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In This Issue Volume 4 October-November 2003 Issue 44-45 IN THIS ISSUE: • THE GREATEST PROBLEMS OF THE SERBIAN TRANSITION Macroeconomic Stability without Economic Growth and Inadequate Tax Policy which Stifles Economic Activity and Increases the Trade Deficit • MACROECONOMIC REVIEW • THE REFORM OF INSTITUTIONS • ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO (from the previous Issue) Belgrade, January 20, 2004 Economic Review No. 44-45 Serbia w/o Kosovo and Metohija: Basic Economic Indicators θ 2002 X 2003 X 2003 I-X 2003 IX 2003 X 2003 θ 2001 IX 2003 X 2002 I-X 2002 GDP growth rate1 4.0% … … … … … Industrial production - total 1.7% … … 8.3% -3.6% -3.5% Central Serbia 1.6% … … 5.1% -3.9% -4.7% Vojvodina 2.1% … … 14.2% -3.2% -1.2% Average nominal net wage, in CSD2 51.8% 11,953 12,432 4.0% 23.8% 25.3% Nominal gross wage, in CSD … 17,277 17,986 4.1% 24.6% 25.7% Real growth in average net wage, in %3 30.2% … … 2.6% 14.8% 13.5% Ratio consumer basket / average net wage -31.1% 1.0 1.0 0.0% -16.7% -17.8% Unemployment rate, registered4 8.1% 32.2% … 0.5% 6.7% 12.2% Current account , in USD million5 227.8% -7 … -93.4% -93.5% 0.3% Trade balance, in USD million6 39.3% -328 ... 14.2% 9.1% 31.2% Exports, USD million 20.6% 210 ... 8.2% 8.2% 21.5% Imports, USD million 31.8% 538 ... 11.8% 8.8% 27.6% Money supply (M1) CSD billion (end of period) 110.8% 98 98 0.5% 9.9% 28.3% Cash 122.6% 39 40 2.6% 2.8% 15.0% Deposit 104.6% 59 58 -0.9% 15.4% 39.8% Real money supply, in EUR million 107.5% 1488 1481 -0.5% 1.1% 20.3% NBS for. curr. reserves, USD mil (end of period) 95.0% 3349 3545 5.9% 70.3% 50.5% Discount rate - annual level -77.0% 9.0% 9.0% 0.0% -5.5% -24.0% Market interest rate - monthly level -48.5% 1.2% 1.2% -2.5% -26.9% -43.9% Retail prices7 19.5% … … 0.8% 7.9% 12.1% Costs of living7 16.6% … … 0.9% 7.2% 10.1% Industrial producer prices7 8.8% … … 0.8% 4.4% 4.6% Medium exchange rate (CSD/EUR) - average 2.1% 65.76 66.43 1.0% 8.7% 6.6% 1 Estimate 2 By the gross wage methodology applied as of June 1, 2001 3 Deflator is cost-of-living index 4The number of the employed comprises those employed in the socially-owned sector, private sector and small enterprises 5 The data refer to August 6 The data refer to September 7 The data refer to November Source: SZS, RZS, NBS, RZTR G 17 Institute October – November 2003 Economic Review Prepared by Ivana Radovic THE GREATEST PROBLEMS OF THE SERBIAN TRANSITION Press Conference Held on September 25, 2003 Milko Štimac, CEO G17 Institute INTRODUCTION From its beginning the G 17 Institute has been monitoring the transition in Serbia and studying the transitional experiences of other countries around the globe. Many comparative studies have been made in order to discover the shortest and least painful road through transition, because there is not such a thing as a painless transition. Besides the scientific experience our researches gained during the last three years, this period also brought us the experience of implementation of reforms. The Institute’s associates, who took direct part in the implementation of reforms, bring a new quality to the consideration and comprehension of the Serbian transition, because now, besides foreign experiences, we have our own, both positive and negative experiences relating to the implementation of reforms. The third year of the transition in Serbia is decisive because reforms have been halted, displaying regressive tendencies in certain areas. The intention of the G 17 Institute is to present the good and the bad sides of reforms in Serbia, through its research and a series of press conferences that will be based on the results of the mentioned research, all of these in order to examine the reasons that brought the reforms to a halt, to examine segments of reforms and the transition which hit Serbian society, the political economy and the system as a whole most severely, as well as what should be done to overcome problems that hinder further development and to apply the best solutions to the Serbian transition. The greatest problems of the Serbian transition will be presented through eight basic problems: macroeconomic stability without economic growth; inadequate tax policy which stifles economic activity and increases the trade deficit; privatization fallen short of initial expectations, which is reflected in tycoonization that inevitably imperils long-term interests of the Serbian economy (Serbian tycoons recently met with the outgoing Government of Serbia); halted reform of the banking sector and the financial market; the unfavorable