this game is very interesting. Maybe New York: Greenwood Press, pp. some signs come out from the game we 241-258. 70 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994 Social Space Fiske, Susan T. and Shelley E. Taylor. and Symbolic Power. Warquant, J. Social Cognition. 2nd edition, New D. Loic trans. in In Other Words: York: McGraw Hill, 1991. Essay Toward a Reflexive Laur, Valdek 2005. Hingede Peeglid Sociology Cambridge University (Mirrors of the Souls) Press, 231-264. Arvutimaailm (The World of Barry Buzan. People, States and Fear: An Computers) 10/05. p 51 Agenda for International Security McQuail, Denis 1994. Mass Studies in the post-Cold War Era. 2nd Communication Theory. Third edition. New York: Harvester Edition. London: SAGE Wheatsheaf, 1991. publications. Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Republic of T. 2005. Weblog Wilde. Security: A New (6. Civilization I manual 1999. January 2006) (5. January 2005. Official web page. 2006) (3. Republic of T. January 2006) (5. (2. January (6. January The Official Civilization III web site 2006). 2002. Frequently asked questions: Fairclough, Norman. Discourse and Culture & Nationality Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. (2. January 2006) Firaxis 2005a. Official web page. Game 2Kgames Official web site 2005. reviews. (4. January 2006) ards.php?id=GAMCIVIV>

(5.January 2006)

Firaxis 2005b. Official web page.

Teacher features.

(5. January 2006).

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WORK IN PROGRESS SECTION

BORDERLINE DISPUTE BETWEEN SLOVENIA AND CROATIA IN THE POST YUGOSLAV ERA: SOLUTIONS, OBSTACLES AND POSSIBLE THERAPY of leading parties and current prime Mitja Durnik, ministers is much more diplomatic with PhD Candidate SIDIP – Slovenian some tremors in relations. The political Association of Innovative Political history of current political elites in Science, University of Ljubljana Croatia and Slovenia discovers politics [email protected] which has had an extreme right and populist element. The main goal of the Marjeta Zupan article is to present potential solutions BA Candidate, Faculty of Humanities, of the borderline delimitation and to University of Primorska, answer the question if politicians and [email protected] their advocacy of the status quo are real obstacles to a better future in Abstract bilateral relations.

The Slovenian and Croatian 1. Diagnosis government do not have a strategy for bilateral relations in the near-term. Main bilateral problems between From the moment when the two states Slovenia and Croatia arise from the life became independent, a series of in former Yugoslavia: the borderline mistakes have been made that made definition problems, especially in the foreign policy inconsistent. Conflicts Piran Bay and the possible access of are resolved, but politicians use Slovenia to the open sea, the problem of political symbols (especially border) Krško nuclear power plant and the for short-term political goals. A question of residents of Ljubljanska solution for the borderline conflict is banka.1 Both states did not resolve these from the legal core quite simple but it seems that the long-term status quo is useful for both leading political parties 1 (Croatian Democratic Union and Piran Bay is a small bay between Slovenia Social Democratic Party of Slovenia). and Croatia, situated in the south west of Slovenia and in the north west of Croatia. Both parties often use political Borderline between countries in this part of discourse with elements of demagogy the sea is not defined yet. and populism for the “purposes’ of the Ljubljanska banka has been the most internal political scene. At the important and the biggest bank in former international level political discourse Yugoslavia. It was reconstructed shortly after the break of Yugoslavia and a new 72 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 problems successfully in the past years a decline of most cross-border contacts and as a result of these unsuccessful in terms of both dynamics and negotiations the past good relationship structure.2 Institutional contact lost its became strained. importance in the last decade, informal contacts – between friends, locals and The Slovene-Croatian border was families – has been frequent even after formed in 1991 and until that year was the construction of a new border:3 an internal border between two federal units, which has not operated as a It seems that the main obstacle to the demarcation line and later has become final solution of the border is politicians an external border separating two (members of a political elite) in both sovereign states. After 1991 the countries for whom the status quo is borderline has meant the formalization still a political strategy which keeps of life including the new “regime’ as them at the “top of the water’. Even the most manifested thing in this current prime ministers use very changing process. Many specialists democratic and diplomatic political point out that the new boundary brought speech (rhetoric) for the international public and politicians; political elite in domestic political scenes perform quite radical positions one to another. Some bank called Nova Ljubljanska banka was set social movements and extreme political up. Management of Nova Ljubljanska banka parties are used as a mediator in what a defined that this is a completely new bank way polite expressions of top politicians and does not have any connection with the present in a more radical way. previous. Consequently, it decided that money of Croatian and Bosnian citizens, which they had on accounts in the previous To follow the red line of a subject we Ljubljanska banka, does not belong to the want to confirm or refuse the next Nova Ljubljanska banka. Management of hypothesis: the new bank any many politicians in Slovenia advocated that money of Croatian Current status quo in relations both and Bosnian citizens is a subject of political parties (Croatian Democratic negotiations between successors (republics) Union and Democratic Party of of former Yugoslavia. Slovenia) uses for internal short Nuclear power plant Krško was built in the political goals. Solution of a problem is former Yugoslavia. Current and previous governments of Slovenia and Croatia cannot from the legal point of view quite make an agreement how large 'peace of a cake' every state belong to. The problem is the price of electricity produced in a nuclear plant and Croatia often wanted to step out of 2 Simona Zavratnik-Zimic, “Constructing the partnership and consequently the ‘exit »New« Boundary: Slovenia and Croatia”, price’ is still not defined. However, it is still Revija za sociologiju. 34 3/4 (1986): 1-2. not clear which country should keep a 3 Zavratnik-Zimic, “Constructing New nuclear waste in the future. Boundary”, ibidem. 73 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 simple to define. But an “unsolved Ramet differentiated between the term problem of the border’ is that kind of organized intolerance and radical right political symbolism which is strongly which are “open to some dispute”. The used for the internal mobilization of term “radical right” is usually publics in both countries. connected with the terms “ultraright” or “extreme right” and is often applied 2. Radical Right Determinants of New with the organized-intolerance which Political Elites in Post-Communist has been invented as a political term in States: Myth or Reality? the twentieth century. Relating to Ramet organized intoleranceis a Radical groups or parties have numerous common determinants such segment of a political landscape, which as nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism arose, historically, as a dimension of and intolerance. Because of cultural “irrationalism’, and is inspired fundamental changes in the late 1980s, by intolerance (of any defined as “outsiders’), and hostility to notions of some scholars fulfilled mentioned terms popular sovereignty or popular rule…It with terms such as anti-communism, is also characterized by ideological and anti-pluralism, anti-Americanism and programmatic emphasis on “restoring’ anti-democracy. Williams pointed out supposedly traditional values of Nation that we have two traditional or community and imposing them to explanations why radical politics often the entire Nation or Community. 5 find a place in a society: psychological or socio–psychological approaches try Markus Birzer6 has recognized a to explain such a phenomenon in terms connection between the radical right of personal characteristics of the and “irrational nationalism’, individuals involved, on the contrary, sociological or socio-political theories point out that the radical right must be viewed as a special problem or a set of problems which could be managed and led by the political system.4 5 Ramet, Sabrina P., “Values and Behaviours of Organized Intolerance in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe”. The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and George Griffin, (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 4 Christoper Williams, “Problems of 1999). 4. Transition and the Rise of the Radical 6 In Ramet, »Values and Behaviours«, 5. Right”. The Radical Right in Central and Markus Birzer, “Rechtsextremismus – Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Definitionsmerkmale und Ramet and George Griffin, (University Park: Erklarungsansätze,” in Jens Mecklenburg, The Pennsylvania State University Press, ed. Handbuch Deutscher Rechtsextremismus 1999). 30. (Berlin: Elefanten Press 1996). 74 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 consequently James Gregor7 pointed mentioned, Stoss said that the radical out that nationalism was irrelevant to behaviour has both individual and Nazi ideology and inessential to fascist society determinants. According to politics. Some scholars also talked him, individuals who develop a radical about rationalist determinants of the right point of view consequently act radical right8, but Ostdenied mentioned upon them.11 Zimmerman and Saalfeld expression and said that radical right is pointed out that a single political irrational in system has a power to fight against the radical right but several factors are any meaningful sense, preferring to important at the starting point: the characterize it as “rational, through that nature and composition of a raises the question as to whether the government, debates around the hatred of entire groups could be question of “issue space’, relating to interpreted as a ’rational’. 9 immigration, language, law and order,

