sign in sign up
<<
Home , Alfredo Duran, Alpha 66, Angry Boys, Armando Valladares, Baggage (The Americans), Bay of Pigs

Diplomacy and Human Migration: A of U.S. Relations with during the Late

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Hideaki Kami

Graduate Program in History

The Ohio State University

2015

Dissertation Committee:

Professor Robert J. McMahon, Adviser

Professor Peter L. Hahn, Co-adviser

Professor Stephanie J. Smith

Copyright by

Hideaki Kami

2015

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes U.S.-Cuban relations by focusing on the interaction of diplomacy and human migration during the late Cold War years. It explores how the U.S. government reformulated its Cuban policy in light of ’s institutionalization of power while, at the same time, trying to build a new relationship with the Cuban-

American community as the latter forged a new, politically mobilized constituency within

U.S. society. Based on historical sources from the , Cuba, and other countries, I argue that the triangular relations among Washington, , and formidably reinforced the status quo. As hundreds of thousands of Cuban-Americans participated in U.S. politics in the hope of toppling the Castro regime, the U.S. government could no longer dismiss their concerns as completely alien to the national interest. But while committing to “freedom” in Cuba in their public statements, U.S. policy-makers in fact placed a higher priority on stability in the Sea; they collaborated with the Cuban government to prevent migration crises such as the 1980

Mariel boatlift, one of the largest and most traumatic in modern U.S. history. By exploring the interactions of diplomacy and human migration, this dissertation not only analyzes the contradictory nature of U.S. policy toward Cuba but also illuminates how the making of U.S. foreign policy has changed due to the inflow of people from other parts of the world.

ii

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Yuji Kami, who always supported my

endeavor.

iii

Acknowledgement

My academic journey toward completing a Ph.D. dissertation has received much support and encouragement from countless persons and institutions. When I entered the

University of , the Funou Foundation assisted my undergraduate study and several overseas trips. When I continued at the University of Tokyo for its graduate program, the

Japan Society for the Promotion of supported me. For the first two years at The

Ohio State University, the -United States Educational Commission granted me a

Fulbright Fellowship. Without their support, my quest for a Ph.D. degree would have been an unfulfilled dream.

Generous grants from the Ohio State University’s Department of History,

Mershon Center, Center for American Studies, and College of Arts and played crucial roles in advancing my research. Outside support from the Society for

Historians of American Foreign Relations, the Presidential Foundation, and the George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, also provided important support as well. A pre-doctoral research fellowship from the University of

Miami’s Cuban Heritage Collection gave me the opportunity to conduct intensive research in Miami for three months. I was fortunate to receive a Presidential Fellowship from the Graduate School of the Ohio State University, which enabled me to devote the final year of my Ph.D. program to writing this dissertation.

iv

In Tokyo, I was lucky to discover a topic that inspired my intellectual curiosity and passion. My undergraduate adviser, Hitoshi Takahashi, sparked my interest in migration and Cuban relations with the United States. Testuya Amino, Jun Ishibashi,

Hideo Kimura, Ayako Saito, Fumihiko Takemura, and Keiichi Tsunekawa also supported my study of and understood my interest in North America. I am forever thankful to Jun Furuya. Not only did he accept me as his advisee, but he also guided my study, nurtured my intellectual development, and spent countless hours and days consulting with this young scholar. His classes were intellectually stimulating and instrumental to my growth, as were those of Yasuo Endo, Kenryu Hashikawa, Takeshi

Igarashi, Fumiaki Kubo, Fumiko Nishizaki, Masako Notoji, Takuya Sasaki, and Yujin

Yaguchi, who had superb knowledge of U.S. politics, culture, and history. Ryan Irwin,

Itsuki Kurashina, Sidney Pash, Sayuri Shimizu, and Paul Sracic gave me very helpful advice during my transition to Ohio State.

My choice of Ohio State as the site for my graduate study proved fortuitous. Peter

Hahn, Robert McMahon, Mitch Lerner, and Jennifer Siegel have created an outstanding diplomatic history program. Lilia Fernández, Steven Conn, Donna Guy, Stephanie Smith, and David Stebenne introduced me to new themes in Latin American and U.S. history.

Philip Brown, Alice Conklin, Peter Hahn, and Stephanie Smith created an intellectual environment in their writing seminars. I was delighted that Stephanie Smith agreed to join my dissertation committee and believe her perspectives have added much to my research. Jim Bach, Ashley Bowerman, Chris Burton, Katherine Eckstrand, Jane

Hathaway, Clay Howard, Robin Judd, Steve McCann, Rich Ugland, and Kristina Ward

v kept me out of administrative trouble. David Lincove always helped me find books, journals, and databases at Ohio State University Libraries. I thank Peter Hahn for his exacting standards, always pushing me to be a better scholar, and inspiring me with his devotion to the field of diplomatic history. I am most indebted to Robert McMahon, who encouraged me to study at Ohio State, served as my adviser, and provided heartfelt backing during the various difficult points in graduate school.

I was also lucky to spend my time in Columbus with an exceptional group of graduate students. Matthew Ambrose, Dani Anthony, Alexandra Castillo, Nicholas

Crane, Reyna Esquivel-King, Delia Fernández, Megan Hasting, Steven Higley, Patrick

Potyondy, Ryan Schultz, Spencer Tyce, Leticia Wiggins, and many other participants in formal and informal writing seminars read my chapters, gave me suggestions, and helped me improve my writing skills. Patrick provided breaks from my intellectual efforts by inviting me to pick-up soccer games on Ohio State’s gorgeous field. Will Chou, my friend, fellow historian, and language-exchange partner, contributed to this project in countless ways. He always stepped forward to offer valuable assistance, discover methods of collaboration, and make my life in the United States much easier.

A great number of academics, archivists, and staff members outside Ohio State helped me produce this study. María Cristina García, Tanya Harmer, Yuko Ito, Yasuhiro

Koike, William LeoGrande, Alan McPherson, Louis A. Pérez, Kanako Yamaoka, and two anonymous readers for the Journal of Cold War Studies, read part of this research in one form or another, giving me inspirational comments, thoughtful criticisms, and wonderful suggestions. I thank Isami Romero Hosino for inviting me to join his panels to

vi present papers on various occasions. Yuki Oda, my senpai, always used his experience to show the path forward for me. Takahito Moriyama let me stay at his place during my research in Tallahassee, . I also acknowledge my sincere gratitude to David

Engstrom, who generously provided me with his interview transcripts, as well as Myles

Frechette and Robert Gelbard, who shared with me accounts of their service for the

United States.

Numerous archivists and staff members extended timely and invaluable help to me. In Miami, I was in the good hands of María R. Estorino, Gladys Gómez-Rossie,

Annie Sansone-Martínez, and Rosa Monzón-Alvarez of the ’s Cuban

Heritage Collection, as well as Christina Favretto, Beatrice Skokan, Cory Czajkowski, and Yvette Yurubi of the University of Miami’s Special Collections. Koichi Tasa made my stay in Miami more accommodating. I learned greatly about the

Cubans from my meetings with Alfredo Durán, Francisco Hernández, and Marifeli Pérez-

Stable. Matthew Angles, archivist at the Cuban American National Foundation, not only opened the door to the archive, but also assisted me in sifting through unprocessed materials.

My research in Havana benefited tremendously from conversations with Carlos

Alzugaray, Jesús Arboleya, García Entenza. Néstor García Iturbe, Lázaro Mora, José

Luis Padrón, Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, José Viera, among others. Raynier Pellón

Azopardo at the Centro de Investigaciones de Política Internacional went out of his way to process my academic visas. I enjoyed working with Eduardo Válido and Renier

González Hernández at the Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. My

vii friendship and collaboration with Elier Ramírez Cañedo was a great pleasure, one which I hope to continue in the future. Margarita Fonseca expanded my contacts in Havana with her introductions. I will never forget my gratitude to Gloria León, who helped navigate my study from the very beginning, and Piero Gleijeses, who put me in touch with her.

The archivists and staffs of the Archivo General de México, the Archivo Histórico

Genaro Estrada, the Library and Archive of , and the National Archives of the

United Kingdom were all professional, friendly, and quick to help. Of special mention are

Brittany at the Library, Shelly Williams at the

Library, and Zachary Roberts at the George H. W. Bush Library. They patiently processed my mandatory review requests for thousands of U.S. records. Numerous others, especially those in Florida-based archives, contributed to this study by offering me their research assistance.

My family was my greatest source of support throughout this endeavor. I deeply appreciate the understanding of my mother, Keiko, and my brother, Tomoaki, for my pursuit of an academic career. It is regrettable that my late father, Yuji Kami, cannot see this work, which is dedicated to him with all respect for what he had done for me.

Finally, Chen Zhang made my otherwise lonely life richer and more enjoyable. I am grateful to her translation of a Russian memoir for this study, and am proud of her forthcoming dissertation on Russian . Hopefully, we can be united in Tokyo soon.

viii

Vita

2003...... Tsuru High, Yamanashi, Japan

2008...... B.A., The University of Tokyo

2010...... M.A., The University of Tokyo

2010-2011 …………………………………. Research Fellow (DC1), Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

2011 to present ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University

2015 to present …………………………….. Presidential Fellow, The Ohio State University

Publications

“The Limits of Dialogue: Washington, Havana, and Miami, 1977-1980.” Journal of Cold War Studies, forthcoming 2016.

“Ethnic Community, Party Politics, and the Cold War: The Political Ascendancy of Miami , 1980-2000.” Japanese Journal of American Studies 23 (2012): 185-208.

“The Ebb and Flow of Cold War Tensions: The U.S. Government and Anti-Castro Exiles from 1980 to 1992.” Pacific and American Studies 11 (March 2011): 51-71.

Fields of Study

Major Field: History

ix

TABLE of CONTENTS

Abstract ...... ii Dedication ...... iii Acknowledgement ...... iv Vita ...... ix Abbreviations ...... xi

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER 1: Between and Counterrevolution ...... 21

CHAPTER 2: The Legacy of Violence ...... 64

CHAPTER 3: A Time for Dialogue? ...... 102

CHAPTER 4: The Crisis of 1980 ...... 165

CHAPTER 5: Superhero’s Dilemma ...... 215

CHAPTER 6: Reaching Equilibrium ...... 261

CHAPTER 7: Making Foreign Policy Domestic? ...... 311

CONCLUSION ...... 378

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 390

x

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the text.

AIPAC American Israel Public Affairs Committee CANF Cuban American National Foundation CDA Cuban “Democracy” Act of 1992, United States CIA Central Intelligence Agency, United States CORU Comando de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas CUINT Cuban Interests Section DFS Dirección Federal de Seguridad, FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States FLNC Frente de Liberación Nacional de Cuba FMLN Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, INS Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States NSC National Security Council, United States NSPG National Security Group, United States OAS Organization of American States PD Presidential Directive POW Prisoners of War PRM Presidential Review Memorandum, United States RECE Representación Cubana del Exilio RIG Restricted Interagency Group, United States

xi

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SCC Special Coordination Committee, United States SNOWI Senior Naval Officer, West Indies, Great Britain UNCHR Commission on Human Rights USICA United States Information and Cultural Agency USINT United States Interests Section VOA Voice of America

xii

INTRODUCTION

On December 17, 2014, and Raúl Castro turned a new page of

U.S.-Cuban relations by declaring the intention to normalize diplomatic relations. After an 18-month-long secret negotiation over prisoner swaps, the announcement signaled the beginning of the end of half a century of mutual hostility. Amid a flurry of posts, tweets, and broadcasts on the global mass media, Cubans on the street waved the two nations’ flags in support of a historic change in bilateral relations. With the lifting of travel restrictions finally in sight, many Americans expressed wishes to visit Cuba, where they could enjoy cigars, mojitos, music, beaches, and a warm . The new policies enjoyed solid public support, as indicated in polls taken after the announcement in both countries. Whereas 63 percent of U.S. citizens favored normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba, 97 percent of Cubans agreed that normalization of relations was good for their country.1

Public approval for the new policy did not necessarily deter the campaign against the improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations. A leading opponent was , a senator from Florida of Cuban descent, who blasted Obama’s policy shift in an interview,

1 Pew Research Poll, “Most Support Stronger U.S. Ties with Cuba,” January 16, 2015, http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/01/1-15-15-Cuba-release.pdf (accessed October 25, 2015); and Washington Post (hereafter WP) (online), “Poll shows vast majority of Cubans welcome closer ties with U.S.,” April 8, 2015. For an account of U.S.-Cuban negotiations prior to the announcement, see William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, “Inside the Crazy Back-Channel Negotiations That Revolutionized Our Relationship with Cuba,” Mother Jones, August 12, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/secret-negotiations-gross-hernandez-kerry-pope- obama-castro-cuba (accessed August 13, 2015). 1 even prior to the announcement. “My own interest in Cuba has been always furthering democracy and freedom,” he declared. “Nothing that the President will announce today is going to further that goal.”2 Former Florida governor Jeb Bush, along with many other hopefuls in the Republican Party for the 2016 presidential election, soon joined him. Both

Rubio and Bush had deep political roots in Miami, a major stronghold of anti-Castro politics in the United States for the last three decades. For them, normalization of relations would forego the U.S. commitment to “freedom” in Cuba, a neighboring country just 90 miles away.3

Yet unlike in previous decades, such advocacy no longer proved effective. In his

January 2015 State of Union address, Obama described the previous U.S. policy as outdated. “When what you’re doing doesn’t work for 50 years,” he said, “it’s time to try something new.”4 With the backing of U.S. public opinion and the blessing of Latin

American governments, Obama moved forward. At the Seventh Summit of the in April, the U.S. president had the first substantial meeting with a Cuban president in more than five decades. In May, he removed Cuba from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Republican-majority Congress ignored his request for the lifting of the embargo on Cuba. Yet in the following summer, the two countries restored

2 Statement by Rubio, available at http://video.foxnews.com/v/3947931342001/sen-rubio-blasts- white-houses-absurd-cuba-concessions/?playlist_id=2114913880001#sp=show-clips/daytime (accessed September 1, 2015). 3 Pema Levy, “Rubio Leads Opposition to Obama’s Cuba Shift,” Newsweek (online), December 17, 2014; Sean Sullivan, “The Four Biggest Things Marco Rubio’s Cuba Moment Said about His Political Future,” WP (online), December 18, 2015; and Sabrina Siddiqui, “Marco Rubio: I will absolutely roll back Obama Cuba Policy,” Guardian (online), July 10, 2015. 4 Remarks by Obama, January 20, 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 (accessed September 1, 2015). 2 diplomatic relations, reopened the embassies in each capital, and agreed to discuss the remaining outstanding matters, such as the embargo and human rights issues.

The unexpected ease with which the process of restoring diplomatic relations occurred poses a question of why this did not take place much earlier. Obama’s White

House argued that decades of U.S. isolation of Cuba had failed. Such understanding, however, was hardly new. After the of 1959, the U.S. government sponsored counterrevolutionary forces, imposed an embargo, and resorted to other hostile measures. As Fidel Castro nonetheless remained in power and contested U.S. foreign policy, the notion of failure already had appeared by the 1970s. The end of the Cold War did not change such an assessment but rather highlighted Washington’s unparalleled inflexibility.5 Although the U.S. government expanded economic relations with China,

Vietnam, and other communist countries, it strengthened the embargo on Cuba and forbade most travel to the island. Why did the United States treat Cuba so differently?

Trying to answer such questions, historians, political scientists, sociologists, and migration scholars direct their attention to Miami Cubans. More than a million Cubans moved to the United States, principally , in opposition to Fidel Castro and his brother, Raúl. Despite comprising less than one percent of the U.S. population, scholars claim, these anti-Castro have wielded a disproportionate

5 On U.S. assessments of the embargo’s effectiveness, see for example, Appendix F “US and OAS Sanctions against Cuba (1962-Present),” included in CIA Research Paper, “: A Historical Analysis,” March 1989, in folder “Cuba (General) January-June 1990 [4],” NSC: William T. Pryce Files, George H. W. Bush Library (hereafter GHWBL). The CIA concluded that the isolation in fact benefited Castro by allowing him to solidify his rule over the island. 3 amount of political influence on the making of U.S. policy toward Cuba. They created a powerful ethnic lobby in Washington, allied with influential politicians like Rubio and

Bush, and formed a solid voting bloc in Florida, a large and important state in U.S. elections. Only recently, perhaps as a result of a generational shift, did Cuban Americans show support for greater ties to their homeland, a goal that Obama pursued in his

“historical” move.6

In light of such arguments, this study explores the complex “triangular” dynamics among Washington, Havana, and Miami. The main sources of the U.S.-Cuban dispute have been ideological rivalries, disparities of power and resources, and fundamental differences in attitude. Yet, because Cuban émigrés in South Florida intervened in international politics at critical moments, relations between Washington and Havana also intermingled with political dynamics of the Cuban-American community. Drawing on international and multi-archival research, this study complicates traditional diplomatic historical accounts that mainly focus on the two national capitals. It analyzes how the

U.S. government reformulated its Cuban policy in response to Fidel Castro’s

6 For example, see Stephen G. Rabe, “U.S. Relations with Latin America, 1961 to the Present: A Historiographical Review,” in Robert D. Schulzinger, ed., A Companion to American Foreign Relations (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), p. 395; and Soraya M. Castro Mariño, “Cuban-U.S. Relations, 1989-2002: A View from Havana,” in H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds., Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy: The Impact of the ‘‘’’ (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), pp. 305-332. For works that underscore Miami Cubans’ political influence, see also, Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, Unfinished Business: America and Cuba after the Cold War, 1989-2001 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005); Melanie M. Ziegler, U.S.-Cuban Cooperation: Past, Present, and Future (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007); Susan E. Eckstein, The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the US and Their Homeland (New York: Routledge, 2009); and Henriette M. Rytz, Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban-American Story of Success and Failure (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 4 institutionalization of power, while at the same time, trying to build a new relationship with the Cuban-American community as the latter forged a new, politically mobilized constituency within U.S. society.

In doing so, this study analyzes the migration-diplomacy interaction, a topic that has not received adequate attention up to this day. The promotion and control of migration had been one of the most important considerations for policymakers across the boundaries of nation-states during the Cold War. Yet, as seen in the advocacy of Miami

Cubans, the migrants not only contested nation-states’ regulation of population flows, but also actively pursued foreign policy agendas that did not necessarily match those of policymakers in the capitals, especially in terms of priorities. To achieve their ends, the

Cuban émigrés took diverse political actions in the United States and beyond. Their activities traverse otherwise separate themes across disciplinary and territorial boundaries, as seen in this work’s analysis of migration crises, terrorism, ethnic lobbies, and party politics.

It was the massive inflow of Cubans that prompted the transformation of Miami into one of the most important U.S. with strong ties to Latin America. While responding to the ebb and flow of Cold War tensions and the development of U.S. two- party politics, the dynamics of Miami Cuban politics in turn had significant implications for the broader realm of foreign relations. It is difficult to agree with those who claim that migration defines the composition of and therefore is the single most important

5 determinant in the making of foreign policy.7 Yet, by assessing the demographic change in the “nation” and the mixture of U.S. and non-U.S. politics, this study traces the gradual yet ongoing transformation of U.S. “national interests” and asserts that migration is important to the fabric of international power relations. Diplomacy may outline migration, but the international movement of people also helps to shape the contours of foreign relations in the long run.

In exploring Washington-Havana-Miami relations, this study ties together the three major emerging themes of the historical scholarship. First and foremost, any analysis of U.S.-Cuban relations should examine Havana-Washington relations within the international context, especially the global Cold War. The traditional Cold War scholarship was overwhelmingly Eurocentric, paying exclusive attention to the United

States and the . Yet, in recent years historians have gone beyond the traditional assumption of the Cold War as a superpower battle, moved the so-called Third

World to the center of their scholarship, and highlighted the global dimension of the conflicts that incorporated uncountable smaller powers and non-state actors.8 In light of such trends, scholars have reexamined and underscored Havana’s leading role in the Cold

War, especially in Latin America and . It was Havana, rather than , that

7 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Press, 1975), pp. 23-24. 8 Robert J. McMahon, ed., The Cold War in the Third World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 3-4. For leading examples, see for example, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: ’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 6 emerged as a principal foe of Washington at times.9

The Cold War aggravated, broadened, and prolonged U.S.-Cuban conflicts. Yet, caution should be exercised not to reduce the source of U.S.-Cuban conflicts only to differing ideologies and geostrategic interests. Cuba gained formal independence in 1902.

Yet as historian Louis A. Pérez, Jr. explains, almost all aspects of Cuban lives, ranging from political economy to cultural representation, came under the overwhelming influence of North American hegemony. The Revolution of 1959 marked a radical break with this past, creating tensions between rising Cuban and the status quo favored by traditional U.S. policy imperatives. This study affirms that not only imbalances in power and resources, but also fundamental differences in attitudes between and hegemonic states, characterized the geographical and ideological battles of the two nations facing each other across the Florida Straits.10

Nonetheless, precisely because of Miami’s importance in the making of U.S. foreign policy, it is necessary to analyze the changing relations between Washington and

Miami. Despite frequent references to Cuban-American political influence, few have primarily focused on the complex development of relationships between the U.S.

9 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); idem., Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); and Tanya Harmer, Allende’s and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 10 Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); idem., Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Lars Schoultz, That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); and Castro Mariño and Pruessen, eds., Fifty Years of Revolution. 7 government and the Cuban American community.11 In contrast, this study weighs the impact of massive Cuba-to-U.S. migration on U.S. society and the shifting calculations of

U.S. national interests. It belongs to “New Diplomatic History,” which looks beyond

“what one clerk said to another,” a stereotypical image of the field in the eyes of non- diplomatic historians. Practitioners of this approach reexamine the nation’s foreign policy not only in the eyes of the elite circles of policymakers, but also through the stories of a larger cross-section of society.12

As such, this project seeks to bring migration and ethnic history into the broader narrative of international history. Rather than depicting immigrants’ incorporation into

U.S. society as a linear, progressive, and inevitable process, the recent migration history scholarship emphasizes the ongoing influence, and mixture, of politics and culture in both the United States and migrants’ countries of origin. By following this “transnational” (or

“global”) turn in migration history, this study taps into the rich fountain of knowledge on migrants’ “foreign relations.”13 Still, unlike migration historians whose central focus

11 Based on media reports and published sources, most scholars highlight similarities of their interests and worldviews. But too much emphasis on similarities obscures serious disagreements, which frequently appear in unpublished records. See for example, Damián J. Fernández, “From Little Havana to Washington, D.C.: Cuban-Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Mohammed E. Ahrari, ed., Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987); Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business; Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo; and Schoultz, Infernal. Although their arguments are insightful, these studies explore few Miami Cuban sources. 12 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a Global American History,” Diplomatic History 21 (Fall 1997): 499-518. 13 For historiography of immigration history, Mae E. Ngai, “Immigration and Ethnic History,” in Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, eds., American History Now (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), pp. 358-375. For migration historians’ works that address transnationalism, see for example, Donna R. Gabaccia, Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Thomas Lorrin, Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York (: University of Chicago 8 remains on the nation-states’ control of human mobility and its impact on the lives of migrants, this study places more emphasis on the impact of migration and migrant activities on high-level international politics. More than how nation-states manipulated migration and migrant communities as a tool of diplomacy, this work explores how policymakers and leading figures in ethnic communities engaged in discussions, negotiations, and power struggles over nation-states’ chief foreign policy goals.14

The plentiful literature on Cuban migration into the United States—often conducted by scholars of Cuban origin—informed this inquiry. Earlier works of historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists explored why thousands of Cubans came to the United States, how they settled into Miami and elsewhere, and how they developed political and cultural attitudes in the United States.15 Later works

Press, 2010); Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Matthew Frye Jacobson, Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 14 Migration history receives scant attention in the field of diplomatic and international history. According to Kristin Hoganson, this is because human mobility unsettles “the foundation of traditional foreign relations history.” It decenters the decision-making from Washington and disaggregates the nation, “the basic unit of international relations history.” Hoganson, “Hop off the Bandwagon! It’s a Mass Movement, Not a Parade,” Journal of American History 95 (March 2009): p. 1089. A few exceptions would include Jason C. Parker, Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); and Alexander DeConde, Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992). For a work by an international relations scholar who analyzes migration as a tool of diplomacy, see Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Press, 2010). 15 Among the earliest works on Cubans in the United States are Richard R. Fagen, Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O’Leary, Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution (Stanford, CA: Press, 1968); Thomas D. Boswell and James R. Curtis, The Cuban-American Experience: Culture, Images, and Perspectives (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983); Felix Masud-Piloto, With Open Arms: Cuban Migration to the United States (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988); idem., From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-1995 9 evaluated the consequences of Cuban migration, such as the development of multiracial conflict and collaboration with African-Americans and “Anglos” (non-Hispanic whites), for the Sunshine State.16 María Cristina García and other historians analyze how diverse groups of Miami Cubans formed distinctive identities, reacted to changing geopolitics, and engaged in numerous noteworthy political activities.17 This work extends this discussion to scrutinize how Miami Cuban politics figured in Washington’s policymaking toward Havana.

If Washington’s relationship with Miami was complex, so was Havana’s relationship with Miami. Traditionally, scholarship on the Cold War in Latin America focused on U.S. interventions and their devastating consequences for the region. As a result, the literature on inter-American relations has tended to exaggerate the centrality of

(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); and James Olson and Judith Olson, Cuban American: From Trauma to Triumph (New York: Twayne, 1995). 16 Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Also, Sheila L. Croucher, Imagining Miami: Ethnic Politics in a Postmodern World (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997); Guillermo J. Grenier and Lisandro Pérez, The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the Unites States (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2003); and Alex Stepick et al., This Is Our Land: Immigrant and Power in Miami (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 17 María Cristina García, Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959- 1994 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). See also, María de Torres, In the Land of Mirrors: Politics in the Unites States (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Gerald E. Poyo, Cuban Catholics in the United States, 1960-1980: Exile and Integration (Nortre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); Silvia Pedraza, Political Disaffection in Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Eckstein, Immigrant Divide; and Julio Capó, Jr., “It’s Not Queer to be Gay: Miami and the Emergence of the Gay Rights Movement, 1945-1995” (Ph.D. diss., Florida International University, 2011). For Cuban Americans in other regions, see for example, Yolando Prieto, The Cubans of Union City: Immigrants and Exiles in a New Jersey Community (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2009). 10 the United States.18 Yet, newly emerging scholarship reassesses Latin American agency, reevaluates their experiences of the Cold War “from within,” and explores the dynamics of “revolution and counterrevolution” as a central theme of its analysis. were those who aspired to abolish the legacy of feudalism in favor of collective, egalitarian notions of social democracy. Counterrevolutionaries were those who defended the status quo. As revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries fought for contrary visions of power and resorted to violence, Latin America’s Cold War became far from “cold.”19

It is both appealing and challenging to adopt this revolutionary-versus- counterrevolutionary framework for the analysis of Cuba. It is appealing because as in other in Latin America, the Cuban Revolution initiated the revolutionary process aiming for a radical break with the past and generated counterrevolutionary forces seeking to resist, mitigate, and subvert its impact. At the same time, it is also challenging since the emigration of counterrevolutionaries to the United States extended a Cuban “” both spatially and chronologically. Because Cuban counterrevolution merged into U.S. politics, the analysis of the Cuban case requires better understanding of the political system in North America, as well as Latin America. As the Cuban

18 On the criticisms, see Max Paul Friedman, “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations,” Diplomatic History 27 (November 2003): 621-636. 19 For recent scholarship, see for example, Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, eds., In From the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 3-46; and Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph, eds., A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010). For a debate over U.S. roles in this binary battle, see Hal Brands, Latin America’s Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); and Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 11 revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamic persisted beyond anyone’s design, it also requires a long-term assessment.20

To be sure, compared to the Korean and Vietnamese counterparts, this Cuban struggle hardly turned bloody except for a few occasions. But it bears emphasizing that both victorious revolutionaries and defeated counterrevolutionaries continued to engage in “the politics of passion,” politics construed as a moral imperative for absolute ends. In this fierce zero-sum battle, opponents were more than adversaries; they were enemies, traitors, evil, and inhuman.21 When Cuban counterrevolutionaries called themselves

“exiles,” attacked Fidel Castro as “dictator,” and spoke of the “liberation” of the homeland, they still operated on this cultural code. Despite years of life in the United

States, their leadership identified their role as “The Opposition,” a single legitimate alternative to revolutionary Cuba. Not all opponents of the Cuban government were counterrevolutionaries. Neither were all critiques of counterrevolutionary forces revolutionary. Yet, much of Miami’s behavior as a rival power against Havana originated from the revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamic that first appeared in the wake of the Cuban Revolution.

Along with Miami’s attitudes toward Havana, the story of Cuban migration into the United States requires careful analysis of Havana’s policy toward Miami. The topic is still sensitive but not as prohibitive as it had been before. As shown in Jesús Arboleya’s

20 Nicaraguan and Chilean battles during the Cold War would be similar to the Cuban case, even though these two did not last as long. For the Cuban Revolution, see Pérez, Reform and Revolution. For the Cuban counterrevolution, see Jesús Arboleya, The Cuban Counterrevolution, trans. Rafael Betancourt (: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000). It was originally published as La contrarrevolución cubana in Havana in 1997. 21 Damián J. Fernández, Cuba and the Politics of Passion (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000). 12 award-winning book, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos (Cuba and Cuban Americans), the

Cuban government originally looked to emigration as “betrayal” of the nation, calling all emigrants counterrevolutionary “gusanos” (worms). The revolutionary government confiscated all and rights of all Cubans who had indefinitely left the island, prohibited their return except for strictly humanitarian cases, and condemned contact with families or friends in the United States as signs of disloyalty. Havana eventually stopped viewing emigration in such black-and-white terms.22 Yet, the development was hardly unidirectional or predictable. Indeed, this research indicates that the story of Havana’s policy toward Miami closely relates to Washington’s interactions with Havana and

Miami.

For a long time, scholarship on U.S.-Cuban relations focused on conflicts and hostilities. Most recently, however, Cuban and U.S. scholars have started to re-examine

Washington and Havana’s ill-fated attempts at dialogue. Elier Ramírez Cañedo and

Esteban Morales chronicle U.S.-Cuban efforts to normalize diplomatic relations during the 1970s, although they conclude that U.S. officials regarded dialogue not as the objective, but as a tool to control Cuba’s foreign policy. William M. LeoGrande and

22 Jesús Arboleya, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos: El fenómeno migratorio cubano (Havana: Fondo Editorial Casa de las Américas, 2013), esp. chap. 4. Some other works also illuminate part of Havana’s attitudes toward Miami. See for example, Arboleya, Havana-Miami: The U.S.-Cuba Migration Conflict, trans. Mary Todd (: Ocean Press, 1996); idem., Cuban Counterrevolution; idem., La ultraderecha cubano-americana de Miami (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2000); Jacinto Valdés-Dapena Vivanco, Pirates en el éter: la guerra radial contra Cuba. 1959-1999 (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006); and Hedelberto López Blanch, La emigración cubana en Estados Unidos: descorriendo mamparas (Havana: Editorial SI-MAR S.A., 1998). For a view on migration by Cuban scholars, see also, Antonio Aja Díaz, Al cruzar las fronteras (Havana: Molinos Trade S.A., 2009); and José Buajasán Marrawi and José Luis Méndez, La República de Miami (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2003). 13

Peter Kornbluh, while extending this discussion to cover the entire period since 1959, also place the major part of the blame on Washington’s inability to react positively to

Havana’s numerous attempts at dialogue. Unlike other traditional accounts that highlight ideological antipathy, racial prejudices, and cultural traits, their stories of dialogue address some elements of contingency.23

Where this study differs from theirs is its aim to go beyond the traditional framework of diplomacy and analyze how human migration acted as a critical element of international politics. Rather than treating Havana-Washington relations as separate from

Washington-Miami and Miami-Havana interactions, this study intends to tie them together and show how international history, U.S. history, and Latin American history may overlap. To this end, I follow the lead of migration historians in utilizing rich Miami

Cuban sources, including letters, personal notes, diaries, interview transcripts, memoirs, and manuscripts, as well as Miami newspapers, journals, magazines, and newsletters. At the same time, I reassess U.S. government documents, such as policy discussion papers, directives, meeting files, cables, and intelligence reports, which diplomatic historians commonly utilize. Most of them were classified until very recently, especially those in the Carter, Reagan and Bush years.

23 Elier Ramírez Cañedo and Esteban Morales Domínguez, De la confrontación a los intentos de “normalización”: La política de los Estados Unidos hacia Cuba (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2011); ibid., 2da edición ampliada (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2014); and William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). For other insightful analyses of Cuban foreign policy, see for example, Carlos Alzugaray, “Cuban Revolutionary Diplomacy 1959-2009,” in B. J. C. McKercher, ed., Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 169-180; and Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989). 14

Access to these historical sources helps to reevaluate the intimate relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy making. Although political scientists, unlike historians of U.S. foreign relations, pay attention to ethnic lobbies and U.S. foreign policy, they are too eager to engage in a normative debate over whether ethnic groups make healthy contributions to U.S. foreign policy.24 It is necessary for diplomatic historians to utilize their expertise. A careful analysis of previously untapped historical records has much to offer. It helps not only to better explain the objectives and capabilities of ethnic lobbies, but also to illuminate Washington’s struggle to create a unified foreign policy in light of the nation’s demographic changes. Such an assessment is indispensable to critically reexamine the construction of “national interests”—something too often unexamined in studies of U.S. foreign policy.25

In addition to U.S. government and nongovernment sources, this study draws on an analysis of Cuban foreign ministry records in Havana, as well as the internal records

24 For the controversy, see esp. Yossi Shain, “Multicultural Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 95, no. 100 (1995): 69-87; and Samuel Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 28-49. For the most recent one, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). For works by political scientists on ethnic groups and U.S. foreign policy, see for example, Louis L. Gerson, The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1964); Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Thomas Ambrosio, ed., Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); and David M. Paul and Rachel A. Paul, Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009). For Latinos, see for example, Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Harry P. Pachon, eds., Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: Representing the “Homeland”? (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 25 For a model of such a historical assessment, see Peter L. Hahn, Caught in the : U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945–1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). For domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy, see for example, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Andrew L. Johns, ’s Second Front: The Domestic Politics, the Repubilcan Party, and the War (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010); and Melvin Small, Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 15 of the Cuban American National Foundation, once the most powerful anti-Castro organization in Miami. This greater access to primary Cuban sources is crucical for an assessment of divergent interpretations of historical events in Washington, Havana, and

Miami.26 Third-country perspectives, such as those of Britain, Canada, and Mexico, which have maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba despite U.S. , often prove useful. Due to an Anglo-American “special relationship,” British records are revealing about Washington’s policymaking. As Canadian and Mexican diplomats enjoyed greater access to Cuban leadership, their records provide insight into otherwise unattainable

Cuban thinking of the United States. Equally helpful are Soviet sources. Although many

Russian documents remain classified, some declassified sources and memoirs of Soviet policy elites are quite informative.27

This study consists of seven chapters. The first chapter provides a historical context for diplomacy and human migration in U.S.-Cuban relations. The Cuban

Revolution not only signaled the beginning of a new revolutionary regime, but also engendered the rise of counterrevolution and its alliance with the U.S. government. As

26 The Cuban foreign ministry has recently opened its archive to researchers, although the nature of one’s topic may determine the availability of the records. The Cuban American National Foundation has allowed the only two writers to use its sources. Nestor Suárez Feliú, El Rescate de una Nación (Miami, FL: Fundación Nacional Cubano Americana, 1997); and Álvaro Vargas Llosa, El exilio indomable: historia de la disidencia cubana en el destierro (: Espasa, 1998). These authors cited few U.S. and Cuban government records to corroborate their stories. 27 On Cuban relations with Mexico, Renata Keller, Mexico’s Cold War: Cuba, the United States, and the Legacy of the (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). On Canada, see John M. Kirk and Peter McKenna, Canada-Cuba Relations: The Other (Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1997). On Britain, see Christopher Hull, British Diplomacy and US Hegemony in Cuba, 1898-1964 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 16

Washington sponsored massive Cuban migration into the United States, these developments divided the Cuban population across the Florida Straits and created a sizable Cuban community in Miami. The second chapter focuses on Miami extremists, who unleashed indiscriminate violence across the Caribbean, Latin America, and North

America. Originally trained by the CIA, they acted independently of Washington and provoked a series of terrorist incidents that had a significant impact on international politics. Despite the scale of tragedies, however, Miami terrorists ultimately failed to undercut U.S.-Cuban détente.

Chapter Three charts the shifting triangular relations among Washington, Havana, and Miami in the late 1970s. When Jimmy Carter aggressively cracked down on Miami- originated terrorism, Fidel Castro contemplated his major gesture toward the United

States. After opening dialogue with the Cuban community abroad, the Cuban government released 3,600 prisoners from Cuban jails and allowed over 100,000 Cuban émigrés to visit the island for family reunification. In light of rising Cold War tensions, however, these results led to the of 1980, one of the most controversial migration crises in the Caribbean. Chapter Four traces the course of this crisis, in which

Washington and Havana engaged in a six-month-long diplomatic battle for the control of migration. Unable to prevent massive Cuban migration and its volatile impact on U.S. society, Carter eventually yielded to Castro.

The next two chapters examine the rise of a Cuban-American lobby and the

Republican Party’s outreach to Miami Cubans. Despite his manifested hostilities against

Castro, Ronald Reagan came to terms with the existence of the Cuban government in

17

Havana and probed cooperation on migration issues. Yet by committing to the promotion of “freedom” in front of increasingly politically powerful Miami Cubans, Reagan not only made U.S. cooperation with Cuba more difficult, but also rendered normalization of diplomatic relations almost impossible. Chapter Seven extends the discussion to the end of the Cold War. Like his predecessor, George Bush considered Havana’s change of internal structure as the main precondition for an improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations.

Yet, whereas counterrevolutionary Cubans in Miami aimed for the immediate end of the

Castro regime, Washington waited for a sign of change on the island and kept contact with Havana over migration issues.

In the conclusion, I argue that U.S.-Cuban relations reached equilibrium of

“hostile coexistence” by the end of the Cold War. As a precondition for talks about normalization of relations, Washington demanded that Havana radically transform its domestic politics in addition to its foreign policy—more in response to the rise of Cuban

American political power than to the decline of Cold War tensions. Yet despite the shared ideological hostility to the Castro regime, Washington differed from Miami in accepting the existence of a revolutionary regime in Cuba. Despite the limits imposed by political necessities, Washington pursued talks with Havana to make U.S.-Cuban relations more controllable and prevent another migration crisis near its border. As such, migration played a fundamental role in creating this deadlock by promoting the ideological split of the Cuban population.

18

What follows is a history of human migration and its impact on U.S. foreign relations. The project does not argue that power and ideology do not matter, nor does it claim that migration plays the primary role in defining U.S.-Cuban relations. Quite the opposite, it shows that these elements were complementary to each other, consisting of complex and reinforcing forces across the Florida Straits. Out of necessity, reference to two major U.S.-Cuban geopolitical battles—Southern Africa and Central America—are kept to minimum. U.S.-Cuban disagreements over the international economic system, the transformation of race, gender, and political culture in Revolutionary Cuba, and the trajectory of U.S. politics and society after World War II also remain on the periphery of this study. For readers interested in these subjects, they are and will be the subjects of other works, including ones this author wishes to write in the future.

By bringing migration into diplomacy, my interest here is to look for the missing piece in the existing story. The question of how Cuban migration acted as an important element of international politics remains underexplored due to gaps in three fields of U.S. history, Latin American history, and diplomatic and international history. My study intends to overcome this problem by presenting a new narrative based on mulatiarchival sources and interdisciplinary approaches. Such a study is necessary not only for better understanding of U.S.-Cuban relations, but also in light of massive migration from Latin

America, which has been transforming U.S. society. People coming from Latin America carried historical baggage, and continued to interact with their homeland. How do such evolving phenomena enrich or complicate the story of foreign relations? In what ways do migrant activities pose new challenges and opportunities to the nation-states in our age?

19

In dealing with these questions, the picture of U.S. relations with Latin America may appear even messier than previously acknowledged. The blending of North and Latin

American peoples and cultures not only took place between the two continents but also within the United States. In other words, U.S. behavior in the world might have become even more complex as the growing number of people moved into the United States.

20

CHAPTER 1: Between Revolution and Counterrevolution

Origins of the Triangular Relations among Washington, Havana, and Miami

The Cuban Revolution marked a critical juncture both in terms of Cuban discussion on the nation’s future and Cuban relations with the United States. The revolutionary programs entailed the emergence of counterrevolutionary forces and encountered disapproval from U.S. policy elites. Whereas counterrevolutionaries and

Washington forged an anticommunist alliance, revolutionaries in Havana counterbalanced this by inviting Soviet power into the Western Hemisphere. U.S.-Cuban mutual antagonism endured for decades. Washington imposed an economic embargo, mounted diplomatic campaigns to isolate the island, and orchestrated subversive activities inside Cuba. Havana mobilized the masses, pursued guerilla movements elsewhere, and resisted numerous surprise attacks organized by Washington and counterrevolutionary militants.

The late and early 1970s saw signs of change. The fervor of anticommunism in the United States declined after the end of the . U.S. policy elites realized that their association with Cuban counterrevolutionaries was not as effective in toppling the Castro regime as they had imagined. As the pace of Cuban integration into the socialist bloc quickened, the revolutionary regime under the leadership of Fidel Castro grew powerful and stable. ’s death in ,

21

Castro’s endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the failure of Cuba’s

Ten-Million-Ton campaign in 1969-1970 assisted this trend. The of

Cold War détente, Latin American defiance of U.S. power, and other global and regional developments also appeared to demand a new U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Still, it was unclear how Washington and Havana could come to terms with the tumultuous past of U.S.-Cuban relations. The following is a brief narrative of U.S. relations with Cuba from 1959 to 1974. Instead of seeking to cover all features of bilateral relations, this chapter provides the necessary background for the following ones by illuminating several key themes like Cold War geopolitics, U.S. clashes with the

Cuban Revolution, and revolution-counterrevolution dynamics across the U.S.-Cuban border. While drawing primarily on secondary sources, it pays special attention to the massive inflow of Cubans into the United States, its ramifications for Cuban politics, and its implications for U.S. foreign policy. This chapter shows that U.S.-Cuban relations developed hand-in-hand with the revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamics that developed first within Cuba and later across the Florida Straits.

Background for the Revolution

Cuba’s nation-building stagnated under the Spanish imperial rule for centuries.

Although the sugar economy produced prosperity on the island, it also harbored slavery, racial discrimination, and social inequality. By dividing Cuban society by class, color, and geographical sections, Cuba’s economic and social structure posed a crucial obstacle to the early rise of the independence movement. Whereas many Latin American countries

22 achieved self-determination in the 1820s, Cuba’s war of independence belatedly came in

1868 and lasted intermittently for over thirty years. Despite much devastation and human sacrifice, independence itself was a crushing disappointment for Cuban nationalists. The

United States accused of sinking the Maine, intervened in the war, and occupied the island. As a small nation with limited power, the subsequent political and economic dependency on the United States inhibited Cuba’s exercise of national sovereignty.28

Cuba’s economic and political stability seemed crucial for U.S. commerce and security. Since of Thomas Jefferson, Cuba was an important point of the vital

U.S. sea lanes. As such, North Americans imagined that the geographical proximity of

Cuba was a proof of manifest destiny to assert their prominence on the island. After the

War of 1898, the United States conquered Cuba, as well as the Philippines, , and . Although Cuba gained nominal independence in 1902, Uncle Sam held a naval base at Guantánamo in southeast Cuba, invoked the to intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs, and employed racialized and gendered rhetoric to justify his dominance. In the early years of the Cold War, the United States acted as a “hegemonic power” in the Western Hemisphere and aligned with the of as a member of the anticommunist “Free World.”29

Power imbalances combined with the geographic proximity to make almost all aspects of Cuban life become increasingly dependent on U.S. economy and culture. On

28 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, chaps. 1-7; and ibid., The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 29 Pérez, Cuba in the American Imagination; Thomas G. Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Schoultz, Infernal, chaps. 1-3. 23 the eve of the revolution, the United States absorbed half of Cuba’s sugar exports and about two-thirds of all island exports. U.S. companies owned about 40 percent of the

Cuban sugar lands, 80 percent of the utilities, and almost all cattle ranches, railways, and petroleum industries. The omnipresence of U.S. interests benefited some Cubans, especially those who worked for U.S. companies, studied abroad, travelled to Miami for shopping and vacations, and adopted aspects of the American way of life. Yet,

Americanization of the island was not immune from criticisms as social discontent grew.

Gaps in living standards between the rich and poor, elites and masses, whites and nonwhites, as well as those in cities and the countryside, increased. Of all, rural workers, peasants, and Afro Cubans suffered poverty, insecurity, and neglect. They saw little hope of improving their living.30

Cuba’s traditional political system was incapable of dealing with growing popular discontent that originated in the skewed social structure. Pre-revolutionary Cuba undertook political reforms to little avail. After the , the 1933 revolution took place but sustained only for a brief moment. Reformist elements enacted the 1940

Constitution that promised universal suffrage, free elections, civil liberties, and workers’ rights. Yet, Cuban politics ultimately succumbed to massive corruption. The depth and breadth of national cynicism with politics was so great that the general public did not react to the 1952 coup by Batista, who voided the scheduled elections. Almost all

30 Paterson, Contesting Castro, pp. 39-45. On U.S. influence on Cuban identity and culture, see Louis A. Pérez, Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture (New York: Ecco, Harper Collins, 1999), esp. chap. 6. For prerevolutionary Cuba’s economic performance, see Carmelo Mesa- Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981), pp. 7-10. 24 national institutions of political order were in disgrace. Political parties served few other than professional politicians. Newspapers undermined their credibility by accepting subsidies from the dictator. As such, the middle-class had no viable political institutions to defend its interests collectively.31

What Cuba needed was a radical change, according to Fidel Castro, young revolutionary nationalist. Born in 1926 as a son of a wealthy Spanish-born landowner in the eastern province Oriente, Castro received education at a Jesuit school, earned a degree at the , and immersed himself in student politics. He joined the Orthodox Party, a wing of Cuban nationalists calling for social justice, removal of corruption, and economic independence from the United States. On , 1953, in response to the coup by Batista, Fidel Castro and his brother Raúl assaulted the Moncada military barracks in . Released from jail in a 1955 amnesty, the brothers left for Mexico, where they united with Ernesto “Che” Guevara and received military training. In December 1956, they returned to the island in the yacht . On his landing, Fidel Castro launched a guerrilla war against Batista and became the most powerful Cuban leader in the wake of the Revolution.32

31 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 210-236, 252-56. 32 For biographies of Fidel Castro, see for example, Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet, My Life, trans. Andrew Hurley (London: Allen Lane, 2007); Leycester Coltman, The Real Fidel Castro (New Haven, CT: Press, 2003); and Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York: William Morrow, 1986). Szulc famously claims that Castro was a communist and intended to make the revolution socialist from the very beginning. But this observation is dubious. See Samuel Farber, The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), pp. 61-63. For the revolutionary war, see for example, Julia A. Sweig, Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 25

Revolution, Counterrevolution, and U.S. Charge of Communism

The Cuban Revolution indicted “the accumulated ills of Cuban society” and declared “a substantive and symbolic break with past politics.” Fidel Castro rallied the masses, made speeches, and presented his vision of power and social justice by appealing directly to the masses. As his revolutionary rhetoric in turn stimulated pressure for immediate, deep, sweeping change, he promoted far-reaching social reforms at a speed and scope that overwhelmed the existing legal structures. In the first nine months, the government enacted 1,500 decrees, , and edicts to increase wages, reform education, abolish racial segregation in public spaces, provide health care and unemployment relief, and reduce rents and utility fees. Most important was the Agrarian Reform of May 1959, which invited vigorous U.S. opposition.33

Castro was enormously popular and successful in ensuring the longevity of the revolution. Rural workers, peasants, and the unemployed enthusiastically embraced the revolutionary leader who promptly implemented life-saving measures, forcefully mobilized the nation for the literacy campaign, and aggressively worked for the improvement of their health and nutrition. As principal beneficiariaries, Afro Cubans became earnest supporters of the new regime that dismantled much of the old structure of segregation and discrimination, especially in the public sphere. Since the traditional political order was in disrepute, the vast majority of middle-class white Cubans also rallied to Castro, who attacked the prerevolutionary past, called for national unity, and

33 The government nationalized land exceeding 1,000 acres with the exception of land used for the production of sugar, rice, and livestock, whose maximum limits were set at 3,333 acres. Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 238-243. 26 demanded individual sacrifices to the revolution. He was particularly effective in arousing Cuban nationalism and converting it into people’s support for the revolution. As he became the face of the revolution, Fidelismo became a secular state religion.

Numerous Cuban women and men became uncritical true believers, even though they might not have automatically embraced all revolutionary measures with an equal degree of enthusiasm.34

The Agrarian Reform had an impact on U.S. thinking of Cuba. Mindful of the overwhelming popularity of the revolution, Washington initially took a wait-and-see approach toward Cuba. Indeed, Vice President received Castro, who made a good-will tour in the United States in April 1959. Underneath the cautious U.S. approach was confidence in the value of their traditional ties. U.S. policy elites hoped that pro-U.S. moderate wings of the revolutionary regime would ultimately nudge Castro away from radicalism. Yet, such thinking became increasingly untenable after the

Agrarian Reform. The compensations instituted by the government antagonized U.S. investors and invoked the specter of communism. In the early summer of 1959, the

Dwight Eisenhower administration began considering a policy of regime change, while closely following internal developments in Cuba.35

34 Ibid., p. 239, 242-43; and Lillian Guerra, Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and Resistance, 1959–1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), esp. chap. 4. For Afro Cubans, see also, Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

35 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 88-100; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 23-24. The Cuban government offered compensation but only the amount equal to the assessed tax value as of October 1958, which was about 20 percent of market value. They would pay not in cash but in twenty-year government bonds with an annual interest of 4.5 percent. This manner did not meet Washington’s 27

Under such circumstances, revolutionary-counterrevolutionary dynamics had profound implications for U.S. policy toward Cuba. As in other social revolutions in

Latin America, the first to rise in opposition included politicians, government officials, and military officers with ties to the old regime, as well as owners, large and small, whose interests, ideologies, and ways of life were threatened. They left the island, organized counterrevolutionary forces, and mounted a campaign against what they perceived as a “communist conspiracy.” Some embezzled public funds. Others allied with , the dictator of the . In early August 1959, these elements made the first major attempt to overthrow the revolutionary government by military means.36

Joining them were anticommunist moderates who had participated in the revolution but lost political struggles afterwards. The summary execution of war criminals frightened them, as they saw a flagrant disregard for due process. As Castro posted communists in key government positions and relied on radicals like Raúl and Che

Guevara to implement the Agrarian Reform, pro-U.S. anticommunists resigned and departed for the United States. In testimonies before the U.S. Congress and media, these former revolutionaries denounced what they considered the “communist takeover” of the

Revolution.37 For Castro, such accusation of communism was a sinister attempt to invite

standard for “prompt (within six months), adequate (full market value), and effective (in convertible currency)” compensation. Schoultz, Infernal, p. 99. 36 Arboleya, Cuban Counterrevolution, pp. 40-51; and Fabían Escalante, The Secret War: CIA Covert Operations against Cuba 1959-1962, trans. Maxine Shaw (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1995), chap. 2. See also, Rafael Díaz-Balart, Cuba: Intrahistoria. Una lucha sin tregua (Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 2006), pp. 99-109. 37 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, p. 240, 246; and Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 77-84. 28 counterrevolution. There was the Guatemalan precedent; only five years earlier,

Washington had exploited communist influence to justify its use of counterrevolutionaries in toppling the revolutionary regime.38

A major U.S.-Cuban showdown arrived in the fall of 1959. A series of air attacks by Florida-based counterrevolutionaries coincided with the resignation of , chief of the command for Camagüey, one of Cuba’s central provinces. Convinced that the

U.S. government was deliberately promoting counterrevolution by manipulating anticommunist forces, Castro delivered his harshest speech against the United States, imprisoned Matos on the charge of treason, and announced a series of measures curtailing civil liberties in the name of national security.39 The vast majority of Cuban women and men supported these measures and remained faithful to Castro. As historian Louis A.

Pérez, Jr. notes, the increase of organized attacks from opponents in the United States had

“far-reaching consequences,” making defense of the nation “indistinguishable” from defense of the revolution.40

These developments effectively drew a line in the sand, forcing Havana and

Washington to harden their positions. U.S. officials not only opposed the Agrarian

38 Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 63-67. On the Guatemalan counterrevolution, see Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in : The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). 39 These measures included the end of judicial independence, decrees expanding the definition of counterrevolution, and the application of capital punishment of traitors. Fidel also reopened the Revolutionary Tribunals, eliminated the category of political prisoners (in preference for “common delinquents”), and deterred future rebels from calling a strike or informal work slow-down. Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 103-4; and Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 84-87, 91-92. 40 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, p. 246. The administration launched a concerted effort to halt the flights only after February 18, 1960, when an incident involving a U.S. citizen took place. The attacks nonetheless continued. Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 111-12. 29

Reform, but also felt uneasy about Castro’s leadership style, revolutionary rhetoric, and frequent criticisms of the U.S. government, which often appeared in response to verbal

U.S. interferences in Cuban affairs.41 They also noticed that the moderate force that they counted on was losing its internal battle against radicals. In the absence of signs of moderation of the revolution, few could defend the continuation of the wait-and-see policy. Then came the above-mentioned speech by Castro, which Washington considered hopelessly anti-American, if not outright pro-communist. On November 5, Eisenhower decided to probe “a step-by-step development of coherent opposition” in Cuba, which later evolved into covert actions in support of counterrevolution, including assassination plots against Castro.42 In March 1960, whereas Castro accused the United States of exploding the French vessel La Coubre in Havana and killing more than one hundred people, Eisenhower formally activated a plan by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to sponsor a counterrevolutionary invasion of the island.43

Thereafter, U.S.-Cuban tensions quickly escalated and merged with the broader current of the Cold War, as well as the 1960 U.S. election. Despite initial misgivings,

Soviet premier developed strong personal affinity toward the island and offered economic and military assistance to Castro.44 In May 1960, in response to the

41 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 87-92, 112-14. 42 Ibid., pp. 104-5, 116. For the Eisenhower administration’s early consideration of assassination plots, see Howard Jones, The Bay of Pigs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 13, 18-19, 21. See also, Escalante, Secret War, pp. 42, 50. 43 The charge remains unproven of whether the CIA was behind this incident. Jones, Bay of Pigs, p. 17. The number of sabotages increased from 34 in September to 35 in October, 80 in November, and lowered to 57 in December. Escalante, Secret War, pp. 62-63. 44 The Soviet leadership apparently drew a similar conclusion that the fall of 1959 was a major turning point in U.S.-Cuban relations. For Moscow, Fidel’s decision to assign Raúl to be a new minister of the 30 increase of supply of Soviet oil to Cuba, the U.S. government instructed three U.S. oil companies in Cuba not to refine Soviet petroleum. When Havana confiscated these businesses, Washington eliminated Cuba’s sugar import quota. The deepening ties between Moscow and Havana not only inspired further counterrevolutionary attacks on the island, but also encouraged two presidential candidates, John F. Kennedy and Richard

Nixon, to wage a political battle over who could be tougher on communism. As Kennedy blamed the vice president for “the loss of Cuba,” Nixon pleaded with Eisenhower to impose an economic embargo on the island. When Eisenhower complied, Castro nationalized all remaining U.S. properties, as well as non-agricultural properties owned by Cubans. On January 3, 1961, the United States terminated diplomatic relations with

Cuba.45

U.S. Alliance with Cuban Counterrevolution, 1961-1962

U.S.-Cuban confrontation was not only important in Cuba, but also in the rest of the Western Hemisphere. As U.S. leaders feared, the Cuban Revolution inspired left- wing revolutionaries across Latin America. The spread of news of Cuba’s open defiance of traditional U.S. hegemony energized pro-Cuban forces to contest local oligarchies allied with the U.S. government. Washington, determined to preempt the emergence of

“another Cuba,” sought to undermine Cuba’s popular appeal through public relations

Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in October 1959 was a further proof of Cuba’s direction toward communism. Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), pp. 22-31. 45 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 117-139. Thereafter, the Swiss embassy in Havana and the Czech embassy in Washington represented U.S. and Cuban interests in each other’s country respectively. 31 campaigns. The U.S. government also developed the Alliance for Progress to create, promote, and showcase a non-Cuban model for and political democratization. As Castro accelerated the radicalization of the revolution, U.S. resolve to attack every dimension of the revolutionary society grew only stronger.46

Cuba’s political radicalization also accelerated the ideological split of the Cuban population. The radicalization made those Cubans who ideologically and economically depended on traditional U.S. interests increasingly vulnerable, pushing them out of the country. They hoped that their leave would be temporary, although their flight itself served to consolidate revolutionary rule on the island.47 For the Cuban government, their emigration not only helped to eliminate internal opposition, but also to purify the revolutionary society. Havana viewed emigration as “betrayal” of the nation, calling all emigrants “gusanos” (worms), harassed them on their departure, and confiscated their citizenship, rights, and properties. The mere indication of a desire to leave led to the expulsion from workplaces and the loss of access to university education. Only in the late

1970s did the Cuban government start to reevaluate its relations with emigrants and stop describing emigration in stark black-and-white terms.48

For the U.S. government, these Cuban emigrants were the enemies of the enemy, whose symbolic importance was tremendous. Although Havana claimed that most of them left the island “voluntarily” without “political persecution,” Washington called all

46 Rabe, Killing Zone, chaps. 4-5; and Brands, Latin America’s, chaps. 1-2. For the Alliance for Progress, see Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (New York: Routledge, 2007). 47 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 252-56; and García, Havana USA, pp. 13-14. 48 Arboleya, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos, pp. 229-230. 32

Cuban emigrants “exiles” and “refugees” to highlight their plight and discredit the revolution in the eyes of .49 Because many of the emigrants were professionals and middle-class, Washington also expected that the emigration would deprive the revolutionary regime of human resources. Cuban emigration was a critical component of CIA operations. By 1961, the political spectrum of the anti-Castro movement ranged from rightwing supporters of the Batista regime, anticommunist

Catholic groups, members of the old political parties, to former leftist revolutionaries.

Despite their disagreements and infighting, the CIA established an umbrella group, which would supposedly become a provisional government for post-Castro Cuba.50 The U.S. alliance with Cuban counterrevolution led to the creation of , approximately

1,500 men, trained for an invasion.

U.S.-Cuban tensions reached a peak on April 17, 1961, as John F. Kennedy unleashed these counterrevolutionary warriors. Inherited from his predecessor, the plan was flawed in many ways. The brigade lacked training, resources, and personnel. Trying to camouflage U.S. involvement, the U.S. president made fatal decisions, such as the relocation of the landing site, the substantial reduction of pre-invasion air strikes, and the imposition of strict limitations on U.S. air cover for the invading brigade. No less fundamental was the miscalculation that millions of Cubans would welcome the invaders.

Although he might not have known exactly when and from where the attack would come,

Castro anticipated the invasion, suppressed internal opposition, and captured principal

49 Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles, pp. 1-6; and Arboleya, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos, p. 28. 50 The group was called the Frente Revolucionario Democrático and replaced in March 1961 by the Consejo Revolucionario Cubano. García, Havana USA, pp. 123-26; and Arboleya, Counterrevolution, chap. 2. 33 underground leaders, whom the CIA deemed as necessary to cause the corresponding insurrection. Castro’s decisive victory in the Bay of Pigs consolidated his power, cemented Cuba’s integration into the socialist bloc, and demoralized his foes on the island.51

Driven by a zeal for revenge, Kennedy implemented a policy of maximum hostility toward Cuba, anything short of a direct invasion. His measures included military maneuvers near Cuban waters, a total economic embargo of the island, a diplomatic offensive including the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States

(OAS), and the exercise of pressure on U.S. allies in Asia, Latin America, and Western

Europe to terminate diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba. The U.S. government launched , a comprehensive destabilization plan to incite an open revolt, which would supposedly set the stage for a costless U.S. invasion.

The CIA’s Miami headquarters employed hundreds of U.S. officers and thousands of

Cuban agents, recruited Mafias for assassination of Cuban leaders, and devoted millions of dollars to sabotage, raids, clandestine radios, and assistance to remaining counterrevolutionary groups on the island.52

The outright interferences in Cuban affairs ultimately propelled the United States to face the 1962 . Traditionally, scholars have argued that the Soviet

Union deployed nuclear missiles to Cuba principally because of its desire to redress the

51 Just prior to the invasion, Fidel declared the Cuban Revolution as “socialist,” sending a symbolically important message to the world. On the invasion, see Jones, Bay of Pigs. For Cuba’s moves, see also Escalante, Secret War, pp. 78-83. 52 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 171-183. According to Fabían Escalante, a Cuban intelligence officer, a total of 5,780 counterrevolutionary actions took place from January to August 1962. 718 were economic sabotages. Escalante, Secret War, p. 116. 34 strategic balance against the United States.53 Yet, recent scholarship has emphasized

Nikita Khrushchev’s deep sympathy for the Cuban Revolution and his strong desire to defend the island as a symbolically important ally in the Third World. Although Moscow backpedaled at the last moment of the crisis and agreed to withdraw the missiles from the island, it achieved an otherwise unattainable goal: Washington pledged that it would not invade Cuba. As some argue, the origins of the missile crisis lay in “the story of the

Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro’s personality, and his embrace of the Soviet Union.”54

Still, the missile crisis was a psychological trauma for Cubans both in Havana and

Miami. Once the crisis reached a climax, Washington and Moscow termed the crisis as a nuclear security issue between the two superpowers, rendering Cuba as an essentially irrelevant player. To Havana’s frustration, the Soviet Union neither consulted the Cubans prior to the end of the crisis nor addressed any of the five points they saw as essential for its resolution: the lifting of the embargo, the termination of subversion, the end of counterrevolutionary attacks, the cessation of violation of Cuban air and naval space, and the return of Guantánamo. Castro drew a lesson that he could not trust either superpower.

His foreign policy radicalized, seeking allies to reduce their vulnerability in the East-

West context.55 Miami Cubans also disliked the superpower bargaining. Once its

53 See for example, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999). 54 Khrushchev also was conscious of ’s China and its challenge to his prestige as the principal leader of the communist camp. Before the final resolution, he secured the removal of the U.S. nuclear missile from Turkey. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” p. x. See also, Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Knopf, 2008). 55 James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), esp. chap. 1. 35 existence was known, anti-Castro groups denounced Kennedy’s non-invasion pledge as a plot against freedom in Cuba. They repeatedly urged the U.S. presidents to abrogate it.56

A Tactical Change: Regime Change through Ideological Penetration

Although the missile crisis marked a watershed in the Cold War, prompting the two superpowers to seek ways of , it did not dissipate U.S.-Cuban hostilities. As Castro refused on-site inspection of the Soviet withdrawal of missiles,

Kennedy downplayed the importance of his non-invasion pledge. Two months after the crisis in Miami, Kennedy welcomed Bay of Pigs veterans released from Cuban prisons.

With a Brigade 2506 flag in hand, he declared, “I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana.”57 The U.S. president reactivated the secret war against Cuba, funded selected groups of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, and encouraged these “autonomous groups” to attack Cuba from outside the U.S. territory.58 Although

Kennedy also explored the possibility of dialogue with Castro through back-channel , he was assassinated before any official discussions were scheduled.59

56 See for example, Mauel Antonio de Varona, , and Andrés Vargas Gómez to Ronald Reagan, November 12, 1985, ID #351318, FO006-09, White House Office of Records Management: Subject Files (hereafter WHORM), Ronald Reagan Library (hereafter RRL); and Cuban American National Foundation, Towards a New U.S.-Cuba Policy (Washington, DC: CANF, 1988). 57 Joan Didion, Miami (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 97-98. 58 Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Standing Group of the National Security Council, June 8, 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1961-1963, Vol. XI: Doc no. 346. 59 The question of what might have been remains within the realm of speculation. Schoultz, Infernal, p. 211. For the details of this story, see LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 60-80. 36

Lyndon Johnson, the next U.S. president, was never as enthusiastic about Cuba as

Kennedy. Johnson inherited a series of anti-Cuban policies and intensified diplomatic offensives against U.S. allies trading with the island.60 In response to the December 1963 discovery of a cache of Cuban arms in , the U.S. government successfully pressed all OAS member nations except Mexico to suspend all bilateral diplomatic and consular relations, trade, and sea transportation with Cuba.61 In Castro’s view, this maneuver was “a shameless call to counterrevolution,” proposed by “imperialists” and supported by “all right-wing military .” On July 26, 1964, Cuba issued the

Declaration of Santiago affirming the right to assist the revolutionary movements in “all those countries” that interfered in Cuba’s internal affairs.62

Unlike Kennedy, however, Johnson gradually reduced the U.S. commitment to

Cuban counterrevolution. In its efforts to topple the Castro regime, Washington had provided select counterrevolutionary groups with funds, arms, and equipment. These groups supposedly operated outside the United States so that the U.S. government could publicly deny any association with them “no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U.S. complicity.”63 Such perfect separation was impossible to maintain in practice. In September 1964, one group mistakenly attacked the Sierra Arranzazu, a

Spanish freighter, killing three and injuring eight. The incident set off a diplomatic

60 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 229-236. 61 Ibid., pp. 226-29. 62 Fidel Castro, Declaration of Santiago, July 26, 1964 (Toronto: Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 1964), pp. 14-15, 23, 31-32, 36-37. 63 Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Standing Group of the National Security Council, June 8, 1963, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XI: Doc no. 346. 37 scandal. Cuba and Spain were furious. and , which had provided bases for the group, grew nervous. The Soviet Union complained. As the operations had achieved nothing but international embarrassment, the U.S. government terminated the program sometime in 1965.64

Havana did not fail to notice the decline of these U.S.-led counterrevolutionary offensives, according to a heretofore secret paper on subversive aggression by a Cuban intelligence officer. Based on reports from the Ministry of the Interior’s Dirección

General de Inteligencia (General Director of Intelligence) and Dirección General de

Contrainteligencia (General Director of Counterintelligence), the author indicates that the

CIA not only assisted in military attacks against the island from the sea, but also created an intelligence network within the nation. It engaged in subversive activities against civilian and non-civilian targets, supplied equipment and materials to counterrevolutionary rebels, and established illegal channels of entrance and departure near the Cuban coast. A major part of the credit for the termination of these operations goes to revolutionary vigilance, as the CIA did not trust the counterrevolutionary groups out of fear that they might have been infiltrated by Cuban counterintelligence.65

But Cuba still had no peace of mind. According to the author, the Johnson administration not only maintained its policy of isolating Cuba, but also resorted to

64 Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations against Cuba, 1959-1965 (Washington, DC: Potomac, 2005), chap. 13. The total cost of U.S.-led operation in Cuba for the year 1963 was about $21-22 million. 65 “IV. Las actividades subversivas después de la crisis de octubre,” n.d. (ca. 1973), Caja “Bilateral 27,” Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (hereafter MINREX). The document consisted of five chapters. The author cites numerous intelligence reports to analyze the trajectory of subversive activities against the Cuban Revolution from 1959 to 1973. 38

“ideological diversionism.” Originally coined by Raúl Castro, the term referred to the promulgation by enemies of the revolution of ideas and that did not conform to the official line of revolutionary .66 To prove this point, the author refers to

Johnson’s speech in April 1964. “The effectiveness of our policy is more than a matter of trade statistics,” the U.S. president said. “It has increased awareness of difference and danger, it has revealed the brutal nature of the Cuban regime, it has lessened opportunities for subversion, it has reduced the number of Castro’s followers, and it has drained the resources of our adversaries who are spending more than $1 million a day.”67

Cuba apparently took Johnson’s self-evaluation seriously. Even though the prospect of U.S. military invasion and CIA-led paramilitary actions declined, they believed that the U.S. government was working for regime change. According to the paper, Washington’s new aims were to “destroy the Cuban Revolution from inside” through attempts at “ideological penetration.” With powerful media and tools in hand, enemies of the revolution could exploit any show of ideological weakness.

In their view, Washington was using intellectuals as tools to “diffuse bourgeois ideas among the youth” and impede “the revolutionary process.” The growth of “anti-socials” would in turn make Cuban society more vulnerable to the “influence of these activities of the enemy.” Weakened solidarity at home would therefore jeopardize national security.68

66 For discussion on “ideological diversionism,” see Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 228-29 67 “V. La esperanza en los cambios internos,” n.d. (ca. 1973), Caja “Bilateral 27,” MINREX. See also, Speech by Johnson, April 20, 1964, American Presidency Project (hereafter APP). 68 Ibid. The paper specifically mentioned the existence of Radio Swan, a CIA-led clandestine radio broadcast. 39

Increasing vigilance and narrowing acceptance of ideological pluralism in this period appear to be another by-product of Cuban confrontation with the United States.

Embargo, Migration, and Contradiction in U.S. Policy toward Cuba, 1962-1965

The U.S. embargo and other hostile acts proved ineffective in preventing Cuba from expanding its activities abroad. Africa particularly appealed to Havana because it not only held deep historical ties to the island, but also attracted relatively little attention from Washington. Starting from January 1962, Cuba intervened in Algeria, Zaire, Congo,

Guinea-Bissau, and to assist independent movements in those areas.69 Cuba also hosted the first Tri-continental Conference and founded the Organization for the

Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in 1966, as well as the

Organization of Latin American Solidarity a year later. As Che Guevara called for “two, three, or many ,” Castro excoriated orthodox communist parties following

Moscow’s orders in Latin America. Soviet relations with Cuba cooled under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, who generally favored gradual change in Latin America and a relaxation of tensions with the United States.70

Perhaps the U.S. policy of isolation was more efficient in mounting social discontent in Cuba than deterring Cuba’s behavior abroad. For Cuba, the loss of the

United States as a natural trading partner meant a reduction in foreign currency earnings,

69 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions. 70 Yuri Pavlov, The Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 1959-1991 (New Brunswick, NY: Transaction, 1993), pp. 86-88; Mervyn J. Bain, Soviet-Cuban Relations, 1985 to 1991: Changing Perceptions in Moscow and Havana. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2007), pp. 21-26; and H. Michael Erisman, Cuba’s Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000), pp. 68-73. 40 a decline in consumer goods purchasing power, and substantial changes in lifestyle. Yet aside from the embargo, government’s mismanagement in the early 1960s might have been another reason for the economic downturn. In an overly ambitious move to overcome Cuba’s dependence on sugar, the Cuban leadership liquidated the capitalist system, placed a greater emphasis on industrialization, and replaced market mechanisms with central planning. But this process of state collectivization was too broad and too rapid for the government to control the delicate relations between demand and supply.

The island experienced one of the worst recessions in 1962-1963. After 1965, the government forged a new strategy that underscored sugar production once again.71

It also bears emphasizing that the political impact of the U.S. embargo was cushioned by U.S. migration policy. Of particular importance is the 1965 Camarioca

Crisis, which led to the opening of special flights between and Miami. After the missile crisis the U.S. government had suspended all Cuba-to-U.S. flights, forcing thousands of Cubans to enter the United States either via a third country, by boat, or through the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo. The Cuban government had no interest in keeping those who grew dissatisfied with the revolutionary regime, since it would contradict the socialist principle of building society on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless,

Havana still protested Washington’s acceptance of these illegally-departed Cubans, including those who resorted to criminal acts such as boat hijacking. On September 28,

71 Mesa-Lago, Economy, pp. 1-18; and Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 257-265. For a more critical evaluation, see Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 172-181. 41

1965, Castro denounced Washington’s practices, opened the port of Camarioca, and announced that Cubans with relatives in the United States could leave the island.72

In response, Johnson developed an orderly departure plan and sought negotiations with the Cuban government. In early November, the two countries agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding in order to facilitate Cuba-to-U.S. migration on a basis of family reunification. The two governments exchanged a list of names of Cubans eligible for migration and operated an airlift between Varadero and Miami of two flights a day, five days a week. In the period from December 1965 to April 1973, a total of 260,561

Cubans arrived in the United States through this program, popularly dubbed “” in the United States, as if all these Cubans came to the United States for political reasons.73 In fact, compared to the earlier one, this second-wave migration included more blue-collar, service, and agricultural workers, who faced no imminent threat of persecution but left the island in search of economically better lives. For its part, the

Cuban government continued to treat emigrants as traitors of the nation, even though such emigration acted as a safety valve for social discontent principally resulting from economic stagnation. Intertwined with the ongoing Cold War, Cuban migration into the

United States remained highly politicized.74

72 Arboleya, Cuba y cubanoamericanos, pp. 227-28. 73 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 103-7; and Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles, pp. 64-68. 74 Pedraza, Political Disaffection, esp. chap. 1. The Cuban government also exercised control over the process by forbidding the emigration of men of ages from 15 to 26 (required for military service), certain technicians, and political prisoners. 42

The migration crisis also confirmed the contradictory nature of U.S. policy toward

Cuba. The United States kept the embargo on Cuba in the hope of increasing dissatisfaction among the Cuban people and thereby pressuring the Cuban regime to change its behavior. But U.S. migration policy defied this logic by helping the revolutionary regime remove the discontented from the island.75 Even the above- mentioned paper by a Cuban intelligence officer acknowledges that Cuba-to-U.S. emigration in the 1960s and early 1970s “reduced considerably” the base of support for the CIA and counterrevolution.76 In a sense, Washington inadvertently became a strange bedfellow of Havana in bringing counterrevolutionary forces to Miami and cementing revolutionary power in Cuba.

Miami, Community Formation, and Participation in U.S. Politics

The massive inflow of Cubans promoted the transformation of late twentieth century Miami. In 1959, Miami was a segmented society that consisted of a large number of retired Jews, segregated in ghettos, and northern and southern white migrants drawn to South Florida’s opportunities. For others, it was a shabby local city for spending winter. Since the Cuban Revolution, thousands of Cubans reached ashore, received residency, and brought in money, skills, talents, ideas, language abilities, and cultural traits. As the size of the Cuban community grew, Miami attracted more

Latinos, expanded its ties to Latin America, and became the “City on the Edge,” which

75 Louis A. Pérez Jr., “The Personal is Political: Animus and Malice in the U.S. Policy toward Cuba, 1959-2009,” in Castro Mariño and Pruessen, eds., Fifty Years of Revolution, pp. 137-166. 76 “IV. Las actividades subversivas después de la crisis de octubre.” 43 appeared to be a precursor for many other U.S. cities.77 As their economic success sustained anti-Castro politics, the transformation of Miami also had political implications for U.S. relations with Cuba.

