Submission to UK and Irish governments in advance of the 60th United Nations Commission on Human Rights

ABColombia Christian Aid, Cafod, Oxfam GB, Save the Children UK, SCIAF, Trócaire

Agencias Británicas e Irlandesas trabajando en Colombia British and Irish agencies working in Colombia

February 2004 Recommendations

1. We request that the High Commissioner submit his report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

2. We support a strong statement by the Commission on Colombia, which calls on the to:

• comply with its duty to protect civilians and those working in defence of human rights – members of non-governmental organisations, trade unions, and popular and social organisations • take rapid and effective measures to break the continuing links between state security forces and paramilitary groups, as recommended by the UN and inter-American human rights bodies • strengthen protection of human rights, through developing and implementing a national plan of action for human rights and international humanitarian law in line with the Vienna declaration, and international recommendations • prioritise creating an adequate policy on forced displacement, which places prevention of displacement and protection of rights at its centre, and is properly funded • ensure that justice and reparation for victims of the conflict do not become casualties of talks with paramilitary and other armed groups, and that amnesties are not offered to those responsible for gross human rights violations. Decree 128 should therefore be withdrawn and the draft Bill on the reintegration of armed groups should be reformed in accordance with UN recommendations • fully implement the 24 UN human rights recommendations made in 2003 and supported in the London Declaration (July 2003) • take urgent steps to comply with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, especially the right to universal, free, basic education for all Colombian children and the development of a state protection policy for children and young people • revise military and criminal-code provisions concerning children who take part in the conflict or are recruited into armed groups, in accordance with international standards of juvenile justice.

2 Introduction

For the past five years, the international community, human rights groups and other elements of civil society, have been calling on the Colombian government to account for its policies and actions before the United Nations Commission for Human Rights. As in all previous years, we, the British agencies working in Colombia, refer the Colombian government to the clear and repeated recommendations of the UN system, the inter-American system and non- governmental organisations that could be incorporated into public policy.

Considering the UN human rights recommendations made in 2003 to the Colombian government and the analysis of progress made to date,1 once again the recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights have been widely ignored – indeed, in many cases policies have been implemented that directly contradict the recommendations.

The EU’s Council Conclusions (January 2004) and the London Declaration (July 2003) both reflect the priority the international community gives to the fulfilment of these recommendations. We urge the commission to send an unequivocal message to President Alvaro Uribe Vélez that: • respect for human rights and international humanitarian law is not ‘optional’ • UN human rights recommendations cannot be selectively implemented • the support of the international community depends upon the Colombian government making a genuine commitment to human rights.

For these reasons, we press the commission for a strong and unambiguous statement on Colombia and for the commissioner’s report to be presented to the General Assembly, providing a second, more political forum at which the Colombian government can be held to account for its actions.

A review of the past year

It is now 18 months since President Alvaro Uribe Vélez came to power. The priority of the administration has been the development of a range of legislation under the guiding concept of the policy (DSP). Accordingly, there have been a number of changes since the last commission on human rights: • After eight months, the ‘state of internal commotion’ (SIC) and rehabilitation and consolidation zones (RCZ) were ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court and dismantled. • The highly controversial network of paid, anonymous informers has expanded considerably, as has the peasant-soldier initiative. • Mass detentions of civilians without warrant have become commonplace. • Human rights groups and other non-governmental organisations 2 (NGOs) have become increasingly stigmatised and been made targets of multiple raids, threats and attacks, as well as being subjected to arbitrary judicial proceedings.

A highly controversial process of paramilitary demobilisation is already underway in some parts of the country, with a potential amnesty for human rights violations in the pipeline. An anti-terrorist Bill has also been approved by CongressYet, while the military approach to addressing Colombia’s conflict is being ever expanded, there is still no sign of the Action Plan on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that the Colombian government agreed to last year.

1 See State of Compliance by the International Office on Human Rights – Action Colombia, OIDHACO 2 Typically, these organisations are elements of civil society, working on human rights, displacement, peace and developmen issuest; they also encompass church groups, women’s groups, social organisations and movements, black and indigenous groups.

3 An ongoing disagreement over human rights statistics is currently dominating the dialogue between the state and civil society organisations, but whatever the definitions and enumeration methods used, human rights abuses remain extremely widespread. All sides in the conflict – guerrillas, paramilitaries and the state – systematically ignore the right of civilians to remain outside the conflict, using violence, torture, ‘disappearances’, kidnapping, killings, threats and blockades to control the population.