national identity and unemployment Linz specified conditions which were and the way they are handled, and needed for the emergence of radical nevertheless, the level of economic right and fascism: the existence of a recession and political chaos or sense of national betrayal or turmoil.12 What determinants are going humiliation, the breakdown of state with the term fascism? Specific authority, a national “cultural crisis’ ideology and goal, some anti- and a complex mixture of random communist, anti-liberal and anti- circumstances and deep-seated conservative tendencies, fascist groups structural processes.10 In addition to the share some common features of style and organization such as mass mobilization via the political 7 In Ramet, »Values and Behaviours«, ibidem. A. James Gregor, »Fascism at the End of the Twentieth Century,« in Society 34, no. 5 (July and August 1997). Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: 8 In Ramet, »Values and Behaviours«, Universitetsforlaget, 1980). ibidem. 11 In Williams, “Problems of Transition”, 9 In Ramet, »Values and Behaviours«, ibidem. See more in: Richard Stoss, Politics ibidem. David Ost, »The Radical Right in Against Democracy: Right Wing Extremism Poland: Rationaliy of the Irrational. The in West Germany (Oxford, Berg Publishers, Radical Right in Central and Eastern 1991). Europe since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet 12 In Williams, “Problems of Transition”, and George Griffin, (University Park: The ibidem, 34-35. See more in: Ekkart Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999). Zimmerman and Thomas Saalfeld, “The 10 In Williams, “Problems of Transition”, Three Waves of West German Right-wing ibidem. See more in: Juan Linz, “Political Extremism,” in Peter H. Merkel and Space and Fascism as a Latecomer”, in Stan Leonard Weineberg, eds. Encounters with Ugelvik Larsen, Bern Hagtvet and Jan Petter the Contemporary Radical Right (Boulder, Mykebust, eds. Who Were the Fascists? Colo.: Westview Press, 1993). 75 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 militarization of political relationship, a the understanding of the traditional stress on symbolism, male dominance political definition of a state in and the use of an authoritarian, international community that brings charismatic type of leadership.13 together people, territory and power15. But the transition process brings a lot Throughout the post-communist of unpopular and negative issues. The transition, process change in political »new enemy on the edge« became parties discourse has been in a large migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and manner connected with ideological homeless people in urban areas. sources. The question is what has really Zavratnik-Zimic16 points out that been a 'change' in political parties of power players from the past have been Central and Eastern European replaced with mentioned “subjects’ of Countries? In the case of Slovenia and the new political reality. It seems that Croatia we could also make a states in transition cannot understand generalization of the mentioned to the the loos of “big father’ and it is quite level of EEC countries, renovated clear that the “new substitute’ is the political parties have chosen between focal point inside the Freudian two possible ways of political replacement theory. discourse: social-democratic or radical rhetoric. Buyukakinci added: 4. From Communism to Democracy: Neglected the Past? The liberalizing parties are slipping toward the centre during the post- Croatian Democratic Union (Sanader) ideological transformation, while the and Social Democratic Party (Janša) are parties representing the orthodox political parties which share some leanings prefer to adopt the extremist perspectives. 14 common historic components. Former President of Croatia and CDU Franjo Newly formed countries were also Tudman was a member of Yugoslav called post-communist, post-socialist army while, at the same time, Janša was or states in transition. We could an important young communist. The understand mentioned terms as a wide origins of both parties and leaders are range of social changes that transcend the same. Also many members of both parties are nowadays completely neglecting their 'communist pedigree'. In Croatia, the CDU is now officially 13 Stanley G, Payne, A History of Facism. In oriented to a kind of conservative Christoper Williams, “Problems of Transition”. 35-36. 14 Erhan Buyukakinci, The Neo-Communist Parties and Power in Central and Eastern 15 Zavratnik-Zimic, “Constructing New Europe: Change in Political Discourses and Boundary”, ibidem. Foreign Policy Position (East European 16 Zavratnik-Zimic, “Constructing New Quarterly, Vol. 39, 2005) Boundary”, ibidem. 76 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 politics while Janša's party advocates political speeches and addresses have 17 that it is a modern social democracy, had a strong radical right accent. but relating to many authors (Rizman, Schelder, Kuzmanic) shares some By the year 2003, the HDZ leaders common determinants which are similar understood that the party had to change to those of extreme right-wing parties. a political strategy or it would be questionable in its existence as a key The mentioned story of a big father was political actor in Croatia. The most realized in the first year of Croatian important actor in this process of independency. At the beginning of the change was new party president Ivo collapse of Yugoslavia and when the Sanader, who at the beginning wanted war in Croatia began, Franjo Tudjman to reconstruct HDZ into a conservative became a leader of the whole of the party in the European political tradition. nation and before that won the elections Vlahutin continued: with quite a big majority of voters. But his later politics flew into the water of Very few people in Croatia believed he populism; he led the party which had in would have had enough strength and could get enough support to reinvent their policy a lot of elements of radical the party for the winning on the next politics. In Tudjman’s political career elections. Sanader cleansed the party of we can observe one thing. He was a his notorious shady characters and member of military elite in ex- disciplined others to support his Yugoslavia, the youngest army general, European vision for Croatia. 18 but even in that time became a dissident. Radical right determinants Sanader has been successful in existed inside the ruling party Croatian restructuring the internal structure of a Democratic union: party at the beginning. Nowadays CDU is different than this political party was The block with stronger support among in Tudjman's political era. The party has voters, organization and access to the lost a part of an ideological pedigree power is the (radical) right wing within although it is still very nationalistic but the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU). It controls several state ministers (ministry of defence being the most important). There were a substantial 17 Grdešic, Ivan, “The radical right in number of supporters among elected Croatia in Its Constituency”. The Radical representatives in the national Right in Central and Eastern Europe since parliament who promote conservative 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and George and right-wing policies. Some of them Griffin, (University Park: The Pennsylvania control important parliamentary State University Press, 1999). 171-189. committees and have strong influence 18 Romana Vlahutin, “The Croatian on the legislative process. The Exception”, Western Balkans Moving On, prominent politicians on the right side ed. Judy Blatt, (Paris: Institute for European enjoy easy access to Croatian president Security Studies, Challiot Papers: number Franjo Tudjman. Some of Tudjman’s 70, 2004). 28-36. 77 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 at least the political rhetoric of Sanader Rizman said that maybe Spomenka is more sophisticated. Vlahutin stated Hribar’s definition about Janša went too that he had some political abilities for far with accusation. Hribar said it is political survival: very difficult to define a personality of a politician who applies In foreign affairs he has many qualities that former Croatian president Tudjman …a strange mixture of populism, lacked: he was a talented egalitarianism, xenophobia, anti- communicator, well trained in intellectualism and intolerance toward international relations, capable of marginal groups with a political quickly responding to the challenges of discourse and iconography which negotiations and, above all, a realist. reminds one at the same time of He dedicated the first six months of his Nazism and Stalinism but who still tries government to securing EU candidate to form his authoritarian posture inside status for Croatia... it was clear that the the existing democratic order, and EU goal would take precedence over all demagogically swearing to it. 21 other matters. Whether this reflected a genuine pro-European vision or was a Craig Nation argues that Janša can be tactical move to gain enough political the representative of demagogic credit for the next term does not really matter because it has served the country populism and compares him with well. Croatia has been accepted as an Tudjman in Croatia, Sali Berisha in EU candidate.19 Albania or Vladimir Meciar in 22 23 Slovakia . Miheljak and Kurdija Janša is a demagogic populist and a emphasized that he has had the same political figure of the radical right- problem like Bossi in Italy or Haider in stage. Rizmansays that he consists of a number of paradoxes, which do not pertain only to Slovenia but it is a characteristic of post-communist states: Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. former devoted communist and Marxist Sabrina P. Ramet and George Griffin, turned to extreme anticommunist and (University Park: The Pennsylvania State pacifist, who in the former regime University Press, 1999). 147-170. 21 struggled for legalization of Rizman, »Radical Right Politics in conscientious objection and civilian Slovenia”, 160. More see in Vlado Miheljak control of the army, and against the sale and Slavko Kurdija, “Preoblikovanje of arms by the Yugoslav army around slovenskega volilnega telesa”, Meje the world, later became defence demokracije, ed. Darko Štrajn (Ljubljana: minister. 20 Liberalna akademija, 1995). 22 Rizman, »Radical Right Politics in Slovenia”, ibidem. 23 Rizman, »Radical Right Politics in 19 Vlahutin, “The Croatian Exception”, 31. Slovenia”, ibidem. More see in Miheljak 20 Rudolf M. Rizman, “Radical Right and Kurdija, “Preoblikovanje slovenskega Politics in Slovenia”. The Radical Right in volilnega telesa”. 78 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Austria: how to prove that his political Understand the Main Principles of party is “social democratic”. Diplomacy? “Selling the Fog’ and Continuing Status Quo In this context the distinction between populist and charismatic type of a It seems that the current Prime politician can be very interesting. Ministers of both countries in political Schelder24 defined that the populists are speeches (rhetoric) in bilateral issues do rather “chameleons’ who have the not use classical phrases of radical right ability to adapt to their environment. wing parties. We could say that The charismatic type aims at mentioned discourse is closer to that of transcending every day life and Jurgen Habermas’ reasonable promises changes. Relating to Rizman's democracy. Habermas pointed out that opinion Janša comes close to the first discourse could become radical in a description, although he tries to build a sense that no aspect of our life can have kind of a political image on the latter, special immunity on potential Schelder25 calls this attitude devaluation. Relating to the latter, a “charismatic populism’. Janša paints discourse does not have any real himself as a victim in both – previous potential to become something as a (authoritarian) and the present “revolutionary’ thing. It is possible to (democratic) system. His political re-evaluate some aspects of collective rhetoric was also very interesting at that life. We can say that a social time. He always presented stereotypical construction of our political and social theory of conspiracy that is of the world has had origins in: existence of a secret organization “UDBO-MAFIJA’: a “hidden hand’ of … traditions that are handed down, the the communist nature, which is still patterns of integration we have dominating over the economy and inherited, and the identities that have politics.26 been conceptually opened up to us by our surroundings are our only building blocks in constructing our future.27 5. Prime Ministers’ Bilateral Meetings: Janša and Sanader The discourse of political parties in opposition is often more independent than that of ruling parties and could contain radical elements of criticism. A 24 Rizman, »Radical Right Politics in political discourse of a leading party Slovenia”, ibidem. More see in Andreas does not reflect only the interests of the Schedler, “Anti-Political Establishment Parties”, Party Politics 2, no. 3 (1996). 25 Rizman, “Radical Right Politics in Slovenia”, ibidem. More see in Schelder, 27 Simone Chambers, Reasonable “Anti-Political Establishment Parties”. Democracy: Jurgen Habermas and the 26 First syllable refers to the top secret police Politics of Discourse (Cornell University in the old-communist regime. Press, 1996): 164-165. 79 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 people that it represents electorally, but neighbourly problem, the new cabinet also the special interests of the public refuses to acknowledge such a thing. institutions and the bureaucracy.28 Yet the harshness, if it exists, is restricted to the four walls behind In our case it is quite clear that the closed doors. Janša thinks like a 'external discourse' of Janša and soldier and strategist; he uses “a fresh Sanader is quite different than the and interesting logic’. In his opinion, rhetoric they often use for internal conflicts can occur also in the future, purposes in the core of making home but this is why the government is in politics. Janša's discourse in the favor of Croatia having a future in internal political arena is not that kind Europe. Relating to him, if Croatia of direct attack towards Croatia. He implements more European standards, often uses foreign minister Dimitrij there will be more chances of holding Rupel about whom some international talks and adhering to agreements. He media say he is unable to use regrets the postponement of the diplomatic principles in international beginning of Croatia's [EU] diplomacy. Janša and Sanader have negotiations. made many informal 'gentleman’s agreement' on the bilateral level but in The postponement is not tragic because reality they were not able to execute a negotiations framework has been any of them. Due to the mentioned, approved for Croatia … Some states speaking solutions of bilateral were against the beginning of negotiations with Croatia also due to a problems (border, nuclear power plant disappointment with The Hague's Krško, Ljubljanska banka) is not an efficiency. The Hague's image is not interest for political elites in both completely ideal despite some moves. countries at the moment. Polite This has resulted in stricter criteria, political speeches at bilateral especially in the case of those states conferences and meetings along with where such criteria can be set. Croatia 29 extreme and rude political discourse on is partly a victim of this situation. the internal political scene seems to be quite a useful combination for the long- The Slovenian Prime Minister had to term status quo in bilateral relations. respond also to criticism from Slovenian opposition parties that the It seems that Janša is learning from past mistakes: while the left (previous) government created the impression in Europe that Slovenia is a part of the 29 Report of the Slovenian National Television, March 16, 2005, Pogajanja s Hrvaško preložena. http://www.rtvslo.si/modload.php?&c_mod 28 James. N. Rosenau, Scientific Study of =rnews&op=sections&func=read&c_menu= Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 16&c_id=70775, accessed on April 22, 1970). 2006. 80 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 government was too soft in relations between the two countries. No solution 31 with neighbouring countries. will prejudge the final border line.