For all the Cuban , the survival of the revolution meant that they could not return to their homeland as most of them had expected. As their wait rolled from years to decades, many of these Cubans found it necessary to concentrate on new lives in the United States. Many resided in South Florida, particularly the Miami (Dade County), where the Cuban population underwent a 30-fold increase from fewer than 20,000 just prior to the revolution to nearly 600,000 Cubans by the early

1980s.78 Here, they managed to preserve, express, and assert a strong sense of cubanidad

(Cubanness), an identity that remains both political and cultural. While calling themselves “exiles” rather than “immigrants,” they developed a dual identity as both

Cubans and Americans. As historian María Cristina García explains, “Miami had become

Havana USA: the border town between Cuba and the United States.”79

By 1980, due to the successive waves of migration, approximately 800,000 persons of Cuban origin lived in the United States.80 The Cuban community in the United

States was diverse, although less so than in their homeland. Compared with the first wave that occurred right after the revolution, the 1965-1973 air flights included less of top-

77 Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge. By Miami, scholars generally refer to metropolitan Miami (Dade County). 78 Boswell and Curtis, Cuban-American Experience, p. 71. 79 García, Havana USA, p. 118. 80 For demographical data on persons of Cuban origin, see Lisandro Pérez, “The Cuban Population of the United States: The Results of the 1980 U.S. Census of Population,” Cuban Studies 15, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 1-18. The number does not include those who arrived in the Mariel boatlift of 1980. 44 echelon of prerevolutionary Cuba and more of blue-collar workers and former small business owners. As men of military age had to stay, the recent wave included more women and the elderly. There also were substantial numbers of Cubans of Chinese and

Jewish heritage. Blacks, youths, and farmers remained underrepresented among the overseas community because they tended to support the revolutionary government and its programs. In the case of Afro-Cubans, U.S. immigration policy since 1965 gave preference to those with relatives already in the United States, thus favoring the whites who came first to the United States.81

Unlike many other Latin American migrants, Cubans enjoyed generous assistance for their resettlement into the United States. From 1961 to 1973, federal assistance programs expended roughly $957 million to provide Cuban newcomers with meals, residences, job training, and other necessities. Furthermore, all Cubans enjoyed special legal status after November 1966, when the U.S. Congress enacted the Cuban Adjustment

Act. This special legislation allowed Cubans to apply for permanent residency only a year and a day after arriving in the United States.82 It is also important to note that residents in

South Florida generally opposed the increase of Cubans in their areas because they worried about its impact on their jobs, taxes, housing, schools, and language. By 1974,

81 García, Havana USA, pp. 43-44; and Eckstein, Immigrant Divide, pp. 14-20. For Afro-Cubans in Cuba, see de la Fuente, A Nation for All. 82 García, Havana USA, pp. 20-23, 26-28, 44-45; and Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, Political and Economic Migrants in America: Cubans and Mexicans (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), p. 41. 45 because of strong local antagonism, the federal program resettled 299,326 of the 461,373

Cubans who had gone through registration.83

Thousands of Cubans nonetheless resided in “Little Havana,” the area located west of downtown Miami.84 Here, Cubans established hometown associations, engaged in , opened private educational institutions to teach their children about Cuban history, and published hundreds of Spanish-language newspapers, tabloids, newsletters, journals, and magazines. They renamed parks, monuments, streets, and businesses after heroes of Cuba’s war of independence such as Jose Martí. Many traditional cuisines, cultural festivals, and social rituals also persisted in the new environment. Seeking spiritual support, thousands of Cubans kept their style of Catholic faith through devotion to the statue of La Virgen de la Caridad del Cobre (Our Lady of Charity).85 Many of those who initially settled elsewhere also returned to Miami, looking for jobs, friends, neighbors, and a warm climate.86

Geographical concentration and a strong sense of cultural ties also nurtured an

“ethnic enclave.”87 Miami Cubans benefited from individual capabilities, social networks,

83 Residents complained of preferential treatment of newcomers, worried about the decline of property values and the quality of education for non-Spanish speaking students, and alleged that Cubans disregarded American laws, especially traffic regulations. Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles, pp. 62-64; García, Havana USA, pp. 20, 28-30, 40-41; and Croucher, Imagining Miami, chap. 4. 84 Raymond Mohl, “Miami: The Ethnic Cauldron,” in Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, eds., Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth since World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 71. 85 A smaller number of Cubans, less than 10 percent, practiced Protestant faiths or Santería (a syncretic Afro-Cuban faith). Boswell and Curtis, Cuban-American Experience, chaps. 7-9; and García, Havana USA, pp. 86-99, 171-198. 86 By 1990, over half of Cuban population in the United States lived in the Miami area. 87 Alejandro Portes and Robert L. Bach, Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the Unites States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 203. 46 and a variety of federal assistance and resources to create thousands of ethnic companies that provided capital, employment, and job training for those who arrived later.88 As a group, Cuban Americans in the late 1970s tended to receive higher education, hold better-paying jobs, and gain higher incomes than other Latinos, although they were behind non-Hispanic whites.89 Furthermore, Cuban-born entrepreneurs energized the local economy of South Florida by taking advantage of Miami’s location as a crossroads between North and Latin America, as well as easy access to cheap labor and abundant capital. They transformed Miami into “the Capital of Latin America,” a center for trade, finance, and aerial transportation in the Western Hemisphere.90

Although anticommunist Cubans took pride in their economic prosperity and believed that their success was vindication of their work, all stories of communities are not necessarily positive. Due to language barriers, licensing requirements, and a lack of demand for their skills, middle-class Cubans experienced an abrupt economic downturn when they moved to the United States. Many suffered from poverty, especially the elderly. Some elements participated in , in particular drug-trafficking.91

More notorious was the community’s intolerance of dissent. Cuban newspapers, tabloids, and radio programs incessantly denounced the adversarial regime in their homeland. For

88 Mohl, “Miami,” p. 78.

89 For example, in 1979, Cuban-American median family income was $17,538 while non-Cuban Latino and non-Hispanic median family earned $14,569 and $19,965 respectively. Cuban-American unemployment rate (5 percent) was lower than non-Cuban and even non-Hispanic counterparts (8.9 percent and 6.5 percent respectively). 12 percent of the Cuban Americans received four-year or more college education. This figure was higher than the one of all Latinos (6.7 percent) and closer to the one of non-Latinos (16.9 percent). Boswell and Curtis, Cuban-American Experience, pp. 104, 107. 90 Barry B. Levine, “Miami: The Capital of Latin America,” Wilson Quarterly 9, no. 5 (1985): 47-69. 91 García, Havana USA, p. 143; and Arboleya, Cuba y cubanoamericanos, pp. 118-19. 47 them, opposition to Castro was not a political opinion as much as a moral issue—“the

Cause”—that no member of the community could question. To describe this atmosphere, sociologists Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick chose an apt phrase, “moral community.”92

As their stay prolonged, many Cubans became naturalized U.S. citizens and participated in U.S. politics. By 1980, 55 percent of the eligible Cubans in Dade County were U.S. citizens, compared to 25 percent in 1970.93 Professionals created the Latin

American Chamber of Commerce, the Cuban American Medical Associations, and numerous other organizations to advance their interests. Civic organizations, such as the

Cuban National Planning Council, the National Association of Cuban American Women, and the National Coalition of Cuban Americans emerged to address community issues, such as employment, health care, gender equality, and language discrimination. A number of individuals started to run for local government posts. In 1973, two Bay of Pigs veterans, Manolo Reboso and Alfredo Durán, respectively became the first Cuban-born commissioner of the city of Miami and the first member of the Dade County school board.

Party politics also followed this increased political participation, as the

Republican and Democratic Party competed for the hearts and minds of Cuban

Americans. Florida was one of the strongholds for conservative Southern Democrats, who dominated posts at local and state levels and provided winning chances to promising candidates. Since the mid-1960s, the Florida Republican Party directed its efforts toward

92 See, their City on the Edge, p. 107. 93 García, Havana USA, p. 113. 48 influential campaigners of Cuban origin, such as Edgardo Buttari and Manuel Giberga, close associates of Nixon. These activists drove Cuban American voters to their camp by sending a message that the Democratic Party was responsible for the Bay of Pigs fiasco because Kennedy was a Democrat.94 The trend alarmed the Florida Democratic Party, whose counteroffensive in the late 1970s addressed socioeconomic issues, took advantage of infighting among Cuban American Republicans, and selected Alfredo

Durán to be the first Hispanic chair of the party.95 By the early 1980s, party affiliation was almost even among Cuban Americans.

Homeland Politics Continued

For some, however, Cuba remained the sole focus of their lives. In the eyes of

U.S. officials after the missile crisis, Cuban paramilitary groups in Florida, such as Alpha

66, were embarrassments rather than assets, as they attacked the ships of the Soviet

Union as well as Britain, Japan, Spain, and other U.S. allies trading with Cuba. Following the change of interests, Washington belatedly enforced U.S. laws such as the Neutrality

Act of 1917 (18 U.S.C. 960), which prohibited persons in the United States from financing, organizing, or carrying out hostile expeditions against foreign powers with which the United States was at peace.96 To evade U.S. law enforcement, the groups

94 Bernardo Benes to Dante Fascell, May 8, 1972, in folder “Groups-Cubans, Campaign ‘72,” box 1838, Dante B. Fascell Papers, University of Miami’s Special Collections (hereafter UM-SC). 95 Miami News, June 14, 1976, p. 5A; and New York Times (hereafter NYT), July 4, 1976, p. 19. 96 The federal government also enforced the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) section 38, which prohibited the unlicensed exportation of certain defense articles and services. Training with automatic weapons was also a federal crime. On U.S. dealings with invasion plans, see the next chapter. 49 stored explosives in a third country, typically , and picked them up just before launching the raids. Yet, as Cuban intelligence agents already penetrated into the groups, the raids almost always ended in dismal failure.97

The more desperate and radical they became, the more drastic their tactics grew.

Disillusioned with perceived U.S. betrayals of their cause, dozens of anti-Castro groups acted independently of the CIA to launch the “War along the Roads of the World” (La

Guerra por los Caminos del Mundo). Instead of commando raids and guerilla campaigns, they favored spectacular terrorism against Cuban diplomats, Cuban governmental buildings, as well as other “unfriendly” targets in third countries.98 Most notorious were groups led by , a pediatrician and former CIA agent. According to the U.S.

Justice Department, Bosch engaged in “more than thirty acts of sabotage and violence” between 1961 and 1968, including the bombing of the British vessel Gramwood in Key

West, the Japanese vessel Asaka Maru in Tampa, and the Japanese vessel Mikagesan

Maru in Galveston, Texas. In September 1968, Bosch fired a bazooka at the Polish vessel

Polanica, anchored in the port of Miami.99

97 I Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, Informe Central: Presentados por el compañero Fidel Castro Ruz Primer Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba (Havana: Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 1975), chap. 8, esp. p. 199. 98 John Dinges and Saul Landau, Assassination on Embassy Row (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 145-47. 99 U.S. Justice Department, Office of the Associate Attorney General, “In the Matters of Orlando Bosch-Avila,” June 23, 1989, in folder “Cuban Americans-Florida/ Orlando Bosch,” White House Office of Public Liaison: James Schaefer Files, GHWBL. See also, Orlando Bosch, Los años que he vivido (Miami, FL: New Press, 2010), see esp. pp. 122-28. 50

Bosch himself claimed that they were not “terrorists” but “freedom fighters” using terror as the only means available to them.100 This argument resonated with many

émigrés, who praised them as heroes, offered funding for the cause, and volunteered for their legal defense.101 Yet regardless of their claims and popularity, the U.S. government considered them “terrorists” and shared information with other countries to stop them. In

May 1967, for example, Mexico’s intelligence agency Dirección Federal de Seguridad

(DFS) received the FBI information on Bosch, who attempted to bomb a British ship carrying cereals to Cuba from a port of Tampico, Tamaulipas.102 Ominously, in June

1968, a DFS informant reported that Bosch was changing its targets from ships to airplanes, mobilizing his agents in Mexico, the Bahamas, the United States, and elsewhere.103 In November 1968, U.S. authorities imprisoned Bosch for his firing on the

Polanica, although he violated parole six years later to become a fugitive. His name came back to newspapers in October 1976, when the worst pre-9/11 aviation terrorist incident occurred near Barbados.

From the opposite end of the political spectrum emerged the leftist movement.

Influenced by the Civil Rights movement, feminism, and the antiwar movement in the

United States, a group of radical academics and students started to reevaluate their culture

100 Bosch, Reflexiones (n.d., 2006?), pp. 39-40. 101 García, Havana USA, pp. 143-44. 102 U.S. authorities foiled the plot by arresting Bosch’s agents. Mexico later located the explosives within its territory. DFS, “Explosivos Localizados en el Estado de Tamulipas,” May 4, 1967, Versiones Públicas (hereafter VP), Fondo Dirección Federal de Seguridad (hereafter DFS), Archivo General de la Nación de México (hereafter AGN). 103 DFS’s report on Bosch, 20 de junio de 1968, VP, DFS, AGN. DFS’s informant also reported that Bosch was talking about the bombing plot at the Olympics in Mexico. DFS’s report on MIRR, September 21, 1968, VP, DFS, AGN. 51 and identity, as well as their relations with the homeland. At the forefront was Lourdes

Casal, a dark-skinned sociologist, who travelled back to the island on a regular basis after

1973 and started a magazine, Areíto, in April 1974. In favor of U.S.-Cuban normalization of relations, the magazine reported on the accomplishments of the revolution, in stark contrast to the community’s problems with discrimination, inequality, and social alienation.104 Areíto provoked negative responses from the community and came under bombing threats. Yet, in addition to its defense of ideological plurality, this movement later formed the Brigada Antonio Maceo, whose trip would invoke notable repercussions in Cuba and the United States.

It also bears emphasizing that many ordinary Cuban emigrants held contradictory feelings about U.S. relations with Cuba. According to a poll of Miami

Cubans in December 1975, more than 53 percent of the respondents staunchly opposed

U.S.-Cuban normalization. Yet the same poll also revealed that despite public anti-Castro discourse, 49.5 percent expressed their desire to visit the island, perhaps to meet their families.105 What was noteworthy about this poll was that it was taken only two months after the controversy stirred by Fernando De Baca, special assistant to Gerald Ford for

Hispanic Affairs. Because De Baca commented that Cuban émigrés publicly opposed normalization yet privately wished to visit the island, numerous angry community leaders called him “irresponsible,” “insulting,” and “treacherous.”106 The poll not only verified

104 Editorial, Areíto 1, no. 1 (April 1974), p. 1; and Editorial, Areíto 1, no. 4 (January-March 1975), p. 52. 105 Quoted in García, Havana USA, pp. 138-39. 106 Miami Herald (hereafter MH), September 3, 1975, pp. 1A and 2A. For letters of from angry Cubans, see those in folder “U.S.-Cuban Relations (1)” and folder “U.S.-Cuban Relations— 52

Baca’s statement, but also exposed the complex nature of Cuban politics in Miami. This complexity would provide an important background for U.S. policy toward Cuba during the later years.

Nixon, Détente, and Cuban-Soviet Relations

Richard Nixon was not a pragmatist in terms of his views on Cuba. In the early

1970s, the U.S. president promoted détente with China and the Soviet Union, the two biggest communist powers in the world. These moves reflected a substantial decline in anticommunist zeal in Washington, coincided with the emergence of realpolitik at the center of U.S. policy design, and stirred expectations that Nixon might suggest normalization of relations with Cuba. Yet, Nixon did not move in that direction, probably due to his deep-seated personal animosity toward Castro as well as his close friendship with Charles “Bebe” Rebozo, an anti-Castro Cuban émigré in Miami. When his chief foreign policy adviser brought up the idea of reviewing U.S. policy toward Cuba, Nixon hesitated, halted the process, and later opposed it completely. “I’m not changing the policy towards Castro,” Nixon declared to Kissinger in December 1971,

“as long as I’m alive.”107

Correspondence,” both in box 5, Office of Public Liaison (hereafter OPL): Fernando De Baca Files, Gerald Ford Library (hereafter GFL). 107 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 120-23. According to Kissinger, Cuba was a “neuralgic problem” for Nixon. The U.S. president also hated to appear “weak” before “his old friend (Rebozo).” Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 633-34, 641. For détente, see for example, Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). 53

Throughout his first term Nixon largely ignored Cuba, focusing on more pressing issues such as the ongoing conflicts in . Major exceptions were U.S.-

Soviet talks over the Soviet deployment of submarines in , Cuba, and the increase of hijackings of U.S. airplanes to the island. From May to October 1970, the U.S. government worried that the new deployment of submarines would violate the Kennedy-

Khrushchev understanding and change the military balance in favor of the USSR. The two superpowers eventually resolved this incident—without Cuba’s participation—by confirming the agreement.108 On the hijacking issue, however, the United States had to deal directly with Havana for cooperation. In February 1973, the U.S. and Cuban governments concluded a “memorandum of understanding,” a five-year pact committing themselves to punish hijackers or return them. But the agreement did not signal a new beginning of U.S. relations with Cuba.109

Nixon’s stubbornness was particularly striking in light of Havana’s changing foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As existing scholarship points out,

Havana’s revolutionary strategy faced a fatal blow in October 1967, when its principal practitioner, Che Guevara, was killed in Bolivia. While its guerilla operations encountered further setbacks, Havana also faced increased pressure from Moscow, which demanded a radical change in Cuba’s foreign policy for the sake of its pursuit of peaceful coexistence with the United States. According to James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, the relationship reached “near a breaking point,” when Moscow scaled back deliveries of oil

108 The Soviets withdrew a submarine from Cuba. Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 251-55. See also the next chapter. 109 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 255-260; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 123-26. 54 to the island and Havana purged a pro-Soviet faction from the .

Still, Cuban-Soviet relations improved incrementally after August 1968, when Castro endorsed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.110

Equally important was the unfavorable result of Cuba’s Ten-Million-Ton Sugar

Harvest campaign (La Zafra de los Diez Milliones). Embracing the concept of a “new man” (hombre nuevo) and rejecting material incentives for labor, Castro proclaimed that an underdeveloped country could make a gigantic leap forward toward communism, skipping the transitional stage of capitalism. If selfless revolutionaries sacrificed personal liberty for collective goods, he claimed, their limitless labor would produce ten million tons of sugar, bring in massive foreign hard currency, and make possible Cuba’s economic take-off.111 Despite these promises, however, the campaign proved overly ambitious.112 Because Castro had served as the face of this crusade and directed all available resources to this effort, the May 1970 announcement of its failure not only reflected a massive economic disaster, but also exerted a tremendous political toll on

Castro. The Cuban leader admitted that he had committed “errors of idealism.”113

As the projected shortcut to communism closed, Havana undertook massive reforms—Sovietization—on its own initiative. Following the Soviet economic model, the

110 Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days; and Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 90-92. 111 The concept of a new man was originally conceived by Che Guevara. Mesa-Lago, Economy, pp. 18-24; and Pérez, Reform and Revolution, p. 259-260. 112 Reasons for the failure may include: chaotic economic planning, inefficient management, further emigration of professionals and technicians, and the decline of labor productivity through the total elimination of material incentives for labor. Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 261-63. 113 I Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, Informe Central, p. 104. For a critical analysis of the campaign, see Guerra, Visions of Power, pp. 290-304. 55

Cuban government adjusted wages according to quality and quantity of production and replaced ideologically fervent, yet incompetent revolutionaries with economic managers who had little enthusiasm for socialism.114 Parallel to these steps was the institutionalization of the political system. Castro restored mass organizations, augmented the membership of the Communist Party, and created a new political structure, Poder

Popular (People’s Power). He delegated administrative power to mass organizations and the state, which consisted of a Council of Ministers, a National Assembly, fourteen provincial assemblies, and 169 municipal assemblies. These reforms culminated in the

First Congress of the Communist Party in 1975, as well as the first elections under

Cuba’s new constitution in 1976, which a specialist described as “very similar to the

Soviet one.”115

Cuba’s Sovietization had critical implications for its foreign relations since it cemented Havana’s ties to Moscow. The Caribbean adoption of the Soviet model not only satisfied Soviet ideological needs, but also cushioned their allegations of Cuba’s misuse of resources. In 1972, the Soviet Union supported Cuba’s participation in the

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and made a special trade arrangement with the island. Moscow postponed debt payment schedules, extended new lines of credit, and increased the price it paid for Cuban exports.116 In foreign policy, Castro publicly

114 Mesa-Lago, Economy, p. 29. According to Fidel, “revolutionaries also have an obligation to be a realist” by acting with better knowledge of history, political sciences, and universal experiences. I Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, Informe Central, pp. 102-3. In September 1970, Havana enacted the Ley contra la vagancia (The Law against Laziness) and criminalized refusal to work. 115 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 265-68. For a quote, see Bain, Soviet-Cuban Relations, pp. 27- 28. 116 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 268-271; and Bain, Soviet-Cuban Relations, pp. 26-32. 56 endorsed détente and peaceful coexistence in a communique issued during Leonid

Brezhnev’s 1974 visit to Cuba. This endorsement did not necessarily mean the end of

Cuba’s autonomy. While rationalizing its policy within the overall framework of Soviet global strategy, Havana continued to advance an essentially independent agenda in the

Third World.117

Sovietization brought economic prosperity to Cuba and expanded its trade with non-socialist countries. Historically high sugar prices assisted this trend. Sugar prices rose from 3.75 cents per pound in 1970 to 29.96 per pound in 1974, generating massive hard currency and reversing Cuba’s trade deficits to a small surplus in 1974—the first in fifteen years. The island purchased Western technology, capital equipment, and consumer goods from Canada, Japan, and Western Europe.118 Cuba’s Vice President Carlos Rafael

Rodríguez toured capitals in these countries and signed new agreements on trade, finance, and technological cooperation. These arrangements fitted well within Havana’s strategy of breaking the economic blockade. Canada, , Mexico, and Cuba’s other trading partners vehemently opposed the jurisdiction of U.S. laws that prohibited trading with Cuba through subsidiaries of U.S. companies in their territories.119

117 British Foreign Ministry Joint Memorandum, “CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev’s Visit to Cuba,” n.d., Records of the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office (hereafter FCO) 7/2650, Public Records Office, National Archives of the (hereafter PRO); Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 95-102; and Tayna Harmer, “Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967-1975,” Journal of Latin American Studies 45, no. 1 (February 2013): 61-89. 118 For the change of sugar prices, see Table 19 in Mesa-Lago, Economy, p. 89. 119 Canadian exports to Cuba rose from $58 million in 1972 to $217 million by 1975. Japan’s exports to the island also increased from $51 million in 1972 to $438 million by 1975, making the nation the largest non-communist trading partner. Quoted in Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, January 16, 1979, p. 4, NLC-24-79-8-3-9, Records retrieved through the RAC system (hereafter RAC), Jimmy Carter Library (hereafter JCL). For a basic summary of Cuba’s relations with Canada and Britain, see for 57

Growing reliance on the Soviet Union and continued dependency on sugar export were not a panacea for Cuba’s structural economic problems despite these gains. As non-

Cuban observers frequently noted, Cuba in the mid-1970s exuded confidence in the maturity of the revolution. With Soviet economic assistance, Cuba played a larger role abroad, achieved some degree of industrial development, and made further advances in social welfare for the population, particularly in education, nutrition, health care, sports, and culture. These developments led not only Cuban citizens but also foreign observers to express somewhat optimistic views of the nation’s future.120 However, the adoption of the

Soviet model also had a negative impact. It ultimately deprived Cuba of new ideas, creative thinking, and institutional flexibility.121 In the late 1970s, as the price of sugar on the world market plummeted, stagnation set in, disrupting Cuba’s trade with non-socialist countries. This loss of economic vitality would have important ramifications for Cuba’s view of the United States.

U.S.-Cuban Relations in Latin American Context

When the U.S. government signaled its distance from Cuban counterrevolution, it

example, “Canada/Cuba Relations and U.S./Cuba Relations,” October 6, 1975, vol. 10851, file 20- Cuba-1-3-USA, part 4, Record Group 25: Department of External Affairs (hereafter RG25), Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC); and Hugh Carless (Latin American Department) to J. E. Jackson, January 13, 1976, FCO 7/3125, PRO. 120 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 272-285. For foreign observers’ views of Cuba in the mid- 1970s, see for example, Informe político, attached to Mexican embassy in Havana to , April 15, 1974, Leg. III-3256-2, Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (hereafter AHGE); and Comments by Fingland (British ambassador in Havana), in Memcon (Fingland, Shlaudeman), August 14, 1974, pp. 2-3, FCO 7/2650, PRO. For a critical view, see Guerra, Visions of Power. 121 Arboleya, Cuba y cubanoamericanos, pp. 236-41. 58 also emphasized that such attitudes would not represent any change in U.S. policy toward

Cuba.122 But developments in Latin America during the late 1960s and early 1970s severely undermined this resolve. A series of global events, such as Washington’s fiasco in Vietnam, détente and breakdown of bipolarity, the collapse of Bretton Woods, and oil shocks of 1973-1974 raised doubts of U.S. prominence of power. Buoyed by economic growth, rising nationalism, and subscription to “dependency” theory, several Latin

American countries vigorously contested U.S. hegemony at international forums. As the perception of the Cuban military threat declined, these non-communist nations expressed sympathy for the Cuban Revolution, defied U.S. diplomatic design, and worked to lift the

1964 OAS sanctions on the island.123

Castro readily responded to this change in regional dynamics. Cuba’s major focus shifted from assistance in Guevara-type guerilla movements to selective acceptance of peaceful coexistence with non-communist countries. Cuba also took a cautious approach in Chile, a major Cold War battleground in the early 1970s. Castro not only collaborated with orthodox Soviet-line communist parties but also formed an intimate personal relationship with Chilean leader Salvador Allende, notwithstanding their ideological disagreement over the path toward socialism. Havana remained calm even after the

United States and played roles in subverting the Chilean Revolution. Instead of

122 Washington to all U.S. embassies in Central America and the Caribbean, February 16, 1972, in folder “POL 33-6 Cuba/ Plataforma 1,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, Record Group 59: Department of State Records (hereafter RG59), National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA). See also the next chapter. 123 Brands, Latin America’s, chap. 5. By 1975, Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations with Chile, , Argentina, , Venezuela, and . Cuba also established diplomatic relations with four of former British colonies—Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. 59 reacting violently, Havana drew a conclusion from this experience that the revolutionary moment was nonexistent in Latin America. The Cuban government thus would need to wait for better times ahead.124

As Cuba signaled its readiness to normalize relations with the United States, expectations for a change in U.S. policy grew greater. In January 1974, when the Cuban ambassador to Mexico implied that the only precondition for the opening of talks with the

United States was the lifting of the embargo, dozens of U.S. newspapers gave wide coverage to this comment and issued editorials in favor of talks.125 In the U.S. Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution to demand the end of the embargo and dispatched Pat M. Holt, its executive director, to Cuba for a fact-finding mission.126 But more critical than this gradual erosion of the Cold War policy consensus was Kissinger’s concern about U.S. standing in Latin America, where the second-term

Nixon administration had inaugurated a policy of “a new dialogue.”127 Between two rounds of foreign minister-level-meetings in Mexico City in February and Washington in

April, he had received enormous pressure from his Latin American counterparts who

124 Harmer, Allende’s Chile. 125 British embassy in Washington to London, February 12, 1974, FCO 7/2650, PRO. British embassy in Washington to H. M. Carless, May 7, 1974, FCO 7/2650, PRO. See also, NYT, April 24, 1974, p. 8. 126 On return, Holt released an eleven-page report on his visit to recommend that the United States improve relations with Cuba. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Cuba: a Staff Report, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., August 2, 1974. 127 This new policy initiative aimed for the expansion of trade, economic cooperation, and technological innovations, as well as the multilateral resolution of outstanding political issues such as the return of the Panama Canal. The Nixon and Ford administrations took the initiative of their own, although their enthusiasm waned substantially later on and their rhetoric did not accompany practices. National Security Decision Memorandum 257, June 10, 1974, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdm-nixon/nsdm_257.pdf (accessed February 26, 2015). For U.S. views, see Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), chaps. 23-24. 60 sought to involve Cuba in this new framework.128

Kissinger intensely disliked how smaller Latin American countries put him on the defensive even as he sought greater dialogue with them. In July 1974, when Kissinger and his staff discussed U.S. responses to Argentina’s continued advocacy for Cuba’s participation in the foreign ministers’ meeting, Kissinger noted, “I don’t mind changing our policy but I do mind being pushed.” U.S. policy was the domain of the United States, not others. “If anybody gets credit for getting [Castro] there,” he continued, “it’s going to be us. (Laughter.) I’m serious.” If the United States changed its policy, “let’s do it as our own policy…I’m open-minded on Cuba, but we’ll do it at our own speed.” It was such calculation of U.S. interests in light of changing global and regional dynamics that drew

Kissinger to the idea of exploring normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.129 As the

Watergate scandal forced Nixon out of his presidency, Kissinger was ready to pursue confidential talks with Castro.

Conclusion

The Cuban Revolution not only broke past relations with the United States, but also marked the beginning of counterrevolution and deepening divisions of opinions

128 For example, Mexico’s Foreign Minister Emilio O. Rabasa asked Kissinger to invite Cubans to the next foreign ministers’ meeting, saying that “every time we speak about this thing Cuba, Castro, or somebody comes out and says we were instruments of the United States…And that hurts my national pride.” Telcon (Rabasa, Kissinger), March 13, 1974, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter DNSA). Kissinger and his aides discussed how to drive the Cuban issue away from the U.S. press coverage of the meeting. “If these meetings get identified with Cuba,” Kissinger said, “they are dead.” Secretary’s Staff Conference Minutes, April 10, 1974, esp. pp. 1-13, DNSA. See also, Kissinger, Years of Renewal, chap. 23, esp. pp. 727-28. 129 State Department Staff Meeting Minutes, July 16, 1974, esp. 17-23, DNSA. 61 among the Cuban population. Much like the experience of the Cold War in Latin

America, Cuba’s radical changes yielded conflict between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries. In the case of Cuba, however, this revolutionary- counterrevolutionary dynamic migrated across the borders of nation-states, as opposition to the revolution expanded from the island itself, became entrenched in the United States, and continued political and military activities. Emigration made Cuba a rare exception to the ultra-violent cycle of revolution and counterrevolution in Latin America. Yet along with local and global developments, it also would help to prolong the Cuban strife.

By the mid-1970s, new momentum for a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement had appeared to emerge. The United States halted its program of sponsoring Cuban counterrevolutionary groups, whereas the revolutionary government remained firmly in power, aligned with the Soviet Union, and increased its support among Latin American countries. Yet, Washington and Havana pursued differing global interests. Although

Washington sought détente with communist countries such as China and the Soviet

Union, it did not intend to cede leadership over any part of the world to them. Havana revised its approach to revolutionary movements in the Third World, but it did not completely give up its devotion to the cause of national liberation. Until the very end of the Cold War, the foreign policy interests of Washington and Havana clashed as part of the Cold War in the Third World.

Due to its heavy geographical concentration, extraordinary economic growth, and strong sense of political and cultural identity, the Miami Cuban community was destined to play a critical role in U.S. relations with Cuba. Many opposed the Cuban government,

62 even as they felt betrayed by the U.S. government. Washington had provided refuge and sponsored their movement, but it also had abandoned their cause during the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and Operation Mongoose. For them, any moderation of U.S. hostility toward revolutionary Cuba was tantamount to an assault against their personal pride. Some Miami Cubans appeared convinced that they should do everything possible, including the indiscriminate use of violence, to continue their fight. As a result, this legacy of violence endured far beyond U.S. policymakers’ original design.

63

CHAPTER 2: The Legacy of Violence

Realpolitik, Détente, and Counterrevolutionary Terrorism in the Caribbean, 1970-1976

In his speech almost fifteen years after the Bay of Pigs, José Miró Cardona called the United States a “guardian of Castro.” As one of the most prominent Cuban opposition leaders abroad, Miró Cardona would have become the provisional after the U.S.-sponsored invasion. But he now charged the U.S. government with having abandoned Cuban counterrevolutionaries in the middle of their fighting, pledged no- invasion of his homeland during the Cuban missile crisis, and failed to isolate Cuban communism from the rest of the world. To make matters worse, he added, the U.S. and

British governments defended Castro by preventing Cuban “patriots” from raiding against the island. “If we are alone, absolutely alone…there is only one route left to follow,” he proclaimed, “Violence? Yes, violence. We are obliged to do so.”130

Miró Cardona died in August 1974, but his advocacy for violence endured as an ominous guidance for Miami Cubans. A series of sensational and embarrassing reports of counterrevolutionary raids in 1970 prompted the U.S. government to change its attitudes toward anti-Castro militants and intensify its efforts to curve their activities. For the time being, however, the crackdown had the effect of radicalizing anti-Castro militants.

During the three years from 1974 to 1976 alone, they caused 202 incidents that affected

130 José Miró Cardona, Exaltación de José Martí (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editora Horizontes de América, 1974). 64 twenty-three countries—with 113 taking place inside the United States.131 Some reportedly looked to the speech by Miró Cardona as an endorsement of their acts.132 This development culminated in the October 6, 1976, bombing of a Cubana airliner near

Barbados, killing all seventy-three passengers and crew aboard. The Crime of Barbados became the worst pre-9/11 aviation terrorist incident in the Western Hemisphere.

Previous studies have not examined the surge of anti-Castro terrorist incidents as a critical component of U.S. relations with Cuba and the broader Caribbean. With its focus on Washington’s relations with Havana, U.S. scholarship has not detailed shifting

U.S. relations with the military movement in Miami from 1970 to 1976 as a whole.133

Cuban scholarship has paid closer attention to the counterrevolutionary military movement. Yet, a shortage of documentation developed somewhat dubious interpretations of the phenomena, leading some to accuse the United States of masterminding almost all incidents, including the October 1976 bombing.134 The existing literature on the Cuban American community examines the surrounding political

131 José Luis Méndez Méndez, Los años del terror (1974-1976) (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006), p. 2. For another attempt to calculate the number, see Carlos A. Forment, “Political Practice and the Rise of an Ethnic Enclave: The Cuban American Case, 1959-1979,” Theory and Society 18 (1989): 47-81. 132 Hilda Inclán, “Cardona Inspires Acción Cubana,” Miami News, March 22, 1974, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Terroristic Activity: Terrorism in the Miami Area, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., May 6, 1976. 133 Schoultz, Infernal; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel. Until today the 1976 incident itself has attracted relatively little attention in the United States. 134 Carlos Rivero Collado, Los sobrinos del Tío Sam (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1976); Méndez Méndez, Los años del terror; and Nicanor León Cotayo, Crimen en Barbados, 5ta ed. (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006). For a more nuanced description, see Carlos Alzugaray and Anthony C. E. Quainton, “Cuba-U.S. Relations: Terrorism Dimension,” Pensamiento Propio 34 (July-December 2011): 71-84. 65 atmosphere, motives of individual groups and leaders, and the community’s responses to the wave of terrorism. The geographical scope of their analysis nonetheless remains limited, making it difficult to treat the movement as a critical issue of international security beyond the United States.135

Based on diplomatic and security intelligence sources in the United States and elsewhere, this chapter moves its focus from Washington-Havana relations to the important issue of how the U.S. government confronted the legacy of its commitment to

Cuban counterrevolution in Miami after it had given up overthrowing the Cuban government through military means. By the mid-1970s, the U.S. government found it almost inevitable to coexist with revolutionary Cuba, worked to curtail Miami Cuban commando raids, and contemplated normalization of relations with the Caribbean island.

Yet, the U.S. government’s turnaround in Cuban policy also invited defiance by Miami

Cubans. U.S. dealings with Miami militants in turn proved far from satisfactory for

Cuban and international observers, especially after the surge of terror by anti-Castro militants opposing U.S.-Cuban détente.136

This chapter argues that U.S.-Cuban normalization of relations required more than the termination of U.S. sponsorship of counterrevolutionary groups. When Secretary of

State Henry Kissinger contemplated a major change in U.S. policy toward Cuba, he gave little attention to thousands of Miami Cubans. Yet, once the militant groups escalated

135 García, Havana USA; Torres, Mirrors; and Prieto, Union City, pp. 120-25. 136 Scholars disagree over the definition of terrorism. Here, I broadly define terrorism as an act of threat of violence designed to achieve a political objective. For a scholarly discussion, see Peter L. Hahn, “Terrorism,” in Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds., The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 66 their “war,” the chain of terrorist incidents provoked a crisis of confidence among many

Caribbean countries that suspected the arrival of another secret U.S. machination against revolutionary Cuba. Due to the past association with Cuban counterrevolution,

Washington’s denial of any U.S. responsibility for these acts proved difficult to accept.

Rather than ignoring its history, the U.S. government would have needed to confront the legacy of violence—directly—not only to prevent the tragic events, but also to give credibility to its claim of innocence.

The Meaning of “Terrorism”—A View from Havana

Reading of the Cuban records on terrorism is an emotionally difficult task for historians unless they favor the indiscriminate use of violence. In a box named

“Terrorismo Chronología” (Chronology of Terrorism) at the Cuban foreign ministry archive, there is a fifty-three-page list of bombings, killings, and attacks against the

Cuban people from 1959 to 2001. In 1959, there occurred 26 terrorist incidents and attempts, killing 4 and injuring 54. In 1960, the list had 122 items, in which 124 were dead, many missing, and 286 injured. In 1961, 246 died and 410 got injured. These numbers turned downward after 1963. The number of victims decreased from 52 in 1963 to 18 in 1964, and to 2 in 1965. The annual number of casualties thereafter fluctuated between 0 and 13—until 1976, the year when the Crime of Barbados took many invaluable lives.137

137 This list has English, Spanish, and French versions. I use the English one for analysis. “Detailed Chronological List of Terrorist Acts and Actions Committed against Cuba from 1959 to the Present (English),” 2001, Caja “Terrorismo Chronología 1959-1999,” MINREX. 67

The number of the list may be open to question, as the Cuban government could not identify individuals who conducted these terrorist incidents in many cases. The

Cuban government obviously used an expansive definition of “terrorism,” as it counted the Bay of Pigs, a combat against counterrevolutionary forces, as such. But even those who are skeptical of the entire claim by the revolutionary government may find the following entries disturbing.

December 26, 1960. An explosive device blows up in the cafeteria of the Flogar

department store in Havana, wounding ffiteen people, including numerous minors.

November 25, 1961. Peasant Ricardo Díaz Rodríguez is murdered by a terrorist

gang in front of his wife and three small children in Trinidad, Sancti Spíritus.

July 2, 1962. Three peasants, one of whom was a woman, are murdered. A ten-year-

old girl and her mother were beaten as well, but they managed to escape while

being shot at.

July 21, 1963. A peasant in Jatibonico, Sancti Spíritus, is shot to death after his eyes

are gouged out.

November 13, 1965. A woman is wounded when a boat armed with 30 and 50 mm

machine guns opens fire on the coastline of the Havana neighborhood of Miramar.

68

The extensive nature of the list suggests that they are only small portion of the Cuban experiences. As its entries continued until 2001, the list indicates that a series of aggressions and attempts, often directed against civilians, continued far beyond the mid-

1960s, when the CIA stopped funding counterrevolutionary groups.138

The operations certainly antagonized Castro and millions of Cubans. If one thinks that the Cuban leader allowed these terrorists to attack the island to direct the public anger against Yankee , such reasoning is utterly wrong. His show of anger appears in numerous historical records. In a secret speech before his , for example, Castro called the raid “a flagrant, public, extremely irritating activity,” whose

“moral damage” was “far greater” than the damage it actually caused. What the Cuban leader resented most was not really about the raids themselves but about the lack of U.S. actions deterring them, thereby allowing his enemies to act “with impunity.”139 Because there was no public acknowledgement regarding the beginning and end of U.S. covert operations, Havana perceived almost all attacks as a part of one plan directed or condoned by Washington. For instance, a report from a Cuban intelligence officer claims that Nixon sponsored a counterrevolutionary “invasion” plan in 1970 to “distract economic efforts, human and military resources for the defense.”140

138 Ibid. Some individuals remain on payrolls but mainly for compensation for their earlier service. 139 Quoted in Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous, p. 66. 140 The author of this report refers to the Torriente Plan, which appears in the following sections. “IV. La esperanza en los cambios internos,” n.d. (ca. 1973), pp. 8-9, in Caja “Bilateral 27,” MINREX. See also, Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous, pp. 17, 161. For comments on this issue by Cuba’s Interior Ministry Sergio del Valle, see British embassy in Havana to London, August 12, 1970, FCO 44/372, PRO. 69

The Year of Invasion?

In April 1969, the U.S. State Department studied the feasibility of using Miami

Cubans for covert actions. The review offered nothing surprising. It confirmed the inconvenient reality that over four hundred operations during the years from 1961 to

1967 were counterproductive. They not only “consolidated internal support of Castro” but also increased “international sympathy for the Cuban regime.” Few Cubans inside the island would take up arms against Castro. The Cuban government became an “extremely formidable target” for paramilitary operations from abroad because it not only established an “almost hermetic” internal security system, but also enjoyed “solid support” from “key power groups—military, youth and peasants.” Anti-Castro activists and militants already had left for the United States. “Unfortunately,” however, these counterrevolutionary elements abroad “suffered from the same decline in operational effectiveness” that

“typically affects exile movements with the passage of time.”141

Militant groups simply did not disappear. A CIA report noted that their commando raids hardly mobilized internal revolts in Cuba, since their potential supporters either had left Cuba or prepared to leave.142 But many Miami Cubans thought differently. For some, Havana’s 1970 failure of the Ten-Million-Ton Sugar Harvest campaign presented an ideal opportunity for an “invasion.” The State Department was aware that the three groups were particularly active. The Representación Cubana del

141 Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee, April 26, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-10: Doc. no. 200. For U.S. views, see also Memcon (Campora, Funseth), April 9, 1970, in folder “POL 33-6 Cuba/ Plataforma 1,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA. 142 CIA Intelligence Report, April 1970, CIA Records Search Tool (hereafter CREST), NARA. 70

Exilio (RECE) was trying to enlist the support of the Panamanian government to set up a camp for clandestine operations in Cuba.143 Its rationale was to get around the Neutrality

Act of 1917, which prohibited persons in the United States from knowingly financing, organizing, or carrying out hostile expeditions against foreign powers with which the

United States was at peace.

Another group led by José Elias de la Torriente, a naturalized U.S. citizen of

Cuban origin, promoted the so-called Torriente Plan, a pledge of a military invasion of

Cuba by the end of the year 1970. In his conversation with Matthew D. Smith Jr., the U.S.

State Department’s point man in Miami, Torriente was confident. He assured that even a military confrontation would be unnecessary since Castro was weak. “The Castro regime, including the military,” he said, “is riddled with anti-Castro patriots who await the proper opportunity to finish the regime once and for all.” The exile military was merely a catalyst to instigate a radical change. When Smith said something to the contrary,

Torriente insisted that U.S. intelligence was as mistaken about Cuba as in the wake of the

1961 —this time by underestimating popular dissatisfaction. In his view, “90 percent” of the Cubans” were waiting for their return.144 Torriente kept preparing for military expeditions and toured Latin America for support, notwithstanding

143 U.S. embassy in Panama to Washington, January 22, 1970, in folder “POL 33-6 Cuba/ Plataforma 1,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA. 144 Memcon (Torriente, Smith), “PLAN TORRIENTE,” April 1, 1970, in folder “POL 33-6 Cuba/ Plataforma 1,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA. Smith’s official title is U.S. State Department’s Director of Miami Office of the Coordination of Cuban Affairs. He was in constant touch with Miami Cuban leaders and monitored their activities. 71 repeated U.S. declarations of enforcing neutrality laws.145

The United States, Britain, and

Even more reckless than Torriente was Alpha 66, the third group that pursued an invasion plan. In April 1970, the group in fact landed its men near , an eastern city of Cuba, and killed five soldiers. Castro arrested them and accused the United States of “organizing troops of mercenaries.”146 As the news spread across the world, Henry

Kissinger’s aide Viron P. Vaky called for action against the anti-Castro group. “Present activity is a technical violation of U.S. law [of neutrality] and of international law,” wrote

Vaky. If condoned, Castro might take it as a “deliberate” Washington effort to “increase pressure” on Havana.147 In another memo to Kissinger, Vaky argued that the raids could

“provoke a Cuban retaliation action which in my judgment we neither want nor are we prepared for.” But it was Richard Nixon who vetoed Vaky’s recommendation. On the margin of the memo Kissinger wrote: “No formal action. [I] have discussed [this matter] with Pres. [Nixon].” Washington virtually let loose the raiders by taking no actions.148

145 Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State to the Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs, August 14, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-10: Doc. no. 223. 146 Speech by Fidel Castro, April 19, 1970, Discursos e intervenciones del Comandante en Jefé Fidel Castro Ruz (hereafter Discursos). For an insider story of Alpha 66, see Miguel L. Talleda, Alpha 66 y su histórica tarea (Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 1995), chaps. 10-11. 147 Vaky to Kissinger, April 28, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-10: Doc. no. 216. For its media coverage, see NYT, April 20, 1970, p. 1. 148 Vaky to Kissinger, April 30, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-10: Doc. no. 217. See its footnote for the response by Kissinger. Scholars have suspected that Nixon sought to unleash raids against Cuba in later years. Schoultz, Infernal, p. 248; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 120. This record shows that the U.S. president actually did so in April 1970. 72

It was only a week after this decision that Alpha 66 caused another sensational incident. This time the group blew up two Cuban fishing boats, kidnapped eleven crew members at a Bahamian islet, and demanded the release of their members from Cuban jails. Although Alpha 66 eventually released the hostages, Cuba’s reactions were volatile.

Tens of thousands of Cubans demonstrated in front of the Swiss embassy in Havana, which represented U.S. interests in Cuba in the absence of U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations. In a major speech on May 20, 1970, Castro kept attacking since its foreign minister implied that Havana dramatized the issue to deflect attention from the failure of the Ten-Million-Ton Sugar Harvest campaign. Castro attributed the source of this thesis to the CIA. He claimed that the “dirty methods of intrigue” were nonsense, immoral, and stupid enough “to expect that this country will…accept the right of kidnapping the fishermen” by its foes abroad.149

The rising tensions across the Florida Straits inadvertently gave a spotlight to

London, as Castro verbally attacked the British governor of the Bahamas. The British

Empire held thousands of Caribbean islands and assumed responsibility for their external defense and internal security. But along with financial difficulties, the geographical reality that around seven hundred Bahamian islands scattered over fifty thousand square miles of the Atlantic made the implementation of this mission almost impossible.150

149 Speech by Fidel Castro, May 20, 1970, Castro Speech Data Base, Latin American Network Information Center (hereafter LANIC). The tendency to view Cuba’s reaction to the kidnapping as a deliberate effort remains strong. For the latest version, see Lillian Guerra’s award-winning book, Visions of Power, pp. 308-15. Guerra claims that Fidel “tried to distract the public by spotlighting” this event. 150 The Bahamian Patrol was only one of many responsibilities that the British Defense Ministry assumed in the Caribbean. The ministry had to deal with disaster relief, perform military exercises, promote naval sales, undertake periodic military training, and prepare for the Falkland Islands in case 73

Nevertheless, Castro called the governor “a liar” and denouced him for having allowed

Alpha 66 to use the British colonies as launching pads for the raids. He also threatened to take unilateral measures against the “mercenaries” next time they entered the Bahamas.151

“If we get into a slashing match the Cubans will always win,” quibbled Richard Sykes, the British ambassador in Havana, “if only because they are prepared to to grosser terms than Her Majesty’s Government would countenance.”152

Despite such misgivings, however, Britain showed a degree of understanding for

Cuba’s plight. Recalling that Castro repeatedly cursed the CIA in his presence, Sykes came to a conviction that the Cuban leader was “genuinely” angry about the raids. In his view, moreover, the U.S. denial of responsibility was “a Bronx cheer.” Even though he was aware of political sensitivity and legal limits, the ambassador found it difficult to believe that were unable to control the raiders. The ambassador requested urgent actions in London. “Isn’t there a danger that Alpha 66, realizing how simple it is to interfere with the Cuban fishing fleet, may try to repeat the operation?” he asked. “If so, the next time might be all too soon. I hope we can put this strongly to the

of emergency. They also had to protect significant U.S. interests in some of the British Caribbean. Chief of Staff Committee, Defense Operational Planning Staff, “British Capability to Meet Commitments in the Caribbean Area,” August 1970, Records of the Ministry of Defence (hereafter DEFE) 11/886, PRO. This information was for British Eyes Only. 151 Cuba had no interest in the cays, but “if they cannot take care of, we make an offer with pleasure to take care of the cays, at least in front of the mercenaries.” Speech by Fidel Castro, May 19, 1970, Discursos. On this point, see also Communique by Fidel Castro (published in Granma, May 13, 1970), FCO 7/1603, PRO. 152 British embassy in Havana to London, May 20, 1970, FCO 7/1603, PRO. 74

Americans.”153 Even the insulted governor in the Bahamas urged London to reinforce

British forces and the Bahamas police.154

London did what it could do to persuade Havana that it was serious about the raids. Despite repeated requests, the increase of border patrols turned out to be financially infeasible.155 Yet, the governor of the Bahamas consulted with the Bahamian Prime

Minister to pass an amendment to the penal code, specifically designed to deter the use of the Bahama territory for international aggressions.156 British diplomats conveyed their concerns to their American counterparts, listened to what they had to say, and reminded them that “similar incidents would embarrass all.”157 In early August, London sent

Commodore David Roome, the Senior Naval Officer, West Indies (SNOWI), to Havana.

This unprecedented gesture toward Cuba aimed to remove “any Cuban misapprehensions as to our determination to patrol the Bahamas.”158 The visit was “worthwhile,” the ambassador reported. Although the raids continued, Havana rarely attacked Britain

153 British embassy in Havana to Hayman, May 20, 1970, FCO 7/1603, PRO. 154 Governor of the Bahamas to London, May 29, 1970, FCO 44/372, PRO. See the attached paper, “Possibility of Increased Measures to Deter Cuban Encroachment in the Bahamas,” May 20, 1970. 155 The frequency of patrol flights actually dropped since October. SNOWI to British Defense Ministry, August 7, 1970; Governor of the Bahamas to London, August 9, 1970; Governor of the Bahamas to London, September 24, 1970; A. B. Urwick to A. G. Rucker, October 5, 1970; British Defense Ministry to SNOWI, October 8, 1970; London to the Governor of the Bahamas, October 16, 1970, all in FCO 44/372, PRO; and Governor of the Bahamas to London, November 25, 1970, FCO 44/373, PRO. 156 Governor of the Bahamas to London, October 16, 1970; Governor of the Bahamas to London, October 22, 1970; Governor of the Bahamas to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, October 26, 1970, all in FCO 44/373, PRO. 157 Sykes himself visited Washington and talked with State Department and CIA officials. British embassy in Havana to London, June 16, 1970, FCO 44/372, PRO. 158 British embassy in Havana to London, May 14, 1970; British embassy in Havana to Hayman (Telegram 226), May 26, 1970; C. D. Wiggin (American Department) to Hankey and Renwick, June 2, 1970; London to British embassy in Havana, June 3, 1970; London to British embassy in Havana, June 8, 1970, all in FCO 7/1603, PRO. 75 thereafter.159

Opposing the Invasion Plans

The United States did not make any gesture toward Cuba, even though it hardened its stance against the counterrevolutionary raids. After the May 1970 kidnapping,

Washington determined these expeditions by Cuban emigres were “counterproductive,” simply providing Castro with propaganda opportunities. Washington also considered their activities as embarrassing, troublesome for friendly nations like Britain, and harmful to their “credibility as a nation of laws.”160 Based on this judgment, the State Department reiterated to representatives of various Miami Cuban organizations that the U.S. government would enforce its laws. “If there is sufficient evidence of activity based in the United States for any such military expedition,” it stated, “then the fact that a third country might be used as a staging area would not preclude the United States from proceeding to enforce its laws.”161 The FBI targeted Alpha 66 for serious investigation.

According to an insider-story of Alpha 66, the group finally encountered “fierce prosecution” by U.S. authorities.162

159 Cuba apparently welcomed this unprecedented gesture, as both Interior and Foreign Ministers received the SNOWI. British embassy in Havana to London, August 5, 1970; and British embassy in Havana to London, August 12, 1970, both in FCO 44/372, PRO. The SNOWI also found the visit “most friendly.” SNOWI to Defense Ministry in London, August 18, 1970, DEFE 11/886, PRO. 160 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, “Current U.S. Policy toward Cuban Exile Groups in the US who Undertake Actions against Cuba,” July 13, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume XII: Doc. no. 240. 161 “Taking Points Paper for discussions with Cuban exiles and selected members of the press in Miami,” May 13-15, 1970, in folder “POL 30-2 Cuba,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970- 1973, RG59, NARA. See also, Talleda, Alpha 66, pp. 97-99; and NYT, May 27, 1970, p. 29. 162 This quote is from Talleda, Alpha 66, p. 101. 76

The perceived turnaround in U.S. attitudes angered anti-Castro activists in Miami.

For Jorge Mas Canosa, “military leader” of RECE, the decision represented “a historical contradiction.” After Smith briefed him of Washington’s intent of enforcing neutrality laws, Mas Canosa pointed out that the U.S. government “obviously” had broken the same laws by sponsoring the Bay of Pigs invasion. “Now you tell me that the United States will not permit any similar expeditions to be mounted on U.S. even without U.S. aid and assistance,” he said. “Why [do you make] this change of policy? Has the U.S. government decided to abandon Cuba to communism?” Mas Canosa warned that the policy would not only alienate the Cuban community but also generate more defiance and disturbances. Although he agreed to convey the message to RECE members, he pledged that it could not give up the hope of overthrowing the Castro regime.163

Torriente reacted somewhat differently. At first, his group pretended that there was no conflict of interests with the U.S. government. In August 1970, when he met with

Smith, Torriente boasted that Castro would face public apathy, absenteeism, and disorder within a couple of months and that he would exploit this situation by using infiltration, sabotage, and military actions against Soviet installations and ships. But when Smith repeated the U.S. intention of enforcing neutrality laws, he suddenly realized that the U.S. government would block his plan. With tears in his eyes, Torriente denounced the U.S. policy as “mistaken.” The stated policy, he claimed, was not valid since it did not interpret the U.S. laws correctly. Neither was it applicable to their action in a third country. If the United States nonetheless tried to prevent their war against Castro, he said,

163 Memcon (Smith, Mas Canosa), May 19, 1970, in folder “POL 30-2 Cuba,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA. 77

“We will have no option but to resist such interference with force if necessary.” He swore, “We will fight Castro whether you are with us or against us.”164 The invasion never materialized, however.

Unknown to Torriente, there was another reason why Washington maintained its opposition to the invasion. In August 1970, Washington received a Soviet note of protest urging it to “strictly adhere” to the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding.165

According to Kissinger’s memoir, Moscow used this exchange to cover the deployment of submarines to Cienfuegos, Cuba, which later caused a superpower diplomatic showdown.166 Yet declassified U.S. records also suggest that by persistently raising concerns about the invasion plans in Miami, Moscow effectively persuaded Washington to expand the understanding to include U.S. curtailment of counterrevolutionary forces.167 A month after the Soviet note, Kissinger approved a cable to inform Guatemala,

Nicaragua, and Costa Rica that Washington did neither support nor encourage the invasion plan by Torriente. This initiative partly aimed to reassure the Soviets of “our intention to abide by the 1962 understanding on Cuba.”168

164 Memcon (Torriente, Smith), August 31, 1970, in folder “POL 33-6 Cuba/ Plataforma 1,” box 2221, Subject Numerical Files, 1970-1973, RG59, NARA. 165 A Soviet note, attached to Memcon (Kissinger, Vorontsov), August 4, 1970, DNSA. 166 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 632-33. 167 Moscow repeated their interpretation of the 1962 understanding to that effect. See Memcon (Kissinger, Dobrynin), October 6, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XII: Doc. no. 224; and Memcon (Kissinger, Dobrynin), October 23, 1970, pp. 3-4, DNSA. 168 Arnold Nachmanoff (National Security Council Staff) to Kissinger, November 25, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XII: Doc. no. 233. The telegram was sent on December 21. When the Carter administration reviewed anti-Castro terrorism, it acknowledged that the issue had two aspects—U.S. inability to control the terrorists and the “linkage of a U.S. non-aggression pledge to Soviet-Cuban military ties.” It is obvious that the latter concerned the 1962 understanding. Paper, Presidential 78

In the November 1972 study of anti-Castro paramilitary operations, the CIA confirmed that the U.S. “current policy” was “to interdict exile groups who attempt to mount paramilitary operations against Cuba from U.S. territory.”169 As such, in February

1973, when Washington reached a five-year agreement with Havana on the prevention of hijackings, it allowed Havana to include an article requiring the United States to prosecute those who conspired, prepared, and executed “acts of violence or depredation against aircraft or vessels.”170 Yet, the agreement did not solve the issue as Cuba repeatedly denounced U.S. non-compliance with it. For instance, in April 1976, when a

Cuban militant group sank two Cuban fishing boats, killing one crewmember, an angry

Castro warned that Havana would cancel the agreement unless Washington prevented similar aggressions.171 The U.S. capability of restraining Miami militants became even more dubious in light of a surge of terrorism that occurred in response to Kissinger’s attempt at dialogue with Cuba.

Henry Kissinger’s Realpolitik—U.S. Détente with Cuba

On March 1, 1975, Kissinger made a major speech on U.S. relations with Latin

America in Houston, Texas. Having outlined his aspiration to engage in “new dialogue”

Review Memorandum/ NSC-17, attached to Habib to Vance, March 7, 1977, in folder “3/1-3/15/77,” box 2, Anthony Lake Papers, RG59, NARA. 169 Paper Prepared in the CIA, n.d., FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XII: Doc. no. 266. 170 Text of the agreement, in folder “Cuba-Hijacking,” box 2, National Security Adviser (hereafter NSA): NSC-Latin American Affairs Staff Files (hereafter NSC-LAASF), GFL. 171 Speech by Fidel Castro, April 19, 1976, Discursos. The Cuban government also charged the U.S. government with its inability to prosecute Cuban hijackers who forcefully seized vessels to arrive in U.S. shores. See for example, MINREX to Swiss embassy in Havana, August 25, 1973; and MINREX to Swiss embassy in Havana, August 2, 1976, both in MINREX. 79 with Latin America, the secretary of state suggested that the United States should work together with its southern neighbors on three major issues—the Panama Canal, Cuba, and economic relations. On Cuba, Kissinger commented that the communist neighbor no longer posed a threat to Latin America, leading the OAS countries to review the 1964 sanctions against trade and diplomatic contact with the island. If the OAS lifted the sanctions, he stated, “the United States will consider changes in its bilateral relations with

Cuba…We see no virtue in perpetual antagonism between the United States and

Cuba.”172 The speech provoked massive protests from Cold War warriors, including numerous anti-Castro activists in Miami. Ominously enough, the FBI received information indicating that the latters’ reaction would be “violent.”173

As Cuban and U.S. scholars have written, Kissinger already had initiated his talks with Castro over six months before this speech. In June 1974, Kissinger sent an unsigned note to Castro, leading to the opening of U.S.-Cuban secret talks exploring normalization of relations. In January 1975, the first preliminary talks took place at La Guardia airport in New York, where Kissinger’s personal aide, Lawrence Eagleburger, met Ramón

Sánchez-Parodi, Cuba’s special envoy, and Néstor García Iturbe, first secretary of the

Cuban mission to the United Nations. In July, four months after Kissinger’s speech, the

U.S. assistant secretary of state William P. Rogers joined them to hold another meeting to discuss numerous bilateral issues such as the U.S. embargo, compensation of nationalized

172 Speech by Kissinger, Department of State Bulletin (hereafter DOSB), March 24, 1975, pp. 361-69. 173 For FBI’s information, see Information note for Kissinger, March 4, 1975, in folder “3/4/1975,” box 5, National Security Adviser (hereafter NSA): White House Situation Room (hereafter WHSR): Presidential Daily Briefings Files, GFL. On letters by Miami Cubans, see Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 263- 65. 80

U.S. properties, the release of prisoners, emigration and family visits, and foreign policies. Then, following the OAS decision to end the 1964 collective sanctions against

Cuba in San José, Costa Rica, Washington exempted subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad from the U.S. embargo against trading with Cuba.174

In hindsight, Kissinger’s attempt at dialogue was doomed to fail. Unlike counterrevolutionary activists, Kissinger had no interest in the internal affairs of Cuba.

As he explained in his memoir, his offer to Castro was essentially “noninterference by the

United States in Cuba’s domestic arrangements” in return for Cuba’s change in foreign policy, including its end of an alliance with the Soviet Union and Third World revolutionaries.175 But these conditions were far from acceptable to the Cuban leader, who had little intention of changing its external policy merely in exchange for U.S.-

Cuban détente. In his eyes, Washington was too arrogant and presumptuous in trying to dictate Cuba’s foreign policy, when Cuba did not demand any change in U.S. foreign policy elsewhere. Cuba did not demand the end of U.S. alliances with any nations nor ask for the removal of U.S. troops from any part of the world.176

Moreover, as Washington maintained and used the embargo as the most important

U.S. leverage to extract foreign policy concessions from Cuba, Havana saw Kissinger’s

174 Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, chap. 3; ídem., De la confrontación, 2da edición ampliada, chap. 3; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 126-143. Also informative is Néstor García Iturbe, Diplomacia sin sombra (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2007). For details on third-country subsidiary issues, see Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 271-74. 175 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 770, 787. See also, Memcon, July 9, 1975, in Pastor to Brzezinski, March 7, 1977, in folder “Cuba 2/78-4/78,” box 10, Geographical Files (hereafter GF), Collection (hereafter ZBC), JCL. 176 Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, p. 76; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 151. 81 realpolitik as immoral and insensitive to its claim to national sovereignty. Using the embargo as a diplomatic tool was to demand a concession with a dagger in the neck, as the Cuban leader often claimed. In conversations with U.S. negotiators, his representatives demanded that the United States unconditionally “relaxed” the economic blockade—at least partially on food and —before the start of any formal bilateral negotiations. The U.S. refusal to consider this request then antagonized the revolutionary government and virtually stalled progress in the talks.177 One may also note that Cuba in the mid-1970s was not impatient at all. Its economy benefited from the historically high sugar prices and seemed to “keep growing” without opening trade with the United States.178

U.S.-Cuban clashes of foreign policy interests were almost inevitable. Having entered into an open debate over Puerto Rico, the two countries disputed most vehemently over Cuba’s roles in Angola since November 1975. In response to South

African aggression against the Angolan government in Luanda, Cuba sent a large expeditionary force numbering over 30,000 to its assistance without consulting

Moscow.179 This development in Africa greatly disturbed Ford and Kissinger, who looked to Cuba, rather than apartheid , as a major destabilizing force in the region. As U.S. officials worried about the possibility that the Cubans would spread the

177 For Cuba’s views, see Eagleburger to Kissinger, “Meeting in New York with Cuban Representatives,” January 11, 1975, in Pastor to Brzezinski, March 7, 1977, in folder “Cuba 2/78- 4/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL. 178 Fidel instructed the Cuban delegation to emphasize this point. “Chronología de hechos referidos a los acercamientos de EE. UU. a Cuba con el pronóstico de mejorar las relaciones bilaterales y las repuestas de Cuba (junio de 1974-febrero de 1977),” pp. 7-8, cited in Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, 2da edición ampliada, pp. 95-96. 179 For details of Cuba’s intervention in Angola, see Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions. 82 war beyond Angola, Kissinger even considered contingency plans for a naval blockade and military action against Cuba.180 Working with Venezuela, the U.S. secretary of state also coordinated diplomatic pressure on the Caribbean countries, especially Guyana, to stop Cuban forces from using their territory as transit sites to Africa.181

Furthermore, as the 1976 presidential election approached, Gerald Ford shifted attention from Havana to Miami.182 Unlike Nixon, Ford generally disregarded strong anti-Castro sentiment in Miami before undertaking a new initiative in Cuba. He neither targeted Miami Cubans in his incipient Hispanic outreach strategy nor intervened in the old bitter infighting between the two camps of Cuban American Republicans.183 Yet, as his rival Ronald Reagan campaigned intensively in Florida, the U.S. president realized that their votes grew increasingly more important for winning this crucial state. Trying to justify his previous policy, Ford asked Castro to consider family reunification as an important gesture toward the United States.184 Yet, when Havana made only a minor concession allowing a small number of Cuban Americans to visit the island, Ford made a

180 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 148-150. 181 U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Washington, December 24, 1975; Kissinger to U.S. embassy in Georgetown, December 24, 1975; U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Kissinger, December 24, 1975; U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Kissinger, December 27, 1975; U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Kissinger, December 31, 1975; and Kissinger to U.S. embassy in Georgetown, February 16, 1976, all in Central Foreign Policy Files, Record Group 59, Access to Archival Databases at the National Archives (hereafter DOS-CFP). For Venezuela, see U.S. embassy in Caracas to Kissinger, January 2, 1976, DOS-CFP. 182 Latinos, mostly of Cuban origin, made up about 15 percent of registered voters of the most populous Dade County. For the first time the ballots in Dade County were printed in Spanish as well as English. NYT, March 10, 1976, pp. 1, 19. 183 See for example, NYT, May 28, 1976, p. 53; and Lilian M. Giberga to Ford, April 6, 1976, in folder “Cuba Policy (3),” box 3, OPL: Thomas Aranda Files, GFL. 184 “U.S. Policy towards Cuba,” n.d., in folder “Cuba,” box 6, Staff Secretary’s Office: Presidential Handwritten Files, GFL. 83 major speech in Miami, attacking Cuban policy in Angola and calling the Cuban leader

“an international outlaw.”185 Almost everyone knew that the U.S. president was courting

Miami Cuban votes.186 Ford failed to gain the majority of their votes, although he managed to win the Republican primary in Florida.

Terrorism Made in U.S.A.

Following the break of Cuba’s isolation in the Western Hemisphere, the Ford administration encountered more than electoral backlash in Miami. As María Cristina

García notes, many émigrés believed that normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations was “an endorsement of Castro-communism.”187 In order to prevent a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement, a few conspired for military raids against Cuba, even though it was even more difficult to get around the increased U.S. surveillance since May 1970. Many sent letters of protest, marched in the street, and passed a resolution against U.S.-Cuban détente, yet they hardly reached the president’s desk.188 There also were activists like RECE’s leader Jorge Mas

Canosa, who proposed that their followers “look for friends and allies” in the United

States, instead of continuing military raids. His organization courted seventeen U.S.

185 Speech by Ford, February 28, 1976, APP. Cuba allowed approximately 60 persons per week to return to the island for a ten-day visit on strictly humanitarian bases. García Iturbe, Diplomacia sin sombra, p. 75. 186 For Cuba’s views, García Iturbe, Diplomacia sin sombra, pp. 69-71; and Speech by Fidel Castro, April 19, 1976, Discursos. For British views, British embassy in Washington to London, March 8, 1976, FCO 7/3124, PRO. In their talks with British counterparts, U.S. officials admitted the existence of electoral concerns. 187 García, Havana USA, p. 139. 188 See for example, José Manuel Casanova to Ford, March 17, 1975, in folder “Cuba-Congressional (1),” box 2, NSA: NSC-LAASF, GFL; and Casanova to Ford, March 17, 1975, in folder “U.S.-Cuban Relations—Correspondence,” box 5, OPL: Fernando De Baca Files, GFL. 84 senators like Richard Stone and to form the “Americans for a Free Cuba,” an anti-Castro caucus in the U.S. Congress.189 But it would take half a decade until their lobbying in Washington achieved more than symbolic acts.

Not all Miami Cubans rejected dialogue. Some expressed hopes that Ford addressed humanitarian issues such as the release of Cuban prisoners and family reunification.190 Many more ordinary Cuban émigrés sought information about how changes in diplomatic relations would affect their lives. Thousands of letters asking for consular service flooded into the Czech embassy in Washington, which represented

Cuban interests in the United States in the absence of U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations.

Topics of inquiries ranged from the benefit of seeking a Cuban passport, customs regulations in Cuba, the possibility of exchanging foreign currencies for pesos, and flight schedules from Mexico, Jamaica, and Barbados to Havana.191 The nature of these questions reveals that a substantial number of émigrés anticipated an opportunity to visit their families in Cuba, whom they had not met since they had left the island.

Yet, of all variances in Miami’s reactions to Kissinger’s realpolitik, none was more striking than the startling increase of terrorist acts. By denouncing what they saw as capricious U.S. attitudes, extremist groups resorted to indiscriminate violence—terror— as a political tool to pursue what they claimed as a “revolutionary” cause. Anti-Castro

189 RECE, December 1974, pp. 6-8; RECE, November, 1975, pp. 6-7; and Diarios Las Américas, November 15, 1975, p .1. 190 See for example, Memcon, “Cuban Exiles,” February 26, 1975; and Memcon, “Exile Attitudes on U.S.-Cuban Relations,” April 14, 1975, both in folder “U.S.-Cuban Relations (2),” box 5, OPL: Fernando De Baca Files, GFL. 191 Rudolf Hromádka to Lourdes Urrutia Rodríguez (chief of the Office of Minister, MINREX), March 10, 1975, Caja “Migratorios 4,” MINREX. 85 terrorism had appeared since the early 1960s, and broadened the scope of its activities trailing the expansion of Cuba’s diplomatic and commercial relations. Between March

1972 and August 1976, the Frente de Liberación Nacional de Cuba (FLNC) engaged in more than 39 terrorist acts in the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, and other nations.192 The group considered Cuban diplomatic representatives and “all forms of commercial and technical exchange with the Castro regime” as “military objectives.”193

The FLNC celebrated an “internationalized anticommunist fight,” speaking of “glory” and “passion for liberty.”194

There were many more such organizations. Acción Cubana was led by Orland

Bosch, a long-time practitioner of violence as a justifiable means to achieve political ends.

“The fight for Cuba’s liberty obliged us to marry with actions and violence,” he claimed.

Referring to the Cuban government’s “tyranny” and the U.S. government’s “betrayal,”

Bosch called violence “the only path” toward Cuba’s liberty.195 Once imprisoned in the

United States, Bosch violated parole in 1972, leaving the United States without authorization. Having turned himself into an international fugitive, he established the

Acción Cubana, which took credit for numerous terrorist acts in Mexico, Panama,

192 Miami to FBI Director, August 25, 1976, in Miscellaneous Box 2A, HSCA Subject Files: Orlando Bosch Avila, JFK Assassination Records Collection (hereafter JFK), NARA. 193 FLNC, Mensaje, June 21, 1974, in folder “FLNC,” box 1, Antonio Arias Collection, University of Miami Libraries’ Cuban Heritage Collection (hereafter UM-CHC). The message was sent to a local Miami radio station. 194 FLNC, Mensaje al Pueblo Cubano, December 1974, with its attachment, in folder “FLNC,” box 1, Antonio Arias Collection, UM-CHC. 195 Bosch, “Terrorism cubano,” January 1977, folder “Orlando Bosch,” box 1, Antonio Arias Collection, UM-CHC. For a Cuban scholar’s account, see Méndez Méndez, Los años del terror, pp. 88-89. 86

Venezuela, and , among others.196 There also emerged , which not only engaged in terrorist acts in the United States, but also became involved in drug- trafficking.197 Some organizations like the Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano enjoyed intimate connections with the Chilean military dictatorship, with which it agreed to terrorize their common enemies. The pact resulted in the 1976 assassination of Orlando

Letelier, a former Chilean ambassador to the United States, in Washington, D.C.198

The growth of international anticommunist terrorism was a headache for law enforcement authorities in targeted countries like Mexico, a leading voice for Cuba’s reengagement in inter-American affairs. Luis de la Barrera Moreno, director of Mexico’s intelligence agency DFS, noted that FLNC agents were infiltrating from South Florida. In response, he recommended that Mexican officials verify if U.S. passport-holders with

Latina/o were of Cuban origin, undertake complete inspection of their personal belongings, and search for documents that might be used as “letter bombs.”199 Within a month, however, FLNC bombed the Cuban consulate in Mérida, Yucatán.200 In

November 1974 alone, thirteen bombs exploded in three cities. Two months later, the

196 Acción Cubana, Communique, December 1974, in folder “Acción Cubana,” box 1, Antonio Arias Collection, UM-CHC. 197 Cuba Update 5, no. 5 (Fall 1984), pp. 4, 6. 198 Dinges and Landau, Assassination, pp. 149, 265; and Ariel C. Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 1977-1984 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997), pp. 26-29. 199 De la Barrera Moreno, “FLNC,” April 15, 1974, expediente 76-3-74, legajo 6, hoja 3-5, DFS, AGN. 200 FLNC, Comunicado #10, May 14, 1974, in folder “FLNC,” box 1, Antonio Arias Collection, UM- CHC. 87 bombings killed five people and injured twenty-seven in three Mexican cities.201

“Loose” System of Counterterrorism

Terrorism also posed an acute problem for U.S. authorities, as some militants used violence against each other. In Miami alone, four homicides and at least fifty-five bomb explosions took place from late 1974 to May 1976.202 José Elias de la Torriente, whose plan for an invasion of Cuba did not materialize, was assassinated in April 1974.

Some other political figures encountered similar fates, and the names of more individuals, including RECE’s Mas Canosa, appeared on a black list circulated in Miami.203 In April

1976, when Emilio Milián, one of the most popular Cuban American radio personalities, voiced against terrorism, he also was bombed and lost both legs. A month later the FBI and Miami police arrested Antonio de la Cova and two others for their attempts to place a bomb at a pornography store. The FBI also indicted Roland Otero for eight bombings, including the one of the proper FBI office in Miami. Yet, the overwhelming majority of cases remained unresolved.204

The cases of bombings, threats, and assassinations were so abundant that the U.S.

Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on “Terrorism in the Miami Area.”

201 Jane Franklin, Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1997), pp. 111, 113. DFS’s reports on the FLNC and AC are abundant. See for example, Report on the bombing attempts at the Cuban embassy, January 25, 1974, Versiones Públicas (VP); De la Barreda Moreno, November 25, 1975, expediente 76-3-75, legajo 6, hoja 58-63; Report on a bombing, November 28, 1975, expediente 76-3-75, legajo 6, hoja 225-6; and Report on AC, December 26, 1975, VP, all in DFS, AGN. 202 U.S. Senate, Terroristic Activity, pp. 612-13. 203 DLA, February 25, 1975, p. 2B. 204 MH, September 7, 1976, pp. 1B, 8B. 88

According to Thomas Lyons and Raul J. Díaz from the Dade County public safety department, Miami terrorists were well-organized, determined, and enjoyed foreign connections. Yet, along with the easy accessibility of explosives in the area, the officials also pointed out the lack of coordination among law enforcement authorities. Whereas the FBI remained “sorely understaffed” in Miami, they claimed, the CIA refused to provide them with necessary information.205 Their testimony was contradictory to the view of the Justice Department expressed to Dante Fascell, a Miami congressman who requested an explanation. Referring to a few cases, Attorney General Clarence M. Kelley stressed “excellent cooperation” among local, state, and federal agencies. Yet, the same letter confirmed that the FBI did not investigate the case of Emilio Milián since the jurisdiction over the bombing belonged to the Bureau of Alcohol, , and Firearms, instead of the FBI.206

The State Department later concurred with the assessment by the Dade County officials. In July 1977, Anthony Lake, head of the State Department’s policy planning staff, reviewed this issue and concluded that the U.S. counterterrorism system was “loose.”

The main office in charge of counterterrorism considered anything other than international terrorism as matters of domestic law enforcement. Within the Justice

Department, moreover, operations were divided among sections dealing with gun control, foreign agent registration, customs, and other matters. The FBI tracked individual groups and persons, but it lacked both personnel and clear legal authority for preventing their

205 U.S. Senate, Terroristic Activity, pp. 612-14, 632. 206 Kelly to Fascell, May 18, 1976, in folder “Justice-Cuban Terrorism Correspondence, 1976-77,” box 2292, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. 89 criminal acts. Although the United States ratified an international convention on sabotage of aircraft, the U.S. Congress had not yet passed necessary legislation for implementing it.207 Since May 1970, the U.S. government affirmed its intention of enforcing laws against any violent attacks against Cuba.208 Yet, lacking institutional setups, these admonitions lacked credibility in the eyes of anti-Castro terrorists.

