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Contact Expert Group – Project Summary Project Title US3 Dismantlement of nuclear powered strategic submarines General Information Start Date: 1995-01-01 End Date: 2016-01-31 Status: Active by 2015 Cost: Over 354 000 000 USD Project Summary In 1992, the United States of America and the Russian Federation concluded the Agreement on the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Umbrella Agreement. Since then, joint efforts for dismantlement of Russian decommissioned strategic nuclear submarines started. The U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program provided over $350M (in U.S. Dollars) in assistance to the Russian Federation in joint efforts to dismantle nuclear-powered submarines and their associated ballistic missile launchers. In 2013 this Agreement expired, and the U.S. and Russia signed a bilateral protocol on threat reduction that reinforces their longstanding partnership on nonproliferation. Since 2013, the joint joint nuclear security activities were conducted under the 2003 Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) and the related bilateral protocol signed in Washington, D.C. The work is mainly being conducted at the Nerpa shipyard in Murmansk Region, Zvezdochka and SevMash shipyards in Severodvinsk, at Zvezda shipyard near Vladivostok and at Shipyard #49 at Kamchatka Peninsula. The scope of the project includes: - Provision of equipment and infrastructure improvements to facilitate SSBN dismantlement, including building of two on-shore SNF defuelling facilities (at Zvezdochka and Zvezda shipyards), - Defuelling of SSBNs, elimination of missile launchers, dismantlement of SSBNs, - Transportation of SNF to the Mayak plant for reprocessing and sealing the reactor compartments, - Reduction of low level RW volume, - Building of six SNF transport railcars, - Providing design of storage facility for 150 SNF casks at Mayak facility Progress and Results Since 1992, the dismantlement of 33 nuclear submarines has been carried out in the frames of the U.S. Russia cooperation. The record of latest projects: • The final joint project in the submarine dismantlement programme (the Delta III Hull #393) is currently underway. It is slated for completion in early 2016. • In 2012, the OSCAR 617 submarine was defueled with the US funding. DTRA funded the rail transportation of SNF from OSCAR 617 for re-processing at the Mayak plant. • In 2011 the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency completed two shipments of SNF from the Zvezda shipyard to Mayak. The SNF from OSCAR 618 was delivered to Mayak in June and the SNF from AKULA 502 was delivered to Mayak in October. • In 2011 the US completed a contract with Zvyozdochka Shipyard for dismantlement of Delta III Class - 392 strategic nuclear submarine. Work included elimination of ballistic missile launcher section and its three-compartment reactor unit (In September 2010, US eliminated 16 associated SLBM Launchers). These efforts were in cooperation with Canada and Rosatom. • In 2009, the dismantlement of a Typhoon class submarine was completed at the Zvyozdochka shipyard. Besides, in order to support these activities the following equipment has been supplied to the shipyards: - excavators with metal cutting shears, - cranes, - automatic guillotine baler shears, - cable choppers for copper recovery, - tractors and trailers, - forklifts, - industrial tools and cutting torches. - concrete foundations and working pads, - lighting towers, - work scaffolding, - electrical distribution systems. The following installations for RW volume reduction were commissioned (38.2 million USD): a) at Zvezdochka shipyard: - 2500 m3 of laundry water, - 1500 m3 of liquid waste, - 200 m3 of solid waste. B) at Zvezda shipyard: - 2500 m3 of laundry water, - 200 m3 of solid waste, - 15000 m3 storage facility. In order to facilitate defuelling of submarine reactors the following equuipment and faciities have been repaired (8.7 million USD): - three nuclear service ships (PM) - SNF cask handling equipment: - electrical and ventilation equipment. Two on-shore SNF defuelling facilities were built at Zvezdochka and Zvezda shipyards (24.6 million USD). These facilities provide possibility to defuel up to 12 submarines per year and store temporarily the discharged SNF. They are equipped with required infrastructure (cranes, roads, radiation monitoring, etc.). SNF storage capacities were substantially extended, including: - procurement of 25 TUK-108/1 casks (developed under the AMEC Program) at SevMash shipyard, - construction of interim storage pad for 60 casks at Zvezdochka shipyard, - construction of interim storage pad for 80 casks at Zvezda shipyard, - design storage facility at Mayak plant for 150 SNF casks. Six rails cars for SNF cask transportation have been built under the contract with Atomspetstrans. Technical Areas ▸ Dismantlement of nuclear submarines ▸ Storage of spent nuclear fuel ▸ Transportation of spent nuclear fuel Regions/Sites ▸ North West Russia ▸ Far East Russia ▸ Murmansk Region ▸ Arkhangelsk Region Facilities ▸ Zvezdochka shipyard ▸ Nerpa Shipyard ▸ Sevmash ▸ Zvezda Shipyard Framework Agreement ▸ CTR Agreement ▸ MNEPR Agreement Supporting Countries ▸ United States of America Funding Organisations ▸ US Department of Defence ▸ US Defense Threat Reduction Agency Participating Organisations ▸ Nerpa Shipyard ▸ Zvezdochka shipyard ▸ Sevmash ▸ Zvezda Shipyard Leading Organisations ▸ US Department of Defence ▸ US Defense Threat Reduction Agency Project Leaders Justin Richards and Anatoly Zakharchev Related Projects ▸ EU4 Improvement of the safety of the management of radioactive waste in the North-West Region of Russia/ Interim storage ▸ EU6 Improvement of radioactive waste management at the Severodvinsk naval yards ▸ CA1 Dismantlement of Nuclear Powered Submarines in North-West Russia ▸ RU6 Interim Dry SNF Storage at Mayak Plant ▸ UK7 Dismantling of two Oscar 1 Class nuclear submarines ▸ NO1 Dismantlement of two Victor II class multipurpose nuclear powered submarines ▸ NO7 Establishment of engineering infrastructure for remediation of nuclear storage site at Andreeva Bay ▸ IS2 Conception of the Russian Nuclear Powered Submarines Inactivation and Recycling ▸ IS3 Environmental Assessment of the Nerpa Ship Repair Complex ▸ NO10 Dismantlement of one Victor III class multipurpose nuclear powered submarine ▸ UK9 Dismantling of one Victor III Class nuclear submarine ▸ JP2 Japan’s Assistance for the Dismantlement of the Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines .
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