The rights of victims to truth, justice and reparation are largely ignored. The proposed alternative justice Bill, effectively offering amnesties to paramilitaries and guerrillas who agree to de-mobilise, is likely to make matters worse. The Bill may also guarantee members of the security forces impunity. The UN and the EU have emphatically pointed out that the Colombian government must respect international humanitarian law and human rights conventions to which it is a signatory.

The humanitarian situation remains extremely urgent, characterised by complex displacement strategies and dynamics.3 In 2003, illegal armed groups began to deliberately restrict the movement of civilians in conflict-affected areas, effectively preventing them from displacing. They now use intimidation and threats to prevent people displacing on a large scale, while selective killings and individual or ‘trickle’ displacement have begun to replace mass displacement. The relatively slow but steady flow of displaced people is much harder to monitor and record. There are often no conditions for safe and sustainable returns, resulting in re-displacement.

In human rights cases almost 100 per cent impunity remains the norm. Members of the armed forces accused of human rights abuses are still being tried in military, instead of civilian, courts. Civilian courts fail repeatedly to advance investigations into human rights violations, particularly when high-ranking security-force officers are implicated. Collusion between the army and paramilitary groups continues to be reported across the country. And the government has appointed members of the military who have outstanding, credible allegations of human rights abuses against them, in particular, the recently appointed General Ospina as head of the armed forces.

In December 2003, an anti-terrorist Bill was approved in Congress on its eighth reading. This reform Bill grants judicial police functions to the military, allowing them to waive processes of judicial authorisation, contravening UN human rights recommendations. The Council Conclusions of the EU urge the Colombian government to reconsider the Bill.

This brief summary of the human rights context in Colombia has highlighted some of the elements of DSP that pose particular concerns for human rights. There is more detail below on each of these key issues, which we believe should be addressed in a strong statement by the Commission.

Undermining the rule of law

President Uribe started his presidency by declaring a ‘state of internal commotion4 (SIC) and followed by issuing Decree 2002, the first special legislation for the SIC. This decree gave the police and security forces judicial police powers, with authority to capture, search and intercept communications without warrant, and to use the results obtained as admissible evidence. While the SIC and the ‘rehabilitation and consolidation zones’ (RCZs) were revoked after the

3 Combatants on all sides continue to use strategies that draw civilians directly into the conflict, in many cases forcing them to abandon their homes and livelihoods, in other cases controlling the movement of the civilian population through armed sieges and blockades of entire communities. Although an expert NGO consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES) recorded a significant decrease in the rate of displacement for January-September 2003 compared to the previous year, this apparent ‘improvement’ in statistics appears to reflect an increasingly common strategy of restricting the movement of civilians in conflict- affected areas, effectively preventing them from displacing. 4 In the first months of his presidency Alvaro Uribe Velez declared a ‘State of Internal Commotion’ (SIC) similar to a state of emergency, granting the government and state forces special powers in areas defined as ‘rehabilitation and consolidation zones’.

4 Constitutional Court had declared them unconstitutional. The ‘anti-terrorist Bill’ currently being legislated will have similar implications to the RCZs, but at a national level.

Several Colombian parliamentarians opposed the reform Bill on the basis that it is fundamentally unconstitutional. It also contravenes UN human rights recommendations. The reform Bill grants judicial police functions to the military, and includes measures to make arrests without warrants, detain citizens for up to six days with no right to habeas corpus, tap phones, interrogate suspects and collect evidence in war zones (a task reserved until now for civilian prosecutors) without judicial authorisation. Regulatory legislation could bring the Bill into force in March 2004.

Essentially, the law will weaken the role of institutions that make up the justice system, such as the defensoría and procuraduría, despite the fact that for many European countries these are priority funding objectives in Colombia. The implications of such a reform for civil liberties and human rights – particularly those of civil society and communities that denounce human rights abuses by the state – are extremely grave. The UN Office on Human Rights responded to the Congressional vote in favour of the Bill with a statement of concern:

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Office in Colombia notes again that any measure taken to counteract violence and terrorism must respect human rights and hopes that the Colombian authorities will honour their international commitments regarding the protection and guarantee of those rights.

