Plan Lazo: Evaluation and Execution
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Plan Lazo: Evaluation and Execution by Charles H. Briscoe While involvement of the two major “white- U.S. and Colombian governments led to the development hat” players and one “black-hat” player in today’s of an internal security system to support one of the most narco-terrorist war in Colombia dates to La Violencia of successful counterinsurgency campaigns of the time.1 1948–1966, the stakes for the insurgents have changed. Shortly after his August 1958 inauguration, President They have dramatically shifted from trying to achieve Lleras Camargo requested “expert U.S. assistance” to political power to effect socioeconomic changes in the countryside to using economic power to control sociopo- litical affairs in rural areas.La Violencia may have been offi- cially declared as ended in 1966, but mass killings have continued as insurgent and self-defense elements com- 3 peted to dominate the peasants and prosper from their source of economic power—the illegal drug production and extortion of the wealthy Panama and government justices. This Venezuela article will show how the U.S. 2 government worked to assist 1 Colombia with its insurgent 1 Urabá-Darien 6 4 and bandit problems during 2 Caribe-Since-San Jorge 3 Serranía del Perijá the early 1960s through 1966. 5 4 Magdalena Medio 8 The early recommendations 5 Pacific Bogotá to employ counterinsurgency 6 Saravena-Arauca 8 Andean Orinoco Colombia measures had merit then and 7 Piedmont 7 remain viable today in Colom- 8 Ariarí-Meta 9 Caquetá-Putumayo bia. Many now appear in Plan 8 Colombia and Plan Patriota. 5 The first phase of the post- Bogotazo and Violencia (vio- lence) encompassed the first Ecuador 9 two National Front govern- ments led by Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo and Conser- Brazil President Alberto Lleras Principal Colonization vative Guillermo León Valen- Zones Since 1940 Camargo, former OAS cia (August 1958–1966). The N Secretary General, 1945– 0 200 Miles National Front resulted from P e r u 0 200 KM 1946 and 1958–1962 a 1957 bipartisan agreement to alternate the presidency and ministries every four years, effectively dividing power Principal regions of colonization in Colombia after 1940 are between the two major political parties for sixteen years. shown in yellow. Rural areas in Regions 7 and 8 (east and During this period extensive collaboration between the south of Bogotá) and in the northern part of Tolima (west of the capital) were those most affected by the bandits and quasi-guerrillas instigating La Violencia. 38 Veritas help with his government’s highest priority, the Nation- in rural areas “bore watching.”4 al Emergency Issue. Lleras Camargo, the well-respected The social upheaval after more than ten years of former Secretary General of the Organization of Ameri- political strife (of civil war proportion) had led to an can States (OAS), had been the driving force behind the estimated 250,000 deaths and had forced another 1.5 armistice between the Conservatives and Liberals that million Colombians to leave their homes and farms. The had united them in the National Front to restore order public confidence in government at all levels had been and end the bloodshed. In November and December destroyed. The 35,000-man army was garrison-bound 1959, a State Department–sponsored team was sent to and the national police (33,000) were unable to stop the Colombia to conduct an extensive survey of the violence violence perpetrated by bandits and quasi-guerrilla problem to make recommendations to the White House gangs. The military and police were not popular with before Lleras Carmago’s official Chief-of-State visit to the rural people. Civilians generally avoided contact and Washington in April 1960.2 did not report incidents of violence for fear of “terroristic The joint U.S. government team, chartered to sur- reprisals” by the bandits or quasi-guerrilla elements. A vey the violence problem in Colombia, was organized traditional peasant saying applied: “The law, like a dog, and led by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with bites only the man wearing a poncho.”5 The team made Defense and State Department representation. Hans V. specific recommendations in several areas. Tofte, formerly Office of Stra- The Americans felt that the Army had to be proactive tegic Services (OSS) in Europe, instead of taking pride in not being involved because it World War II and JACK [Joint showed how “non-political” the military was. The armed Advisory Commission, Korea forces had to demonstrate their integrity and a sincere (CIA)], was the team leader. desire to help and befriend the civilian population. Effec- The other team members tive suppression of the violence would regain the popu- were retired Colonel (COL) lar prestige the Army had earned during the Korean War Berkeley Lewis, an ordnance and restore confidence and respect for government. But, expert with broad logistics the armed forces had to fight the