The Slovene government's position on At an official meeting in Grad Mokrice, Croatia's European perspective is the the Prime Ministers have confirmed the same as the previous government's known fact that there are open issues position, ever since Croatia expressed between the two countries. Premiers the wish to join the EU if it meets the also stressed that these problems could conditions. This position changed only not overshadow their generally good for a brief period at the time of [Anton] Rop's government, right before the relations. Sanader explained: elections, and that change did Slovenia no favours in the EU. Support for We have agreed to initiate work on an Croatia is not unconditional. Croatia agreement on avoiding incidents in the must meet the same criteria as all the Bay of Piran, i.e. the Cove of other (EU entry) candidates. It would Savudrija. The other thing we agreed nevertheless be unfair if Croatia was was to wind up work, as a lot has asked to meet conditions that the other already been done, on an extremely candidates did not meet, or if some important agreement which has not yet other concepts were hidden behind been finalized - the agreement on these conditions. 30 avoiding double taxation... It all looked like a new beginning… The two countries had not created these Sanader has used the similar approach problems, but they have been inherited, of the “soft communication’ when i.e. they were rooted in the expressing his position about the disintegration of the common state relationship with Slovenia in an (Yugoslavia). This initiative is the unofficial meeting in Portorož. continuation of a forgotten meeting between the two governments in the …Slovenia and Croatia will finalize a former Yugoslavia in 1990, when they statement on avoidance of incidents, were expected to draw up a joint

which has been largely harmonized, strategy which never materialized. 32 within ten days… Statement on avoiding incidents would not represent a final agreement on the border 31 Report of the Slovenian National Television, March 7, 2005, Janša v Bovcu s Sanaderjem. http://www.rtvslo.si/modload.php?&c_mod =rnews&op=sections&func=read&c_menu= 30.Report of the Slovenian National 1&c_id=69881, accessed on March 22, Television, May 14, 2005, Janša in Sanader 2006. o incidentih. 32 Report of the Slovenian National http://www.rtvslo.si/modload.php?&c_mod Television, January 21, 2005. Janša in =rnews&op=sections&func=read&c_menu= Sanader tudi o arbitraži. 1&c_id=69881, accessed on March 21, 2006. http://www.rtvslo.si/modload.php?&c_mod 81 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

debate’. Devetak said that the 6. Possible Therapy and Potential mentioned conflict is from the legal Solutions of a Border Dispute: Using practice point of view not as difficult as the “Ultimate Ratio” politicians try to show