The European Commission also called on the Colombian government to comply with international law, reiterating that under no circumstances does the fight against terrorism justify the violation of human rights. It expressed fears that the anti-terrorist constitutional reform creates ambiguity that might result in such violations. In Colombia, where impunity levels are particularly high, where there is documented collusion between elements of the state and paramilitary forces, and where human rights defenders and civil society activists are constantly at risk for denouncing human rights violations, legislation which undermines human rights is very dangerous.

Frequently, raids and searches result from information provided by anonymous military or paid informers. Among those particularly affected by arbitrary proceedings are members of organisations that have denounced human rights violations, campaigned for peace or socio- economic rights, and have frequently been labelled as subversive by the security forces.

Under Attorney General Luis Camilo Osorio, there has been a decrease in investigations and prosecutions of human rights abuses by his office. Some prosecutors and judicial investigators working on high profile cases of military officials charged with gross human rights violations have also been dismissed or forced to resign in circumstances that have been wholly lacking in transparency.5 As a result, major human rights investigations have been severely undermined, and the climate of impunity has been reinforced.

Harassment of civil society organisations, human rights defenders and vulnerable communities

There has been a continuation of last year’s office and house searches have continued, detaining civilians and using informers. There has been a number of cases of information being stolen from NGO offices, particularly those working to protect human rights and denounce abuses.

5 The dismissal of the regional attorney of Sincelejo, Orlando Pacheco, following his ordering the release of 128 people held without evidence, is an example of such a lack of transparency.

5 Amnesty International has documented 15 cases of Colombian human rights defenders killed since August 2002.6 Colombian government statistics show that, from 1 January to 17 November 2003, there were 68 reported murders of trade unionists. The Trade Union Confederation record the killing of 76 trade unionists from January until September of 2003.7

Amnesty International has evidence that the families of people who have ‘disappeared’ are being threatened by paramilitaries soon after the ‘disappearance’ of their relatives, to prevent them from filing a denunciation before the authorities. Multiple instances have been recorded of trade unionists’ families being threatened, kidnapped, tortured and ’disappeared’.8 Attacks, threats, selective assassinations, illegal raids and thefts have created a climate of extreme hostility and fear.

Mass detentions are also very frequent. One clear example was the detention, in August 2003, of around 42 social activists and human rights defenders in Saravena, in the department of Arauca. Their homes were raided after they had denounced the presence of paramilitary groups operating in collusion with the security forces in Saravena.

These strategies help undermine NGOs and other civil society actors, such as trade unionists. Several public servants and officials within the Uribe administration have failed to adhere to Presidential Decree 007 (signed by President Pastrana in 1999) that expressly forbids them from making comments that discredit NGOs and requires that they be disciplined for doing so.

Perhaps the most extreme example of this was in September 2003 when President Uribe himself, following the publication of a report by Colombian civil society organisations documenting rising human rights violations in the first year of his administration, made a public speech in which he issued blanket allegations against human rights organisations, linking them to subversive groups ‘in the service of terrorism’. Refusing to withdraw his comments, he made a similar allegation against a well-known human rights organisation during his visit to Europe in February 2004.

Such comments, roundly condemned by the international community, place members of these organisations at direct risk from attack by paramilitary groups. If the state has evidence of illegal activity by NGOs and other civil society activists, its duty is to present this in a court of law, where it can be challenged and tested, not to make dangerous insinuations and accusations in public fora where there is no recourse to a defence for those accused. However, the chances of such impartial investigation happening are severely undermined by the stigmatisation of human rights defenders, the use of the informer network and the failure to dismantle paramilitary structures.

The network of informers and peasant soldiers

The network of informers has expanded rapidly during the past year. Members of this network are required to compile and pass on intelligence on illegal armed groups to the security forces. The creation of this network, therefore, gives civilians a direct role in the conflict, blurring the distinction between civilians and combatants. There is evidence that some informer networks are operating in areas with strong paramilitary presence, where they may end up complementing the paramilitary strategy.