Under U.S. Watching-and-Monitoring

Washington’s inability to control violence greatly disturbed Castro. On June 6,

1976, after a bomb killed two officials of the Cuban embassy in Lisbon and another bomb exploded outside the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, the Cuban leader could no longer repress his indignation. “No one will be frightened. No one will shirk his duty. No one will withdraw from his functions,” he said before making startling comments. “Of course, we have not responded with terrorism. [Yet] if the Cuban state were to carry out terrorist acts and respond with terrorism to the terrorists, we believe we would be efficient terrorists…If we decide to carry out terrorism, it is a sure thing we would be efficient.” Realizing that he might have gone too far, Castro soon stepped back. “We simply say that we have not applied it and do not propose to implement it in the

207 Lake to Warren Christopher, July 7, 1977, in folder “7/1-15, 1977,” box 2, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, RG59, NARA. 208 Kissinger to U.S. embassy in Nassau, March 13, 1974, DOS-CFP. U.S. officials also conveyed the message directly to Miami organizations. See for example, Memcon, “Cuban Exile Activities,” April 29, 1975, in folder “U.S.-Cuban Relations (2),” box 5, OPL: Fernando De Baca Files, GFL; and a draft reply (to Juan E. Pérez Franco to Ford, February 28, 1976), March 25, 1976, in folder “Cuba- Political, Military (3),” box 2, NSA: NSC-LAASF, GFL. 90 immediate future…May the governments where these criminals carry out these actions take appropriate measure to avoid them.”209

In Havana’s view, the United States was responsible for all terrorist incidents because it had historical ties with counterrevolution. Castro conceded that the CIA might not direct—or even control—terrorists against Cuba. Nevertheless, he stressed that the agency “taught them how to handle explosives.”210 Moreover, Washington never provided to Havana information it had gained about violent conspiracies against the island. Just five days after this speech, five anti-Castro groups including FLNC, Acción

Cubana, and Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano formed a new umbrella group, the

Comando de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas (CORU), in the Dominican

Republic. Presided over by Bosch, they discussed plans to kidnap Cuban diplomats, launch attacks against airlines, and create front groups for actions taken inside the United

States. Reports of their activities reached the White House Situation Room. The State

Department handed information to several Caribbean countries, but not Cuba.211

Under U.S. watching-and-monitoring, groups under the CORU unleashed monstrous terror against their targets. In July, a bomb exploded in the wagons of a Cuban

209 Speech by Fidel Castro, June 6, 1976, LANIC. The Canadian ambassador in Havana thought that Castro uttered these words not as a serious warning but as an inadvertent expression of his emotional uproar. Later Carlos Rafael Rodríguez assured him that such was the case. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, June 16, 1976, vol. 12524, file 20-Cuba-1-4, part 8; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, June 28, 1976, vol. 10851, file 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 4, both in RG25, LAC. 210 Speech by Fidel Castro, June 6, 1976. 211 Evening Report, July 22, 1976, in folder “July 22, 1976,” box 1, NSA-WHSR: Evening Reports from the NSC Staff Files, GFL; and Robinson to U.S. embassy in Georgetown, September 17, 1976, DOS-CFP; and U.S. embassy in Port of Spain to U.S. embassy in Georgetown, September 8, 1976, DOS-CFP. See also, CIA, Weekly Situation Report on International Terrorism, September 7, 1976, pp. 6-7, CREST, NARA. 91 airliner’s airplane at a Jamaican airport a few minutes before the departure. Days later another bomb blasted the office of British West Indian Airways in Barbados. Mexican authorities could not prevent the killing of a Cuban consul’s bodyguard in Mérida,

Yucatán, although they managed to arrest two CORU agents for the attempt to kidnap a

Cuban consul and also foiled a plot to bomb the Cuban embassy in Mexico City.212 In

August, CORU kidnapped two Cuban employees of the Cuban embassy in Argentina, bombed the Cubana Airlines office in Panama, as well as the Guyanese consular office in

Trinidad and Tobago. The last bomb was particularly upsetting for Guyanese leaders, who not only worried about the act but also received information of assassination plots against them. To assuage their suspicions, Washington sent Joe Leo, a U.S. legal attaché in Caracas, reiterating that U.S. policy had nothing to do with an upsurge of terrorist incidents all over the world.213 In September, the CORU retaliated against Mexico’s imprisonment of the agents by bombing the Mexican embassy in Guatemala City.

The Crime of Barbados and its Impact on Foreign Relations

Among all CORU-related incidents, none was more notorious than the bombing of Cubana Flight 455 near Barbados on October 6, 1976. Nine minutes after departure a bomb exploded on the airplane, killing all seventy-three people aboard. Victims included

212 If they had succeeded in kidnapping the Cuban consul, they would have killed him immediately, buried his body, and demanded that the Mexican government persuade the Cuban government to release Huber Matos and Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo, two well-known anti-Castro prisoners. DFS’s report on Gaspar Jiménez (arrested and interrogated by DFS), July 24, 1976, VP, DFS, AGN. See also, DFS’s report, “Estado de Yucatan,” July 23, 1976, expediente 76-3-76, legajo 7, hoja 1-4, and also, July 24, 1976, expediente 76-3-76, legajo 4, hoja 14, both in DFS, AGN. 213 U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Kissinger, September 7, 1976; and U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Kissinger, September 10, 1976, both in DOS-CFP. 92 fifty-seven Cubans, including all the members of the Cuban national fencing team, eleven

Guyanese, and five North Koreans. News of the bombing caused a flood of informants’ reports on the involvement of the CORU throughout the Caribbean and the United

States.214 Trinidad and Tobago authorities arrested Freddy Lugo and Hernán Ricardo, executors of the plan. Venezuelan counterparts caught Orlando Bosch, chief of the

CORU, as well as , another Cuban-born militant. Posada Carriles previously served as a CIA agent and took a job at the Venezuelan intelligence agency.215

The incident infuriated Castro and a million Cubans who attended a national memorial service for the victims on October 15. The sudden loss of youthful—and innocent—lives caused an intolerable pain across the island. In a speech, Castro presented a list of suspicious moves by Washington, remarked on the historical associations between Cuban counterrevolutionaries and U.S. officials, and cast the CIA as responsible for “terrorist actions that culminated into the unbelievably barbarian destruction of an entire Cuban civil airplane.” Therefore, he added, the U.S. government violated the spirit of the 1973 anti-hijacking agreement and forced him to suspend it. The agreement would expire six months later unless the United States took measures to terminate terrorist campaign against the island, said the Cuban leader.216

214 See for example, J. G. Deegan to R. J. Gallagher, October 12, 1976, in folder “Serial 71-99,” box 1, HSCA Subject Files: Orlando Bosch Avila, JFK, NARA. 215 For Posada Carriles, see his memoir, Los caminos del guerrero (n.p., 1994). It remains unclear to what extent Venezuelan officials, especially Cuban-born officers in the intelligence agency, were involved in this incident. 216 Castro’s speech in Granma, October 15, 1976, pp. 1-3. For a Cuban view, see León Cotayo, Crimen en Barbados. 93

Castro’s charge was nothing but anti-American propaganda, according to Henry

Kissinger. On the same day, the U.S. secretary of state called Castro’s charge of U.S. involvement “totally false,” declaring that the U.S. government had “nothing to do with the explosion.”217 In private conversation, Kissinger worried about the potential damage done by the incident. Three days before the speech by Castro, Kissinger already overruled his aide’s suggestion of sending a diplomatic note to Havana explaining the

U.S. position on this incident. He feared that it would merely provide fodder for what he saw as Cuban propaganda.218 According to an information note from the White House

Situation Room, Castro needed “something dramatic to shift attention away from Cuba’s economic difficulties…just as he did during difficult economic times in May 1970.”

Moreover, the Cuban leader would “probably also try to use the current incident to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the countries of the Caribbean.”219 As if such were his concerns, Kissinger was reluctant to take part in the joint investigation into the terrorist incident by Caribbean countries. “Why do we have to get so involved in the investigation?” Kissinger said to his aides. “That makes us look guilty, to begin with.”220

Kissinger’s attempts to minimize U.S. responses to the Crime of Barbados backfired in the Caribbean. A day after the incident, Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes

217 Kissinger’s News Conference, October 15, in DOSB, November 8, 1976. 218 “I don’t see any sense in a note to Castro,” Kissinger responded. “This way all he has to do is start a campaign.” Transcript of Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, October 12, 1976, pp. 33-34, in folder “October 12, 1976,” box 11, Record of Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, RG59, NARA. 219 Situation Room for Scowcroft, October 14, 1976, in folder “10/14/1976,” box 10, NSA: WHSR: Noon and Evening Notes Files, GFL. 220 Transcript of Kissinger’s Staff Meeting, October 18, 1976, pp. 23-24, in folder “October 18, 1976,” box 11, Record of Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, RG59, NARA. 94

Burnham called the U.S. ambassador in Guyana, appealing to the United States to stop its

“allies.”221 When little was done, Burnham publicly questioned U.S. indifference toward counterrevolutionary activities in his speech at the memorial service for the victims.222 As the theme of U.S.-led destabilization spread across the Caribbean, the U.S. embassy in

Trinidad and Tobago lamented the U.S. failure to defuse “residual suspicions” regarding

Washington’s “relatively benign and protective eye toward anti-Castro terrorists.”

Caribbean anxiety was “fueled by the relatively low key U.S. government’s response to the aircraft sabotage,” its cable stated, “when that reaction was compared with the usually instant American reaction to terrorist acts where innocent lives are lost.”223

In Kissinger’s mind, however, it was Castro who caused this regional crisis of confidence in the United States as a lawful country. “The real question is how much faith and credit responsible people in the area are going to put in Cuban propaganda,” said a cable sent by Kissinger to the U.S. ambassador in Venezuela, where President Carlos

Andrés Pérez worried about allegedly secret U.S. intentions regarding terrorism.224

Kissinger eventually dispatched a joint briefing team of State Department-FBI officials to

221 U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Washington, October 7, 1976, in folder “Serial 1-21,” box 1, HSCA Subject Files: Orlando Bosch Avila, JFK, NARA. 222 Speech by Burnham, cited in U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Washington, October 18, 1976, DOS- CFP. 223 U.S. embassy in Port of Spain to Washington, October 20, 1976, in folder “Serial 196,” box 1A, HSCA Subject Files: Orlando Bosch Avila, JFK, NARA. Tom Adams, Prime Minister of Barbados, also brought up a U.S. conspiracy against his government in his talks with Ricardo Alarcón, Cuban ambassador to the United Nations. Alarcón to Fidel Castro, “Informe del compañero Ricardo Alarcón sobre el viaje a Trinidad-Tobago y Barbados,” October 26, 1976, pp. 9-13, Caja “Crimen de Barbados,” MINREX. 224 Kissinger to Vaky, October 28, 1976, in folder “Cuba-Cubana Airlines Crash,” box 2, NSA: NSC- LAASF, GFL. For Carlos Andrés Pérez’s view, see U.S. embassy in Caracas to Washington, October 23, 1976, in folder “Cuba-Cubana Airlines Crash,” box 2, NSA: NSC-LAASF, GFL. 95

Venezuela, as well as several other Caribbean countries.225 In Barbados, the team claimed that the U.S. government was not involved in the incident, that it took the issue of terrorism seriously, and that it wanted to deepen international cooperation. Yet, “Castro has attempted to turn public opinion in Caribbean against us by confusing events of early

1960s and present,” the U.S. visitors added. “Anti-Castro terrorists also exploit this confusion for their own purpose.”226

It must have been a difficult task for Kissinger to demand that his Caribbean neighbors simply forget the legacy of U.S. support for Cuban counterrevolution. As shown earlier, it was Kissinger who, in response to international pressure, oversaw the downscaling of the U.S. commitment to military raids against Cuba after May 1970. Yet, the reputation of Kissinger was tainted in the region due to his involvement in the overthrow of the Chilean government in September 1973. When anti-Castro warriors radicalized and expanded their operations beyond U.S. territories, moreover, his reactions to their activities were passive and conciliatory in the eyes of the neighboring countries.

The failure of U.S.-Cuban dialogue also played a role. Because these countries came under intense U.S. pressure for anti-Cuban collaboration, they apparently thought that the incident was another U.S. countermeasure against Cuban intervention in Angola.227 In a sense, even though the U.S. government was not directly responsible for the bombing, the

225 J. B. Adams to Held, November 1, 1976, in folder “Serial 128-154,” box 1, HSCA Subject Files: Orlando Bosch Avila, JFK, NARA. 226 U.S. embassy in Bridgetown to Washington, December 4, 1976, DOS-CFP. 227 Particularly informative is the view offered by Guyanese Foreign Minister Frederick Wills after Jimmy Carter took the presidency, cited in U.S. embassy in Georgetown to Washington, February 11, 1977, DOS-CFP. 96 lack of sensitivity to the past, as well as the lack of effective counterterrorism measures, made the United States appear to be part of the larger problem.

Havana’s Renewed Signals

Yet, despite the horrendous aftermath and the exchange of acrimonious remarks, scholars should not rush to the conclusion that terrorism successfully destroyed political space for U.S.-Cuban dialogue. Previous studies typically introduce the October 6 bombing as an epilogue to Kissinger’s failure of dialogue with Cuba. But it bears emphasizing that since the summer of 1976 Cuba actually grew more interested to reopen

U.S.-Cuban dialogue after the November U.S. presidential election. Having pushed out the invading forces from South Africa, Cuba focused on military training and civilian assistance, started to withdraw the troops from Angola, and conveyed its oral message to

Kissinger through Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme that it had “no desire to spread throughout Africa.”228 While these measures pointed at the potential removal of a critical foreign policy disagreement, an abrupt drop in the world-market sugar price deprived the island of much foreign hard currency and caused a massive economic recession in Cuba since 1976. The recession was so severe that the government added coffee to rationing, halted trade with non-socialist countries, and suspended the announcement of Cuba’s first

Five-Year plan for 1976-1980.229

228 Memcon (Olof Palme, Kissinger), May 24, 1976, DNSA. See also, Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 34-35 229 Speech by Fidel Castro, September 28, 1976, Discursos; and U.S. embassy in San José to Washington, October 8, 1976, DOS-CFP. See also, British embassy in Havana to London, January 26, 1977, FCO 7/3333, PRO; and O.G.S. memorandum for the Minister, “Cuba’s Economic Situation,” October 22, 1976, vol. 12524, file 20-Cuba-1-4, part 8, RG25, LAC. 97

In light of these developments, Havana renewed signals of interest in U.S.-Cuban détente. In June 1976, in his talks with the Canadian ambassador in Havana, Carlos

Rafael Rodríguez conceded that the opening of trade with the United States would not only help Cuba to achieve industrial development and economic independence, but also allow the island to expand Cuba’s relations with the rest of Latin American and Western countries. Cuba would not sacrifice its relations with the socialist bloc, but neither would it reject U.S. overtures for better relations. Referring to his knowledge of the complex nature of the embargo, he also commented that the executive office could exempt food and medicines from the embargo, leaving the rest to an approval of the U.S. Congress.230

Since his comment implied that Havana would look to the partial lifting of the embargo as a major U.S. gesture, the Canadians asked Rodríguez if they could pass his words to

Kissinger. After consulting with Castro, Rodríguez raised no objection.231

Surprisingly, Cuba’s signals grew more frequent after the Crime of Barbados.

Castro’s funeral speech itself was intentionally made benign, according to a secret Cuban message received by Washington in late October. Cuba viewed the absence of U.S. official denouncements of the terrorist acts as evidence of official U.S. complicity and suspended the agreement as the only avenue to express displeasure at the U.S. failure to control counterrevolutionary terrorism. The message then addressed Cuba’s remaining interest in normalization of relations with the United States, as well as the renewal of the

230 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, June 28, 1976, vol. 10851, file 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 4, RG25, LAC. 231 Director General of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere, June 30, 1976, vol. 10851; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, July 29, 1976, vol. 16019, both in file 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 4, RG25, LAC. The Canadians told the British that they eventually decided not to act as an intermediary for the time being. British embassy in Havana to London, June 30, 1976, FCO 7/3124, PRO. 98 anti-hijacking agreement, but only after the end of the terrorism and the declaration of

U.S. position on this issue.232 Within a few weeks, Havana sent similar messages through diverse channels to suggest that combating terrorism would be the first real step that

Washington and Havana could take toward normalization of relations.233 The message was identical in all these cases, leading Washington to believe that Havana was mounting a well-organized campaign for an improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations.234 Finally, on

November 13, Kissinger took a small yet positive step. He sent a note to Havana to affirm a U.S. position against terrorism. The U.S. secretary of state apparently cooled down a bit just before he left his office.235

Conclusion

Cuban counterrevolution radicalized from 1970 to 1976. Independent of

Washington, militant groups like Alpha 66 frequently launched raids against the island via a third country. Yet, their major public coup in May 1970 embarrassed the United

States and invited international pressure for preventive actions not only from Cuba, but also from Britain and the Soviet Union. Despite Nixon’s sympathy for Miami Cubans,

232 Emphasis added. Cuba’s U.N. Mission delivered this message to Arnie Nachmanoff, former NSC staffer. Information note for Scowcroft, October 28, 1976, in folder “10/28/1976,” box 18, NSA: WHSR: Presidential Daily Briefings Files, GFL. 233 Kingston to Washington, October 27, 1976, DOS-CFP; CIA Report, November 3, 1976, in folder “2 of 3,” box 2, HSCA Subject Files: Luis Posada Carriles, JFK; and Scowcroft to Ford, November 24, 1976, in folder “11/24/1976,” box 18, NSA: WHSR: Presidential Daily Briefings Files, GFL. 234 INR Afternoon Summary, November 23, 1976, p. 4, in folder “November 23, 1976,” box 3, NSA: WHSR: Evening Reports from the NSC Staff Files, GFL. 235 Message from Swiss embassy in Cuba, “Hijacking Agreement,” November 15, 1976, in folder “ Cuba-Hijacking,” box 2, NSA: NSC-LAASF, GFL. The State Department also authorized Cubana airline’s regular flights to Canada over U.S. territory. MINREX to Swiss embassy in Havana, November 29, 1976, Caja “Bilateral 18,” MINREX. 99 the U.S. government finally took this issue seriously, demoralized Alpha 66, and made clear its opposition to other invasion plans. That satisfied few in Miami. As Mas Canosa noticed, the U.S. government’s enforcement of its neutrality laws was a historical contradiction. Like Torriente, many also confirmed that the interests of the U.S. government and anti-Castro activists in Miami were never the same. Whereas détente and coexistence with Cuba further disillusioned anti-Castro activists, extremists mounted a campaign of terror across the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

U.S. responses to this surge of terrorism were far from timely. As Kissinger claimed, the United States was not directly responsible for the terrorist incidents across the world, including the one of the Cubana airplane on October 6, 1976. But in the eyes of Cuba and other Caribbean nations, the United States was a part of the problem due to its past association with Orlando Bosch, Luis Posada Carriles, and more. Unlike Britain, in May 1970, the United States denied any legitimate reasons for why Castro was angry about terrorism, looking to him as an anti-American spokesman who either needed attention away from domestic problems or intended to harm U.S. relations with other countries. The calculated U.S. silence on the Crime of Barbados nonetheless exacerbated the credibility problem of the United States as a lawful country. Given that the Church

Committee had just released a report on numerous U.S. covert operations in the region, including CIA-led assassination plots against the Cuban leader, the United States probably would have needed more than attacking Castro before claiming its innocence.236

236 See U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Reports of the Select 100

Still, despite the scale of tragedy caused by the incidents, terrorists apparently failed to achieve their major purpose of halting U.S.-Cuban détente. After all, the Crime of Barbados was such a horrendous event that no one with a decent measure of humanity would support the scheme behind it. Even in the immediate aftermath, the Cuban government presented terrorism as a common enemy, against which Washington and

Havana worked together as the first step toward normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.

When Jimmy Carter responded favorably to this suggestion, it paved the way for the most notable moments of U.S.-Cuban dialogue during the Cold War. Castro contemplated his first major gesture toward the United States—even though the U.S. embargo remained in place.

Committee to Study Government Operations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 1975. The report based on this investigation was published in 1976. 101

CHAPTER 3: A Time for Dialogue?

Jimmy Carter, Fidel Castro, and the Triangular Dynamics around Migration

In June 1977, a CBS news program broadcast “The CIA’s Secret Army,” a special documentary on the intertwined history of the U.S. government and Cuban émigrés. In the wake of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the U.S. government encouraged thousands of

Cuban émigrés to leave the island and trained hundreds of civilians for an invasion of

Cuba. Having abandoned these “freedom fighters” at the Bay of Pigs, the U.S. government launched Operation Mongoose, “the secret war” against revolutionary Cuba, using “the secret army” of Cuban counterrevolutionaries. By the time the U.S. government ended the clandestine operations, hundreds of Cubans had lost their lives and thousands more served time in Cuban jails. Many Miami Cubans nonetheless remained adamant, as the documentary showed. Some even waged a “terrorist war” against anybody calling for a U.S. rapprochement with Cuba.237

To the surprise of viewers of the documentary, however, the U.S.-Cuban dialogue in the late 1970s had a transformative impact on the Cuban American community in

Miami. When Jimmy Carter initiated a rapprochement with Havana, Washington’s new attitude strongly encouraged Havana to promote a dialogue with a group of Miami

Cubans. The subsequent talks among Washington, Havana, and Miami resulted in the

237 Transcript, CBS Reports with Bill Moyers, “The CIA’s Secret Army,” June 10, 1977, The United States and Castro’s Cuba, 1950-1970: Paterson Collection (Microfilm). 102 release of thirty-six hundred political prisoners in Cuba and the visits of over 100,000

Cuban émigrés to their families in the homeland. A year later these consequences helped to provoke the Mariel Crisis, one of the largest and the most traumatic migration crises in modern U.S. history. Around 125,000 Cubans left for the United States.

This chapter and the next explore the complex interactions between diplomacy and human migration at a critical period of U.S.-Cuban relations. For long Washington manipulated Cuban migration as a part of its policy of hostility toward Havana. Yet, when Washington sought to normalize diplomatic relations and disengaged itself from the counterrevolutionary project, Miami Cubans referred to their collective history to demand greater attention to their peculiar needs. Cuban migration also was a matter of special concern for Havana. By claiming the principle of national sovereignty, the Cuban government viewed all internal issues as nonnegotiable with Washington. But the Cuban government considered Washington’s suggestion for an improvement of relations with

Cubans living abroad while reassessing Cuban policy toward the United States.

As a result, Washington, Havana, and Miami interacted more intensely than previously acknowledged by scholars. U.S. diplomatic historians examine Carter’s ill- fated attempt to achieve normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, yet provide relatively little information about developments in Miami and Havana.238 Migration historians document the varying reactions of Cuban émigrés to U.S.-Cuban détente, as well as their

238 Schoultz, Infernal, chap. 10; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, chap. 5. Two Carter’s officials also provide their insights into bilateral relations. Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of US-Cuban Relations since 1957 (New York: Norton, 1987); and Robert A. Pastor, “The Carter-Castro Years: A Unique Opportunity,” in Castro Mariño and Pruessen, eds., Fifty Years of Revolution, pp. 237-260. 103 conflicting political activities ranging from terrorist threats to private diplomacy. Yet, an analysis of declassified government records also reveals how the shifting ideas and sentiment among Cuban Americans became one of the most controversial elements of secret U.S.-Cuban negotiations.239 This chapter also seeks to incorporate the perspectives of the Cuban government. Particularly important are the declassified records of U.S.-

Cuban meetings, the interview transcripts of key Cuban policymaker José Luis Padrón, and the unpublished memoir and manuscripts of Bernardo Benes, who acted as an intermediary between Carter and Castro.240

This chapter thus describes the complex triangular relationship among

Washington, Havana, and Miami as one of the fundamental themes of the U.S.-Cuban dialogue of the late 1970s. As Washington was reevaluating its relations with Havana, it also tried to reframe the roles of Miami Cubans by containing terrorism and addressing human rights issues. Washington’s shifting attitude toward Miami in turn enabled Havana to envision a new economic future for Cuba, one in which Miami Cubans would play an important role. As other scholars note, U.S.-Cuban attempts at normalization of relations

239 For the best works on the Cuban American community, see García, Havana USA. For Cuban perspectives, Arboleya, Cuban Counterrevolution; and idem., Cuba y los cubanoamericanos. 240 This chapter enriches from Cuban scholarship, especially Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación and ibid., 2da edición ampliada. Ramírez Cañedo generously collaborated with me in interviewing Padrón and shared with me his other interview transcripts. An unpublished memoir by Benes, Mis conversaciones secretas con Fidel Castro, is found in folder “In his own words,” box 2, Mirta Ojito Papers, UM-CHC. Robert Levine uses this source to write Benes’s semi-biography, Secret Missions to Cuba, Secret Missions to Cuba: Fidel Castro, Bernardo Benes, and Cuban Miami (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). However, Levine focuses on Benes’s activities, rather than what Benes heard from U.S. and Cuban officials. Further, Levine presents his work without referring to outside sources to corroborate Benes’s version of the story, leading Padrón to claim that the book is “full of impreciseness and lies.” Padrón, interview transcript, Havana, November 4, 2013, p. 8, in author’s possession. Yet, when checked against other sources, this memoir contains some valuable information on U.S.-Cuban relations. 104 deadlocked due to the Cold War in Africa, where East-West rivalry intermingled with

North-South conflicts.241 But it was also Washington and Havana’s subsequent miscalculations and disagreements over the issues of Cuban migration—human ties between Havana and Miami—that contributed to the breakdown of the dialogue.

Castro’s Messages through Bill Moyers

Throughout late 1976 and early 1977, Castro continued to send signals to demonstrate his interest in improved U.S.-Cuban relations.242 Of particular importance was the one he sent via CBS news correspondent Bill Moyers, who visited Cuba in early

February 1977. Here, Castro not only underscored his hope of normalizing diplomatic relations with the United States, but also set forth Cuba’s positions on broader issues.

Terrorism was the first topic that Castro spoke about with Moyers. “Be against it. Don’t let them do it with immunity.” Along with the U.S. economic blockade on Cuba, the

Cuban leader looked to U.S. sponsorship of counterrevolution as “undeclared acts of war.” He urged the U.S. leader to put himself in his shoes. “Imagine if we had trained to invade the United States, if we had tried to assassinate your president…if we had turned loose a gang of thugs to try to bring down your government.”243

241 Schoultz, Infernal; LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel; Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies; and Pastor, “Carter-Castro,” p. 257. 242 For Cuba’s signals from October to December 1976, see the previous chapter. See also, Stuart Eizenstat to Carter, December 9, 1976, in folder “Confidential File, 11/76-1/77,” box 1, Office of the Staff Secretary Records, JCL. 243 Handwritten notes, Bill Moyers’ conversations with Fidel Castro and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, in Vance to Carter, February 8, 1977, NLC-128-12-5-16-4, RAC, JCL. 105

Castro elaborated on other contentious issues between Washington and Havana.

The United States should lift the economic blockade on Cuba, which—Castro admitted—

“has done us [the Cubans] great damage.” On human rights issues Castro said the release of Cuban prisoners convicted of political crimes “should not be the object of negotiations but the result of negotiations.” Castro promised that he would not make the U.S. base in

Guantánamo a point of major importance, although it had been a source of great provocation to Cuba. According to Moyers, the Cuban leader called Angola “our

Vietnam” as if Cuba had been reluctant to intervene in Southern Africa and eager to withdraw its troops if possible. On revolution in Latin America, Castro made clear his respect for the principle of coexistence as long as the other governments did the same. “I do not want to be involved in the internal affairs of my neighbor,” he stated.244

Finally, on the Soviet Union, the Cuban leader expressed his preference for trading with the United States because of the geographical proximity. Cuba would continue to do business with Russians who provided the island with preferential trade benefits. But he reportedly stated, “Once Kennedy agreed not to invade Cuba, we no longer needed the Russians militarily. Once [counterrevolutionary] terrorism against

Cuba from American territory stops, we need them less.” What Cuba aimed to achieve was a relaxation of tensions with the United States, relative autonomy from superpower confrontation, and expansion of trade with all parties. “As far as the trade is concerned, it would be much easier to do business with the Americans than the Russians…You are so

244 Handwritten notes, Moyers’ conversations with Fidel Castro. 106 close.” The Cuban leader ended the meeting with a positive tone. The United States and

Cuba had “many reasons to want good relations.”245

It remains unclear if Moyers’ handwritten note reflected what the Cuban leader had actually stated. Moyers went to Cuba to create the above-mentioned CBS documentary. His personal interest might have colored his report. It is difficult to believe that Castro described Angola as “our Vietnam,” especially because the Cuban delegation refused such comparison afterwards. Perhaps, Moyers, who worked as the Press

Secretary for the Johnson administration, was the one who drew this reference.

Regardless of possible misunderstandings, however, Cuban officials repeated that

Castro’s remarks to Moyers “officially” represented Cuban positions.246 Moyers’s report also had a strong impact on Cyrus Vance, Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of State, who spent hours debriefing Moyers. “We will carefully study what Bill has reported and be submitting to you shortly a recommended timetable and scenario for opening discussions with the Cuban government,” Vance wrote to Carter.247

Carter’s Approaches toward Havana

Prior to Castro’s meeting with Moyers, the Carter administration already had explored the idea of normalization of diplomatic relations. At his confirmation hearings in early January 1977, Secretary Vance made clear his intention of opening U.S.-Cuban

245 Ibid. 246 See for example, Vance to Carter, March 11, 1977, NLC-128-12-6-11-8, RAC, JCL; and Memcon (Terence A. Todman, Torras), March 24, 1977, NLC-24-10-8-2-3, RAC, JCL. 247 Vance to Carter, February 8, 1977, NLC-128-12-5-16-4, RAC, JCL. 107 discussions despite the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Vance’s State Department led the suspension of SR-71 aerial reconnaissance overflights over Cuba and accepted a

Cuban proposal for opening talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.248 This approach was in tune with Carter’s general philosophy that “nations cannot solve the problems among them unless they communicate with one another.”249 Cuba was one of the enemy countries with which Carter wanted to try dialogue in order to alleviate international tensions. “If I get an equivalent response from these countries,” he noted in his diary, “then I would be glad to meet them more than halfway.”250

As such, Carter ordered the State Department to devise the Presidential Review

Memorandum (PRM) 17 on U.S. policy toward Latin America, of which Cuba was part.

By contextualizing Cuban initiatives into Latin American policy, the administration drew on a report of the private commission chaired by Sol Linowitz, former U.S. ambassador to the OAS. The so-called Linowitz report advocated a new dialogue with Cuba, as well as the return of the Panama Canal, to signal a new U.S. attitude toward southern neighbors.251 But PRM17 also suggested that the State Department deal with Cuba as a

248 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 101-2; and Harold H. Sunders and Todman to Vance, “SR- 71 Reconnaissance Flights over Cuba,” February 8, 1977, NLC-6-16-2-17-8, RAC, JCL. For Vance’s views, see “Overview of Foreign Policy Issues and Positions,” in Vance to Jack Watson, October 24, 1976, in folder “Transition,” box 42, Plains Files (hereafter PF), JCL. 249 Quoted in Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, January 16, 1979, p. 4, NLC-24-79-8-3-9, RAC, JCL. 250 Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), p. 27. 251 Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, The United States and Latin America: Next Steps (New York: Center for Inter-American Relations, 1976). Its content on Cuba is similar to those in State and Defense Option Paper, November 3, 1976, in folder “Transition,” boxes 41 and 42, PF, JCL. 108

“special country” which could be “dealt separately and more quickly.”252 The unique treatment of Cuba reflected Carter’s concern about Cuban involvement in Africa, which required more than a single regional scope. In his late February 1977 talks with Canadian

Prime Minister , Carter referred to Castro’s meetings with U.S. visitors

(Moyers) and asked for Canadian views of “various indications that Cuba was reducing its forces in Angola more rapidly.”253

Here entered Carter’s other chief foreign policy adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, the son of a Polish diplomat. From the very beginning, Brzezinski was less enthusiastic than

Vance about a new approach toward Cuba. At a pivotal March 9, 1977, policy review committee meeting on Cuba, all Carter’s chief advisers endorsed a step-by-step approach toward normalization of diplomatic relations, in which the U.S. government would use the lifting of the embargo as “a bargaining chip” to withdraw Cuba’s major concessions in foreign policy and human rights. Yet, divergent views on the question of Africa already emerged. Referring to Castro’s conversation with Moyers, Vance explained that the Cubans wanted to withdraw from Africa even though they held “the theoretical position that they have an inherent right to send troops overseas.” Brzezinski was unimpressed. “I greet Castro’s blabbing to possibly naïve Americans with some

252 PRM17, available at http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/prmemorandums/prm17.pdf (accessed October 22, 2015). 253 Memcon (Carter, Trudeau), February 22, 1977, pp. 25-26, NLC-23-16-4-5-0, RAC, JCL. Although Carter referred to Castro’s meetings with various U.S. visitors, it is clear that he had the one with Moyers in mind here. This handwritten record alone contains much information about Cuba’s views on Africa. 109 skepticism.” Vance responded, “Yes, you may be right. But the only way to prove it is to start talking.”254

Not all items provoked such a heated debate. In a discussion paper for the same meeting, the State Department contended that greater U.S. communication with the island would increase the U.S. presence and serve “the long-term objective of seeking to diminish Soviet-Cuban ties.” Even a flow of U.S. tourists would help to achieve this goal because it “will re-awaken the attraction among the Cuban people for American goods and values, and deflect the population from the stern task of building socialism.”255

Throughout Carter’s presidency, this belief in the superiority of the American way of life over Cuba’s hardly came into question. On March 19, shortly after he signed Presidential

Directive (PD) 6 to begin exploratory talks with Cuba, Carter announced the end of the ban prohibiting U.S. citizens from travelling to Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and North

Korea. Beneath the decision was the Carter administration’s desire to transform the

Cuban revolutionary regime through dialogue and engagement.

Washington Listens to Miami—Human Rights

In PD6, the Carter administration identified five major U.S. goals in Cuba. In addition to the reduction of “Cuba’s foreign intervention” and “Cuban relationship

(political and military) with the Soviet Union,” the administration remained interested in the old issue of “compensation for American expropriated property.” To these three,

254 Minutes of Policy Review Committee Meeting 15, “Cuba,” March 9, 1977, NLC-24-61-4-4-0, RAC, JCL. 255 Paper, Presidential Review Memorandum/ NSC-17, pp. 9-10, attached to Habib to Vance, March 7, 1977, in folder “3/1-3/15/77,” box 2, Anthony Lake Papers, RG59, NARA. 110

Carter added two more—“combating terrorism” and “human rights.”256 These issues did not come up randomly, but resulted from Carter’s resolve to clean up the legacy of

Washington’s association with Cuban counterrevolution. By April 1980, approximately

800,000 persons of Cuban origin lived in the United States, half of them concentrated in

Florida. As they integrated into the U.S. constituency, the U.S. government could no longer dismiss their concerns completely as alien to U.S. national interests, even though their political power was not as great as it would become a decade later.257

Recently declassified records reveal that Carter took great care to approach

Miami Cubans. As the previous chapters indicate, the community’s view polarized over time. Whereas hardliners and militants kept calling for the overthrow of the Cuban government, a small yet notable number of leftist youths and professionals advocated dialogue with the Cuban government. Between these wings appeared the “moderates,” who remained hostile to the government but grudgingly accepted dialogue as a way to achieve important community interests, such as the release of political prisoners in Cuba and the reunification of Cuban families. Yet, when Carter assumed the presidency, most of these moderates remained silent for fear of being labeled communists, amid a flurry of terrorist threats and political assassinations.258

256 PD6, March 15, 1977, available at http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd06.pdf (accessed February 15, 2012). 257 The transition paper urges the new administration to make “special efforts” to explain new policy to Cuban American leaders. State and Defense Option Papers. For demographical data on persons of Cuban origin, see Pérez, “The Cuban Population.” 258 For militants and hard-liners’ views, see articles and editorials that appeared in DLA, Patria, La Nación, among others. For moderate and radical views, read Réplica and Areíto respectively. For letters from Cuban Americans calling for family reunification, see also, Jorge Roblejo Lorie to Pastor, May 26, 1977, and others in folder “Hispanic Issues: Cuban 3/77-8/77,” box 71, Records of the Office 111

Carter allied with these moderates by incorporating their thinking into the U.S. agenda for discussion with Cuba. Alfredo Durán, chair of the Florida Democratic Party, became an early supporter of Carter during the 1976 presidential election. While endorsing liberal programs on domestic issues, Durán opposed negotiations with Castro unless the latter withdrew his troops from Africa and released political prisoners from jails.259 In response to the released Linowitz report, Durán reportedly said that U.S.-

Cuban normalization “would be a tremendous mistake at this point.” What he probably meant was that normalization was possible if some conditions were met.260 For his part,

Carter visited Durán and his group during the campaign at the editorial office of Réplica, a magazine that emerged to counter the far-right-wing newspaper Patria. The presidential hopeful promised that he would consider Cuban American views if he was elected.261

It was Durán who advised Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski of Miami Cuban opinions in February 1977. Durán explained that the Cuban American community would be “divided” on the issue of normalization. For some, normalization was simply unacceptable. For others, it would be “a means to reunite families.” Durán then urged

Carter to prioritize human rights issues, such as the release of prisoners, family reunification, and visitation rights, over compensation for confiscated U.S. property. In this way, he claimed, Washington could avoid creating the impression that normalization of the Assistant for Public Liaison (hereafter OAPL), JCL. See also, García, Havana USA, pp. 48, 138-140; Torres, Mirrors, chap. 4, esp. pp. 92-94; and Arboleya, Counterrevolution, chap.5. 259 Réplica, September 8, 1976, p. S-2. Durán also worked with Bernardo Benes, Manolo Reboso, Manolo Reyes, Max Resnik, editor of Réplica, and Maurice Ferré, Puerto Rican mayor of the city of Miami. 260 Italics added. Miami News, December 21, 1976, p. 3A. 261 See, Réplica, February 4, 1976, p. 18; Réplica, July 28, 1976, p. 9. 112 was designed to benefit U.S. business. Carter apparently liked this advice.262 For the following weeks the U.S. president reiterated the importance of human rights in his public statements on Cuba, triggering Havana’s protest.263 In a message to Carter, Castro complained that the U.S. government had no right to teach him on human rights given the

CIA plots to assassinate him. Castro nonetheless proposed private discussions, instead of public lectures.264

Within such intricate Washington-Havana-Miami interactions, human rights entered U.S.-Cuban talks. At the first meeting in New York on March 24, 1977, in which the U.S. and Cuban delegation discussed fishery and maritime boundaries, Assistant

Secretary of State Terrence Todman introduced human rights issues as those “of the greatest importance to the Cuban community in the United States.”265 At the end of the second round of talks in Havana on April 24-27, Todman stepped further, indicating that

Washington would consider the lifting of the embargo on food and medicines in exchange for important humanitarian gestures from Havana. In reply, Cuban foreign minister Isidro Malmierca referred to the historical background, in which the U.S. government promoted Cuban migration to harm the Cuban economy. Yet, despite such

262 Vance to Carter, February 5, 1977, NLC-128-12-5-14-6, RAC, JCL. See also, Memcon (Carter, Durán), February 5, 1977, NLC-24-10-7-9-7, RAC, JCL. 263 Remarks by Carter, February 16, 1977, , 1977, and May 20, 1977, all in APP. See also, Carter, White House Diary, p. 62. 264 Rick Inderfurth to Brzezinski, March 1, 1977, NLC-24-10-8-4-1, RAC, JCL. Carter confirmed the receipt of this message and agreed to favor private discussion. Memcon (Castro, McGovern), April 9, 1977, cited in Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, 2da edición, pp. 171-72. 265 Memcon (Todman, Torras), March 24, 1977, p. 18. 113 misgivings, he promised that Havana would study individual cases.266 Even such qualified comments startled the U.S. delegation. In a report to Vance, Todman expressed his surprise that Malmierca seemed willing to discuss all issues, including political prisoners.267

Washington Faces Miami—Terrorism

Along with human rights, terrorism also attracted much of Carter’s attention.

Urged by Durán and his group, Vance strongly demanded that Attorney General Griffin

Bell investigate this issue by himself. In the face of Bell’s reticence and complaints,

Vance kept arguing that the success of U.S.-Cuban détente required the of terrorism. Carter’s ethics also allowed for little compromise with the inhumane nature of terrorism. When Carter watched Bill Moyer’s CBS documentary, “The CIA’ Secret

Army,” he was “appalled at the idea that people could use U.S. territory as a base for terrorist action.” The U.S. president promptly ordered CIA Director Stansfield Turner to ensure that the agency would never authorize any of anti-Castro militants’ operations.

When Carter received a report on anti-Castro terrorism, he stressed to Vance, “We can watch it, not yield to the threat.”268

After the Crime of Barbados in October 1976, the U.S. government no longer could dismiss Miami terrorism as the business of someone else. Even the CIA identified

266 Memcon (Malmierca, Todman), April 27, 1977, pp. 3, 7, NLC-24-11-1-2-9, RAC, JCL. 267 Todman to Vance, May 2, 1977, NLC-24-11-1-1-0, RAC, JCL. 268 Minutes of PRM 15; Pastor to James Schecter, January 12, 1978, NLC-24-75-1-1-1, RAC, JCL; and Handwritten note by Carter, in Vance to Carter, March 7, 1977, in folder “State Department Evening Reports, 3/77,” box 37, PF, JCL. 114 anti-Castro terrorism as “among the most active and most disruptive terrorist groups” that undermined U.S. interests.269 Yet, despite PD6, in which Carter ordered Bell to investigate this problem, the Attorney General emphasized what the Justice Department could not do, rather than what it could do. In a report to Brzezinski, he claimed that federal agencies could prosecute anti-Castro militants only after they violated specific

U.S. laws. To direct non-criminal investigations otherwise would infringe the First

Amendment and lead to unfair targeting of the Cuban American community.270 In light of these responses, Robert Pastor, the NSC’s specialist for Latin American affairs, complained that the Justice Department was “not zealous as they could be.”271 On May

25, 1977, anti-Castro militants bombed an office of Mackey Airlines, the first U.S. carrier that planned to resume flights to Cuba.272

Much like human rights, terrorism also emerged as a crucial topic of U.S.-Cuban talks. At the above-mentioned March 1977 meeting, Todman asked Havana to renew the anti-hijacking agreement. In response, Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Pelegrín Torras reminded Todman of the Crime of Barbados. “These things are not easy for our people to understand,” he said, “and our government must be responsive to them.”273 At the

Havana talks a month later, Todman again brought up the same issue by implying U.S.

269 CIA, “International Issues: Regional and Political Analysis,” February 16, 1977, pp. 18, 22, CREST, NARA. 270 On the legal constraint on the FBI, see esp. Bell to Brzezinski, April 8, 1977, NLC-24-10-9-2-3, RAC, JCL. 271 Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, “Justice Department’s Response to PD-6,” April 15, 1977, NLC- 24-69-6-6-8, RAC, JCL. 272 Brzezinski to Carter, July 20, 1977, in folder “Cuba, 5-10/77,” box 13, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor (hereafter RNSA), JCL. 273 Memcon (Todman, Torras), March 24, 1977, pp. 19-20, NLC-24-10-8-2-3, RAC, JCL. 115 willingness to make a public statement against terrorism. This gesture had little impact on

Malmierca, who demanded “more than words.” Todman claimed that the U.S. government had cut its ties with anti-Castro terrorists. “Whatever may have occurred,” he stressed, “these relationships no longer exist.” To underscore this point, Todman handed a FBI report to Malmierca and remarked on a U.S. request for Cuba’s assistance for investigations in the Orlando Letelier assassination, which involved anti-Castro militants.274

The effectiveness of the U.S. control of terrorism was put to the test between

June and August, when the administration learned of a new threat. Carter immediately mobilized federal agencies and provided the information to the governments of the

Bahamas—where the plotters supposedly stored fuel and arms—and Cuba. The response foiled the plot, yet the administration took the issue so seriously that it created an interagency task force to review the procedures for prevention. Vance argued that

“simply swapping information may not be sufficient in such volatile situations” and that

“thought should be given to expanding present procedures to allow the appropriate agency to take the lead in following events and making recommendations.” Carter supported Vance’s argument and wrote, “We need to move on this.” On the next day,

Carter asked Brzezinski, “What are we doing to control Cuban-U.S. terrorists?” In a memorandum for Brzezinski’s answer to Carter, Pastor responded, “Not enough.”275

274 Memcon (Malmierca, Todman), April 27, 1977, pp. 2, 5, 7-8, NLC-24-11-1-2-9, RAC, JCL. For the assassination, see the previous chapter. 275 Vance to Carter, July 13, 1977, NLC-7-18-5-4-6, RAC, JCL; Handwritten Memo, Carter to Brzezinski, July 14, 1977; Brzezinski to Carter, July 20, 1977; and Pastor to Brzezinski, July 20, 1977, all in folder “Cuba, 5-10/77,” box 13, RNSA, JCL. 116

Castro volunteered to assist Carter. In June 1977, he ordered Néstor García

Iturbe, first secretary of Cuban mission to the United Nations in New York, to provide

U.S. officials with an oral statement on terrorism. The statement detailed a plot against

Cuba, including such information on principal executioners, their whereabouts, weapons, financial sources, and collaborators in Miami.276 In doing so, Havana admitted that it had deeply infiltrated South Florida, yet made clear its disposition to expand counterterrorism cooperation. Later in his message to the U.S. president, Castro promised that he would continue to oppose terrorism even though the anti-hijacking agreement had expired. The

Cuban leader referred to a large number of Cuban-born residents trained by the CIA as “a monster that has been created [by the U.S. government] and will be extremely difficult to control.”277 In late October, two Cuban intelligence officers, José Luis Padrón and

Antonio de la Guardia, exchanged views on Miami terrorism with FBI representatives.278

These efforts started to bear fruit. On August 15, 1977, U.S. federal and local agents seized three boats and automatic weapons that they claimed would be used for hit- and-run raiding on Cuba. In November, the FBI reported that the number of terrorist actions declined from 23 to 8 within the last twelve months despite an anticipated increase following Carter’s announcement of a new policy toward Cuba. The FBI claimed that it had conducted “aggressive and penetrating” criminal investigations into

276 Memcon, July 22, 1977, NLC-24-65-11-3-9, RAC, JCL. For Cuba’s side, see García Iturbe, Diplomacia sin sombra, pp. 100-110. 277 Church to Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski, August 12, 1977, in folder “Cuba, 5-10/77,” box 13, RNSA, JCL. 278 Cited in James B. Adams (associate director) to Aaron, April 13, 1978, NLC-17-61-1-7-8, RAC, JCL. 117 past terrorism, taken “stringent measures” to deter future actions, and devoted additional manpower and resources to maintain an “aggressive posture” against Cuban-émigré terrorism.279 In a U.S.-Cuban talk about maritime cooperation in May 1978, a U.S. delegation assured that the administration was doing everything possible to prevent any escalation of terrorism in the Florida Straits.280

In the end, however, Carter’s campaign against terrorism might have been too vigorous for many Miami Cubans to accept. Highly publicized efforts against terrorism drew vocal criticism not only from hardliners like RECE leader Jorge Mas Canosa, but also from Bernardo Benes, who later played a role in a U.S. dialogue with Cuba. Their defition of “terrorism” was different. Unlike the U.S. and Cuban governments, they still considered raiders who plotted to topple the Cuban government through military means as “patriots,” rather than terrorists.281 As Maurice A. Ferrer, mayor of the city of Miami, wrote to Carter, Washington’s anti-terrorism campaign created “utter confusion” in the minds of thousands of these Cubans.282 Such developments worried Durán, who preferred a gradual approach to “sensitize” the community to the goals of the U.S. government. In late October, he led a group of Miami Cubans, including Mas Canosa, to convey Miami’s

279 FBI Director to Bell, November 29, 1977, NLC-24-11-4-5-4, RAC, JCL. Pastor to Brzezinski, December 10, 1977, in folder “Cuba, 11/77 to 2/78,” box 13, RNSA, JCL. For a FBI’s self-evaluation, see also Michael Kelly to Brzezinski, Christopher, Turner, , 1977, in folder “Cuba 10- 12/77,” box 11, NSA: Staff Material-North/South (Pastor) Files, JCL. 280 The Cuban delegation complained that none of “counterrevolutionary terrorists” went to prisons. The U.S. delegation did not refute this point but claim that it was the result of the division of power between executive and judicial branches of the U.S. government, not the show of hostile intentions against the revolutionary regime. “Resumen del informe sobre los resultados de las conversaciones guardacostas-guardafronteras,” May 8-10, 1978, Caja “Agresiones 3,” MINREX. 281 See for example, DLA, August 5, 1977, pp. 1, 23; DLA, , 1977, p. 1; DLA, August 7, 1977, p. 1; and an editorial, August 7, 1977, DLA, p. 4. 282 Ferrer to Carter, August 8, 1977, in folder “Cubans,” box 2287, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. 118 views to Brzezinski.283 After the meeting, Brzezinski reported to Carter that he had

“relieved their anxiety.”284 This was hardly true.

A Deadlock over Africa and the Embargo

Despite Carter’s important achievement on terrorism, the U.S.-Cuban dialogue was losing its momentum because of the renewed Cold War in Africa. The bilateral talks started in March 1977, and by August, the two countries agreed on fisheries and maritime boundaries and reopened interest sections—“embassies in all but name”—in each other’s capitals.285 They made other gestures. Whereas Washington halted SR-71 overflights and lifted the ban on travel by U.S. citizens, Havana released ten U.S. prisoners and permitted a number of visits of divided families. But the growing African conflicts complicated matters. Havana stalled the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, its major ally, in response to the increased regional tensions after the Shaba I affair. Angola pleaded with

Cuba to defend the nation against its hostile neighbors, Zaire and South Africa, both of which allied with the United States.286

It was in this context that Brzezinski reframed the U.S. discussion on Cuba. By then U.S. policy toward Cuba was essentially part of a U.S. dialogue with Latin America, as advocated by the Linowitz report. Although the State Department expressed concern

283 Pastor to Brzezinski, October 26, 1977, NLC-24-11-4-2-8, RAC, JCL; and Pastor to Brzezinski, October 7, 1977, NLC-24-19-7-20-5, RAC, JCL. 284 Brzezinski to Carter, October 28, 1977, NLC-1-4-2-58-1, RAC, JCL. 285 For the quote, Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 114. Although the U.S. and Cuban interest sections already existed in the Swiss and Czech embassies, U.S. and Cuban diplomats began to staff them and reopened the offices in former embassy buildings in Havana and Washington. 286 For the best account of the Shaba I affair, see Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 39-44. 119 about Cuba’s role in Africa, it avoided linking this issue with bilateral matters.287 But at a crucial August 3, 1977, meeting on Cuba, Brzezinski advocated the opposite. He stood against the State Department’s proposal for the partial lifting of the embargo, which aimed to draw Havana’s concessions on human rights. The national security adviser conceded that human rights was important “because it is good in itself; because it is important to the President; and also because it is of great importance to the Cuban

American community.” Yet, he insisted that the administration maintain the embargo because it was “the only U.S. leverage” to restrain Cuba’s African policy, which he identified as the single most important U.S. national interest regarding Cuba. Secretary of

Treasury Michael Blumenthal vehemently contested this far-reaching shift of policy understanding. “Normalization is important not just because of Cuba’s activities in

Africa,” he exclaimed. Still, it was Brzezinski who won the debate. Carter himself was deeply concerned about Cuba’s roles in Africa. In his talks with Tanzanian President

Julius Nyerere, Carter complained of the continued presence of Cuban troops in Africa, which made it “impossible for us to normalize relations with Cuba.”288

This abrupt change in the U.S. policy orientation puzzled Havana. Cuban foreign policy was a matter of national sovereignty, Castro believed. Cuba also was defending the existing government in Angola from external aggression. Abandoning the Angolan

287 Talks with Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers, cited in Canadian embassy in Washington to Ottawa, April 7, 1977, vol. 16019 file 20-Cuba-1-3-USA part 5, LAC. 288 Vance was absent from the meeting. Blumenthal was a member of the Linowitz commission. Department of State’s Policy Paper, n.d., NLC-24-17-6-7-4, RAC, JCL; Minutes, Policy Review Committee Meeting, August 3, 1977, NLC-15-8-1-10-5, JCL; and Brzezinski to Carter, August 18, 1977, Declassified Documents Reference System (hereafter DDRS). For Carter’s comment on Cuba’s roles in Africa, see Memcon (Carter, Nyerere), August 4, 1977, NLC-133-42-3-20-2, RAC, JCL. 120

Revolution for the sake of an improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations was unthinkable, as

Castro reassured Angolan President Agostinho Neto.289 Furthermore, the Cuban leader was essentially nationalist in nature, and did not want to create the perception that he was opportunistic and susceptible to U.S. pressure.290 Castro refused the linkage between his interests in Africa and U.S.-Cuban détente. Both publicly and privately, Castro repeated that Cuban solidarity with its African allies was nonnegotiable.291 “Cuba is not China,” he said at one point.292

But Carter continued to claim that Cuba should withdraw from Africa to make progress on U.S.-Cuban normalization. When this suasion did not work, Carter tried to mount international pressure on Cuba through negative public relations campaigns.293 In

November, in a statement for attribution to a “high-ranking Administration official,”

Brzezinski told U.S. reporters that there has been a recent military buildup by Cuba in

African countries that made normalization of relations with Cuba “impossible.” He cited an increase of 4,000 to 6,000 Cuban troops in Angola since July, a figure that turned out to be based on a change in CIA bookkeeping, not on an actual increase. Brzezinski’s

“marked indifference to the facts” irritated Cuban officials.294 Castro later called it

289 Memcon (Castro and Neto), March 23, 1977, Consejo de Estado (Cuba), Wilson Center Digital Archive (hereafter WCDA). 290 Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, pp. 2-3. 291 For example, see interview with Castro for Afrique Asie, , 1977, in Bohemia, May 20, 1977, pp. 58-65. 292 Speech by Fidel Castro, , 1979, Discursos. 293 Carter, White House Diary, p. 134. 294 Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 122-27; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 25, 1977, vol. 12614 file 20-Cuba-1-3, part 13, LAC. 121

“deliberate propaganda,” and “this was when the anti-climate in the United States began.”295 A month later, Castro’s rhetoric flared up in a speech. “In the same manner that in the past we fought against five presidents of the United States,” he declared, “we will now fight against the sixth.” Cuba had already begun to send new troops to the Horn of Africa, this time to defend from invading Somalian armies.296

U.S.-Cuban disputes over Africa reached a peak in May 1978, when Carter and

Castro engaged in verbal battles over the Shaba II affair. As soon as Castro received news of the intrusion of Angola-based Katangan rebels into Zaire’s Shaba province, he conveyed an assurance to Carter that Cuba was not involved. Despite the receipt of this confidential message, however, Washington publicly condemned the Cuban presence in

Africa as the cause of the incident and denounced the Cuban leader as a liar. Castro shot back, and went public to blame Brzezinski for misleading the U.S. president.297 Not surprisingly, the exchange of these accusations did not help to foster U.S. public support for the dialogue. By this time Carter became hostage of his rhetoric, as Wayne Smith notes. The administration “talked so often and in such alarmist terms about the Cubans in

Africa…that various members of Congress began to demand that something be done.”

But “when none did, Carter was labeled a wimp.”298 The process of U.S.-Cuban normalization appeared to stall.

295 Memcon (Castro, Turner, Pastor), December 3-4, 1978, DDRS. 296 Fidel Castro, 2nd Period of Sessions of the National Assembly of People’s Power: City of Havana December 24, 1977, Year of Institutionalization (Havana: Political Publishers, 1978), p. 66. On the Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa, see Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 49-53. 297 For the best account of the Shaba II affair and U.S.-Cuban reactions, see Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 55- 60. 298 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 142. 122

Cuba’s Outreach Efforts in U.S. Society

The disagreements over Africa did not necessarily end the U.S.-Cuban dialogue, however. Castro was not impatient. In his May 1977 interview with ABC reporter

Barbara Walters, the Cuban leader estimated that U.S.-Cuban normalization would prolonge until Carter’s second term.299 For the time being he worked to generate favorable audiences both in the United States and Cuba. The Cuban leader invited journalists, business groups, and politicians to Havana, and talked with many of them personally. The Cuban interests section (CUINT) in Washington was developing relations with the Congress, business, the press, academics, and influential private citizens. Castro also sought to prepare the Cuban public in anticipation of eventual U.S.-

Cuban normalization. “Imperial aggression strengthened revolutionary spirit in Cuba,” he said in one of the speeches, “but the Cuban Revolution would not need imperialist aggression to survive.”300

Monthly reports to Havana from Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, head of the CUINT in

Washington, contained considerable information on Cuba’s outreach to U.S. society.

Since its opening in August 1977, this Cuban outpost in the U.S. capital strove to provide information, expand people-to-people communication, and overcome the negative stereotype of the revolutionary regime. In the U.S. Congress, the CUINT could count on the Congressional Black Caucus and liberal Democrats as natural allies because of their

299 Entrevista Concedida por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro a la Periodista Norteamericana Barbara Walters, 19 de Mayo de 1977 (Havana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 1977). 300 Speech by Fidel Castro, September 28, 1977, in Bohemia, October 7, 1977, pp. 50-59. 123 sympathy for the Cuban fight against apartheid Southern Africa. The section also reached out to conservative Republicans to see if they could visit the island and seek business relations despite ideological differences. The CUINT was also active in non-political fields. It hosted cultural events and music performances in various U.S. cities and kept in touch with U.S. universities, which showed interest in organizing trips to Cuba.301

Expanding Cuba’s influence in the United States required much labor, especially in light of what was perceived as an “anti-Cuban” campaign by Brzezinski. The CUINT lamented that Washington’s show of hostility had a chilling effect on U.S. business sectors since several local chambers of commerce cancelled their planned trips to Cuba.

Still, the section had some good news. It reported favorably on the Black Caucus’s criticisms against Carter’s accusation of Castro over the Shaba II affair. Afro-business sectors and a lobbying group TransAfrica, which advocated global justice for the African world, remained eager to visit the island. The report also highlighted that the Cuban

National Ballet made a superb performance in Washington and impressed the audience.

“We consider that the presence of the Ballet in Washington has been very fortunate,”

Sánchez-Parodi wrote, “since it contributed to counterattack the current campaign against our country.”302

A month later, the CUINT pleasantly noted that the Conference of Mayors approved a resolution in favor of its visit to Cuba despite strong opposition from the

301 CUINT in Washington to Havana, Informe de apreciación sobre la política de Estados Unidos hacia Cuba, June 6, 1978, Caja “Bilateral 22,” MINREX. 302 Ibid., see esp. pp. 10-16, 25. 124 mayor of Miami.303 Even as late as February 1979, the CUINT reported that U.S. academic, media, and business sectors maintained interest in the island despite mounting difficulties in government-to-government relations. The list of U.S. universities that kept in touch with the CUINT included Johns Hopkins, Columbia, Harvard, MIT,

Georgetown, George Washington, Howard, UT Austin, Florida, North Carolina at Chapel

Hill, and U.C. Berkeley. The section also organized several cultural activities, such as

“Cuban Night” at the National Press Club in Washington, orchestra performances by

Aragón and Elena Burke in New York, and a tour by famous musicians Silvio Rodríguez and Pablo Milanés around U.S. cities. According to Cuban diplomats in Washington, all these activities contributed to “the increase of Cuban political influence in the United

States.”304

Castro’s Overtures: Fidel Castro’s “New Economic Policy”

Havana’s most far-reaching move on this front was its outreach to the Cuban

American community. Carter’s initial policy amplified expectation among Miami moderates that U.S.-Cuban dialogue may result in the release of prisoners in Cuba and reunification of Cuban families. Searching for their identity and cultural origins, radical youths and professionals travelled to Cuba for three weeks, with the concurrence of the

Cuban government. Castro entertained the group of 55 Cuban émigrés, the Brigade

303 CUINT in Washington to Havana, Informe de apreciación sobre la política de Estados Unidos hacia Cuba—del 6 al 30 de junio de 1978, Caja “Bilateral 22,” MINREX. 304 CUINT in Washington to Havana, Informe de apreciación sobre la política de Estados Unidos hacia Cuba—del 5 de diciembre de 1978 al 12 de febrero de 1979, February 20, 1979, pp. 3-4, 10-11, Caja “Bilateral 22,” MINREX. 125

Antonio Maceo, and allowed their documentary, 55 Hermanos, to be shown at Cuban theaters, which drew record crowds. “Scenes of young exiles returning to their childhood rooftop playgrounds and neighborhoods warmed the hearts of a public that until then had been publicly encouraged to despise those who had left,” according to a participant of the brigade. “Audiences left the theaters crying.”305

Behind the scenes Castro opened secret channels with Bernardo Benes, a Jewish banker of Cuban origin in Miami. Benes did not hold an official title in the administration, yet he belonged to Durán’s group and saw the dialogue with Castro as the only way to solve human rights problems in Cuba. In August 1977, he encountered José Luis Padrón, executive assistant to the Cuban Ministry of Interior’s first vice minister, by chance.

Alberto Pons, a friend of Panamanian Vice President Ricardo de la Espriella, knew that both Benes and Padrón happened to be in Panama and arranged their meeting in the hope of better U.S.-Cuban relations. It was after this meeting that Benes decided to act as a private intermediary between Washington and Havana, and recruited his friend, Charles

Dascal, to join him. In contrast to Brzezinski, Benes and Dascal were more interested in the wellbeing of the prisoners than Cuban interventions in Africa.306

Of special importance was the first Havana meeting of Benes and Dascal with

Castro in February 1978. Here Castro expressed sympathy for their interest in the plight of prisoners, and promised that he would examine the matter, as well as the issues of

305 Torres, Mirrors, p. 93. On the brigade, see an editorial, Areíto 4, nos. 3-4 (Spring 1978). For this trip, see Roman de la Campa, “Itinirario de la Brigada Antonio Maceo,” and Miriam Muñiz, “Algunas Cartas y Anotaciones,” both in Areíto 4, nos. 3-4 (Spring 1978), pp. 12-23. 306 Padrón, interview transcript, Havana, February 10, 2010, in author’s possession. Padrón finds Levine’s version of the first encounter false. 126 family reunification. Castro then exhibited interest in opening clandestine channels of communication with Carter. He repeated that Carter was a moral, decent person with religious convictions, and emphasized that it was important to sit down with him before his term ended. The meeting lasted for over seven hours and impressed not only the visitors but also Cuban officials. “Unprecedent [sic]—180 degrees change of position regarding Cuban Community abroad and U.S.,” Padrón dictated to Benes after the meeting. “[I have] never heard him talk to strangers in such a candid and open way— economic development, commercial and trade relations—tell Dr. Breszinsky [sic] this is the Cuban NEP [New Economic Policy] of [Vladimir] Lenin.”307

According to Padrón, who became a special envoy of Fidel Castro thereafter, the meeting was the first time when he and other Cuban officials heard of Castro’s new vision for the Cuban economy. The timing was crucial. It was five years before the

Decree no. 82, issued in 1982, which approved foreign capital investment. “I think it was extremely important,” Padrón says, that Castro was ready to adjust the Cuban economic system in response to the changing relations with the United States, while considering new scenarios and new interests. Benes and Dascal also played a critical role in giving

Castro a new perspective on the Cuban American community, which, according to

Padrón, “none of us [Cuban leaders] had.” Dascal spoke frankly to the Cuban leader,

“Fidel, you are betting for the losing chicken, the Soviet Union.” He explained how a

307 Memoir by Benes, pp. 12-19; Benes’ note, “First Meeting of Bernardo Benes with Fidel Castro in Havana, Cuba,” in folder “Dialogue, n.d., 1977-1979,” box 2, Mirta Ojito Papers, UM-CHC. A partial version of this meeting appears in Levine, Secret Missions, pp. 91-92. The NEP was a more capitalist- oriented economic reform conducted by Vladimir Lenin since 1921. While holding state control of large state industries, Lenin promoted privatization to promote production, trade, and economic growth. abolished it in 1928. 127

Cuban émigré who had arrived with fifty pesos in the United States became one of the richest men in twenty years.308

Out of his desire to tell a real story about Miami, Benes later produced a TV documentary on the political, economic, and cultural accomplishments of the Cuban community. This video astonished Castro. When an announcer introduced a Cuban

American shoe factory producing sixty thousand shoes a day, Castro jumped up and said,

“Benes, this is wrong. This should be sixty thousand a year.” Benes responded, “No,

Fidel. It is sixty thousand pairs of shoes a day, as the announcer says.” For a while,

Castro found it difficult to grapple with what he had watched. “This is a million of

Cubans who left for the north in a mess, for the country whose culture was different and foreign, for the country that was discriminatory and capitalist. Look [at] what they have done!”309

Some Cuban officials like Padrón appreciated Benes and Dascal’s roles because of their concerns about Cuba’s economic future. “I was very critical of the economic scheme that was predominant in Cuba at that moment,” recalls Padrón in an interview.

The Cuban economy was “almost carbon copy of the Soviet system,” and “I was convinced that would not develop the country.” Padrón looked for new ideas and found two sources of inspiration: the Jews and the Palestinians. Both of them benefited from political and economic ties among their . “So I said, well, we had a nation, we had a state. Why could not we do the same?” Castro seemed to agree with him. The

308 Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 8. 309 Memoir by Benes, pp. 42-44. Padrón frankly confirmed this story. Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, pp. 2, 6. Similar story appears in Levine, Secret Missions, p. 99, although the author does not mention some critical elements of this story. 128

Cuban leader appointed Padrón as Cuba’s Minister of , allowing him to set up a new corporation, CIMEX, for which the government would work with foreign capital.310

Later, Castro himself told Benes that Cuba’s priority was to promote détente with the

West and establish “a new order of economic development.”311

As the phrase NEP implied, Castro did not abandon the final goal of building socialism but viewed the new economy plan as a temporary measure to reconstruct the

Cuban economy. He indicated to Moyers, Benes, and Dascal that Cuba had no intention of cutting its economic ties to the Soviet Union because they were beneficial for the island.312 As indicated previously, neither did Castro have any idea of abandoning his policy objective in Africa only to improve relations with the United States. However, despite these qualifications, the revelation of Castro’s intentions prior to the opening of secret meetings was important. By illustrating his strong desire to reenergize the Cuban economy, it helps to understand why he showed a keen interest in resuming talks with the

United States, even though Carter maintained the embargo on the island.313

310 Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 4. Padrón discussed the idea of mixed industry with Benes and Dascal in Mexico City in late March. Memoir by Benes, pp. 99-103. Dascal viewed Padrón as one of pragmatic and open-minded Cubans who wanted to change the course of Cuba’s economic future. See Dascal to Brzezinski, n.d., in folder “Cuba, 2/78-4/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL. 311 Memoir by Benes, p. 116. 312 Memoir by Benes, pp. 113-4. See also, Memcon (Padrón, Newsom), July 5, 1978, p. 11, in folder “Cuba, 5/78-8/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL. 313 The Cuban government also took some other measures to lower regulations on economic activities. In July 1978, the government issued the Decree no. 14 to authorize part-time economic activities of selling hand-made goods. The same decree also allowed individuals to provide personal services like car repair and plumbing on a part-time basis. Jorge F. Pérez-López, Cuba’s Second Economy (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995), pp. 91-94. 129

Alpha Channel

Washington was ambivalent toward Benes and Dascal’s private diplomacy and

Castro’s interest in the opening of a secret U.S.-Cuban communication. After he received

Havana’s messages through Benes and Dascal, Brzezinski sent his deputy David Aaron to the meeting with Padrón in New York on April 14, 1978.314 Unlike Benes and Dascal,

Brzezinski and Aaron had far less interest in human rights issues than Cuba’s roles in

Africa. “I will suggest to Padrón that the Cubans are being exploited by the Soviets in

Africa,” Aaron pledged to Brzezinski a day before the meeting.315 When Aaron actually fulfilled his promise, Padrón gave him a frank response. “You’re not well informed,” he said. “We believe that sometimes the United States underestimates the character, the position, and the influence of Cuba in Africa.” The talks made clear the degree of misperception, although they agreed to continue to talk.316

In contrast, Vance’s State Department paid more attention to human rights issues and took more forthcoming attitudes toward the resumption of U.S.-Cuban talks.

According to William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, the Cubans found the New York meeting so unsatisfactory that they asked Benes and Dascal to contact the State

Department. At their meeting with Vance, Benes and Dascal found him more amicable, engaging, and interested in their account than Brzezinski. Whereas Brzezinski cut them out of communication, Vance even assigned his top aide, Peter Tarnoff, as their contact

314 Brzezinski to Aaron, March 27, 1978, in folder “Cuba, 2/78-4/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL. 315 Aaron to Brzezinski, April 13, 1978, DDRS. 316 Memcon (Padrón, Aaron), April 14, 1978, in folder “Cuba 2/78-4/78,” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL. 130 person.317 Appealing to human rights concerns, Vance then persuaded Carter to open

Alpha Channel, a top-secret channel with Havana. For the following months, U.S. and

Cuban delegations met in New York, Washington, Atlanta, Cuernavaca (Mexico), and

Havana.318

In New York on June 15 and Washington on July 6, U.S. and Cuban representatives exchanged their views about Africa and human rights. The talks on the latter went smoothly. In light of Castro’s talks with Benes and Dascal, Padrón stated,

Havana had already decided to release hundreds of prisoners and authorize their departure with their families from Cuba. This new initiative would help to “improve the climate between the U.S. Cuban community and Cuba” and also “create a propitious climate in U.S. public opinion.”319 Vance’s State Department welcomed this move, showing its willingness to accept these Cubans and process their visa applications.320 But

Brzezinski doubted Castro’s intentions, suspected Vance’s naiveté, and instructed the U.S. delegation not to discuss “any bilateral issues.” In that way, Washington would not have to reciprocate Havana’s concessions on human rights.321

317 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 184-85; and Levine, Secret Missions, 97-99. 318 Virtually all memcons were declassified very recently. Partial stories appear in Levine’s Secret Missions, Schoultz’s Infernal, Gleijeses’ Visions, and LeoGrande and Kornbluh’s Back Channel. Yet none of them tells about the Atlanta meeting, the most important of all. Padrón claimed that the Soviet Union knew nothing about this channel. Padrón, interview transcript, February 10, 2010, p. 9. On Carter’s decision, see Tarnoff, interview transcript by David Engstrom, July 20, 1988, p. 4, in author’s possession. 319 Statement by Padrón, in Memcon (Padrón, Newsom), June 15, 1978, pp. 4-6, DDRS. 320 Statement by Newsom, in Memcon (Padrón, Newsom), July 5, 1978, pp. 1-2. 321 Newsom, interview transcript by David Engstrom, July 17, 1987, p. 6, in author’s possession; and Brzezinski to Carter, July 7, 1978, in folder “Cuba—Alpha Channel [6/78-10/78],” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL. On Brzezinski-Vance rivalry, see Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 120-22. 131

Then came the meeting in Atlanta on August 8, 1978. By then the Cuban expectation about the prospect of better U.S.-Cuban relations had increased to one of its highest points. Unlike the previous New York meeting with Aaron, Padrón found the

Washington meeting with Vance’s assistant David Newsom very satisfactory. “This is as if a man who could not speak for twenty years,” he described to Benes, “suddenly started to speak words like ‘dad,’ ‘mom,’ and ‘honey (nené).’”322 Their enthusiasm waned when they found that Washington was discouraging fifteen countries from attending the Non-

Aligned Movement summit to be held in Havana. In his major July 26 speech Castro unleashed a diatribe against U.S. imperialism, ridiculed Carter’s human rights policy, and condemned U.S. support for Nicaragua, Chile, and other undemocratic regimes conducting genocide and .323 Padrón admitted that the address was acrimonious, but sent messages to Carter through Benes that Cuba looked to the Atlanta meeting as

“very important” and expected that Washington would reciprocate Havana’s concessions.324

The Atlanta meeting completely disappointed the Cubans. In response to Castro’s

July 26 speech, the NSC’s Aaron opened the meeting by citing Carter’s comment, “Are they [Cubans] really serious?” This question infuriated the Cuban delegation.325 Neither were they pleased to hear again the U.S. position that Cuba should withdraw from Africa

322 Memoir by Benes, p. 122. 323 Castro also claimed that the United States repeatedly violated human rights principles by dropping atomic bombs in Japan, by intervening militarily in Latin America, and by assassinating millions of Vietnamese. Speech by Fidel Castro, July 26, 1978, Discursos. 324 Memoir by Benes, pp. 126-28; and Tarnoff to Vance, August 3, 1978, DDRS. 325 Levine, Secret Missions, pp. 101-4; and Memoir by Benes, p. 133. 132 and restrain criticism of the United States on such matters as Puerto Rico. Padrón reiterated that foreign policy was nonnegotiable with the United States. The Cuban troops came at the request of Angola. Unless the United States gave a security guarantee for

Angola from the external danger of South Africa, Angola would not ask the Cubans to leave. The State Department’s Newsom called the meeting “disappointing,” but the U.S. delegation made it even worse for the Cuban counterpart by cutting the meeting in half.

When Padrón requested that they talk about the blockade and Guantánamo on the Cuban agenda, the U.S. delegation refused to comment. The discussion had entered a vicious cycle. Padrón denounced this meeting as “one-sided.”326

In Havana, Benes saw Castro losing patience. Cuba already had released more than 1,000 prisoners. Although Castro still wanted to bring the U.S. delegation to Havana to expedite U.S.-Cuban talks, he also quipped that Carter did little to reciprocate his gesture. “Everything has been unilateral,” the Cuban leader said. “We want to work constructively. But if they fuck us, we shall fuck them twenty-four hours a day! We are willing to talk about anything, but in an atmosphere of decorum. We will not stand to be humiliated!” Castro repeatedly said, “Cuba will not deal with the United States with concessions or conditions!”327

Benes thought that this misunderstanding drew from cultural differences between the United States and Cuba. To the Cubans, Castro’s vitriolic attacks on the United States in his public speeches simply reflected his trademark revolutionary zeal. To the

326 Memcon (Aaron, Newsom, Padrón, Arbesú), August 8, 1978, NLC-24-12-2-9-1, RAC, JCL. 327 Memoir by Benes, pp. 134-26, 141-42, 144. Benes met Castro a week after the Atlanta meeting. 133

Americans, these criticisms of Yankee imperialism during negotiation periods not only increased the political cost of the dialogue but also meant a lack of sincerity on the part of

Cuba.328 However insightful this observation might have been, it is also undeniable that

Washington and Havana confronted a security dilemma in Southern Africa. As historian

Piero Gleijeses notes, Carter failed to restrain South Africa, which exacerbated the regional tensions and threatened Angola. Even if Cuba was eager to reduce troops in

Angola, South African intransigence made this impossible.329 The U.S.-Cuban talks became more complicated after Castro embarked on a dialogue with “the Cuban community abroad.”