investment climate; the absence of legal security; institutional and political instability and growing social costs of the transition. All these topics are equally important, as all of these problems equally obstruct further development of reforms. i G 17 Institute October – November 2003 Economic Review Mlađan Dinkić MACROECONOMIC STABILITY WITHOUT ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INADEQUATE TAX POLICY WHICH STIFLES ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND INCREASES THE TRADE DEFICIT Macroeconomic stability which is not accompanied by economic growth has emerged this year, i.e. this problem did not exist in Serbia in the previous two years of the transition. Namely, year 2003 will be the first year of the transition without economic growth. An even more important problem is the fact that institutional and structural reforms have been halted, resulting in an economic recession which continues for two years already. According to all economic indicators, the recession started approximately in autumn 2002. It was not visible at the beginning; but today sufficient time has passed for us to safely say that Serbia is in a serious economic recession. Three consecutive years of macroeconomic stability have certainly been one of the greatest achievements of the transition thus far. Both according to our estimates and according to indicators in the first eight months, this year’s inflation will certainly be below 10% at an annual level, which will be the first one-digit inflation registered in our country since 1969. This is really a great achievement. In the period of January-August 2003, retail price inflation was as low as 5%, and it is realistic to expect that year-end inflation will not exceed 9%. During the period of my being in the position of Governor of the NBY as well as today, I hold to the opinion that monetary policy has been set appropriately. The same people who used to work with me practically still carry out monetary policy, and any fundamental changes are not very likely. What is likely is the strengthening of market instruments for monetary regulation, introduction of repo-operations which was announced for September and the introduction of an interbank money market by the end of the year. I believe monetary policy will be essentially completed in that respect. However, Serbia is facing another problem: macroeconomic stability exists, but it is not accompanied by economic growth. This problem is not specific just to Serbia; it has been faced by other transition countries, such as Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well. The problem is that the domestic product may even drop slightly compared to last year. Namely, GDP increased by 5% in 2001 and by 4% in 2002; at the beginning of this year economic policy-makers projected GDP growth at 3.5-4% in 2003. Eight months later, it became obvious that this projection will not come true. The domestic product, i.e. GDP (applying the system of national accounts) will range between -0.8 and +0.5%; in any event, it will be around zero. It is difficult to estimate whether it is going to be slightly positive or slightly negative, as there are four months until the end of the year, but anyhow, year 2003 will be the first year without economic growth. ii G 17 Institute October – November 2003 Economic Review Estimation of real GDP growth in Serbia in 2003 G 17 Institute’s estimation Weighs for Realistic Optimistic GDP index growth rate % index growth rate % calculation1 Industry 96.5 -3.5 97.0 -3.0 28.2 Agriculture2 93.0 -7.0 94.0 -6.0 21.1 Construction 100.0 0.0 103.0 3.0 3.9 Transport3 103.0 3.0 103.0 3.0 7.1 Trade4 103.0 3.0 110.0 10.0 11.9 Other services5 104.0 4.0 104.0 4.0 27.8 Real GDP 99.2 -0.8 100.5 0.5 100.0 The Table above shows the structure of GDP formation by sectors, offering two estimations of growth by the end of the year: one is in our opinion realistic, and the other is optimistic. GDP will decrease according to the realistic estimation, while according to the optimistic estimation, it could rise by 0.5% at best. The two most important sectors that constitute 50% of GDP are industry and agriculture. As far as industrial production is concerned, it is not likely to reach even zero since it dropped by 3.8% during the first eight months year-to-year. Theoretically speaking, to reach its last year’s level, i.e. for the industrial production growth rate in 2003 to be zero, the deseasonal index of industrial production will have to increase by as much as 20% by the end of the year.
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