This initiative has been criticised by the human rights community in general and in particular the former High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson; Defensor del Pueblo,

6 Amnesty International:Human rights defenders: the voice of the voiceless. www.web.amnesty.org/mavp/av.nsf/pages/HRD#americas 7 For various sources of statistics on killings of trade unionists in Colombia, see the website of the Colombian Human Rights Observatory: www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/observatorio 8 Data from the Escuela Nacional Sindical – see the website of the Colombian Human Rights Observatory: www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/observatorio

6 Eduardo Cifuentes; former Mayor of Bogotá, Antanas Mockus; and Senator Piedad Córdoba, President of the Human Rights’ Commission of the Colombian Senate.

According to Ministry of Defence data, there are now more than 1.6 million informers.9 Although they are recruited from across society, internally displaced people (IDPs) are particularly vulnerable to pressure. There is evidence that in some cases IDPs have been coerced into joining the network in order to be allowed to register as displaced.10

The claims of anonymous informers are used to arrest so-called ‘terrorists’, but without any judicial process or investigation. It is not clear how security forces use the information. Given the use of anonymous witnesses and excessive military powers, and extensive documented links between military personnel and paramilitary forces, there are serious questions are raised about the impact of such a system on human rights, let alone on longer-term prospects for reconciliation among Colombians.

The peasant-soldier initiative also expanded to incorporate approximately 17,600 soldiers by the end of 2003.11 In light of the paramilitary demobilisation, this programme is particularly worrying, since it constitutes a potential structure for ‘re-cycling‘ demobilised fighters into the armed forces. It also risks militarising society further and drawing more civilians into the conflict. For example, Amnesty International has documented cases of at least 39 families of peasant soldiers in Saravena who received threats from guerrilla groups.

Human rights violations by illegal armed groups

Armed opposition groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) are responsible for numerous violations of international humanitarian law, including indiscriminate attacks that have resulted in significant civilian casualties. Rural areas continue to experience the greatest insecurity, although urban centres are increasingly suffering from targeted bomb and grenade attacks.

Throughout 2003, guerrilla groups continued to kill civilians they accused of collaborating with their enemies, as well as pursuing their policy of kidnapping civilians to use as hostages. The FARC continues to hold, among others, a number of candidates who stood for public office and for local government posts, as well as the 13 deputies kidnapped from the Departmental Assembly of Cali in Valle on 11 April 2002.

On 5 May 2003 the FARC killed ten of its hostages, including the governor of Antioquia, Guillermo Gaviria, and his peace adviser and former Colombian Defence Minister Gilberto Echeverri, during a rescue operation by the Colombian military in Antioquia in the municipality of Urrao. On a visit to Colombia in January 2004, European Commissioner Chris Patten condemned the kidnappings as a gross violation of human rights, and publicly declared the EU’s support for a humanitarian exchange with the FARC.

According to a December 2003 report by the ‘Alianza’,12 a civil society coalition monitoring the implementation of the UN’s human rights recommendations, the FARC reportedly killed 104 people in 16 massacres and the ELN killed 13 in three massacres between January and June 2003. Paramilitaries committed an estimated 30 massacres, with a total of 180 victims.

9 Presidency of the Republic – Ministry of Defence, ‘The Effectiveness of the Colombian Democratic Security and Defense Policy’, Aug 2002- Dec 2003 See www.mindefensa.gov.co/ 10 Amnesty International Press Release, AI Index: AMR 23/078/2003 (Public) News Service No: 282: Colombia/Panama: Right to Refuge Under Threat, 12 December 2003. 11 www.presidencia.gov.co 12 Alianza. Seguimiento a las recomendaciones del Alto Comisionado de Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, December 2003.

7 Colombian Ministry of Defence statistics show that in the first ten months of 2003 there were 19,102 murders. Although this number represents a decline in absolute terms, clearly the risks for civilians remain exceptionally high. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists,13 in the first year of Uribe’s administration the number of people killed outside combat for socio- political reasons was 3,956, similar to the number in the final year of President Pastrana’s administration. Similarly, the number of people killed in combat (state agents, paramilitaries, guerrillas, civilians) remained remarkably consistent for both periods (3,022 and 3,000), approximately twice the figure of five years ago.