The Entangled Triangle: Havana, Miami, and Washington

On September 6, 1978, Castro surprised the world media by inviting Cuban

émigrés to the Diálogo, a dialogue for national reconciliation among Cubans at home and abroad. The Diálogo planned to address not only the release of thousands of Cuban prisoners convicted of political crimes, but also the reunification of Cuban families separated across the Florida Straits for over twenty years. Havana’s decision was transcendent. For years Castro and millions of Cubans had condemned Cuban Americans as gusanos (worms) because they left the island at difficult times after the revolution. But the Cuban leader now referred to them as members of the “Cuban community abroad” and expressed his regret that he had used this insulting term. He argued that the past was

328 Levine, Secret Missions, pp. 103-4. 329 Gleijeses, Visions, p. 113. See also, Memcon (Aaron, Newsom, Padrón, Arbesú), November 1, 1978, in folder “Cuba—Alpha Channel [11/78],” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL. 134 the past. “For the first time in almost twenty years,” he claimed, “we are willing to talk with personalities of the Cuban community abroad.”330

Castro’s September 1978 press conference startled U.S. officials, even though they had prior notice. Peter Tarnoff rushed to call Benes and asked why Castro created a new situation. Tarnoff feared that Havana’s actions would force Washington to start to discuss U.S.-Cuban issues in the public just before the November mid-term election.

Benes reminded him that the conference was merely symbolic. But soon Washington concluded that Havana was using new pressure tactics to make the United States commit to negotiations.331

Havana tried to reassure U.S. officials, sending a message that it “just wanted to make the community more amicable, less hostile.”332 Indeed, from the start of U.S.-

Cuban talks, it was Carter who encouraged Castro to improve relations with Miami.

Then, why did Castro go public? According to Padrón’s recollection, the Cuban government wanted to engage in the battle for the hearts and minds of Cubans abroad.

But not all Cuban leaders at home were convinced. Many Cubans could not forgive those who had left. Much like Miami Cubans, Havana Cubans had many disagreements among themselves. “These disagreements appeared discreetly and subtly, if not openly, in front of Fidel,” Padrón recalls.333 Castro had to persuade Cubans both inside and outside Cuba.

Six weeks later, when the first group of forty-eight prisoners left Cuba, Castro stated,

330 Press conference by Fidel Castro, September 6, 1978, in Diálogo del gobierno cubano y personas representativas de la comunidad cubana en el exterior (Havana: Editora Política, 1994), p. 12. 331 Memoir by Benes, pp. 144-46; and Tarnoff to Brzezinski, September 13, 1978, DDRS. 332 Memoir by Benes, pp. 155-57. 333 Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 2. 135

“Please do not think that this was easy for us. For us this was also a brave gesture, since we have had to explain to the [Cuban] people, who have spent twenty years fighting and holding that way of thinking.” He added, “If they do not understand, this is a failure.”334

But after the Atlanta meeting the U.S. government found it difficult to believe that

Cuba was acting in good faith. Cuba also tried to move faster exactly when the United

States tried to slow down the pace of negotiations. The United States had a lot of other foreign policy issues, such as Vietnam, China, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and the Middle East. At the inter-agency meeting on August 22, 1978, NSC’s Aaron reminded the participants that the U.S. president “wants to be careful not to overload the circuits.” As the 1978 mid-term election was approaching, the NSC and State Department decided to conduct a broader analysis of U.S.-Cuban relations and its domestic political impact.335

Equally instructive is Washington’s reading of Miami reactions to the Diálogo.

Many Miami Cubans reacted enthusiastically to Castro’s invitation. Unaware of the existing secret U.S.-Cuban talks, they thought that negotiations with Castro were the only path to break a revolutionary-counterrevolutionary impasse, in which thousands of Cuban prisoners stayed behind bars and tens of thousands of families remained separated across the border.336 Yet, working with Castro was still unthinkable for many militants and hardliners. “Talk with Castro…is politically absurd,” wrote Mas Canosa. He claimed that

334 Quoted in Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, p. 171. 335 Memcon (Christopher, Aaron), esp. p. 3, August 23, 1978, NLC-15-60-2-2-5, RAC, JCL. 336 García, Havana USA, pp. 47-48; Torres, Mirrors, pp. 94-95; and WP, October 24, 1978, p. A13. 136 the release of prisoners had nothing to do with the Diálogo; it was a gesture to Carter. He urged his readers not to succumb to “emotional impulse” and “fall into Castro’s ploy.”337

Despite this mixed feedback, Washington was rather impressed by the emerging dynamic that mounted pressure on the seemingly inactive administration. Citing an example of Jewish-Israeli relations, Tarnoff wrote to Brzezinski that the Cuban American community might become a pressure group calling for new steps toward U.S.-Cuban normalization. In line with this argument, Tarnoff hinted at a growing discrepancy between the national interest and Cuban American interest in the foreseeable future:

The time may come when they will want to move ahead faster than will suit our

purpose…But even should they begin to get ahead of us, this should not prove a

serious problem. As a pressure group, the relatively small Cuban American

community has definite limits. We move ahead in opening the normalization

process despite their objections; we should be able to control its pace even should

they urge a faster one.338

The administration soon found the growing desires for a change in their lives among thousands of Cubans and Cuban Americans uncontrollable.

337 DLA, September 14, 1978, in Jorge Mas Canosa, Jorge Mas Canosa en busca de una Cuba libre: Edición completa de sus discursos, entrevistas y declaraciones, 1962-1997 ( Gables, FL: North- South Center Press, University of Miami, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 333-34. 338 Tarnoff to Brzezinski, September 13, 1978, DDRS. 137

Many Consequences of the Dialogue—The Release of Prisoners

In the end, Havana’s ill-timed gesture ironically reinforced suspicion rather than good feeling in Washington. At the Cuernavaca meeting on October 28, 1978, the U.S. and Cuban delegations again exchanged their views on Africa, but failed to break the impasse. The Cubans stressed the release of prisoners and the effort to improve their relations with the Cuban American community as proof of their seriousness regarding the dialogue with the United States. Padrón reminded the U.S. delegation of its significance:

You have always told us that this [Cuban Americans’ attitude toward Cuba] was

a very important factor in allowing any U.S. administration to improve relations.

We concur with this and feel that a hostile Cuban community in the U.S. is

useful neither to the U.S. nor Cuba. We, therefore, determined that it was

prudent, appropriate and advisable for us to improve relations with the Cuban

community.

The U.S. delegation disappointed Padrón by sticking to the same point: it would consider the lifting of the embargo only after Cuban troops left Africa. Prevalent among U.S. officials was Brzezinski’s line that the presence of Cuban troops in Africa was far more important than .339 Washington’s fixation on Cuba’s ties to the

Soviet Union was so great that it occasionally misread intelligence reports. In November

339 Memcon, November 1, 1978; and Aaron to Carter, October 30, 1978, in folder “Cuba—Alpha Channel [6/78-10/78],” box 10, GF, ZBC, JCL. See also Pastor, “Carter-Castro,” p. 246. 138

1978, the U.S. government dramatized the Soviet upgrading of MiG-23s on the island and resumed SR-71 surveillance flights over Havana.340

Still, it bears emphasizing that Washington and Havana continued to maintain communications. In his report to Carter on foreign policy priorities for 1979, Secretary

Vance insisted that normalization of relations with traditional anti-U.S. countries remain a U.S. goal to stabilize international system, expand U.S. influence in the world, and counter the Soviet expansion of power. Carter still probably saw merits in such arguments, although he wrote in the margin of the memorandum: “Status quo on

Cuba.”341 Neither did Castro foresee any immediate hope for progress in U.S.-Cuban dialogue, but he too wanted to avoid any backsliding. In his message to Carter, the Cuban leader conveyed his wishes to pursue links with the Cuban American community and maintain U.S.-Cuban cooperation on issues of mutual interest, including the exchange of information on terrorists. “[That’s] ok to me,” Carter responded.342

In the absence of Washington’s outright opposition, Havana continued to build its links with Miami. The Cuban government initially allowed Benes to assemble a broad range of people as community representatives, but when his recruitment did not go well amid the flurry of bomb threats, it started to contact “all of those who [had] expressed a willingness to participate in this dialogue.”343 In late November, the Committee of 75

340 For this controversy, see Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 328-330. Carter noted in his diary that the whole incident “was being made out of a molehill.” Carter, White House Diary, p. 262. 341 Vance to Carter, n.d., in folder “State Department Evening Report, 1/79,” box 39, PF, JCL. 342 Vance to Carter, March 22, 1979, in folder “State Department Evening Report, 3/79,” box 39, PF, JCL. 343 Memoir by Benes, p. 151; Miami News, November 6, 1978, p. 1A. Some rejected the offer, and others made no response. 139

(simply because at a certain point it had seventy-five members) attended its first meeting with Castro in Havana. At the end of this discussion Castro announced that he would free

3,600 prisoners from Cuban jails, permit these Cubans, as well as thousands more former prisoners and their families, to leave the island, grant émigrés permission to visit their families in Cuba, and promise further consideration of other matters of interest for the community abroad. The announcement was “window-dressing.” Benes, Dascal, and

Castro had already worked out all the details.344

This time, Castro underscored Carter’s contribution to his decision, but Havana’s move puzzled Washington. The number of former prisoners allowed to leave Cuba far exceeded the number that the U.S. government could accept amid an economic depression. The U.S. Justice Department was reluctant and slow in processing the entry of Cuban prisoners, and upset both the Cuban government and the Committee of 75.345 In the face of Cuban American pressure, Bell later agreed to accelerate the processing, but the problems remained unresolved for over a year, until Carter personally intervened.346

For the time being, thousands of ex-prisoners had to endure stigmatization for their involvement in the U.S.-led counterrevolutionary plots, and were incapable of securing jobs. Concerned about their plight, Cuban émigrés—regardless of their stance on U.S.-

Cuban normalization—demanded that Carter take a “moral responsibility” in the name of

344 Acta Final, December 8, 1978, in Diálogo, pp. 112-17; and Levine, Secret Missions, p. 111. 345 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 158-59. 346 Carter to Bell, August 10, 1979, Benjamin Civiletti to Carter, August 16, 1979; Pastor to Brzezinski, August 17, 1979; and Brzezinski to Carter, August 17, 1979, all in folder “Cuba 7-8/79,” box 14, RNSA, JCL. 140

“human rights.”347 By this time U.S. officials like Pastor interpreted Havana’s rapid release of prisoners as deliberate attempts to embarrass Washington. “We have allowed

Castro,” he lamented, “to make a Carter victory seem like a Castro triumph and a Carter failure.”348 The CIA reported that Havana’s true purpose was to “neutralize that group

[Cuban Americans] as an obstacle to normalization and, ideally, to encourage leaders of the community to criticize U.S. policy toward Cuba.”349

The idea of this report must have come from the fact that Havana took similar positions to Miami on the issue of emigration. In a speech before the Committee of 75,

Castro said that “the U.S. government had a moral obligation of receiving these prisoners, who had families or friends, or who acted here under the influence of the U.S. government.”350 He repeated the same view at the secret U.S.-Cuban talks on December

3-4, 1978, when he received Washington officials for the first time in Havana. Castro took a very aggressive stance at this meeting. “We are not negotiating these things

[Cuban policies in Africa] to get you to lift the blockade,” he said. “You were the ones who linked the two problems, not we.” On the U.S. embargo on and food, “this is in complete opposition to President Carter’s human right policy…History will bear witness to your shame.” On return Pastor wrote to Carter, “As he [Castro] spoke…we

347 Benes and Durán to Phil Wise, September 21, 1979, DDRS; and Torres, Mirrors, p. 97. 348 Pastor to Brzezinski, May 4, 1979, DDRS. 349 CIA, “The Cuban Foreign Policy,” June 21, 1979, NLC-6-14-1-2-7, RAC, JCL. 350 Remark by Fidel Castro, November 22, 1978, in Diálogo, p. 103. 141 were viewing a man who had bottled up 20 years of rage and was releasing it in a controlled but extremely impassioned manner.”351

This was true except for the last third of the conversation. Castro completely changed his attitude once the talks shifted to the topic of prisoners. He used the words,

“por favor (please),” twice, to ask the U.S. government to take all Cubans who wanted to go to the United States. His main concerns were about “ex-prisoners,” the Cubans who had been set free prior to August 1, 1978, when the U.S. and Cuban governments reached an agreement. Tarnoff explained that the U.S. government gave priority to the current political prisoners and would accept up to 3,500 of them. The ex-prisoners had to apply for immigration visas through normal channels and to wait until their turn came. Castro urged them to reconsider their positions. “Here I am acting as their attorney… Some have undergone social adaptation, and for others it was more difficult…If the United States had not supported the counterrevolution, very few people would have gotten involved.”

The current number did not cover these ex-prisoners, “but we would ask you to please take the others [ex-prisoners] into account.”352

When this plea did not work, Castro raised a question: “If they leave this country illegally, will you take them?” As Tarnoff gave no clear answer, Castro then made a warning. “So, you are going to be leaving us a lot of ex-prisoners. You’ll be saying it is our fault. But I’d ask you to consider the illegal departure cases. For a while the U.S. was welcoming them, encouraging them, but if you refuse to take them now, they will all try

351 Tarnoff and Pastor to Carter, “Our Trip to Cuba, December 2-4, 1978,” n.d., DDRS. Gleijeses’s Visions covers the part of the conversation on Africa. 352 Memcon (Castro, Tarnoff, Pastor), December 3-4, 1978, pp. 32-33, DDRS. 142 to leave.”353 Castro clearly indicated that migration problems would be matters of concern not only for Cuba, but also for the United States. This warning should have been ominous for Washington. Indeed, many ex-prisoners reportedly spoke of leaving the island in the same way as in the Camarioca boatlift of 1965, in which around 5,000

Cubans were brought by their families into the United States.354

Many Consequences of the Dialogue—Family Visits to Cuba

Starting from January 1979, the release of prisoners was no longer the only consequence of the Diálogo that caused a problem for the Cuban government. Castro allowed Cuban families abroad to visit the island to address their humanitarian needs and isolate his enemies abroad. In the middle of envisioning a new economy, Havana no doubt viewed their visits as a source of foreign currency and courted visitors to spend money in Cuba. Vaguely aware of such a calculation, anti-Castro militants and hardliners tried to discourage émigrés from traveling to Cuba. Still, many émigrés, especially those who had left parents, siblings, and children, did not want to miss this chance to see them for the first time in years. As historian María Cristina García puts it, “family now took precedence over political ideologies.” Despite the increasingly hostile bilateral relations, over 100,000 Cuban Americans enjoyed the visits to their families in Cuba as the benefits of the Diálogo, allowing the Cuban government to earn $150 million.355

353 Ibid., pp. 36, 39. 354 MH, December 10, 1978, pp. 1A, 18A. On the Camarioca boatlift, see Chapter One. 355 García, Havana USA, pp. 51-54; Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 198-99; and Torres, Mirrors, p. 97. 143

However, the result of this massive family reunification ultimately exceeded

Havana’s calculation for it stimulated discontent in Cuba. For those who had already lost any affection for the Cuban government, the tales of the United States pointed at an alternative way of life. A disgruntled young Cuban girl later wrote in her memoir:

Contrary to what I had been taught in school about the ways of capitalism, my

uncles explained that he had medical insurance, so medicines and visits to the

doctor were free or cost very little. If his children earned good grades or were

excellent athletes, their university education also would be free. No one told him

what to do, except his bosses. And if he didn’t like them, he could leave and work

elsewhere. He could travel outside the country easily, without having to alert

anybody of his intentions. The neighbors didn’t bother him—in fact, he didn’t

even know most of his neighbors—and he didn’t have to work for free on

Sundays for good of the neighborhood. He tended his own garden and made his

own repairs at home. He expected nothing from the community but also was not

obliged to do anything for anybody, except obey commonsense rules of civility

and the laws of the country.356

For these Cubans, their individualistic hope for self-realization came in great conflict with the collective nature of revolutionary society. Numerous consumer goods that returned Cubans brought for families, relatives, and friends also might have played a role.

356 Mirta Ojito, Finding Mañana: A Memoir of a (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), p. 62. 144

The Cuban economy had stagnated since 1976, which made it more difficult for the

Cuban government to provide the population with these items as incentives and rewards for their labor. Castro instead believed in the strength of revolutionary consciousness and austerity among Cubans, and millions of Cubans kept their belief in the revolution. But the somewhat exaggerated demonstration of wealth by Cuban Americans made at least thousands of Cubans impatient with their political and economic system. Along with former prisoners and their families, they started to dream of living in the United States.357

As Cuban scholar Jesús Arboleya frankly notes, Cuban institutions and societies were unprepared to control what he calls an “emotional clash” and its enormous consequences.358 Contemporary non-Cuban observers reached the same conclusion. The year 1979 was bad for the Cuban economy. The country faced a variety of problems ranging from the lowering sugar prices, natural disasters, job absenteeism, and the arrival of the baby boomers to the labor force. In a cable to Moscow the Soviet ambassador noted that prior to the arrival of the visitors the Cuban leadership had intensified ideological work for the people to prevent unnecessary confusion. Castro himself took time to explain at the Seventh Plenum of the central committee of the Communist Party in December 1978 and at a national conference of party leaders in February 1979.

Likewise, the Communist Party authorized its organizations at local and regional levels to

357 Torres, Mirrors, pp. 97-98; Ojito, Finding Mañana, pp. 55-56, 62; and José Luis Llovio-Menéndez, Insider: My Hidden Life as a Revolutionary in Cuba, trans. Edith Grossman (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988), pp. 355-56. Cuban newspapers like Granma exacerbated the problems by not reporting much on who the visitors were. Even when it reported, the newspaper followed the previously endorsed line of interpretation: Cubans in the United States were suffering from discrimination and unemployment in racist and unjust capitalist country. See for example, Granma, October 5, 1978, p. 5. 358 Arboleya, Counterrevolution, pp. 172-73. 145 explain to the workers about a new policy toward the Cuban community abroad.359

According to a British report, Castro facilitated their work by videotaping his February

1979 speech, in which he spent four hours elaborating on the economic and humanitarian benefits from the family visits for the nation as if he were pleading with people to understand this transcendent decision.360

But by late 1979, Cuban leaders nonetheless had to admit that the government was facing greater economic woes and social problems at home. Two days after the IX

Plenum of the Communist Party’s central committee in November, Cuba’s First Vice

President Raúl Castro made a major speech about Cuban economic difficulties. He exhibited the new emergency plan that would prioritize the distribution of resources to maintain people’s basic necessities, such as food. What impressed foreign observers was his criticism of internal problems, rather than external problems such as the U.S. blockade. Raúl Castro even said that the Cubans should not use the U.S. blockade as an excuse to ignore their own inefficiency.361 At the same time, Cuba took various measures, such as a shakeup of the leadership, increased neighboring vigilance, salary reforms, and the opening of free peasant markets. Yet, according to the Canadian ambassador, Cuban leaders’ rhetoric and actions had “little practical effect.”362

359 Soviet embassy in Havana, April 26, 1979, WCDA. See also, a report prepared by the Cuba section of the Soviet Institute of of the World Socialist System, January 2, 1980, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 639, l. 1-9, WCDA. For Cuba’s economic woes, see also, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 349-352. 360 British embassy in Havana to London, May 18, 1979, FCO 99/309, PRO. On its speech, see also, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 15, 1979, NLC-SAFE-17A-13-31-3-4, RAC, JCL. 361 Speech by Raúl Castro, November 30, 1979, in Granma, December 1, 1979, pp. 2-3. 362 Canadian diplomats very closely followed these Cuban campaigns. See for example, Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, December 4, 1979, December 14, 1979, December 17, 1979, December 146

Many Consequences of the Dialogue—Miami Cubans

The impact of Diálogo was also palpable across the Florida Straits. In February

1979, the CUINT in Washington reported to Havana that the dialogue had a positive impact on Cuba’s interests in the Untied States. It not only eliminated the administration’s accusation of Cuba’s “supposed violation of human rights,” but also amplified support for normalization of relations among Cubans living in the United

States. Despite some worrisome developments such as growing internal conflict within the Committee of 75 and reports of a swindle by persons claiming to organize family trips, the CUINT asserted that “Cuban emigration must continue to play an important role as to Cuba’s political influence in the United States” as long as the community benefited from the result of dialogue and recognized “the consolidation of the Revolution.”363

But things did not go smoothly. Encouraged by these “achievements,” radical activists, academics, and those who supported U.S.-Cuban normalization formed a lobbying group urging U.S. officials to lift the embargo. The group submitted an open letter with ten-thousand signatures and surprised U.S. congressmen by underscoring the size of pro-normalization voices in the Cuban-American community.364 For anti-Castro militants, however, this was a betrayal of their cause. A group named El Condor publicly

20, 1979, January 23, 1980, and February 1, 1980, all in vol. 18508, file 20-Cuba-1-4, part 9, RG25, LAC. 363 CUINT in Washington to Havana, Informe de apreciación sobre la política de Estados Unidos hacia Cuba—del 5 de diciembre de 1978 al 12 de febrero de 1979. 364 Cuban American Committee for the Normalization of Relations with Cuba to Vance, May 16, 1979, in folder “96th-1st-1979 International Relations, Cuba,” box 2480, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. See also, Areíto 5, no. 19-20 (1979), pp. 7-8. 147 called for “revolutionary justice” against Dascal and Benes.365 Omega 7 not only killed two participants in the Diálogo in 1979, but also bombed the buildings of the Soviet and

Cuban missions to the United Nations in . In September 1980, the FBI failed to prevent Omega 7 from assassinating Félix García Rodríguez, a diplomat at the

Cuban U.N. mission, even though the agency regarded the group as “the most dangerous terrorist organization” in the United States and placed the “highest priority” on arresting its members.366

Between radicals and militants were ordinary Cuban Americans, who generally hardened their anti-Castro feelings. Despite Havana’s efforts to attenuate such hostility, their major achievements—the release of prisoners and family reunification—appeared to have produced the opposite result at least in the short span. Once they arrived in Miami, most former prisoners criticized the Cuban leaders who had imprisoned them. Many

U.S.-to-Cuba visitors felt “exploited” during their visits to the homeland because the

Cuban government had called them “tourists” and charged “outrageous prices” for airfares and hotel accommodations.367 Despite government monitoring, reports of illicit business taking advantage of family trips persisted. An official of the Ministry of the

Interior worried that such wrongdoing would give Cuban consulates a “purely commercial image” among travelers.368

365 FBI in Miami to Director, November 21, 1978, and El Condor, Aclaración Necesaria, published in La Nación, November 17, 1978, both in FBI, Freedom of Information Act. 366 NYT, March 3, 1980, p. A1; and Torres, Mirrors, pp. 98-102. 367 Torres, Mirrors, pp. 97, 112. 368 Justo Hernández de Medina Hurtado (MININT official) to Olga Miranda, November 17, 1980, in Caja “Migratorios 7,” MINREX. 148

Furthermore, many visitors returned with tales of the “poor life” in Cuba and renewed their desires to bring their families and friends to the United States. Unable to comprehend or unwilling to accept Havana’s emphasis on social goods rather than individual access to consumer items, many of the visitors were simply shocked with the living standards of Cubans on the island. This experience strengthened their belief in the superiority of the American way of life. What followed was a rumor of instability in

Cuba, rather than a perception of a strong consolidation of the revolutionary regime.

Anti-Castro groups like Abdala, Alpha 66 and Brigade 2506 grew energized. Abdala even started to exploit family visits to send letters and activists to Cuba to mount propaganda campaigns on the island.369

It was against this background that Castro declared a war against the decay of the

Cuban Revolution. In his December 1979 speech before the last session of Cuba’s national assembly of Popular Power, the Cuban leader identified the attack against the integrity of the revolutionary cadres as Cuba’s greatest national security threats. He warned against counterrevolutionaries, who were taking advantage of these economic and social difficulties and were “trying to sow discord, mistrust, and deviations among the youth, the students, the people, and the intellectual sectors.” “Therefore,” Castro argued,

“the revolution must be firmly vigilant.” He announced that the government had begun

“the first roundup of criminals”—criminals in a broader sense—including “the bum, the

369 Llovio-Menéndez, Insider, pp. 354-55; Ojito, Finding Mañana, p. 168; WP, December 2, 1978, p. A29; Aquiles Durán, “Delegación Abdala en La Habana distribuye volantes,” Abdala, December 1978, p. 1; and “Compatriota: Si Vas a Cuba...¡Sé Util!” Abdala, February-March 1979, pp. 1-3. 149 antisocial, the absentee, the shameless, and the unfulfilled.”370 Castro emphasized that the enemies of the revolution lived inside Cubans themselves.

Back to Confrontation—Presidential Directive 52

All of these developments set the stage for the 1980 Mariel migration crisis, but none was more important than Washington’s intensifying hostility toward Cuba. U.S. officials grew too preoccupied with Cuban foreign policy to stay focused on the Florida

Straits. They continued to dismiss Castro’s gesture to the Cuban American community as pressure tactics and overlooked a major externality of increased people-to-people contacts, which drove larger numbers of Cubans to seek another life in the United States.

During the last two years of Carter’s presidency, the relations between

Washington and Havana went from bad to worse. The U.S. perception of Cuban threats grew exponentially in the Caribbean and Central America. The United States traditionally proclaimed its hegemony, repeated military interventions, and promoted U.S. economic and security interests through its support for dictatorship. Yet by the late 1970s, economic recessions, social discontent, population growth, and rising political repression combined to escalate confrontation between traditional ultra-right oligarchies and growing leftist militants. Whereas the oligarchies acquired U.S. assistance, unleashed massive violence, and did everything possible to hold their power, the revolutionaries became more determined, magnified their popular support, and looked to Cuba as a new

370 This speech circulated in the United States, and appeared in World Affairs, vol. 143, no.1 (Summer 1980), pp. 20-64. When Pastor mentioned the speech in one of the meetings, the Cubans did not deny its content. 150 model of society.371 Two events held special importance for Washington. The revolutionaries achieved victory in in March 1979 and Nicaragua in July 1979.

Certainly, the Carter administration did not take a simplistic view of looking to

Cuba as the main cause of the revolutions in Grenada and Nicaragua. Yet, as Cuba’s influence grew, Washington recognized Havana as a major rival in the Cold War in

Africa, Latin America, and the rest of the Third World. In addition to revolutionary movements in the Caribbean and Central America, Washington particularly dreaded

Havana’s leadership at the Sixth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in

September 1979. Carter feared that Castro would exploit his presidency to drive the movement to the socialist bloc. In early July, when Brzezinski reported on Moscow’s promotion of Cuban leadership in the movement, Carter wrote, “Let we do just the opposite by telling the truth about the Soviet puppet.” Brzezinski quickly ordered the

State Department, the CIA, and the U.S. Information and Cultural Agency (USICA) to develop briefing materials, highlight Cuba’s “dependence” on the USSR, and discredit

Cuba’s nonaligned status.372

It was around this time that segments of the Carter administration developed new thinking regarding Cuba. Previously, the administration assumed that Havana disagreed with Washington mainly because it depended on Moscow to conduct foreign policy.373

However, the NSC’s Pastor started to claim that Cuba itself was a dangerous power

371 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd ed. rev. and expanded (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993); and Rabe, Killing Zone, pp. 149-155. 372 Handwritten note on Brzezinski to Carter, July 12, 1979; Brzezinski to Vance, Turner, and John Reinhardt, July 12, 1979, all in folder “Cuba 7-8/79,” box 14, RNSA, JCL. 373 See PD6. 151

“driven by revolutionary zeal, nationalistic purpose, and the personal glory of Fidel.”

Rather than reducing Cuban dependence on the USSR, he proposed, Carter should “make

Cuba appear very dependent on the Soviets.”374 Brzezinski took a similar view. “Whether

Cuba is acting as a Soviet surrogate, partner, or (in my view least likely) simply dragging the USSR along” did not matter, he wrote to Carter. Cuba “served Soviet interests and created far-reaching problems” by making Carter appear weak at home and abroad.375

Seeking to discredit Cuba’s nonaligned status, Brzezinski’s NSC repeated requests for intelligence-gathering on the island, particularly its connection with the Soviet Union.376

The result was the Soviet brigade crisis, which was to some extent Brzezinski’s self-fulfilling prophecy. Once again the administration misread the intelligence reports, mishandled its “new finding,” and was overwhelmed by the turn of the events. Although

Washington claimed that the Soviet Union had just placed its brigade to Cuba with the intention of increasing tensions in the , this new accusation proved baseless.

Because the administration nonetheless demanded Soviet concessions, it proved difficult to stop the anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban campaigns it initiated. As Carter notes in his memoir, it was “politically devastating to SALT,” the foundation of U.S.-Soviet détente.

Moscow even made a face-saving gesture by calling its troops a “training center,” instead

374 Pastor to Brzezinski, July 19,1979, NLC-12-19-3-17-7, RAC, JCL. 375 Brzezinski to Carter, July 27, 1979, in folder “Weekly Reports 102-120,” box 42, Subject Files, ZBC, JCL. 376 Chronology, “Soviet Military Activities in Cuba and Intelligence Deficiencies relating to Cuba,” n.d. (around August 29, 1979), NLC-23-53-3-2-3, JCL. The first order took place on March 6, 1979, just a week before the Grenada Revolution. Brzezinski and his subordinates repeated such requests on April 10, May 18, and July 12. For the last order, see Brzezinski to Vance, Turner, and John Reinhardt, July 12, 1979. 152 of a “brigade.” But the damage was already done. The U.S. Senate stalled the ratification process of the SALT II treaty.377

In the wake of the brigade crisis, Carter signed Presidential Directive (PD) 52 to

“contain Cuba as a source of violent revolutionary change.” PD52 marked a major change of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Rather than normalizing relations with Cuba, the U.S. government now pursued a series of hostile measures against the island, including diplomatic offensives against Cuba, the resumption of the SR-71 reconnaissance overflights, and planning for military operations around Guantánamo.378 Aiming for an economic encirclement of the island, the U.S. government asked Britain, France, West

Germany, Japan, Spain, , , and Canada to discourage additional private and official financing for Cuba.379 Cuba should be vulnerable to such economic pressure,

Washington claimed, as Cuban external hard currency debt increased dramatically from around $1.4 billion in 1976 to $2.5 billion in 1978.380 Yet, after probing each other’s reactions, these countries dismissed this initiative as ineffective, difficult to enforce, and merely harmful to their economic interests.381

377 Carter, White House Diary, p. 354; Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 126-133; and Vitaly Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva: pamiatnye gody (Moscow: Fond imeni I. D. Sytina, 2001), pp. 69-83. See also, David D. Newsom, The Soviet Brigade in Cuba: A Study in Political Diplomacy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). 378 PD52, October 4, 1979, in folder “Presidential Directive 41-63,” Vertical Files (hereafter VF), JCL. For Cuba’s reaction, see Memcon (Parodi, Feinberg), October 19, 1979, NLC-24-14-7-8-4, RAC, JCL. 379 Vance to U.S. embassies in London, et, al., October 12, 1979, NLC-16-118-3-24-5, RAC, JCL. 380 Kempton B. Jenkins to Habib, et. al., July 27, 1979, NLC-24-13-5-20-4, RAC, JCL; and Lawrence Theriot to Pastor, August 14, 1979, NLC-12-19-3-14-0, RAC, JCL. 381 Memo to the Prime Minister, “U.S.A. Demarche on Cuba,” November 8, 1979, vol. 16019 file 20- Cuba-1-3-USA, part 5, RG25, LAC. The file contains information about the confidential exchange of opinions among Canada, Japan, Britain, France, and West . See also, Roderic Lyne to 153

Carter’s NSC often believed that the lack of outside support for U.S. policy toward Cuba drew from the lack of information, rather than the weakness of their assessment. Therefore, another pillar of PD52 was to intensify intelligence-gathering, briefing for other countries, and public relations campaigns in order to “put the Cubans on the defensive in the court of world opinion.”382 In particular, the NSC’s Pastor wanted to address Cuba’s economic failures to undermine Cuba’s appeal in developing countries.383 Prodded by him, Brzezinski requested an assessment of the Cuban economy, and the CIA produced a report “The Cuban Economy: Model for Third World

Development.” The report not only highlighted the economic failure of the Cuban

Revolution, but also Cuba’s impressive achievement in important aspects of daily life such as health, education, and employment. Yet, its main point was that impoverished countries admired Cuba because they emphasized its social and political successes without knowing its economic failures.384 Pastor called the report “excellent and balanced.” At Pastor’s urging, Brzezinski complimented the agency for this study.385

East-West détente was over in December 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan. Yet, these developments only reinforced the charted course of U.S. policy

Michael Alexander, “Credits for Cuba,” November 19, 1979; and Lyne to Alxander, December 14, 1979, both in Records of the Prime Minister’s Office 19/12, PRO. 382 U.S. officials referred to the classified part of PD52 in declassified reports. See for example, Daily Report Item for Carter, drafted by Pastor, February 12, 1980, NLC-24-86-5-5-1, RAC, JCL; and Turner to Brzezinski, February 28, 1980, NLC-132-22-10-9-0, RAC, JCL. 383 Pastor to Brzezinski, December 11, 1979, NLC-24-85-4-3-5, RAC, JCL. 384 CIA National Foreign Assessment Center, “The Cuban Economy: Model for Third World Development,” February 15, 1980, NLC-17-39-10-7-3, RAC, JCL. 385 Pastor to Brzezinski, March 22, 1980, NLC-132-22-10-5-4, RAC, JCL; and Brzezinski to Turner, March 28, 1980, NLC-15-9-1-10-4, RAC, JCL. 154 toward Cuba in PD52. In Washington’s imagination, Cuba became a major contender for influence in the region not only because of what it did, but also because of what it was.

The simple existence of Cuban society as an alternative development model was the source of dangerous radicalization in small, powerless, and impoverished countries. The

State Department prepared to expand people-to-people programs to increase the U.S. presence in the Caribbean. The USICA increased positive publications on U.S. activities to keep “Cuban adventurism” in check.386 With PD52 in hand, the Carter administration grew more zealous in calling attention to Cuba’s economic problems to rectify the supposedly distorted world opinion of Cuba. The scene of Cubans rushing out of their country appeared to be ideal material for such global education.

Endgame—Prelude to Mariel

In late 1979, a number of Cuban ex-prisoners and other desperate people entered foreign embassies in Havana or hijacked naval vessels to leave the island. These incidents highly irritated the Cuban government. In late October, Cubans who hijacked a boat with crew arrived in Miami, received a “heroes’ welcome,” and evaded imprisonment. Three more hijackings ensued, each of which accompanied a Cuban protest. But U.S. federal authorities arrested none of these hijackers.387 To emphasize the gravity of this matter

Castro publicly issued a warning to Washington on March 8, 1980. “We hope they [the

386 Tarnoff to Brzezinski, “U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean,” January 15, 1980, NLC-6-46-4-15-5, RAC, JCL. 387 MH, October 25, 1979, p. 2C; MH, February 17, 1980, pp. 1A, 4A; Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 200-204; and David W. Engstrom, Presidential Decision Making Adrift: The Carter Administration and the Mariel Boatlift (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), pp. 48-50. 155

United States] will adopt measures so they will not encourage the illegal departures from the country,” he said, “because we might also have to take measures in this regard once.”

The Cuban leader hinted that Havana would stop restricting the flow of people as it did during the 1965 Camarioca exodus.388 Despite these statements, however, the United

States took little action.

U.S. scholars have attributed U.S. inaction to bureaucratic inertia. Washington was preoccupied with an economic recession, energy crises, , and the Iranian hostage crisis that began in late 1979. Carter also paid attention to hijackings in Cuba, but failed to mobilize authorities. Although the U.S. president urged the Justice and State

Departments to explore ways to restrict maritime hijackings, the Justice Department claimed that obtaining a conviction was “questionable” in the Southern District of Florida, where judges would likely favor the hijackers and their Cuban American supporters.

Carter nonetheless ordered his officials to examine possible measures, yet he had to wait for reports for another four months.389 In this regard, the State Department’s Tarnoff recalls, Havana should have understood the limit of U.S. presidential power. Carter and his federal government could not simply return hijackers to Cuba since they all went to juries in South Florida. All Carter could do was “not to endorse [their decision].” In short, the U.S. system was unresponsive, but it was “not deliberate.”390

388 Speech by Fidel Castro, March 8, 1980, in Granma (Havana), March 10, 1980, pp. 1-4. 389 Vance to Carter, February 25, 1980, NLC-7-22-8-18-3, RAC, JCL; and Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 204-6. See also, Handwritten note in Vance to Carter, March 5, 1980, NLC-128-15-3-3- 8, RAC, JCL. 390 Tarnoff, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 7. 156

But Cuba must have seen U.S. inaction from very different angles. The topic of ex-prisoners and hijackers in fact came up at the U.S.-Cuban meetings in Havana on

January 16 and 17, 1980. Here again, as in the previous Havana talks in December 1978,

Tarnoff asked for Castro’s patience and explained that the U.S. government was accepting half a million migrants, especially 200,000 Vietnamese, from around the world.

Castro was quick to point out that Washington kept receiving illegally arrived Cubans without prosecuting their crimes. In view of perceived U.S.’s double standards, he posed two options. “Either you take measures [to return them] or we should be free of any obligation to control those who wish to leave illegally.” Tarnoff remarked that “you must recognize the special situation that exists” and added, “It is not possible to forcibly return these people to Cuba.” This comment angered Castro. “That’s an absurd situation,” he exclaimed. “Some countries are criticized because they do not let people leave. [But] we are willing to let anyone leave who wishes to.”391 Pastor replied with sarcasm,

“According to our figures,” he said, “we project that by the year 2000 there will be ten million wishing to leave Cuba.”392

Pastor’s comment reflected his belief that the emigration problem was something that Cuba should take care of—alone. After all, without realizing the fatal consequences for U.S. border control, he had been looking for ways to exploit any indications of Cuba’s weaknesses, including the movement of people. As early as , Pastor himself

391 Memcon (Castro, Tarnoff, Pastor), pp. 72-73, in folder “Cuba—Carter’s Trip, May 12-17, 2002 [2],” VF, JCL. Despite the peak of Cold War tensions after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter sent State Department’s Tarnoff and the NSC’s Pastor to see if Castro criticized the invasion. Castro refused to do so, yet presented his views on world politics for eleven hours. 392 Ibid. 157 suggested that the U.S. government seek ways to take advantage of Cuban American visits to the island “as a much more potent force for influencing the Cuban people.” Then after Carter’s signing of PD52, he advocated the use of U.S. films to “reinforce the impressions left by the Cuban-Americans…that imperialism is not so bad, and that in the last 20 years, Cuba has not only failed to keep up [with economic expectations]…but it has fallen behind.”393

For his part, the U.S. lack of responsiveness to repeated Cuban appeals must have led Castro to perceive more hostile intent on the U.S. side than the latter actually wanted to convey. Cuba raised this issue repeatedly in its secret meetings with the United States in October 1978, in December 1978, and again in January 1980. The result was frustrating. Clearly in Castro’s mind, the emigration crisis was another U.S. provocation, followed by the Soviet brigade crisis, as he explained to the Soviet ambassador in Cuba.

Castro apparently believed that the United States politicized and exploited humanitarian issues to attack the Cuban society.394

Carter’s responses to the Peruvian embassy crisis exacerbated Castro’s inclination to assume the worst of U.S. attitudes. On April 1, six Cuban asylum seekers crashed a minibus through the gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana, resulting in the death of a

Cuban guard. Infuriated, Castro withdrew police protection from the embassy and announced that anyone wishing to leave Cuba could enter the embassy. The result was more than he expected; within forty-eight hours over ten thousand Cubans entered the

393 Pastor to Brzezinski, October 12, 1979, NLC-24-84-6-2-5, RAC, JCL. 394 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, p. 117. The Cuban delegation presented this thesis to the U.S. delegation months later. Memcon (Padrón, Tarnoff, etc.), June 17-18, 1980, DDRS. 158 embassy. “We, including Fidel,” recalls Padrón, “never expected that it would create the phenomena of the Peruvian embassy.”395 In any case, the crisis caught global attention and invoked emotional responses from Cubans both in Havana and Miami. Echoing the front-page Granma editorial of April 7, which called these asylum seekers “lumpens” and

“anti-socials,” thousands of Cubans marched and shouted: “Go away, delinquents! Go away, scums!” They soon started to throw stones and rotten food at the asylum seekers.

Across the sea these Cubans in the embassy became heroes, for whom Miami Cubans started to collect money, food, and medicine. They demanded that Carter take all of them, holding a placard like “Human Rights for 10,000.” The militants waved flags and chanted,

“War! War! War!”396

Carter refused their demands and strove to avoid turning the incident into a U.S.-

Cuban issue. Aware of widespread public opposition to rising immigration from abroad, the U.S. Congress had enacted the 1980 Refugee Act, which required individuals to prove a well-founded fear of persecution. Granting unconditional entry to Cubans would violate the intent of the law. Such practice would also antagonize African Americans and liberals since Carter refused refugee status for thousands of Haitians entering into the United

States. But more important might have been Washington’s fear of making a precedent for future migration waves from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America.397 Carter sought to deal with the Peruvian embassy crisis through a multilateral approach. At his

395 Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 5. 396 Granma, April 8, 1980, pp. 1-2, April 9, 1980, pp. 2-4, and April 10, 1980, pp. 1-4; MH, April 8, 1980, pp. 1A, 8A; and MH, April 9, 1980, p. 20A. 397 Discussion Paper, Mini-PRC Meeting on Cuban-Peruvian Situation, April 8, 1980, DDRS; and Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 138-39, 144-48. 159 urging, the United Nations and the International Red Cross stepped forward. Spain, Costa

Rica, , Canada, Belgium, and Venezuela offered to take some hundreds of the

Cubans. Costa Rica agreed to serve as a processing point for their emigration.

But Carter could not resist the temptation of exploiting the crisis. In his remarks on April 9, 1980, Carter emphasized “the real threat of Cuba” was not its military capability but its claim to “a model to be emulated by people who are dissatisfied with their own lot.” But according to the U.S. president, the Peruvian embassy crisis shattered the myth of the Cuban society. “We see the hunger of many people on that island to escape political deprivation of freedom and also economic diversity.” Those who entered the embassy were “freedom-loving Cubans” who merited special concerns in a closed, totalitarian society.398 The speech was a deliberate attempt to put Havana on the defensive in the Cold War battle for the hearts and minds in the Third World.399 The next day U.S. newspapers reported on a plan that the U.S. government would conduct

Operation Solid Shield, the largest military exercise in the Caribbean in four years, starting from May 8.

Carter’s April 9 address was the last blow. That was enough for Havana to end the dialogue with Washington. Indignant at the speech, Castro made up his mind to shoot back at Carter. Whereas Granma started to depict an ugly caricature of the U.S. president

398 Carter, April 9, 1980, APP. See also, John E. Reinhardt to Brzezinski, April 25, 1980, in folder “Broadcasting to Cuba,” box 90501, Carnes Lord Files, Ronald Reagan Library (hereafter RRL). 399 Pastor complained that the State Department did little to highlight “a failure of the Cuban model” until Carter corrected it with his speech. Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, April 10, 1980, with Talking Points, “Next Steps on U.S. Policy to Cubans in Peruvian Embassy,” NLC-24-87-6-4-9, RAC, JCL. Pastor directed the USICA to intensify radio broadcasting of the embassy crisis and the speech. Pastor to Brzezinski, April 15, 1980, NLC-24-55-1-15-8, RAC, JCL. 160 next to a Nazi military officer, Castro opened Mariel, a port 25 miles west of Havana, to force down his hand. On April 19, the Cuban government announced that Cuban

Americans could come to Cuba to pick up their families and friends. Behind the scenes, moreover, Havana had already arranged the first boatlift by contacting a few Miami

Cubans to “break the ice,” as Padrón recalls this pivotal moment.400 As the news of the first boatlift spread, Cubans living in the United States rushed to Miami and looking for boats or persons who could go to Mariel on their behalf.401

Fearful of a flood of Cubans flowing into the United States, Washington held interagency meetings. The U.S. objective was the avoidance of “the outcome, desired by both Castro and the Cuban American community, though for different reasons, of having this issue become a U.S.-Cuban issue.” The first thing that U.S. officials came up with was to dissuade Miami Cubans from heading toward Cuba. Carter threatened to impose fines against boat captains for each person they brought in, yet he could not stop these determined people. The administration then set up a meeting with Miami Cubans and decided to wait for its results.402 In Brzezinski’s eyes, the Cuban American community grew “hysterical.” Yet, the national security adviser urged Carter to “open up a dialogue with the community.” Even though he did not know how, “it is essential that we try to

400 Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 5. 401 A caricature in Granma, April 10, 1980, p. 5. This and other versions of ugly Carter appeared continuously for a while. For Cuba’s decision, see also, Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, p. 119. For a view of Miami, see Ojito, Finding Mañana, chap. 7. 402 Summary, Mini-Presidential Review Committee Meeting on Cuban Refugees, April 22, 1980, NLC-17-40-7-7-5, RAC, JCL; and Victor Palmieri (U.S. coordinator of refugee affairs), interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 12, February 22, 1988, in author’s possession. 161 reach out to the community or risk encountering increasing defiance and confrontation.”403

This last-minute initiative for a dialogue bore little fruit. At an April 26, 1980, meeting with Miami Cubans, Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher asked for their cooperation. “We need your help,” his talking points went. “We urge you to use your influence to hold back the sending of boats to Cuba.”404 The plea went to no avail.

Instead, it merely clashed with “the highly emotional feelings in south Florida about the possibility of recovering grandmothers and cousins,” according to the State Department’s

Newsom. The meeting was “a disaster,” as half the invitees left the room in the middle.405

The administration misunderstood the dynamics of migration politics at this critical moment. For those Miami Cubans rushing to Mariel, no issue was more important than family reunification. “Once the boats were gone,” recalls Victor Palmieri, U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs, “the game was over.”406

Conclusion

The late 1970s presented a rare opportunity for Americans, Cubans, and Cuban

émigrés in the United States to come to terms with the tumultuous past of U.S.-Cuban relations. Carter wanted to normalize U.S.-Cuban relations to signal a new U.S. attitude

403 Brzezinski to Carter, April 25, 1980, NLC-41-14-11-8, RAC, JCL. 404 “Talking Points,” n.d., State Department records, ARA/CCA 86 D 90, box 7544, in the author’s possession. The document was supposedly used for Christopher for the April 26 meeting. I am grateful to Dr. David W. Engstrom for sending me this record. 405 David Newsom, interview transcript, FAOH; Watson, interview transcript by David Engstrom, pp. 21-22, March 7, 1988, in author’s possession. 406 Palmieri, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 9, February 22, 1988. 162 toward Latin America and stabilize global affairs through greater communication throughout the world. Carter also expressed sympathy for human rights in Cuba. He listened to the moderate wings of the Cuban American community and cracked down on the militarists. A sense of justice and a willingness to take on moral responsibilities, rather than sheer political necessity, drove his actions. As Brzezinski admitted, the issue of human rights was important because it was good in itself, and important to Carter and the Cuban American community.407

Washington’s new attitude greatly impressed Castro, who saw Carter as morally principled and personally likable. Even though Carter did not lift the embargo as Castro requested, Castro started to envision a new economic model, in which Miami Cubans would play a significant role with their accumulated capital and skills. Havana’s decision to release thousands of Cuban prisoners certainly reflected Castro’s aspiration to mend fences with Carter without making concessions on Africa.408 But Castro also looked to

Miami, basing his foreign policy on something more than realpolitik. Havana’s permission of Cuban American visits to Cuba, which had great implications for the bilateral relations, came out of the combination of Havana’s need for capital, its confidence in the maturity of the Cuban Revolution, and its willingness to cater to

Miami’s human needs.

407 See Brzezinski’s comment at the policy review committee meeting on August 3, 1977, cited above. 408 Gleijeses, Visions, p. 119. 163

As others note, U.S.-Cuban dialogue stalled over the Cold War in Africa, where

East-West rivalry intermingled with North-South conflicts.409 But it was also the disagreements over Cuban migration—due to Washington’s shift in attitude toward

Havana-Miami relations—that endangered the spirit of U.S.-Cuban dialogue. Despite its initial willingness to value Cuban American interests, Washington effectively backed out when it embraced a narrower definition of national interest that linked U.S.-Cuban dialogue with a change in Havana’s foreign policy. Notwithstanding its encouragement to

Havana to improve relations with Miami, Washington grew alarmed when Havana unexpectedly quickened the pace of U.S.-Cuban reconciliation after September 1978.

When Havana and Miami’s rapid rapprochement stimulated a new momentum for a change in the lives of ordinary people on both sides of the border, Washington ignored

Havana’s emigration agenda and seemed to implement policies whose legitimacy was deeply contested at the grassroots level. By April 1980, Washington’s actions were far from meeting Havana’s desire to be treated as equal, and far from meeting Miami’s demand for special attention to their needs.

The growing discrepancy, conflicts, and contradictions between U.S. foreign policy and Cuban and Cuban American politics culminated in a migration crisis that

Washington failed to anticipate, prevent, or control. It was such interaction between diplomacy and human migration that shaped U.S.-Cuban relations at a critical moment in history of both nations.

409 Schoultz, Infernal; Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies; and Pastor, “Carter-Castro,” p. 257. 164

CHAPTER 4: The Crisis of 1980

The United States, Cuba, and a Diplomatic Battle over Migration Control

“I feel half dead,” Angel Castillo cried. When she heard of the opening of Mariel, she immediately thought of her families in Cuba—her brother, his wife, their two children, and his wife’s mother. She knew that they wanted to leave the island. Five months ago, when she visited them, her brother complained of economic and political conditions, and desired to avoid sending his children to the military service. Regardless of the U.S. government’s warnings, therefore, she borrowed some money from her relatives, joined her neighbors to look for boats, and sailed to Mariel. Her endeavor proved fruitless. Cuban authorities notified her group that they could not leave with more than one-third of people they reclaimed. Unable to separate her family, she conceded her spot to others. Yet despite this setback, she did not give up her hope. “To bring them here, I will do whatever I will need to do.”410

Angel Castillo was one of thousands of Cubans in the United States who dreamed of reunification of families for years. Each played a role in making the 1980 Mariel boatlift one of the most traumatic migration crises in U.S. history. Within six months after the opening of the Mariel port, thousands of boats left Miami, Key West, and other

U.S. ports. Unable to stop the flow, Jimmy Carter allowed 124,784 Cubans to arrive in

410 Oral history records, in folder “#594 6-6-80,” box 3, Diana Kirby Papers, UM-CHC. All names for Cuban individuals from the records are pseudonyms. 165

South Florida. The boatlift exhausted federal, state, and local resources, and created a massive furor among millions of Americans. The U.S. president called this migration crisis “one of the most difficult human problems” he ever faced in the White House.411 In the words of Carter’s chief of staff Jack Watson, the boatlift was “an avalanche of human beings that was cascading across the Florida Straits in unbelievable numbers.”412

This chapter explores the Mariel boatlift as a case study of the interaction of diplomacy and migration. The migration crisis had many origins, including Cuba’s pursuit of the Diálogo of 1978. As the previous chapter shows, Havana’s attempts to mend fences with Miami went awry and had a disturbing impact on the Cuban population. Yet, the boatlift would not have occurred in the way it did without the dramatic escalation of U.S.-Cuban tensions in 1979-1980. As revolutionaries in the

Caribbean and Central America allied with Havana, the U.S. government adopted PD 52 and intensified verbal attacks on the Cuban internal system. It was the loss of bilateral cooperation over the movement of people that fundamentally defined the migration crisis.

Both Havana and Washington found it necessary to terminate the crisis at one point or another, but engaged in a diplomatic battle over the terms to end it.

The migration crisis has attracted relatively scant attention from diplomatic historians, who apparently left the work on this topic to be done by other scholars.413

Previous studies, especially those written by former U.S. officials, almost unanimously

411 Carter’s remarks, October 1, 1980, APP. 412 Jack Watson, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 6, in author’s possession. 413 For a concise description on the Mariel boatlift, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 356-361; Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 135-38; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 214-224. 166 conclude that Carter mishandled this migration crisis. According to these sources, Carter should have moved more speedily, streamlined the decision-making process, and conveyed clearer messages to his multiple audiences.414 Migration historians also add that the economic recession, the sensational reports of Mariel Cubans, and the declining public support for the arrival of new immigrants—even within the Cuban American community—compounded Carter’s difficulties in handling the crisis.415 Of the available research on this topic, the most comprehensive work is that by political scientist David

W. Engstrom, who added considerable nuance by showing how presidential decision- making went adrift due to the institutional and bureaucratic mechanism. His masterful work also touches on Carter’s efforts to end the crisis through diplomatic means.416

This chapter builds on these previous works by focusing more on how the United

States and Cuba exercised diplomacy over migration control. The Mariel boatlift was not simply about the movement of Cubans leaving their homeland and creating problems in the United States. It had a diplomatic aspect in the sense that U.S. and Cuban officials pursued what they considered as the best interests of each nation while seeking to end the crisis. Washington was not fully reactive, with no policy and no aim other than accepting the people. Determined not to make an important foreign policy concession, Washington upgraded propaganda attacks, examined military and diplomatic options, and assembled

414 For the works by former U.S. officials, see Ronald Copeland, “The Cuban Boatlift of 1980: Strategies in Federal Crisis Management,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 467 (May 1983): 138-150; Alex Larzelere, The 1980 Cuban Boatlift: Castro’s Ploy— America’s Dilemma (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988); and Mario Antonio Rivera, Decision and Structure: U.S. Refugee Policy in the Mariel Crisis (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991). 415 See esp. García, Havana USA, chap. 2. 416 Engstrom, Adrift, see esp. pp. 114-121 for Carter’s diplomatic efforts. 167 international conferences by nudging U.S. allies like Britain. Havana took up this challenge by mobilizing international and domestic support and insisting that the U.S. government admit its wrongdoings and change its attitudes toward Cuba.

This chapter argues that the fundamental flaw of the U.S. approach was Carter’s willingness to enter such a diplomatic battle with Fidel Castro, the only person who could actually control the migration flow. Carter considered negotiations with Castro, but refused to accept Castro’s demand that the two countries discuss broader bilateral issues.

Because such discussion would inevitably lead to a major reversal of U.S. policy toward

Cuba since PD52, it would have meant a major foreign policy defeat for the U.S. president. Carter tried in vain to assemble international pressure against Cuba in the hope of making it too embarrassing for Castro to continue the boatlift. His administration also considered numerous measures and contingency plans in dealing with the crisis. But in the end, the U.S. president himself—however belatedly—recognized the flaw of his approaches. The migration crisis came to its conclusion when Carter chose to cut his losses by accepting Castro’s terms of negotiations.

Miami Ignores Washington

As Havana unleashed the wave of Cuban migrants, Washington hastily assessed how to prevent this new migration crisis—without much cooperation from Miami

Cubans. When hundreds of Cuban Americans were leaving for Mariel, Washington found no legal authority to stop them on the high seas or prevent them from carrying Cubans from Cuban waters. Washington probed for numerous options, including a naval

168 blockade of South Florida and the forceful transportation of Cubans to the U.S. base of

Guantánamo. But each idea appeared problematic from legal, political, and humanitarian standpoints. The U.S. government also feared that coercive federal actions might drive

Miami Cubans to violent riots and amplify disorder. “I did understand…the powerful human emotions that were at work there,” recalls Watson. Washington made a compromise. It tried to discourage further boatlifts by threatening a fine of $1,000 for each person brought from Cuba, while accepting Cubans once they landed in the United

States.417

Despite the disastrous April 26 meeting, the U.S. government kept making efforts to open dialogue with Miami Cubans. “It was our belief, from very early on,” recalls

Eugene Eidenberg, Secretary to the Cabinet and Assistant to the President, “that a key part of this whole episode in controlling [the boatlift] had to do with the Cuban-American community.” Chosen by Carter as a point-man in Miami, Eidenberg sought to enlist the community leaders’ help to dissuade their followers from joining the boatlift. Yet, his efforts were “massively unsuccessful.” Working class Cuban Americans mortgaged their homes, sold their cars, used their savings, or borrowed from friends and relatives to cover the expenses of the journey. In retrospect, Eidenberg was not sure if the Cuban American

417 Summary, Mini-PRC Meeting on Cuban Refugees, April 22, 1980, NLC-17-40-7-7-5, RAC, JCL; Brzezinski to Carter, April 25, 1980, NLC-41-14-11-8, RAC, JCL; Watson, interview transcript by David Engstrom, pp. 23-24; Case Study Paper of Stuart Eizenstat, pp. 9-10, in folder “Stu. Eizenstat (Mariel Case Study),” box 1, Mirta Ojito Papers, UM-CHC; Palmieri, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 13; and Admiral John Costello (chief of operations in Coast Guard Headquarters), interview transcript by Stuart Eizenstat, pp. 3, 18, in folder “Coast Guard,” box 1, Mirta Ojito Papers, UM-CHC. For the lack of legal authority, see Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 83-84; and Larzelere, Boatlift, pp. 238-244. 169 leadership was able to exercise its influence in any way since “the emotional level was running so high.”418

Miami defiance was nothing but outright. Eidenberg claims that he encountered

“a script for a Frank Capra movie” in Little Havana. “We are among the most patriotic of

Americans. We would do nothing to hurt our country, our adopted country, the country which has given us new lives.” But they also said, “You can’t ask us not to take the opportunity to get our uncles and relatives.”419 José Pérez, captain of a vessel heading toward Cuba, accepted an interview for without seeking anonymity.

“I want to see them arrest me for going to get my parents. I want to see them arrest me and keep me from feeding my children.”420 According to María Cruz, a Miami Cuban who called her congressional representative’s office, Cuban Americans might violate

U.S. laws but remained good U.S. citizens. The reason was simple. It was because they were assisting people in “fleeing from communism.”421 Such genuine, yet self-righteous belief was difficult to change overnight.

A New Form of “Warfare” with Castro

Unable to control Miami Cubans, Washington looked at the opposite end of the equation. Should the administration dramatize the issue in front of world opinion,

418 Eidenberg, interview transcript by David Engstrom, pp. 4-12, June 17, 1988, in author’s possession. See also, Renfrew, interview transcript by David Engstrom, June 17, 1988, pp. 2, 9, in author’s possession. 419 Eidenberg, interview transcript by David Engstrom, June 17, 1988, p. 14. 420 NYT, April 25, 1980, pp. A1 and A10.

421 Call memo, BB to file, April 29, 1980, in folder “Pending-State Correspondence, 1980,” box 2394, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. See also, MH, April 24, 1980, pp. 1A, 23A. 170

Washington calculated, Havana would find it too embarrassing to keep the port open for emigrants. On April 27, 1980, Vice President Walter Mondale made a statement to underscore the crisis as the best “proof of the failure of Castro’s revolution.” The exodus was “a callous, cynical effort by Castro,” said Mondale, to play on “extraordinarily dangerous and unlawful boat trips.”422 To assist public relations campaigns against Cuba, the Voice of America (VOA) worked with the CIA, carried a lead news analysis, and gave “as much coverage as they have given to any other issue including [the Soviet invasion in] Afghanistan.”423

To preempt Cuba’s counter-propaganda, Washington cancelled Operation Solid

Shield, a massive military maneuver in the Caribbean. As part of the increased U.S. military activities in the Caribbean, directed by PD52, the operation involved the landing of 3,400 Marines at the U.S. base in Guantánamo. Yet, the announcement of the exercise disturbed not only Castro, who accused the United States of posing a military threat against Cuba, but also other pro-U.S. governments in Latin America, which worried about the perceived U.S. resolve to escalate tensions. In his letter to Carter, for example,

Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo expressed concern about the exercise, which he claimed would embolden Castro to mount further anti-U.S. “propaganda.”424 As a result,

Carter abandoned the exercise, diverted U.S. vessels to rescue ships in distress on the

422 Statement by Mondale, April 27, 1980, in DOSB 80 (June 1980), p. 68. For the rationale, see Brzezinski to Carter, April 27, 1980, NLC-133-218-4-37-8, RAC, JCL; and Brzezinski and Watson to Mondale, et. al., April 28, 1980, NLC-24-88-1-10-6, RAC, JCL. 423 Reinhardt to Brzezinski, April 25, 1980, in folder “Broadcasting to Cuba,” Carnes Lord Files, RRL. 424 Carazo to Carter, April 23, 1980, NLC-24-10-6-1-6, RAC, JCL. 171

Florida Straits, and presented this policy change as a humanitarian gesture.425 The violations of Cuba’s aerial space by U.S. espionage aircraft instead became more frequent.426

Furthermore, Carter sought to shore up international support for the U.S. position by bringing the case to international forums. Washington calculated that multilateral approaches would not only alleviate the U.S. burden of accepting Cubans, but also help to reinforce public relations campaigns against Cuba. In his reply to the above-mentioned letter from Carazo, Carter urged him to convoke an international conference on Cuba to

“bring pressure on Castro” to stop his “inhuman actions.” According to an instruction given to the U.S. ambassador in San José, the conference would “try to re-internationalize this crisis in order to put credible pressure on Castro” to restore migration normalcy surrounding the island.427 On May 8-9, 1980, at Carter’s urging, the San José conference of twenty-two countries and seven international organizations took place. The United

States formed a tripartite commission with Costa Rica and Britain to demand Cuba’s unconditional closure of the crisis.

The leading advocate of these diplomatic approaches was Zbigniew Brzezinski’s

NSC. Although the day-to-day management of the boatlift was transferred to Carter’s crisis coordinator Jack Watson, Brzezinski continued to contemplate ways to terminate

425 Brzezinski to Carter, April 28, 1980, NLC-7-41-5-5-9, RAC, JCL; Brzezinski to Carter, April 29, 1980, NLC-24-57-6-2-5, RAC, JCL: and Clift to Mondale, April 30, 1980, NLC-133-203-4-16-7, RAC, JCL. 426 Estado comparativo de las violaciones del espacio aereo de Cuba en 1980 y 1981, MINREX. Cuba counted the total number of U.S. violations of Cuba’s aerial space from May to October 1980 was 71. This was even more numerous than 1981, when Reagan assumed the presidency. 427 Christopher to the U.S. embassy in San José, May 1, 1980, NLC-16-105-5-3-0, RAC, JCL. The cable cited Carter’s letter to Carazo. 172 the crisis on U.S. terms. Eager to enter a diplomatic confrontation with Havana, the NSC focused on the best part of the exodus: the Cuban Revolution was in trouble. Such was the case even after Carter experienced a major difficulty in curtailing Cuban migration.

For instance, Brzezinski’s deputy David Aaron wrote to Carter that Castro “can no more control his population than we can control the Cuban American community.” As the

Cuban leader was under pressure, Aaron claimed, he was “trying to get us to scream first.”428 Eidenberg recalls a startling statement by Brzezinski at one meeting. “You don’t understand, [but] we got to deal with this as a new form of warfare. They are throwing people at us as if they were bullets.”429

Carter backed Brzezinski, when he endorsed the NSC’s recommendation to

“orchestrate a world-wide campaign pointing out Cuba/ Castro’s responsibility” for the

Mariel crisis.430 The VOA programming emphasized that the mass exodus was “an international not just a U.S. concern” and that Cuba, not the United States, was the one

“seeking a confrontation…to mask massive internal problems.”431 By late May, when

Carter renewed his order of providing “maximum publicity of the Cuban refugee issues through VOA,” Brzezinski had much to write in a progress report. In addition to building four 50-kw transmitters in Antigua and Grand Turk for broadcasting VOA programming

428 Aaron to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report 140,” May 9, 1980, DDRS. It may be worthwhile to note that the infamous NSC-State Department infighting ended in the resignation of Cyrus Vance, a head of the State Department. The new Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, took office on May 8 but needed some time to learn on the job. 429 Eidenberg, interview transcript by David Engstrom, June 17, 1988, p. 24. 430 Handwritten note by Carter, in Les Deneno to Donald Holm, May 27, 1980, NLC-15-9-2-5-9, RAC, JCL. 431 Reinhardt to Brzezinski, May 16, 1980, in folder “5/1/80-6/30/80,” FG 298-1, White House Central Files, JCL. 173 in the English Caribbean for four to five hours, the USICA also prepared a full-length film on the boatlift in multiple languages, undertook a study on “listening habits” of peoples in Cuba and the Eastern Caribbean, and expanded “very rapidly” its leadership grants and speaker’s programs to the Caribbean area.432 Still, despite the intensity of these diplomatic/ propaganda efforts, they fell far short of bringing Castro to his knees.

Castro’s Hardened Defiance

Although the Peruvian embassy crisis certainly took Castro by surprise, he quickly reshaped the unfavorable series of events to his advantage. A Granma editorial on April 14 called for three massive demonstrations on April 19, May 1, and the day of the U.S. maneuvers at Guantánamo to “express their outrage and revulsion against the

Yankee provocations and threats.”433 On May 1, despite Washington’s cancellation of the exercise, one million Cubans attended the mass demonstration in Havana. Castro charged the United States with masterminding all the crises and affirmed the sacred virtue of the revolution. “No society in the entire hemisphere has a healthier moral atmosphere than ours,” he proclaimed. “No society has higher moral values than those our society has achieved in the twenty-one years of the Revolution.”434 The famous incident of the

432 Brzezinski to Carter, “NSC Weekly Report 143,” May 30, 1980, NLC-128-10-3-2-4, RAC, JCL. For Carter’s order, see Brzezinski to USICA Director, May 30, 1980, NLC-15-9-2-5-9, RAC, JCL. 433 Editorial, Granma, April 14, 1980, p. 1. 434 Speech by Fidel Castro, in A Battle for Our Dignity and Sovereignty (Cuba: n.d., 1980?), p. 87. For Cuban public support, see Granma, May 1, 1980, pp. 1-3, and May 2, 1980, pp. 1-8. 174

USINT in Havana occurred the day after. Around 400 Cuban asylum seekers flooded into the section, chased after by angry neighboring organizations.435

Castro incessantly attacked those who were leaving the island. Granma called all

Mariel Cubans “antisocial,” or someone who lacked “national sentiment and attachment to the homeland.”436 The appeal to national sentiment in turn sanctioned the act of repudiation (group punishment). “Enraged mobs prowled the neighborhoods of Havana day and night, armed with sticks, rotten eggs, and tomatoes,” as Mirta Ojito recalls in her memoir.437 These elements forced Cubans leaving for the United States to confess their illegal or antisocial behaviors. The USINT in Havana received the following report.

“They [emigrants] would be pelted with eggs, made to wear signs saying ‘I am a worm,’ and sometimes forced to run a gauntlet of jeering neighbors. In many cases, they were beaten up, and in at least one or two cases they were beaten to death.”438 The scene was disgusting for many revolutionary Cubans who refused to join the act.439

The Cuban government further delegitimized the whole exodus by placing its

“undesirables” on the boats coming to Mariel. According to Cuba’s law of dangerousness of 1979, Cuban authorities had incarcerated those who engaged in antisocial behaviors,

435 U.S. and Cuban scholars disagree on what actually happened. U.S. scholars argue that the Cuban government suddenly directed violence against men and women waiting for their visas in front of the USINT in Havana. They escaped the violence by entering into the building. See Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 217-231; and Schultz, Infernal, pp. 356-57. In contrast, Cuban scholars view the story as a part of U.S. propaganda instigated by USINT chief Wayne Smith to embarrass Cuba in front of world media. See Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, pp. 231-32. 436 Granma, April 27, 1980, p. 1. 437 Ojito, Finding Mañana, pp. 170-74. 438 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 212-13. See also, García, Havana USA, pp. 63-64. 439 Arboleya, Cuba y cubanoamericanos, p. 52. 175 such as thefts, alcoholism, gambling, drug addiction, homosexuality, prostitution,

“extravagant behavior,” vagrancy, religious practices of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and dealing on the black market. Given their bleak prospect of life in revolutionary Cuba, these anti-revolutionary “delinquents” would have seized the first chance to leave for the

United States. Included in this group were “common criminals,” those who had committed robbery, assaults, and other non-felonies. Based on the study of Cuban scholars, Jorge Domínguez estimated that about eight thousand common criminals joined the boatlift.440 Reports of criminals appeared in U.S. newspapers, accompanied by people with mental disorders, prostitutes, unaccompanied minors, and spies.

When Washington used acrimonious words in making a protest, Havana lined up even harsher sentences in reply. In a five-paragraph note, the State Department charged

Havana with sending “hardened criminals,” calling this practice unacceptable for “any civilized society.”441 The Cuban foreign ministry prepared thirty-five paragraphs to reject this accusation. The government “never” authorized the departure of “persons imprisoned for violent crimes involving bloodshed.” Even if those with such criminal backgrounds had joined the boatlift, they had already finished their sentences and thus had “the same right” to move. The government violated no international laws. Cubans were free to emigrate. Their poverty was created by “unequal and unjust development,” for which the

U.S. history of exploitation was responsible. After overviewing the record of U.S.

440 Jorge I. Domínguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba,” in Christopher Mitchell, ed., Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 57. See also, Rafael Hernández and Redi Gomis, “Retrato del Mariel: el ángulo socioeconómico,” Cuadernos de Nuestra América 3, no. 5 (January-June 1986): pp. 124-151. 441 U.S. State Department to CUINT in Washington, June 7, 1980, Caja “Migratorios 7,” MINREX. 176 toleration of crimes, terrorism, and illegal departures, the note rhetorically asked, “From what moral perspectives can the United States speak of criminals?”442

No Diplomatic Opening

Confronted with Havana’s hardened defiance, Carter found it impossible to continue the present policy. By May 14, 1980, the number of Cuban arrivals reached

37,085 and showed no signs of relief for the White House. As federal, state, and local officials were confused, panicked, and exhausted their resources, U.S. public opinion polls turned overwhelmingly against the admission of new Cubans. The notable presence of “undesirables” made the entire group of Mariel Cubans less welcome.443 The boatlift became an “administrative and logistical nightmare.”444

Carter’s famous “open-arms” speech on May 5, 1980, exacerbated the problem.

“We’ll continue to provide an open heart and open arms,” he declared, “to refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination and from economic deprivation, brought about primarily by Fidel Castro and his government.”445 In private, Carter quipped that

442 MINREX note to USINT in Havana, June 11, 1980, in Caja “Migratorios 7,” MINREX. See also, Speech by Castro, June 14, 1980, LANIC. 443 Watson to Carter, May 2, 1980, in folder “Cuban Refugees,” box 178, Domestic Policy Staff Files (hereafter DPS): Eizenstat, JCL. For confusion, see Copeland, “Cuban Boatlift”; Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 69-72; and Larzelere, Boatlift, pp. 238-244. For the public opinion, see Gallup Poll, May 16-19, 1980, in George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1980 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1981), pp. 120-22; and Newsweek, May 26, 1980, p. 25. 444 A quote from Watson, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 12. 445 Speech by Carter, May 5, 1980, APP. 177 the U.S. press exaggerated the “open-arms” part of this speech.446 But aside from the rhetoric, the speech itself well represented the basic tenet of the policy at that time.

Instead of refusing Cubans, Carter was following the strategy of trying to force Castro to stop the boatlift by attacking the Cuban model and by mounting pressure on Castro. What

Carter did not notice was that this approach simply had been backfiring. Unable to stop the boatlift, a combination of Carter’s humanitarian “open-arms” and public condemnation of Cuba simply appeared naive in the eyes of many Americans.447

Desperate to change the game, Carter made another address on May 14 for his three core audiences: the U.S. public, Miami, and Havana. For the U.S. public, Carter clarified his intention of enforcing stricter laws against participants in the boatlift.

Following his order the Coast Guard warned all vessels against going to Cuba, utilized aerial surveillance, and established a naval “blockade” to intercept boats traveling to

Cuba. Ashore, the INS and Customs issued intent-to-fine notices, seized private boats carrying Cubans, and kept them in custody, subject to forfeiture. Being aware that law enforcement alone would not work, Carter also tried to reassure Miami Cubans by promising an orderly departure program as an alternative to the boatlift. Carter urged them to register those whom they wanted to bring into the United States at newly opening family registration centers. Finally, to make this arrangement possible, Carter demanded

446 Case Study Paper of Eizenstat, p. 15. Jack Watson reinforces this point. “If you read the President’s words in response to that question carefully, he really wasn’t off the mark.” Watson, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 10. 447 On the next day, when Carter received the situation report on the Mariel boatlift, he dictated, “Organize a concerted PR campaign [against Cuba].” Christopher to Carter, May 6, 1980, NLC-7-23- 3-4-2, RAC, JCL.

178 that Castro agree to begin an airlift or sealift for “qualified” Cubans and accept over 400

“hardened criminals” whom Carter found among the newcomers.448

The new policy produced mixed results. Stricter law enforcement and opening family centers achieved a significant drop in the number of vessels heading toward Cuba.

Miami Cubans became more cooperative, partly because Carter made crystal clear his intention of restricting the flow. Many also began feeling that Castro was using their desire for family reunification to his advantage. But the boaters already in Mariel had little incentive to leave without their relatives, and were willing to pay fines. Trying to go around the naval blockade in South Florida, some vessels departed for Mariel from

Puerto Rico and Jamaica. The number of southward vessels plummeted, yet continued.449

Havana had even less motive for listening to Carter. A few days later Cuba mobilized the third and largest mass demonstration, and over five million people joined marches in several cities.450 At Mariel, Cuban authorities apparently took forceful law enforcement measures. They reportedly prohibited boat captains from leaving Cuba without taking passengers, threatened to fine the captains, and insinuated retaliation against their waiting families. With fewer boats available, Cuban authorities also put too many passengers on each boat—too many for some vessels to survive the voyage back to

448 Speech by Carter, May 14, 1980, APP. For discussion, Eizenstat, Watson, and Brzezinski to Carter, May 13, 1980, in folder “Refugees—Cuban and Haitian [5],” box 22, DPS: Civil Rights and Justice- White, JCL. For law enforcement, see Larzelere, Boatlift, chap. 16. 449 Case Study Paper of Eizenstat, pp. 17-18; Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 110-2; Eidenberg, interview transcript by David Engstrom, March 22, 1991, pp. 18-19, in author’s possession; García, Havana USA, p. 68; and Cuban Refugee Task Force, SITREP 25, May 30, 1980, in folder “Pending—State Cubans Work File, April-June, 1980,” box 2394, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. For mixed Cuban American reactions to Carter’s policy, see for example, editorial, Patria, May 16, 1980, p. 2. 450 Granma, May 15-18, 1980, all pages. 179 the United States. Because of overloading problems and the likelihood of ship wreckages, the Coast Guard and Navy had to focus on rescue-and-search missions, rather than law enforcement on northbound vessels.451

More important was Havana’s rejection of Carter’s scheme for an orderly departure program, a central component of the new U.S. policy. A Granma editorial on

May 19 called the proposition “partial solutions,” and made a proposal of its own—U.S.-

Cuban talks on all issues of bilateral relations, of which migration control was only part.

