John F. Drinkwater. The Alamanni and Rome 213–496: (Caracalla to Clovis). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xi + 408 pp $125.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-19-929568-5. Reviewed by James E. Cathey Published on H-German (February, 2009) Commissioned by Susan R. Boettcher This book offers a fne-grained account of the the nature of the people and the archeology] and leaders and peoples on the Roman and Alamannic to present my own ideas on the relationship be‐ sides (more or less) of the Rhine and the events tween the Alamanni and imperial Rome.... [Those that defined their symbiotic relationship during who] in their readiness to accept the Roman his‐ the approximately three hundred years between torical background as a datum run the risk of Caracalla and Clovis. John F. Drinkwater seems to missing current shifts in opinion in this feld" (p. leave no leaf unturned in his interpretation of the 3). He rejects mass migration as the source of the sources, and he provides a lucid narration of a re‐ Alamanni in favor of a process of ethnogenesis constructed history that illuminates Roman politi‐ through gradually cohering warbands. Some cal and personal motivation in interacting with scholars take their name to express an ancient, the Alamanni and other groups, importantly the special relationship with the god Mannus: "The Franks and Burgundians, primarily on the upper 'al' prefix of 'Alamanni' was exclusive, not inclu‐ and middle Rhine. sive. 'Alamanni' signifies 'Mannus' own people', Alamannic groupings were local in character created directly by him" (p. 65). These early "Ala‐ and never formed any sort of unified polity, while manni" are hypothesized to have been an elite the Franks emerged from their own disorganiza‐ troop, that is, a warband, of the Juthungi, whom tion to form a kind of national identity only in the the Romans met as ferce warriors. The name of fifth century, when Alamannia had ceased to exist the elite Alamanni warbands was then extended as such. The Alamanni, like the Franks, had no to all Juthungi. Advances in archeology have aid‐ unifying mythical past (as did, say, the Burgundi‐ ed in differentiating the Alamanni from, say, the ans or Goths). Their names were generic, not eth‐ Burgundians or Visigoths, although subgroups of nic. Drinkwater's programmatic statement is: the Alamanni, such as the Bucinobantes or "The aim of this book is to review this work [on H-Net Reviews Lentienses, cannot be identified distinctively threat came through infrequent long-distance through archeology. raiding by self-motivated warbands, certainly not The body of the book is an almost painstaking a permanent problem for Roman forces on the deconstruction or interpretation of the writings of lower and middle Rhine. But emperors needed to Roman historians and inferences regarding the be generous to an army whose support they relied motives of all players. The Alamanni and the Ro‐ on. Furthermore, the reputation of a general de‐ man army faced each other across the Rhine at pended on the victories he won. Repelling Ala‐ the current Swiss-German border, and down‐ mannic threats solidified reputations; victories stream between Gaul and Alamannia. The "bar‐ against eastern enemies, such as the Persians, barian threat," created by raids and attempts to brought glory. The end goal was to pacify groups; settle land on the left bank of the river, served the to do that, the cooperation of Alamannic leaders interests of Roman leaders by justifying taxation had to be achieved at the same time as victories to maintain an army, which in turn offered a path were sustained against raids. to power. Even before the period of this book, After an introduction, Drinkwater divides his Julius Caesar used the Germani as a reason to sta‐ presentation into nine chapters: "Prelude," "Ar‐ tion an army in Gaul, which created the military rival," "Settlement," "Society," "Service," "Conflict and fnancial strength that propelled him to 285-355," "Conflict 356-61," "Conflict 365-94," and prominence in Roman politics. Not only were the "The Fifth Century." He adds an appendix on the Germani not a threat to Italy; they had been ac‐ Lyon Medallion, references, and an index. "Pre‐ tively recruited into the Roman army approxi‐ lude" posits the inferiority of the Alamanni to mately three hundred years before the Alamanni Rome and sketches the background of raids into were portrayed as threatening the frontier. True Roman territory, beginning with the Cimbri and enough, raids were conducted by various parties Teutones in the late second century BCE, showing north and east of the Rhine into eastern Gaul and how Julius Caesar's exploits with the Gauls set the Raetia--and later by the Alamanni--but such ac‐ stage for later "barbarian threats." "Arrival" con‐ tions fell far short of an invasion. The "threat" cerns the settlement history of what is now