Contrary to the UN recommendation that illegal groups immediately and unconditionally release their kidnap victims, during the first seven months of 2003, 1,242 people were kidnapped in Colombia, of whom the FARC kidnapped 435; the ELN 242; paramilitaries 86; and common criminals 199 (it is not known who abducted the remainder). It is clear that the illegal armed groups are also blatantly ignoring the recommendations the UN Human Rights Office in Colombia made in 2003.14

Demobilisation of illegal armed groups

In January 2003, the government issued Decree 128, enabling the government to grant pardons to members of guerrilla or paramilitary groups, who are not under criminal investigation or been sentenced for crimes proscribed by international humanitarian law. The vast majority of guerrillas or paramilitaries are not under investigation for human rights abuses or violations, and on surrender would be automatically eligible for pardon. According to a Ministry of Defence report,15 over 3,500 FARC, ELN and United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) combatants were demobilised.

The danger is that these combatants will now be able to join peasant-soldier or civilian-informer network structures and potentially be equipped with powerful weaponry. More recently, the government presented a Bill to Congress that goes beyond Decree 128 by granting de facto amnesties to incarcerated combatants who terminate their membership of an illegal armed group. Also included are those associated with armed groups involved in a peace process with the state and who surrender to the authorities – even if they have been found responsible for serious human rights violations.

The main beneficiaries of this legislation would be paramilitary groups who are in talks with the government to negotiate a peace agreement with the state. If this Bill is approved, those responsible for human rights violations, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, will benefit from guarantees of impunity. In the EU Council Conclusions published in January 2004, the Council ‘underlined the particular importance of further amendments to the proposed amnesty law in order to ensure full consistency with Colombia’s obligations under international instruments regarding human rights and international humanitarian law.’

Meanwhile, the government is sending a strong message to law courts to desist from advancing judicial proceedings into cases of human rights violations perpetrated by paramilitaries operating in coordination with security force members. Such actions jeopardise the right of victims of human rights violations and their families to truth, justice and integral reparation.

It was a condition of the demobilisation process of paramilitary forces in the Santa Fe de Ralito agreement that all paramilitary such groups should be involved, and that there should be a total ceasefire and halt in kidnappings. Even though none of these conditions are being met, on 25 November 2003, over 800 members of the paramilitary group Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN)

13 See, for example, letter to the Editor, Wall Street Journal, published in El Tiempo, 9 February 2004. 14 Alianza. December 2003. Seguimiento a las recomendaciones del Alto Comisionado de Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos. 15 Presidency of the Republic – Ministry of Defense, ‘The Effectiveness of the Colombian Democratic Security and Defense Policy’, Aug 2002- Dec 2003. See www.mindefensa.gov.co/

8 were supposedly ‘demobilised’ in Medellín. But there are indications that suggest this process was neither transparent nor serious.

First, it is not clear that all those who surrendered to the authorities were in fact combatants. Information received by Amnesty International suggests that prior to the ‘demobilisation’, youths in different districts of Medellín had been asked to volunteer themselves for the ‘demobilisation’ process.

Secondly, after the ‘demobilised’ combatants were submitted to a three-week rehabilitation course, during which their criminal records were checked by judicial authorities to ensure there were no pending criminal investigations against them, they were granted amnesty and returned to their homes. It is not clear what guarantees were in place to ensure that they would not continue to operate as paramilitaries on their return. Moreover, the ‘demobilisation’ process coincided with the development of private security firms in the city and there is a danger paramilitaries will end up working for them.

Press reports suggest that the weapons handed over to the authorities as part of the amnesty appear to have been old weapons, not the modern equipment many BCN fighters possess. Before the demobilisation, the BCN made clear that its rural units would remain operational. The BCN has an estimated strength of over 2,000 combatants, so the ‘demobilisation’ of 800 fighters still means that this Block remains militarily strong.16

Forced displacement

Combatants on all sides continue to use strategies that draw civilians directly into the conflict, in many cases forcing them to abandon their homes and livelihoods, in other cases controlling the movement of the civilian population through armed sieges and blockades of entire communities. While current government policy prioritises humanitarian assistance for displaced people, international and national organisations working in this area believe that protection of rights and displacement prevention should be at the core of any public policy if it is to be effective.

According to an expert NGO consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), there were 175,270 recorded IDPs for the nine-month period, January-September 2003. However, although this represents a significant decrease in the rate of displacement compared to the previous year, this apparent ‘improvement’ in statistics appears to reflect an increasingly common strategy of restricting the movement of civilians in conflict-affected areas, effectively preventing them from displacing.