The editorial claimed that the U.S. government was the one that started to use migration as a political weapon. Carter stalled the emigration of ex-prisoners, encouraged them to leave illegally, and created negative publicity against the Cuban system. Therefore, the editorial stated, the two countries had to talk about the fundamental cause of the emigration crisis—U.S. hostilities—and to cover such issues as the U.S. economic blockade against Cuba, U.S. support for counterrevolutionaries, and the return of the

Guantánamo base to Cuba. This was Cuba’s position, as Raúl Castro explained to the

Soviet ambassador in Havana. “Cuba is ready to [have] a serious conversation with

Americans about our [migration] problem,” he said. “But we intend to hold the conversation around the whole complex of questions.”452

451 MH, May 16, 1980, pp. 1A, 22A; García, Havana USA, p. 68; and Larzelere, Boatlift, p. 159. The problem of these stories was their reliance on the testimonies of Mariel Cubans themselves. Wayne Smith tried in vain to see if the reports of forced loading were true. Yet, the Cubans did not approve his request for access to the Americans in the Mariel harbor. Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, June 5, 1980, NLC-24-88-5-10-2, RAC, JCL. On the Coast Guard priority, see Watson, interview transcript by Engstrom, p. 16. 452 Granma, May 19, 1980, p. 1; and Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 122-3. 180

Carter’s Failed “Multilateral” Approaches

Havana’s counterproposal was unacceptable to Carter. According to a summary paper prepared by the State Department two months later, Havana since the beginning of the migration crisis had made clear its willingness to enter into talks with Washington,

“but only if the whole range of bilateral issues important to Cuba can be discussed.” 453

Yet, the U.S. government had avoided discussing bilateral issues of the major importance, such as the embargo, to “indicate our displeasure with Cuba’s aggressive foreign policy.” Therefore, the paper continued, opening of U.S.-Cuban talks on Cuban terms meant not only reversing a rationale of U.S. policy toward Cuba, but also “giving in to Castro’s pressure tactics” of employing migration as a foreign policy tool.454 In other words, accepting Cuban terms for opening talks would have meant a major foreign policy defeat for Carter, as well as Brzezinski, who had argued since August 1977 that

Carter should not consider the lifting of the embargo—full and partial—unless Castro changed his foreign policy.455 As Carter’s reelection approached, the national security

453 State Department Options Paper, “Negotiating with Cuba,” July 31, 1980, p. 3, in folder “Cuba- Refugees, 7/22-31/80,” box 18, NSA: Staff Material-North/South (Pastor), JCL. Since late April 1980, Carter secretly probed Castro’s willingness to discuss the migration crisis—through the USINT in Havana and Panama—without discussing larger bilateral issues, although it received no positive response. Christopher to Carter, May 1, 1980, NLC-7-23-3-2-4, RAC, JCL; Situation Room Checklist, May 14, 1980, NLC-133-218-5-18-8, RAC, JCL; and Brzezinski to Carter, May 7, 1980, NLC-SAFE 17 E-27-6-8-8, RAC, JCL. Havana spent three weeks to answer the proposal, according to a U.S. document. Christopher to Carter, June 13, 1980, NLC-7-23-4-15-9, RAC, JCL. 454 Ibid. 455 See the previous chapter for my discussion on the August 1977 meeting among U.S. officials. 181 adviser also appealed to Carter’s concerns about domestic politics. Brzezinski insisted that Carter maintain a hard stance on Cuba and deal with the boatlift accordingly.456

For the time being at least, Carter also hoped that his strategy of internationalizing the crisis would turn the unfavorable tide somehow. As explained earlier, bringing the migration case to international forums was a critical piece of Carter’s diplomatic offensive against Cuba. Yet, despite hectic behind-the-scenes moves by U.S. diplomats, the administration failed to elicit enthusiastic international support. For example, although twelve countries at the May 8-9 San José conference pledged to accept hundreds of Cubans, the combined number was far from meeting the demand. Of the participants, only Britain and Costa Rica joined the United States to form a commission urging Cuba to open discussions on an orderly departure program along the lines of Carter’s May 14 address.457 The Cuban government rejected their notes, calling them “wholly improper.”458 After Cuba refused their demand once again, the group convened another

San José conference on June 27-28 to underscore Cuba’s inhumane treatment of emigrants.459

456 Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report 149, August 7, 1980, DDRS. See also later sections. For Carter’s reluctance to talk with Castro in an election year, see also, Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 117-19. 457 British embassy in San José to London (Telegrams 106, 107, 108), May 9, 1980, FCO 99/501, PRO. See also, Costa Rican ambassador in Britain to Payne, May 12, 1980, FCO 99/502. PRO. 458 British embassy in Havana to London, May 22, 1980, and May 24, 1980, FCO 99/502, PRO. 459 Editorial, Granma, May 10, 1980. The Cuban foreign ministry later sent a copy of this editorial to London as a Cuba’s formal position on the tripartite proposal. Cuban Embassy in London, May 13, 1980, FCO 99/502. PRO. See also, Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 117-19. 182

Cuba denounced these endeavors as “American-manipulated propaganda” and warned non-U.S. countries against participation in the “hostile act” against Cuba.460 In essence, Havana’s perception was correct. It was “multilateral” only in appearance, as the

British records reveal. British action was driven as much by a shared Cold War goal of discrediting the Cuban model in the Third World, as by perceived obligation to the

Anglo-American “special relationship.”461 But even these U.S.-friendly diplomats in

London found the Americans too reckless and too eager to use the multilateral approach for “domestic consumption.”462 To increase the chance of success of their maneuver, the

British proposed that the tripartite group take time to expand its membership and refrain from seeking publicity for its actions. The Americans cast aside these premonitions and claimed that they had to take action immediately and publicly since Carter already referred to international efforts in his speeches. These U.S. responses puzzled the British, who wondered if Washington truly wanted to pressure Havana to sit at negotiating tables, rather than just making Carter look better.463

The British also felt that their presence was merely a cover for the “unilateral” nature of the tripartite approach. Without the British presence, this mechanism lacked any international credibility, as Costa Rica was vulnerable to Cuba’s accusation of its being

“in the U.S. pocket.”464 But if the membership of the tripartite group expanded, it would

460 See for example, British embassy in Havana to London, May 9, 1980, FCO 99/501, PRO. 461 Carrington to British embassy in Vienna, May 15, 1980, FCO 99/502, PRO. 462 Carrington to British embassy in Washington, May 15, 1980, FCO 99/502, PRO. 463 Memcon (Loy, Ridley, Aguilar, et. al.), May 18, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO. 464 British embassy in Washington to London, June 23, 1980, FCO 99/504, PRO. 183 be too unwieldy for the United States to control and serve Carter’s political interests.465

In this case, the prestige and good intentions of London were too convenient for

Washington to ignore. Although the British nonetheless went along with the Americans, the whole effort appeared “unrealistic” in their eyes.466 By the time Washington called for the second San José conference, the British had lost all hope. “It seems likely,” they lamented, “that this proposal stems from continuing domestic political pressure for visible action by the administration.”467

Mariel Cubans: Profiles, Motives, and Strategies

Whereas Carter hesitated to open talks directly with Castro, the flow of Cuban migration continued in the spring and summer of 1980. By early June, the number of

Mariel Cubans arriving in the United States reached one hundred thousand. Resettling these unwelcome strangers became another source of problems for the U.S. president.

The profiles of Mariel Cubans complicated U.S. resettlement efforts. U.S. governmental sources indicated that many Mariel Cubans were young, urban males who held some menial job experiences. About 70 percent of the Cubans were male, and more than half were under the age of thirty. Most of them had not completed high-school-level education, and few received college degrees or professional training. Notably, about twenty-four thousand Mariel Cubans claimed to having served in Cuban prisons. Some

465 See esp. Memcon (Loy, Ridley, Aguilar), May 18, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO. 466 Carrington to British embassy in Washington, May 28, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO; and A. J. Payne to Maitland, May 28, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO. 467 British embassy in Washington to London, June 17, 1980, FCO 99/503, PRO. In late June 1980, the British decided to distance itself from the tripartite scheme. 184 participated in robbery, theft, possession of explosives, and other non-felonies under U.S. immigration laws. Others did something that North Americans did not consider as punishable “crimes,” including the refusal to work, the rejection of joining the

Communist Party, the failure to serve the army, traffic violations, loitering, gambling, and petty thefts.468

These data might be potentially biased since they were entirely based on self- confession made by Mariel Cubans, who might seek to dramatize their defiance to Cuban authorities to earn U.S. sympathy. Nevertheless, the U.S. intelligence community largely accepted their claims, called these Cubans “revolutionary dropouts,” and emphasized the lack of economic and political prospects in Cuba, rather than family reunification, as the principal cause of the boatlift. Of particular importance was the size of the Cuban youth included in the boatlift. U.S. officials reasoned that the Cuban youth had no memory of the pre-revolutionary era, took socioeconomic achievements in the first decades of the revolution for granted, and therefore, became frustrated with the economic system once a depression occurred. The 1979 visit of Cuban Americans to the island apparently exacerbated their disillusion.469

468 Robert L. Bowen, ed., Report of the Cuban-Haitian Task Force (hereafter CHTF), November 1, 1980, in folder “CHTF Documents—A Report of the CHTF,” pp. 55, 70, box 24, Cuban Refugee Center Records, UM-CHC; and CHTF Data Book, p. 75, in folder “Briefing Materials, Senate Appropriations 3/16/81 [1],” box 11, Records of the Cuban-Haitian Task Force, JCL. U.S. and Cuban scholars disagree on the degree of Mariel Cubans’ labor participation in the Cuban economy prior to their departure. See Robert L. Bach, Jennifer B. Bach, and Timothy Triplett, “The Flotilla “Entratns”: Latest and Most Controversial,” Cuban Studies/ Estudios Cubanos 11, no. 2-12, no. 1 (January 1981- January 1982): pp. 29-48; and Hernández and Gomis, “Retrato del Mariel.” 469 CIA Special Analyses, “Cuba: Profile of the Refugees,” July 7, 1980, in folder “Cuba: Refugees, 7/6-21/80,” NSA: Staff Material North-South (Pastor), JCL; and U.S. State Department Paper, “Cuba: Sociological Profile of the Refugees,” June 3, 1980, in folder “Statistics,” box 1, Mirta Ojito Papers, 185

Such a strong emphasis on Cuba’s difficulties tended to cloud many other aspects of the boatlift. The U.S. data also suggested that more than half of the Mariel Cubans had relatives in the United States. Of these, about 30 percent had immediate family such as parents or spouses; around 40 percent had other blood relatives; and 25 percent had non- blood relatives.470 For these Cubans, the principal motive for migration might have been their desire to reunite with family members separated for a long time.

Race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality also informed each individual’s decision to leave for the United States. Contrary to the prior waves of Cuban migration, a sizable proportion of the newcomers—at least 20 percent—were nonwhites. Many Afro Cubans became enthusiastic supporters of the revolution, which promoted open access to public facilities and beaches, as well as employment, education, and health care. But those who came to the United States did not hesitate to say that racial prejudices persisted in Cuba and inhibited their socioeconomic success. Comparatively, Cuban women were more enthusiastic than men because the revolution enlarged educational and career opportunities. Some women stayed, even though their husbands left Cuba to avoid military services and other obligations. Homosexuality was a crime, subject to fines and imprisonment in Cuba. The estimated number of gays among Mariel Cubans was around one thousand, but probably more.471

UM-CHC. Both of them rely on a large sample of over 30,000 Mariel Cubans processed by U.S. authorities. For Cuba’s economic woes and the impact of family visits, see the previous chapter.

470 For data on Mariel Cubans’ family ties, see CHTF Data Book, p. 75.

471 In his 1971 speech, Fidel Castro defined homosexuality as “social pathology” and moved to make it illegal, Pedraza, Political Disaffection, p. 158. See also, Julio Capó, Jr., “Queering Mariel: Mediating Cold War Foreign Policy and U.S. Citizenship among Cuba’s Homosexual Exile 186

Contemporary oral history records reveal that the motives of Mariel Cubans were even more complex. As in the case of many other migrants, individual decision was part of family strategies. An Afro-Cuban middle-class couple, Olga and Jorge Lezcano, lived in Havana. Despite their hatred of the government, they could not leave the island since they had no relatives in the United States. For them, the Peruvian embassy crisis was the first chance they seized to leave the country. Before their departures they left Jorge’s old mother to his brother remaining in Cuba. Jumping into the embassy amid a full-scale protest was too dangerous for the elderly.472

Some families were more fortunate than others. Eight members of the Casanova family had no issues with the government. But their youngest son, Miguel, wanted to go to the United States, and his desire to leave Cuba grew stronger after his godmother in

New York came back for a visit with souvenirs and stories of her life. The families eventually found a way out. When Miguel lied that he had committed a crime of playing (), Cuban authorities gave passports to all family members without bothering to verify his confession of guilt. Without further troubles the entire family arrived in the

United States in August 1980.473 The case of María Rodríguez and her husband was more burdensome. Trying to have a quiet and private life away from neighboring community activities, the couple tried to leave Cuba with their two sons. But when they waited in line

Community, 1978-1994,” Journal of American Ethnic History 29, no. 4 (Summer 2010): pp. 78-106. For the proportion of nonwhites, see CHTF Data Book, p. 58. For race, gender and sexuality, see esp. Pedraza, Political Disaffection, chap. 6.

472 Oral history records, in folder “#195 12-19-80,” box 5, Diana Kirby Papers, UM-CHC.

473 Oral history records, in folder “#823 1-5-81,” box 7, Diana Kirby Papers, UM-CHC.

187 in El Mosquito, an emigration center near Mariel, Cuban officials stopped their sons because they were close to the military age. On arrival, the couple started to work to reclaim their remaining families, her mother and two sons left in Cuba.474

Many families wanted to live together. Other families decided to send one of the members to the United States in hopes that he or she would bring the other members to the United States in the future. Bryan Walsh, archdiocese of Miami, noticed that most of the young men came alone simply because they did not want to risk exposing their wives, children, and elderly to the dangerous voyage. Many teenage boys also did the same so that they could reclaim the rest of their families later.475 Miguel of the Casanova family might have done so if he could not cheat Cuban authorities. There also were some extraordinary examples. Louisa Mendoza Hernández, an eighty-three-year-old widow, initially refused to go along with her three sons and a daughter. She had only two teeth, was unable to walk by herself, and thought that she could not survive the voyage. “I’ll never make the trip. You go ahead and leave. You have more life.” But her son insisted,

“You’ll have to kill me first.” So she came. The reason why she came to the United

States was her decision to follow her siblings.476

474 Oral history records, in folder “#289 10-28-80,” box 5, Diana Kirby Papers, UM-CHC. The military age was sixteen to twenty-seven, only for men.

475 U.S. Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Caribbean : Cubans and Haitians, 96th Cong., 2nd sess., May 12, 1980, p. 14. 476 MH, May 18, 1980, p. 23A. 188

A Quagmire of Confusion

Carter struggled to resettle thousands of these Cubans into U.S. communities, and tried to accommodate their needs and concerns as quickly as possible. Carter assigned

Jack Watson to lead this resettlement effort. Thomas R. Casey of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) took charge of onsite coordination of all federal government activities, including those of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice,

Treasury, Transportation, and Health and Human Services. The FEMA opened processing centers in Key West, where INS officials conducted initial screening and inspection. If aliens had close family ties, then they were sent to Miami processing centers, such as Miami’s Tamiami Park and the Opa-Locka barracks, to go through further identification, security clearances, and medical checks. They received a parole for stay and an employment authorization before moving to new places to live.

Mariel Cubans with no family ties or who had criminal backgrounds were airlifted from Key West to one of the four processing centers outside Miami. These were: Eglin

Air Force Base in Northwest Florida; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort Indiantown Gap,

Pennsylvania; and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The processing at the camps took longer than in Miami since the security clearance procedure was more intensive. Also, the federal government used voluntary agencies, such as United States Catholic Conference, to match entrants with sponsors throughout the United States. Only when the inmates found sponsors could they receive an I-94, as well as a small amount of money and a flight ticket to leave the camps. Those whom the INS suspected of having committed serious

189 nonpolitical crimes went to the Atlanta Penitentiary. They had to wait there for exclusionary hearings.

Various factors delayed the resettlement process. Voluntary agencies had difficulty finding sponsors and jobs since U.S. society was suffering an economic recession. The relationship between the FEMA and voluntary agencies was far from harmonious. FEMA’s Casey snapped when voluntary agencies protested that he had made a decision without an in-advance notice.477 The failure to establish a structure of command and communications resulted in a bureaucratic mess. The situation was so chaotic that Casey angrily complained at an interagency meeting that his private phone received calls from Cuban Americans looking for their families.478 The profile of Mariel

Cubans who went to the camps was another unfavorable factor. They were more likely to be nonwhite, male, single, and more difficult to find sponsors than Miami arrivals.479 The

U.S. press sensationalized the existence of criminals, people with mental disorders, homosexuals, prostitutes, and unaccompanied juvenile delinquents. The last group posed a difficult legal problem of custody.480

The worst of all was the Fort Chaffee riot of June 3, 1980, which engulfed U.S. news reports. Angry at processing delays and chaotic camp management, two hundred

477 AC to Fascell, May 9, 1980, in folder “Pending-State Cubans Work File, April-June, 1980,” box 2394, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. Congressman Fascell received reports from his staff attending numerous FEMA meetings. For FEMA’s problematic relations with voluntary agencies, see Rivera, Decision and Structure, pp. 179-180. 478 AC to Fascell, May 22, 1980, in folder “Refugee and FEMA,” box 2408, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. 479 Bach, Bach, and Triplett, “Entrants,” p. 46. 480 For minors, see José Szapocznik, Raquel E. Cohen, and Roberto E. Hernandez, eds., Coping with Adolescent Refugees: The Mariel Boatlift (New York: Praeger, 1985). 190

Cubans rioted, stormed out in protest, and caused a panic in the state of Arkansas. As three-to-four hundred local armed citizens gathered and threatened to attack the Cubans,

Governor Bill Clinton feared “a bloodbath that would make the Little Rock Central High crisis look like a Sunday afternoon picnic.”481 The scene of Clinton’s state troopers and federal marshals turning the rioters back with tear gas appeared in the U.S. media for days and weeks. The press also took this opportunity to highlight the criminal environment in the camps, including gang violence, prostitution rings, rape and stabbing, liquor stills and contraband, and homemade firearms. It often failed to note, however, that those who joined such activities were small minorities.482 The riot dismayed even the

Miami Cuban media. A reporter for Réplica dismissed the rioters as delinquents who did not merit “the title of political refugees.”483

The pace of resettlement slowed down. Poll after poll indicated that increasingly more U.S. citizens experienced frustration with the ongoing migration disorder. A Gallup poll of May 16-19, 1980, showed that 57 percent of the respondents opposed Cuban migration into the United States. Yet, the disapproval rate for U.S. acceptance of Cuban migrants increased to as high as 73 percent, according to a Harris poll two months later.

Another Harris survey on August 26, 1980, also noted that 81 percent were critical of

481 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 276. 482 Gastón A. Fernández, The Mariel Exodus Twenty Years Later: A Study on the Politics of Stigma and a Research Bibliography (Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 2002), pp. 48, 65-66; and García, Havana USA, p. 70. 483 See an article in Réplica, June 11, 1980. Hardliners also agreed on this. See for example, Jorge Mas Canosa, RECE, Mensage, June 1980, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. I, pp. 359-360. For a more detailed analysis, see García, Havana USA, pp. 68-74. 191

Carter’s handling of the crisis.484 Members of the U.S. Congress claimed that they received letters and phone calls from constituents displeased with Carter’s handling of the boatlift. They demanded that Carter waste no time before doing something.485 After the riot, not only terminating the boatlift but also returning Cuban “undesirables”—felons, rioters, and those whom the U.S. government considered excludable under immigration laws—became a top priority for Carter. The U.S. president demanded a report on how he could “deport Cuban criminals and other unacceptable characters.”486

It was around this time that Carter officials made a decision about the status of

Mariel Cubans. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. government had traditionally accepted all

Cubans as “refugees” and rejected Haitians as economic migrants. In the face of public criticisms of such double standards, however, Carter wanted to treat them on equal terms without stimulating further immigration.487 As a result, the U.S. government created a new legal category of “Cuban-Haitian entrant” as a “one-time only measure.” The status was temporary, awaiting the passing of special legislation in the Congress. For the time being, “entrants” could stay in the United States, eligible for the Aid to Families with

Dependent Children, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, vocational

484 All poll data cited here are found in folder “Attitudes on Immigration Prepared by Reagan-Bush ’84 (July 26, 1984),” OA11586, Michael Deaver Files, RRL. 485 They differed on what exactly Carter should do. Frank Moore, Bob Schule, and Terry Straub to Carter, “Congressional Consultation on the Cuban-Haitian Situation,” June 6, 1980, in folder “Cuban Refugees,” box 178, DPS: Eizenstat, JCL. See also, Carter to Muskie, June 4, 1980, NLC-7-23-4-7-8, RAC, JCL. 486 Carter, White House Diary, p. 434. 487 See the previous chapter. For details, see Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 142-160. 192 and English training, and other resettlement and social services.488 This decision was symbolically important, as Jorge Domínguez notes. To refuse Mariel Cubans the

“refugees” status represented “the breakdown of earlier ideological consensus.” Cuban migration was no longer welcomed merely to emphasize the benevolence of the U.S. system and the bankruptcy of Cuba’s.489

Another Failed Diplomacy

As Washington’s handling of the crisis went into a quagmire of confusion, bureaucratic mess, and declining public support, Havana was declaring its “victory.”

According to the Soviet ambassador in Cuba, Fidel Castro was triumphant in their conversation on June 6, 1980. “About 118,000 people left the country, in which eighty percent are criminals or potentially dangerous people and people living on the fringes of society,” he remarked to the ambassador. “We won a two-month-long fight around the events in the Peruvian embassy. This action improves the condition in the country.”

Castro also favorably mentioned a U.S. proposal for a confidential bilateral talk. “We understand that the problems of ‘economic blockade’ and the base in Guantánamo will not be solved quickly. But important is the fact itself that the United States displayed preparedness to hold the talks.”490

488 Palmieri’s statement and White House Fact Sheet, June 20, 1980, DOSB (August 1980), pp. 79-82. Since 1984, the U.S. government allowed these “entrants” to readjut their status. See Chapter Six. 489 Domínguez, “Cooperating with the Enemy?” p. 47. 490 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 123-24. On a U.S. proposal, see Muskie to Carter, May 24, 1980, in folder “State Department Evening Report, 5/80,” box 40, PF, JCL. 193

To Castro’s disappointment, however, the subsequent U.S.-Cuban talks in Havana made clear that Carter was not yet ready to concede. After spending three weeks to respond, the Cuban government accepted a U.S. proposal for talks to see what

Washington had to say. On June 17, 1980, Carter’s representatives, the State

Department’s Peter Tarnoff and the NSC’s Robert Pastor, met with José Luis Padrón and other Cuban representatives. Here, Tarnoff and Pastor expressed a U.S. desire to improve relations with Cuba. Still, they said, the resumption of dialogue was possible only after

Cuba agreed on an orderly departure program for Cubans, took back Cuban

“undesirables,” and allowed the Cubans who remained in the USINT building to depart for the United States. The proposal was far from satisfactory for Cuban representatives.

“No progress was possible,” Padrón exclaimed, unless Washington first showed its willingness to discuss all parts of U.S. policy toward Cuba, such as the economic blockade of the island. The talks went in circles and reached “a dead-end.” 491

In his memoir, Wayne Smith, chief of the USINT in Havana, attributed the failure of the talks to Brzezinski’s NSC. Contrary to the State Department, he wrote, the NSC did not comprehend that accepting Castro’s terms was necessary to open negotiations and stop the boatlift.492 But there was more to think about this failure, since Havana and

Washington held contrasting views on the causes of the migration crisis. Following the

Granma editorial of May 19, the Cuban delegation argued that the fundamental cause of the crisis was U.S. hostility, and the fundamental solution was a major reversal of U.S.

491 Memcon (Padrón, Tarnoff), June 17-18, 1980, DDRS; and Tarnoff and Pastor to Carter, June 18, 1980, DDRS. U.S. officials apparently did not notify London of the June 1980 U.S.-Cuban talks. 492 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 216. 194 policy toward Cuba. The U.S. delegation rejected this explanation and portrayed Cuba’s lack of economic growth and political freedom as the major sources of the crisis. By blaming everything on the United States, they argued, the Cubans conveniently neglected their own problems, including the devastating impact of the 1979 Cuban American visits on Cuban society. U.S. denial of responsibilities for the outbreak of the crisis in turn antagonized the Cubans. In the end, the U.S. and Cuban diplomats accused each other of creating the migration crisis while downplaying their share of the blame.493

The importance of NSC-State Department’s differences paled in comparison to

Cuban defiance. Both the NSC’s Pastor and the State Department’s Tarnoff questioned the rationale for using the embargo to change Cuban foreign policy. But they also remained cautious about the lifting of the embargo, since it would harm U.S. “credibility” in the world. The unilateral lifting of the embargo, especially when Cuba did not change its foreign policy, would send a wrong message that the United States had “no staying power.” Castro “wouldn’t even see me on that occasion, Tarnoff recalled, “because he was insisting that I apologize, not personally, but on behalf of the President for having been a party to stimulating this.” The Cuban leader “did not deny that he was responsible for what was going on but he really put it on the back of the American president.” In both the NSC and State Department’s views, what was at stake was national pride and international credibility.494

493 Memcon, June 17-18, 1980. 494 Tarnoff, interview transcript by David Engstrom, p. 16. Tarnoff stated that Wayne Smith’s opinion had not always represented the view of the State Department. 195

A Contingency Plan

Unable to stop the boatlift, the United States came very close to a war with Cuba over migration control. In late June 1980, the U.S. Coast Guard conveyed alarming news to Carter about the Blue Fire, anchored in a Mariel port. Seeking to bring in as many as two thousand Cubans to the United States, forty Cuban Americans commissioned this large “stateless” freighter, over which the United States had no jurisdiction. U.S. officials convened an interagency meeting on an emergency basis to discuss ways to disable the vessel, turn it around, and escort it back into Cuban waters. Yet, they noticed that such an operation could result in “a serious military confrontation or clash” with Cuba.495 After studying military options “in greatest detail,” Carter’s top officials at the Special

Coordination Committee (SCC) recommended that Muskie send a note of protest to

Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.496 Should Cuba ignore a U.S. message, the United States would send a warning that it would take “physical action” to stop “a new wave of immigration on stateless vessels.”497

Carter’s top officials also proposed that Carter consider a drastic military action if the Blue Fire arrived in the United States anyway. To prevent any more large stateless vessels from carrying Cubans, the U.S. president would send U.S. vessels to enter Cuban waters and impose a “blockade” on the Mariel Harbor. Alternatively, the U.S. ships would simply stay outside Cuban waters, seize vessels departing Mariel—through the use

495 Brzezinski to Carter, “Halting More Cuban Refugees,” June 30, 1980, NLC-133-219-1-35-2, RAC, JCL. 496 SCC Summary of Conclusions, July 1, 1980, NLC-17-22-4-4-1, RAC, JCL. 497 Brzezinski to Carter, “Cuba—Refugee Ship,” July 3, 1980, NLC-133-219-2-6-3, RAC, JCL. 196 of lethal force if necessary—and escort them to shallow water offshore one half mile from the east of Havana. Both options involved the deployment of “sizable” U.S. forces to prepare for a dangerous conflict with Cuban authorities. Whereas the U.S. Navy and

Coast Guard favored the first plan, the Pentagon was preparing the second one.498 This was the moment when the U.S. government “came closest to implanting the military action option,” recalled Pastor. “The NSC actually sent the military options up to the

President for his approval.”499

The U.S. government did not have to implement this military contingency plan because the Cuban government agreed to prohibit the Blue Fire from loading any

Cubans. On receipt of Muskie’s note, the Cuban government chose not to exacerbate

U.S.-Cuban tensions despite its misgiving about the ongoing SR-71 overflights, which resulted in material damage in Havana area and greatly irritated Cuban leaders.500 As often mentioned, Cuba’s responsiveness might have originated from Castro’s growing concern about the 1980 U.S. presidential election. “I remember that during some of our conversations with Fidel,” Padrón recalled, “we commented that Mariel was fatal to the

Democrats and those who came after were worse.” Castro obviously preferred Carter to his campaign rival, Ronald Reagan.501

498 Ibid. 499 Pastor, interview, cited in Larzelere, Boatlift, p. 270. 500 Wayne Smith to Muskie, July 3, 1980, DDRS. See also, Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 232- 33. The CIA found no evidence that the Cubans knew that the U.S. navy vessels had moved up to the twenty-four parallel and were considering the use of force. Pastor concluded that Muskie’s message to Rodríguez, rather than the U.S. show of force, was the key to the resolution of this affair. Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, August 6, 1980, in folder “Cuba 1980-7 to 8,” box 15, RNSA Country Files, JCL. 501 Padrón, interview transcript, November 14, 2013, p. 5. 197

As if such were the case, Castro publicly expressed his worries about Reagan’s

Republican Party. Issued on July 15, 1980, the party’s platform identified Cuba as the source of the growing conflicts in Central America and reiterated the party’s willingness to contest the “takeover” of the region by Marxist-Leninists.502 In response, Castro made two major speeches on July 19 and July 26. In the first speech, Castro presented the choice of Carter and Reagan as one of peace and war. He welcomed Carter’s decision to send economic aid to Nicaragua while denouncing the platform as “a terrible platform posing a threat to peace.” In the second speech, Castro’s attack on the platform became more scathing by calling it “the most dangerous and reactionary.” His warning against its consequences of Reagan’s victory was almost apocalyptic. “If the platform is fulfilled,” he predicted, “there will be war between the United States and the Latin American peoples.”503 The Cuban government began to take positive measures for Carter. It allowed the first group of eighty-three individuals in the USINT to prepare for their departure for the United States within two weeks after the second speech.

Carter Geared toward Diplomacy

Without access to historical records, most scholars attribute the end of the Mariel boatlift to Castro’s concern about Reagan’s electoral victory alone. According to them,

Havana ended the boatlift because Castro realized that the cost of the continued chaos

502 Republican Party Platform of 1980, July 15, 1980, APP. 503 Castro’s speech, July 19, 1980, and July 26, 1980, both in LANIC. 198 would be far greater than its benefits by lowering Carter’s chance of reelection.504

This explanation is only partially true, as Castro’s decision also reflected his recognition of Carter’s substantial change of attitude. For instance, the U.S. president took measures against Cuba-to-U.S. hijackings to address Cuba’s expressed concerns prior to the boatlift. In June 1980, four months after Carter’s initial request, the Justice

Department finally submitted a report in favor of new measures against hijackers.505 Then on July 12, 1980, three days after the arrival of a hijacked Cuban vessel in Key West,

Carter took an opportunity to implement the recommendations. He not only approved the public announcement condemning the forceful hijacking as a means of escaping Cuba, but also authorized a “thorough investigation” in each future case while collaborating with the Cuban government. On the latter, Washington asked Havana to cooperate on the return of vessels, as well as the prosecution of hijackers in a Miami court.506

As the continued hawkish approaches failed to end the boatlift, the voice for negotiations with Castro also grew within the administration. In late July, Muskie’s State

Department prepared a paper, “Negotiating with Castro,” for an inter-agency meeting of

Carter’s top advisers. This paper was noteworthy on many points. First, it conceded that a series of hostile words and actions by the U.S. government in 1979-1980—i.e. the Soviet brigade crisis and Operation Solid Shield—“no doubt” made Castro worry about “what

504 Schoultz, Infernal, p. 361; Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 234; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba, pp. 222-23. 505 Benjamin R. Civiletti to Carter, “Hijacking of Cuban Vessels,” June 9, 1980, DDRS; and Christopher to Carter, “Hijacking of Cuban Vessels,” June 26, 1980, DDRS. 506 Christopher to the USINT in Havana, July 12, 1980, NLC-24-18-6-1-8, RAC, JCL. For a Carter’s decision, see also, Brzezinski to Muskie and Civiletti, July 15, 1980, NLC-24-18-6-4-5, RAC, JCL. 199 he perceives as a dangerous trend” in the United States and the prospect of U.S.-Cuban

“military confrontation.” Second, the paper noted that Castro expressed his willingness to open talks on the migration crisis within the larger framework of bilateral issues, although the United States avoided taking this offer. According to this paper, Washington feared that such negotiations would inevitably lead to discussion of the embargo, which they wanted to keep as an instrument to change Cuba’s foreign policy. Third, the paper concluded that the opening of direct U.S.-Cuban talks was a viable means to stop the boatlift and prevent a future one. In this regard, the paper admitted that U.S. diplomatic efforts to mount pressure on Castro on the international stage “provide no insurance against a repetition of the massive exodus.” Based on these understandings, the State

Department proposed three schemes for U.S.-Cuban negotiations. One of them was

“quiet, comprehensive diplomacy,” in which the United States expressed a willingness to revise the embargo in exchange for Cuba’s termination of boatlift and acceptance of criminals. The paper noted that such negotiations would be “largely on Castro’s terms, not ours.”507

Despite the shared concern about the restoration of migration control,

Brzezinski’s NSC opposed this proposal. Chaired by the national security adviser, an inter-agency meeting on August 7, 1980, concluded that negotiation strategies “do not offer anything useful.” Instead of diplomacy, Brzezinski promised that the NSC would continue to explore other plans, especially the forceful return of the “criminals and

507 State Department Options Paper, “Negotiating with Cuba.” 200 undesirables.”508 It turned out that Brzezinski was the one who preferred military operations to negotiations. In a separate paper the same day, he argued that foreign policy was “the greatest opportunity for the exercise of Presidential leadership, in a manner that could significantly influence the outcome of the elections.” In his views, leadership exercise still meant taking hostile measures against Cuba, however impractical it might have been to solve migration problems. Brzezinski claimed that the military operation of returning the Cubans “might be an appropriately dramatic step, designed to signal Castro that there are limits beyond which the U.S. cannot be pushed.”509

Yet, there was no effective ways to end migration problems except negotiations with Castro. The number of arrivals went down to 280 in the week of August 4, but started to increase to 709 in the week of August 11, to 1,203 in the week of August 18, and to 1,267 in the week of August 25.510 Hundreds of frustrated Mariel Cubans kept rioting. Whereas the August 5 riot at Fort Indiantown injured sixteen Americans and forty-two Cubans, the August 14 riot at Fort McCoy became “a full-scale, four-alarm, highly dangerous” one.511 The unending boatlift created another problem. A dozen disgruntled Mariel Cubans started to seize an airplane through the use of faked or real

Molotov cocktails to return to Cuba. They hijacked nine U.S. aircraft beginning on

August 10. As the resolution of the boatlift became more urgent, top U.S. officials again

508 Summary of Conclusions, August 7, 1980, NLC-126-22-12-1-3, RAC, JCL. 509 Brzezinski to Carter, NSC Weekly Report 149, August 7, 1980, DDRS; and Engstrom, Adrift. See also, Aaron to Brzezinski, August 4, 1980, NLC-133-219-3-2-6, RAC, JCL. 510 Bowen, ed., Report of the CHTF, p. 90. 511 On the latter, at least sixty-five inmates were stabbed. Two federal marshals, one FBI agent, and a military policeman were injured. NYT, August 7, 1980, p. A26; and Nick Nichols (former officer of CHTF), “Castro’s Revenge,” Washington Monthly 14 (1982): pp. 38-42. 201 gathered at the SCC meeting on August 20. To Brzezinski’s irritation, they found the forced return of criminals infeasible.512 “The only thing we could think of,” recalled a

U.S. official with a sense of shame, was to load “undesirables” on several large old boats, which “would be sailed back to Cuba and sunk close to shore.” This was “not the sort of think a country like the U.S. does.”513

As the military operation disappeared from the agenda and internationalizing approaches offered no hopes of terminating the crisis, the SCC meeting reconsidered diplomacy. This idea also attracted Carter’s attention. “We need to discuss this [option] in more depth,” the U.S. president directed to Brzezinski.514 Six days later Carter expressed his concern about the increase of Mariel Cubans. “Refugee flow from Cuba is increasing,” he wrote to Brzezinski and Jack Watson. “Step up confiscation of boats and other steps. Prepare private high-level mission to Castro.”515 In a report to Carter the next day, a reluctant Brzezinski cited the failure of the June 1980 conversation and discounted the State Department’s ideas as unlikely to succeed.516 Yet, in light of Carter’s expressed interest in negotiations and Muskie’s advocacy for diplomacy, the SCC meeting chaired by Brzezinski on August 28, 1980, concluded that the idea was “worth discussing.” The

512 Brzezinski to Carter, “Cuban Refugees” (with Summary of Conclusions), August 21, 1980, NLC- 128-12-3-2-2, RAC, JCL. The State Department drafted a letter to Rodríguez according to this line. Drafted Letter from Muskie to Rodríguez, n.d. (ca. July 31, 1980), in folder “Cuba-Refugees, 7/22- 31/80,” box 18, NSA: Staff Material-North/South (Pastor), JCL. 513 John Bushnell (deputy assistant secretary of state), interview transcript, p. 332, FAOH. 514 Handwritten note by Carter, in Brzezinski to Carter, “Cuban Refugees” (with Summary of Conclusions), August 21, 1980, NLC-128-12-3-2-2, RAC, JCL. 515 Carter to Brzezinski and Watson, August 26, 1980, in folder “Cuba 1980-7 to 8,” box 15, RNSA Country Files, JCL. 516 Brzezinski to Carter, August 27, 1980, in folder “Cuba 1980-7 to 8,” box 15, RNSA Country Files, JCL. 202 national security adviser remained cautious. He emphasized the necessity of choosing an unofficial person as an emissary and thus denying Castro “the opportunity to embarrass us politically.”517

Carter’s Private Emissary to Havana

Carter selected Paul Austin, Coca-Cola board chair and his close friend in Atlanta, as a special emissary to Havana. The State Department prepared the talking points for

Austin, whom Carter entrusted to propose a two-stage negotiating process. The first phase concerned the immediate end of the migration crisis. If Cuba agreed to end the crisis, then the two countries would discuss by the first quarter of 1981 the reinstitution of a hijacking agreement, the start of bilateral air service, the removal of a list of rare medicines from the target of the U.S. embargo against the island, and the conversation with the Cubans about all aspects of problems in U.S.-Cuban relations. Unlike the previous one, the new proposal contained an in-advance promise of talks on all bilateral issues, a major concession on the U.S. part to Cuba’s demand for full respect of its grievances.518

But Austin went even further in his talks with Castro on September 3, 1980. He told the Cuban leader that Carter wanted to hold “the face-to-face summit meeting before

Christmas.” The two leaders should meet alone without aides to “discuss frankly” the

U.S.-Cuban problems and set the agenda for further negotiations. Then, the following

517 SCC Summary of Conclusion, August 28, 1980, NLC-24-18-8-7-1, RAC, JCL. 518 Taking Points for Emissary to Use in Cuba, n.d., NLC-128-1-18-7-2, RAC, JCL. 203

January, a small group of U.S. and Cuban officials would start negotiations, at the first of which Carter and Castro might be present. Only after presenting such a dramatic proposal did Austin stress the importance of Cuba’s restraint on its foreign policy during the election year. Austin asked Castro to do three things. Castro should stop the migration crisis from Cuba, wane his criticism of U.S. policy in the Third World, and stop

“intemperate public attacks” against the United States. In return, Carter would prepare to lift the embargo against Cuba on all types of medicines by the end of the year. Austin also added that Carter would appreciate it if Cuba took back Mariel “undesirables” and worked to restate the anti-hijacking agreement. Finally, Austin asked Castro to keep this message secret.519

Castro’s reaction was enthusiastic, according to Austin. When Peter Tarnoff visited him several days later, Austin claimed that Castro had received “Carter’s message” with “pleasure and gratitude,” and “agreed completely” with the proposal.

Referring to his July speeches, Austin’s story went, the Cuban leader had stressed that

Reagan’s victory would pose a menace to world peace and displayed strong feelings against the Republican Party platform concerning non-aligned countries. Cuba understood the intricacies of a U.S. election year, and would cooperate with the Carter administration on several issues, including the punishment of hijackers. Castro also had noted that Cuba already worked to solve the remaining USINT problem. As a new gesture he would also release around thirty U.S. citizens in Cuban jails charged with drug-trafficking, common crimes, and counterrevolutionary activities. On the issues of

519 Memo for the record by Tarnoff, “Account of Mr. Paul Austin’s Conversation with Cuban President Fidel Castro,” September 8, 1980, NLC-128-1-18-7-2, RAC, JCL. 204 stopping the Mariel crisis and of taking back Cuban “undesirables,” Austin stated, Castro would consider them as the first issues of the talks. The Cuban leader had repeated that

“he set great store in the Austin visit, and the message received from the President.”520

Some might dispute the validity of this account. According to U.S. scholars

William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Austin showed early symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease and was incapable of conveying messages.521 Yet, based on their analysis of the

Cuban memorandum of conversation, Cuban historians Elier Ramírez Cañedo and

Esteban Morales Domínguez not only confirm his story, but also conclude that Austin’s mission was important for the conclusion of the boatlift. In addition to Austin’s unauthorized proposal and Castro’s insinuation of his counterproposal, the Cuban record shows that Castro indicated his appreciation of the visit. “I want to tell you that I had been thinking of this before your visit,” he said to Austin. “But when I received the message I was further convinced of the convenience of making this gesture.”522 The next day Castro approved a U.S. request for consular access to U.S. prisoners in Cuba.523 In a message to Mexican President José López Portillo, the Cuban leader also expressed his desire to help to reelect Carter.524

520 Ibid. 521 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 177-78. The authors claim that Austin already demonstrated his incapacity during his February 1978 visit to Cuba. Yet, there is no evidence that Austin brought up his idea of a Carter-Castro meeting at that time. It is also perplexing to believe that Carter again sent Austin to Havana if he had known Austin’s mental problems. 522 Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, 2da edición, pp. 360-63. 523 Muskie to Carter, September 4, 1980, NLC-7-23-7-5-7, RAC, JCL. 524 José López Portillo, Mis tiempos: Biografía y testimonio político, 2 vols. (Mexico City: Fernández Editores, 1988), p. 1002. 205

Castro’s Decision to Suspend the Crisis

After confirming Castro’s interest in talks, Carter decided to send Tarnoff to

Havana to take over the rest. Carter and Muskie had to be careful about Austin’s unauthorized proposal.525 If Castro asked about the summit, Tarnoff was instructed to characterize it as Austin’s “private suggestion,” to which the U.S. president would follow up after negotiations made “solid advances.”526 On September 12, immediately after landing in Havana, Tarnoff informed Padrón that Austin’s visit was “unofficial.”

Thereafter, according to Tarnoff, Castro said little of the visit except to ask if Austin had met with Carter to report on the trip. When Tarnoff assured him that Austin was debriefed by a third person, Castro stated that the visit allowed him to express a willingness to engage in dialogue. “There is no doubt in my mind,” Tarnoff later reported to Carter, “that Castro has dismissed any proposal that Austin may have made.” Because the Cuban leader did not make a big fuss about it, Austin’s mishaps made “no irreparable damage” to U.S.-Cuban dialogue.527

Thereafter, Tarnoff followed the original talking points, reiterating Washington’s wishes to improve U.S.-Cuban relations. Tarnoff proposed two-stage talks to discuss migration issues first and broader issues of U.S.-Cuban relations later. In response, Castro

525 When he read the report, Muskie underlined and put exclamation mark (!) on the line about the Carter-Castro summit meeting before Christmas. Muskie to Carter, September 8, 1980, NLC-128-1- 18-7-2, RAC, JCL. 526 Carter seemed more willing to talk with the Cubans than Muskie’s State Department. For example, the State Department tried to limit the items of medicines that the Washington would exempt from its embargo on Cuba to “rare medicines.” Carter erased the adjective, exempting all kinds of medicines. Muskie to Carter, September 8, 1980; and “Talking Points and Responses to be Made for Peter Tarnoff,” n.d., both in folder “Cuba—Alpha Channel 6/79-9/80,” box 11, GF, ZBC, JCL. 527 Tarnoff to Carter, September 12, 1980, NLC-6-15-2-17-9, RAC, JCL. This report was for Eyes Only for Carter, Brzezinski, Muskie, and Christopher. 206 conveyed his formal decision to take five measures, most of which he had already mentioned in his talks with Austin. First, Cuba would not condone any more U.S.-to-

Cuba hijacking. Second, Cuba would release all thirty-three U.S. prisoners. Third, Cuba would “suspend” the departure of any Cubans from Mariel until November 4. “What we want is to make a gesture to Jimmy Carter, not to Ronald Reagan,” Castro stressed. Cuba would be ready to discuss a concrete solution to the migration problem with Carter if the latter won reelection. Fourth, Cuba would permit all remaining Cubans in the USINT in

Havana to depart for the United States. Fifth, Cuba would refrain from taking any measures “which might be harmful in terms of the U.S. domestic situation.”528

Castro demanded nothing in return from the United States despite offers from

Washington. By calling these decisions “unilateral,” Castro stressed that he had no expectations that Carter would reciprocate them.529 This approach might have originated from Castro’s concerns about U.S. domestic politics. Tarnoff thought that Castro did a favor for Carter by avoiding public conversations “that could possibly damage the president’s reelection chance.”530 However, the reasoning behind Castro’s gesture derived from not only a fear of Reagan’s victory but also a positive assessment of

Carter’s change in attitude. As Carter accepted negotiations on all bilateral issues, it was clear that the U.S. president accepted Cuba’s demand that the two countries discuss

528 Memcon (Tarnoff, Castro, Padrón), September 17, 1980, NLC-15-60-5-14-9, RAC, JCL; and Tarnoff, interview transcript by David Engstrom, pp. 16-17, in folder, “Tarnoff,” box 1, Mirta Ojito Papers, UM-CHC. For a story on the Cuban part, see Ramírez Cañedo and Morales, De la confrontación, 2da edición, pp. 363-68. 529 Ibid. See also, “Talking Points and Responses to be Made for Peter Tarnoff.” 530 Tarnoff to Carter, September 12, 1980. 207 migration issues only in the broader context of bilateral relations. After Tarnoff’s visit, recalled Padrón, the Cuban leadership saw “a possibility” that the two countries could reach some understanding on their relations, pursue mutual interests, and coexist—if

Carter was reelected.531

The Absence of a Lasting Agreement

With the close of the Mariel port in sight, Washington poured much effort and resources into the resettlement of Mariel Cubans. In October 1980, Carter signed the

Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, increased necessary funding for state and local governments, and improved federal intergovernmental cooperation.532 By

November, due to the intensified resettlement efforts, over 90 percent of Mariel Cubans and Haitians had resettled into U.S. communities.533 The Cuban-Haitian Task Force, which Carter had established to advance migrants’ resettlement in mid-July, eventually closed the four processing camps and moved all remaining Cubans to the Atlanta

Penitentiary.534 According to the Congressional Research Service, the estimated total costs related to the boatlift in 1980 and 1981 were over $739 million, or $5,914 per

531 Padrón, interview transcript, November 4, 2013, p. 6. Padrón noted that the Cubans also assumed that Carter relieved Brzezinski from the making of Cuban policy. Such an assessment might have explained Cuba’s optimistic views of the prospect of U.S.-Cuban dialogue. Ibid., p. 9. 532 Engstrom, Adrift, pp. 164-68; and Rivera, Decision and Structure, pp. 204-6. 533 Christian R. Holms to Patricia R. Harris (secretary of HHS), October 11, 1980, in Robert L. Bowen, ed., Report of the CHTF. 534 The least popular group remained in the camp. Racial factors worked, since sponsors requested at times that they would not take a black Cuban. A June 1981 confidential memorandum reported that 95 percent of the remaining Cubans were blacks with little skills and education. Fernández, Twenty Years Later, p. 74. When the camp closed 1,410 of the inmates went to the Atlanta Penitentiary. For their fates, see the next chapter. 208 emigrant.535 The expenses included the task force’s operations, camp management, and reimbursement to states for cash, medical, social services, law enforcement costs, educational relief, as well as the maintenance of jails, , and special care institutions.536

For Carter, the migration crisis was also politically costly. “They’re not going to hurt our country,” Carter stressed to American voters. “I am very proud that our country has once again proven that we’ve not lost the ideals and the human beliefs and the religious beliefs and the generosity that has made this country great.” Carter repeated,

“Our country is not going to be hurt. It’s going to be helped.”537 Carter’s prediction was probably true. Years later, many became restaurant owners, musicians, television anchors, psychologists, bedding designers, and other professionals making notable achievements in various fields.538 But the majority of the U.S. voters of 1980 did not believe in the U.S. president. Along with the Iranian hostage crisis, the Mariel boatlift severely damaged the prospects for Carter’s reelection in several key states, as the U.S. president noted the day after his loss.539

535 Cited in Howard H. Frederick, Cuban-American Radio Wars: Ideology in International Telecommunications (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1986), p. 40. 536 CHTF Data Book, pp. 43, 56. 537 Carter, October 13, 1980, APP. 538 MH, April 18, 2000, p. 1A; MH, April 21, 2000, p. 1E; Rivera, Decision and Structure, p. 221; and García, Havana USA, pp. 115-17. Gastón Fernández rather emphasizes the traumatic impact on nonwhite Mariel Cubans, especially those who had to stay in the camps for a long time. He read the statistical data to conclude that the stigma of Mariel resulted in their higher rate of unemployment, mental disorders, and imprisonment. Fernández, Twenty Years Later, pp. 78-83. 539 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 2693. 209

U.S.-Cuban talks over migration started a month after the 1980 election, although they failed to reach an agreement. The U.S. and Cuban delegations met in New York in

December 1980 and in Washington in January 1981. U.S. officials sought to establish an orderly departure program, repatriate thousands of “undesirable” Mariel Cubans, and gain

Havana’s pledge of “no more Mariels,” a promise that the Cuban government would not allow migration crises like the Mariel boatlift to occur in the future.540 But Cuban officials flatly denied any commitment to “no more Mariels.” Moreover, the Cubans stated that Havana would agree to receive up to 3,000 Mariel Cubans only if they

“voluntarily” expressed a desire to return and were approved by Cuban authorities on a case-by-case basis.541 The U.S. delegation found this condition “completely unacceptable,” since it believed that few “undesirable” Mariel Cubans would volunteer to be deported to Cuba, and few of the people with mental illnesses were capable of making decisions.542

U.S. officials thought that the Cubans intentionally delayed the conclusion of an agreement with the Carter administration in hopes of beginning relations with the

540 Washington also wanted to reinstate the anti-hijacking agreement. Muskie to Carter, January 9, 1981, in folder “Cuba 11/80-1/81,” box 15, RNSA-Country Files, JCL. 541 The Cuban version of the minutes are: “Breve reseña de los aspectos básicos discutidos en conversaciones con el gobierno norteamericano en torno al problema migratorio entre ambos países, 22-23,12, 80,” December 29, 1980, MINREX; and “Síntesis de los aspectos esenciales discutidos en conversaciones en Washington entre el 12 y el 16 de enero de 1981,” n.d., MINREX. For quotes, see Cuba’s prepared text of the agreement. “Acuerdo relativo a la normalización de relaciones migratorias entre Cuba y Estados Unidos,” Caja “Migratorios 7,” MINREX. 542 For the U.S. views, see State Department Scope Paper, “Guidance to US Delegation for Possible Discussions with the Government of Cuba Concerning Migration Issues,” n.d., in folder “Cuba (3/19/1984-4/18/1984),” box 29, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country Files (hereafter NSC-ES-CF), RRL. 210 incoming administration on a positive note.543 There is no documentary evidence to support this claim. A Cuban report on the talks indicates that Havana perceived disagreements with Washington as genuinely profound.544 As such, the report even recommended the opening of public relations campaigns against Washington’s refusal to increase visa issuance for Cubans in the absence of a migration agreement. The Cuban government could use interviews and newspapers, mobilize civic, religious, and cultural groups, and employ “propaganda actions and agitation in favor of family reunification and free immigration of Cubans by friend organizations.” It could direct Cuban emigrants waiting for visas to send letters to families living in the United States, asking for

Washington’s expedition of visa-issuing process.545

The report also probed the idea of the “utilization of irregular emigration routes,” in which the government would selectively load Cubans whose family members reclaimed on their ships from the United States. The measure not only would “alleviate the migration situation” in Cuba, but also would serve as a “mechanism of pressure” on

Washington. If this procedure did not produce desirable outcomes, then “the possible organization of disguised illegal departure” was to be considered. At this point, the author of the paper may have noticed that he or she was going too far. The paper made clear that it was not recommending “the resumption of similar [migration] flow to that of Mariel.”

543 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 236. 544 Informe sobre el diferendo Cuba-EE.UU. sobre cuestiones migratorias, attached to José Viera to Isidoro Malmierca, June 21, 1984, MINREX. In his September 1980 talks with Tarnoff, Castro himself had displayed an unwillingness to receive any Mariel Cubans. Tarnoff to Carter, September 13, 1980, NLC-6-15-2-17-9, RAC, JCL. 545 “Síntesis de los aspectos esenciales,” pp. 8-10. 211

Should a migration crisis of such scale reoccur, the paper reasoned, the incoming administration might use it to justify aggression against Cuba.546 Such was Havana’s thinking on migration issues just before Reagan assumed the presidency. Even after the end of the Mariel boatlift, Cuban officials were exploring diverse methods in search of a better deal on migration control.

Conclusion

Castro preferred Carter to Reagan in the 1980 U.S. presidential election. Then, why did Castro not move earlier to end the boatlift and assist Carter’s campaign? For this question, it may be instructive to consider Castro’s speech of June 14, 1980, three days prior to the failed talks in Havana. Here, Castro proclaimed that Cuba would forever defend the moral and dignity of national sovereignty and was willing to wait until the

United States treated his revolution with respect. “We have time [to wait before] they learn [us],” said the Cuban leader. “We [will wait for] 20 years…40 years…and 100 years, if necessary.”547 True to this proclamation, Castro agreed to terminate the boatlift only after he recognized a meaningful change in U.S. attitudes toward Cuba. In addition to his concerns about Reagan, Carter’s gesture toward Castro contributed to the opening of U.S.-Cuban negotiations.

In retrospect, Carter could have moved much earlier. One may suggest that Carter should have followed the precedent of Lyndon Johnson, who ended a similar migration

546 Ibid, pp. 10-11. 547 Castro’s speech, in Granma, June 16, 1980, pp. 2-3. 212 crisis fifteen years earlier by quickly opening talks with Castro.548 Internal and external dynamics apparently combined to work against following this step, however. In 1980, the number of Cubans wishing to leave the island, as well as the number of Miami Cubans trying to bring in their families, was far greater than in 1965. Contrary to the immediate aftermath of the 1965 U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic, U.S. preoccupation about Cuba’s threats magnified dramatically in 1979-1980, as seen in Carter’s decisions in PD52. For the U.S. president, it was not easy to accept what was considered as a major foreign policy defeat. More than national pride was at stake in an election year. Carter’s advisers wanted to avoid paying political costs by capitulating to Castro’s demand when the latter challenged the U.S. control of migration.

Yet, given the price of an uncontrolled migration crisis like the Mariel boatlift,

Carter could have chosen to cut his losses, rather than enlarging them. Unable to stop the boatlift, prevent camp riots, and return “criminals and other undesirables” to Cuba, the

U.S. president found the course of events too unfavorable to continue. Few of the measures advocated by Brzezinski and his NSC, such as international machinations against Cuba, propaganda campaigns abroad, and contingency planning for military operations, proved adequate for restoring migration normalcy in the Florida Straits. By the summer of 1980, Carter reassessed his strategy, sent emissaries to Havana, and agreed with Castro’s proposal for comprehensive discussions on all bilateral issues, of which migration control was only part. Prodded by Muskie’s State Department, he apparently

548 In the times of Camarioca exodus, in which 5,000 Cubans started to arrive in a similar fashion, the Johnson administration quickly moved to conclude negotiations with the Cuban government for an orderly departure program for about 268,000 Cubans between 1965 and 1973. See Chapter One. 213 reached a conclusion that the decision to endorse negotiations with Cuba would have been politically costly, but probably much wiser.

Behind the end of the Mariel boatlift appeared a “diplomatic revolution,” in which a big country yielded to a small one. What made this turnaround possible was no less than the massive migration of Cubans who desired a new life in the United States and their families who aspired to bring out their loved ones. The crisis of 1980 was a product of such interaction between diplomacy and human migration, which continued to shape

U.S. relations with Cuba in the coming years.

214

CHAPTER 5: Superhero’s Dilemma

Ronald Reagan, the Cuban American Lobby, and the Legacy of the Mariel Crisis

On May 20, 1983, Ronald Reagan acted as a “superhero” for Cuban counterrevolutionaries in Miami. Invited by Jorge Mas Canosa and his Cuban American

National Foundation (CANF), the U.S. president attended a ceremony for Cuba’s

“independence” day in Miami. Whereas the Cuban government claimed to achieve full independence on January 1, 1959, its foes in Miami commemorated May 20, 1902, as the day when the U.S. military government in Cuba transferred formal sovereignty to Cuba’s first government. Havana-Miami conflicts of memories were not the subject of concern for Reagan, however. Following the remarks of Mas Canosa and Florida Senator Paula

Hawkins, the U.S. president proceeded to the podium.549

“It’s a great pleasure for me to be with a group of Americans,” Reagan began his speech, “who have demonstrated how much can be accomplished when people are free.”

Having praised the achievements of Mas Canosa and other Miami Cubans, the U.S. president attributed their success to “a consuming passion for liberty,” or what he called

“the American spirit.” According to Reagan, this was something that both Latin and

549 Schedule of Reagan, May 20, 1983, in folder “5/20/1983,” box 30, Office of the President: Presidential Briefing Papers, RRL. Even after the formal transfer of sovereignty to the Cuban government, the United States claimed its right to intervene in Cuba’s domestic affairs and stationed its troops indefinitely at the base of Guantánamo. For this arrangement, see Pérez, Reform and Revolution, chap. 7. 215

North Americans treasured. He repeated, “We are all Americans here in the Western

Hemisphere.”550

If “freedom” or “liberty” was a magical word for blurring boundaries between

Latin and North Americans, it also was a convenient rationale for the U.S. policy of hostility toward Cuba. While comparing Havana’s economic difficulties and Cuban

Americans’ prosperity in Miami, Reagan reiterated the superiority of the American way of life over the one of -Leninism, which he wanted to remove from human history. Here in the name of freedom, Reagan asked Miami Cubans to support his war against “the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan axis.” The U.S. president quoted Cuba’s hero of independence, José Martí. “Every moment is critical for the preservation of freedom,” he declared.551

Reagan’s audience stopped this speech thirty-two times with standing ovations.

By extending the “American spirit” to cover all the Americas, Reagan helped Miami

Cubans remove any contradictions in their entering the U.S. political system without compromising political claims in their homeland. Reagan’s appearance at the Cuban

“independence day” set a precedent. In the coming decades, U.S. presidents and presidential hopefuls would come to Miami to speak of their historical roles in narratives of freedom. Among them was Barack Obama, who stood by CANF leaders, called Cuban

Americans “ambassadors of freedom,” and quoted the same line of José Martí as Reagan

550 Speech by Reagan, May 20, 1983, APP. 551 Ibid. 216 did.552 Regardless of the varying nuances and interpretations, “freedom” has been the word that U.S. leaders frequently used to legitimatize Miami Cuban advocacy.

This chapter provides one of the first historical analyses of interlocking U.S. policies toward Havana and Miami in the early 1980s. It confirms the existence of a strong ideological hostility toward Castro on Reagan’s part, which guided U.S. foreign policy in Latin America throughout his presidency. Determined to “frighten” Cuba out of its actions abroad, the Reagan administration mounted verbal attacks on Castro, escalated tensions in the Florida Straits, and refused to open any new U.S.-Cuban dialogue unless

Havana radically changed its foreign policy. In Miami, these hard-line postures gained massive support. Reagan worked with CANF in promoting Radio Martí, a new weapon in the ideological war against revolutionary Cuba.553

Yet, unlike previous studies, this chapter also stresses that Reagan’s goals and priorities ultimately differed from those of his followers in Miami. Reagan refused to commit any U.S. force against Cuba, primarily due to Havana’s massive defense buildup, his concern about U.S. public opinion, and a perceived willingness in Moscow to intervene in any U.S.-Cuban military conflict. He did not approve a naval blockade, close the USINT in Havana, or repeal the non-invasion pledge that had been a crucial part of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. Even by early 1982, the U.S. government

552 Obama added, “Every moment is critical. And this must be our moment. Freedom. Opportunity. Dignity. These are not just the values of the United States—they are the values of the Americas.” Speech by Obama, May 23, 2008, APP. 553 Schoultz, Infernal, chap. 11; LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Chennel, chap. 6; Nestor García Iturbe, De Ford a Bush (Havana: Editora Política, 2008), pp. 32-41; Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, Cuba- USA: diez tiempos de una relación (Mexico City: Ocean Sur, 2011), pp. 185-190; and idem., “The Reagan-Castro Years: The New Right and Its Anti-Cuban Obsession,” in Castro Mariño and Pruessen, eds., Fifty Years of Revolution, pp. 261-278. 217 harbored little intention of intervening in Cuba’s internal politics, a position contradictory to the hopes of counterrevolutionaries who sought the destruction of the Castro regime.

Furthermore, in 1984, Reagan opened negotiations with Castro over migration, an important diplomatic achievement in U.S.-Cuban relations.554

The early 1980s thus reveal how migration cut both ways. Cuban migration helped create a new political force within the United States, which was extremely hostile to the idea of an improvement of U.S.-Cuban relations. Yet, Cuban migration also was a critical transnational issue, which required communications between the two countries.

Although migration control is seen as a trivial issue for foreign policy analysts who are strictly concerned about the state and its power, in this period it was tremendously important to the U.S. president, the White House, and the general U.S. public, which was otherwise paying little attention to its Caribbean neighbor. In May 1983, Reagan might have appeared as a “superhero” in the eyes of his followers in Miami. For multiple reasons, however, Reagan was soon compelled to compromise this image by seeking cooperation with the Cuban government.

Ronald Reagan Confronts Fidel Castro

In the early 1980s, the Cold War entered one of its most perilous moments. The

United States and the Soviet Union participated in the simultaneously escalating conflicts

554 The best secondary source on Washington-Miami relations is Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo, chaps. 3-4. Yet, their emphasis on a shared ideology among Washington and Miami tends to downplay conflicting aspects of the relations. Lars Schoultz’s views of CANF are ambiguous. At one point his book tells about “Cuban American capture” of U.S. policy toward Cuba, but later it downplays CANF’s agency and power, paying more attention to a shared anti-Castro ideology with Washington. See, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 370-71, 402, 418, 565-66. 218 in Afghanistan, Iran, Poland, Southern Africa, Southeast Asia, Central America, and the

Caribbean. In the mind of Ronald Reagan and his supporters, the Soviet Union was an

“evil empire,” which used Cuba as its “surrogate” and exploited every opportunity to advance a communist march over the globe. Determined to eradicate such “red menace,” they undertook the largest defense military-buildup in history, escalated the verbal attacks on communist countries, and tried to send powerful messages to allies that the United

States had the will and capabilities of protecting its interests. They could not tolerate any defeat in the Western Hemisphere for fear of its impact on domestic and international politics.555

Fidel Castro had good reason to worry about Reagan even before he became U.S. president. Horrified by Reagan’s foreign policy views during the 1980 election, which he called “extremely reactionary and dangerous,” Castro started to mobilize the entire nation for defense.556 As historian Piero Gleijeses describes, Cuba developed a new military doctrine, the War of the Entire People, and organized the entire population into

Territorial Troops. Inspired by Vietnamese allies, Havana prepared for “another

Vietnam,” which would be a costly, but victorious guerrilla war against the invading force. Cuba received 1.5 million weapons from the Soviet Union and other socialist

555 Gleijeses, Visions, p. 167; Schoutlz, Infernal, pp. 362-66; and Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. 123-28. The military expansion cost $1.6 trillion over five years. For Reagan’s views, see Reagan, An American Life: Ronald Reagan, The Autobiography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), pp. esp. 471-73. 556 See the previous chapter. During the 1980 campaign Reagan advocated a naval blockade of Cuba several times. See for example, NYT, January 28, 1980, p. B5. 219 countries.557 Raúl Castro, a chief of the Cuban military, later recalled that the purpose of this mobilization was to elevate the estimated cost for the invaders to deter the invasion.558

Castro also assisted revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America. He took the lead in creating a clandestine transportation network of weapons and munitions from Moscow through Havana to destinations in Nicaragua and Grenada.559 More important was Cuba’s aid to the revolutionary movement in El Salvador, the region’s most unequal society, full of rural poverty and class tensions. After unifying Salvadoran revolutionaries under the

Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), Cuba helped the FMLN devise military strategies and secure military supplies from the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the

Palestine Liberation Organization. On January 10, 1981, the guerillas launched the “final offensive,” seeking to present the revolution as a fait accompli prior to Reagan’s assumption of the presidency. The operation failed, however. The civil war entered a bloody deadlock.560

Once he became a U.S. president, Reagan claimed that Cuba was the main source of the Central American turmoil. The U.S. president did not ignore the social and

557 Gleijeses, Visions, p. 175. See also, Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 121, 262. 558 Raúl Castro was certain that they would achieve victory as long as at least twenty percent of the armed Cubans engaged in such a protracted war. Mario Vázquez Raña, Raúl Castro: Entrevista al periódico El Sol de México (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1993), pp. 34-37. 559 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 100-101; Agreement between USSR and Grenada, July 27, 1980, in Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall, eds., The Grenada Papers (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984), pp. 23-28; and Protocol between USSR and Grenada, October 27, 1980, in Seabury and McDougall, eds., Grenada Papers, pp. 29-30. 560 Andrea Oñate, “The Red Affairs: FMLN-Cuban Relations during the , 1981- 1992,” Cold War History 11, no. 2 (May 2011): 133-154. Based on her interviews with the FMLN commanders, Oñate delineates how the FMLN and Cuban leaders interacted. See also, Wanye Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 241. 220 economic origins of the problem. But his emphasis was definitely on the external environment, in particular the roles of Cuba. On this point, he agreed with Secretary of

State Alexander Haig, who viewed El Salvador as “a classic case of internal unrest capitalized upon by foreign communists.”561 Captive to the Cold War mindset, Reagan set the prevention of “another Cuba” as the most important U.S. goal in the region.562 He declared at one of the NSC meetings, “I don’t want to back down. I don’t want to accept defeat.” By defeat, he meant the admission of the legitimacy of the revolutionary rule in

Nicaragua and the political claims of the guerillas in El Salvador.563

Still, Reagan was more reluctant than Haig to deploy U.S. military forces to the region. Aware that most Americans feared that U.S. involvement would lead to “another

Vietnam,” Reagan worried about public perceptions of himself as a warmonger. “I knew that Americans would be just as reluctant to send their sons to fight in Central America,” he wrote in his memoir, “and I had no intention of asking them to do that.” 564 As a self- proclaimed believer of the “we are all Americans” concept, Reagan also appeared to worry about the Latin American image of North Americans as the “Yankee colossus” that was “too willing to send in the marines and interfere with their governments.”565 At one

561 Haig to Reagan, January 26, 1981, in folder “NSC 3,” box 91282, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File (hereafter NSC-ES-MF), RRL. 562 Reagan said, “We must not let Central America become another Cuba…It cannot happen.” Minutes, NSC 2, February 11, 1981, p. 5, in folder “NSC 2,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL. 563 Minutes, NSC 24, November 10, 1981, p. 6, in folder “NSC 24,” box 91283, NSC-ES-MF, RRL. 564 Reagan, American Life, p. 239. On the U.S. public, see also, William M. LeoGrande, Central America and the Polls (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 1987), esp. pp. 41-42. 565 Reagan repeatedly mentioned this concept at various NSC meetings and in his diary. Minutes, NSC 24, pp. 5-6; Minutes, February 6, 1981, p. 3, in folder “NSC 1,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL; Reagan, American Life, p. 239-240; and Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries Unabridged, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), vol. 1, pp. 176-77 (December 3, 1982). 221 time he said at a NSC meeting, “North and South America together equals China, a pretty big colossus if we were all buddies.”566

Whether or not he actually believed in this idea was difficult to tell. Even so, his three-dimensional policy would have been far from meeting an expectation among his center-to-leftist audiences in Latin America. First, the U.S. government attempted to reverse revolutionary trends in the Caribbean and Central America. In El Salvador, it enlarged military and nonmilitary aid to the government, regardless of its highly problematic human rights records. In Nicaragua, the U.S. government accused the

Sandinistas of taking part in the Salvadoran war, demanded a break with Cuba, and sponsored counterrevolutionary groups (). Second, Reagan hoped to garner domestic and international support through public relations campaigns, as well as the

Caribbean Basin Initiative. In collaboration with Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela, the

U.S. president presented this project as a peaceful means to preempt revolutions. The initiative, he believed, would uproot regional poverty and economic dissatisfaction through greater flow of trade and investment, rather than traditional forms of foreign aids.567

The third and most difficult part was about what to do with Havana. Right after his inauguration, Reagan rejected the cancellation of the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, in which the United States pledged no-invasion in Cuba. “Now that we have no ,” he wrote, “I can see where we have a chance to lose a point by just

566 Minutes, February 10, 1982, p. 19, in folder “NSC 40,” box 91283, NSC-ES-MF, RRL. 567 See esp. Strategy Paper for the NSC and its Executive Summary, [around March 23, 1981], in folder “NSC 6,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL. 222 cancelling the agreement.”568 Haig nonetheless kept insisting on the invasion of Cuba, and assigned Thomas Enders, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, to chair the Restricted Interagency Group (RIG) to probe for military options. But to Haig’s annoyance, the RIG found it too costly to intervene in Cuba, which would involve thousands of U.S. casualties. The number was probably high enough to deter anybody but

Haig in Washington from pondering such operations.569

Instead of a direct U.S. military invasion, the Reagan administration chose to employ a comprehensive set of hostile measures against Cuba as the third pillar of its policy in the region. Washington launched military exercises in the Caribbean Sea, mounted pressure on Latin American countries to cut their relations with Cuba, imposed new restrictions on the activities of Cuban diplomats in the United States, strengthened the economic embargo, and intensified psychological warfare by releasing faked intelligence on the movement of U.S. forces. All these measures intended to exacerbate

“Castro’s paranoia over the likelihood of a U.S. invasion” and force Cuba to divert its limited resources away from greater involvements in Central America.570 As former

568 Handwritten note on Allen to Reagan, January 30, 1981; and Haig to Reagan, “Analysis of the 1962 US-USSR Understanding on Cuba,” January 26, 1981, both in folder “Cuba (01/04/1981- 02/21/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 569 Charles A. Gillespie (executive assistant for Thomas Enders), interview transcript, pp. 236-37, FAOH. See also, Joe David Glassman (State Department policy planning staff), interview transcript, pp. 21-23, FAOH; and Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 127-29; and Robert C. McFarlane with Zofia Smardz, Special Trust (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994), pp. 177-181. For the White House’s objection to Haig’s activities, see also Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 366-69. 570 Richard Allen’s Briefing Book for NSC Meeting on February 6, 1981, in folder “NSC1,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL. For Cuba’s views of anti-Castro policies, see Sánchez-Parodi, “The Reagan-Castro Years,” p. 264-69. 223

USINT chief Wayne Smith wrote in his memoir, the basic assumption of this policy was that Washington could intimidate Havana to change its behavior.571

Cuba and the Soviet Union React

Even before Reagan implemented his anti-Cuban policies, Castro was already shifting his goals in Central America. Once the final offensive fell apart and Reagan took power, Cuba suspended the flow of military aid to the guerillas in El Salvador and started to call for a reduction of U.S.-Cuban tensions. Havana appeared ready to settle for something less than victory in El Salvador if this concession would help to preserve the revolutionary government in Nicaragua, promote a negotiated peace in El Salvador, and avert a U.S. attack on Cuba itself.572 U.S. officials were aware of Havana’s new moves, as they commented at the joint U.S.-British-Canadian talk.573 Even the hawkish Haig wrote in his memoir that the flow of arms into Nicaragua and El Salvador “slackened” as

Havana and Moscow supposedly “had received and understood the American message.”574

571 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 245. 572 Ibid., pp. 241-42; and Wayne Smith to Haig, March 21, 1981, in folder “Cuba (02/14/1981- 04/17/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 573 John Bushnell’s remark in Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Havana, April 16, 1981, vol. 22007, 20- Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. 574 Haig, Caveat, p. 131; and Wayne Smith to Haig, et.al., June 1, 1981, in folder “Cuba (05/22/1981- 06/02/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. See also, Oñate, “Red Affairs,” p. 146. 224

But Washington saw Havana’s gestures as simply signs of weakness that had to be exploited further. 575 Washington was satisfied with the deterioration in Cuban relations with Jamaica, Venezuela, Peru, and several other Latin American countries.576

Convinced of the utility of their public relations campaigns, some emboldened U.S. officials began to doubt the degree of Soviet commitment to the defense of Cuba, much less to the fighting of El Salvador.577 Equally remarkable were Cuba’s economic difficulties. After all, the structural problems that helped to cause the Mariel boatlift remained, including low productivity and low morale among workers.578 Indeed, the

Mexican embassy in Cuba observed that Havana’s mobilization of the population for national defense had consumed considerable resources, suspended economic activities, and squandered “the expectation of the improvement of the living condition of the Cuban population.”579

That Washington intensified its anti-Cuban campaigns, instead of reciprocating

Havana’s gestures, must have irritated the Cuban leader. For a while Castro moderated his rhetoric to avoid inflaming U.S.-Cuban tensions.580 Yet in his July 26, 1981, speech,

Castro exploded in anger by charging the Reagan administration with introducing an

575 Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Havana, April 16, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. 576 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 371-72. 577 Paula Dobriansky to Allen, “Soviet Defense Commitment to Cuba,” March 25, 1981, in folder “Cuba (02/14/1981-04/17/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 578 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 372-73, 405-6. 579 Informe, attached to the Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, October 12, 1982, III-3552- 1, AHGE. 580 Speech by Fidel Castro, April 16, 1981, April 19, 1981, Discursos. 225 epidemic of dengue fever that had killed 113 people, including 81 children.581 Even harsher was his remark at the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting in Havana on

September 15. “The U.S. system is not fascist,” he said, “but…the group that constitutes the main nucleus of the current U.S. administration is fascist; its thinking is fascist.”582 In a private talk with visiting U.S. congressmen a week later, Castro expressed his wishes to resume dialogue with Washington.583 But in less than a month, when two U.S. columnists wrote in about “another Cuban foreign intervention” by five-to-six hundred special forces in Nicaragua, Castro’s anger went over its limit. He publicly accused Washington of manufacturing “a huge lie” to justify its anti-Cuban policies.584

Castro could not afford to ignore such a baseless allegation, due to his belief that

Reagan would use it as a pretext for military actions. No less worrisome were the statements by Secretary Haig. In his September 1981 meeting with Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko in New York, the secretary of state denied any intention of intervening in Cuban internal affairs. But more than attacking Soviet deliveries of weapons to the island, he claimed that Cuba’s international activities posed “a major

581 The number of casualties increased to 158, and 101 were children. The U.S. government categorically denied any responsibility for this outbreak of the epidemic by pointing out Cuba’s mismanagement. For U.S. views, see State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs, “Case Study of Cuban Hypocrisy: The 1981 Dengue Epidemic in Cuba,” December 1985.