bandits and quasi-guer- experience and a tour as a rillas like an insurgency instead of emulating U.S. Army military attaché in Argenti- conventional war doctrine that perpetuated a traditional na; Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) external defense role.6 Joséph J. Koontz, service with The report recommended that a the U.S. Military Advisory special 1,000-man “Lancero” counter- Assistance Group (MAAG) guerrilla force be organized, trained, Hans V. Tofte in World War Bogotá from 1952–1956; Major and equipped “to eliminate the quasi- II, the Joint Survey Team Chief (MAJ) Charles T.R. Bohan- guerrillas.” The force had to be able to non, former WWII guerrilla conduct operations in units as small as leader in the Philippines who a fire team. Dedicated aerial reconnais- also advised the government sance and resupply assets were essential during the Communist HUK and they needed organic ground trans- uprising; COL Napoleon Vale- portation to move 200 men. It was envi- riano, Philippine Constabu- sioned that the “Lancero” force would lary and former Police Chief, conduct special intelligence missions Original Lancero Manila, who was “rated the and combat operations under a military shoulder patch most successful anti-guerrilla command that was focused exclusively fighter in the military cam- on finding and eliminating the enemy.7 paigns against the HUKs”; Supporting measures included the establishment of and Bruce Walker, ex-U.S. an effective intelligence branch in the Armed Forces Marine lieutenant with for- and a major reorganization of the civilian intelligence Sketch of Colonel eign service tours in Ecuador service. The government information program had to Napoleon D. Valeriano and Honduras. All were flu- be aggressive and imaginative and capable of psycho- and Major Charles T.R. ent Spanish speakers.3 logical warfare. The image of the Army and Police had Bohannon. To collect information, the to be rehabilitated to make them more “attractive” to joint survey team interviewed the people. Critical to this was a broad reorganization “more than 2,000 officials and civilians in all walks of life and improvement of Police forces through better educa- during visits to more than 100 cities, townships, military tion, training, and equipment. Land settlement and civic garrisons, and talked with a number of guerrilla chiefs” action “self-help” projects were part of rehabilitation across the country. Their assessment was pretty grim. programs. The “Lancero” force was to receive paramili- According to the report, the violence situation was criti- tary and civic action training and their activities were to cal. It was worsened by a much more active Communist be geared to support national rehabilitation efforts.8 threat than reported. The “Auto-Defensa” armed militias Resettlement projects would serve as long-term Vol. 2 No. 4 39 solutions if the government provided Lacking air support, the “invasion fleet” was destroyed before temporary support and the means to the exiles could get ashore. The ease with which the Cuban rapidly make families self-sufficient. Self- dictator was able to crush the overthrow attempt demonstrat- help projects started in the established ed that he controlled the island. Kennedy accepted the blame rural communities, while insignificant for the failure. President Kennedy’s recourse was to accelerate contributions to the national economy, funding for the Alliance for Progress. Fidel Castro declared created immediate popular support. The civic action projects initiated by Army and Police units in the field had to be designed to improve the image of Alliance for Progress President Dwight the security forces among the people. D. Eisenhower, Those with the most potential were In March 1961, President John F. Kennedy proposed a 1953–1961 direct government-to-people efforts.9 A ten-year economic cooperation plan between the United key part of all recommendations was States and Latin America that countered the announce- assignment of dedicated U.S. specialists ment by Premier Nikita Khrushchev that the Soviet Union to serve as advisors to the “Lanceros,” would support “wars of national national police, civil affairs, government liberation” worldwide. The U.S.- information, psychological warfare, and sponsored program was intended intelligence elements.10 to counter Communist threats to In the final 25 May 1960 report to Sec- American interests and dominance retary of State Christian Herter, the joint in the region. The mutual cost-shar- survey team concluded that the present ing capital investment program U.S. 1963 violence was primarily criminal activity was designed to promote social, “Alliance for by bandit gangs who operated like qua- political, and economic reform Progress” post- si-guerrillas. The team estimated that in the region to reduce the latent age stamp Secretary of current violence perpetrated by these causes for insurgency. The objec- State Christian bandit groups could be quelled in ten tives seemed reasonable: annual increase of 2.5 percent A.