50years AFTER Revolution : Total Failure

Cuba 50years after Revolution : Total Failure

Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

INTRODUctIoN

January 2009 marks the 50th anniversary of the revolution that sought to transform Cuba. ’s 26th of July Movement ousted the dictatorship of in order to build “a more democratic, more prosperous, more independent and more just nation.”

Since that time, Cuban society has changed profoundly. Today, the regime that has governed Cuba for half a century has replaced the authoritarian Batista government with a totalitarian one: a single-party communist system in which the State controls the economy, anyone who thinks differently is repressed and the autonomy of civil society is severely limited.

This time the celebrations will be hosted by Raúl Castro, who was confirmed Head of State and chief minister on February 24th, after his brother’s illness in July 2006. Some analysts hoped that, given the pragmatism of the youngest Castro brother and the disastrous situation of the country when he took office, his appointment would usher in a time of economic change that was much needed in Cuban society.

But how can we speak of change in Cuba when there political prisoners are still being held in custody? How can we speak of change when no one has sought to transform a single aspect of the country’s civil and political rights?

While the Revolution’s 50th anniversary is a good time to take stock of the results of that event, reliable information for doing so is difficult to obtain. This document seeks to take an accurate, objective look at those results. The conclusions

-  - drawn herein were based on studies published in journals with editorial review boards and studies conducted by renowned institutions.

Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba (1992 and 2002) affirms that:

“Cuba is an independent and sovereign socialist state of workers, organized with all and for the good of all as a united and democratic republic, for the enjoyment of political freedom, social justice, individual and collective well-being and human solidarity.”

The following analysis compares these ideals of political freedom, social justice, and individual and collective well being established in the Revolution itself, with the reality of life in Cuba today.

-  - Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

I. Political Freedom

The tactics used to Political freedom does not exist in Cuba today. A totalitarian impose the regime’s dictatorship has been installed, with a State that controls mandates include everything and a very weak civil society. The Cuban government threats by police, has eradicated or neutralized institutions that played a crucial criminal prosecution, role in democratic transitions in Eastern Europe. In addition surveillance, arrests, to wiping out the opposition, from the start Castro’s model travel restrictions and covered up the repression of his detractors under the notion of loss of employment for “popular revolutionary responses.” To control Cuban society, political causes he installed a network of government-aligned organizations1 (Human Right Watch, from the national to the municipal level, organizations that are February 18, 2008). accountable to the highest echelons of the Communist Party.

For close to five decades Cuba has restricted virtually all forms of political opposition. Cuban citizens have seen their basic rights systematically eroded, including freedom of expression, privacy, association, movement and due process. The tactics used to impose the regime’s mandates include threats by police, criminal prosecution, surveillance, arrests, travel restrictions and loss of employment for political causes (Human Right Watch, February 18, 2008).

Amnesty International has expressed deep concern about recent “acts of repudiation” in which pro-Government groups insult, intimidate and sometimes even physically assault those they consider to be “counterrevolutionary.”2 These acts are often carried out in collaboration with official security forces, and on some occasions with the participation of Revolutionary Defense Committees or Rapid Response Brigades (Amnesty International, March 17, 2006).

-  - Since the Cuban communist regime took power, thousands of people have been executed and thousands more arbitrarily tried and summarily judged without access to proper legal counsel, as the country has no independent justice system or Rule of Law.

Cuba has the world’s highest rate of imprisonment for political crime. According to Freedom House (2000-2001), thousands of political prisoners are in custody in Cuban prisons, most of them housed in cells alongside dangerous criminals, convicted of vague crimes such as “dissemination of enemy propaganda” or “peligrosidad” (danger to society). There are reliable reports of dissidents being tortured in prisons and psychiatric institutions, where many of those arrested in recent years are now housed.

Cuba also leads the Western hemisphere in capital punishment rates, along with Iran and the Democratic Republic of Congo. According to the “Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation,” 5,000-6,000 people have been condemned to death since 1959, despite the fact that in recent years the use of the death penalty has dropped substantially. A de facto moratorium operated from 2000 to 2003, when it was set aside (Ravsberg, 2004).

According to the “Truth and Memory Project,” there have been approximately 4,038 executions, 1,292 unofficial assassinations, 1,219 balseros (raft people) found dead or disappeared and, according to the (23/04/06) 13,403 Cubans killed in international missions, mostly during 15 years of war in Ethiopia and Angola. What the Castro brothers are leaving is a legacy of blood and injustice.