582 Speech by Fidel Castro, September 15, 1981, LANIC. 583 Vance Hyndman to Edward J. Derwinski and George E. Danielson, “Castro meeting,” September 28, 1981, in folder “Cuba (9/30/1981-10/8/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. Allen sent this to Reagan for weekend reading. 584 WP, October 19, 1981, p. A15; and Speech by Fidel Castro, October 24, 1981, LANIC. Cuban officials told Canadian diplomats that the speech was mandatory reading for understanding the outline of Cuban domestic and foreign policy. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, October 28, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. Castro’s anger blew up in front of the Soviet ambassador in Havana. “This is a shameless and gross lie!” Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, p. 262. 226 threat” to the United States.585 Then, less than two weeks after the appearance of the

Washington Post column, Haig publicly declared that the administration had completed

“extensive studies” on ways to thwart Cuban intervention in the Western Hemisphere.586

Havana quickly reacted to this statement by resorting to the massive mobilization of reservists and deploying troops along the coasts.587

When the escalation of U.S.-Cuban tensions appeared to go out of control, the

Soviet Union intervened. In his letters to Reagan, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev repeatedly urged Reagan to stop anti-Cuban campaigns in favor of the normalization of diplomatic relations. “This is a dangerous, slippery road,” Brezhnev claimed. “At the same time, we are convinced that any step by the U.S. towards normalization of relations with Cuba would find an appropriate response on the part of that country.”588 When tensions nonetheless escalated, Moscow’s attitudes became more forceful. The Soviet

Union demanded Washington’s compliance with the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, amplified its military supplies to Havana, and dispatched new MiGs to the island for its defense. Haig finally relented, although he continued to advocate anything short of an invasion.589 By this time Reagan was wary of the prospect of a war, as well as

585 Quoted in “Your Presentation to Gromyko, January 26, 1982, Checklist,” January 15, 1982, U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act Virtual Reading Room (hereafter DOS-FOIA). 586 WP, October 30, 1981, p. A9. 587 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 263-64. Havana was closely following Haig’s moves and statements, as well as the U.S. military maneuver in the Caribbean. 588 Brezhnev to Reagan (unofficial translation), October 15, 1981, in folder “USSR 8106115,” box 37, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files (hereafter NSC-ES-HS), RRL; and Brezhnev to Reagan (unofficial translation), December 1, 1981, in folder “USSR 8190038, 8190057,” box 37, NSC-ES-HS, RRL. 589 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, p. 264; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 26, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. For Haig’s advocacy for the use of force, 227 the public perceptions of him being a warmonger. Encouraged by Mexican President José

López Portillo, Washington agreed to send Haig to Mexico City for a meeting with

Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez.590

No Meeting of Minds

Reagan finally agreed to try diplomacy but only to demand a radical change in

Cuban foreign relations. He apparently thought that Havana might take this offer because

“Castro is in trouble—his popularity is fading, the [economy] is sinking and [the] Soviets are in no position to help.”591 The Haig-Rodríguez talk in Mexico City produced no meeting of minds. Haig reassured Rodríguez that Washington did not challenge the internal social system in Cuba, while stressing that the United States was capable of coexisting with China, Yugoslavia, and other communist countries. “I do not believe that

President Reagan has some kind of preconceived notion regarding the social system in

Cuba,” he said. “This must be determined by the people of Cuba.”592

The dialogue essentially ended here. Despite his gesture to Cuba’s sensitivity to its claim of national sovereignty, Haig then demanded that Cuba change its foreign policy to make U.S.-Cuban coexistence possible. In reply, Rodríguez claimed that Cuba’s

see his comments in Minutes, NSC 24, November 10, 1981. For CIA’s analysis of Soviet-Cuban relations, see CIA, “Cuba-USSR: Vulnerabilities in the Next Six Months,” February 12, 1982, CREST, NARA. 590 López Portillo, Mis tiempos, pp. 1047, 1053-54, 1063-65, 1082, 1094. See also, Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 250. 591 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, p. 101. 592 Memcon (Haig, Rodríguez), November 23, 1981, p. 209, in Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996): pp. 207-215. This version was translated from Spanish to Russian, and to English. 228 foreign affairs, including Havana’s solidarity with Third World countries and ties to the

Soviet Union, were non-negotiable. Cuba would not sacrifice these “principles” just for the sake of improving relations with the United States.593 Another clandestine meeting in

March 1982 of Vernon Walters with Fidel Castro in Havana also failed to break this deadlock. Walters later wrote in his memoir that Castro repeated, “Everything is negotiable.” Yet, Walters thought the Cuban leader was contradicting this word by stating that he would continue to ally with the Soviet Union and Third World revolutionaries.

Therefore, Walters concluded, the Cuban leader was not serious about the dialogue, but merely interested in buying time.594

Canadian diplomatic records indicate that Walters’s conclusion was imprecise.

Despite its rhetoric and open defiance, Cuba was in fact ready to compromise its foreign policy, not as the result of U.S. pressure but as the practical necessity for negotiated peace in Central America. On November 24, 1981, just a day after the Mexico City talks,

Rodríguez met with the Canadian ambassador in Havana and proposed what he called a

“global accord.” The essence of this proposal was mutual non-intervention from outside the region. Cuba would renounce its support for the revolutionaries. In return, the United

States would give a security guarantee to Nicaragua, stop aiding the Salvadoran junta, and work on a negotiated settlement in El Salvador and “democracy” in Guatemala.595

593 Ibid., esp. pp. 212-13. See also, Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 170-72; Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 379-380; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 228-230. 594 Vernon Walters, The Mighty and the Meek: Dispatches from the Front Line of Diplomacy (London: St. Ermin’s, 2001), pp. 152-56. See also, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 381-84; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 230-33. 595 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 27, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. 229

The Canadian ambassador found the proposal favorable to Cuba, but still promising enough to form a basis for the start of a U.S.-Cuban dialogue.596 Ottawa soon sent this information to Washington. To reinforce its sincerity, furthermore, Cuba informed

Wayne Smith, chief of the USINT in Havana, that it had suspended all shipment of military equipment to Nicaragua.597 Cuba was also urging the Salvadoran government to initiate dialogue with its revolutionary opposition.598

Washington apparently did not respond to this proposal.599 Perhaps, the U.S. government was unable to consider any gestures from Castro because of a deep-seated suspicion about his motivation.600 Yet given the nature of Cuba’s proposal, the question was also about whether Washington could allow social and political changes to evolve without outside interference, including its own.601

Thus, it is important to explore what Washington was thinking about Central

America and the Caribbean. In early November, top U.S. officials had important

596 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 30, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. Numerous Canadian records indicate that Cuba expected that Canada would play a constructive role as a back channel to the United States. Because of its support for a negotiated peace in Central America, Ottawa was closer to Havana than Washington on this issue. Months later U.S. visitors in Cuba heard of a similar Cuba’s proposal. See LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 234.

597 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, p. 254. 598 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, December 3, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. 599 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, December 21, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. 600 Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 65-66. William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh take the similar view to reiterate Washington’s ideological preconception that Havana had no interest in the talks. See their work, Back Channel, pp. 234-36. 601 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, December 21, 1981, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. 230 discussions on U.S. policy toward the region. After subsequent NSC meetings, Reagan concluded on January 4, 1982, that it was necessary to “assist in defeating the in El Salvador” and “oppose actions by Cuba, Nicaragua, or others” aiding the leftist insurgents. To this end, the U.S. president authorized a comprehensive set of U.S. policies, including the increased military and economic assistance to the Salvadoran government, military training and support for Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, the tightening of the embargo on Cuba, and contingency plans for direct military actions against Cuba and Nicaragua.602 While spearheading a counterrevolutionary war in

Central America, the Reagan administration designated Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, halted the commercial air link between Miami and Havana, and re-imposed new sanctions on U.S. citizens travelling to Cuba.603

The fact that the Castro-Walters meeting took place even as Reagan was implementing these measures suggests that he was unwilling to consider U.S. withdrawal from the region, with or without Cuban compromises. To satisfy Washington, Havana would have had to cut ties with the Soviet Union and abandon revolutionary allies in the region. Otherwise, even if Havana was ready to modify its foreign policy to some extent,

602 National Security Decision Directive (hereafter NSDD) 17, January 4, 1982; and Follow-up Note, January 13, 1982, in folder, “January 13, 1982,” box 2, William Clark Files, RRL. Other measures included: creation of public information task force; emergency economic assistance; renewal of intelligence gathering; and enhancement of U.S. military preparedness. Some items remain classified in NSDD 17, but appear in Follow-up Note. 603 Trying to impede Cuba’s exports, the United States also demanded that its trade partners sell products that contained no Cuban nickel. Washington also allowed the 1977 fishing agreement to lapse by refusing to reopen the talk with Havana. 231 it was unlikely to be enough.604 When Havana categorically refused these demands, U.S. policymakers found it convenient to claim that Castro had no interest in talks whatsoever, citing his ideology and anti-U.S. sentiment.605

This episode makes clear that the U.S. and Cuban governments continued to fight over importan foreign policy interests. Nevertheless, the fact that Reagan and Castro explored talks was still noteworthy. The U.S. government did not demand changes in the internal affairs of Cuba, as it would do in later years. Haig did not lie to Rodríguez. The

Reagan files of 1981-1982 contain little evidence to suggest that the administration actively worked to topple the Castro regime in the short span. If the CIA reported on

Cuba’s vulnerabilities at home, for example, its chief aim was to explore ways to exploit

Cuba’s domestic difficulties for the purpose of undermining Cuba’s foreign policy, not vice versa.606 Internal change in Cuba might have been desirable. Yet, the principal focus of Washington remained on Cuba’s foreign affairs, not its internal affairs. Reagan’s supporters in Miami had different ideas.

604 Lars Schoultz also points to a series of bureaucratic problems exacerbated by change of personnel as another factor. But this author found little documentary support for this assertion. Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 384-86. Wayne Smith suspected that Reagan simply wanted “a charade” to give the impression that diplomatic attempts were made. Wayne Smith, Closest of Enemies, pp. 257-58. This author’s view is that Reagan had not noticed that his goal of breaking Cuban-Soviet ties through verbal persuasion was unattainable in the first place. 605 On Cuba’s repeated proposal for U.S.-Cuban dialogue, see for example, Shultz to Ferch, “Weicker- Castro Conversation,” April 7, 1983, in folder “Cuba (1/5/1983-5/9/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL; Canadian Embassy in Havana to Ottawa, May 25, 1983, June 8, 1983, vol. 19386, 20-Cuba-1-3, part 16, RG25, LAC; MH, June 17, 1983, p. 1A; and Transcript of interview with Fidel Castro, in Cuba Update 4, no. 4 (August 1983), Supplement, pp. 1-7. 606 CIA, “Cuba: Tactics and Strategy for Central America,” August 1982, DDRS; and CIA, “Cuban Actions Inimical to U.S. Interests,” November 9, 1982, CREST, NARA. 232

Ronald Reagan and Miami Cubans

In Miami, Reagan’s Cuban policy rekindled the counterrevolutionary dream of

Castro’s overthrow. Many anti-Castro organizations declared support for Reagan, such as the National Association of Cuban American Women, a nonprofit and nonpartisan group aiming to protect the rights of minorities and women. “Support President Reagan’s foreign policy,” its pamphlet stated, “which… has imparted dignity to the fact that we face up to communism every day.”607 Numerous stories and cartoons that depicted the

U.S. president as a friend, ally, and “superhero” appeared in Spanish-language tabloids, newspapers, and magazines.608 In the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections, 90 percent of votes cast by Miami Cubans went to Reagan.609 Numerous Cuban Americans readily took diplomatic and foreign policy posts. For example, Otto Reich became head of the State

Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy. José Sorzano served as deputy chief of the

U.S. mission to the United Nations and later Latin America specialist for the NSC.

Reagan was popular not only because he was an anticommunist warrior, but also because he was respectful of Miami Cubans, who strongly felt that they had been victimized by the Mariel boatlift. The image of Cubans in the United States had plummeted nationwide, as report after report on Cubans detailed crime, rape, mental

607 Ana María Perera to Reagan with Brochure, July 29, 1981, #034899, Federal Government Organizations 006-01, WHORM: Subject File, RRL. 608 Many of them are available at the University of Miami’s Cuban Heritage Collection and the Florida International University’s Special Collections. See also, Hideaki Kami, “Ethnic Community, Party Politics, and the Cold War: The Political Ascendancy of Miami Cubans, 1980-2000,” Japanese Journal of American Studies 23 (2012), pp. 191-93. 609 García, Havana USA, p. 146. 233 health problems, unemployment, and gang violence.610 Typical headlines of U.S. newspaper articles were: “Miami’s Agony,” “America’s New Bandidos,” and “Castro’s

‘gifts’ filling New York jails.”611 According to a public opinion poll in 1982, the U.S. public viewed Cubans as the least welcome migrants in U.S. history.612 With Al Pacino starring as a Mariel Cuban who turned into a drug kingpin, Brian de Palma’s ultraviolent movie Scarface capitalized on this popular anti-Cuban sentiment. “Think about it,” De

Palma exclaimed in an interview, “CUBANS! ! AL PACINO! MACHINE

GUNS! GIRLS! WOW! That’s what I want to see.”613

In contrast, Reagan continued to call Miami Cubans “freedom fighters.” His participation in Cuba’s “independence” day was only one of many indications of his deep sympathy for Miami Cubans. “I’ve always thought,” Reagan later wrote in his memoir,

“[that] it was a tragic error for President Kennedy to abandon the Cuban freedom fighters during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.” Kennedy’s decision not to send air cover for the invading forces stranded “those courageous men on the beach, letting them die or be captured.” This episode was even more tragic because Kennedy could have at least “let

610 Nick Nichols, “Castro’s Revenge,” Washington Monthly 14 (1982): 38-42; and Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles, pp. 94-95. 611 WP, December 8, 1981, pp. A1-A2; Time, October 12 1981, p. 31; and Chicago Tribune, February 21, 1982, p. 5. 612 Only 9 percent of respondents felt that Cuban migration generally had been “a good thing for the country,” and 59 percent felt it had been “a bad thing.” The approval rate for Cuban migrants ranked last of a total of fifteen immigrant groups included in the survey, much lower than Vietnamese and Haitians. 1982 Roper Reports, quoted in Portes and Stepick, City on the Edge, p. 31. 613 Laurence F. Knapp, ed., Brian de Palma Interviews (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2003), p. 89. Scarface appeared from Universal Studio in 1983. 234 the planes come in and rescue them.”614 It is not difficult to surmise from this recollection that the U.S. president had not forgotten the U.S. role in the invasion nor did he ignore the historical responsibility that Washington might have taken on to regard these Cold

War warriors with respect.

Reagan did not treat all anti-Castro activists equally, however. Already in October

1980, one of the militant groups, Alpha 66, recruited recent Mariel arrivals, trained them in Florida camps, and carried out their first raid against Cuba since 1977, which reportedly killed a Cuban policeman and wounded others. Jimmy Carter’s State

Department again pledged its opposition to such raids and increased the surveillance of

“these anti-Castro terrorist groups.”615 The Reagan administration followed that line, although its rationale might have been less informed by moral standpoints than practicality. Reagan’s national security staff feared that random military operations would draw the United States into not only unexpected military confrontation but also exchanges of terrorism with Cuba. In this scenario, a briefing book stated, the United

States was “much more vulnerable.”616

The Reagan administration did more than monitor the Cuban American community. It also provided information to the Cuban government behind the scenes. On

October 9, 1981, for example, the State Department informed the Cuban foreign ministry

614 Italics mine. Reagan, American Life, p. 472. For other Reagan’s remarks on Cuba and Miami Cubans, see Cuban American National Foundation, Reagan on Cuba (Washington, DC: CANF, 1984). 615 Muskie to Carter, “Transition Issues,” November 10, 1980, NLC-12-13-1-31-9, RAC, JCL. 616 Allen Briefing Book for 6 Feb NSC Meeting, in folder “NSC1,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL. 235 of a counterrevolutionary terrorist’s plan to attack a Cuban airliner in Miami.617 Four days later, Washington notified Havana that the FBI arrested a suspect named Armando

César Santana Alvarez and was going to hold a press conference.618 The FBI also started to arrest members of a terrorist organization named Omega 7, including its leader

Eduardo Arocena, for planning to assassinate Cuba’s UN ambassador Raúl Roa Kourí in

1980.619 The level and consistency of information-sharing and law enforcement might have been far from ideal from Cuba’s perspectives. Yet at one point, Castro referred favorably to this development of U.S.-Cuban cooperation on counterterrorism.620

The Emergence of CANF

With the arrival of Reagan’s presidency and the crackdown on terrorism, political dynamics in Miami favored the appearance of a new organization called Cuban American

National Foundation (CANF).621 Unlike traditional militants and hardliners, the foundation aimed to topple the Castro regime by accumulating power within the U.S. political system instead of raiding the island. This strategy worked well. Within the first

617 Resúmen de los Hechos Más Importantes de la Situación Política de los EE.UU., no. 101, pg. 11, October 9, 1981, MINREX. 618 Resúmen de los Hechos Más Importantes de la Situación Política de los EE.UU., no. 102, pp. 11- 12, October 16, 1981, MINREX. 619 In 1984, U.S. judges pronounced a life sentence on Arocena. See FBI, “Omega 7,” October 29, 1993, obtained from Cuban Information Archives, http://www.cuban-exile.com/doc_001- 025/doc0011.html (accessed November 25, 2009). 620 Fidel Castro’s announcement, December 14, 1984, printed in Bohemia, December 21, 1984, p. 42. 621 For details of this section and others related to CANF, see Kami, “Creating an Ethnic Lobby: Ronald Reagan, Jorge Mas Canosa, and the Birth of the Foundation,” in Andrew L. Johns and Mitchell Lerner, eds., The “Tocqueville Oscillation”: The Intersection of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), currently revising for publication. 236 few years after its birth, the foundation cemented its position as the most influential

Cuban American group in the United States. Based on interviews with Washington officials and media reports, many previous studies attribute the success of the foundation to its connection with Reagan Republicans.622 Indeed, Reagan welcomed and supported the foundation’s activities in numerous ways. Most importantly, the foundation gained access to his top-level advisers and at times, the president himself.

But little known was the emergence of the foundation as a product of anti-Castro hardliners’ reactions to Cuba’s public relations efforts in the United States. In the late

1970s, these activists recognized that the Cuban government intensified its approaches to various U.S. sectors, including Cuban émigré society, to facilitate an improvement of

U.S.-Cuban relations. They saw numerous trips made by U.S. politicians, business people, and tourists to Cuba with much chagrin. They also felt that Castro was utilizing human rights issues, something that nobody could contest, to neutralize their opposition to a

U.S.-Cuban dialogue—to some extent in collaboration with Jimmy Carter. The 1978

Havana-Miami dialogue was a shocking event for Mas Canosa, to-be chair of CANF, who acknowledged that it was Castro’s victory and their defeat. Mas Canosa and his friends started to explore ways to stem this seemingly inevitable trend for a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement.623

622 Torres, Mirrors, p. 115; Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo, pp. 32-36; and Arboleya, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos, pp. 178-79. These authors give the impression that the inspiration for the foundation came from U.S. officials such as national security adviser Richard Allen and CIA director William Casey. 623 Kami, “Creating an Ethnic Lobby.” 237

CANF would have emerged as one of the first nationwide Cuban American political groups with or without Reagan’s assistance, although the latter was critical to the foundation’s early success. Carlos Salman, long-time Republican activist and CANF’s founding member, had contact with Richard Allen, who was to be Reagan’s first national security adviser. Allen not only endorsed the idea of forming a Cuban American lobby, but he also agreed to meet with the group a couple of times during the 1980 campaign. At the same time the group looked to more than Reagan Republicans for assistance. José

Ruiz Rodríguez, another CANF founding member, brought in his Jewish friend, Barney

Barnett, who in turn introduced the group to Tom Dine, executive director of the

American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It was this most powerful Jewish lobby group that set up the orientation seminars for all CANF directors and taught them how to lobby Washington. Barnett also played another important role; he gave the name of CANF to the group.624

CANF was born on July 6, 1981, as an organization working “to advise, educate, and otherwise inform the public of the advantages of a democratic form of government and the threat by communistic forms of government in the Western Hemisphere, such as those represented by the country of Cuba.”625 Mas Canosa became the first chairman.

Born in Santiago de Cuba, he had criticized the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, left

Cuba in opposition to Fidel Castro, and joined the Bay of Pigs invasion, although he never landed at the island. After his brief service for the U.S. military, he continued to

624 Ibid. See also, Vargas Llosa, El exilio indomable, p. 121. 625 Articles of Incorporation, July 6, 1981, and By-laws of CANF, Article 2, in folder “Incorporation and By-Laws,” box 1.04, CANF Archive. 238 engage himself in anti-Castro organizations such as RECE. Meanwhile, Mas Canosa also advanced his career to be president of Church and Tower, a firm of engineering contractors. Benefitting from ethnic solidarity, language abilities, and a variety of different forms of government and nongovernment assistance, he and the other sixteen businessmen apparently achieved the “American Dream” in just one generation.626

Because of this background, the members of CANF found it relatively easy to

“Americanize” anti-Castro politics. These individuals saw little contradiction in asking for the help of the U.S. government to achieve their aims of toppling the Cuban government. Besides, in contrast to diehard militants, they shared a certain degree of pragmatism with the administration, as indicated in a paper written by Mas Canosa days after the 1980 election. In this paper, he analyzed the situation as follows:

While Castro’s Cuba continues in a relentless offensive…the Soviet Union

continues to utilize it’s [sic] Third World proxy, Cuba, to attain further victories

against the West….In the implementation of a policy which could put an end to

such revolutionary adventurism, however, caution must be observed in order to

avoid an open confrontation which could lead to a situation of high tension,

where the use of armed force may become inevitable.

626 “Jorge Mas Canosa,” in Thomas M. Leonard, ed., Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010). (E-Book; accessed October 25, 2014). For a more critical portrait, see for example, Arboleya, Counterrevolution, pp. 228-231. 239

Instead, he proposed that the U.S. government initiate new radio broadcasting to Cuba, which was to be Radio Martí.627

CANF became one of the most powerful ethnic lobbying groups in U.S. history by combining the rising Cuban American economic power with decades-long counterrevolutionary goals. Unlike preceding anti-Castro groups, the foundation was most successful in raising and utilizing funds. Its directors, trustees, and patrons were wealthy business leaders who generously contributed $10,000, $5,000, and $1,000 per year. With numerous luncheons, dinner parties, and fundraising campaigns, CANF gathered $363,709 in the first twelve months after its establishment. Looking to the

AIPAC as a model, the foundation adopted a corporate management structure and built a strong organizational base to utilize resources efficiently. In particular, they set up CANF as a non-profit educational organization to be eligible for tax-exempt status of 501 (c) 3, while using the Free Cuba PAC as a political action committee and the Cuban American

Foundation as a lobbying group. In addition to much sympathy from the president and other high-ranking officials, the financial and organizational strength as an interest group distinguished the foundation from hundreds of other anti-Castro organizations that had appeared since 1959.628

CANF also had its bipartisan allies in the U.S. Congress, such as Florida Senator

Paula Hawkins, Miami congressman Dante Fascell, and other members of the Florida

627 Italics added. Mas Canosa, Back-Up Paper, November 10, 1980, folder “Radio Free Cuba (5),” box OA 90051, Carnes Lord Files, RRL. 628 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, April 20, 1982, and CANF Financial Report, August 11, 1982, both in folder “Minutes, 1981-1985,” box 1.04, CANF Archive. Some directors contributed much more than the minimum of $10,000. 240 delegation. But outside Florida the foundation had to overcome North Americans’ stereotype of Miami Cubans as terrorists and drug traffickers, the image reinforced by newspaper reports and movies like Scarface.629 Thus, while trying to compete with the

Cuban government in Havana, the foundation incessantly invited senators and representatives—along with their families—to Miami, where they enjoyed generous fundraising events and comfortable stays in winter. The directors of CANF were all men, yet according to Irma Mas Canosa, wife of Jorge Mas, their wives had an important role to play at parties. They tried to present “the best face” of Cubans as “united and civilized” to convince the invitees that they were “ordinary” American families and their cause was therefore “American.”630

By the time Reagan prepared for his 1984 reelection campaign, the White House could not miss the growing presence of CANF, as well as Reagan’s popularity among

Miami Cubans. Approached by Michael Deaver, White House’s deputy chief of staff,

CANF proposed that the U.S. president join Miami Cubans to celebrate Cuba’s formal independence on May 20, 1983. But when Mas Canosa and Deaver met to discuss this idea, there emerged a disagreement on one issue; Deaver insisted that the Republican

Party of Dade County had to be the host of the event, whereas Mas Canosa demanded that the event had to be nonpartisan since it was a patriotic event. The meeting went nowhere, and Mas Canosa stood up. “Well, when you are ready, let us know.” Three weeks later the White House came back to the foundation. CANF became “the sole

629 Pepe Hernández, interview, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. 2, pp. 1473-74; and Vargas Llosa, El exilio indomable, p. 130. 630 Irma Santos de Mas Canosa (wife of Jorge Mas Canosa), interview, Luis J. Botifoll Oral History Project (hereafter LBOHP), UM-CHC. 241 sponsor” of the event. As such, the foundation would choose whom it could invite. The

White House would make sure that there was no sign appearing on the backdrop on the

Dade County Auditorium except for the foundation’s one.631

Reagan’s visit to Miami on May 20, 1983, became the biggest public relations coup for the foundation. Various small Cuban American organizations still advocated

U.S.-Cuban dialogue, family reunification, and the lifting of the embargo.632 But their demonstrated power was not comparable to that of CANF, which could not only sponsor the presidential visit to Miami, but also negotiate over the terms of the visit with the

White House. Rather than a puppet of the Reagan administration, the foundation acted on its own purpose, capitalized on Reagan’s popularity among Miami Cubans, and turned its access to the Reagan administration into its claim to the sole authority among Miami

Cubans.

Radio Martí as Gospel of Freedom

In October 1983, in collaboration with Mas Canosa’s CANF, the Reagan administration won congressional approval for Radio Martí, a U.S.-sponsored radio broadcaster to Cuba. The administration viewed propaganda campaigns as a central component of its Cuban policy, partly because Reagan saw the Cold War as a conflict of

631 Kami, “Creating an Ethnic Lobby.” See esp. Memorandum of Understanding for Miami Event, May 20, 1983, May 13, 1983, in folder “Cuba/ Jorge Mas,” box 1, Series 7, Paula Hawkins Papers, Winter Park Public Library (hereafter WPPL). 632 Cuban American Coordinating Committee, with a Statement of Purpose, May 16, 1983, in folder “98th-1st-1983 Cuba,” box 2480, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. 242 ideals and worldviews as much as it was a clash of arms and interests.633 Reagan and his officials believed that by directly sending “true” information to Cubans on the island, the

United States could convince them to stand up against Castro for their rights and freedom as well as an affluent and “better” American way of life. After abandoning military intervention as infeasible in the short term, Washington considered radio broadcasting a long-term effort intended to encourage an ultimate transition to U.S.-led democracy and a reinstatement of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere.

Initially, however, Reagan Republicans envisioned this radio broadcasting mainly as an instrument for breaking Cuba-Soviet ties. In the above-mentioned Santa Fe report of May 1980, Roger Fontaine, who later became a member of Reagan’s national security staff in charge of Latin American affairs, advocated new radio broadcasting to Cuba, declaring that “if propaganda fails, a war of national liberation against Castro must be launched.” But regardless of such confrontational rhetoric, the report also recommended that Washington promise “generous” assistance to Havana if the latter decide to terminate its alliance with Moscow. “U.S. assistance,” it stated, “should go well beyond what even the Castro regime is demanding as an American step toward normalization of relations.”634 Once the Soviet Union disappeared, Fontaine came out in opposition to Mas

Canosa by advocating the end to the U.S. embargo on Cuba.635

633 On Reagan, see Reagan, American Life. See also, , The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), chap. 6; and James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The and American Foreign Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996). 634 Committee of Santa Fe, A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties (Washington, DC: Council for Inter-American Security, 1980), pp. 46-47. 635 Fontaine and William Ratliff, “Liberate Cuba. Liberate Us. Lift the Embargo, Now; Conservatives, Lead the Way,” NYT, February 17, 1994. Academic OneFile. Web. (accessed September 16, 2014). For 243

In contrast, Mas Canosa and his supporters aimed for much more than a change of foreign policy in Cuba. Referring to the Mariel boatlift, his November 1980 memorandum highlighted “a marked desire within the Cuban population to increase anti- government activities of a disruptive nature.” For him, the purpose of new, powerful radio broadcasting to Cuba was to “respond encouragingly to the highly motivated opposition to Castro’s regime.” Mas Canosa sought to stimulate internal discontent and help it to topple the Cuban government. He would have supported the termination of the

Havana-Moscow alliance only if it would fit within the greater purpose of regime change.636

Of course, as long as Cuba remained allied with the Soviet Union, these differences did not affect the collaboration between the Reagan administration and Miami

Cubans. These two lines of purpose often merged into an attack on the same enemy.

While considering Mas Canosa’s report and others, the NSC staff concluded that Radio

Free Cuba, a U.S.-sponsored radio broadcaster, was “vital to U.S. interests.” Modeled on

Radio Free Europe, this planned radio broadcast intended to break the monopoly on communications in Cuba. In the long run, it would hopefully create “the conditions necessary for an upheaval to occur―an upheaval that would fundamentally alter the character of the Cuban regime.”637 By October 1981, when the administration announced

his earlier views, Fontaine, On Negotiating with Cuba (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Research, 1975). 636 Mas Canosa, Radio Free Cuba “Project,” November 10, 1980, in folder “Cuba (5/22/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. Richard Allen forwarded Mas Canosa’s proposal to Fontaine. 637 Fontaine and Carnes Lord to Allen, March 24, 1981, in folder “Cuba/ Broadcasting/ Radio Free Cuba (5),” box 90125, Roger Fontaine Files, RRL. 244 this project, the NSC staff further elaborated its organization, budget, programming, and schedule of implementation.

The next step was to set up the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, a special advisory board to undertake further preparation for Radio Free Cuba. The NSC staff wanted to make sure that each member of the commission not only shared “the administration’s general philosophy on foreign policy,” but also represented no

“particular faction of the exile community” in order to avoid being hijacked for particular political purposes.638 The administration’s choice for a Cuban American representative was Mas Canosa, who was not an American citizen at that time but gained a strong endorsement by Florida Senator Paula Hawkins.639 Along with the other nine conservative U.S. citizens on the commission, Mas Canosa, himself a specialist on propaganda, gained an official title in government and started to play an insider-role in preparing for the radio broadcasting, now known as Radio Martí.640

The final step was to gain Congressional support for providing the radio broadcasting with a budget. CANF lobbied intensively, but faced opposition from the

National Association of Broadcasters that expressed concerns about the Cuban government’s capability of jamming U.S. radio airwaves. Teaming up with powerful

638 Carnes Lord and Fontaine, “Suggested Initiative: Radio Free Cuba,” in Allen to Haig, June 2, 1981, in folder “Cuba/Broadcasting/ Radio Free Cuba (4),” box 90125, Roger Fontaine Files, RRL. 639 Hawkins to Allen, September 25, 1981, in folder “Cuba-Radio Broadcasting/ Radio Martí (2)”; and Hawkins to Allen, October 23, 1981, in folder “Cuba-Radio Broadcasting/ Radio Martí (1),” both in box 90125, Roger Fontaine Files, RRL. Hawkins later lobbied the INS and FBI to speed up the process of Mas Canosa to be a naturalized U.S. citizen. Hawkins to John Gossart, November 18, 1981; and Hawkins to Bill Garvey, November 20, 1982, both in folder “Cuba/ Jorge Mas,” box 1, Series 7, Paula Hawkins Papers, WPPL. 640 See Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba, Final Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982). 245 farm lobbies, which represented interests of agricultural businesses that relied on radio information on weather, the association mobilized their allies in the U.S. Senate and defeated a move to call up Radio Martí in the autumn of 1982. Regardless, the bill passed in the next autumn. Foes and friends of the new radio initiative eventually agreed on a compromise. The U.S. government would procure five million dollars to compensate U.S. radio stations in case of Cuba’s jamming and would place Radio Martí under the VOA and an advisory board to guarantee its political neutrality and operational effectiveness.641

Radio Martí became the first major achievement for CANF, which spent around

$2.5 million in its lobbying efforts. The foundation’s booklet claimed, “Now Radio Martí is a beautiful reality,” making “a substantive contribution for the cause of Free Cuba.”642

Although this early victory would have been unattainable without the support of the administration, CANF increased its credibility of power among Miami Cubans and further strengthened the anti-Castro movement. Many deepened their sense of political efficacy and became more inclined to vote for politicians who paid attention to their feelings against the Cuban government.643 The administration welcomed this trend. By selecting Mas Canosa as chair of the Presidential Advisory Board, Washington chose him

641 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 402-4; Daniel C. Walsh, An Air War with Cuba: The United States Radio Campaign against Castro (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2012), pp. 78-87; and Fredrick, Radio Wars, pp. 31-37. For the amount of spending, see Jacqueline Tillman to McFarlane, “Cuban- American Agenda,” January 16, 1985, in folder “Cuba (12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 642 Jacqueline Tillman to McFarlane, “Cuban-American Agenda,” January 16, 1985, in folder “Cuba (12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL; and CANF, Radio Martí ya es una realidad…! (Washington, DC: CANF, ca. 1984).

246 as a leader of Miami Cubans and made “an important symbolic commitment” to his followers.644

Migration as Reagan’s Achilles Heel

Whereas Reagan promoted Radio Martí, his administration still suffered from the disastrous legacy of the 1980 Mariel boatlift. In the early 1980s, Washington repeatedly demanded that Havana accept thousands of Mariel Cubans without precondition, but to little avail. This inability to solve the ongoing migration problems amplified the political, economic, and psychological baggage of the Mariel boatlift. The return of Mariel Cubans remained “the most pressing bilateral problem with Cuba,” according to Kenneth

Skoug.645 Yet, Washington’s migration problems were more than this single issue. Aware of a U.S. vulnerability to similar migration crises, John Bushnell, deputy assistant secretary of state, recalled that he had told Haig that “the ace Castro always had up his

643 Kami, “Ethnic Community.” 644 Walter Raymond, a NSC specialist, strongly opposed this selection precisely because he worried about making a commitment to Miami Cubans. However, Mas Canosa and his congressional allies campaigned hard for this post. Mas Canosa gained endorsement from Hawkins, Dante Fascell, ex- Senator Richard Stone, House Republican leader Bob Michel among others. Raymond to McFarlane, February 14, 1984, in folder “Radio Martí (2/4/1984-3/14/1984),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL. For letters on behalf of Mas Canosa, see Dennis Thomas and David L. Wright to McFarlane, February 9, 1984, in folder “Radio Martí (2/4/1984-3/14/1984),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL; Stone to Clark, September 29, 1983, reproduced in John Elliston, Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda (Melbourne: Ocean, 1999), pp. 222-24; Hawkins to Ed Meese, July 29, 1983, Hawkins to Baker, July 29, 1983; and Hawkins to José Salgado, October 12, 1983, all in folder “Cuba/ Jorge Mas,” box 1, Series 7, Paula Hawkins Papers, WPPL. 645 Kenneth N. Skoug, Jr., The United States and Cuba under Reagan and Shultz: A Foreign Service Officer Reports (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), p. 9. 247 sleeve was sending lots of Cubans to the U.S. as boat people.”646 Another U.S. official also remembers that the prevention of another Mariel was “a major obsession.”647

To capture fully the importance of migration in foreign relations, it is necessary to look at the rising anti-immigrant sentiment in U.S. society. In the early 1980s, poll after poll indicated that the overwhelming majority of U.S. citizens opposed further Cuban migration into the United States.648 Worried about the fiscal strain on already stretched social programs, many Americans also questioned the capabilities of newcomers to become “American.”649 They rallied around new anti-immigration groups such as the

Federation for American Immigration Reform, which started to shape public debate through its well-organized lobbying efforts. Roger Conner, the federation’s executive director, frankly stated that the Mariel boatlift was a “catalyst” to make Americans aware

646 John Bushnell, interview transcript, p. 507, FAOH. 647 G. Phillip Hughes (deputy foreign policy adviser to George Bush, 1981-85), interview transcript, p. 53, FAOH. 648 For example, 71 percent of the respondents of a CBS News and the New York Times survey on June 24, 1980, opposed the settlement of Mariel Cubans into the United States. 73 percent of the Harris poll on July 17, 1980, agreed that it would be wrong to accept so many Cubans into their country at the times of economic troubles at home. 81 percent of the respondents of the Harris Survey on August 26, 1980, viewed negatively of Carter’s handling of the Mariel Crisis. 76 percent of the respondents of the Research Forecasts survey from September to November 1980 agreed that the United States had been too willing to accept Cubans and South Vietnamese as refugees. There was no racial boundary. 78 percent of white respondents and 73 percent of black respondents of the ABC News and the Washington Post survey on March 23, 1981, believed that the U.S. government should discourage Cubans from coming into the United States. All poll data cited here are found in folder “Attitudes on Immigration Prepared by Reagan-Bush ’84 (July 26, 1984),” OA11586, Michael Deaver Files, RRL. 649 Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), chap. 7. 248 of “something they had been reading about and thinking about for a while but not really brought into focus.”650

Although Reagan in principle wanted to reduce the size of the U.S. government, the loss of migration control would have forced him to do the opposite. The costs for the

Cuban-Haitian programs were $425.6 million in FY 1981 and $405.6 million in FY1982.

Thus, Reagan was spending millions of dollars for unwelcome strangers, at the same time that he cut social welfare programs for native-born Americans.651 Washington also faced the demand of state and local governments for compensation for similar expenditures. As of September 1981, the estimated unreimbursed cost for Florida alone in dealing with the

Mariel crisis was over $80 million.652 The presence of criminals, people with mental illness, and children without parents among Mariel Cubans added a special financial burden. The White House and Justice Department continued to discuss options of building and expanding new jails, detention centers, and special facilities across the states, although they would cost additional millions of dollars.653

Due to political and financial pressure, Reagan’s White House set the restoration of migration control as one of its top-priority domestic issues. After a cabinet meeting on

650 U.S. Senate Committee on Judiciary, Annual Refugee Consultation for 1982, 97th Cong., 1st sess., September 22, 1981, p. 296. See also, Reagan, July 30, 1981, APP. 651 Office of U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs, “Report on Costs for Refugees and Cuban and Haitian Entrants,” October 25, 1982, in U.S. Senate Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Refugee Consultation, 97th Cong., 1st sess., September 29, 1982, pp. 33-52. 652 Data by National Association of Counties, September 1981, in U.S. Senate, Annual Refugee Consultation for 1982, p. 179. 653 Edward C. Schmults (deputy attorney general) to James A. Baker III, et. al., March 10, 1982, in folder “Immigration Policy: Cubans and Haitians,” box 10, James W. Cicconi Files, RRL. For discussion on the new detention centers, see other documents in the same file. 249

February 26, 1981, Reagan directed Attorney General William French Smith to establish an inter-agency task force and review five major migration issues, one of which concerned Cuban migration.654 Shortly thereafter, this task force recommended that the

U.S. government allow one-hundred and sixty thousand Cuban and Haitian “entrants,” who came to the United States during the Mariel boatlift, to apply for permanent resident status after residing in the United States for two years. Given the strong anti-immigration feelings, however, it also proposed various measures to deter another possible migration crisis. Aside from strengthening law enforcement capacities, its report suggested the repeal of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act and the closing of the special path toward permanent residency for future Cuban migrants.655

The repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act would have been politically controversial, however. On January 13, 1982, an INS officer detained Andrés Rodríguez

Hernández, a Cuban stowaway, found on a Panamanian vessel in Miami. Although

Rodríguez applied for asylum in the United States, the Justice Department immediately repatriated him to Cuba, making him the first Cuban in decades who failed to remain in the United States.656 Because the State Department confirmed from the Cuban

654 Reagan to William French Smith, et. al., March 6, 1981, in folder “Pending-State Cubans Work File #5, January-December 1981,”in box 2394, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. The five main issues are: (1) flow of aliens (level of immigration and temporary worker program); (2) illegal aliens in the U.S. (legalization); (3) enforcement (employer sanctions; worker ID; expedited legal procedures); (4) Haitian influx; and (5) Cuban refugee policy. 655 William French Smith to Reagan, June 26, 1981, in folder “Immigration and Refugee Matters (3),” OA6518, Edwin Meese Papers, RRL; Craig L. Fuller (Director of Office of Cabinet Administration) for the Cabinet, July 10, 1981, in folder “Immigration and Refugee Matters (Task Force Report),” OA9945, Edwin Meese Papers, RRL; and Speech by Reagan, July 30, 1981, APP. 656 Chronology in Alan C. Nelson (acting commissioner of INS) to William French Smith, January 22, 1982, in folder “Immigration: Cubans/Haitians,” OA11593, Michael Uhlmann Files, RRL; and Memo 250 government that Rodríguez would not be unduly treated, he was unable to establish a

“well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”—a necessary condition for asylum approval under the Refugee Act of 1980. Havana was well aware of the symbolic importance of this deportation. Cuban authorities not only dropped illegal exit charges against

Rodríguez, but also allowed the Miami Herald to interview him and his family in

Havana.657

Yet as often happened, Havana’s satisfaction meant Miami’s resentment. The deportation instigated a riot in Miami; five thousand angry demonstrators clashed with local police officers. In dealing with the crisis, the city of Miami soon established a blue ribbon commission, whose members included Jorge Mas Canosa, and issued a resolution condemning the deportation, instead of the demonstration.658 Angry Miami Cubans also came to meet with White House chief of staff James A. Baker III to convey “the unprecedented rise of anti-Reagan sentiment.”659 Attorney General Smith still defended the deportation as “consistent” with U.S. “policy of discouraging mass migrations to the

United States, like the Mariel boatlift.” 660 But the White House relented; thereafter, all

for William P. Clark, “Repatriation of Cuban Stowaway,” January 29, 1982, in folder “Cuba (1/23/1982-2/1/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 657 MH, January 21, 1982, p. A1; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, January 27, 1982, vol. 22007, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 6, RG25, LAC. 658 City of Miami, Blue Ribbon Committee Report on Miami Cuban Demonstration of January 16, 1982, Miami, July 28, 1982. 659 Elizabeth H. Dole to Baker, January 21, 1982, in folder “Immigration: Cubans/Haitians,” OA11593, Michael Uhlmann Files, RRL. 660 Craig Fuller to William French Smith, January 28, 1982; and Smith to Fuller, February 5, 1982, in folder “Immigration Policy: Cubans and Haitians,” box 10, James W. Cicconi Files, RRL. 251

Cubans, including stowaways, could remain in the United States.661 Further, the White

House blocked Myles Frechette, whom Mas Canosa considered responsible for the deportation, from becoming chief of the USINT in Havana and later from becoming deputy assistant secretary for inter-American affairs.662

After shelving the proposal for repealing the Cuban Adjustment Act, U.S. policymakers looked for other formulas to prevent another possible Mariel. While drawing on the task force report, the State Department continued to devise a contingency plan and made a list of emergency procedures that included a naval blockade of South

Florida. According to its early 1982 memorandum, the Coast Guard would “seal selected southern Florida ports” to prevent all U.S. flag vessels from departing to Cuba in search of their families. Since such a forceful measure would be legally questionable, the memorandum directed the Justice Department to prepare for lawsuits.663 The operation required the cooperation of the state of Florida. Starting in 1983, the federal government and Florida discussed the plan, leading to a simulation exercise in January 1984.664

661 William P. Clark reported to Reagan that nobody would be returned to Cuba. Clark to Reagan, “More Cuban Stowaways,” January 30, 1982, DDRS. 662 Frechette ended up going to Cameroon as ambassador. For this episode, see also Kami, “Creating an Ethnic Lobby.” 663 Clark and William French Smith to Reagan, “Contingency Planning for a Cuban Boatlift,” January 20, 1982, in folder “Cuba (2/8/1982-2/11/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. William Clark reported verbally to Reagan on the summarized version of this report, “Preventing another Mariel,” on February 11, 1982. Handwritten note on William P. Clark to Reagan, “Contingency Planning for a Cuban Boatlift,” February 11, 1982, in folder “Cuba (2/8/1982-2/11/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 664 State of Florida, Background: Mass Immigration Contingency Plan, in folder “Mass Immigration Emergency Plan,” box 7, Governor ’s Office of General Counsel’s Immigration Policy Files, State Archive of Florida (hereafter SAF). 252

Yet even with this envisioned “containment” of Florida, the problem apparently remained unresolved unless Washington discouraged Havana from “using migration as a weapon against the United States.”665 Rumors of a new boatlift periodically circulated in

Miami. On June 10, 1983, the news that a U.S. cabin cruiser was in Varadero, Cuba, possibly preparing to bring Cubans into Florida, recalled a traumatic memory of Mariel.

Washington held an interagency group meeting three days later, and concluded that the

State Department would ask Cuba not to repeat Mariel. “I was appalled,” wrote its Cuban desk officer Kenneth Skoug in his memoir. “If our defense against a ‘Second Mariel’ was to ask Cuban forbearance, we were in bad shape.”666 The specter of another Mariel continued to haunt Washington.

Military Options of Returning “Excludables”

Apparently in Reagan’s mind, the most important migration issue during the first term was how to return thousands of Mariel “excludables,” or those whom the U.S. government considered “ineligible” for resettling in U.S. society. On May 18, 1981, when he received the above-mentioned task force report on immigration, the U.S. president wrote in his diary: “Our 1st problem is what to do with 1000’s of Cubans— criminals and the insane that Castro loaded on refugee boats and sent here.”667 Since then he had kept referring to this issue as if it had been the single most important issue of both

665 Clark and William French Smith to Reagan, “Contingency Planning for a Cuban Boatlift,” January 20, 1982. 666 Skoug, United States, p. 15. 667 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vo. 1, p. 40. 253 migration policy and U.S. relations with Cuba.668 One of the principal reasons why

Reagan accepted Mexico’s suggestion for the opening of the U.S.-Cuban talk at Mexico

City was his desire to solve this problem, as Haig noted in his memoir.669 “Ask him

[Castro] one thing,” said Reagan at one of the NSC meetings. “We’d have a lot better time if they [the Cubans] would take back all those Cubans we have.”670

By then, Mariel “excludables” consisted of three groups. The first group was those who admitted or supposedly admitted to having committed felonies and those whom the INS deemed as excludable under U.S. immigration laws. The second group came from the Fort Chafee and other processing centers. They were those whom the U.S. government found “very hard” to resettle into U.S society due to mental illnesses or criminal records either in the United States or Cuba. The third group was those whom the

INS detained due to their committed crimes after the initial resettlement, although the crimes were not necessarily of the magnitude that would make automatically these people excludable. Once the INS revoked their parole, however, they had to be excluded from the United States as soon as possible.671 The State Department estimated that the cost of

668 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, pp. 54, 55, 56. See also, Portillo, Mis tiempos, p. 1063. 669 Haig, Caveat, p. 133. 670 Minutes, NSC 17, July 7, 1981, p. 12, in folder “NSC 17,” box 91282, NSC-ES-MF, RRL. 671 Unlike deportation hearings, the burden of proof at the exclusionary hearing was on the applicant. For the details of procedure, see Michael Cardozo to Lloyd Cutler and Watson, “Exclusion of Undesirable Cubans from the States,” in folder “Cuban Refugees,” box 178, DPS-Eizenstat, JCL. Hearings proceeded without witnesses and any access to documentation from the Cuban government. When there was insufficient evidence or changed testimony of the witnesses or of the detainee by the time of exclusion hearing, the judge usually found the detainees excludable due to its entrance without proper documents. Detainees suspected on criminal grounds were also sentenced exclusion on “documentary grounds” or lesser offenses. INS officers’ lack of familiarity with Cuban colloquialism and idiom also caused confusion. Rivera, Decision and Structure, pp. 134-35. 254 detaining these Cubans was $10,000 per person per year, but the existence of the third category meant that the number of detainees was likely to increase as time progressed.672

As political and financial pressure mounted, the Reagan administration, particularly Haig’s State Department, examined the military options of sending Mariel

“excludables” back to Cuba.673 According to Gillespie, a participant of the RIG group, they started to sketch the following plan:

In San Francisco Bay, in northern California, there was a number of old Liberty

cargo ships, vessels used during World War II to carry goods back and forth. The

idea would be to take enough of those vessels, deploy them to a port somewhere

along the , and install metal benches on the decks which would

hold as many people as possible. There would be CIA hired or recruited crews to

operate the ships. In the dead of night we would seek court orders through the

Attorney General, take these Cubans out of the federal prisons, bus them, truck

them, or fly them, in chains, to the ships, and put them aboard. Actually, they

would be shackled to the benches. There would be an automatic machine to open

the shackles at a certain moment to release all of them. The Liberty ships would

then leave the U.S. port, go to Varadero Beach on the North Coast of Cuba, in

Matanzas Province and be steered toward the beach, on automatic . The

672 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Issues in United States-Cuba Relations, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., December 14, 1982, pp. 19-20. 673 Mike Guhin to Bud McFarlane, “Return of excludables to Cuba,” February 22, 1982, in folder “Cuba (2/13/1982-11/6/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 255

crews would then be lifted off by helicopters at the last moment. Then, lo and

behold, the ships would hit the beach, and all of these criminal and insane

Marielitos would be back in Cuba.

This discussion was unforgettable for Gillespie. “This subject was discussed in this kind of detail by grown men who…were considered senior executives” of the U.S. government.674 Stephen Bosworth, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, quibbled. “I mean these people all needed adult supervision.” Speaking of the reaction of his boss, Bosworth lamented, “Haig actually said he thought it was a great idea and commended us for our imagination.”675

Declassified secret U.S. records suggest that the civilians were not the only ones who wasted time and resources in such a manner. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) dutifully considered “various imaginative military options” such as the ones of sending them back secretly via small boats, via helicopters, and others. But the JCS ended up rejecting all of these schemes owing to the high risk of Cuban detection, the substantial risk of the loss of lives of both U.S. personnel and migrants, expected negative publicity, low prospect of success, violations of international laws against exposing innocent persons to harm in such an operation, and most importantly, the desire to maintain the

674 Gillespie, interview transcript, pp. 237-38, FAOH. 675 Stephen Bosworth, interview transcript, p. 65, FAOH. See also, Haig, Caveat, p. 137. 256

U.S. commitment to human rights and safety of life at sea. The end could not justify the means, its report concluded.676

Finally by February 1982, the NSC determined the military options as unmistakenly infeasible.677 Meanwhile, the U.S. legal system complicated problems. In

August 1981, federal judge Marvin Shoob questioned the legality of indefinite detention of Mariel “excludables” and directed the U.S. government to initiate a review process for their release.678 This sentence was a victory for civil libertarians, but a nightmare for the

Justice Department, which immediately appealed. “A judge threatens to release them from our jails and turn them loose on society,” an irritated Reagan complained in his diary. “The problem—as yet unsolved is how to return them.”679 But except for the opening of the talk with Havana, what else could he do?

The Reagan administration turned to diplomacy again, but not before halting the immigration visa issuance for Cuban citizens in Havana. The State Department wanted to use this measure as leverage to persuade Cuba to agree on an immigration accord, even though the most affected group was counterrevolutionary ex-prisoners, whom Miami

Cubans regarded as their heroes.680 On May 25, 1983, just five days after Reagan’s visit

676 Working Paper, “Cuban Detainee Repatriation,” n.d., attached to John A. Wickham, Jr. to Weinberger, “Cuban Detainee Repatriation,” November 2, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/5/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 677 See also, Attachment to Background Study on Preventing Another Mariel, n.d., in folder “Cuba (2/8/1982-2/11/1982),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 678 Rivera, Decision and Structure, p. 138. 679 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vo. 1, p. 113. 680 The State Department continued to issue visas for immediate family members of U.S. citizens and permanent residents. State Department, “U.S. Efforts to Negotiate the Return to Cuba of the Mariel excludables,” June 14, 1984, in folder “Cuba (4/27/1984-6/26/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 257 to Miami, Enders met with Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, head of the CUINT in Washington, to remark on this measure, hand over the first list of 789 “excludables,” and repeat the same demand that Havana accept these Cubans without any precondition.681 Apparently, the Cubans were “surprised” that Washington was seeking to resolve this migration issue

“when so many other more urgent matters required addressing.”682 After Havana rejected

Washington’s demand, the State Department again sent a similar note.683

Cuba again refused the U.S. demand and reiterated its position. In its diplomatic note on September 11, 1983, Havana claimed that the U.S. government caused the migration crisis, drove massive propaganda, and welcomed Mariel Cubans to embarrass the revolutionary regime. In Cuba’s views, most Mariel Cubans were “simply a group of persons who were social misfits by choice and devoid of the principles that govern the life of the Cuban national community, who refused to do any useful work or to assume any social responsibility, and some of whom participated in antisocial and criminal activities.” Referring to the hijacking incidents preceding the boatlift, the note argued, the

U.S. government nonetheless presented these elements as “heroes” in front of world opinion only to demand later that Cuba accept some of them. While calling such U.S. behavior “irresponsible,” the note stated that Cuba would be ready to talk about this issue

681 Cable from Washington to Havana, attached to José Viera to Fidel Castro, May 25, 1983, MINREX. 682 Comment by José Arbesú (chief of North American section of the Cuban Community Party’s Central Committee) to Canadian ambassador, in Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, June 2, 1983, vol. 22004, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 7, RG25, LAC. 683 Draft response, attached to José Viera to Rodríguez, May 31, 1983, MINREX; and Diplomatic note (translated in Spanish), July 7, 1983, MINREX. 258 only in the context of comprehensive talks on migration normalization.684 In the face of

Havana’s defiance, Washington’s diplomacy by strength hit a wall.

Conclusion—and Prelude to the Next

Determined to prevent another “defeat” in Latin America, Ronald Reagan targeted Cuba as the principal source of turmoil in Central America. While intensifying its assistance to counterrevolutionary allies in the region, Washington implemented a series of hostile measures against Cuba, escalated regional tensions, and disregarded any

Cuban proposal for a negotiated settlement over Central America. In talks in Mexico City and Havana, Washington avoided interfering in Cuban internal affairs yet demanded that

Havana completely break its ties with Moscow and change its foreign policy. In Miami,

Reagan allied with Cuban counterrevolutionaries. He worked with CANF to create Radio

Martí and prepare for a new campaign of psychological warfare against revolutionary

Cuba.

Multiple domestic and international restraints continued to limit Reagan’s policymaking, however. When Cuba refused to cut its relations with Moscow and revolutionary allies in the Third World, the United States found little it could do. As

Castro mobilized the entire nation to deter possible U.S. aggression, the calculated cost of

U.S. casualties reinforced the administration’s reluctance to commit forces against the island. The Soviet Union repeatedly demanded that Reagan confirm the 1962 Kennedy-

Khrushchev agreement. In dealing with the legacy of the 1980 Mariel boatlift, moreover,

684 Translated Note from Ferch to Shultz, “GOC Response to USG Note on Return of Marielitos,” September 22, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 259

Reagan desperately looked for all military options for sending back thousands of Mariel

Cubans to the island for the first three years. It took a little more time for him to realize that a show of hostility alone would not resolve these issues.

In spite of being a problem whose solution clearly required bilateral cooperation,

Cuba-to-U.S. migration also created a U.S. constituency hostile to any dealings with revolutionary Cuba. Far from being puppets of the Reagan administration, Mas Canosa and his newly-born CANF had their own purposes from the very beginning. They not only capitalized on Reagan’s rhetoric of “freedom,” but also proved willing to go beyond the scheme envisioned by the Reagan administration. Despite a shared ideological hostility toward Castro, anti-Castro activists and U.S. officials often entered into discussions, negotiations, and power struggles, as shown in the deportation of Andrés

Rodríguez Hernández and the May 1983 reception of Reagan in Miami. Although the administration looked to Radio Martí as an instrument intended to press Havana to cut relations with Moscow, Mas Canosa considered it a weapon of regime change. The entrance of counterrevolutionary Cubans into U.S. politics made the story of U.S.-Cuban relations more complex.

260

CHAPTER 6: Reaching Equilibrium

Migration Talks, Propaganda War, and the Future Trajectory of U.S. Relations with Cuba

Only a month after Reagan’s celebration of Cuba’s “independence” day in Miami,

Cuban diplomats advocated upgrading public relations efforts in the United States. In a report to Havana, the Cuban mission to the United Nations worried that U.S. citizens knew little about Cuban society. The U.S. blockade limited the amount of information from the island reaching U.S. citizens, leaving cultural and political activities by Cubans living in the United States as the sole voices. Although artists and writers of Cuban origin claimed to represent “Cuban” culture, the mission lamented, their works exhibited “a permanently negative, distorted, and false image of our realities” and reinforced “anti-

Cuban prejudices that transcend broad sectors of U.S. society.” The mission also referred to the emergence of CANF, which aspired to influence U.S. opinions to support a hostile policy toward the Cuban government.685

The report illustrates how the growing presence of Miami Cubans complicated

Cuba’s political strategies in the United States. Since the late 1970s, the revolutionary government sought to broaden contact with various U.S. sectors, improve its image, and magnify Cuba’s “political influence” in shaping Washington’s Cuba policy. Yet, as

685 Informe (by Cuban Mission to the United Nations), June 29, 1983, Caja “Bilateral 25,” MINREX. The mission recommended an interagency meeting involving the Communist Party, the MINREX, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Higher Education to discuss this issue. 261

Reagan escalated tensions with the island and Miami Cubans consolidated their roles as

“freedom fighters,” Havana was put on the defensive. In May 1985, two years after the above-mentioned memo, the U.S. government launched Radio Martí, a U.S.-sponsored radio broadcaster to Cuba. Washington sided with Miami counterrevolutionaries, notwithstanding Havana’s cooperation over migration issues and intensified public relations efforts.

Based on primary sources in the United States, Cuba, and elsewhere, this chapter reassesses interrelated political dynamics among Washington, Havana, and Miami in the mid-1980s. As noted in previous studies, the escalation of U.S.-Cuban tensions reached a peak with the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada. But this chapter also shows that it was immediately after this invasion that Reagan finally realized the inevitability of negotiation with Castro, no matter how reluctant the U.S. president might have been. To pursue one of his most important agenda items, migration control, Reagan accepted the necessity of talks with Castro, even though such meant a retreat from U.S. policy of hostility toward the island. Aware of this political importance, Havana modified its stance on migration and accepted his offer for talks.686

Reagan’s turn to diplomacy in turn merged with local and global forces, generating new political dynamics across the Florida Straits. Because Havana judged the process of migration talks with Washington as constructive, it doubled advocacy efforts

686 Due to the difficulty in gaining access to historical records, scholarship on U.S.-Cuban relations in this period is scarce. For the best available secondary sources, see Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 390-404; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, esp. pp. 236-246. These works situate U.S.-Cuban relations in the broader context of Central American conflicts, although they reveal little about the process of the 1984 migration agreement, the Radio Martí startup, nor the connection between the two episodes. 262 for a relaxation of U.S.-Cuban tensions in light of promising signs of a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement that appeared around the same time. To attenuate Washington’s hostile attitudes, Castro himself appeared on U.S. media, appealed to U.S. audiences for peace, and repeated overtures for better relations. Across the sea, however, anti-Castro forces in

Miami and their allies in the U.S. Congress intensified their lobbying. With the startup of

Radio Martí, CANF’s Jorge Mas Canosa was trying to ensure that the U.S. government would make a new commitment to “freedom” in Cuba.

This chapter thus illustrates how contradictory impulses from Miami and Havana formidably reinforced the emerging equilibrium in U.S. relations with Cuba. Washington came to terms with the existence of a revolutionary regime in Havana and probed for cooperation on issues of mutual concern such as migration. Yet, by pledging the promotion of Cuba’s “freedom” to Miami Cubans, Washington not only made its cooperation with Havana more difficult, but also made any progress toward diplomatic normalization almost impossible. Even before the Cold War ended, Washington began to set drastic changes in Havana’s internal structure, as well as radical shifts in Havana’s foreign policy, as pivotal preconditions for a substantial improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations. Between Miami and Havana, Washington’s preference was often too clear.

Behind the Curtain of a Cold War Sideshow

U.S.-Cuban relations cooled even after the focal point of Cold War confrontation moved away from the Florida Straits. Although replaced Alexander Haig as U.S. Secretary of State, he struggled to seize the control of the foreign policy agenda

263 from anticommunist hardliners overly obsessed with the red menace across the world.

Meanwhile, Reagan’s dream of “We are all Americans” was falling apart. U.S. support for the United Kingdom in the 1982 Falklands/ Malvinas War alienated most Latin

American countries by shattering the myth of hemispheric defense, a central component of the Monroe Doctrine. Latin America’s debt problems with western banks further exposed a North-South divide between wealthy and poor countries, pushing the latter closer to Cuba. Reagan’s Central American policy, especially his promotion of counterrevolution in Nicaragua, also remained divisive at best.687

For its part, Cuba’s position was far from stable. With its capability of mobilizing

Cuban public support, the Cuban government defied intimidation by the superpower. A series of Reagan’s anti-Cuban policies nonetheless disrupted Cuba’s scarce resources, which could have been used to improve living standards. Along with the Falkland/

Malvinas War, the debt crisis, and the contra war, the democratization processes of Latin

American countries helped Cuba win broader sympathetic audiences in the Western

Hemisphere. To Havana’s disappointment, however, the Soviet Union was losing interest in the region, including the defense of Cuba. At the end of 1982, Moscow conveyed to

Havana that the former was unable to protect the latter forever. Cuba would have to rely

687 The Canadians observed that Cuba was the only winner of the Falkland/ Malvinas War, as it helped to break the isolation in Latin America. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, July 15, 1982, vol.18498, 20-Cuba-1-3, part 15, RG25, LAC. On Shultz’s struggles inside the Reagan administration, see George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribner, 1993), esp. pp. 310-17. On Central America, see William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), esp. chap. 8.

264 on itself in case of emergency.688 This thinking probably shaped Cuba’s response to the

U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983.

The U.S. invasion of Grenada marked a turning point in the Cold War in the

Caribbean. Since the late 1970s, the United States had worried about the radicalization of

Caribbean politics due to population growth, economic difficulties, and social frustration.

The 1979 Grenadian Revolution, led by Maurice Bishop’s New Jewel Movement, and its alliance with the Cuban government alerted Washington to the danger of this leftward trend. Washington tried to preempt another revolution by taking the lead in the Caribbean

Basin Initiative to strengthen security and economic assistance to neighboring countries.

While Bishop pursued the Cuban model and implemented drastic revolutionary programs, the Reagan administration also implemented economic destabilization, conducted military exercises, and made hostile remarks about Grenada. By 1983,

Grenada entered a crisis. As its economic and political order broke down, most of the population became disillusioned with the revolution.689

In late October, Reagan ordered U.S. troops to invade this small island. According to historian Michael Grow, the principal Reagan motivation was his fear of “another

Teheran.” With the presence of 800 U.S. citizens attending a medical school in Grenada, he worried that a hostage crisis like the one in Iran in 1979 might have taken place and provoked a tremendous political disaster. Reagan was also receiving requests for the invasion by Grenada’s neighbors, including Jamaica, Barbados, St. Vincent’s, St. Lucia,

688 Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 216-18. See also, Memcon (Raúl Castro, Andropov), December 29, 1982, WCDA; and Comments by Andropov, in Minutes of Politburo Discussion, May 31, 1983, WCDA.

689 Grow, U.S. Presidents, pp. 139-145. 265

Dominica, and Antigua. The leaders of these countries feared that revolutionary chaos would spread beyond Grenada.690

The invasion was highly popular in the United States and these Caribbean countries, although most of the rest of the world deplored the outright military takeover of the island.691 By achieving a quick victory, the U.S. president secured an image among the U.S. public as a powerful and effective leader and minimized the political impact of the deaths of 262 U.S. troops in Lebanon a few days before. U.S. public approval ratings for Reagan shot up. As the invasion reversed the leftward trend in the Caribbean, moreover, U.S. concerns about another Cuba waned rapidly and Washington’s attention moved to other regions and other issues. The July 1982 replacement of Haig by Shultz at the top of the State Department must have reinforced this shift in priority. The perception of Cuba as a direct national security threat to the United States markedly declined.692

But Cuba did not simply fade into the background. Cuba continued to be a key player in Central America and Southern Africa, where conflicts persisted.693 No less important was the U.S. preoccupation with Cuban migration. Indeed, the U.S. invasion of

Grenada brought to the forefront the issues of Mariel “excludables,” thousands of Mariel

690 According to Michael Grow, this speculation of “another Teheran” was “based entirely on conjecture,” as none of the New Jewel Movement had such plans. Grow, U.S. Presidents, pp. 149-153. Some suspect that the bombing in Lebanon might have tipped the balance for the intervention. But Reagan’s diary appeared to indicate that the U.S. president made a decision prior to the bombing. Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, p. 278. 691 The OAS and the UN General Assembly passed resolutions against the invasion. Franklin, Cuba, pp. 194-96. 692 Grow, U.S. Presidents, p. 158; F. Phillip Hughes, interview transcript, pp. 55-56, FAOH. On the shift from Haig to Shultz, see Skoug, United States, p. i. 693 For Africa, see Gleijeses, Visions. 266

Cubans whom U.S. authorities found it necessary to return to the island. The news that the U.S. occupation forces captured 692 Cubans in Grenada as prisoners of war (POWs) mobilized 189 U.S. senators and representatives. Together they demanded that Reagan seize this “ideal opportunity” to send back Mariel “excludables” to Cuba along with the

POWs. To reinforce this point, the U.S. Senate even adopted an amendment to the debt- ceiling bill trying to hold up repatriation of the POWs until Castro’s acceptance of Mariel

“excludables.”694 It was under such intense congressional pressure that Reagan directed the JCS, the State Department, the Justice Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA to explore a top-secret plan to mix the “excludables” and the POWs.

Declassified U.S. records show how seriously Washington contemplated this exercise. According to a JCS working paper, which someone had to “DESTROY WHEN

NO LONGER NEEDED,” they envisioned the following steps: (1) The U.S. military would force the Mariel detainees to move to U.S.-occupied Grenada, possibly by the use of force; (2) the U.S. navy would lure the Cuban ship Vietnam Herocia in Trinidad and

Tobago to Grenada—possibly using deception—to make Castro (and the International

Committee of the Red Cross) believe that the U.S. government would repatriate the

Cuban POWs via this ship; (3) When the ship approached Grenada, specially trained U.S.

694 Bill McCollum, et. al. to Reagan, October 26, 1983, in folder “CO038 (180000-182499),” WHORM, RRL. See also, Lawton Chiles to Reagan, October 26, 1983; and Chiles to Reagan, October 28, 1983, in the same folder. 267 teams would neutralize it, load the Mariel detainees, and head it toward Cuba, with or without escort.695

This operation was politically costly, legally questionable, and problematic from a humanitarian viewpoint. Under the 1949 Third Convention on POWs, all countries must release and repatriate POWs immediately after the cessation of hostilities without condition. A State Department legal adviser feared that the U.S. operation would create a bad precedent for other nation-states to justify indefinite detention of U.S.

POWs.696 The operation would probably involve casualties if the Cubans resisted, and might cost innocent lives. Washington also feared the possibility that Castro would become aware of such clandestine maneuvers. If he stopped all repatriation, the JCS thought, more unwelcome Cubans would remain in U.S. hands.697 Once again, the U.S. government had to shelve this scheme. Within three weeks of the invasion, therefore,

Reagan sent back the POWs alone.

But Reagan could not give up the idea of returning Mariel detainees, who remained in U.S. jails. At his insistence, Washington reviewed all the existing military options and contemplated several new ones, such as the covert transfer of the detainees to

Cuba via Nicaragua. Yet, transferring them to another hostile regime would not only arouse undesirable international sympathy, but also would help to cause another problem

695 Working Paper, “Cuban Detainee Repatriation,” n.d., attached to John A. Wickham, Jr. to , “Cuban Detainee Repatriation,” November 2, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/5/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. This story never appeared in media or any of secondary sources cited above. 696 James H. Michel to Lawrence Eagleburger, October 28, 1983, in folder “CO038 (180000- 182499),” WHORM, RRL. 697 Robert C. McFarlane to Reagan, “Mariel excludables,” November 5, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/5/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 268 if the regime chose to do the same against pro-U.S. countries like Honduras. Because

Central America was too close to the United States, Washington also worried that many of the deported might find a way back to the United States somehow. Another option was returning them to Cuba through the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo. But the operation would contradict the terms of the lease and jeopardize the legal status of the base.

Sending them back from the base to Cuban territory would not be easy. The JCS feared that Cuba might respond by forcing more Cubans to flood into the base, requiring the

U.S. military “either to shoot innocent Cuban civilians or allow the base to be rendered inoperative.”698

The JCS considered many more imaginative, yet even more bizarre options.

Without much surprise, however, they concluded that all these options were too risky, too inhumane, or too questionable in terms of international and domestic laws.699 Finally, national security adviser Robert McFarlane reported to Reagan the unpleasant news about the infeasibility of military operations, as well as on the desirability of diplomacy.

Although negotiations with Castro would involve “the adverse consequences” on U.S. relations with Cuba, McFarlane reported, the Grenada invasion “obviated such delicacy” by making U.S.-Cuban relations bad enough to take new directions.700 Although the logic of this reasoning may be puzzling, it was probably designed to warm Reagan to the idea

698 “Plan for Returning Mariel excludables to Cuba,” attached to Charles Hill to McFarlane, “Mariel excludables,” November 25, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 699 Working Paper, “Cuban excludables,” n.d., attached to John A. Wickham, Jr. to Weinberger, “Cuban excludables,” November 4, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/5/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 700 The Justice and State Departments concurred, yet the Defense Department and the CIA remained skeptical of this approach. McFarlane to Reagan, “Mariel excludables,” November 5, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/5/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL; and Weinberger to McFarlane, “Mariel excludables,” n.d., in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 269 of talking with Castro.701 Three weeks later George Shultz’s State Department came back to the U.S. president seeking his approval of negotiations with Cuba.702

The Reagan administration had to act immediately. First, since the military options were impractical, it had to assure the Congress that the U.S. president was making real efforts to return the Mariel detainees. Second, Cuban Americans and their congressional allies put forth a bill by Peter W. Rodino to resume immigrant visa issuance for Cubans in Havana on behalf of ex-prisoners and their families. In May 1983, the State Department suspended the visa issuance to use it as a bargaining chip for making Havana agree on the return of the Mariel detainees. But supporters of the bill argued that Washington was “penalizing the wrong people.”703 Driven by these “two compelling domestic political reasons,” Shultz’s State Department sent a diplomatic note to Havana to propose U.S.-Cuban talks on migration.704 For the first time, the note did not ask Havana to accept the “undesirables” before opening the talks.705

701 Reagan to Shultz, Weinberger, and William French Smith, “Mariel excludables,” November 6, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 702 It is noteworthy that even at this moment the military options remained on the table in case that Cuba reject the U.S. proposal or the negotiations prove unsatisfactory. Under such circumstances, the report stated, the U.S. government would abandon the talks and publicly announce its intentions of implementing the operation. The report set the D-Day after April 1984 and recommended that the president consult with the Congress to satisfy the requirements of the War Power Resolution. “Plan for Returning Mariel excludables to Cuba,” attached to Charles Hill to McFarlane, “Mariel excludables,” November 25, 1983, in folder “Cuba (11/25/1983),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 703 U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, Cuban/Haitian Adjustment, 98th Cong. 2nd sess., May 9, 1984, pp. 32-34, 37. 704 Tony Motley to Shultz, March 19, 1984; and Hill to McFarlane, March 19, 1984, both in folder “Cuba (7/16/1984-7/23/1984), box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 705 Informe sobre el diferendo Cuba-EE.UU. sobre cuestiones migratorias, attached to José Viera to Isidoro Malmierca, p.6, June 21, 1984, MINREX. On May 2, 1984, Washington sent another diplomatic note to request a Cuba’s response to the U.S. note of March 20. 270

Breaking Deadlock?

At first glance it remained uncertain whether Cuba would agree to the U.S. proposal. In the immediate aftermath of the Grenada invasion, Fidel Castro presented a list of “nineteen lies” about Reagan’s statement justifying the Grenada invasion and comparing the U.S. president with Adolf Hitler for his use of “lies” in misleading the public.706 Castro did not stop attacking Reagan for a while. In his speech on February 24,

1984, the Cuban leader denounced the invasion as a “monstrous crime” and stressed that all the Cubans would fight until the last one died should the United States invade Cuba.707

Years later in his talk with Soviet foreign minister Eduardo Shevardnadze, Castro recalled that Cuba had reinforced the defenses of Cuba and Nicaragua. “After [the invasion of] Grenada, the Nicaraguans fortified themselves militarily a lot,” he said. “We sent more advisers, prepared more people, and assisted in coordination with the Soviets in sending more arms.”708

There was always a gap between rhetoric and practices, however. On receipt of the U.S. diplomatic notes, Cuba appreciated the U.S. disposition to initiate talks on migration problems, although it agreed on the dates only after the U.S. presidential election. Cuba’s note of May 22, 1984, pointed at the hostile and threatening speeches against Cuba by Reagan and other U.S. officials, as well as the recent military exercises

706 Castro claimed that Reagan lied about Cuba’s responsibilities for disorder in Grenada, the threats to the lives of U.S. students there, and the nature of Cuba’s assistance to the Grenadian revolutionary regime. Fidel Castro’s address, November 14, 1983, printed in Bohemia, November 18, 1983, pp. 50- 56. 707 Speech by Fidel Castro, February 24, 1984, in Bohemia, March 2, 1984, pp. 50-59. See also, speech by Fidel Castro, January 1, 1984, in Bohemia, January 6, 1984, pp. 50-55. 708 Memcon (Fidel Castro, Shevardnadze), October 28, 1985, p. 14, WCDA. 271 near Cuban waters. These actions, the note claimed, did not reflect a U.S. willingness to talk “with equality and mutual respect.” This answer was unsatisfactory for the U.S. government, which wanted to solve migration problems as soon as possible.709

Two weeks later, however, the dynamics of U.S.-Cuban diplomacy seemed to change, as Reverend Jesse Jackson met Castro in Havana. Jackson claimed that the

Rainbow Coalition, his U.S.-born social justice movement, had to go beyond the United

States, and presented a “greater dialogue” for peace as an alternative to Reagan’s policy in Central America.710 To this end he advocated normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, visited Central American countries, and exchanged opinions with the Cuban leader, who announced the release of twenty-two U.S. prisoners and twenty-six Cuban prisoners as a good-will gesture.711 At a press conference in Havana, Jackson claimed that he had persuaded Castro to agree on the resolution of migration problems as a starting point for the dialogue.712 On June 6, Cuba sent a diplomatic note to confirm that Jackson’s visit created “the adequate condition for the start of the discussion.”713 On July 12 and 13, the

U.S.-Cuban talks on migration started in New York.