The following question is important in ...It is more a kind of reflection of this context: will Croatia and Slovenia spiritual crisis in collaboration between have a clear version of the Schengen countries. Both states do not have any regime or will governments try to make real strategy on how to resolve bilateral disputes. From the very beginning both a kind of »mixed version« between the governments have done big mistakes. Schengen principles and local border Croatia was completely shocked when regime? To support the latter view, Slovenia began, very soon after the Zavratnik-Zimic pointed out: collapse of Yugoslavia, to build new border-crossings between countries. In The Schengen regime, designed as a Europe we do not have many border- method of protection, introduces new crossings where you can find it dynamics into the social reality of two kilometres separated one from each small European countries, which is a other. Besides this, Slovenia has phenomenon that extends beyond the occupied the hill Sveta Gera34 which is local Slovene-Croatian significance evidently on Croatian territory. 35 because it introduces the confrontation of the EU integrating models and the Imaginary debate, where is an EU peripheral border regimes into this equitable border, is completely on the region ... Firstly, in the era of globalisation and 'network society' contrary with professional behaviour, closed-type borders are a farce and can which is common with modern not be a real policy solution, and diplomacy. Both countries operate secondly, Slovenia has know-how and similarly; this means both structures almost a half century of experience cannot develop such a cooperation with the local border regime and local which is common to European crossings. 33 principles of collaboration between the two modern states. The conflict between Zagreb and Ljubljana is to a large extent part of a populist debate which involves academic persons and other people, who are specialists for the “borderline 34 Trdinov vrh in Slovene language. 35 Gorazd Utenkar, Suho gašenje v vodi (intervju z dr. Silvom Devetakom). Delo. =rnews&op=sections&func=read&c_menu= http://www.delo.si/index.php?sv_path=43,4 1&c_id=64450, accessed on January 22, 9&so=Sobotna+priloga&da=20051105&ed 2006. =&pa=8&ar=8d116e745cc423c1f84d51161 33 Zavratnik-Zimic, “Constructing New 2b48a5c04&fromsearch=1, accessed on Boundary”, ibidem. March 12, 2006. 82 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

After the decade of useless negotiations was also that the corridor would be “a governments reached the agreement certain shape of a chimney’ and “water about the demarcation of Piran Bay and tower’ could not be a subject of other controversial part of a border. sovereign rights of the two states.38 Croatian government wanted to … “eschew the equidistance principle of The Slovenian and Croatian maritime delimitation and to reclassify government agreed that they would find a corridor of Croatian international a solution in a period of five years from waters as an open sea, creating the the confirmation of the agreement. direct connection between Slovenian They also planned a “supervisor’ as an territory and the High Seas”.36 The intermediate body which would consist agreement was accepted in Slovenia, of experts from Slovenia and Croatia but in Croatia the general public, and its role would be to control the politicians and legal experts strongly implementation of the agreement. If criticized the proposed solution. The countries would not resolve a conflict in most important critics were related on six months after the suggestion of one the issue that the Croatian government side, the case would immediately be put left to Slovenia 20 km2 of the territory on the agenda of an international in exchange to the support of Slovenian arbitration. The Drnovšek - Racan government to Croatian's integration to agreement determined in a special the West.37 manner rights of frontier villages Mlini, Škrile, Buželin and Škudelin. Besides The Drnovšek - Racan agreement the rights people in mentioned villages defined international border between had relating to other agreements, Slovenia and Croatia as it took place in occupants could enter such amount of the core of ex-Yugoslavia. The border goods to Croatia, that life of one person in the mainland would be separated into and his family requires. The agreement 11 sectors and besides this Slovenia foresaw also the possibility that people would keep 80 percent of the whole in these places would gain Slovene Bay. Drnovšek and Racan made an citizenship if they would want. agreement through which a special corridor would be formed. It would be The opponents pointed out that Prime two nautical miles long and would have Minister Ivica Racan in this case the status of the High Seas. The idea exceeded his authority because he ceded the territory without the constitutionally required parliamentary super-majority vote. The opponents said 36 Srecko Vidmar, “Compulsory inter-state that the only possible solution is arbitration of territorial disputes. (Slovenia- Croatia)”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (September 2002):123. 37 Vidmar, »Compulsory inter-state 38 Aleš Gaube and Meta Roglic, »Dogovor o arbitration”, ibidem. meji pred vrati”, Dnevnik (Jun. 6, 2001). 83 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 submitting the conflict to international announce, realization will not change arbitration. The idea was that the Piran rights of third states, which have the Bay would be divided in half and the right to sail around the Adriatic sea. Slovenian territorial waters would not In this case the maritime convention have a direct connection to the High equalizes the legal regime in the Seas. Slovenian politicians rejected the exclusive economic zone with that on arbitration explaining that two involved the High Seas. Sailing to Slovene countries should reach the solution ports is arranged per manner that without the intervention of an ships navigate into them through the international body or an important Italian territorial waters and going out person.39 In this context, Slovenia and through the Slovenian. Italy and Croatia played the “zero sum game’, Croatia could theoretically block up where one player loses as much as the Slovene ports with a certain common second gains. Slovenian government initiative, however, this looks more “sacrificed’ mentioned villages for the like an impossible mission in these corridor to the High Seas, moreover, days. 40 here it is pointed out that these places have not belonged to Slovenia before. Slovenia actually made three mistakes with the announcement of the economic Slovenia has the status of being a belt and epicontinental belt.41 Firstly, on geographically deprived state. It has the the basis of the Drnovšek - Racan right of economic utilization of the zone Agreement, it does not have the right to that Croatia announced and government declare the zone or epicontinental belt, in Zagreb must arrange with special because Croatia changed a part of its agreement. Devetak prejudices Croatian territory into the international waters government will resolve the problem of and with this decision allowed Slovenia utilization of the sea with the agreement to have a free access to the High Seas. with the European Union. Relating to The decision that Slovenia has got these Devetak, the connection between two exclusive rights is basically a legal internal waters and High Seas is not instrument with which the Slovene relevant for the Adriatic Sea: government gives up the agreement and

The latter is not an important question. After Croatia a kind of a zone will announce also Italy and 40 Utenkar, “Suho gašenje v vodi”, ibidem. because of this reason Adriatic Sea 41 Davor Gjenero, Epikontinentalni pas in would not be the real High Sea. ekološka cona – tri nepopravljive napake v Besides this, it is important to eni odlocitvi. Delo. http://www.delo.si/index.php?sv_path=43,4 9&so=Delo&da=20050903&ed=0&pa=7&a r=994d301ec28e7d763d0a5726a33958aa04 39 Vidmar, “Compulsory inter-state &fromsearch=1, accessed on October 23, arbitration”, ibidem. 2006. 84 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 is not just a political gesture. Secondly, have to choose an independent member Slovenia with the mentioned act who is also the president of a legitimizes an action when Croatian commission. It is an important question government announced a similar if countries could confirm a candidate. decision in the year 2003, and against it In a case of a court, this is not an Slovenia was leading an important obstacle, because it chooses the diplomatic action. Thirdly, the Croatian members who will participate in the government could in the future set up judicial process. Besides this, in case an idea of resolving conflict using an that arbitration would take the international court, rather than a kind of procedure, it means the problem would mediation setting up arbitration. That be resolved somewhere in the future. kind of conflict could not be resolved without the re-definition of borders; the Transfer of conflict to the court would next step is always the decision where be efficient because of more reasons. the Court of Justice could competently Yet the agreement, what is a subject of set up the judicial procedure. a trial, would affect on bilateral relations positively. Moreover, states in In the case of the mentioned conflict, a time of a trial could at any moment experts point out that states can resolve resolve the conflict. Slovenia and the problem in two ways: firstly, they Croatia would make an agreement and can decide whether the problem will be decide to immediately notify to the in the hands of international arbitration court, which can always break away the or they can put the conflict on the judicial procedure. Besides this, states agenda of International Court of Justice can make a kind of »gentleman’s in The Hague or the International agreement« where they can admit past Tribunal of the Law of the Sea in mistakes and express a real desire for Hamburg. Devetak42 said it would be a the reconstruction of bilateral relations. better decision if the court would take over the case. In both examples the Relating to Gjenero43 a judicial process process would last two or more years, in The Hague Court of Justice is not a but in a case that the court would usual practice when member states and receive the subject, it is a better candidate members want to have solution, because the judicial process resolved bilateral disputes. The will last less than in a case of arbitration also is not a productive arbitration. In cooperation with the activity, because it means just a latter, involved states must accept the postponement of the real problems to decision who could be a member of a the future. commission, but the real problem takes place in a moment when both sides

