John F. Drinkwater. The Alamanni and Rome 213–496: (Caracalla to Clovis). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xi + 408 pp $125.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-19-929568-5.

Reviewed by James E. Cathey

Published on H-German (February, 2009)

Commissioned by Susan R. Boettcher

This book ofers a fne-grained account of the the nature of the people and the archeology] and leaders and peoples on the Roman and Alamannic to present my own ideas on the relationship be‐ sides (more or less) of the and the events tween the Alamanni and imperial Rome.... [Those that defned their symbiotic relationship during who] in their readiness to accept the Roman his‐ the approximately three hundred years between torical background as a datum run the risk of Caracalla and Clovis. John F. Drinkwater seems to missing current shifts in opinion in this feld" (p. leave no leaf unturned in his interpretation of the 3). He rejects mass migration as the source of the sources, and he provides a lucid narration of a re‐ Alamanni in favor of a process of ethnogenesis constructed history that illuminates Roman politi‐ through gradually cohering warbands. Some cal and personal motivation in interacting with scholars take their name to express an ancient, the Alamanni and other groups, importantly the special relationship with the god : "The and , primarily on the upper 'al' prefx of 'Alamanni' was exclusive, not inclu‐ and middle Rhine. sive. 'Alamanni' signifes 'Mannus' own people', Alamannic groupings were local in character created directly by him" (p. 65). These early "Ala‐ and never formed any sort of unifed polity, while manni" are hypothesized to have been an elite the Franks emerged from their own disorganiza‐ troop, that is, a warband, of the Juthungi, whom tion to form a kind of national identity only in the the Romans met as ferce warriors. The name of ffth century, when Alamannia had ceased to exist the elite Alamanni warbands was then extended as such. The Alamanni, like the Franks, had no to all Juthungi. Advances in archeology have aid‐ unifying mythical past (as did, say, the Burgundi‐ ed in diferentiating the Alamanni from, say, the ans or ). Their names were generic, not eth‐ Burgundians or , although subgroups of nic. Drinkwater's programmatic statement is: the Alamanni, such as the Bucinobantes or "The aim of this book is to review this work [on H-Net Reviews

Lentienses, cannot be identifed distinctively threat came through infrequent long-distance through archeology. raiding by self-motivated warbands, certainly not The body of the book is an almost painstaking a permanent problem for Roman forces on the deconstruction or interpretation of the writings of lower and middle Rhine. But emperors needed to Roman historians and inferences regarding the be generous to an army whose support they relied motives of all players. The Alamanni and the Ro‐ on. Furthermore, the reputation of a general de‐ man army faced each other across the Rhine at pended on the victories he won. Repelling Ala‐ the current Swiss-German border, and down‐ mannic threats solidifed reputations; victories stream between Gaul and Alamannia. The "bar‐ against eastern enemies, such as the Persians, barian threat," created by raids and attempts to brought glory. The end goal was to pacify groups; settle land on the left bank of the river, served the to do that, the cooperation of Alamannic leaders interests of Roman leaders by justifying taxation had to be achieved at the same time as victories to maintain an army, which in turn ofered a path were sustained against raids. to power. Even before the period of this book, After an introduction, Drinkwater divides his Julius Caesar used the as a reason to sta‐ presentation into nine chapters: "Prelude," "Ar‐ tion an army in Gaul, which created the military rival," "Settlement," "Society," "Service," "Confict and fnancial strength that propelled him to 285-355," "Confict 356-61," "Confict 365-94," and prominence in Roman politics. Not only were the "The Fifth Century." He adds an appendix on the Germani not a threat to Italy; they had been ac‐ Lyon Medallion, references, and an index. "Pre‐ tively recruited into the Roman army approxi‐ lude" posits the inferiority of the Alamanni to mately three hundred years before the Alamanni Rome and sketches the background of raids into were portrayed as threatening the frontier. True Roman territory, beginning with the and enough, raids were conducted by various parties Teutones in the late second century BCE, showing north and east of the Rhine into eastern Gaul and how Julius Caesar's exploits with the Gauls set the --and later by the Alamanni--but such ac‐ stage for later "barbarian threats." "Arrival" con‐ tions fell far short of an invasion. The "threat" cerns the settlement history of what is now south‐ was proclaimed largely for political gain in Rome: west . The frst brush east of the Rhine "The 'Germanic threat' thus allowed western em‐ with a Germanic group, called Alambannoi by perors, generals, administrators, and local aristo‐ Cassius Dio, occurred when Caracalla encoun‐ crats to validate their high position in society by tered a raiding party in 213 at the River. The allowing them to be diligent: diligently spending Roman yielded to pressure in the mid third the taxpayers' money, to their own economic and century, as more Germanic groups fltered south social advantage" (p. 361). By the year 240, howev‐ "thanks to the availability of the imperial road er, a genuine threat had developed in the East network" (p. 70). The Alamanni may have come from frequent raids by Goths on the lower from the western part of modern-day Mecklen‐ and at the Black Sea, which did call upon burg or, more generally, from groups living be‐ the emperor and his generals to succeed or be tween the Elbe and Main. Repeated raids by war‐ overthrown. bands led to southern settlement up to the Rhine. The interface at the Rhine was a land of op‐ At the same time that the limes was being portunity for Alamannic leaders, who let them‐ breached in the West, the East was threatened by selves be co-opted by the Romans or used them to incursions of Goths on the lower Danube in the their own advantage for material beneft. During 240s, which diluted Roman defenses. most of the period under consideration the only