-  - Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

Cuba also leads the Though the Batista regime was authoritarian and came into Western hemisphere power through a violent coup, there was still enough freedom in capital punishment at that time for more than 120 publications to be in circulation, rates, along with Iran for political opposition parties to exist, for independent, and the Democratic non-government controlled radio and television stations to Republic of Congo. broadcast programs, and for citizens to enter and leave the According to the country freely (Rojas, 2008). “Cuban Commission on Human Rights Fifty years later, Cuba is a different country. As the Freedom and National House report (2008) indicates, Cuba has become the largest Reconciliation,” 5,000- prison for journalists in the region and the only country on the 6,000 people have continent that expressly prohibits freedom of the press. been condemned to death since 1959, According to the Annual Survey of Press Freedom published by despite the fact that in Freedom House3, Venezuela and Cuba are the only countries in recent years the use of Latin America “without freedom of the press,” rating lower than the death penalty has Irak for this parameter (Table Nº1). dropped substantially. The only form of free expression not repressed in Cuba is that of the Communist Party. A short time after Castro’s rise to power, all mass media outlets were confiscated and placed at the service of the Party and the Government. Radio, television, newspapers, magazines and cinemas were given the sole function of disseminating communist ideology.

Cubans are also banned from watching foreign television shows and listening to shortwave radio. To access the Internet, own a fax machine or a computer, Cubans must have a “valid reason” and sign a users’ agreement with provisions that restrict their use of these media. Citizens must also provide suitable reasons to obtain permission to install a telephone.

-  - Cuba’s Constitutions recognizes citizens’ legal right to profess and practice any religion. However, the Government has placed both legal and practical restrictions on freedom of religion.

Table Nº 1 freedom of the press in latinamerica 2007 – 2008

2007 2008

Country Rating Status Rating Status

Costa Rica 20 L 19 L Chile 30 L 30 L Uruguay 30 PL 30 L Bolivia 37 PL 39 PL Rep. Dominicana 40 PL 39 PL Brazil 42 PL 42 PL Perú 42 PL 44 PL 41 PL 41 PL El Salvador 42 PL 42 PL Panamá 43 PL 44 PL Nicaragua 42 PL 43 PL Argentina 49 PL 47 PL México 48 PL 51 PL Honduras 51 PL 51 PL Paraguay 60 PL 60 PL 59 PL 58 PL Colombia 57 PL 59 PL Haití 59 PL 56 PL Venezuela 74 PL 74 PL Cuba 96 NL 94 NL

Source: Freedom House

-  - Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

In general, religious groups that are not registered continue to experience varying degrees of interference, harassment and repression through official channels. The Government has continued its policy of allowing apolitical religious activities only in locations authorized by the Government itself.

In Cuba political rights do not exist. The Communist Party is the only party allowed and it has a monopoly on all political activities on the island, assisted by the so-called “mass organizations.” Citizens are practically forced to belong to one or more of these political organizations or resign themselves to being passed over for jobs, educational opportunities and even access to consumer goods (Martel, 2005).

There are no free elections in Cuba. Indeed, all forms of political organization other than the official party are prohibited (Freedom House, 2001-2002). Dissidents are therefore not allowed, which explains the high rate of political prisoners –including among these 48 young people who were convicted for seeking signatures supporting a referendum, 23 journalists convicted for writing articles against the regime, and 18 librarians for lending banned books (Montaner, 2007).

According to the Freedom in the World index, Cuba is the only Latin American country classified as “not free” (NF). This index is estimated by analyzing the same group of political rights and civil liberties in all countries. (Table Nº2).

-  - Table Nº 2 freedom in the world, latin america 2007–2008

Version* 2007 2008

Years covered 2006 2007 Countries PR CL Status PR CL Status

Chile 1 1 F 1 1 F Costa Rica 1 1 F 1 1 F Panamá 1 2 F 1 2 F Uruguay 1 1 F 1 1 F Argentina 2 2 F 2 2 F Brazil 2 2 F 2 2 F Rep. Dominicana 2 2 F 2 2 F El Salvador 2 3 F 2 3 F Mexico 2 3 F 2 3 F Perú 2 3 F 2 3 F Bolivia 3 3 PF 3 3 PF Colombia 3 3 PF 3 3 PF Ecuador 3 3 PF 3 3 PF Guatemala 3 4 PF 3 4 PF Honduras 3 3 PF 3 3 PF Nicaragua 3 3 PF 3 3 PF Paraguay 3 3 PF 3 3 PF Haiti 4 5 PF 4 5 PF Venezuela 4 4 PF 4 4 PF Cuba 7 7 NF 7 7 NF

Source: Freedom House The political rights and civil liberty are measured with scores from 1 to 7, where 1 represents the highest and 7 the minimum Scores: “PR” Political Rights, “CL” Civil Liberties “F”, “PF” y “NF” represents “free”, “Partially free” and “Not free” respectively.