43 Gjenero, Epikontinentalni pas in ekološka 42 Utenkar, “Suho gašenje v vodi”, ibidem. cona, ibidem. 85 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Populist pressures are still too large that in this case is maybe the best solution. states could contract some real The final agreement has to be that both agreement concerning to the border. We countries accept a kind of a resolution cannot expect they would adopt a real about avoiding conflicts on the border – »gentleman’s agreement« in the near this means a long-term status quo – or future, certain »quasi status quo«, with final solution of a border between states periods of planned and unplanned which seems to be in these days just a incidents would be a consequence of long-term wish. undefined relationship. The European Union has a practice to 7. Brussels’ Non-Intervention? help in bilateral conflicts in a way that gives standards to members and European Union emphasizes specially candidate states on how they can act in regional and cross-border cooperation this kind of dispute and create and regional development. Because of harmonious economic and political past disputes between these two states, systems. With harmony a number of the Slovenian frontier regions cannot problems disappear. It is very clear that effectively function and they are in the the European Union cannot resolve all process of depopulation. Slovenia in its the mentioned problems automatically, mostly two-year term of EU but it has an infrastructure to help the membership did not carry out any states. serious project relating to cross-border cooperation and besides this it was 8. Prognosis and Possible Future sceptical about proposal of Ricardo Illy Scenario which formed an idea of the European Super-region which in Croatia has A way how to solve the crisis of really been accepted. The only real frontier cooperation is SOPS solution in this aspect is again (agreement about frontier cooperation) establishing strong cross-border which both states do not carry out in the cooperation. majority of paragraphs. Croatia avoids participating as a country which prefers One of the main goals of the European principles of law and does not want to Union is also to settle down tensions on accept the principle “pacta sunt the peripheral parts of the Union. servanda”.44 If Zagreb has carried out Maybe an even more important goal is to restore “multi-applicative” determinants of the integration but the latter is possible only in a case that the 44 Pacta sunt servanda (Latin for “pacts must Union abolishes a dispute between be respected”) is a basic principle of civil Croatia and Slovenia which are together and international law. Pacts and clauses are a bridge between European Union and law between the parties, and presuppose that the West-Balkan Area. The mediation the non-respecting of obligations is a breach of the pact. 86 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 the latter, the “question of war of principle uti possidetis45. According to fishermen’ in Piran Bay would not be a it, it means that until Slovenia and part of the policy agenda these days. Croatia do not except an agreement, the Namely, with the SOPS agreement situation on the border from 25th of Croatia and Slovenia defined a much June 1991, when Slovenia announced bigger fishing corridor than the Piran independence, is valid. Zagreb cannot Bay is. Besides this, Croatia is avoiding accept that kind of explanation because to carry out principles of Banditer’s at that time Slovenia had jurisdiction Commission, which has initiated the over the whole Piran Bay. On the other

45 Uti possidetis (Latin for “as you possess”) is a principle in international law that territory and other property remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict, unless it is not resolved in different manner by treaty. Peter Radan pointed out: “The principle of uti possidetis has two variants. uti possidetis juris relates to borders based upon the new state's right of territorial possession as determined by the legal documents of the former colonial power. Uti possidetis de facto relates to borders based upon territory actually possessed and controlled by the colonial entity at the time of independence, irrespective of legal rights of possession. In the secessionist conflicts of the 1990s the international community asserted that where a federal unit of an internationally recognized state sought to secede, the borders of a future state would, on the principle of uti possidetis juris, correspond to the pre-existing borders of the federal unit. In the absence of agreement to the contrary between relevant federal units, these borders would be regarded as sacrosanct. Such an adaptation of the principle of uti possidetis juris complements the already noted adaptation of the territorial definition of a 'people' with respect to the right of peoples to self-determination” (Cited from the book of Peter Radan, The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International Law, Routledge, 2001, 5).

87 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 side, Croatia Banditer’s principle political reputation or image to help initiated on special places where central Slovenia in Croatia in bilateral disputes. government wanted to prejudice the In practice nothing can be done without borderline. His commission opinion serious involvement of governments. does not allow Slovenia to have access We cannot be very optimistic because to the open sea. The compromise ideology and irrational symbolism are between Prime Ministers Drnovšek and unfortunately more important than an Racan about “demarcation’ has given optimum consensus. Slovenia the majority of the Piran Bay and ensured opening access to the Bibliography international seas. Croatia could get territorial border with Italy (territorial Buyukakinci, Erhan. The Neo- seas). This would be a kind of Communist Parties and Power in “European compromise’ which Central and Eastern Europe: nationalist publics in both countries did Change in Political Discourses and not accept. Foreign Policy Position (East European Quarterly, Vol. 39, Even the current government 2005). completely neglected and ignored the Grdešic, Ivan. “The radical right in mentioned agreement; it seems to be Croatia in Its Constituency”, in The mentioned especially because of Radical Right in Central and ideological reasons. The Drnovšek- Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. Racan agreement was really an Sabrina P. Ramet and George optimum solution for the borderline Griffin. University Park: The conflict. It was a kind of the positive Pennsylvania State University sum-game where one actor looses as Press, 1999. much as another gets. Gjenero, Davor. “Epikontinentalni pas in ekološka cona – tri It is quite clear that the “ideological nepopravljive napake v eni bridge’ between both states it is still odlocitvi”. Delo (Sept. 3 2005). very long and we could not expect the Gaube, Aleš and Meta Roglic. solution in the near future. Despite the ”Dogovor o meji pred vrati”, fact that both leading parties are Dnevnik (Jun. 6 2001). members of the EPP party group, Miheljak, Vlado and Slavko Kurdija, governments are still the main actors “Preoblikovanje slovenskega who are the responsible for the status volilnega telesa”, in Meje quo. This political group in the demokracije, ed. Darko Štrajn. European Parliament is the strongest in Ljubljana: Liberalna akademija, the Parliament and it also has a big 1995. influence on the European Commission. Ramet, Sabrina P., “Values and In the future we can expect that some Behaviours of Organized influential politicians will use their Intolerance in Post-Communist 88 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Central and Eastern Europe”. The Rizman, M. Rudolf . “Radical Right Radical Right in Central and Politics in Slovenia”, in The Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. Radical Right in Central and Sabrina P. Ramet and George Eastern Europe since 1989, ed. Griffin, (University Park: The Sabrina P. Ramet and George Pennsylvania State University Griffin. Pennsylvania: University Press, 1999) Park - The Pennsylvania State Report of Slovenian National University Press, 1999. Television, March 23, 2005. Janša Rosenau, James. N. Scientific Study of pozdravil odlocitve Vrha. Foreign Policy (New York: Free http://www.rtvslo.si/modload.php? Press, 1970). &c_mod=rnews&op=sections&fun Utenkar, Gorazd. “Suho gašenje v c=read&c_menu=1&c_id=71495, vodi”, Delo – Sobotna priloga, accessed on April 23, 2006. (Nov. 5 2005). Report of Slovenian National Vidmar, Srecko. “Compulsory inter- Television, March 16, 2005. state arbitration of territorial Pogajanja s Hrvaško preložena. disputes. (Slovenia-Croatia)”, http://www.rtvslo.si/modload.php? Denver Journal of International &c_mod=rnews&op=sections&fun Law and Policy 31 (September c=read&c_menu=16&c_id=70775, 2002): 101-128. accessed on April 22, 2006. Vlahutin, Romana. “The Croatian Report of the Slovenian National Exception”, in Western Balkans Television, May 14, 2005. Janša in Moving On, ed. Judy Blatt. Challiot Sanader o incidentih. Papers: number 70. Paris: Institute http://www.rtvslo.si/modload.php? for European Security Studies, &c_mod=rnews&op=sections&fun 2004: 21-36. c=read&c_menu=1&c_id=69881, Zavratnik-Zimic,Simona. “Constructing accessed on March 21, 2006. New Boundary: Slovenia and Report of Slovene National Television, Croatia”, Revija za sociologiju 34, March 7, 2005. Janša v Bovcu s (Sep. 2003): 179-188. Sanaderjem. Williams, Christoper, “Problems of http://www.rtvslo.si/modload.php? Transition and the Rise of the &c_mod=rnews&op=sections&fun Radical Right”, in The Radical c=read&c_menu=1&c_id=69881, Right in Central and Eastern accessed on March 21, 2006. Europe since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Report of Croatian National Television, Ramet and George Griffin, January 21, 2005. Janša in Sanader (University Park: The Pennsylvania tudi o arbitraži. Access on: State University Press, 1999). http://www.rtvslo.si/modload.php? &c_mod=rnews&op=sections&fun c=read&c_menu=1&c_id=64450, January 22, 2006. 89 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