Areas particularly affected by this strategy of confinement are Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Montes de Maria, Arauca, Catatumbo, Bajo Atrato and Magdalena Medio, Oriente Antioqueño, the Pacific coast of Nariño, and areas in the former demilitarised zone where the FARC was stationed. It is worth noting that several of these areas are increasingly difficult for international and national human rights organisations to access to monitor what is actually going on.

The reduction in the rate of displacement is partially explained by the fact that paramilitary groups negotiating with the government have adopted new modus operandi, using selective killings and individual, instead of mass, displacement. The relatively slow but steady flow of displaced people is much harder to monitor and record. Moreover, people who do abandon their homes, do not always register as IDPs because of a number of disincentives, including fear of continuing threats and limited and declining benefits.

16 See Amnesty International’s contribution to Colombia Forum, issue 34, Sept- Dec 2003, which can be viewed at: www.usofficeoncolombia.org/coforum.htm

9 CODHES actually records increased displacement in some regions of Colombia (eg Guaviare, Putumayo, Arauca) where military campaigns and fumigation programmes are occuring. Overall, there are some three million displaced people in Colombia.17 There are also serious concerns about the nature of IDP and refugee returns. The government strongly supports returns, and state statistics show 11,143 displaced families returned their places of origin between August 2002 and December 2003.18 However, several documented cases (such as the returns from Jaque in Panama to Jurado) have not guaranteed security, dignity and the freedom of IDPs.19

A recent study showed that only 11 per cent of IDPs want to return,20 and the rate of returns among IDPs fell from 37 per cent in 1997 to two per cent in the first quarter of 2002.21 Clearly, without return programmes fulfilling the essential principles enshrined in the Guiding Principles, governmental return initiatives will fail to address the needs and rights of this huge and highly vulnerable population.

Poverty and inequality

Over the last seven years, the reduction average income of Colombians has fallen dramatically. The World Bank’s World Development Reports, for example, show that, according to a 1996 survey, 28.7 per cent of the population were living on less than US$2 per day, while a 1998 survey shows a rise to 36 per cent of the population. In the autumn of 2003, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its annual Human Development Report for Colombia.22 This estimated that 59 per cent of Colombians were living in poverty (less than US$2 per day), rising to 83 per cent in rural areas. It dedicated particular attention to agriculture and rural land tenure.

Colombia is one of the least equitable countries in the world in terms of the distribution of agricultural land. Some 11,000 individuals or legal entities own nearly 23 million hectares and 2.2 million small peasant farmers own 2.2 million hectares. In the last 12 years the major landowners have doubled their land holdings, while the small peasant farmers have lost about half of their land. Fifty-five per cent of all displaced people were landowners before they were displaced and have very little hope of recovering their land. A clear national strategy for the settlement and use of land must be developed – including policies on the redistribution or return of land held or taken as a result of drug dealing and paramilitarism.

The UNDP report indicates that the UN is eager to restart a dialogue with Washington, aimed at taking narcotics out of the centre of US policy on Colombia, because ending the cultivation of drugs will not end the conflict. The aerial fumigation programme, backed by , is causing major environmental destruction and serious harm to the rural population, particularly children and the elderly. The UNDP report recommends the immediate suspension of aerial fumigation, which only pushes the small peasant farmer into the hands of the armed actors, and its replacement by voluntary manual eradication for all landholdings of less than three hectares. There needs to be major investment in agriculture, including crop replacement, which could be financed by debt swaps.23

Rural poverty remains one of the underlying factors behind the intensification of the conflict. However, policies that reduce state interaction with rural areas to military intervention and

17 CODHES, Desplazados sin salida? Bogotá, 14 December 2003. 18 Presidency of the Republic Colombian Agency for International Cooperation (ACCI) Foreign Affairs Ministry: International Cooperation Strategy. 2004. 19 See joint report by Project Counselling Service and Norwegian Refugee Council, Boundaries: Colombia Regional Report, 18 December 2003. 20 Sistema de información sobre población desplazada por RUT de Movilidad Humana del Secretariado Nacional de Pastoral Social. 21 CODHES. 28 April 2003, Boletín 44, Bogotá 22 www.pnud.org.co 23 Debt swaps are when an indebted country agrees to undertake certain actions or implement certain policies in return for having part of their debt cancelled.

10 measures to combat the do little to tackle the real needs of hundreds of thousands of poor peasant, indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.