-  - Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

II Social Justice

Social indicators Defenders of Castro’s regime often argue in favour of illustrate that in 1958 the Cuban model by highlighting its social achievements Cuba was one of (Ciem, 1999; González, 1999). These individuals affirm that the most prosperous “social indicators have allowed Cuba to achieve a degree and egalitarian of equity by applying centralized economic planning and societies in the State intervention in all social policy sectors” (Ciem, 1999: Americas, surpassed 54). They highlight the fact that Cuba has the best life only by Argentina expectancy, infant mortality and unemployment rates in and Uruguay in its Latin America. socio-demographic indicators. Indeed, However, caution should be taken when drawing at that time Cuba’s conclusions about the benefits of the Cuban model. Social social and economic indicators illustrate that in 1958 Cuba was one of the indicators were notably most prosperous and egalitarian societies in the Americas, similar to those of less surpassed only by Argentina and Uruguay in its socio- developed European demographic indicators. Indeed, at that time Cuba’s social countries such as and economic indicators were notably similar to those and Portugal (Noriega, of less developed European countries such as Spain and 2007). Portugal (Noriega, 2007).

Of the 122 countries analyzed, Cuba ranked 22nd for health indicators, with 128.6 doctors and dentists per 100,000 inhabitants, surpassing countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Belgium. Cuba also had one of the lowest mortality rates in the world (5.8 annually per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to the US rate of 9.5) and literacy on the island stood at 80%, similar to Chile and Costa Rica, and higher than in Portugal.

-  - In that regard, it is wrong to think that Cuba before the revolution was a radically different country with a low level of development. Indeed, in the 1950s it was a nation whose economic and social indicators were on the rise. The country was in the forefront of development in Latin America along with countries such as Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Before the Revolution, the conditions were in place in Cuba for the country’s steady social advancement; but this was not to be, as shows in Table Nº 3.

The indicators above illustrate the changes that have taken place since the Revolution five decades ago. The low unemployment rate has been achieved with artificial employment supplied by the government, while at the same time both salaries and pensions have dropped.

Table Nº 3 Social Indicators in cuba 1989-2007

Indicator 1989 2007 2007/1989 Open unemployment (%) 7,9 1,8 -77 Real Salary (pesos) 188 45 -76 Real pension (pesos) 56 22* -61 Infant mortality (x 1,000 inhab.) 11,1 5,3 -52 Maternal mortality (x 100,000 live births) 29,2 49,4** 69 Dwellings for 1,000 inhab. 6,1 4,6 -25

* figure from 2006. ** The preliminary figure is 31.1, a dramatic drop that requires confirmation. Therefore the figure from 2006 was used. Sources: CCE 1991, ONE 2001 to 2008; Salary from Vidal 2007, Pension from Mesa-Lago 2008; and dwellings from Mesa- Lago based on population and homes built, from CCE, ONE 2001 to 2008.

- 10 - Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

In real terms, salaries in 2007 were 76% lower than in 1989 (Mesa-Lago, 2008: 18). Raúl Castro acknowledged this in his July 26th speech when he stated that “the [minimum] salary is insufficient for meeting [people’s] needs.” Castro went on to affirm that this has made it practically impossible to fulfill the socialist ideal that each individual will contribute according to his ability and receive according to his need, and he therefore advocated a better fit between salaries and prices.

Since the passing of a 1962 legal decree, the monthly food basket has been assigned a fixed monthly price. Each Cuban receives a basket that contains food (except red meat), cleaning products and personal hygiene supplies, but these are only enough to last for about 15 days of the month. Since the state-run markets do not sell supplementary goods and deal in rations, citizens are therefore forced to purchase goods they lack on the black market.

One of Cuba’s most positive indicators is its infant mortality rate, which is the lowest in the hemisphere after Canada. This indicator must be clarified, however, as the rate has been very low since 1958, when it stood at 40.0 for every 1,000 live births, better than France (41.9), Japan (48.9), and Italy (52.8). By 2007 Cuba had reduced its infant mortality rate to 5.3, but the nations mentioned had reduced theirs even further (France, 4.2; Japan, 3.2 and Italy, 5.0).