BOOK REVIEWS consolidated democratic order.2 As a Marc Morje Howard, The Weakness criterion of democratization, the of Civil Society in Post-Communist functioning of civil society has become Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge a major issue for assessing the progress University Press, 2003. of the post-Communist countries. Today, after almost two decades of Author: Simonida Kacarska, transitional reforms, practice has MA in European Politics shown, that, unlike the other elements University of Sussex, United Kingdom. of democratization, civil society [email protected] development is lingering.3

The re-emergence of the civil society Marc Morje Howard, in The Weakness idea in the writings of the Communist of Civil Society in Post-Communist dissidents in the 70s and 80s placed the Europe, analyzes the problem of civil civil society at the core of the society development in the conditions democratic transition in post- of post-Communism. Focusing on the Communist Europe. In turn, civil behavior of ordinary citizens, Howard society has been a dominant concept in examines the reasons behind the low all post-1990 academic literature, which levels of membership and participation considers it an essential element of the in voluntary organizations in the process of democratization.1 Academic countries of Central and Eastern Europe debates have widely acknowledged that and Russia. Emphasizing that citizens’ civil society stands at the core of participation is markedly lower in post- democratization, since without civic Communist systems in comparison to engagement there is no basis for a other post-authoritarian systems, the author argues that the Communist experience is the core reason behind the low participation in voluntary 1 Post-Communist literature has placed the organizations. The analysis locates development of a functioning civil society at three main factors behind the low levels the heart of democratization: See, for of voluntary organizational example, Vaclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless (New York: Palach Press, 1985); membership: the legacy of mistrust of Andrew Janos, East Central Europe in the all formal organizations caused by Modern World (Stanford: Stanford forced participation in Communist University Press, 2000); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Jonhs Hopkins University Press, 1996); 2 Havel, The Power of the Powerless. Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen eds., 3 Ivan Vejvoda and Mary Kaldor. Democratization in Eastern Europe- “Democratization in Central and East domestic and international perspectives European Countries,” International Affairs (London: Routledge Publishers, 1994). 73. No.1 (Jan. 1997): 71. 90 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 organizations; the persistence of validity of the findings, Howard informal private networks, which conducted in-depth interviews with function as a substitute to formal citizens in Russia and East Germany. organizing; and the disappointment With this multiple method, Howard with the new and capitalist systems of overcomes some of the most common today. Concentrating on these problems of academic literature on civil interrelated factors, Howard presents a society, such as sole dependence on persuasive account of the causal link statistical data on organizations, between people’s interpretations of exclusive focus on single case studies their previous experiences and their and over-reliance on theory. Although current social behavior and activities. In difficult to replicate, Howard’s contrast to explanations which relate methodological approach combines a post-Communist behavior to a tabula variety of information concerning the rasa individual, Howard builds upon specificities of civil society building in the popular experiences from the former the conditions of post-Communism, system in order to explain current thereby increasing the validity of the behavior and trends. The data in the research. analysis point to the continuity of attitudes and practices before and after The findings of the analysis tackle two 1989. Howard concludes that the of the most important questions in the absence of civic skills in post- contemporary analysis of post- Communism impedes democratic Communist Europe. First, Howard’s consolidation. Furthermore, the author conclusions put forward strong expects that generational change will arguments in favor of a common facilitate the abandoning of old habits approach for the examination of the and proposes a more active role of the examined region. The similar findings state in supporting and working with on the most-different cases of Eastern voluntary organizations. Germany and Russia indicate that differences between them are “in The merits of Howard’s analysis are degree” and not “in kind”. These located in his methodological and conclusions challenge the supporters of theoretical approach. The author uses a country-based approaches, which have combination of qualitative and emphasized country-specific quantitative data, largely missing in differences, advocating use of single available research on civil society. The case-studies for analysis.4 Despite the analysis is based on cross-national survey data from the World Values Survey coupled with an original representative survey of membership in 4 For a discussion, see Jacques Rupnik “On voluntary organizations conducted in the two models of exit from communism: Russia, East and West Germany. For Central Europe and the Balkans” in Between triangulation purposes and increased past and future-the revolutions of 1989 and their aftermath, eds. Sorin Antohi and 91 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 differences in other arenas of registered voluntary organizations. democratization, the conclusions of this Practice has shown that the number of book indicate that it is both useful and voluntary organizations all over the recommendable to study the problems region is not representative of the actual of civil society development in the development of civil society, conditions of post-Communism with a confirming the need for a shift of common analytical approach. attention to ordinary citizens in the examination of civil society. Second, Howard advocates a shift of focus in the examination of the post- As opposed to other segments of the Communist countries from elites and book, its conclusions are comparatively organizations to ordinary citizens, underdeveloped. In addition, each of the embracing a substantive, rather than a proposed future scenarios necessitates procedural understanding of democracy further analysis. The possible positive and democratization. Thus, Howard impact of generational change requires assesses a substantive aspect of civil an examination of the link between age society building, in contrast with the and organizational membership. usual focus of civil society studies on Moreover, the empirical findings do not formal elements of democratization.5 indicate that the younger generation His methodological approach and with virtually no experience from findings closely support Kaldor and Communism is more likely to Vejvoda’s idea that substantive participate in voluntary organizations. democracy in this region does not rest The work of the state with voluntary upon written provisions, but the organizations, as a second alternative, is practices and habits of the post- also potentially problematic. This Communist heart.6 Concentrating on the option stands in sharp contrast with one behavior of citizens, Howard studies the of the central arguments explaining the vibrancy of civil society, commonly low membership in voluntary neglected in the analysis of post- organizations today, namely the legacy Communist Europe. Hence, this of mistrust of voluntary organizations analysis represents a novel attempt in during Communism due to their the civil society research that connection with the state. As a result, commonly relied on the number of the work of the state with voluntary organizations is unlikely to have a positive impact on the rates of membership in these organizations. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Budapest: CEU Press, 2000). Overall, Howard’s analysis with its 5 For a discussion on formal and substantive focus on cross-regional similarities democracy, see Kaldor and Vejvoda, carries significant implications for the “Democratization.” 6 study of post-Communist Europe. Kaldor and Vejvoda, “Democratization,” Focusing on the behavior of citizens, it 63. 92 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 moves beyond formal approaches, James Kynge. China Shakes the which have proven unsuitable for the World: The Rise of a Hungry Nation, assessment of civil society building. London: Phoenix, 2006. xi + 244 pp. Hence, in terms of both its methodology £8.99/€14.07 (paperback). and findings the research has significant implications for the future study of civil Author: Dylan Kissane society. University of South Australia, School of International Studies Bibliography [email protected]