south‐ was proclaimed largely for political gain in Rome: west Germany. The frst brush east of the Rhine "The 'Germanic threat' thus allowed western em‐ with a Germanic group, called Alambannoi by perors, generals, administrators, and local aristo‐ Cassius Dio, occurred when Caracalla encoun‐ crats to validate their high position in society by tered a raiding party in 213 at the Main River. The allowing them to be diligent: diligently spending Roman limes yielded to pressure in the mid third the taxpayers' money, to their own economic and century, as more Germanic groups fltered south social advantage" (p. 361). By the year 240, howev‐ "thanks to the availability of the imperial road er, a genuine threat had developed in the East network" (p. 70). The Alamanni may have come from frequent raids by Goths on the lower from the western part of modern-day Mecklen‐ Danube and at the Black Sea, which did call upon burg or, more generally, from groups living be‐ the emperor and his generals to succeed or be tween the Elbe and Main. Repeated raids by war‐ overthrown. bands led to southern settlement up to the Rhine. The interface at the Rhine was a land of op‐ At the same time that the limes was being portunity for Alamannic leaders, who let them‐ breached in the West, the East was threatened by selves be co-opted by the Romans or used them to incursions of Goths on the lower Danube in the their own advantage for material benefit. During 240s, which diluted Roman defenses. most of the period under consideration the only 2 H-Net Reviews "Settlement" describes developments in the never easy to be an Alamannic chief. This ex‐ northwest, near the limes. The author posits the plains the attractiveness of Roman support" (p. size of a warband at about six hundred-plus wom‐ 122). Alamannic kings were "in a cultural and en and children. Since warbands most likely also strategic cul-de-sac. For a leader to emerge, he quarreled, settlements would have been widely would have to be victorious in battle, and the sole spaced. Drinkwater posits "a maximum resident worthy opponent was Rome. But Alamannic lead‐ population of c. 120,000 for the fourth century. ers relied on Rome for pay and goods" (p. 124). The third-century fgure must have been consid‐ They often served the Romans militarily. erably lower" (p. 81). Not all settlements were pri‐ Drinkwater profiles fourth-century Alamannic marily agricultural. There were also (at last count) chieftains by name and follows their entry and 62 Höhensiedlungen, or "hill settlements," con‐ departure from imperial duty on a model estab‐ structed from the late third to early fourth cen‐ lished by Julius Caesar. Whereas Caesar employed turies that were used--likely by Alamannic kings Germani as cavalry, the Alamanni in some in‐ with entourages--until the Franks assumed power stances "mixed with the cream of imperial soci‐ in the sixth century. The Romans encouraged such ety" (p. 147) and "lived dangerous but generally settlement, hoping to pay some Alamanni settlers successful lives as Roman grandees. Their descen‐ to help protect the Roman Empire against others. dants may have gone on to do even greater Thus began subsidies that persuaded some Ala‐ things--hidden from us by Roman names" (p. 153). mannic leaders to stay in place. The Alamanni This happy integration waned in the later fourth were, however, not the only group in the region; century due to a change in policy by Valentian I, the originally East Germanic Burgundians, who after which Frankish rather than Alamannic had come west as warrior bands that settled along chieftains joined the Romans. The author propos‐ the upper Main, were also in the region, occasion‐ es models for recruitment in the early period: ally complicating intergroup relations. short-term hires of warband leaders who re‐ "Society" begins with a disclaimer that other turned home after mercenary service and/or sons than the warriors having had "long hair, dyed of chieftains forming warbands from local young red, and [liking] strong drink we know little about men and serving under treaty. Other sources in‐ them. As far as, for example, the lives of women cluded individual crossings to the Romans for per‐ are concerned, we know nothing" (p. 117). The sonal gain, prisoners of war, and long-term hiring Alamanni were pagan before the seventh century. of Alamanni for specific tasks, such as replace‐ Farming may have been viable near the Rhine ment of Roman troops sent to face the Persians. and captured Romans may even have been used The earlier chapters serve as an extended in‐ as slaves. Their political and military structures troduction; later chapters proceed chronological‐ are recounted in commentaries by Julian Libanius ly. In "Conflict 285-355," a close reading of Ammi‐ and Ammianus Marcellinus, who described supe‐ anus leads Drinkwater to conclude that "from the rior kings, kings, lesser kings, and princes.