Even though this represents an improvement, maintaining such a low rate requires funneling massive funds into a problem that was already mostly solved, while many other urgent and severe needs like drinking water infrastructure, food supply, low pensions and housing still need to be addressed (Mesa- Lago, 2005: 197).

- 11 - Indeed, housing is one of the most dramatic aspects of life in Cuba. While the population doubled between 1959 and 2007, there were less new homes built than the number destroyed from disrepair and lack of maintenance. Because new construction has not kept pace with such losses, or with those resulting from hurricanes and tropical storms in recent years (Mesa-Lago, 2008:19-20), the housing rate per 1,000 inhabitants in Cuba dropped by 25% between 1989 and 2007.

Neither has the country achieved social equality, an issue that was used as a rallying flag by Castro’s group. Though no official statistics exist on income distribution, estimations by Cubans and foreigners indicate that income disparity has worsened (Noguera, 2005; Mesa-Lago, 2005; Espina, 2008). Segmented markets and remittances received by other segments of the population have increased that inequality.

Table Nº 4 cuba : indicators of inequality 1989-1999

Income Quintiles Ratio between GINI Poorest Wealthiest wealthiest and Years Coefficient (0-20%) (81-100%) poorest (20/20) 1986 0,22 11,3 33,8 3,3 1989 0,25 8,8 33,9 3,8 1995 0,55 1996 0,39 4,8 54,4 11,3 1996-98 0,38* 1999 0,407 4,3 58,1 13,5

* 1996-1998, Urban Population. ECLAC, (2006): Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean. Source: Mesa-Lago, Carmelo (2005). “Social and economic problems in Cuba during the crisis an recovery”. Cepal Review 86.

- 12 - Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

From the time As the table Nº 4 shows, inequality has persisted and even the Republic was worsened over time. The Gini coefficient rose from 0.22 in established in 1902 1986 to 0.407 in 1999, while the income ratio between the until Castro came to wealthiest 20% of the population and the poorest rose from power, Cuba was a 3.8 to 13.5 between 1989 and 1999. Over the same period, country that welcomed the same rich/poor income ratio rose from 11.90 to 19.91 workers from all across Latin America. nations, especially Spain. Since the fabled Cuba’s Gini coefficient is comparable to the coefficient for revolution, however, the rest of Latin America. However, between 1986 and 1999, the tables have turned; the income ratio of the wealthiest 20% of the population to more than one million the poorest 20% grew by a factor of 3.85, while in the rest Cubans have escaped of Latin America it grew by a factor of 1.674. from their own country by any means possible, A final and moving illustration of Cuban vulnerability while practically no concerns emigration. According to the National Office foreigners —not even of Statistics (ONE), at the end of 2006 Cuba had 3,000 the most ardently inhabitants less than in the previous year. The two causes nostalgic advocates cited for this demographic downshift are the low birth rate of communism from and emigration. Eastern Europe and Russia— have shown a As Montaner (1999:16) points out, from the time the desire to move to the Republic was established in 1902 until Castro came to power, island. Cuba was a country that welcomed workers from all nations, especially Spain. Since the fabled revolution, however, the tables have turned; more than one million Cubans have escaped from their own country by any means possible, while practically no foreigners —not even the most ardently nostalgic advocates of communism from Eastern Europe and Russia— have shown a desire to move to the island.

- 13 - III. Individual and Collective Well Being

In its pursuit of socialism, Cuba implemented a highly centralized economic model in which the State owns virtually all means of production, controlling the production and distribution of goods through centralized planning.

Table Nº 5 cuba : economic indicators 1989,1993 and 2003

Variation Indicator 1989 1993 2003 2003/1989 (%)

Internal Macroeconomic Indicators

Average annual GDP growth 1982-1989 2,9 -0,5 -83 and 1990-2003 (%) Per capita GDP (constant pesos) 1852 1172 1538 -17 Investment/GDP (%) 15,2 6,7 7,8 -19 Fiscal balance/GDP (%) -7,2 -33,5 -3,2 -56

External (in millions)

Goods exported (pesos) 5,4 1,1 1,6 -70 Goods imported (pesos) 8,1 2,0 4,6 -13 Trade deficit (pesos) 2,7 0,9 3,0 11 Terms of Trade (1989=100) 100,0 64,4 44,3 -56 Foreign Debt (US dollars) 6,2 8,8 11,0 77 Foreign Aid/Investment (US dollars) 6,0 2,5 -58 Exchange rate (pesos per US dollar) 7 78 26 271 Gross tourism revenue (US dollars) 550 700 1996 262 Remittances (US dollars) 0 0 915

Source for 1989: Comité Estatal de Estadísticas (1991); for 1993: ONE (1998); for 2002-2003: ONE (2003 y 2004) and CEPAL (2004); for foreign aid/investment and terms of trade: Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López (2005); for remittances: ECLAC (2003).