Havel, Vaclav. The Power of the Powerless. New York: Palach There have been many of books Press, 1985. published in the past five years Janos, Andrew. East Central Europe in describing the fundamental changes to the Modern World. Stanford: international politics that a rising China Stanford University Press, 2000. has provoked. Some, such as David Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. Lampton’s Major Power Relations in Problems of Democratic Transition Northeast Asia or David Shambaugh’s and Consolidation. Baltimore: Power Shift, largely focus on security Johns Hopkins University Press, and foreign policy issues arising from 1996. the PRC’s post-socialist transformation. Pridham, Geoffrey and Tatu Vanhanen. Others, including Nicholas Lardy’s eds. Democratization in Eastern Integrating China into the Global Europe-domestic and international Economy, are concerned with the perspectives. London: Routledge implications for global markets of Publishers, 1994. China’s economic trajectory. James Rupnik, Jacques. “On the two models Kynge’s China Shakes the World: The of exit from communism: Central Rise of a Hungry Nation, however, does Europe and the Balkans,” in not limit itself to considerations of a Between past and future-the sole element of China’s tangible revolutions of 1989 and their impacts on the world. Instead Kynge aftermath, ed. Antohi, Sorin and attempts to consider China from within Vladimir Tismaneanu. Budapest: and without in economic, social and CEU Press, 2000. political terms, succeeding in presenting Vejvoda, Ivan and Mary Kaldor. an informed study of the nation-state “Democratization in Central and that will come to influence international East European Countries,” affairs in ways barely imagined during International Affairs. 73 (Jan. the Cold War. 1997). Broadly, Kynge’s book is divided into two parts which might be thought of as “the impact” and “the cost”. Chapters 93 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

One to Five present studies of Chinese experience, Kynge builds a case for the successes in manufacturing and endemic black market that infests industry, all to the detriment of Chinese cities. In Beijing, he notes, “a communities in Europe and the United whole identity makeover with a PhD in States. Drawing of examples ranging rocket science can be bought for less from steel and vehicle production to than $100” (p.154). Kynge cites the textiles and men’s fashion, Kynge thriving market within major cities in explains how the evolution of China has illegal vehicle license plates which are revolutionized global markets. The final mounted on cars to avoid speeding fines four chapters assess the impact of this (p.155). Such examples build to the revolution within China from a variety inevitable conclusion that, despite all of perspectives. The environmental cost the successes of China, there remain on rivers and forest both in mainland some domestic obstacles for the state to China and across the world, the social overcome in order to continue its costs to individuals and families in meteoric international rise. China as well as the impacts on those in the West who feel they are “losing’ to Kynge uses this methodology the rising Chinese state. Kynge consistently throughout his text, moving concludes that, in spite of the from the specific and personal through significant changes within and without to the general conclusions that depict China, “future scenarios full of doom broader trends, both in China and and gloom” (p.227) fail to consider the abroad. Such an inductive style is integration of the People’s Republic common in texts that attempt to bridge into the world economy in recent years the gap between academic and popular that acts as an increasingly strong social science. While it makes for easy restraint on the possibility of reading and opens the book to a wider international aggression. audience, it also results in an absence of the detailed citations that will aid the Kynge’s style is engaging and it easy to researcher. As such, while it is imagine him as a very British Thomas deserving of its 2006 Financial Times Friedman. In contrast to Friedman’s Business Book of the Year award, it broad generalizations and relentless remains short on the footnotes and name-dropping, however, Kynge takes sourced references that aid scholars in the reader to the very personal building their own arguments. This is experiences of the average citizen in not a failing on the part of Kynge – he China and beyond. Kynge’s account of made no representation of presenting a the impact of identity fraud in China, standard academic work – but it must for example, draws on an interview be considered by the serious researcher with Qi Yuling, a young woman whose of post-communist economies. life was changed forever when a classmate stole her identity after high While it is impossible to compare post- school (pp.149-153). Drawing on Qi’s socialist China with post-socialist 94 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

Central and Eastern Europe in all areas, post-communist economic, social and there are some similarities that remain political development. striking. Besides the impact of the black However, integration is only part of the market, there are clear parallels in two rising China story. Kynge recounts the other areas, the first being the market tale of the Illinois town of Rockford. price of labour in post-socialist Previously the heart of the American societies. Though the disparity in labour machine tooling industry, today it is a cost between China and the rest of the town which has felt the rise of China in world has driven their manufacturing a way that increasingly more sector for a decade, the same cost communities in the West have and will. disparity exists between the former Its manufacturing jobs have departed socialist states of Central and Eastern for the Asian superpower, and have Europe and the states of Western been traded for cheaper imported Europe. While there remains the chance consumer products which now fill the that Western multinationals will bypass aisles of the local Wal-Mart. Describing Central and Eastern Europe and direct this trend, Kynge writes “Rockford’s their investment to China, Kynge does centre of gravity had shifted” (p.98). not discount the possibility of post- China Shakes the World is a compelling socialist European states using their study of Rockford’s story writ globally. comparative advantage in labour costs Kynge’s book is above all else an to their advantage (p.94). account and analysis of the shift in the global centre of gravity from the North Further, China’s embrace of regional Atlantic of the United States and institutions through ASEAN+3 (p.212), Europe to the Asia-Pacific of China and the East Asia Summit and the Shanghai the United States. Of utility to Cooperation Organisation mirrors the researchers and students of post- integration of Central and Eastern socialism, Asia studies and Europe in both the European Union and globalization, Kynge’s work will NATO. While China’s regional enlighten and inform both the scholar integration is not as far-reaching or as and the more general audience with an bureaucratic as that experienced under interest in this rising state. Europe’s continent-wide project, it is significant that major regional powers TJ. Pempel, editor. 2005. Remapping such as Russia and China are working East Asia: The Construction of a more closely in matters of security and Region, Cornell: Cornell University foreign policy. This will surely impact Press, 315 pages. on international affairs just as much as the economic policies that Kynge Author: Jewellord Nem Singh describes in this book. The reader with Lund University, MA Center for East research interests in post-Cold War and Southeast Asian Studies integration in Europe will thus find this [email protected] an interesting comparative study of 95 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