The report also emphasises that there must be increased quality spending on education, employment training and social activities for young people. A recent investigation24 on the impact of macro-economic policies on social spending for children shows a fall in the proportion of the Colombian Gross National Product directed towards children (2.5 per cent in 1995 to 1.5 per cent in 2001), falling vaccination rates, and other deteriorating development indicators. Current government policies are reducing social spending in order to allocate increased resources towards the military and debt servicing. Unemployment figures are high (according to the UNDP report, half the workforce is either un- or under-employed) and there is a housing shortage. Luis Jorge Garay, a leading Colombian economist, writes:

As long as the economy and production do not resume adequate levels of growth, higher that 4.5 per cent per year, it is clear that any social policy cannot be sustainable over time, all the more so if it is not accompanied by profound tax reform or other measures of redistribution.25

Child rights

The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers reported in January 2004 that there was no evidence of government forces recruiting under-18-year-olds as soldiers. However, it confirmed that children were being used for intelligence work or as informants, a strategy that brings them directly into the conflict and places them at risk of retaliation. Armed groups regularly recruit under 18-year-olds, and a September 2003 report by Human Rights Watch notes that more than 11,000 children were fighting in irregular armies in Colombia, including paramilitaries and urban militias. These children urgently require the protection of the state both to de-mobilise and to re-integrate into society according to international norms of justice and rehabilitation.

Despite the fact that Colombia is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Unicef reports that the prospects for children in Colombia are alarming. Over ten million children – some 60 per cent of all children – live in poverty, with 25 per cent living in abject poverty.26 As a result, out of 988,000 births every year, 25,000 children die in their first year and a further 30,000 children under five die annually. Indigenous and Afro Colombian children have substantially less access to healthcare, education, food and well-being than others.27

Two and a half million children between seven and 15 are working illegally, 85 per cent in the worst forms of child labour and in some cases, for up to 16 hours a day.28 More than 40,000 children work processing coca leaves in Putumayo and southern Colombia, with over two- thirds suffering from chemical burns (Unicef). Approximately 2.5 million children of school age are not in the education system.

Forced displacement and violence effects children in serious ways. Minors make up 55 per cent of Colombia’s displaced population, and an average of 20 children are displaced every hour.29 According to the World Food Programme, every displaced child between their fourth and twenty-fifth month of displacement are malnourished.30 Children and young people do not have satisfactory access to education or healthcare in reception areas or return or re-

24 Sarmiento G; Alfredo y otros, Finanzas públicas, niñez y juventud, November 2003. 25 Luis Jorge Garay, Política Económica en El Embrujo Autoritario, 2003, p 35. 26 DANE – National Statistics Agency 27 Unicef, January 2003, see www.unicef.org.co 28 Unicef 2003, see www.unicef.org.co/08-trab.htm (includes refs to ILO, Unicef and Save the Children UK studies) 29 CODHES, – Codhes Informa, Boletin de la Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, Boletin 44, 45 and 46 and UNHCHR – Informe sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Colombia E/CN.4/2003/13 – 24 Feb 2003. 30 World Food Programme – Study of the situation of 1.4 million IDPs in Colombia – see www.wfp.org/country_brief/ Colombian Displaced Can’t Satisfy Minimum Food Requirements, 14 June 2001 and Bulletins No 24 (15 June 2001) and 29 (20 July 2001)

11 settlement areas, which contributes still further to the complex and multiple human rights violations of forced displacement.31

Conclusion

This document has described many of the key concerns of the ABColombia group, based on our experience and knowledge of Colombia, and the priorities and perspectives of our many partners in civil society. We believe that the European Commission has a crucial role to play in ensuring that the Colombian government fulfils its human rights obligations, and we therefore request a strong and unambiguous statement by the Chair that will raise all these concerns.

In addition, we recommend that the report of the UN office in Colombia be submitted to the General Assembly every year, providing a second, crucial forum at which the Colombian government can be called upon to account for its human rights record.

31 MENCOLDES (Fundación Menonita Colombiana para el Desarrollo). Boletin no 9: Las Autoridades de aseguraran de que los niños desplazados reciban una educación gratuita y obligatoria a nivel primario,Mesa de Trabajo de Bogotá sobre Desplazamiento Interno, December 2003.

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