- 14 - Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

Over the last fifty years, Cuba became completely economically dependent on the Soviet Union based on its production of a single product: sugar. The failure and subsequent collapse of the USSR forced the island nation to diversify its economy, but the deficiencies of the model, including its lack of private property rights and failure to recognize the benefits of a free and open market economy, have hindered progress. The table below shows the most reliable recent indicators5 on the Cuban economy.

As Table Nº5 shows, Cuba’s GDP rose by 2.9% annually between 1981 and 1989. However, over the 1991-2003 period6 economic growth slowed to an estimated annual rate of –0.5%. This negative growth reduced per capita GDP by 17% from 1989 to 2003 (Mesa-Lago, 2005: 186).

A more long term perspective on the Cuban model’s inability to ensure the well being of its citizens can be seen in Table 6, which compares per capita income in 7 countries: Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Spain, Portugal, Mexico and Chile. In

Table Nº 6 ranking of income per capita

Country GDP 1957* GDP 2007** Venezuela 1 4 Argentina 2 6 Cuba 3 7 España 4 1 Portugal 5 2 México 6 5 Chile 7 3

* Source: Atlas of Economic Development (1965) Norton Ginsburg ** Source: United Nations Statistics Division (2008)

- 15 - 1957, Cuba ranked third on this list; by last year the country ranked last.

The modest market reforms implemented between 1993 and 1996 were able to reactivate the economy somewhat, but it soon slowed down again and in 2003 began to backslide. Social indicators improved after 1994, but again in 2003 a number of them had still not reached their 1989 level, while poverty and inequality had increased yet again (Mesa-Lago, 2005).

Today, Cuba has one of the worst trade balances on the planet. Low agricultural yields have required the importation of massive amounts of food that, along with fuel and medicine, now account for more than 60% of total imports and use up more than 80% of the country’s foreign exchange, and there is no chance of reverting the situation in the short term.

The figures above confirm the weakness of the Cuban economy, especially now that it is not receiving the long term, very low- interest loans that the USSR used to provide to cover the annual trade deficit. Indeed, Cuba has defaulted on loan payments to South Africa, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Spain, France, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom and other countries. At the end of 2007, Cuba had an estimated foreign debt of US$37.905 Billion, equal to US$3,410 per inhabitant, three times the Latin American average of US$1,173 (Mesa-Lago, 2008:14).

As Oppenheimer (2008) has stated, the Cuban Government blames its problems on the US trade embargo, but this instrument is so full of holes that it can hardly be blamed for the island’s low quality of life. The is now the main exporter of food products to the island and many other US products enter Cuba via other countries as well.

- 16 - Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

IV. Conclusion

Fifty years after the As stated in Article 1 of the Constitution of 1992, and reaffirmed triumph of the 26th in the 2002 version, the purpose of the Revolution was to of July Movement, create a democratic Cuba in which citizens would enjoy political the country has freedom, social justice and individual and collective well being. clearly failed to achieve that aim, Fifty years after the triumph of the 26th of July Movement, the and Cubans have country has clearly failed to achieve that aim, and Cubans have paid paid an enormous an enormous price in the loss of basic freedom. The government price in the loss of decides what citizens will study, where they can work, where basic freedom. The they can shop and even whether or not they can travel abroad. government decides In Cuba there is no political freedom or freedom of expression. In what citizens will Cuba there is no social justice. Instead, the population’s standard study, where they of living has worsened visibly. Cubans cannot continue to live on can work, where a basket of goods that lasts two weeks at most, even if it is well- they can shop and subsidized. Cuba today is becoming poorer and poorer, more even whether dependent on foreign aid and less free. or not they can travel abroad. In In fifty years, what had been the fourth largest economy inL atin Cuba there is no America has dropped to one of the lowest-ranked in the region. political freedom The nation that received European migrants in the first half of or freedom of the 20th Century has become a community of five hundred expression. In Cuba thousand potential migrants. there is no social justice. Instead, With Raúl Castro’s ascent to power, expectation grew that the population’s changes would be made to the country’s unsustainable model. standard of living Two years later, however, he has held onto power and allowed has worsened visibly. only minor signs of reform that remain insufficient. Lacking his brother’s charisma, Raúl Castro has had to face the growing disaffection of the general population, especially among youth. According to a recently published survey, half of all Cubans

- 17 - perceive the country’s situation to be “bad” or “very bad,”7 and those polled felt especially affected by the high cost of living and lack of housing. The level of public services is below expectations also. Despite the shortages they have had to face, however, Cubans affirm that the country’s most urgent priority is the organization of free elections.