The idea of an increasingly cohesive, The second part investigates the drivers socially constructed East Asia is evident of regional integration. Changes in the in the literature on regional integration international and regional political and international relations. As the most economy of East Asia, the strategic dynamic region in the world, East Asian interest of the US, and the economic regionalism demands significant linkages forged by East and Southeast academic attention to map the changes Asian businesses are key variables that in the region. Remapping East Asia shape regional institutions and bottom- demonstrates this effort to understand up processes of economic integration. the historical, political, economic and The conclusion is that institution- social contexts of these changes and building is in flux as it is less what they imply in the prospect of the institutionalised, informal, and integration project. This book offers voluntary; bilateralism is combined new perspectives in three ways: it with multilateralism and regional rejects the EU-based, state-centred cooperation schemes. focus on regional integration, it demands conceptual clarity in using the The final part of the book is regional terms 'regionalism' and 'regionalization', linkages of the institutions, interests and and finally, it takes East Asia's project identities. It complicates our on its own terms using realist and understanding of regionalism by constructivist lenses. The result is a looking at different actors and the compelling argument that greater dynamic processes they undergo to regional cohesiveness is driven by an construct and reconstruct the region. expanding, complex network of webs For instance, the role of 'epistemic by governments, corporations, and ad communities' or policy networks is hoc problem-oriented coalitions revealing of the limitation of the regional institutionalisation. They see The book is divided into three parts. East Asian regionalism as a The first part provides a concise complementary project to the overview of regional institution- American-led regional security building and regionalization in East architecture and 'open' orientation Asia in a comparative perspective by towards global economic integration. analyzing state-to-state interactions and The book likewise makes a reflective demographic changes. The major assessment of regionalism by looking at argument is that domestic politics and the two challenges ahead: (1) the lack societal conditions matter in creating of capacity of Asian countries and the regional cooperation frameworks. The regional institutions to create an commitment toward regionalism is effective international regime for determined primarily by national sustainable development; and (2) the interest, whether it is for economic, challenge of terrorism in Asia. In political or security reasons. conclusion, the contributors 96 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 problematise the goals, interests, and of East Asia into more cohesive and processes of regionalism and politically relevant institutions. Here, regionalization. While East Asia aims we find new trajectories in doing to increase its global influence, it is research on Asian regionalism: China neither ready to make multilateral seen as a domineering regional player regional frameworks more powerful nor poses a challenge to institution-building to limit the role of external actors, and therefore new research agendas particularly the US. The major must focus on the politics of impediment remains nationalism and accommodation and adjustment. national identity, which is reinforced by state actions. More importantly, the book leaves out transnational and national civil society Since the 1990s scholars have turned movements in Asia as a potential actor their attention on the impact of China as of regionalization. In the past twenty a dominant actor in regional and global years, civil society has been active in affairs. Although comprehensive in Asia more than at any point in history. dealing with regionalism and In a region where governments retain regionalization, the book lacks an political legitimacy through economic explicit analysis over this aspect: how performance, the book (and the does the rise of China affect regional literature!) misses out some important security or economic integration? How analytical issues. These include the do international institutions adapt to the extent to which civil society has rise of a potential economic and challenged elites and has sought political power? Such questions are political inclusion in decision-making fundamental in any analysis of in Asia. As shown in Latin America and regionalism because they raise the issue Europe, civil society has been a source of leadership, prospects of economic of democratic legitimacy and credibility integration and the tension between of regional institutions. It is essential to national versus regional interests. It is investigate the nature of this political only in Paul Evans’ chapter that force, their strengths and limitations, attempts to address these issues were and the ways they affect other actors in made. In one way or another, he the dynamics of regionalization. This highlights the tension between China would make our picture of East Asian and Japan to influence Southeast Asian regional integration more complex, states, the ineffectiveness of realistic and theoretically informed. overlapping coalitions based on the 'Asia Pacific Way', and the negative Finally, assessing the prospects requires impact of American assertiveness in the asking the difficult questions: how will region's affairs. This single chapter is an the region move forward given the essential contribution because Evans uneasy relationship between China and represents the optimistic scholars Japan? Will sovereignty-reinforcing attempting to rationalise the institutions regionalism characterised by less 97 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 institutionalisation persist in the context Elizabeth C. Dunn. Privatizing of growing questions over the relevance Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and of ASEAN and the other institutions? Is the Remaking of Labor. Cornell East Asia building common norms, University Press: Ithaca and London, values and identities that will generate 2004. viii + 204 pp; Includes regional cohesiveness, and if so, what is bibliographical references and index the nature of this identity? The book (paperback) barely addresses these questions since its focus is in mapping out the Author: Aleksandar Kostadinov, continuities and discontinuities between University of Bologna, Interdisciplinary Asia’s past and present. The choice to Master in East European Researches synthesize the literature to understand and Studies the integration process is a laudable [email protected] effort, but explanations require prescriptions, which the book does not explicitly state. Such questions raised Privatizing Poland is a case study point towards reforms and changes in structured in six parts, conducted by institutional structures at the regional observation of the privatization process level, to which the book severely lacks in one of the biggest baby food responses. producing companies in Poland. Alima is a successful Polish company Despite these limitations, it offers organized as a typical socialist company important contributions in specifying of a Fordistic way of production. In the processes involved in regionalism order to modernize and transform and regionalization. Historically Alima into a highly competitive and accurate and theoretically conscious of modern production company, in the its position, TJ Pempel has successfully beginning of the 1990s the Polish clarified the debate on national versus Ministry of Privatization decided to sell regional identity, statism versus the company to foreign investors. transnationalism, and economic versus Alima’s new buyer is Gerber, a leading other forms of integration. The book US baby food producer. Since Gerber takes regional integration as a realized that Polish workers are not the combination of these things rather than same as those in Fremont-Michigan an either/or. It illuminates scholars (where Gerber’s main factory is), a new which research areas require more strategy was required in response to effort towards further investigation and Polish socio-economic and religious how regional governance can enhance customs. In the mid-1990s, author its legitimacy. The book remains an Elizabeth Dunn went to work in AG essential reading for students, (Alima Gerber) in Rzeszow. In a very professors and policy makers who want insightful and vivid style, Dunn tries to to understand the past and the present of explain the typical Polish worker’s East Asia. attitude and way of thinking. She was 98 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1 allowed close observation and was able monitoring the control process of to discover many differences between production but, moreover, controlling workers in Rzeszow and Fremont. The worker’s attitudes and productivity. author’s research was that Polish Under socialism, shop floor workers workers did not oppose capitalism and were considered as proste ludzie favor socialism, but their way of (simple people) that could perform only thinking had a more socialist heritage, physical labor without using thus creating a changed personhood and imagination and creativity, hence legacy within the new system. almost impossible to move into other jobs that require imagination, as in a Dunn illustrates different observations marketing department. In the fourth on Polish inter-hierarchical behavior, part, in a very remarkable and striking contrasts between how Polish people way, Dunn explains the meaning of view kierownik (nonflexible, old “znajomosci”. Living in an economy of fashioned bureaucracies whose power shortages, in order to gain something lies on close social and personal ties that could not be obtained persistently with superiors and subordinates) and and on a regular basis, people in menadzer, “manager” as a (flexible, socialist countries created networks of initiative, eager to change, “znajomosci”: informal personal sophisticated) autonomous individual. connections of friends, colleagues and The creation of a new managerial family members that are interconnected structure, emphasizes Dunn, was in horizontal and hierarchical decisive in order to strengthen Alima’s relationships through gift giving, competitiveness. Not having a bonuses, doing favors, etc. Alima- marketing or sales department, and Gerber workers believe that it is not a without identifying a niche market as worker’s productivity or potential was the case with Alima, could contribution to the company that jeopardize the existence of the tempers the final choice on hiring and company. Seeing that the Polish firing, but “znajomosci”. economy was transforming into an open trade and market-oriented country Another interesting observation is how during the 1990s, following the Dunn illustrates the logic of the neoliberal economic model of Western “gendered politics of feeding” (133). countries, the introduction of those Under socialism, women had equal managerial functions was a question of rights to access labor but there was an survival for the company. Establishing underlying division between jobs TQM (Total Quality Management) in considered physically ‘light’ and Alima, observes the author, was the appropriate for women and others second biggest and important which were not appropriate for women. reorganization in the company (after Working in a company such as Alima introducing a marketing and sales was considered a “physically light” job department). TQM is not just and appropriate for women, thus the 99 CEU Political Science Journal. The Graduate Student Review Vol. 2, No. 1

“main reason why mostly shop floor workers were women”. At a more general level, however, the idea of an industrial worker working as a mother was part of the ideology of state socialism, regardless of the industry in which they worked. The construction of femininity in Poland led to a belief within Alima that “women workers make food for babies as mothers, not profit for Gerber as laborers” (145). Considering that East European post- communist countries are just backward reflections of what Western economies were, this could be disastrous for the implementation and final accomplishment of projected strategies. Gerber’s CEO, Al Piergallini, recollects that “this country reminds me a lot of the United States in [the] 1920s” (3) was a typical stereotype about post communist countries in the beginning of 1990s.

Although mostly focused on Alima- Gerber relations, Privatizing Poland offers a wide range of information regarding changed “personhood” as a result of the new political and economic situation in Poland. This volume makes a good contribution to the literature on the postsocialist transition in Eastern Europe and provides valuable insight of workers’ behavior in post-communist systems.

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