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"Settlement" describes developments in the never easy to be an Alamannic chief. This ex‐ northwest, near the limes. The author posits the plains the attractiveness of Roman support" (p. size of a warband at about six hundred-plus wom‐ 122). Alamannic kings were "in a cultural and en and children. Since warbands most likely also strategic cul-de-sac. For a leader to emerge, he quarreled, settlements would have been widely would have to be victorious in battle, and the sole spaced. Drinkwater posits "a maximum resident worthy opponent was Rome. But Alamannic lead‐ population of c. 120,000 for the fourth century. ers relied on Rome for pay and goods" (p. 124). The third-century fgure must have been consid‐ They often served the Romans militarily. erably lower" (p. 81). Not all settlements were pri‐ Drinkwater profles fourth-century Alamannic marily agricultural. There were also (at last count) chieftains by name and follows their entry and 62 Höhensiedlungen, or "hill settlements," con‐ departure from imperial duty on a model estab‐ structed from the late third to early fourth cen‐ lished by Julius Caesar. Whereas Caesar employed turies that were used--likely by Alamannic kings Germani as cavalry, the Alamanni in some in‐ with entourages--until the Franks assumed power stances "mixed with the cream of imperial soci‐ in the sixth century. The Romans encouraged such ety" (p. 147) and "lived dangerous but generally settlement, hoping to pay some Alamanni settlers successful lives as Roman grandees. Their descen‐ to help protect the Roman against others. dants may have gone on to do even greater Thus began subsidies that persuaded some Ala‐ things--hidden from us by Roman names" (p. 153). mannic leaders to stay in place. The Alamanni This happy integration waned in the later fourth were, however, not the only group in the region; century due to a change in policy by Valentian I, the originally East Germanic Burgundians, who after which Frankish rather than Alamannic had come west as warrior bands that settled along chieftains joined the Romans. The author propos‐ the upper Main, were also in the region, occasion‐ es models for recruitment in the early period: ally complicating intergroup relations. short-term hires of warband leaders who re‐ "Society" begins with a disclaimer that other turned home after mercenary service and/or sons than the warriors having had "long hair, dyed of chieftains forming warbands from local young red, and [liking] strong drink we know little about men and serving under treaty. Other sources in‐ them. As far as, for example, the lives of women cluded individual crossings to the Romans for per‐ are concerned, we know nothing" (p. 117). The sonal gain, prisoners of war, and long-term hiring Alamanni were pagan before the seventh century. of Alamanni for specifc tasks, such as replace‐ Farming may have been viable near the Rhine ment of Roman troops sent to face the Persians. and captured Romans may even have been used The earlier chapters serve as an extended in‐ as slaves. Their political and military structures troduction; later chapters proceed chronological‐ are recounted in commentaries by Libanius ly. In "Confict 285-355," a close reading of Ammi‐ and , who described supe‐ anus leads Drinkwater to conclude that "from the rior kings, kings, lesser kings, and princes. Petty later third to the early ffth centuries ... Alamanni kings or chieftains with transitory reigns are and Franks were never a menace to Rome" (p. known from Scandinavian sources. Drinkwater 177). Disturbances were exaggerated for internal comes down on the side of hereditary as opposed Roman purposes, while occasional attacks by war‐ to elected chieftainship, due to the reports of sons bands intruding from the interior of Alamannia following fathers in ofce. The Alamannic laws were repulsed. Any real or exaggerated engage‐ reveal what other Germanic laws reveal: a vio‐ ments suited the purposes of Roman generals. The lent, impoverished society with a vendetta code. subsequent "Confict 356-361" turns on the change As Drinkwater puts it, "one suspects that it was