The economic changes that appear to be on the horizon are needed, but they are far from being sufficient to guarantee economic growth and social well being. There is a further need for legal reforms to guarantee the basic freedoms of a free and democratic society. The Cuban people must be able to express their ideas freely without fear of reprisals from a President who tells them what they are allowed to say; they have waited decades for the chance to do so.

Cuba’s revolutionary regime has been credited with great advancements in public health and education and in sponsorship of culture and sports, particularly during its close relationship with the Soviet Union. However, as statistics published by the U.N., World Health Organization and the International Labour Organization illustrate, those developments were based upon the achievements of the pre-Castro Republic. On the other hand, the enormous price that has been paid in terms of political repression, human rights violations, lack of basic rights and subjugation of Cuban sovereignty to the interests of the Soviet block—not to mention the fact that 20% of the country’s population now lives outside of Cuba—leads one to question whether the Castro brothers’ revolution has been justified.

This is the moment of truth for Cuba. If the country still wishes to achieve political freedom, social justice and collective and individual well being, what is the best recipe? Democracy and the free market.

- 18 - Cuba 50 year s af ter the Revolution: Total Failure

signants :

Carlos Alberto Montaner Internacional Liberal, Cuba Alvaro Vargas Llosa Independent Institute, EEUU Enrique Ghersi CITEL, Perú Ian Vásquez CATO, EE.UU Carlos Ball AIPE, Venzuela Lorenzo Bernaldo de Quirós Freemarket, España Gerardo Bongiovanni Fundación Libertad, Argentina Rocío Guijarro CEDICE, Venezuela Cristián Larroulet Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile Dorita de Ampuero Instituto de Economia Política, Ecuador Martín Krause ESEADE, Argentina Marcela Prieto Instituto de Ciencia Política , Colombia

* Our thanks for the colaboration of Claudia Hernández from Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile.

- 19 - Notes:

1 This network includes leading entities (the Communist Party), popular organizations (Revolutionary Defence Committees, Federation of Cuban Women, National Association of Small Farmers, etc.), government agencies (ministries and quasi-ministerial institutions), educational organizations that disseminate and reiterate the official party line (schools, universities and media channels), and the courts.

2 Readers unfamiliar with such events may refer to: http://www.cubademocraciayvida.org/web/article.asp?artID=1375, which contains an article by Eloy A. González entitled “¿Qué es un acto de repudio?” (What Is An Act of Repudiation?).

3 Annual Survey of Press Freedom 2002, prepared by The Freedom House, is a survey of 187 countries that has been conducted since 1979. Countries are described as Free, Partially Free and Not Free based on the degree to which they allow the free flow of information. Countries with scores of 0 to 30 are described as Free, those who score between 31 and 60 are considered Partially Free, and those with a score of 61 or higher are considered Not Free.

4 The average income distribution in Latin America, which reflects the distance between the richest and poorest income quintiles in 1986, was generated on the basis of data for Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Peru; for 1999 it is based on data for Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica and Paraguay, as those were the only countries with data available. Source: ECLAC (2007).

5 The table covers 1989, 1993 and 2003 because the data for those years was the most complete. Table obtained from Mesa- Lago (2005: 185).

6 A serious problem with evaluating the evolution of GDP from 1989-2003 is that in 2001 the base year used to calculate constant prices was changed from 1981 to 1997. The new series issued by the National Statistics Office (2002 and 2003) only shows data for 1996-2003, and when compared to the same years in the previous series (1998 and 2001), leads to a systematic annual increase of 60% in GDP, a serious anomaly that is unexplained by the authorities. The new series does not go back to 1989, so it is impossible to compare the GDP of the two series for 1989-1995 (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López, 2005).

7 The Voice of Survey that was conducted in late 2007 interviewed 150 Cuban citizens in the capital city. This was a quantitative survey with the participation of residents of 15 municipalities of Havana who responded to 100 questions on various topics (government infrastructure, human rights, government effectiveness, corruption, health and education). (Van de Aar et al 2008: 8-9).

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