709 Diplomatic note, May 22, 1984, MINREX. See also, Hill to McFarlane, “Cuba Rejects Talks on Mariel excludables,” May 24, 1984, in folder “Cuba (4/27/1984-6/26/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 710 “Mission for Peace in Central America: The Reasons for Our Visit,” in folder “Cuba-US (11/29/1983-8/15/1984),” box 90507, Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC (hereafter NSC- LAAD), RRL. 711 Hill to McFarlane, “Release of Political Prisoners by Cuba in Response to Request of Reverend Jesse Jackson,” June 17, 1984, in folder “Cuba (6/27/1984-7/14/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 712 Press Conference, June 26, 1984, in Bohemia, July 6, 1984, pp. 53-57. 713 Diplomatic note, July 6, 1984, MINREX. 272

It is difficult to determine if Jackson’s visit was the determinative factor that broke the deadlock. Certainly, the Cuban leader did not want to help Reagan’s reelection to the disadvantage of the Democratic Party’s candidates like Jackson and Walter

Mondale. This reasoning explains why he obtained Mondale’s concurrence prior to the opening of the talks.714 Also, part of Cuba’s motivation would have been to engage the

United States in dialogue with Cuba and complicate a U.S. posture toward Cuba after

Reagan’s reelection.715 The Cubans built underground shelters, rejuvenated the senior military ranks, and prepared for massive military mobilization, testing a defense strategy.716 In his talks with the Canadian ambassador in September 1984, Cuban Vice

President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez explained that Cuba could not afford to be idle when a reelected Reagan might exploit his relatively greater freedom of maneuver to attack

Cuba.717 Thus, the opening of the talks might have been an attempt to deter possible U.S. aggression against Cuba.718

714 Fidel Castro’s announcement, December 14, 1984, printed in Bohemia, December 21, 1984, p. 39. 715 Skoug, United States, p. 70. 716 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, August 13, 1984, vol. 24967, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8, RG25, LAC. 717 Days later José Viera and Isidro Malmierca talked with Candian diplomats and presented similar views on the danger of reelected Reagan to Cuba. This information was for Canadian Eyes Only. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, September 20, 1984, vol. 24967, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8, RG25, LAC. See also, Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, October 24, 1984; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, September 24, 1984, both in the same folder. 718 Cuba also actively received nongovernmental U.S.-based organizations such as the League of United Latin American Citizens. Interestingly, Washington received a report from General Noriega in Panama on his meeting with Castro on July 5, 1984. Castro reportedly told Noriega that Reagan would win the 1984 election and it would be better for Cuba to improve relations with the United States before the election, rather than risking a further deterioration after the election. Oliver L. North and Raymond F. Burghardt to McFarlane, “Mariel excludables,” July 23, 1984, in folder “Cuba (7/16/1984-7/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 273

Finally, an attribution of the opening of the migration talks to Jackson’s visit alone might overlook another Cuban motivation. As reported by Mexican and Canadian diplomats, Havana’s agreement for the talks also drew from its desire to reduce social discontent at home. Plagued by low labor morale, inefficient governance, the decline of sugar prices, and the U.S. embargo, Cuba’s economic woes appeared to reach no end.

Much like the Mariel boatlift a few years earlier, they reported, Cuban youth grew dissatisfied with their lives.719 As in the case of the massive visit of Cuban Americans in

1979, moreover, the consumer behavior of thousands of foreign tourists from capitalist countries like Mexico and Canada also had an unavoidable impact on the mindset of the

Cuban population.720 In his talk with the Canadians, Alfredo García Almeida, an official of the central committee of Cuba’s Communist Party, frankly admitted that the lack of emigration was causing a “serious local problem.”721 The Cuban desire to initiate migration talks was not as strong as the U.S.’s. But the solution of the migration problems met the interests of Havana and Washington.

Washington Talks with Havana, July 1984

According to a guidance paper written by the State Department, the most important U.S. aim at the migration talks was to make Cuba accept Mariel “excludables.”

719 Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, August 29, 1984, August 31, 1984, and November 13, 1984, all in III-3793-1, AHGE. 720 Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, September 3, 1984, III-3793-1, AHGE. For the 1979 visit, see Chapter Six. 721 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, April 17, 1984, vol. 24967, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8, RG25, LAC. 274

If Cuba agreed, the U.S. government would take three actions; it would resume normal preference immigrant visa issuances of up to 20,000 per year, process refugee admissions for counterrevolutionary prisoners in Cuba to the United States within existing limits, and consider enlarging the number of refugee admissions from Cuba in later years.722 Due to its anti-Cuban posture, Washington also wanted to limit the discussion strictly to migration issues. When Havana chose vice foreign minister Ricardo Alarcón to lead the

Cuban delegation, the State Department wondered if this choice of a high-ranking official indicated Cuba’s effort to introduce broader political issues. To preempt this move, the

State Department assigned Michael G. Kozak, its lower-ranking deputy legal adviser, to lead the U.S. delegation.723

Whereas Washington prioritized discussion on the exclusion issue, Havana considered it only in the context of all aspects of migration. In his opening remark,

Alarcón displayed Havana’s willingness to normalize U.S.-Cuban migration. “By establishing a normal situation,” he said, the two countries “will eliminate the causes that provoked the situation of Mariel and will also remove the dramatic baggage that accompanied this problem.” Alarcón explained that Havana wanted to establish the mechanism for family reunification and resolve the issue of ex-prisoners and their families who wanted to leave for the United States. The Cuban government would

722 State Department Scope Paper, “Guidance to US Delegation for Possible Discussions with the Government of Cuba Concerning Migration Issues,” and “Executive Summary,” n.d., in folder “Cuba (3/19/1984-4/18/1984),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. The NSC agreed to use this paper as the framework for the negotiations with Cuba. Oliver L. North and Raymond F. Burghardt to McFarlane, “Mariel excludables,” July 23, 1984, in folder “Cuba (7/16/1984-7/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 723 The maximum number of 20,000 was established by the 1965 U.S. immigration law. Hill to McFarlane, July 10, 1984, in folder “Cuba (6/27/84-7/14/84),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 275 consider the U.S. plea for accepting Mariel “excludables,” although it believed that Cuba had no obligation to receive those who had committed crimes after arriving in the United

States.724

In the first round of the talks on July 12-13, 1984, the two delegations tried to maximize the number of Cubans whom they wanted to send from their countries. The

U.S. delegation presented a new list of 2,647 “excludables,” including the seventy-eight people with mental disorders, and stated that the final number might reach five thousand.

Although the Cuban delegation eventually accepted the new list, it protested that the recent increase in the number of criminals and people with mental disorders—between

May 1983 and February 1984—indicated that they became problems only after they reached the United States. Furthermore, each time the U.S. delegation requested

Havana’s guarantee of accepting these individuals, the Cuban delegation stressed that the exclusion problem was not a precondition but a part of the package of the migration agreement. In the face of Cuba’s claims, the U.S. delegation ultimately conceded on this point.725

For its part, the Cuban delegation demanded that the U.S. government receive as many ex-prisoners and their families as possible from the island. At one point, the

724 Palabras iniciales del Ricardo Alarcón, July 12, 1984, MINREX. 725 “Sintesis de las Conversaciones entre Cuba y Estados Unidos sobre Materia Migratoria,” July 16, 1984, MINREX. See also, Comentarios finales de la mañana del primer día de conversaciones por Ricardo Alarcón, July 12, 1984, MINREX; and Memcon (Alarcón, Kozak), July 13, 1984, (part 2), MINREX. Since all the returnees had to go through exclusion hearings and possibly appeal process, the U.S. government could not determine the final number of returnees. Regarding those who were in state and local prisons, moreover, the Justice Department worried that the simple inquiry for state and local authorities about the names of those who had committed crimes in the United States would trigger unrest in the Cuban community. 276

Cubans noted that approximately 15,000 had solicited special admissions into the United

States prior to the Mariel boatlift, and additional 15,000 Cubans would likely join this group once the door was open. The total number of 30,000 surprised the U.S. delegation, which contemplated 1,000 as the annual quota for Cuban refugee admissions. Referring to the 1965 immigration laws and the 1980 Refugee Act, Kozak explained that its increase required the administration’s consultation with the Congress, which he promised to do. Kozak added that because the number of immediate family members of U.S. citizens to enter the United States was limitless, the total annual number of Cubans who would enter the United States might be larger. This answer apparently satisfied Alarcón, who expressed some understanding for the complex nature of U.S. legal system.726

At the end of this first round of the talks, both Washington and Havana seemed content with the progress. The State Department cheerfully reported that by confining the talks to migration issues alone, it was able to mitigate the political impact.727 But the

Cuban foreign ministry saw this point very differently. “The most important result,” its analysis paper stated, “is that we have obliged the United States to accept that the migration accord has to be integral and simultaneous with all the aspects of migration problems.” Since the agreement would have “the character of the ‘package,’” the Reagan administration “needs to negotiate with the Congress, which guarantees a bipartisan compromise and amplifies the significance of the accord between the two countries.” The

726 Kozak also added that those who came as refugees could be permanent residents, who could then request family reunification. Memcon (Alarcón, Kozak), July 13, 1984, (part 1), pp. 3-4, 6, 15, MINREX. 727 Hill to McFarlane, July 14, 1984, in folder “Cuba (6/27/84-7/14/84),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. This report on the U.S.-Cuban talks is more concise than Cuba’s counterparts, but largely confirms the above-mentioned analysis. 277 paper also noted that if “excludables” were transferred in groups, “the period of implementation of this agreement…will be necessarily prolonged,” probably for “several years.” The upshot was that “all this will multiply the political meaning of the process.”728 The first round of the talks was “a positive beginning” for Havana precisely because of the political implications of the very existence of the talks for U.S.-Cuban relations.729

Toward the Migration Agreement of 1984

The second round of U.S.-Cuban talks took place from July 31 to August 2. Apart from the details of the legal and administrative matters, the focal points of the talks were the number of returnees, the time span of the exclusion process, and the number of admissions for counterrevolutionary prisoners. The U.S. delegation attempted to make

Cuba accept at least 2,647 persons on the list within a year, and send more of those

Mariel Cubans determined excludable at a later time. For its part, the Cuban delegation refused the initially requested number of five thousand for Mariel detainees returning to

Cuba, but indicated its willingness to receive up to two thousand. The Cuban delegation also insisted that the time span for the process be over five years due to the necessity of the successful reintegration of these individuals into Cuban society.730 Owing to these

728 “Sintesis de las Conversaciones entre Cuba y Estados Unidos sobre Materia Migratoria,” July 16, 1984, MINREX. 729 Alarcón’s letter to Kozak (translated in English), July 18, 1984; and Hill to McFarlane, July 20, 1984, in folder “Cuba (7/16/1984-7/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 730 According to a Cuban document, Alarcón told Kozak and Skoug that the number of 5,000 returnees was “unacceptable” to Cuba. Thereafter the U.S. delegation stuck to the number of 2,647, although it continued to speak of the likelihood of the increase of the number at later points. “Sintesis de las 278 remaining disagreements, the two delegations agreed to hold another round of talks around September.

Yet, the overall atmosphere of the talks was “cordial and more relaxed” than the previous ones.731 The U.S. and Cuban delegations came closer to compromise on the number of refugee admissions. Whereas the U.S. government increased the annual number of refugee admissions in FY 85 from 1,000 to 3,000 (plus 700 unused slots for

FY 84 if agreed by September 30) leaving behind the decision for later years, the Cuban government lowered its requested annual number from 7,000 to 5,000.732 The U.S. and

Cuban delegations also tried to be cooperative on practical matters of the exclusion process. Whereas the Cuban delegation requested that it conduct a case-by-case review of all individuals, the U.S. delegation agreed to provide additional personal information. To

Washington’s delight, the Cuban delegation agreed to conduct the review prior to the final agreement and to accept unconditionally those who passed the review.733

Furthermore, although the second round of talks did not solve the time-span problem, the U.S.-Cuban disagreements were to disappear soon. By this time, the U.S. delegation gained the impression that Havana feared “that once the ‘excludables’ are

Conversaciones,” August 2, 1984, MINREX. For Cuba’s position, see also Alarcón’s letter to Kozak (translated in English), July 18, 1984; and Hill to McFarlane, July 20, 1984, in folder “Cuba (7/16/1984-7/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. For a U.S.’s position, see also Hill to McFarlane, July 27, 1984, in folder “Cuba (7/27/1984-8/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 731 “Sintesis de las Conversaciones,” August 2, 1984, MINREX. The Cuban delegation also favorably commented on the U.S. attitudes, referring to Kozak’s statement that both Reagan and Shultz were directly informed of the process of the talks. The State Department used similar phrase—“businesslike and free of polemics”—to describe the same talks. Hill to McFarlane, August 4, 1984, in folder “Cuba (7/27/1984-8/23/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 732 “Sintesis de las Conversaciones,” August 2, 1984, MINREX. 733 Hill to McFarlane, August 4, 1984. 279 returned, the United States will cease to honor its own commitments.” But after the second round of talks, the State Department completely dropped its insistence on the immediate return of all Mariel detainees—to the effect of eliminating such perceived concerns—simply because it realized that the exclusion process would likely take several years owing to complicated U.S. legal procedures for exclusion.734

The U.S.-Cuban talks proceeded so smoothly that they avoided being paralyzed indefinitely by a politically sensitive incident such as the U.S. overflights of a SR-71 aircraft over Havana on August 11, 1984. The Cuban government expressed “profound indignation,” demanded a U.S. explanation, and conveyed Castro’s message that “the future course of the U.S.-Cuban talks …will depend on the U.S. response to the Cuban protest.”735 Washington refused to acknowledge or deny the overflights, blamed Cuba’s

“interventionism” for all necessary U.S. steps, and disregarded the linkage between migration and other bilateral matters.736 In late October, however, whereas Havana reaffirmed its interest in the resumption of the talks, Washington assured it that the U.S. actions were “no in way intended to humiliate Cuba or to affect its stand in the

734 Ibid. For the procedure, see note 724. 735 USINT in Havana to Washington (with Cuba’s protest note translated in English), August 15, 1984, and USINT in Havana to Washington, August 23, 1984, both in folder “Cuba (9/5/1984-9/17/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 736 Hill to McFarlane, August 31, 1984; and Kimmitt to Hill, September 7, 1984, in folder “Cuba (9/5/1984-9/17/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 280 negotiating process.”737 The two countries agreed to hold a third round of talks in New

York in late November.738

According to U.S. documents, the third-round talks went through many debates, demands, and concessions before reaching an agreement. Most important for

Washington, Cuba examined all individual cases and agreed to readmit some 2,000

Mariel detainees. In return, the U.S. delegation would resume the processing of immigrant visas for up to 20,000 per year, although it resisted Cuba’s attempt to set a minimal number at 15,000 per year. The U.S. delegation also deflected Cuba’s effort to increase the number of refugee admissions for ex-political prisoners and their families. It set 3,000 as the quota of FY 1985. A major U.S. concession was on the time range of the return process. The U.S. delegation compromised with Cuba’s request for five years, and settled on a 28-29 month period starting thirty days after the signing of the agreement. It also agreed that the returns would be at the normal rate of 100 per month, and if the level was not achieved, the remaining number could be used in subsequent months, provided that the number would not reach 150 per month.739

Despite “considerable and repeated” U.S. efforts, however, Cuba rejected any explicit promise of “no more Mariels”—a pledge that it would never allow massive migration crises to occur in the future. Whenever the U.S. made this request, the Cuban

737 Burghardt to McFarlane, October 24, 1984, in folder “Cuba (10/2/1984-10/18/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 738 Hill to McFarlane, November 1, 1984, in folder “Cuba (11/1/1984-11/27/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES- CF, RRL. See also, a Cuba’s diplomatic note, October 29, 1984, MINREX. 739 Hill to McFarlane, “Draft Agreement Reached with Cuban Delegation on Mariel Issues,” December 7, 1984, (attached with Communique and Minute of Implementation) in folder “Cuba (12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 281 delegation demanded a U.S. commitment to stem illegal immigration from the island, something that the U.S. delegation could not accept apparently due to its “traditional policy of giving refuge to Cubans who escape from the island.” Neither could the U.S. delegation obtain a Cuban assurance to accept future Mariel “excludables,” those whom the U.S. government might judge “excludable” after the conclusion of the agreement.740

The lack of language of “no more Mariels” and of Cuban commitment to the acceptance of future “excludables” in a draft agreement was disturbing enough for the INS and the

Justice Department to oppose it. Nevertheless, the State Department, the NSC staff, and

Reagan himself concluded that an imperfect agreement was still better than no agreement. Before the final round of the talks in December, the U.S. president authorized the conclusion of the agreement even if such language did not exist.741

Finally, on December 14, 1984, the White House announced the U.S.-Cuban agreement on migration. Cuba would take back 2,746 Mariel detainees, and might accept more whom the U.S. government later would find “excludable.” The U.S. government would send 100 individuals each month. In return, the United States would also receive as many as 20,000 Cubans each year, although it provided additional number of visas to

3,000 political prisoners and their families in 1985 alone. By offering the same annual

740 The State Department concluded that Washington would be in a stronger position to implement any unilateral measures, such as the suspension of immigrant visa processing, if Cuba refused them again. Ibid. 741 Hill to McFarlane, December 7, 1984; McFarlane to Reagan, December 11, 1984; and Kimmitt to Hill, December 11, 1984, all in folder “Cuba (12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. For INS and Justice Department’s insistence on “no more Mariel,” see Handwritten note by McFarlane on Burghardt to McFarlane, November 7, 1984, in folder “Cuba (11/1/1984-11/27/1984),” box 30, NSC- ES-CF, RRL. This topic came up briefly at a first round of the talks only to face an impasse. Memcon (Alarcón, Kozak), July 13, 1984, (part 2), p. 6, MINREX. 282 number for those from the other countries, Washington not only treated Cuba as an ordinary country but also viewed Cubans leaving the island more as economically- motivated “immigrants” than politically-motivated “refugees.” U.S. and Cuban representatives would meet each six months to analyze the implementation of the accord.

With the agreement in hand, the Reagan administration also decided to allow the rest of

Cuban “entrants” to adjust their status through the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, opening the gate for them to become U.S. permanent residents.

On the same day in Havana, Fidel Castro addressed the nation, underscoring the historical importance of the agreement. U.S.-Cuban migration problems had existed for more than a quarter of a century, during which the United States had accepted terrorists and criminals as “heroes” and had used Cuban emigration—particularly the illegal departure of Cubans—as a “political weapon.” Things had changed, however. First, the

Reagan administration took measures against terrorists. Second, the United States lost interest in provoking illegal departure of Cubans. Third, Cuba continued to cooperate on hijacking issues by jailing those who were responsible. The Cuban leader pointed out these changes as something that facilitated the U.S.-Cuban agreement. Furthermore, he complimented both the U.S. and Cuban attitudes of solving problems of mutual concern and expressed his wishes for the positive repercussions of the agreement across the world:

There will be conversations with Contadora in Central America, conversations

between the revolutionary forces and the Salvadoran government, conversations

283

between the United States and Nicaragua at Manzanillo. Soon in January extremely

important conversations between the foreign minister of USSR and the United

States, Gromyko and Shultz, about questions of transcendent importance will begin

in Geneva. Conversations about problems of South Africa will take place, and

conversations about diverse themes regarding peace and world economy will start

in other parts of the world. I wish that the same spirit that had presided over these

conversations will preside over the other conversations in the coming weeks and

months…and I wish that they reach rational results! This is possible, I repeat, when

we discuss without arrogance, with seriousness, with responsibility, and with

willingness to find solutions.742

If the Cuban leader believed in what he said that day, his expectation was to be betrayed by the start of Radio Martí.

The Delay of Radio Martí’s Startup

The U.S.-Cuban migration agreement disturbed the Cuban American community in Miami. If Reagan delighted anti-Castro Cubans by invading Grenada as if it were a prelude to another invasion of Cuba, the start of the U.S.-Cuban talks contradicted their expectation about what would come next. Miami Spanish local radio stations even received dozens of calls from those who were upset that Reagan negotiated with

742 Fidel Castro’s announcement, December 14, 1984, printed in Bohemia, December 21, 1984, pp. 38- 43 (for quotes, see esp. pp. 41-43). 284

Castro.743 For them, the Reagan administration repeatedly declared that the U.S.-Cuban talks were not “the beginning of a new deal with Castro” nor “departure from firm [U.S.] policy toward Cuba.”744 Yet, the choice of the White House as announcer of the agreement apparently boosted popular expectation for the next. The State Department’s

Cuban desk officer Kenneth Skoug expressed frustration when the Miami Herald placed

“a total misrepresentation” of his speech to indicate Washington’s willingness to broaden

U.S.-Cuban talks.745

The fruits of the migration talks also disturbed many Miami Cubans. On February

21, 1985, the first group of Mariel detainees returned to Cuba, underscoring the symbolic importance of migration normalization.746 One Miami Herald article reported that some

Mariel Cubans with mental disorders dropped out of mental-health institutions for fear of deportation, while quoting local officials’ worries about a “surge of crime.” Added to the confusion was the rumor that Mariel Cubans might be deported without serious inspection. The INS posited that any Mariel Cubans who had committed crime were excludable. Yet, as the INS did not release the list of 2,746 names nor specify the types of crimes that would result in exclusion, it was suspected that U.S. immigration authorities were returning persons guilty of only petty crimes or no offenses except for illegal

743 MH, July 14, 1984, p. 11A. 744 Hill to McFarlane, December 12, 1984; Taking Points for use with Congressional and Cuban Community Leaders; and Walter Raymond, Jr., to Kimmitt, December 13, 1984, all in folder “Cuba (11/1/1984-11/27/1984),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. See also, Skoug and McFarlane, quoted in MH, July 26, 1984, p. 1A and MH, December 18, 1984, p. 19A. 745 Skoug to Ferch, December 29, 1984, DOS-FOIA. The article he referred to was: Alfonso Chardy, “U.S. Aide: We’d Talk to Cuba on Two Issues,” MH, December 19, 1984, p. 14A. 746 A month later, Ricardo Alarcón met John Ferch to review the implementation of the migration agreement. Joaquín Mas to Malmierca, n.d. (ca. March 29, 1985), MINREX. 285 entry.747 The degree of such anxiety was too strong to ignore for Cuban American organizations like CANF.748

The suspicion of “another betrayal” by Washington circulated also because

Reagan had not yet started Radio Martí. The U.S. Congress had passed the legislation in

October 1983, and the White House undertook preparatory works in the hope of starting radio broadcasting in the spring of 1984.749 To this end, Reagan quickly appointed Jorge

Mas Canosa to be chair of the Presidential Advisory Board for Radio Martí, an important organization overseeing the entire process of broadcasting. The selection of other personnel took more time, however. When the U.S. government recruited Spanish-

English bilinguals who possessed good knowledge of Cuba, most of these people turned out to be naturalized U.S. citizens of Cuban origin. As foreign-born nationals, they all had to go through lengthy and extensive security clearances.750

Yet, a more important reason for the delay was Washington’s fear of a radio war with Havana. From the very beginning, Castro vigorously attacked Washington’s plan to set up Radio Martí. “One can’t think of a more vulgar and brutal way of intervention in the domestic affairs of another country,” he declared in a speech on October 24, 1981.

While condemning the use of José Martí, the name of Cuba’s independence hero, Castro

747 Skoug to Michel, “Mental Patients Fear Deportation to Cuba,” March 20, 1985, DOS-FOIA. See also, Skoug to Michel, “Alleged Return of ‘Minor Criminals’ to Cuba,” March 20, 1985, DOS-FOIA. 748 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, February 20, 1985, box 1.04, CANF archive. 749 John Lenczowski to McFarlane, “Contingency Plans for Cuba Reprisals,” January 16, 1984, in folder “Cuba (11/28/1983-1/20/1984),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 750 Skoug, interview transcript, p. 143, FAOH; and Charles Wick to McFarlane, “Update on the Progress of Putting the Radio Marti Program on the Air,” July 30, 1984, in folder “Radio Marti (7/21/1984-10/3/1984),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL. 286 implied a countermeasure of his own. “Let them not forget that we are not in Europe or

Asia, that we are here, very near the U.S. coasts and our radio waves can also reach them.” He added, “We shall see who can resist the most; we shall see who, we or they, are the strongest morally and politically.”751

Castro was very serious about this matter, according to the memoir of the Soviet ambassador in Havana. By the time of this speech, the Cuban leader already had requested that the Soviet Union send equipment for five 500-kilowatt radio stations within a year. When the Soviet ambassador conveyed Moscow’s denial of this demand on the basis of technical problems, Castro’s frustration exploded. “The Americans suffocate us with propaganda,” he exclaimed, “and we cannot shoot back!” Finally in July 1982, at

Havana’s insistence, Moscow decided to help Cuba construct two medium wave radio stations with capacity of 1,000 kilowatts during the period of 1984-1986.752 The report of

Cuba’s preparation eventually reached the White House, which noted that Castro spent

$40 million developing jamming capabilities of U.S. commercial radio stations as far as the Mid-West.753

Cuba’s preparation had the effect of dividing Washington and Miami into two teams with differing priorities. U.S. diplomats tried to solve this matter in talks with

Cuban officials without abandoning Radio Martí. Through the mediation of the

International Telecommunication Union, the U.S. and Cuban delegations met in San José,

751 Speech by Fidel Castro, October 24, 1981, LANIC. 752 Vorotnikov, Gavana—Моskva, pp. 263-65, 267. 753 McFarlane to Reagan, n.d., in folder “NSPG 0107 (2) [Radio Martí],” box 91307, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (hereafter NSC-ES-NSPG), RRL. 287

Costa Rica, to discuss radio interference in August 1983. Although they agreed to schedule the next meeting in Havana in December, the enactment of the Radio Martí bill by the U.S. Senate prompted Havana to suspend it.754 Unable to persuade the Cuban government to accept the radio broadcasting, Washington took Castro’s October 1981 warning seriously and feared that Havana might jam U.S. commercial radio programs in response to the startup. The U.S. government spent several months trying in vain to explore both preventive and contingency actions.755

Unaware of these machinations, Miami Cubans and their allies in the U.S.

Congress mounted growing pressure on the Reagan administration for the immediate startup of Radio Martí. The leading advocate was Florida Senator Paula Hawkins, who incessantly lobbied Reagan to ask for personal intervention in order to “keep our word with the Cuban Americans…and the freedom loving people in the world.”756 When she and another Florida senator, Lawton Chiles, spoke to U.S. Information Agency director

Charles Wick, their plea could not have been blunter. “They said,” Wick recalled, “This is important to us. [We] had a big Cuban population…Cuban-American [in the state of

754 Informe sobre el Estado Actual de las Conversaciones Cuba-USA para resolver las incompatibilidades entre las Radioemisoras de Ondas Medias, attached to René Hernández Cartaya to Joaquín Más, January 8, 1985, Caja “Agresión Comunicaciones 28,” MINREX. 755 Hill to McFarlane, “Radio Martí: Political/ Diplomatic Action Plan,” April 11, 1984, in folder “8490463,” Executive Secretariat, NSC: System Files (hereafter NSC-ES-SF), RRL; and Minutes, “NSPG Meeting,” December 14, 1984, in folder “NSPG 0107,” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL. 756 Hawkins to Reagan, December 12, 1984, in folder “Radio Martí (3/9/1985-3/31/1985),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL. 288

Florida].”757 Elected in 1980 with the aid of Carter’s unpopular handling of the Mariel boatlift, Hawkins was facing a tough reelection in 1986.

It was against this background that Reagan presided over a December 14, 1984,

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting, which he found “most unsatisfactory.” Referring to lobbying by Miami Cubans and Hawkins, Wick advocated the startup on January 28, 1985. Yet, CIA Director William Casey commented that

Cuba’s jamming and counter-broadcasting capabilities grew rapidly with the assistance of the Soviet bloc. The United States was not ready for such a radio war, the State

Department continued. If a radio war lasted for more than a week, a five-million-dollar compensation fund would be inadequate to cover losses for U.S. broadcasters, leading the

U.S. government to back down and face a “very costly defeat.” 758 A humiliation of this kind was unacceptable. “If we retreat we lose face which can hurt us in all of Latin

[America],” Reagan wrote in his diary. “What to do? Right now I don’t know.”759 Weeks later Reagan hesitantly approved the delay for another four months and ordered the

Pentagon to develop a $60 million retaliatory capability against a possible Cuban reprisal.760

757 Wick, interview transcript, pp. 38-39, Presidential Oral History, University of Virginia’s Miller Center (hereafter UV-MC). 758 Minutes, NSPG Meeting, “Radio Martí,” December 14, 1984, in folder “NSPG 0107 (1) [Radio Martí],” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL. 759 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, pp. 407-8 (December 14, 1984). 760 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, pp. 416 (January 16, 1985); McFarlane to NSPG principals, January 17, 1985, in folder “NSPG 0103 (1) [Radio Martí],” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL; and McFarlane to NSPG principals, May 16, 1985, in folder “NSPG 0107 (1) [Radio Martí],” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL. 289

Jorge Mas Canosa, the White House, and Radio Martí

For Jorge Mas Canosa’s CANF and its allies, another delay of Radio Martí was alarming, especially because it coincided with a ground-breaking turn in international events. In January 1985, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign

Minister Andrei Gromyko met in Geneva to explore a relaxation of Cold War tensions across the world. Although the future course of the superpower relations remained unforeseen, the kickoff of a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement amplified the anxiety of counterrevolutionary Cubans in Miami. Shortly thereafter, Mas Canosa and CANF directors met Vice President George H. W. Bush to express their worries that the Reagan administration might have been using Radio Martí as a “bargaining chip” in the migration negotiations with Cuba and in the Geneva talks with the Soviet Union. Bush assured them that such was not the case.761

Mas Canosa was not the type of a man who would leave a meeting empty-handed, however. His CANF proposed a trade-off; if there was no radio broadcasting on January

28, 1985, Reagan should make a presidential statement celebrating the 132nd anniversary of the birth of José Martí. With the support of Bush and NSC officials, Reagan did not oppose this seemingly harmless proposal. “Today we are proud to honor his [José

Martí’s] numerous accomplishments on behalf of his fellow Cubans,” Reagan said in his radio address to Miami and Havana. The speech had little noteworthy content. Yet, by

761 Bush, Handwritten note on Don Gregg and Philip Hughes to Bush, “Meeting with Directors of the Cuban-American National Foundation, January 16, 1985,” January 15, 1985; Philip Hughes to Bush, January 18, 1985, both in folder “Cuba (Safe 3) 3/27/1985-5/23/1985,” box 90510, NSC-LAAD, RRL; Jacqueline Tillman to McFarlane, “Cuban-American Agenda,” January 16, 1985, in folder “Cuba (12/7/1984-1/16/1985),” box 30, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. 290 making the U.S. president declare his support for “an independent Cuba” and pledge that

Radio Martí would start “in the near future,” CANF managed to build the U.S. president’s personal commitment to its counterrevolutionary cause in Cuba.762

Still, the presidential statement did not end the politics over Radio Martí. Paula

Hawkins, the Florida Senator facing a tough reelection fight, resented the delay and refused to receive the State and Defense Departments’ briefing teams denying the rumor that the administration had used Radio Martí as a bargaining chip.763 Two months later, the U.S. president found Hawkins “still complaining about Radio Martí” and even using her vote on the MX intercontinental missile—the centerpiece of Reagan’s nuclear policy—to persuade him to start the radio broadcasting.764 Trying to defuse political pressure from the Cuban American community, National Security Advisor Robert

McFarlane sought to enlist the support of Mas Canosa.765 Yet when McFarlane revealed that Radio Martí could not start because of the administration’s concern about Cuba’s jamming, Mas Canosa went into an uproar. After meeting with Secretary Shultz, Mas

Canosa started to speculate that both McFarlane and Shultz were looking for ways to

762 CANF apparently provided the text of the statement to the administration. Reagan, Statement on the 132nd Anniversary of the Birth of José Martí, January 28, 1985, APP. 763 News from Paula Hawkins, January 29, 1985, in folder “Radio Martí (1/23/1985-1/29/1985),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL; Raymond to Poindexter, “Congressional Briefing Plan,” January 31, 1985, in folder “8590108,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL; and Handwritten note on McFarlane to Reagan, “Radio Martí,” March 19, 1985, in folder “8502186,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL. 764 Raymond to McFarlane, “Paula Hawkins,” March 19, 1985, in folder “Radio Martí (3/9/1985- 3/31/1985),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL; and Handwritten note on Recommended Telephone Call to Senator Paula Hawkins, March 18, 1985, in folder “Radio Marti (3/9/1985-3/31/1985),” box 8, Walter Raymond Files, RRL. 765 Raymond to McFarlane, “Talking Points for Meeting with Jorge Mas,” January 30, 1985, in folder “8590106,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL. 291 scrap the project behind the scenes.766 To Mas Canosa’s chagrin, moreover, McFarlane shelved his proposal that the administration set a “deadline” for the startup.767

Fidel Castro and Public Relations Efforts

Since Radio Martí did not go on the air in a timely manner, expectations that

Ronald Reagan might opt for better relations with Cuba continued to grow. Cuba’s public relations efforts assisted this trend. In January 1985, the Cuban government invited to

Havana William V. Alexander, Jr., the chief deputy of the majority whip in the U.S.

House of Representatives, as well as a large delegation of Arkansas business leaders seeking a new avenue for agricultural trade. In thirty-seven hours of talks, Castro indicated his hope for better relations with the United States, supported a negotiated peace settlement in Central America and Southern Africa, and referred to hijacking issues, radio interference, coast-guard cooperation, and fishing as grounds for new U.S.-

Cuban negotiations.768 Days after their trip, Castro also received a delegation of the U.S. national conference of Catholic bishops, who supported the normalization of relations.769

766 Mas Canosa, interview, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. 2, pp. 1479-80. See also, Vargas Llosa, El exilio indomable, p. 132. 767 Walter Raymond, Jr. to McFarlane, “Radio Martí,” March 4, 1985, in folder “8501679,” NSC-ES- SF, RRL. 768 Back home, Alexander became the leading supporter of U.S. talks with Castro. Stenographic Minutes of U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Briefing—Cuban Trip, February 6, 1985, in folder “Cuban Affairs,” box 353, Claude Pepper Papers, Florida State University Libraries. For a quote, see p. 25. See also, NYT, February 14, 1985, p. A31. 769 As the bishops urged Castro to release 147 current prisoners, Castro offered to free 75. Skouog, United States, p. 86; and Schoultz, Infernal, p. 417. 292

As he took command of this public relations campaign, Castro himself made numerous appearances in Western media in early 1985. In an interview with El País, a major Spanish newspaper, Castro expressed his desire to reach some understanding with the Reagan administration. He commended the U.S.-Cuban migration talks, which he described as “serious, flexible, and respectful.” Cuba was closely watching the development of the Shultz-Gromyko talks in Geneva. “Who knows if Reagan intends to enter history as president of peace!” the Cuban leader stated. “This concerns the interests of the United States as well as the rest of the world.”770 Similar messages of hope for peace appeared in his interviews with the Washington Post, the Spanish news agency

EFE, the Mexican daily Excelsior, PBS’s “NewsHour,” and CBS’s “60 Minutes.”771

The U.S. government found Castro’s appeal for better ties irritating, and termed it a “peace offensive.” 772 When he visited Cuba for a week in late January to discuss the implementation of the migration agreement, State Department’s coordinator of Cuban affairs Kenneth Skoug found that Havana had “no intention to alter [its] basic approach to foreign policy.” Yet, more puzzling for him was Havana’s reluctance to talk about Radio

Martí. Skoug gained the impression that Castro “could head off Radio Martí by suggesting trade and talks on bilateral issues.”773 Such thinking might have appeared during the interviews of Cuban deputy foreign minister Ricardo Alarcón with the Miami

Herald. Alarcón explained that Cuba recently found Reagan more pragmatic than his

770 Fidel Castro, interview quoted in El País (Madrid), January 20, 1985, pp. 1-4. 771 See for example, WP, February 3, 1985, p. A1. Also, Franklin, Cuba, pp. 210-11. 772 Skouog, United States, pp. 84-93, 97. 773 Ibid. 293 rhetoric suggested, referring to the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva, the crackdown of Miami terrorists, and the delay of Radio Martí. On the last point, Alarcón facetiously speculated that the entire project must be “a joke.”774

On March 21, 1985, after cultivating U.S. public interest in talks, Castro formally proposed bilateral U.S.-Cuban discussions on a wide range of issues, including Central

America and Southern Africa. On receipt of this message, John Ferch, USINT chief in

Havana, suspected that Castro had taken this step because he hoped to stall U.S. moves in the two regions through diplomatic engagement. Based on such an assessment,

Washington was unwilling to enter talks with Cuba on geopolitical matters. But the administration was disposed to extend dialogue on migration into other areas, such as narcotics interdiction, radio interference, hijacking, and safety of life at sea. Such a cool but communicative approach was identical to U.S. dealings with other unfriendly communist countries like Vietnam. In early May, the State Department instructed Ferch to convey Washington’s willingness to talk on these “technical” issues on his scheduled departure next month.775

Although it remains unclear why Havana took these notable actions around this time, one reason may be Cuba’s economic recession in late 1984. As Castro himself described in his 1986 report to the Third Congress of Cuba’s Communist Party, declining economic performance and increasing trade deficits prompted the Cuban leadership to

774 Alarcón, cited in MH, March 29, 1985, p. 14A; and Alarcón, cited in MH, March 31, 1985, p. 3A. 775 Raymond F. Burghardt to McFarlane, “Dealing with Cuba,” May 8, 1985, in folder “NSPG 0107 (1) [Radio Marti],” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL. By that time, Cuba began to signal its desire to join regional peace talks in Southern Africa, because Cuba’s ally, Angola, accepted the linkage between Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the country. LeoGrande and Korbluh, Back Channel, pp. 250-51. 294 hold meetings, make new announcements, and take various emergency actions.776 For example, on December 4, 1984, the Cuban leadership issued an alarm to all Cuban people about the nation’s economic situation, appealing for the saving of combustibles and raw materials. “Our problem is the future,” said Castro. “We cannot mortgage our future for

10 square meters of fabric.”777 Under such circumstances, the Canadian embassy in

Havana acquired information from its Mexican counterpart that Cuba was seeking a third country’s help in initiating negotiations with the United States.778

Yet, probably more important than Cuba’s economic deterioration was a political factor, which Raúl Castro confided to Gorbachev. In his view, Washington believed that

Havana was “desperate to start discussion” but such thinking was “totally wrong.”

Havana was deliberately sending messages of peace “to complicate [Washington’s] aggressive line against Cuba, to earn time, and to win political space.” Contact with legislators and the , Raúl said, would help to “influence more liberal and moderate elements” of U.S. society. Rather, it was Washington that grew more anxious to talk, as he explained that Ferch was the one who suggested that the Cubans propose an agenda for talks. “Of course,” he said, “our strategy is not taking a seat to talk with them, except for [on] some problems that are of their interest, such as the one of immigration.”

776 Fidel Castro, Cuba: La situación internacional. Informe al 3er. Congreso del PCC. Febrero de 1986 (: Editorial Anteo, 1986), pp. 31-46. 777 Speech by Castro, December 4, 1984, Discursos. 778 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa (Canadian Eyes Only), February 7, 1985, vol. 24967, 20- Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8, RG25, LAC. 295

Cuba was not optimistic about Reagan’s intentions. Raúl remarked to Gorbachev, “we will establish a play with them.”779

Both the effectiveness and importance of Cuba’s public relations efforts seemed even greater at this critical moment of international relations. Fidel Castro’s above- mentioned statement on December 14, 1984, suggests that the Cuban leader had a larger picture in mind in evaluating the importance of the migration agreement. In his interview with U.S. congressman Mervin M. Dymally, he again emphasized that the migration agreement was “constructive,” that the agreement coincided with the start of U.S.-Soviet détente, and that the United States and Cuba would be able to foster friendship based on mutual respect.780 Sensing a change in the tide of history, the Cuban leader apparently thought that this new development might accompany a significant change in U.S. attitudes toward Cuba. Yet, Raúl’s comment to Gorbachev suggests that even if such a shift did not occur, Cuba’s good-will gestures could at least buy time and increase Cuba’s political influence in the United States.

Radio Martí on the Air

Notwithstanding Havana’s overtures for better relations, Washington’s decision to

779 Memcon (Gorbachev, Raúl Castro), March 20, 1985, esp. 18-19, WCDA. Apparently Havana and Washington had some misperceptions of each other’s moves. Raúl claimed that Ferch’s suggestion was an indication of Washington’s anxious of talks. Yet, there was no such indication in U.S. records. This initiative probably derived from State Department’s preference of secret diplomacy over public appearances by Fidel. 780 Fidel Castro, Nada podrá detener la marcha de la historia: entrevista concedida a Jeffrey Elliot y Mervin Dymally sobre múltiples temas económicos, políticos e históricos (Havana: Editora Política, 1985), esp. pp. 8-13, and 27-31. The edited version of this interview appears in Playboy 32, no. 8 (August 1985). 296 start Radio Martí wiped out any uncertainty about the course of U.S.-Cuban relations.

Radio Martí finally went on the air on May 20, 1985, the Cuban “independence” day.

Havana’s response was prompt. By then only 201 Mariel detainees had returned to Cuba and only eleven ex-prisoners had been admitted to the United States as the result of the

1984 migration agreement. But in light of “cynical and provocative” U.S. actions,

Havana suspended its implementation, leaving thousands of Mariel detainees and ex- prisoners stranded. Aiming at Miami, Havana also halted the visits of Cubans in the

United States to the island. U.S.-Cuban relations entered one of the lowest points during the 1980s. The tone of Cuba’s note was apocalyptic. “One day the people of the United

States themselves will terminate such egoistic, insensitive, blinded, and sterile policy.”781

Newly declassified U.S. records indicate that Reagan authorized the startup at the risk of causing—and even losing—a radio war. Because Congressman Joe Addabbo, chair of the House Appropriations Committee, had stonewalled the administration’s effort to reprogram the budget, the administration was unable to build retaliatory capabilities as planned. At a May 17, 1985, NSPG meeting, McFarlane presented three options: “(1) cancel Radio Martí; (2) go on the air and try…to engage in dialogue with

Cuba so as to deter counter-broadcasting; and (3) delay the plan to develop a retaliatory capability short of our original plan to interfere partially with Cuban television.” It is noteworthy that for the first time the NSC seriously considered the cancellation of the plan as an option, even though its preference seemed to be for option two. Meanwhile,

Shultz strongly opposed the startup in favor of option three. He insisted that Washington

781 The Cuban government’s note, May 19, 1985, printed in Bohemia, May 24, 1985, pp. 48-49. 297 delay the startup until it acquired enough capabilities for deterring a radio war.782

But rather than following the guidance of his advisers, Reagan personally determined the Radio Martí startup. The discussion virtually ended when Reagan simply declared, “we have to go on the air.” Neither the cancellation nor any further delay was acceptable. According to Wick, who was present at the NSPG meeting, this meeting was

“one of the most graphic illustrations of Reagan overruling everybody there—each expert in his own way.”783 On the next day, the persistent State Department sent updated information about Cuba’s jamming capabilities to Reagan. But the U.S. president was adamant. “Right now…we shouldn’t do anything in view of our Monday startup of Radio

Martí,” he wrote. “I’m sorry to have to go against George [Shultz] but I feel very strongly we must go ahead even if we do have to shut down [Radio Martí] temporarily if he

[Castro] jams our commercial channels.”784

A major source of Reagan’s stubborness might have been his ideological belief that Radio Martí was simply the right thing to do. The Reagan administration was planning to create this radio broadcast in the image of Radio Free Europe, which was designed to promote American value of freedom beyond the . Given

Reagan’s view of Cuba in the larger picture of the Cold War, it was not surprising that he

782 Minutes, NSPG Meeting, May 17, 1985, in folder “NSPG 0107 (1) [Radio Martí],” box 91307, NSC-ES-NSPG, RRL. The NSC speculated the most important reason for Addabboo’s opposition was his belief that the Reagan administration was seeking a Tonkin Gulf-type incident to destroy Cuba’s transmitters and escalate a military confrontation with Cuba. Walter Raymond to McFarlane, “Radio Martí,” April 17, 1985, in folder “8590418,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL. 783 By reading the minutes Reagan seemed to have already made up his mind. Ibid. For Wick’s account, see Wick, interview transcript, pp. 39-40, 46-47, UV-MC. 784 Handwritten memo, Reagan to McFarlane, May 18, 1985, folder “NSDD 170 (1),” box 91296, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (hereafter NSC-ES-NSDD), RRL. 298 would have tried to do the same across the Florida Straits. The analogy of and Cuba was “faulty,” according to communication specialist Howard Frederick.

“Communism was imposed on Poland against the will of its people,” but

“Cubans…brought about a revolution against a hated dictatorship without outside intervention.”785 Reagan took a different view. He denied the legitimacy of the Cuban

Revolution by calling counterrevolutionaries “freedom fighters.” For him, Radio Martí was necessary to promote “freedom” in Cuba.

However, this explanation alone does not address the question of why he could not have waited any longer. Here, Jorge Mas Canosa played an interesting role. As explained above, Mas Canosa’s CANF and its allies were working incessantly to persuade Reagan officials, including the president, to build a personal commitment to the project. This effort continued until the last moment, as shown in Mas Canosa’s letter to

Reagan just prior to the NSPG meeting. In this letter, Mas Canosa not only reminded the

U.S. president of his commitment to “freedom” in Cuba, but also emphasized that

Havana Cubans were mocking the United States for the inability to start Radio Martí, referring to Ricardo Alarcón’s comment that the plan must be a “joke.” In Mas Canosa’s presentation, further delay of the broadcast would become a major foreign policy defeat for Reagan against Fidel Castro, something that Reagan’s pride could not have tolerated.

“Now is the time,” he appealed to Reagan, “for demonstrating your continued resolve to

785 Frederick, Cuban-American Radio Wars, pp. 37-41. 299 carry forward in the struggle against totalitarians in the Americas; Radio Martí must go on the air.”786

It is impossible to gauge to what extent Reagan considered these points. But his diary clearly shows that Reagan read the letter and the Miami Herald articles sent by Mas

Canosa. “Now some of Castro’s flunky’s have gone public laughing at us because we haven’t gone on the air,” he wrote on May 17, 1985. “Monday is Cuba’s freedom day.

I’ve ordered us to start broadcasting on…May 20.”787 This writing illustrates that Reagan reacted as anticipated by Mas Canosa. Among thousands of letters from Miami Cubans asking for special attention to their needs and voices, few reached the U.S. president’s desk. From his capacity as chair of the Presidential Advisory Board, Mas Canosa seized

Reagan’s attention and used the language to which he would listen. “Ronald Reagan was the star,” Mas Canosa commented a week later on his influence on Reagan’s decision.

“But we deserve an Oscar for the best supporting role.”788

In Miami, the symbolic importance of Washington’s decision to start Radio Martí was immeasurable. Unlike NSC staff in Washington, anti-Castro folks in Miami considered the radio not only as a pressure tactic to break Soviet-Cuban ties, but also as a pivotal instrument for promoting “freedom” in Cuba.789 Days after the startup, Tomás

786 Mas Canosa to Reagan, April 25, 1985, in folder “8590466,” NSC-ES-SF, RRL. The letter was attached to: McFarlane to Reagan, “The Startup of Radio Martí,” May 15, 1985, in the same folder. It was Mas Canosa who sent to the U.S. president two Miami Herald articles, including the cited MH, March 31, 1985, p. 3A. These materials are also found in folder “Radio Marti-Classified,” box 1.61, CANF Archive. 787 Reagan, Diaries Unabridged, vol. 1, p. 460. 788 Quoted in MH, May 26, 1985, p. 24A. 789 On this point, see the previous chapter. 300

Relegado, news director of a local Spanish radio station, summed up the rising expectation in Miami. “Radio Martí is perceived here not just a radio station but as a gesture of the United States’ moral support” for Cuba’s pursuit of freedom. For them,

Radio Martí marked “a new era of confrontation between the United States and [Castro’s]

Cuba.”790 Years later Mas Canosa called May 20, 1985, “the most emotional day” in his entire life. When he oversaw the beginning of radio broadcasting, he recalled, he and his wife could not hold back tears.791

Across the sea, the Radio Martí startup apparently caught several Cuban officials by surprise. According to the Washington Post, Havana doubted the startup up to the last moment because Reagan had reached a migration agreement with Cuba, probed for

Namibian independence, and softened his rhetoric against Cuba. Havana, therefore, was hoping that Reagan might have wanted to avoid conflicts with Cuba, intentionally delayed the startup, and sought a pretext to abandon it.792 The report had some validity. In talks with Canadian and Mexican diplomats, several high-ranking Cuban officials admitted that the startup was indeed a surprise for them, especially because Reagan could have delayed it in the atmosphere of dialogue following the migration agreement.793

Washington also employed diplomatic schemes to mislead Havana. Days before the

790 Quoted in NYT, May 22, 1985, p. A11. 791 Mas Canosa, interview, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. 2, p. 1484. 792 WP, June 5, 1985, pp. A25, A29. 793 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, May 20, 1985, and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, May 23, 1985, both in vol. 24967, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 8, RG25, LAC; and Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, May 28, 1985, III-3969-2, AHGE. 301 startup, U.S. diplomats met Cuban officials in Havana to discuss radio interference problems.794

Nevertheless, the Cuban government had discussed contingency plans in case of the Radio Martí startup. Havana calibrated this countermeasure very carefully. Aware that Reagan’s fear of a migration crisis was genuine, Cuban officials looked to the suspension of the migration agreement as not a provocative measure that would trigger

U.S. military aggression, but still an effective counterattack against Washington. It is also important to note that the startup altered the political situation in which Cuba had accepted migration talks in the first place. Indeed, on many occasions Fidel Castro warned that if Reagan broadcast Radio Martí “all cooperation will disappear ‘in every sphere.’”795

Triangular Dynamics Continued, 1986-1988

The triangular Washington-Havana-Miami dynamics continued to shape the course of U.S.-Cuban relations during the rest of Reagan’s presidency. On May 24, 1985, only a few days after the cancellation of the migration agreement, Havana opened the safety valve for social discontent at home by allowing Cubans to leave for the United

States via third countries. Regardless of antipathy to Havana, relatives and families in the

United States of these Cubans, especially ex-prisoners, supported this opening of new

794 A year later, Carlos Martínez, an official of the Cuban Ministry of Communication, angrily recalled his surprise at the startup. See Memcon (Martínez, Jahn), April 9, 1986, p. 5, attached to Germán Blanco to Malmierca, April 17, 1986, Caja “Agresión Comunicaciones 28,” MINREX. 795 For example, see Vance Hyndman to Edward J. Derwinski and George E. Danielson, “Castro meeting,” September 28, 1981, in folder “Cuba (9/30/1981-10/8/1981),” box 29, NSC-ES-CF, RRL. The memo was sent to Reagan via the NSC. 302 emigration routes by sending money to cover their travel fees and expenses. But

Washington’s important aim remained the one of sending Mariel “excludables” back to

Havana. The U.S. government suspended the USINT issuance of preference immigrant visas in Havana, trying to pressure Havana to reactivate the migration agreement. This measure greatly disturbed Miami Cubans, who lobbied the White House and Congress to quickly accept the ex-prisoners.796

Washington tried to break this impasse by negotiating with both Havana and

Miami simultaneously. In October 1987, as Miami Cubans threatened to pass a bill in the

U.S. Congress to resume the visa processing in Havana, the administration decided to negotiate with CANF in order to gain its endorsement for a new round of Washington’s talks with Havana. The result was its authorization for a new semi-private refugee program, the Cuban Exodus Relief Fund, in which CANF would bring around ten thousand Cubans in third countries into the United States.797 A month later, the U.S. and

Cuban governments agreed to reactivate the migration agreement. To the surprise of

Washington, however, this agreement provoked riots among the Mariel “excludables” at the Oakdale federal alien detention center in and the Atlanta federal penitentiary. As a result of a deal with the rioters, the Justice Department reviewed each

796 Claude Pepper et al. to Reagan, November 25, 1985; Jeb Bush to Edwin Meese, June 25, 1986; Frank Calzón to Patrick J. Buchanan, July 8, 1986; and Frank Calzón to Elliot Abrams, July 9, 1986, all in #400828, Immigration/ Naturalization, WHORM: Subject File, RRL. 797 Skoug, United States, pp. 167-68. 303 case for deportation. By June 1991, Washington paroled over 1,800 and repatriated only

627 on the original list of 2,746 “excludables.”798

Much like after the first migration agreement, the same rumor that Washington and Havana would soon normalize relations again spread among Miami Cubans.799 The

United States and the Soviet Union continued to go down the path toward the end of the

Cold War. Reagan’s war in Central America reached its limits as the Iran-Contra affair drove out numerous hawkish anticommunist ideologues from power. Remaining officials proved far more pragmatic in dealing with Cuba, even on an issue like Southern Africa.

After a major Cuban victory against invading South African forces in Angola, the United

States agreed to invite Cuba into regional peace talks. Quadripartite negotiations involving the United States, Cuba, Angola, and South Africa ensued. In December 1988, the four parties reached a comprehensive accord, which included the implementation of

UN Resolution 435 (Namibian independence) and the timetable for the withdrawal of

Cuban troops.800 In addition to this diplomatic breakthrough, the U.S. and Cuban governments also made progress in their cooperation on nuclear safety and drug interdiction. These developments led some foreign policy analysts to express their hope for the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.801

798 As of June 1991, up to 300 Cubans on the list remained in jails, according to an INS testimony. See, U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Recent Development in the United States-Cuban Relations: Immigration and Nuclear Power, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., June 5, 1991, pp. 12, 23, 39, 46. 799 Skoug, United States, pp. 186-190. For Miami Cubans’ criticisms of Reagan’s softening of stance on Cuba, see MH, May 2, 1988, p. 1A; and MH, May 1, 1988, p. 22A. 800 Gleijeses, Visions, chaps. 15-19. See also, LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 253-57. 801 Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Hernández, eds., U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989), pp. 1-2. 304

Yet at the same time, Washington continued Radio Martí and cooperated with

Miami in attacking Cuba’s internal society. Of special importance was the inclusion of

Armando Valladares on the U.S. delegation to the United Nation Commission on Human

Rights (UNCHR). Released from a Cuban jail in 1982, he enlisted CANF’s assistance in publishing his memoir, Contra toda esperanza (Against All Hope). As in the case of

Radio Martí, Reagan’s advisors originally viewed criticisms of Cuba’s human rights record as an instrument of mounting pressure on Cuba to change its foreign policy.802 Yet by the end of his presidency, Reagan and Miami Cubans elevated Cuba’s “freedom” itself to an important goal of U.S. foreign policy from just a tool for achieving something else.

Reagan’s May 1988 speech before Miami Cubans symbolized this turnaround in the U.S. rationale for an anti-Cuban policy. “We will never, ever, negotiate away the dream of every Cuban-American,” the U.S. president said, “that Cuba will again join the family of free and democratic nations.”803

While Reagan declared Cuba’s “freedom” non-negotiable, Vice President George

H. W. Bush was promoting TV Martí, a television-version of Radio Martí. Again, behind the scenes, Mas Canosa mobilized his congressional allies in the same manner that he did for Radio Martí. In December 1987, a month after the second migration agreement, the

U.S. Congress passed a bill proposed by Florida Senator Lawton Chiles to provide

$100,000 for a study to determine whether television broadcasting to Cuba was

802 See for example, a top secret National Security Council document (“U.S. Policy in Central America and Cuba through F.Y. ‘84, Summary Paper”) leaked to the New York Times. Here, the attacks on Cuba’s human rights records, as well as the enlistment of support among Cuban émigrés, emerged as a policy of preventing a “proliferation of Cuba-model states” in Central America. NYT, April 7, 1983, p. 16A. 803 White House Press Release of Reagan’s Speech, May 20, 1988. 305 technically feasible. The National Association of Broadcasters opposed the funding, accusing supporters of the project of “trying to court the Cuban-American votes.”804

Skeptical of this project’s effectiveness and the cost, State Department specialists avoided making any commitment to the project.805 Yet, Bush’s public endorsement of TV Martí came at his speech before CANF’s annual congress in June 1988. “Support for freedom, democracy, and human rights,” Bush publicly declared, “must be the organizing principle of American foreign policy.”806

Bush’s commitment to TV Martí was nothing but a political strategy to co-opt

Miami Cubans before the 1988 election. Its chief architect was Jeb Bush, a son of the vice president, who had worked for years to cultivate support for the Republican Party among Miami Cubans. In 1982, the Republican Party in Florida recruited Jeb for

Hispanic outreach because he lived in Miami, spoke Spanish, and could use his name recognition on local radio programs.807 After assuming the chair of the Dade County

Republican Party, he took credit for the close victory in the 1986 Florida gubernatorial election and was appointed by the governor of Florida, Bob Martínez, as Florida’s

Secretary of Commerce. Jeb frequently advised his father on issues related to Cuba and

Miami Cubans. Jeb was a business partner of Armando Codina, one of the youngest

804 NYT, June 18, 1988, p. 1. 805 Skoug, United States, pp. 201-3. 806 Bush also denied the rumor that the U.S. government secretly negotiated with the Cuban government on normalization of relations. Speech to the CANF Annual Congress, Washington, DC, June 13, 1988, in Cuban American National Foundation, Bush on Cuba (Washington, DC: CANF, 1991), p. 34. 807 MH, May 21, 1982, p. 4C. 306 directors of CANF, and served as campaign manager for Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the first

Cuban-American representative to be elected in 1989.808

When the rumor that the U.S. and Cuban governments would normalize relations circulated among Miami Cubans, it was Jeb who alerted the vice president and his staff to its possible impact on his father’s campaign in Florida.809 In a report to the vice president,

Jeb apparently went “so far as to say that Cuban-Americans are close to abandoning the administration” and recommended that his father immediately make a strong statement to support TV Martí to stem this trend.810 Bush concurred with his son. “We must continue to champion the free Cuba cause,” he directed his staff, referring to “concern [among

Miami Cubans] about Administration [’s] ‘drift’ [from policy of hostility toward

Havana].”811 Such was the calculation behind his support for the new television broadcasting to Cuba at the CANF congress in June 1988. Two months later, the U.S.

Senate approved $7.5 million for the initial ninety days of a TV Martí broadcasting test.

808 Both the Reagan and Bush Presidential Libraries held numerous documents that showed Jeb Bush’s strong interest in Cuba, as well as Republican outreach to Miami Cubans. See for example, Jeb to George Bush, n.d. (signature of “GB” dated May 16, 1982) with an attached study report, “Focus Group, April 12, 1982, Cuban American Perceptions, Dade County, Florida,” in Name File, “Jeb and George Bush,” Office of Vice President George Bush, Bush Vice Presidential Records (hereafter BVPR), GHWBL. See also Chapter Seven. 809 Don Gregg to Bush, May 6, 1988, in folder “Cuba 1988,” Donald P. Gregg Files: Country Files, BVPR, GHWBL. There are numerous handwritten notes indicating that Bush’s advisers were in contact with Jeb on this matter. 810 Gregg and Sam Watson to Bush, May 24, 1988, in folder “Cuba 1988,” Donald P. Gregg Files: Country Files, BVPR, GHWBL. 811 Emphasis is original. Bush to Craig Fuller, June 2, 1988, in folder “Cuba 1988,” Donald P. Gregg Files: Country Files, BVPR, GHWBL. See also, Bush to Craig Fuller, June 3, 1988, in folder “Cuba 1988,” Donald P. Gregg Files: Country Files, BVPR, GHWBL. 307

In the November presidential election, Bush garnered 85 percent of the Miami Cuban votes.812

Conclusion—Washington’s Contradictory Impulses

The start of the migration talks clearly marked a significant departure from the line the Reagan administration had previously held. For the first three years the administration demanded Havana’s cooperation on migration and even contemplated military options, but to little avail. At the urging of George Shultz, the U.S. president accepted the necessity of talks with Cuba right after the U.S. invasion of Grenada. This change in U.S. attitudes was positive in the eyes of Cuban officials in Havana. The opening of the talks was a way to preempt a security threat by improving the U.S. image of Cuba. As long as the two countries discussed and cooperated on issues of mutual concern, Cuba could deflect the worst of Washington intentions. Cuba’s desire to open a safety valve for discontents at home also reinforced the inclination for talks. As

Washington and Havana engaged in discussions in pursuit of mutual interests, the 1984 migration agreement became a small, but meaningful, crack in the wall of suspicion across the Florida Straits.813

But the Reagan years also witnessed another development that contradicted this trend toward greater cooperation. In his November 1981 talks with Carlos Rafael

812 García, Havana USA, p. 156. 813 According to William LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, the U.S. government disingenuously made the Cuban government believe that “Cuban concessions on migration would lead to better relations and a broader dialogue.” LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 402. Neither U.S. nor Cuban sources confirm this point. Rather, it seems that Cubans drew the conclusion of their own regarding the merit of the talks. 308

Rodríguez, Alexander Haig assured the Cuban vice president that Washington had no intention of intervening in the internal affairs of Cuba. With the growing presence of

Miami Cubans in the United States, however, this was no longer the case. The driving force behind Radio Martí was CANF’s Mas Canosa, who worked for the legislation in the Congress, solidified his power among Miami Cubans, and cemented his access to the

U.S. president. His personal capacity for lobbying in Washington was nothing but remarkable. It would not be an exaggeration to assert that, in the wake of the Radio Martí startup, Reagan listened to Mas Canosa’s opinion over George Shultz’s. Perhaps, the significance of the startup was that it set an important precedent for Washington to be the custodian of “freedom” in Cuba. In the name of “freedom,” which Reagan called nonnegotiable in Cuba, Washington found itself obliged to intervene in the internal affairs of Cuba, in addition to its external affairs.

Even as the Cold War came close to its end, the next administration could not ignore Reagan’s legacy in U.S.-Cuban relations. At the urging of Washington, Havana agreed to resume migration talks in 1986, leading to a new agreement a year later.

Despite continued conflicts in Central America and Southern Africa, Havana also would concur with Washington in extending cooperation into other bilateral issues such as drug- trafficking, nuclear safety, and the maintenance of the U.S. military base at Guantánamo

Bay.814 This show of Havana’s good-will toward Washington nonetheless appeared to have little impact on U.S.-Cuban relations. As Bush supported TV Martí and followed up

Reagan’s commitment to “freedom” in Cuba, Havana recognized the shadow of Mas

814 Ziegler, U.S.-Cuban Cooperation. 309

Canosa and CANF—the “enemies of the Cuban Revolution”—behind this declaration of

“ideological aggression.”815 Washington’s catering to Miami’s wishes complicated

Havana’s public relations efforts in the United States. As the Cuban mission to the United

Nations lamented, the image of the Cuban Revolution in U.S. society was as bad as ever.

815 See for example, MINREX, Dirección de Prensa, Divulgación y Relaciones Culturales, “Cronología televisión Martí (I),” June 1988, La Biblioteca del Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos y sobre Estados Unidos, Universidad de la Habana [Library at the Center for Hemispheric and United States Studies, University of Havana].

310

CHAPTER 7: Making Foreign Policy Domestic?

The End of the Cold War and the Political Ascendancy of Miami Cubans

For counterrevolutionary Cubans in Miami, the end of the Cold War presented a golden opportunity to realize their dream—the toppling of the Castro regime in Havana.

Their leading voice was CANF chairman Jorge Mas Canosa, who had worked to mount a public relations campaign against the Cuban government since 1981. At the foundation’s special meeting on July 29, 1989, in Naples, Florida, Mas Canosa declared that Cuba now entered a critical moment in history. To seize this chance, he stated, the foundation must expand its role to “assume a more protagonist role in bringing real change to Cuba.”

CANF would now become “THE opposition to Castro,” something akin to a government- in-exile. As such, the foundation should develop a plan for “re-establishment of democracy and freedom.”816

Mas Canosa’s call for a new responsibility for the future of Cuba drew enthusiastic responses from CANF’s board of directors. The foundation succeeded in establishing Radio Martí, and TV Martí too would start its broadcasting soon. The support of 44,000 annual contributors, including 4,800 monthly members, made CANF the largest and most influential Cuban American organization in the United States. Being proud of what they had accomplished so far, Mas Canosa and his followers claimed to the

816 CANF Special Board Meeting Minutes, July 29-30, 1989, pp. 2-3, box 1.04, CANF Archive. 311 sole authority in speaking for the entire Cuban American community and later the Cuban population on the island. There would be “no dialogue with the Castro brothers,” Mas

Canosa pledged. Under his leadership, the foundation embarked on planning for “post-

Castro Cuba,” including Cuba’s new constitution and economic reconstruction.817

The story of CANF as a Janus-faced organization looking at both the United

States and Cuba is another example of how migration could complicate the conduct of

U.S. relations with Cuba. From its stronghold in Miami and elsewhere the foundation mobilized resources and expanded the network of support in Washington. Its magnified lobbying capabilities in turn helped Mas Canosa not only to increase the credibility of his power in the eyes of fellow counterrevolutionaries, but also to channel his preeminence into a claim to represent all Cubans who opposed the Cuban government. As this cycle of power-credibility generation went on, U.S. policy toward Cuba apparently reflected more the interests of Mas Canosa and his followers in Miami than what U.S. policymakers might have perceived as the best interests of the United States.

Based on U.S. and non-U.S. historical records, including private documents of

CANF, this chapter argues that migration remained a critical element of U.S. relations with Cuba. In explaining the roles of Miami Cubans in the making of U.S. policy toward

Cuba, the existing scholarship emphasizes a decline of Cuba’s importance as a national security issue around the end of the Cold War.818 Yet, as this chapter reveals, George H.

W. Bush’s policy toward Cuba was a continuation of Reagan’s, subject to the same

817 Ibid., pp. 3-5. 818 Schoultz, Infernal, chap. 10, esp. p. 448. Some scholars are skeptical of Cuban American influence during the Bush years, yet they have few records to prove it. Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo. 312 contradictory impulses that had shaped Washington’s attitudes toward Havana and Miami since the mid-1980s. Like his predecessor, Bush set Cuba’s “freedom” as a final goal of

U.S. policy toward Cuba because freedom was good in itself and it would be good for his constituency service for the Cuban American community in Miami.

At the same time, however, the Bush administration insisted that the change in

Cuba be “peaceful” and come from inside, even from the initiative of Fidel Castro.

Whereas counterrevolutionary Cubans in Miami aimed for the immediate end of the

Castro regime, U.S. officials in Washington were willing to wait for signs of a “positive” change on the island, kept contact with Havana over issues of mutual concern, and weighed the opinions of non-U.S. countries in making their policy toward Cuba.

Contradictions in approaches between Washington and Miami eventually became salient over the issue of U.S. enforcement of the Neutrality Act and the content of the Cuban

“Democracy” Act. Although Bush ultimately yielded to the political influence of Miami

Cubans, this chapter confirms that the basic pattern of contradiction in U.S. behavior remained the same as before.819

U.S.-Cuban Relations Cooling Down

George H. W. Bush had no intention of normalizing relations with Cuba when he became U.S. President. Since the early days of his vice presidency, he was a strong supporter of the counterrevolutionary cause in Cuba, as seen in his advocacy for Radio

819 On the pattern, see the previous chapter. 313 and TV Martí.820 Working with Secretary of State James Baker and National Security

Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Bush pursued a more pragmatic policy in Central America than

Reagan and proved more willing to explore diplomacy. Baker instructed Assistant

Secretary of State Bernard Aronson to deescalate regional tension and remove this matter from U.S. politics. Yet in Cuba, despite the resolution of crises in Southern Africa and later Central America, Bush carried over Reagan’s policies, attacked Cuba’s internal politics, and further tightened the embargo on the island.821

Bush’s hostile attitudes toward Cuba had several origins. First, the U.S. and

Cuban governments disagreed vehemently over their roles in Central America. Unlike

Reagan, Bush endorsed the “Esquipulas” peace process among Central American presidents. Yet, Washington continued to sponsor Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, even though the Esquipulas agreement called for the termination of aid from outside the region to “irregular forces or insurrectionist movements.” In contrast, despite its support for the peace process, Havana insisted that it continue military assistance to the FMLN unless all parties agreed to terminate the delivery of military equipment.822 The Havana-

Washington dichotomy stood out more prominently after Moscow suspended military assistance to Nicaragua and asked Managua and Havana not to deliver Soviet-made

820 See the previous chapter, as well as numerous speeches in CANF, Bush on Cuba. 821 Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 419-420; Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, p. 22; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, chap. 13. 822 For Castro’s earlier proposal in November 1981, see Chapter Five. On Esquipulas, see Central American ambassadors to the UN General Assembly, August 31, 1987, available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CR%20HN%20GT%20NI%20SV_870807_Es quipulasII.pdf (accessed October 18, 2015). 314 weapons to the FMLN. Aware of the Havana-Moscow divergence of positions, Bush called Castro “a major source of problems in the region.”823

Equally contentious was Washington’s interference in Cuba’s internal affairs.

Bush displayed strong interest in Cuba’s human rights record and drove this point high on the U.S. agenda.824 Before the opening of discussion at the UNCHR, the U.S. president personally lobbied the leaders of foreign nations, such as Venezuela, Colombia, and

Mexico.825 Like his predecessor, Bush also made numerous speeches in front of Miami

Cubans. “I am unalterably committed to a free, united, democratic Cuba,” he said on May

22, 1989. “Unless Fidel Castro is willing to change his policies and behavior, we will maintain our present policy toward Cuba.” The U.S. president even endorsed Armando

Valladares’s Against All Hope, which denounced the inhumane treatment of Cuban political prisoners. “It meant a lot to the entire Bush family and has certainly been an inspiration to me.” Bush chose the author to lead the U.S. delegation at the UNCHR.826

By then, Havana must have lost nearly all hope for an improvement of U.S.-

Cuban relations. In the early days of the Bush presidency, Castro exhibited cautious optimism regarding the prospect of better relations, referring to the successful conclusion

823 Memcon (Bush, Gorbachev), December 2, 1989, part I (10:00-11:55 a.m.), p.5, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library Website (hereafter GHWBL-Web). All memcons and telcons cited in this chapter are available at the following site (https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/memcons-telcons). 824 to Scowcroft, February 24, 1989, #019497, PR013-08, White House Office of Records Management Subject File (hereafter WHORM), GHWBL. 825 For example, see Memcon (Bush, Carlos Andrés Pérez), March 3, 1989; G. Philip Huges to Melvyn Levitsky (on Bush’s call to Colombian President Virgilio Barco), March 9, 1989; and Memcon (Bush, Fernarndo Solana), March 20, 1989, GHWBL-Web. 826 Bush’s Remarks, May 22, 1989, APP. Valladares published this work in 1986 with Mas Canosa’s support. See his Against All Hope: Prison Memoirs (New York: Knopf, 1986). The Cuban government disputed the validity of his account. 315 of a negotiated peace settlement in Southern Africa and Cuba’s willingness to engage in similar discussion on Central America.827 Yet, the March 1989 leak of Baker’s memorandum, in which he denied any U.S. intention of amplifying discussion with Cuba in the absence of political change on the island, apparently dismayed Havana.828 In April,

Soviet Premier visited Havana and met Castro. As Gorbachev expressed his wishes that the settlement of Central American conflicts would lead to improved U.S.-Cuban relations, Castro complained that Washington did not follow its

“promise” of considering a change of policy after the conclusion of the peace accord over

Southern Africa.829

Two days after the May 20, 1989, speech by Bush, Castro apparently wrote an editorial for Granma. By dictating Cuba’s internal affairs in front of Miami Cubans, the editorial said, Bush acted more as “consul of [counterrevolutionary] worms of Miami” than the U.S. president. Like his predecessor, Bush deemed May 20 as “self-styled”

Cuba’s Independence Day, the date when Cuba transited from a Spanish colony to a U.S.

“neo-colony.” His invited guests, including Valladares, were “annexationists.” The editorial claimed that Cuba had no idea of abandoning its independence for the sake of normalizing relations with the United States. “Nobody gave us our freedom. To preserve

827 For example, see his remark in El regreso de Fidel a Caracas, 1989 (Caracas: Ediciones de la Biblioteca de la Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1989), pp. 10-11. 828 See for example, René Mujica (then deputy chief of CUINT in Washington), “The Future of Cuban-US Relations: A Cuban View,” in H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds., Cuban Foreign Policy Confronts a New International Order (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 63-76; and Carlos Alzugaray Treto, “Cuban Foreign Policy during the ‘Special Period’: Interests, Aims, and Outcomes,” in H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds., Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy: The Impact of the ‘‘Special Period’’ (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006), pp. 49-71. 829 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 260. Castro repeated the same argument when Eduard Shevardnadze visited Cuba in October 1989. See Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 220-21. 316 our freedom we are prepared [to fight].” For the Cubans, “socialism or death is a real option.”830 The Canadian embassy concluded, “Cuban-U.S. relations appear to be back to their customary vitriolic level.”831

Havana’s Thinking of Bilateral Issues

U.S.-Cuban relations might have improved if Washington refrained from launching TV Martí and avoided intervening in Cuba’s internal affairs. In June 1989,

Carlos Aldana, the influential secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central

Committee, had lunch with John Taylor, chief of USINT in Havana. While expressing bewilderment regarding Bush’s connection with “anti-Cuban” activists in Miami, Aldana reiterated opposition to TV Martí and proposed negotiations on exchanges of TV programs as an alternative. If this was infeasible, he suggested, Havana would introduce the Cable News Network (CNN), which he praised as relatively objective and timely.832

Thereafter, Aldana kept discussing Central America and TV Martí with Taylor, noting that there would be “good perspectives” on other issues of mutual interest. But, as Taylor recalled, Aldana repeatedly warned that Cuba would see the broadcasts as “evidence that

U.S. hostility toward Cuba would not change whatever the regime did.”833

830 Editorial, May 24, 1989, Granma, p. 1. 831 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, May 26, 1989, vol. 28310, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 10, RG25, LAC. The Mexican embassy in Havana also concluded that a seeming relaxation of U.S.- Cuban tensions from the beginning of Bush presidency ended by May 1989. Informe, p. 5, attached to Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, June 2, 1989, III-4394-1, AHGE. 832 USINT in Havana to Washington, June 20, 1989, in author’s possession. 833 Taylor, interview transcript, FAOH, pp. 146-47. For Aldana’s view of TV Martí and CANF, see also Aldana, interview for Areíto, September 10, 1989, in Granma Weekly Review (translated in 317

Another possible key item of mutual concern was drug interdiction. In February

1988, U.S. authorities arrested Reinaldo Ruiz, a Miami Cuban drug trafficker, who smuggled cocaine through Cuba into the United States. After he confessed collaboration with Cuban officials, Taylor approached Aldana, who promised an investigation. The result was the late June 1989 arrest of , a famous military commander, and

Antonio de la Guardia, head of the Ministry of Interior’s department in charge of circumventing the U.S. blockade of Cuba.834 Both of them were executed. Others, such as

Interior Minister José Abrantes, were imprisoned. To underscore a hard stance on drug issues, Cuba even declared a policy of shooting down any aircraft that illegally penetrated

Cuban airspace and refused to obey an order to land. Although Washington opposed this policy for fear of risking innocent lives, it welcomed Havana’s efforts to crack down on drug businesses.835

By addressing Washington’s bilateral concerns, Havana sought to deny

Washington any ammunition for negative campaigns and deter possible aggression. Also noteworthy in this regard was Cuba’s discussion on “migration and commercial politics with Cubans in the United States.”836 In September 1989, when Jaime Crombet, secretary for the Central Committee of the Communist Party, presided over an interagency meeting

English), attached to Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, September 13, 1989, vol. 28310, 20- Cuba-1-3-USA, part 10, RG25, LAC. 834 Ziegler, U.S.-Cuban Cooperation, pp. 67-68; Gleijeses, Visions, pp. 493-94; and LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp. 327-28. See also, Morley, interview transcript, pp. 91-92, FAOH; and Taylor, interview transcript, pp. 165-66, FAOH. 835 Non-Paper handed by Taylor, n.d., attached to Germán Blanco to Malmierca, July 1, 1989; and Malmierca to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, July 12, 1989, both in MINREX. 836 Sánchez-Parodi to Malmerica, September 11, 1989, Caja “Migratorios 14,” MINREX. 318 on this issue, the Cuban foreign ministry reiterated concern about migration fraud. In the judicial process against the ex-Interior Minister, Cuban authorities confirmed the existence of illegal practices that had financially exploited family travel and emigration.