3 H-Net Reviews in relations when the Alamanni settled on the Ro‐ Drinkwater writes: "The wholesale alienation of man side of the Rhine, an action Drinkwater sug‐ border communities so soon after his accession gests was not aggressive but witnessed to their de‐ and arrival in the west would have been needless‐ sire to become Roman subjects; the chapter illus‐ ly risky. What we see is Valentinian acting like Ju‐ trates his point about the illusory nature of the lian in both cowing and provoking the western Alamannic threat. We read that Julian (a cousin of enemy of choice.... Most Alamannic communities Constantinus II who became Caesar of the West in would fall into line, but ... Roman action would in‐ 355 BCE) retook , Brumath, Seltz, evitably goad some hotheads to fght. These could Rhinezabern, Speyer, Worms, and in 356, be picked of once Valentinian had reached the with resistance only at Brumath. In the following Rhine; but other events prevented this" (p. 272). year, Alamanni blockaded the roads and fed to is‐ Hotheads did act. A raid by perhaps a few thou‐ lands in the Rhine. Seven chieftains under Chn‐ sand Alamanni had the indirect efect of provok‐ odomarius demanded that Julian retreat, but he ing the main Roman feld army at Rheims. Valen‐ attacked instead. The Battle of Strasbourg was tinian's feld marshal rolled up the Ala‐ hailed as a glorious victory and Julian spared Chn‐ manni from behind and conquered them at odomarius and sent him to Rome. Julian proceed‐ Châlons-sur-Marne. ed to Mainz, put a bridge over the Rhine, and in‐ A victory by one of his generals thus rhetori‐ vaded Alamannic territory. The Alamanni eventu‐ cally bolstered Valentinian's presence in the West ally sued for peace and Julian added to his glory (so that he did not go to face the Persians). After a by defeating six hundred Frankish raiders who raid into Mainz and a separate assassination of a had attacked while he was busy with the Alaman‐ major Alamannic leader, Vithicabius, Valentinian ni. In subsequent seasons Julian continued to pen‐ launched a campaign over the Rhine and estab‐ etrate Alamannic territory, in part to suppress lished fortifcations on the river and east of it, one suspected hostile districts and in part to secure at Mons Piri--now Bierhelder Hof in Rohrbach the Main frontier against the Burgundians. Julian near Heidelberg. The successor of Vithicabius was was able to "proclaim himself conqueror of Ger‐ subsequently rewarded with the construction of mani, Franks, and Alamanni" (p. 252). He as‐ the Zähringer Bergburg. Valentinian fortifed the sumed the title of Augustus and used his military Rhine frontier from north to Mainz and east dealings in the West to set him up for honors and to the and Danube Rivers, including fortifed transfer East to face the Persians. By 361 he had landing sites for warships. left Gaul. Drinkwater states that Valentinian "never in‐ "Confict 365-394" begins with the death of Ju‐ tended to conquer the Alamanni" (p. 299) but lian in June 363, which led to the reign of Valen‐ rather engaged in a defensive strategy that al‐ tinian, whose career is hard to follow due to gaps lowed him to call containment a victory. The Ala‐ in the record. The chapter again illustrates the Ro‐ manni were exploited as the emperor saw ft: as man exploitation of a "barbarian threat" for indi‐ recipients of imperial clemency or as victims of vidual political gain. Ammianus, useful as a imperial intolerance. The occasional goading of source for the year 378, provides news of Alaman‐ neighboring Alamannic communities into revolt nic incursions into Gaul early in the reign of was useful in maintaining the illusion that they Valentinian. The Alamanni became troublesome constituted a major enemy, requiring the perma‐ after 365 when the Romans changed long-stand‐ nent presence of a large (and growing) army and ing agreements on gift exchanges to seal treaties. a senior emperor and his court. "The Fifth Centu‐ The unilateral termination of an established ry" recounts in more rapid sequence the events diplomatic custom was ofensive to the Alamanni.

4 H-Net Reviews leading to the dissolution of the Alamanni as a de‐ fned group to contend with and the reasons for the rise of the Franks. This account of the rise and fall of the Ala‐ manni and their manipulation by the Romans is a book highly recommended as a compendium of scholarship by Drinkwater himself and others over the course of investigation into this period of Roman and Germanic history. Drinkwater integrates (with great detail) scholarship from a great many sources and thus provides both a thorough survey and a guide to further reading. A good companion volume would be Karlheinz Fuchs et al., Die Alamannen (1997) with ffty-four essays on aspects including anthro‐ pological considerations, law(s), dress and weapons, working with metals, burial customs, the early church, and language--among others. Drinkwater's volume should be of interest to his‐ torians and to those who have sought a good source on the interaction between the Romans and the Alamannic people(s) in the earliest period of their history.

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Citation: James E. Cathey. Review of Drinkwater, John F. The Alamanni and Rome 213–496: (Caracalla to Clovis). H-German, H-Net Reviews. February, 2009.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=23731

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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