The foreign ministry argued that Cuba had a “legitimate right” as a sovereign nation to receive economic benefits from migration flows, especially as it confronted the U.S. blockade. Still, it also claimed that the government should adopt a “just and humane” migration policy to avoid being exposed to accusations of inhumane politics and fraudulent commercial practices.837

The World Transformed?

As in the previous decades, Moscow was fully supportive of Cuban attempts at dialogue with Washington. Gorbachev’s USSR sought to mediate U.S.-Cuban differences in hopes of reducing Cold War tensions, facilitating peace talks in Central America, and reducing the cost of supporting its allies in Havana. In light of growing economic and political difficulties at home, Gorbachev undertook major internal reforms and reevaluated foreign policy goals in the Third World. During this process Moscow shared the objective with Washington of persuading Castro to change his internal and foreign policies. Yet unlike Washington, Moscow believed that Castro was not as dogmatic as

Bush claimed he was. Rather than mounting pressure on Castro, Soviet policymakers

837 Sánchez-Parodi to Crombet, September 11, 1989, Caja “Migratorios 14,” MINREX. The report draws on a Miami newspaper in referring to Jorge Mas Canosa’s announcement that CANF would study this subject. The MINREX archive had numerous documents on the irregular flows of Cubans, such as those left for Puerto Rico through the Dominican Republic. Cuban officials paid close attention to this matter, trying to figure out if there was any violation of laws. 319 urged U.S. counterparts to engage him in talks and encourage him to introduce change at his initiative.838

Washington discarded Moscow’s pleas, including the ones personally made by

Gorbachev. Since his April 1989 trip to Havana, Gorbachev exploited as many opportunities as possible to remind U.S. leaders that Castro was in favor of talks, peace, and the normalization of relations.839 Then came the December 1989 Malta Summit.

While ranking Central America and Cuba as top-priority items, Bush demanded that

Gorbachev halt economic and military assistance to Cuba, which he estimated at $5.5 billion per year.840 Instead of yielding to this demand, however, the Soviet premier emphasized “Cuba’s interest in normalizing relations with the United States” and offered his mediation. In response, Bush cited Costa Rican President Oscar Arias’s suspicion that

Cuba masterminded the major FMLN offensive in El Salvador, which occurred a few weeks earlier. By underscoring Costa Rican concern about Cuba’s role in the region, the

838 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 205-211, 216-17. For Gorbachev’s personal views of Cuba, see for example, Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 88. See also, Anatoly S. Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, trans. Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 204. 839 Gorbachev to Bush (unofficial translation), May 6, 1989, in folder “Gorbachev Correspondence- Outgoing [2],” Soviet Union-USSR Subject Files, NSC: Condoleeza Rice Files, GHWBL; and Memcon (Gorbachev, Baker), May 11, 1989, in folder “FM Shevardnadze, Edouard-USSR [3],” Soviet Union-USSR Subject Files, NSC: Condoleeza Rice Files, GHWBL. 840 Selected Released Pages of Briefing Book for the President, “The President’s Meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev, December 2-3, 1989, Malta,” n.d., available at National Security Archive Website, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%209.pdf (accessed October 31, 2014). 320

U.S. president claimed that Castro was “clearly out of step” with the trend of democratization across the world.841

Bush’s argument did not end there. “Castro poses yet another grave problem,” he continued. “I am talking about many Cubans who have been expelled from Cuba and whose relatives in Cuba are being persecuted. Many such Cubans tend to live in southern

Florida, and their passions run high against this man who is considered to be the worst dictator.”842 After this remark the U.S. president went back to the same demand that

Moscow cut its ties to Havana to remove “this serious element of friction in Soviet-

American relations.”843 Gorbachev reminded Bush that Cuba was a sovereign country with its own government, urging the U.S. president to probe the idea of dialogue. “I mention Castro’s signal because I think it shows Castro sees his interest lies in changing his relations with the U.S. and others,” the Soviet leader explained. “So please give it some thought.” Bush conceded a little. “We have had feelers from him. But [I can respond only] if he could do something in human rights.”844

841 Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2, 1989, p. 14-15. For a U.S. version, see Memcon (Bush, Gorbachev), December 2, 1989, part II (12:00-1:00 p.m.), pp. 1-2, GHWBL-Web. For Oscar Arias’s view of Cuba, see Telcon (Bush, Arias), November 28, 1989, GHWBL-Web. 842 Quoted in Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2, 1989, p. 15. Similar but weaker languages also appear in the U.S. version. “There is another major Castro problem—the emigres (in Florida) who have strong emotions about this last dictator.” Memcon (Bush, Gorbachev), December 2, 1989, part II (12:00-1:00 p.m.), p. 2. 843 Soviet Transcript of the Malta Summit, December 2, 1989, p. 17. 844 Memcon (Bush, Gorbachev), December 2, 1989, part II (12:00-1:00 p.m.), p. 4. Partial story of this meeting appear in Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs, trans. Georges Peronansky and Tatjana Varsavsky (New York: Doubleday, 1995), pp. 512-13; and George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage, 1998), pp. 165-66. 321

Bush’s incentive to listen to Castro probably lessened as the world transformed in his favor. After the November 1989 collapse of the Wall, the survival of communist regimes in Eastern Europe grew doubtful. The wind of change also swept the

Western Hemisphere, as Bush remarked in his Thanksgiving Address, stating that

Panama, Nicaragua, and Cuba were the only three major exceptions to the regional trend toward democratization.845 But two of these did not merit further concerns after the

December 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama and the February 1990 electoral defeat of the

Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Even the entrenched guerilla war in El Salvador came closer to its end, as Cuba finally suspended its military assistance to the FMLN.846 The age of the military missions of Cuban internationalists was ending. It became obvious that Cuba posed no security threats against any types of Latin American regimes, not to mention the

U.S. government.847

U.S.-Cuban tensions nonetheless reached a peak on March 27, 1990, when the

U.S. government started TV Martí. Two months earlier, Cuba’s foreign minister Isidoro

Malmierca wrote to President of the UN Security Council Essy Amara to condemn this project as a “violation of Cuban national sovereignty.” The startup “would not only lead to a greater deterioration of relations between Cuba and the United States,” the letter claimed, “but would unleash a crisis of unforeseeable consequences.” Aside from these warnings, Havana also expressed its disposition to negotiate with the United States,

845 Thanksgiving Address to the Nation by Bush, November 29, 1989, APP. 846 Report on a Conversation with Fidel Castro, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, June 20, 1990, TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d. 62, l. 1-6, WCDA. 847 Vázquez Raña, Raúl Castro, pp. 61-62. See also, Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, October 24, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. 322 including the exchange of radio and television programs “on a basis of absolute reciprocity and mutual respect.” Cuba was also willing to place U.S.-Cuban disputes under “international arbitration” to resolve this issue.848 The Cuban foreign ministry sent this letter to all countries with which Cuba had diplomatic relations, as well as U.S. congressmen.849

As often was the case, Cuba’s appeal for peace fell on deaf ears in Washington.

CANF had long promoted the TV Martí project and Bush had publicly endorsed it in front of the foundation’s supporters in June 1988. As one State Department official recalled, the TV station “really was an issue of ‘we have to do it’ and so it became an issue of how do we do it.”850 As the U.S. government considered its sponsoring of TV

Martí as “nonnegotiable,” any attempt at U.S.-Cuban dialogue seemed to reach a dead- end.851 Cuba’s reactions to the start of the broadcasts were predictable. The Cuban government jammed the station and accused the United States of creating “conditions necessary to launch a military aggression.”852 Undoubtedly, the startup of TV Martí damaged Havana’s remaining hopes of improving relations with the United States. In

848 Fidel Castro approved the revised draft. Malmerica to Amara (unofficial translation), January 17, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. 849 Malmierca to Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, January 17, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. The same box had numerous letters from Malmierca to foreign ministers. See also, Raúl Roa Kourí to Malmierca, January 10, 1990; and Malmierca to José M. Miyar Barrueco, January 11, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. 850 Vicki Huddleston, interview, cited in Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, p. 32 851 For U.S.-Cuban contacts prior to the startup, see Cronológico sobre contactos oficiales bilaterales relacionados con Acuerdo migratorio e interferencias radiales, attached to Germán Blanco to José Viera, May 21, 1990, Caja “Agresión Comunicaciones 28,” MINREX. 852 Declaration of MINREX, March 27, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. See the previous chapter for Bush’s endorsement of TV Martí. The television broadcasting has been controversial up to this day. See, Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 441-44. 323

May, Global Shield, a U.S. military exercise at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo, triggered a Cuban counter-maneuver, Cuban Shield.853

Jorge Mas Canosa’s CANF

TV Martí was another major victory for Mas Canosa’s CANF, which continued to increase its power in Washington. By 1990, the Cuban-origin population in the United

States reached over a million. Over 60 percent lived in South Florida, where the Hispanic population had gained prominence in almost all spheres of life. Cuban American politicians stepped up the political ladder to be representatives at local, state, and federal levels. CANF also tapped the rising economic prowess of Miami Cubans by recruiting new members and building new chapters across the nation and beyond. By June 1992, the foundation held its chapters in Atlanta, Chicago, Jacksonville (Florida), California, New

Jersey, New Orleans, New York, Orlando (Florida), Puerto Rico, West Florida,

Venezuela, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Madrid. Between July 1981 and November 1992, the number of CANF’s directors paying an annual fee of $10,000, increased from 14 to

62, with 71 trustees.854

CANF was controversial yet popular among Miami Cubans. There emerged numerous reports on Mas Canosa’s alleged abuse of influence, and their volume kept growing as he became more politically powerful. He was unmistakably harsh toward his

853 Mujica, “A Cuban View,” p. 67. 854 Kami, “Ethnic Community.” By the early 1990s Cuban Americans achieved approximating economic parity with the national population despite the handicap of a much shorter average length of residence in the country. Portes, “The Cuban American Community Today: A Brief Portrait,” January 1993, in folder “Cuba,” box 61, Bernardo Benes Collection, UM-CHC. 324 political enemies, such as Ramón Cernuda, who antagonized the chair of the foundation by challenging the rationale for tightening of the U.S. embargo. When U.S. Customs agents raided the home of Cernuda to confiscate more than 200 paintings from Cuba,

Mas Canosa bragged on radio that he was the one who convinced federal agents to do so.855 Because of such behavior, even some former directors of the foundation, such as

Raúl Masvidal, called him “paternalistic and authoritarian.”856 In light of growing criticisms, Mas Canosa himself admitted that he was driven by passion, but only because he believed in what he was doing. “We never forget our friends,” said Mas Canosa. “And we always remember our enemies.”857

Yet despite these problems, the clear majority of Miami Cubans favored the foundation’s hardline stance on the Cuban government. According to a Florida

International University survey in March 1991, over three-fourths of Miami Cubans favored increased economic pressure on Cuba, the denial of diplomatic and trade relations with the island, and even U.S. support of an armed internal against the

Cuban government.858 Several other polls conducted by a local Spanish television station not only produced similar results, but also demonstrated the positive evaluation of CANF

855 The federal agents returned the paintings to Cernuda after they confirmed that he did not violate any U.S. laws. John Newhouse, “A Reporter at Large: Socialism or Death,” New Yorker, April 27, 1992, pp. 81-82; and Carla Anne Robbins, “Dateline Washington: Cuban-American Clout,” Foreign Policy (Fall 1992), pp. 162-182. 856 Journal, May 11, 1990, p. A1; García, Havana USA, pp. 150-2; and Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 436-37. 857 Magazine, May 3, 1992, p. 23. 858 MH, March 31, 1991, pp. 1B and 2B. These results were largely identical in polls taken in October 1991 and 1993. See Gullermo J. Grenier, Hugh Gladwin, and Douglas McLaughen, The 1993 FIU Cuba Poll: Views on Policy Options toward Cuba held by Cuban-American Residents of Dade County, Florida, July 1, 1993, available at https://cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/1993-cuba-poll.pdf (accessed January 6, 2015). 325 among many Miami Cubans. A poll taken in April 1992 was particularly encouraging for the foundation because half of Cuban American respondents chose CANF as “the most respected [Cuban American] organization.”859

CANF incessantly worked to broaden bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress. At times, the foundation collaborated with nationwide conservative groups to make Cuban issues a litmus test for electoral retaliation in districts where Cuban American votes were few. At other times, the foundation made inroads into the liberal wings of U.S. politics by enlisting the help of influential congressmen such as Dante Fascell and Claude Pepper, as well as friendly lobbyists like Jerome Berlin, a top Democratic fundraiser in Miami.860

Most noteworthy was the foundation’s ability to turn around two liberal Democrats who occupied important posts in the congressional making of foreign policy. One was

Claiborne Pell, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The other was Robert

Torricelli, chair of the subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House

Committee on Foreign Affairs.861

CANF’s access to the executive office grew stronger because of the role played by Jeb Bush, the son of the U.S. president. After persuading his father to endorse TV

Martí, Jeb continued to serve as an intimate conduit to the White House for the foundation. He not only delivered letters from Miami Cubans to his father’s office, but

859 MH, May 5, 1992, p. 2B. For the foundation’s view of this poll, see Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, May 15, 1992, p. 3, CANF Archive. See also, MH, May 9, 1991, p. 1B. 860 Berlin was national finance chair of the Democratic senatorial candidates in the 1988 election. Bob Graham’s press secretary Ken Klein commented. “Everybody wins. The foundation gets access to the Democratic mainstream and Jerry brokers the money.” MH, April 11, 1988, p. 1A. 861 Philip Brenner and Saul Landau, “Passive Aggressive,” NACLA Report on the Americans 27, no. 3 (November 1990), pp. 18-19; and Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, pp. 14-16. 326 also added favorable comments on their pleas. On various occasions, Jeb personally lobbied his father to meet Cuban American leaders, including Mas Canosa. It was also

Jeb who helped Mas Canosa to send his policy recommendations to the Bush transition team several weeks after his father’s electoral victory in November 1988.862 Jeb’s writings almost always drew the attention of his father and the staff working for him. At one point Bush passed a memo from Jeb on Cuba to National Security Adviser Scowcroft, noting that it was from “my boy in Cuba.”863

Jeb Bush actively engaged in Miami politics. In August 1989, he became a campaign manager for Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who became the first Hispanic congresswoman in the United States. He also lobbied on behalf of Orlando Bosch, an anti-Castro militant who orchestrated more than thirty acts of terrorism. After serving for years in a Venezuelan jail, Bosch asked for political asylum on his return to the United

States. The White House initially let the Justice Department undertake a review of his records and make a decision on his case. But when the Justice Department ruled in favor of his deportation, the decision caused a massive protest in Miami, where Jeb joined Mas

Canosa and Ros-Lehtinen to demand White House intervention in this judicial process.864

862 Mas Canosa thanked Codina and Jeb Bush for this arrangement at one of CANF’s meetings. Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 22, 1988, p. 3, box 1.04, CANF Archive. For Jeb’s activities in Miami in the 1980s, see the previous chapter. 863 Handwritten note by Bush to Scowcroft, June 25, 1991, attached to Jeb to George Bush, June 12, 1991, in folder “Cuba: TV Marti [1],” NSC: Charles Gillespie Files, Subject Files, GHWBL. 864 U.S. Justice Department, Office of the Associate Attorney General, “In the Matters of Orlando Bosch-Avila,” June 23, 1989, and Sichan Siv and Shiree Sánchez to Bush, June 30, 1989, both in folder “Cuban Americans-Florida/ Orlando Bosch,” White House Office of Public Liaison: James Schaefer Files, GHWBL. Bush’s public liaison officers noted Jeb’s attendance in the protest as if it were an important matter for the U.S. president’s consideration. For a protest, see MH, June 30, 1989, p. 1A. 327

In June 1990, Bosch was released. As the New York Times pointed out, it was “a startling example of political justice.” The administration “coddles one of the hemisphere’s most notorious terrorists” to carry favor in South Florida.865

Planning for the “Post-Castro” Dream

With its strong influence in Washington, CANF started to assume the role of

“government-in-exile” after Mas Canosa’s July 1989 announcement. The first job was to send messages to the Cuban people on the island to dispel the “myth” that “the exiles are only interested in taking back forcefully everything they once owned.”866 To this end, the foundation set up La Voz de La Fundación, its own radio broadcasting to the island.

Apart from Radio and TV Martí, Mas Canosa appeared on this radio station, trying to explain about the foundation’s views of the island, the implications of international change for Cuba, and the foundation’s visions for post-Castro Cuba. CANF officially declared that it would make responsible nobody but the Castro brothers, and expressed its willingness to talk with any governmental officials to find a political solution to the

Cuban problem.867

CANF’s planning for post-Castro Cuba mainly consisted of two parts. Mel

Martínez, a principal organizer of CANF’s chapter in Orlando and future U.S. Senator from Florida, led a group of directors to establish a political work commission. Its task was to study Cuba’s political system during and after the imagined Cuban transition to

865 Editorial, NYT, July 20, 1990, p. A26. 866 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, March 15, 1990, p. 3, box 1.04, CANF Archive. 867 See numerous speeches, talks, and interviews in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. II, esp. pp. 809-38. 328 democracy, including the release of political prisoners, the establishment of civil rights and human rights, and the creation of a new Cuban constitution. Based on the commission’s discussion, the board of directors agreed that CANF would negotiate with any elements in Cuba that aimed to remove the Castro brothers from power and promote

“freedom as we know it” inside Cuba.868 The commission also presented a “Fundamental

Law for Transition,” which would help a provisional government to build free enterprise and democracy.869

A twin was an economic work commission chaired by Tony Costa, president of a foliage company in Miami. Pessimistic about the availability of economic assistance from

Western countries, the commission identified privatization and foreign investment as a guide for Cuba’s economic future.870 The inspiration for such ideas probably came from disciples of the economist Milton Friedman, who readily preached to CANF directors about the gospel of laissez-faire and small government. According to these guest lecturers, the post-Castro regime should “capitalize as quickly and as much as possible” to build “a just society.”871 When Mas Canosa toured Wall Street to recruit future investment in Cuba, Malcolm S. Forbes Jr., editor of the U.S. business magazine Forbes,

868 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, December 8, 1989, p. 4, box 1.04, CANF Archive. 869 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, January 26, 1990, box 1.04, CANF Archive. 870 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, December 8, 1989, p. 5, box 1.04, CANF Archive. 871 Minutes of CANF Congress, June 22-24, 1990, p. 2, box 1.04, CANF Archive. Three guest speakers were Manuel Ayau, president of the University Francisco Marroquín in Guatemala; Eduardo Maryora, dean of the school of law of the same university; and Victor Canto, associate of economist Arthur Laffer. The former two studied under Milton Friedman. 329 endorsed this move. “With the guidance of men like Mas,” he wrote, “Cuba could quickly become a model for the rest of Latin America.”872

Yet ultimately, CANF directors were not true believers of laissez-faire, as seen in their unequivocal opposition to the flow of capitals that would benefit their enemy.873

Most important, they championed the Mack Amendment, which would block foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba. Other measures that Mas Canosa contemplated were those to prohibit vessels trading with Cuba from entering U.S. ports for six months; to require countries borrowing U.S. loans to stop lending trade credits to

Cuba; to eliminate U.S. sugar quotas of all nations that imported Cuban sugar; to reduce

U.S. aid to any country purchasing Cuban sugar by an amount equal to those purchases; and to send a strong signal to dissuade foreign nations from granting concessional trade credits to Cuba.874 Mas Canosa was willing to support measures that would infringe other nation’s sovereignty only if he believed they would hasten Castro’s fall.

In early March 1990, Mas Canosa enlisted the help of Jeb Bush to bring these ideas to the attention of the U.S. president and his chief of staff John Sununu.875 In a proposal paper titled “The ,” Mas Canosa contended that radical changes in Eastern Europe and Central America presented “new opportunities to promote

872 Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., “Soon to Come: Capitalist Cuba,” Forbes, September 17, 1990, pp. 19-20. 873 See the discussion in Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, April 14, 1991, box 1.04, CANF Archive. 874 Paper, “Cuban Democracy Act,” attached to Mas Canosa to Sununu, March 6, 1990, #120195, CO038, WHORM, GHWBL. Armando Codina was also present. 875 Bush to Sununu, February 13, 1990, #129424, FG001-07, WHORM, GHWBL; and Mas Canosa to Bush, March 5, 1990, with the attached “U.S. Policy toward Cuba: Measures and Consideration,” in folder “Cuba, General—January-June 1990 (3),” NSC: William T. Pryce Files, GHWBL. 330 a free and democratic Cuba.” Mas Canosa introduced the above-mentioned measures that tightened the U.S. embargo. But he also proposed the opening of a direct mail service to

Cuba and the authorization of U.S. funds for supporting groups.876 These two items belong to what future scholars would term “Track II,” whose aim was to influence

Cuban internal politics through greater communication with the island, rather than isolating the island from the rest of the world (“Track I”). Scholarship has mistakenly attributed the origin of such approaches to Congressman Robert Torricelli.877 Yet, it was

Mas Canosa who sat at the driving seat in the anti-Castro movement in the United States.

Cuba at a Crossroads—Trade, Foreign Investment, Tourism, Culture, and More

Whereas Mas Canosa sought to reduce Cuba’s economic relations abroad, Fidel

Castro expanded them as quickly as possible. By the mid-1980s, the Cuban leader already faced a stagnating economy, and the U.S. embargo was not the only thing to blame. Sovietization of the Cuban economy in the early 1970s brought some tangible benefits in the short span. Yet, following the 1976 drop in sugar market prices, the Cuban economy suffered from trade deficits, mismanagement, and growing labor indiscipline and inefficiency. Then, before the 1986 opening of the Third Congress of the Cuban

Communist Party, Castro identified Cuba’s “errors,” undertook austerity measures, and attacked market mechanisms, private enterprise, and material incentives for labor. Unlike

876 Paper by Mas Canosa, “Cuban Democracy Act.” 877 See for example, Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo, pp. 90-100. For CANF, so-called “Track II” actually started with the Radio Martí startup of 1985. 331

Gorbachev’s , Castro’s “rectification” apparently prioritized intensive ideological and political work over the pursuit of economic growth.878

Yet, regardless of his diatribes against capitalism, Castro never repealed the Law

Decree no. 50 of 1982, which authorized foreign investment in the form of joint ventures with a Cuban entity. As Gorbachev launched his reforms and the future of the socialist bloc became uncertain, Cuba could no longer rely on the socialist bloc, which had supported the Cuban economy through preferential trade, barter, and financial arrangements.879 Even as early as July 1989, Castro declared that Cuba might have to survive without the Soviet Union. “Just imagine,” the Cuban leader rhetorically asked,

“what would happen in the world if the socialist community disappeared?” Castro made a historical reference to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, in which the Cubans were left alone in front of the United States. “I believe in the people,” he stated. Even if the USSR dissolved or entered a civil war, “Cuba and the Cuban Revolution would continue struggling and resisting.”880

To prepare for days without the Soviet Union, the Cuban leader sought ways to energize the economy. For example, the revolutionary government discounted tourism as

878 Resolution on the Program of the Community Party of Cuba, in Gail Reed, Island in the Storm: The Cuban Community Party’s Fourth Congress (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1992), pp. 101-110. For Cuba’s economic performances, see also the previous chapters. On rectification, see Pérez-López, Second Economy, pp. 120-23. 879 Over the period of 1983-1989, the socialist bloc accounted for over 80 percent of Cuba’s trade. After 1976, the Soviet Union paid four or five times the world market price to purchase Cuban sugar. The Soviet Union also supplied oil to Cuba at preferential prices, and allowed the island to re-export since the late 1970s. The socialist bloc also provided development assistance to the island. Pérez- López, Second Economy, pp. 123-28. 880 Speech by Fidel Castro, July 26, 1989, LANIC. 70 percent of Cuba’s overall trade was with the Soviet Union and 15-18 percent with Eastern Europe. Schoultz, Infernal, p. 429. For Cuba’s memory of the crisis, see Blight and Brenner, Sad and Luminous. 332 a vehicle for economic development due to its close association with the capitalist evils of prostitution, drugs, gambling, and organized crime. Yet at his mid-December 1989 luncheon meeting with EEC ambassadors, Castro emphasized that tourism was vital to

Cuba’s future economy and that Varadero, sixty miles east of Havana, would become a major resort.881 In May 1990, the revolutionary government for the first time oversaw the inauguration of hotels jointly built with foreign capitalists in

Varadero. Thereafter, the government constructed hotels, invited foreign capital for joint ventures, and increased rentable cars, taxi drivers, and special stores selling consumer goods for foreign tourists.882 International visitors more than tripled from 132,000 in

1981 to around 424,000 in 1991.883

Havana also sought to increase revenue through cultural diplomacy in the United

States. According to quarterly reports from Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky &

Lieberman, P.C., a law firm in New York that represented the Cuban government in the

United States, Cuban officials discussed ways to take advantage of the 1988 Berman

Amendment, which had exempted “informational materials” from U.S. trade sanctions. In

April 1989, Cuba’s Ministry of Culture founded ARTEX, an entity to advance the

“commercialization” of Cuban cultural products and make “financial contributions” to

881 The British embassy briefed the Canadians on Castro’s remarks. The Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, December 29, 1989, vol. 28301, 20-Cuba-1-3, part 23, RG25, LAC. Castro again showed up for a seven-hour luncheon with EEC ambassadors and emphasized new financial opportunities in Cuba. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, January 26, 1990, vol. 28301, 20-Cuba-1-3, part 23, RG25, LAC. 882 Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, May 4, 1989, III-4394-1, AHGE. 883 María Dolores Espino, “: A Development Strategy for the 1990s?” in Jorge F. Pérez-López, ed., Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 147-166. 333 the island. Directed by the Ministry of Culture, the law firm assisted ARTEX in promoting books, songs, films, paintings, sculptures, and other financially valuable works. Music was the most important. The law firm identified appropriate U.S. record companies, explained the amendment, and cultivated their interest in Cuban musicians.884

Capitol Records, a major U.S. record company, released the first record, Cuban jazz pianist Gonzalo Rubalcaba’s The Blessing, in the spring of 1991.

More than trade, foreign investment, tourism, and promotion of culture, Cuba also worked to augment political ties with countries beyond the socialist bloc. Of particular importance was Latin America, a natural area for Havana’s diplomatic effort. Despite the

U.S. policy of isolating Cuba, the region’s democratization had reduced anticommunist zeal and increased the call for Cuba’s reintegration into the Western Hemisphere. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Cuba established, normalized, or repaired relations with

Brazil, , Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, and Colombia. Cuba became a full member of the Latin American and the Caribbean Economic System, an organization to promote economic integration and social development in the region. In

1990, with the region’s support, Cuba gained a seat on the UN Security Council for a two-year term.885 By choosing Cuba to take up this post, Latin American diplomats

884 The firm’s representatives made numerous trips to Havana and met with top Cuban officials, including Armando Hart, Cuba’s Minister of Culture. See for example, Krinsky to Bank Nacional de Cuba, “Combined Quarterly Reports for the Periods ending September 30 and December 31, 1989,” February 5, 1990, pp. 4-5, 12-16, 20-26, as well as other reports, in Caja “Bloqueo 1990-1992,” MINREX. On ARTEX, see its website, http://www.artexsa.com/quienes-somos (accessed October 13, 2015). 885 Damián J. Fernández, “Continuity and Change in Cuba’s International Relations in the 1990s,” in Jorge F. Pérez-López, ed., Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 49-54. 334 encouraged the Cuban government to work beside the United States, a permanent member of the council.886

Approaches by Mexico, Canada, and USSR

As U.S.-Cuban tensions flared up, various third parties sought to mediate differences. For example, Mexico stood at the forefront in expanding relations with Cuba in the late 1980s and early 1990s, even as it deepened economic ties with the United

States. After joining other regional powers to call for the return of Cuba to the OAS, the

Mexican foreign ministry probed the idea of contributing to an improvement in the relations between the two neighboring countries. In its view, Washington’s startup of TV

Martí was particularly worrisome, as it believed might cause an armed confrontation and entail further radicalization of the Cuban Revolution. In late February 1990, Mexico thus offered its assistance to Havana and Washington for establishing a confidential communication channel to discuss TV Martí problems.887

Despite the wishes of Mexico, it could not stop U.S.-Cuban relations from deteriorating. Washington’s response to Mexico’s efforts was icy. The U.S. State

Department rejected the offer, affirmed its right to start TV Martí, and insisted that Cuba

886 NYT, October 19, 1989, p. A19. Cuba also began signaling its change of a stance on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibited testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons. For a long time Cuba reiterated U.S. hostility toward Cuba as the principal reason for its inability to participate. Carmen Moreno de Del Cueto to Antonio Villegas Villalobos, September 19, 1989, III- 4394-1, AHGE. 887 “Estrategia para proporcionar distención Cuba y Estados Unidos,” February 26, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE; and Mexico City to Mexican embassy in Havana, February 27, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. For earlier thinking, see also Mexican foreign ministry’s office of Latin America and the Caribbean affairs to Sergio González Galves, September 28, 1989, III-4394-1, AHGE. 335 hold “fair, competitive elections” before being readmitted into the OAS.888 In contrast,

Havana appreciated the offer, reaffirmed its willingness to solve the issue by peaceful means, and even assured that it would not undermine Mexico’s interests under any circumstances.889 Not surprisingly, the Mexicans concluded that Washington, rather than

Havana, was the one that created an obstacle to dialogue and resolved to assist Cuba’s reintegration into the region. Much like the Soviet Union, Mexico hoped to see a change in Cuba’s political system, but with “strict respect” for Cuba’s sovereignty.890

Similar ideas of mediation emerged in Canada, another major U.S. trading partner that maintained economic ties with Cuba. For years political disagreements persisted between Ottawa and Havana over the latter’s intervention in Africa and Latin America. In

December 1989, as Cuba’s military activities declined, Canadian Foreign Minister Joe

Clark conducted a “thorough” policy review.891 Its conclusion was that Ottawa could convince Havana to undertake political change and mend fences with Washington by promoting Canadian trade with the island and using it as leverage. In April 1990, Clark sent his assistant deputy Louise Frechette to initiate a new dialogue with Castro.892 “We

888 Non-paper, forwarded to Sergio González Galvez, March 14, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. 889 Sánchez-Parodi to Malmierca, March 20, 1990; and a memorándum del Gobierno de México a Cuba, n.d., both in Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. 890 Memorandum para Información Superior, “Cuba—Relaciones Bilaterales entre Cuba y Estados Unidos,” April 11, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. Later Washington blamed Havana for Mexico’s persistent demand on a dialogue. U.S. note, “Mexican Proposal on Cuba,” attached to Mexico City to Mexican Embassy in Washington, May 29, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. 891 Message of Joe Clark, quoted in Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Havana, December 7, 1989, vol. 14500, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 37, RG25, LAC. See also, Briefing Note for Cuba Strategy Roundtable (chaired by Clark), December 18, 1989, vol. 14500, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 37, RG25, LAC. 892 Quoted in Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Havana, February 19, 1990, vol. 14500, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 37, RG25, LAC. 336 are…one of few countries that can help Cubans [to] correctly assess outside realities and recognize need for change,” Clark wrote to a skeptical Canadian ambassador in

Washington. “Now is the time to use whatever measure of influence we may have in

Havana.”893

Yet, Ottawa’s enthusiasm about dialogue waned rapidly, as it confirmed the importance of U.S. domestic politics. Because of the existence of the Cuban American lobby, U.S. policy toward Cuba was “not a foreign policy question, but one of domestic policy,” something outside the scope of Canadian influence. As such, Ottawa lacked leverage either on Washington or Havana.894 What is surprising is that Bush himself did not even deny this perception in a private phone conversation with Canadian Prime

Minister . According to Mulroney, he stressed to Gorbachev prior to the

May-June 1990 Washington summit that Soviet aid to Cuba posed a “[domestic political] problem for George Bush.” The Soviets must understand that “Cuban Americans play a big role in the Republican Party” and that Cuba was a “fundamental issue” for the U.S. president. Bush did not express displeasure at the Canadian interpretation of the problem.

Instead, Bush thanked Mulroney for his assistance, saying, “That’s very helpful,

Brian.”895

893 Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Washington, May 9, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. 894 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 2, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. Similar observations appear in numerous Canadian reports. See for example, Briefing Note for Cuba Strategy Roundtable, December 18, 1989, vol. 14500, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 37, RG25, LAC; Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 2, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC; and Briefing Note for the Meeting, November 5, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. 895 Memcon (Bush, Mulroney), May 31, 1990, p. 1, GHWBL-Web. 337

Gorbachev refused to surrender so easily despite rapidly deteriorating economic conditions at home. To Havana, Soviet delegations in 1990 and 1991 repeatedly addressed Moscow’s desire to review the terms of bilateral trade and observe massive political and economic reforms on the island.896 To Washington, the Soviet leadership made clear its intention of transiting to a “regulated market economy,” stressed the importance of Western assistance, and requested a U.S. loan of approximately $15 to 20 billion dollars.897 But when Bush asked Gorbachev to cut economic ties with Cuba once and for all, Gorbachev again dug in his heels. The Soviet leader instead asked Bush to open talks with Castro. “It is better if he hears from you rather from us,” he remarked. In reply, Bush described the Cuban-American “patriotic” community, noting that the issue was “emotional” in the United States.898

Tellingly, Bush even vetoed Secretary Baker’s proposal for softening the U.S. stance on Cuba. Trying to shift gears, Baker hinted at the opening of U.S. talks with Cuba if the latter terminated support for the FMLN. Soviet foreign minister Eduard

Shevardnadze did not miss this silver lining. “If the U.S. treats Cuba as an equal,” he

896 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 216-17. For information on the Soviet delegation by Leonid Abalkin in April 1990, see Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 179-180; and Canadian embassy in Moscow to Ottawa, June 1, 1990, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. For the Cuba lobby in Moscow, see Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 176-78. See also, Report on a Conversation with Fidel Castro, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, June 20, 1990, TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d. 62, l. 1-6, WCDA. For the other Soviet-Cuban talks over economic relations, see Report on a Conversation with Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, August 31, 1990, TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d. 61, l. 1-3, WCDA. 897 Memcon (Gorbachev, Baker), May 18, 1990, pp. 9-10, in folder “Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989-June 1990 [4],” Special Separate USSR Notes Files: Gorbachev Files, Brent Scowcroft Collection (hereafter BSC), GHWBL. 898 Memcon [Draft] (Bush, Gorbachev), June 2, 1990 (11:15 a.m.-12:59 p.m.), pp. 6-7, in folder “Gorbachev (Dobrynin) Sensitive July-December 1990 [2],” Special Separate USSR Notes Files: Gorbachev Files, BSC, GHWBL. 338 quickly followed, “[this] thing might work—as in the case of Angola, where we made it work after they got treated like equal partners.” Baker was emboldened. “Here is a wild suggestion: that you [Gorbachev] tell him [Castro] the President [Bush] said that there will be an improvement in relations and a dialogue, if he will firmly sign on to and support Esquipulas, which bans the export of insurgency [into] Central America.” But

Bush jumped in and overruled Baker’s suggestion. “That only deals with a small part of the problem,” he complained. “For the establishment of full relations with Cuba the people must be able to have free elections, and must enjoy human rights.”899

Here again, despite the U.S.-Soviet rapprochement, the U.S. president sided with his favorite constituency in Miami. Because Bush clearly stated that Cuba’s foreign policy was “only a small part of the problem”—smaller than Cuba’s internal politics—the

Soviets were again reminded that the idea of a U.S. diplomatic opening with Castro prior to Cuba’s political change was not in tune with Bush’s thinking.900 But such a U.S. stance was unacceptable for Havana. When top-level Soviet officials participated in a “Miami-

Moscow dialogue,” a conference organized by CANF just prior to the Washington summit, the Cuban government promptly protested their dealings with “the enemies of the Cuban Revolution.” According to Yuri Pavlov, chief of Latin American affairs at the

Soviet foreign ministry, Carlos Aldana warned that any further contact with the

899 Italics mine. Ibid., pp. 7-8. By Esquipulas, Baker was referring to the termination of Cuban support for the FMLN. U.S. military support for the “irregular forces” practically ended after February 1990, when the contras won the Nicaraguan election. See an earlier section on the U.S.-Cuban disagreements over this issue. 900 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, p. 217. “Bush will remain hostile toward Castro until the Cuban- American community blesses a change,” said an anonymous Soviet official. Quoted in Time, June 18, 1990, p. 22. 339 foundation would be considered “disloyal to Cuba.” When Pavlov brought up an idea of lessening tensions with Cubans abroad, Aldana shook his head. “The national reconciliation will be achieved,” he stated, “but not with these people.”901

Bush’s Preference for “the Status Quo”—No Abrogation of TV Martí

An alliance between Washington and Miami was never complete, however.

Within a week after launching TV Martí, George Bush found something disturbing in the

Fort Worth Star Telegram, a local newspaper in Texas. An article written by Georgie

Anne Geyer accused Jorge Mas Canosa of advancing his “ambitions to be president of a post-Castro Cuba.” According to this piece, CANF directors spoke of using Radio and

TV Martí for the aim of “invoking a ‘confrontation’ between the United States and Cuba.”

If Castro responded to a U.S. provocation, they expected, “President Bush will have to retaliate.” Bush underlined the last sentence: “Someone in the White House has got to straighten this out.” Puzzled by this warning, Bush forwarded it to his chief of staff John

Sununu with a probing question. “Is Mas [Canosa] playing games [with me]?”902

There exist many other indications that Bush and his administration did not automatically side with counterrevolutionary Cubans, whose ultimate goal was the immediate toppling of the Castro regime. For example, the NSC specialist for Latin

901 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 161-62. For the conference, see Jacqueline Tillman (CANF executive director) to Robert Gates, May 18, 1990, in folder “Cuba, General—July-December 1990 (4),” NSC: William T. Pryce Files, GHWBL; and James C. Siegel, Moscow-Miami Dialogue: The Mini-Summit, occasional paper series III, no. 4 (Miami, FL: University of Miami, Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, 1990). 902 Bush read this article and underlined all quoted sentences. Bush to Sununu, April 23, 1990, attached to Georgie Anne Geyer, “Taxpayers support illusions about Cuba,” Fort Worth Star Telegram, p. 45B, found in #310079, FG434, WHORM, GHWBL. 340

American affairs William Pryce confided to the Canadians that after the startup of TV

Martí the majority opinion of the administration in fact favored the status quo and thus differed from the one of CANF. The U.S. government would maintain pressure on

Havana on regional peace, human rights, and democratization, and continue to broadcast

TV Martí under whatever circumstances. But it would oppose any further tightening of the embargo, avoid risking any unnecessary confrontation, and keep exploring opportunities for cooperation on issues of mutual concern.903

Among the most important of such bilateral issues was the control of migration.

In June 1990 in New York, Michael Kozak, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-

American affairs, met Ricardo Alarcón, Cuban ambassador to the United Nations. The meeting solved few problems. Whereas Kozak tried to increase the number of Mariel returnees to the island, Alarcón urged the U.S. delegation to accept close to 20,000

Cubans as immigrants per year and comply with the “spirit” of the previous migration agreement. Despite the lack of notable accomplishments, however, both sides agreed to maintain contact.904 They also discussed the irregular flow of Cubans into the United

States via third countries like Panama. When Kozak asked if the two countries could exchange information on migration fraud, Alarcón called such cooperation “useful.”

903 Canadian embassy in Washington to Ottawa, May 15, 1990, vol. 28651, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 12, RG25, LAC. The Canadians gained similar information from Robert Morley, State Department’s coordinator for Cuban affairs. Canadian embassy in Washington to Ottawa, June 28, 1990, vol. 28651, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 12, RG25, LAC. 904 On instruction from Havana, the Cuban embassy in Ottawa briefed the Canadian government of the meeting. Canadian embassy in Washington to Ottawa, July 12, 1990, vol. 28651, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 12, RG25, LAC. 341

Kozak promised that he would provide relevant information in the future and ask the

Cubans to do the same.905

Havana’s acceptance of U.S.-Cuban talks on migration did not mean that Cuban leaders remained hopeful for the normalization of relations. In his talks with the Soviet ambassador in Havana, Castro “clearly confirmed Cuba’s readiness to normalize relations,” yet he also manifested “pessimism” about U.S. intentions, highlighting

Washington’s demand for political change. The Cuban leader also revealed that he had instructed the Cuban delegation in New York not to give “the impression that we are in a hurry” for a U.S.-Cuban rapprochement.906 Especially after the startup of TV Martí,

Havana seemed to believe that Washington would take advantage of any sign of weakness. In an interview with CNN, he declared that Cuba would “never accept any conditions that have to do with the internal policy of the country” for the sake of improving Cuban relations with the United States.907

Havana’s reactions to a new U.S. proposal for an exchange of television programs confirm this point. This proposal originated from Washington’s hesitation to distance itself from Miami. Based on a poll and on-site verification, the USINT in Havana reported TV Martí had gained the zero reception in Cuba. But under Mas Canosa’s influence, the U.S. Information Agency commissioned a survey based on interviews with

Cubans coming into Miami to present the opposite result. Despite its awareness of

905 Memcon (Kozak, Alarcón), June 21, 1990, pp. 3-4, MINREX. 906 Report on a Conversation with Fidel Castro, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, June 20, 1990, TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d. 62, l. 1-6, WCDA. 907 Fidel Castro, interview, found in An Encounter with Fidel: An Interview by Gianni Minà, trans. Mary Todd (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1991), p. 257. 342 jamming problems, an interagency working group avoided judging the veracity of the two outcomes. It instead recommended the opening of U.S.-Cuban talks as “a means of securing a mass audience for TV Martí.” If Washington allowed Havana to broadcast its programs in the United States, the group thought, Havana would stop jamming TV

Martí.908

Washington’s machination duped no one in Havana, as the Cuban government knew that it had completely jammed TV Martí. In a memorandum to Fidel Castro,

Aldana summarized Cuba’s positions on this issue. The United States should abandon TV

Martí, and its use of the name of Jose Martí was “a grave affront to Cuba.” The U.S. programs to be exchanged should not reflect “the points of view of the [Cuban] counterrevolutionary emigration.” Rather, the exchanged programs should value an ethical element and be consistent with mutual respect in terms of focus, visual presentation, and language. In short, this project should serve a substitute, not a justification for the continuation of TV Martí.909 In response to the proposal, Havana suggested that negotiations begin only in September, knowing that Washington could not

908 “TV Martí: PCC Recommendations,” n.d., in folder “Cuba: TV Marti [7],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GWHBL. On the alleged Mas Canosa’s influence on the USIA, see also, Taylor, interview transcript, pp. 155-57; and David Michael Wilson (executive assistant to deputy director of USIA), interview transcript, pp. 67-69, FAOH. 909 Aldana noted that his staff was thinking of introducing a 27-minute-long weekly news program into a Havana City TV Channel in exchange of broadcasting a program of Cuba’s equivalent in , the largest TV channel in Spanish in the United States. Aldana to Fidel Castro, August 18, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. 343 wait that long.910 In August, when Bush declared that TV Martí passed a five-month preliminary test, releasing $16 million for its funding, Havana showed little surprise.911

Bush’s Preference for “the Status Quo”—Declaration of Non-Aggressive Intent

Castro’s will did not bend even as the Cuban economy entered a dangerous phase.

By the summer of 1990, Moscow began to experience difficulties in delivering products to Havana.912 On September 28, Castro responded to this emergency by declaring a

“special period” (período especial) and undertaking additional austerity measures. Castro warned that this period might become “very difficult and very harsh,” adding that his enemies in Washington and Miami did their best to make the survival of the revolution harder. “That is their hope,” he stated, “the hope of the counterrevolutionary community there in Miami.” These people were “already thinking about the post-revolutionary period…Undoubtedly their basic ambition would be to turn this country into a Miami, and into a total gambling den.”913

As long as Havana vowed to defend the existing one-party political system,

Bush’s attitude would remain hostile. In the fall of 1990, trying to quicken the pace of the negotiated settlement in El Salvador, the U.S. president approached the leaders of Spain,

Mexico, and Venezuela to convince Castro to restrain the FMLN. Yet, when Moscow

910 Aldana to Manuel Davis, August 20, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. See also, Aldana to Malmierica, August 2, 1990, Caja “Bilateral 21,” MINREX. 911 NYT, August 28, 1990, p. 2A; and Pro-Memoria, September 3, 1990, attached to Viera to Rodríguez, September 3, 1990, Caja “Agresión Radio TV Martí 34,” MINREX. 912 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 185-190; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, October 5, 1990, vol.16002, 20- 1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. 913 Speech by Castro, September 28, 1990, LANIC. 344 brought up the idea of inviting Cuba to U.S.-Soviet talks on regional peace, Washington not only rejected it but also repeated the demand that the USSR cut economic ties with

Cuba.914 In the spring of 1991, Washington courted votes of newly emerged East

European countries and succeeded for the first time in passing a U.S.-sponsored resolution against Cuba at the UNCHR in Geneva. In early May, Bush dismissed a proposal by Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez, who volunteered to mediate

U.S.-Cuban differences. “I don’t think we should be doing anything to support a dictator,” Bush stated frankly.915

In the face of a Havana-Washington impasse, Moscow sought to defend its

Caribbean ally with declining capabilities. At the end of 1990, the Soviet Union forged a new trade agreement with Cuba for the year 1991, although it never delivered most products. Moscow also kept trying to persuade Washington to open talks with Havana on issues like El Salvador and the . More important were Moscow’s attempts to withdraw a U.S. security guarantee for Cuba in exchange for Soviet reduction of its military assistance to the island. In June 1990, the Soviet foreign ministry’s Pavlov initiated such negotiations with Aronson. Soviet deputy foreign minister Georgiy

Mamedov followed up by conducting shuttle diplomacy among Moscow, Washington, and Havana. Yet, the process dragged on due to the reluctance to make concession by

914 Diplomatic note handed by Soviet ambassador in Mexico to the Mexican foreign ministry, October 1, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. The note was on the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow in September-October 1990. 915 Memcon (Bush, Pérez), May 3, 1991, p. 8, GHWBL-Web. 345 both the U.S. and Soviet militaries. Further, Havana insisted that if the Soviets removed their troops from Cuba, Washington should do the same from its base at Guantánamo.916

What came out of these maneuvers was a major speech by Bush on May 20, 1991.

Bush used all kinds of tough rhetoric and reiterated his “unwavering commitment for a free and democratic Cuba.” He stated that U.S. goals in Cuba were “freedom and democracy.” As such, “if Cuba holds fully free and fair elections under international supervision, respects human rights, and stops subverting its neighbors, we can expect relations between our two countries to improve significantly.”917 On the same day in

Miami, Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson attended CANF’s tenth anniversary of its founding to reiterate the same points.918 The newspapers heralded the presidential message as a “new initiative on Cuba.” Scholars have agreed with this assessment, calling Bush the first U.S. president to demand Cuba’s internal political change as a primary condition for better U.S.-Cuban relations.919

916 U.S. embassy in Moscow to Washington, June 23, 1990, DOS-FOIA; Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, pp. 213-16, 223; and Canadian embassy in Moscow to Ottawa, March 15, 1991, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. The Soviet ambassador in Ottawa later confirmed this story. Ottawa to Canadian embassy in Moscow, June 13, 1991, vol. 16002, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. According to a U.S. source, Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnykh offered a 2/3 cut in Soviet military aid to Cuba in exchange for a U.S. non-invasion pledge. Fact Sheet “Central America/ Cuba,” n.d., in folder “POTUS Trip to Moscow and Kiev, July 29-August 1, 1991 [2],” box 1, NSC: Nicholas Burns Files: Subject Files, GHWBL. 917 Speech by Bush, May 20, 1991, APP. 918 Remarks of Bernard Aronson to the CANF Tenth Anniversary Meeting, May 20, 1991, in folder “Cuba (General) July 1991-October 1991 [1],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. 919 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 266; and Morris and McGillion, Unfinished Business, p. 37. A major exception is Jorge I. Domínguez, “U.S. Policy toward Cuba in the 1980s and 1990s,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 533 (May 1994): pp. 171-72. For media coverage, see for example, MH, May 21, 1991, p. 1A. 346

Yet, according to the NSC officials who drafted the speech, it contained “no new policy” because they knew that the United States had placed demands on Cuba’s democracy since Reagan’s presidency.920 What was more remarkable about this speech was the public declaration of nonaggressive intent, which Bush shrouded in the overwhelming volume of hawkish language. Bush made clear an essentially peaceful

U.S. intent by challenging Castro to “let Cuba live in peace with its neighbors” including the United States.921 However clumsy it might have sounded, this remark was significant because a U.S. President unilaterally pledged, for the first time since the end of the Cold

War, that the United States had no plans to invade Cuba militarily. In his testimony before the U.S. Congress, Aronson reinforced this point, speaking of Washington’s expectation that Moscow receive this message favorably and consider the withdrawal of its troops from Cuba.922

After this speech Washington largely went back to a wait-and-see approach, looking for any new indication of Castro’s change of mind. Before the summit meeting in

Moscow, Bush telephoned Mexican President Carlos Salinas to discuss the issues of El

Salvador and Cuba. “I hope there will be pressure for [Castro] to reform,” he said. “We would have instantly better relations if he did.” Bush essentially exhibited his incipient

920 David Pacelli to Robert M. Gates, May 17, 1991, in folder “Cuba (General) January 1991-June 1991 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. Aronson also said that there was no change in policy. Quoted in MH, May 21, 1991, p. 1A. 921 Speech by Bush, May 20, 1991. 922 U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Cuba in a Changing World: The United States-Soviet-Cuban Triangle, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., April 30, July 11 and 31, 1991, pp. 105-6. For the State Department’s views, see also Morley to Aronson, “Soviet Assets in Cuba and Potential Trade-offs,” May 29, 1990, DOS- FOIA. 347 idea of a step-by-step approach, linking better relations with the United States with domestic reforms in Cuba. “If Castro would do something, then we could do something.”

Bush hastened to add. “But without change on his side, I can’t do anything” because “I have my own political problems here.” Bush denied any hostile feelings toward the island. “We have great affection for the Cuban people and want better relations with

Cuba.” Then he uttered something enigmatic. “After all, there are more Cubans in Miami than there are in Cuba.”923

CANF and Corporate America

Although Bush was equivocal in terms of numbers, he was probably conscious of growing agitation in Miami. Three days before the May 20 speech, CANF announced the establishment of a blue ribbon commission to establish a “blueprint for a free-market economy in a post-Castro Cuba.” Mas Canosa teamed up with economic libertarians such as Malcom Forbes and Arthur Laffer and prepared for drafts of bills and codes for privatization laws; commercial, banking, foreign investment, and tax codes; currency and monetary policy guidelines; foreign debt guidelines; and relations with international financial organizations.924 The commission’s advisory board was composed of Florida senators, Miami representatives, conservative thinkers, former U.S. officials, as well as anti-Castro Cubans like Valladares.

923 Memcon (Bush, Salinas), July 11, 1991, GHWBL-Web. 924 CANF Press Release, May 17, 1991, in folder “Blue Ribbon Commission,” box 1.82, CANF Archive. 348

In addition to political support, the foundation also looked for U.S. corporate allies because private investment was the key to its economic transition plan.925

According to its internal documents, CANF’s “sale pitch” to U.S. corporations was to make them believe that non-economic factors, such as “support for Cuban American initiatives,” would become an important matter of consideration when the future Cuban government assessed bids on commercial ventures and service contracts. In other words, the foundation requested $25,000 as fees from U.S. corporations in return for their imagined privileged access to investment opportunities in post-Castro Cuba.926 In dealing with U.S. corporations whose property was seized by the Cuban government, the foundation also emphasized that the project would lead to “quick resolution” of their asset claims.927

Numerous U.S. corporations displayed interest in CANF’s blue ribbon commission, which held conferences across major U.S. cities. The Mid-America

Committee for International Business and Government Corporation Inc., an association of 160 multinational corporations in the Mid-West, co-sponsored one of the events in

Chicago, which attracted around 100 executives from U.S. companies. “I don’t think it’s a matter of if Castro will fall, [but]…a matter of when,” said the committee chairman

925 CANF, Blue Ribbon Commission on the Economic Reconstruction of Cuba: Conceptual Outline, March 27, 1991, in folder “Blue Ribbon Commission-Incoming Correspondence,” box 1.82, CANF Archive. 926 A CANF leader may offer a special discounted rate “as a sliver bullet to close .” Tom Cox, “Blue Ribbon Commission: My Trip Backgrounder,” August 13, 1991, in folder “Blue Ribbon Commission-Incoming Correspondence,” box 1.82, CANF Archive. 927 Tom Cox, “New York August 14, ‘Blue Ribbon Commission’ Meetings with Corporate Board Candidates,” August 13, 1991, in folder “Blue Ribbon Commission-Incoming Correspondence,” box 1.82, CANF Archive. 349

Tom Miner. “And when he does, we want to be one of the first in.” According to Miner, most of the associated companies operated in pre-Castro Cuba and looked to Mas Canosa as the best candidate for the next Cuban president.928 Corporate America probably liked him even more, after the foundation produced a transition paper. While presenting democratic rule, corporate power, and individual freedom as remedies for Cuba’s ills, the paper sentenced the 1959 “Castro’s” Revolution as “a consummate failure.”929

A Struggle for the Voice of the Community

In addition to Castro, however, CANF also confronted Cuban Americans who supported dialogue and reconciliation among Cubans abroad and on the island. After the cancellation of Diálogo following the 1980 Mariel boatlift, pro-dialogue forces lost momentum. But groups like the Cuban American Committee continued to advocate the lifting of the U.S. embargo, accused CANF of misrepresenting the voices of the community, and complimented Bush’s declaration of non-aggressive intent as a “step in the right direction.”930 Other new spokesmen also appeared in favor of greater engagement, such as Ramón Cernuda, coordinator of dissident groups on the island, and

Francisco Aruca, owner of a travel company, Marazul, and director of Radio Progreso.

928 Chicago Tribune, October 29, 1992, pp. A1-A2. 929 CANF, Transition Paper, May 1993, in folder “Blue Ribbon Commission-Incoming Correspondence,” box 1.82, CANF Archive. 930 For Alicia M. Torres’s testimony in the writing, see U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, p. 213. See also, Torres to Bush, June 29, 1990, in folder “Cuban American Committee,” White House Office of Public Liaison: Shiree Sánchez Files, GHWBL; and Torres’s testimony in the writing, included in U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 18, 25, April 2, 8, May 21, June 4, 5, 1992, pp. 500-509. 350

The rise of pro-dialogue voices partly reflected Miami’s continuing interest in humanitarian issues. As indicated above, Cuban American opinion generally favored the hardline stance advocated by CANF. But when it came to the question of family reunification and greater communication, the same people endorsed engagement with the island. According to a poll in March 1991, 76 percent of Cuban Americans favored negotiations with the Cuban government to allow family members in Cuba to come to the

United States, and 62 percent favored dialogue to allow normal direct phone connections with the island.931 Another poll indicated that 55 percent affirmed that the sending of medicine, clothing, and money to families in Cuba was more important than mounting pressure on the Cuban government.932

Accordingly, Havana’s emigration policy also became more nuanced and responsive to human needs. In May 1985, the Cuban government halted Cuban American visits to the island as if it were punishing the entire community for CANF’s promotion of

Radio Martí. Yet in November 1988, the Cuban government again eased restrictions on

U.S.-to-Cuba family visits and took no similar retaliatory measures in response to the

1990 startup of TV Martí.933 Another sign of Havana’s new attitude toward emigration was a phased relaxation of emigration regulation, lowering the minimum age for short visits to the United States to twenty. This policy change resulted in a surge of Cuban applications for nonimmigrant visas at the USINT in Havana from 2,730 in 1988 to

931 MH, March 31, 1991, pp. 1B and 2B; and 1993 FIU Cuba Poll. 932 MH, May 9, 1991, p. 1B. 933 For Cuba’s thinking, see also Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, November 8, 1988, vol. 28310, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 10, RG25, LAC; and Carlos Aldana, interview with Areíto, September 10, 1989. 351

34,126 in 1990. As the number went over 32,000 during the first six months of 1991, the

USINT in Havana stopped accepting new applications to clear the backlog.934

Pro-dialogue forces supported increased contacts between Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits to alleviate hardships. Flights carried visitors back and forth three times per week. U.S.-to-Cuba visitors purchased Cuban passports and visas for the chance to bring back a plastic bag with cosmetics, medicine, and drugstore items like aspirin, most of which were no longer available to their families on the island.935 Cuba- to-U.S. visitors received family remittances in advance to cover travel fees so that they could visit the United States and bring back more hard currency. For those who could neither afford to travel to the island nor assist their families in coming to the United

States, businesses sending money, food, medicines, clothes, glasses, and everyday products to Cuba advertised their services in Miami’s Spanish-language newspapers.936

But their advocacy for greater engagement put them on a collision course with

CANF’s pursuit of Castro’s fall. By arguing that travel, family remittances, and gift shipments generated extra revenue for the Cuban government, Mas Canosa urged the

U.S. government to employ a stricter interpretation of the humanitarian exceptions to the embargo.937 An interagency committee in Washington adopted this recommendation. On

934 Statement of Michael G. Kozak before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House of Representatives, June 5, 1991, in folder “Cuba (General) January 1991-June 1991 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. 935 Alan H. Flanigan (chief of USINT in Havana), interview transcript, p. 54, FAOH. 936 See for example, those on El Nuevo Herald, January 13, 1991, February 24, 1991, February 28, 1991; and DLA, January 13, 1991. 937 CANF estimated that the total amount of the revenue was as high as $234.8 million. Mas Canosa to Pacelli, with a CANF’s report, March 1, 1991, in folder “Cuba (General) July 1991-October 1991 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. 352

September 27, 1991, the Treasury Department announced new regulations that limited the travel fees a U.S. national could send to Cuba to $500, lowered the maximum family remittances per quarter from $500 to $300, and prohibited Cuba-to-U.S. visitors from carrying more U.S. currency than they had declared on arrival in the United States.

Rather than allying with pro-dialogue forces, the administration was still attempting to pacify anti-Castro hardliners.938

Dilemma of Regime Change—Loyalty, Voice, and Exit

The counterrevolutionary dream appeared closer to reality after the August 1991 coup in Moscow. The incident sapped the USSR’s will to support Cuba. On September

11, in the presence of Baker, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of its 2,800-man brigades from Cuba, a symbol of the Cuban-Soviet military alliance, without informing

Castro in advance. Much of Soviet aid and trade with Cuba soon disappeared.939 To convert this momentous change into his favor, CANF’s Mas Canosa toured dozens of countries and sought support for his post-Castro plans. He met world figures like ’s

Boris Yeltsin, Britain’s , Mexico’s Carlos Salinas, Czech’s Vaclav

Havel, and Polish leader Lech Walesa. During his December 1991 trip to Moscow, he

938 The State Department thanked CANF for its study of this issue. Vicki Hulddeston to Mas Canosa, October 24, 1991, in folder “Cuba, General—October-December 1991 (2),” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. A law firm that represented Cuba’s interests in the United States assumed that OFAC adopted this provision “more for domestic political appearances than for actual, practical effect.” Memorandum by Krinsky, October 7, 1991, Caja “Bloqueo 1990-1992,” MINREX. 939 Boris Pankin, The Last Hundred Days of the Soviet Union, trans. Alexei Pankin (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 105-7, 114-16; and James A. Baker, III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam’s, 1995), pp. 528-29 353 received “a toast to a free and democratic Cuba” by the Russian parliamentarians “with

Bacardi rum.”940

Broken abruptly from the socialist orbit, Cuba’s economy shrank by more than 40 percent between 1990 and 1993.941 The Cuban government responded to this emergency in various ways. For instance, the government urged Cuban citizens to enter a national debate before the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party. Appealing to their loyalty for the leadership, the Political Bureau of the party sought out citizen participation, commitment, and a “confrontation of idea, where the most convincing, best argued and defended, wins out.”942 Some 3.5 million Cubans participated in 80,000 assemblies to discuss various issues, principally non-political ones.943 Although the Fourth Congress undertook only modest political reforms, Castro praised it as “the most democratic political congress ever held” in revolutionary Cuba.944

The Cuban government harshly treated its . Individuals such as Gustavo

Arcos, Osvaldo Payá Sardiñas, and Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz requested a national dialogue, greater respect for human rights, and a free and democratic election in Cuba.

940 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, January 17, 1992, p. 5, box 1.04, CANF Archive. CANF lobbied Russia to halt all economic and military aid to Cuba, to withdraw all Soviet troops from Cuba, and to gain commitment not to help the Cuban government in case of a “revolt” against Fidel and Raúl Castro. 941 Pérez, Reform and Revolution, p. 293. 942 Statement by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Granma, June 23, 1990, pp. 4-5. 943 For the Communist Party’s preparative works, see Reed, Island in the Storm, esp. pp. 15-18. 944 Speech by Fidel Castro, in Reed, Island in the Storm, p. 196. For an evaluation of the Congress, see William M. LeoGrande, “‘The Cuban Nation’s Single Party’: the Communist Party of Cuba Faces the Future,” in Philip Brenner, et. al., eds., A Contemporary Cuba Reader: Reinventing the Revolution (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), p. 53. 354

While ignoring these demands, the government attacked their declared support for the

U.S. motion at the UNCHR in Geneva, as they appeared to fall into a U.S. ploy.945 In late

August, moreover, the Cuban Ministry of the Interior declared that dissidents with foreign contacts posed a direct threat to Cuba’s national security.946 In the wake of the

Soviet collapse, Cuban authorities intensified surveillance, harassment, and “.”947 Cuba’s internal opposition was rendered exceptionally weak compared to those in Eastern European countries.

Whereas Washington attacked Havana’s human rights record, Havana condemned

Washington’s migration policy. Between 1985 and 1990, U.S. authorities rejected 80 percent of Cuban applicants for immigrant visas, leading only 7,428 Cubans to emigrate to the United States as such.948 Washington explained that the increased number of rejections did not result from any political design but from the inability of many Cuban applicants to meet U.S. requirements.949 Nevertheless, Havana accused the U.S.

945 See Castro’s comment on “Trojan horse” mentioned earlier in this chapter. 946 The ministry claimed that it seized a letter from , an influential anti-Castro Cuban activist in Spain, inviting the dissidents to form the new opposition force to the Castro regime. Cuban Ministry of the Interior’s informative note, sent to the Mexican embassy, August 30, 1991, in Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, , 1991, III-4806-1, AHGE. See also, Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, September 2, 1991, III-4806-1, AHGE. 947 For Mexico’s report on the dissident groups, see Informe, February 1990, attached to Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, February 20, 1990, III-4520-1, AHGE. For human rights groups’ reports, News from Americas Watch, “Cuba,” August 11, 1991; and , “Cuba: Silencing the Voices of Dissent,” December 1992, available at http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/AMR25/026/1992/es/ec33ae5f-ed96-11dd-95f6- 0b268ecef84f/amr250261992en.html (accessed December 20, 2014). 948 Aja, Al cruzar, pp. 167-68; and Arboleya, Cuba y los cubanoamericanos, p. 58. 949 In May 1991, inquired by the Canadian embassy, Thomas Gerth, deputy head of the U.S. interest sections, noted the “surprising” decline of applicants for immigration visas. The USINT had initially expected the annual flow of about 12,000 to the United States based on numbers of sponsorship petitions, some of which was made before 1980. Yet, it appeared that the substantial number of 355 government of manipulating the process to increase domestic discontent and create what

Castro called a “Trojan horse.”950 Although Cuba’s desire to increase emigration was nothing new, the decline of the economy added some elements of urgency. Havana also might have noticed that Mas Canosa and his congressional allies spoke of closing legal

Cuba-to-U.S. migration channels in order to foster a rebellion against the regime.951

But even if Washington had closed legal immigration routes, many discontented

Cubans would have preferred emigration to rebellion. The number of Cubans leaving the island through illegal routes rose, as they still enjoyed a Cold War-era special treatment.

Once they entered the United States, they could apply for asylum, stay for a year and a day, and adjust their status through the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act. There was no likelihood that they would ever face deportation. Lured by such privilege, some came to the United States as tourists and overstayed. Of 16,857 Cubans who travelled to the

United States from January to October 1992, 2,922 (17.3%) did not return to Cuba.952

Others arrived by boats, rafts, or whatever they assembled to cross the Florida Straits.

The number of the boaters increased from 59 in 1988, 391 in 1989, and 467 in 1990, to

applicants or their U.S.-resident sponsors had died by the 1987 migration agreement or had left via third countries. Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, May 31, 1989, vol.28310, 20-Cuba-1-3-USA, part 10, RG25, LAC. 950 Report on a Conversation with Fidel Castro, from the Diary of Yu.V. Petrov, June 20, 1990, TsKhSD. F. 89, op. 8, d. 62, l. 1-6, WCDA. For Cuba’s viewpoints, Diplomatic note, May 23, 1989, MINREX; and Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, October 26, 1988, vol.28310, 20-Cuba-1-3- USA, part 10, RG25, LAC. 951 See comments by Torricelli and Mas Canosa in U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, pp. 173- 74. 952 Bienvenido García Negrín to Roberto Robaina González, July 6, 1993, Caja “Bilateral 36,” MINREX. The INS exaggerated the volume by estimating that 33 percent of all Cuban travelers overstayed in the United States, leading U.S. officials to call the phenomena “a slow motion Mariel.” U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, pp. 15-16, 130. 356

747 already by May 23, 1991.953 Hundreds of silent and cold bodies also reached ashore along the coasts of Florida.954

The specter of “another Mariel” again came across the Sunshine State. In one of the U.S. congressional hearings, Assistant Secretary Aronson swore multiple times that his government would not allow another Mariel. Aronson said, “This President and this administration will not permit, I repeat, this President and this administration will not permit another Mariel.”955 Yet, public declarations of no-more-Mariels did not satisfy the

Floridians, who failed to receive from the federal government $150 million out of the total expense incurred during the Mariel boatlift.956 In May 1991, trying to pacify the rising concerns, the INS provided local and state agencies with a 51-page-long paper,

“Mass Immigration Emergency Plan—Florida.”957 Yet, the State of Florida found the project far from satisfactory, urging the federal government to “continuously pursue all

953 Cuban Arrival by Boat/ Raft, May 23, 1991, in folder “Mass Migration Immigration Plan (2),” box 9, Governor Lawton Chiles: Chief of Staff Subject Files, SAF. 954 Representative Lawrence J. Smith from Florida testified that from January to May 1991, Florida found approximately 860 bodies of Cuban immigrants washed up on shores. The number was 467 all in 1990. U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, p. 6. 955 Ibid., pp. 129-130. 956 The total cost was $400 million. Minutes of the Meeting, July 15, 1991, p. 1, in folder “Mass Migration Immigration Working Group,” box 9, Governor Lawton Chiles: Chief of Staff Subject Files, SAF. Also important was anti-immigration sentiment that remained high among the state’s non- Hispanic populations. See for example, J. Arthur Heise, Hugh Gladwin, and Douglas McLaughen, 1989 FIU/ Florida Poll (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1989), pp. 221, 466; and ibid., 1991 FIU/ Florida Poll (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), pp. 192, 404. 957 U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, “Mass Immigration Emergency Plan—Florida,” October 30, 1987 (revised on May 14, 1990), in folder “Mass Migration Immigration Emergency Plan,” box 9, Governor Lawton Chiles: Chief of Staff Subject Files, SAF. 357 diplomatic avenues available.”958 The Bush administration did not come back to the state of Florida for the following fourth months.

It was a dramatic spike of Haitian migration in late 1991 that prompted further federal actions. The arrival of boatpeople aroused another round of debates over the equal treatment of migrants as the U.S. government sent back Haitians while accepting Cubans.

In the face of massive criticisms of double-standard practices, the Bush administration later modified this policy, kept Haitians at Guantánamo, and approved asylum cases for at least ten thousand. On this occasion, the Bush administration approached the Cuban government regarding the use of Guantánamo as a detention center, which completely defied the terms of the lease. Luckily for Washington, Havana raised no objection. The

U.S. and Cuban governments agreed to cooperate on this migration issue.959

For the state of Florida, however, the Haitian crisis amplified the fear of similar and even greater migration chaos from Cuba. On March 3, 1992, Governor Lawton

Chiles wrote to Bush urging a prompt federal reaction to the Floridian concern.960 In response, the U.S. president reassured the governor by making clear his priority.

“Preventing another Mariel,” the president resolved, “is our first and foremost

958 William E. Sadowski to Jim Krog (Office of Governor’s chief of staff), June 3, 1991, in folder “Mass Migration Immigration Emergency Plan,” box 9, Governor Lawton Chiles: Chief of Staff Subject Files, SAF. For other numerous comments, see the papers attached to this letter. 959 For the debate, see for example, U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees, Cuban and Haitian Immigration, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., November 20, 1991. 960 Chiles to Bush, March 3, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Mariel [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. 358 objective.”961 With this statement, the Bush administration started to work closely with

Florida in developing a contingency plan, which its successor would later use in the migration crisis of 1994. Unlike Miami Cubans, the state of Florida prioritized migration order over the toppling of the Castro regime. Bush’s reply to Chiles illustrated that the

U.S. government would side with Florida in case the latter’s interests clashed with those of Miami Cubans.962

Debates over the Cuban Democracy Act

In the summer and fall of 1991, Bush and Castro adopted a policy of watchful waiting without making any major moves toward each other.963 As Castro made clear to

José Córdoba, chief of staff to the Mexican president Carlos Salinas, Cuba reaffirmed that socialism and the revolution were one and the same.964 And as Bush’s National

Security Adviser Scowcroft remarked to Córdoba, Havana’s position was unacceptable for Washington. “If Castro frees up his economy, if he opens up to democracy,”

Scowcroft stated, “we would be ready to support such moves.”965 Salinas invited Castro for a meeting in , Mexico, as well as the presidents of Venezuela and Columbia.

961 Bush to Lawton Chiles, March 26, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Mariel [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. The NSC officials inserted the quoted line into the draft prepared by the Justice Department. 962 According to Robert Morley, the U.S. government had contingency plans for turning back Cubans, as well as Haitians, if they were coming in unacceptable numbers. Morley, interview transcript, p. 108, FAOH. 963 See for example, Memcon (Bush, Salinas), July 11, 1991, GHWBL-Web; and Memcon (Bush, Pérez), September 24, 1991, pp. 6-7, GHWBL-Web. Castro attended the conference. 964 Decismosexto breve informe sobre la situacion en Cuba, sent from the Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, October 1, 1991, III-4806-1, AHGE. 965 Memcon (Scowcroft, Córdoba), October 18, 1991, p.5, GHWBL-Web. 359

Well aware of Cuba’s desperate need for oil, these three wondered if Castro might make concessions in exchange for access to their resources. Castro praised Mexico yet did little to please them.966

It was Miami Cubans who seized a new initiative. CANF’s Mas Canosa grew restless as multinational enterprises continued to make business with the island to

“position themselves for post-Castro business.”967 He had proposed the Mack

Amendment, which sought to prohibit foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba. But the Bush administration refused to support the amendment because major U.S. allies like Canada, Britain, and Mexico protested its extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. laws in third countries.968 Mas Canosa expressed his frustration at a local Spanish radio. “We always have said that there is conflict between the interests of this great North American nation, which is also our nation, and the interest of the Cuban

966 In October 1991, when José Córdoba visited Cuba, Cuba’s Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez informed him of Cuba’s shortfall of oil and put out feelers at the possibility that Mexico would replace the Soviet Union as a major provider of oil to the island. Decimosexto breve informe sobre la situacion en Cuba, sent from the Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, October 1, 1991, III- 4806-1, AHGE. A U.S. source indicates that Bush persuaded Mexico to “suspend subsidies on oil.” Scowcroft’s comment in Memcon, “Meeting with Cuban-American Community Leaders,” May 6, 1992, p. 2, in folder “Presidential Meetings-Memorandum of Conversations 5/1/92-6/17/92,” Presidential Correspondence Series, BSC, GHWBL. 967 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, April 14, 1991, pp. 1-2, box 1.04, CANF Archive. 968 U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, p. 128. See also, White House Press Statement, “Memorandum of Disapproval,” November 16, 1990, in folder, “Cuba, General—July-December 1990 (1),” NSC: William T. Pryce Files, GHWBL. Canada was especially vocal in opposing the amendment. See News Release, October 31, 1990, and February 19, 1991, both in vol. 16002, 20-1-2- Cuba, part 38, RG25, LAC. 360 nation.” Unlike Bush, however, he was “on the side of the interest of [the] Cuban nation” by prioritizing the fall of Castro.969

On February 5, 1992, Mas Canosa’s congressional allies submitted the so-called

Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) to the Congress. The bill consisted of three parts. Most controversial was the first part, popularly dubbed as Track I, which proposed the

“internationalization” of the U.S. embargo on Cuba by expanding the scope of laws beyond U.S. territory. Building on Mas Canosa’s earlier proposal to Bush, the bill would prohibit foreign subsidiaries of U.S. businesses from trading with Cuba, deny the entrance to U.S. ports of commercial ships entering Cuban waters within six months, eliminate U.S. sugar quotas of any nation that imported Cuban sugar, and reduce U.S. aid to any country purchasing Cuban sugar by an amount equal to those purchases. For U.S. allies, all these were inconsistent with the principles of national sovereignty, international law, and free commerce.970

In addition to these “sticks,” the second part, known as Track II, offered “carrots” for the Cuban government to introduce change in the political system. The proposed measures included permission for the donation of food through international organizations, the limited export of medicine for humanitarian purposes, the increase of telecommunications between the United States and Cuba, and the resumption of direct mail service and payment to the Cuban government for telecommunication services.971

969 Programa, La Voz de la Fundación, retransmisión de “Mesa Redonda” por APR, Radio Mambí, November 29, 1990, in Jorge Mas Canosa, vol. 1, p. 785. 970 Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, pp. 45-46. 971 Bill Text, H.R. 4168, Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, available at The Library of Congress THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c102:H.R.4168: (accessed December 15, 2014). 361

Drawing on Mas Canosa’s earlier proposal, Torricelli and his staff helped CANF expand a list of incentives so that the bill would receive broader congressional support.972 Ileana

Ros-Lehtinen, a Cuban American congresswoman whose stance was less flexible than

CANF’s, nonetheless prevented Torricelli from adding many more “liberal measures.”973

What was entirely new about CDA was “Track III,” which Mas Canosa called

“the guidelines” for the U.S. government to follow in post-Castro Cuba.974 The bill proposed that the U.S. government deliver food, medicine, and medical supplies to Cuba on a “transition to democracy.” Yet, prior to this change, the bill obliged a U.S. President to “certify” to the U.S. Congress that the new government declared its intention of holding free and fair elections, respected human rights and basic democratic freedoms, and stopped subversive activities in other countries. If Cuba established a “democratic” government, the U.S. government must grant full diplomatic recognition, provide emergency relief, and end the U.S. embargo. And again to make this change occur, the bill required a U.S. president to report to the U.S. Congress that Cuba “established democratic institutions through free, fair, and open elections, under international supervision, that represent the will of the majority of the Cuban people.”975

972 Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, pp. 41-42. The authors were unaware that Mas Canosa already favored the opening of direct communication with Cuba. 973 MH, April 14, 1992, p. 16A. 974 For Mas Canosa’s comment at the CANF meeting, see Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, January 17, 1992, p. 6. Torricelli also emphasized the importance of Track III. “We assist them in this struggle by painting an alternate picture of Cuba’s future, what the future will be like after Castro.” U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, p. 416. 975 Bill Text, H.R. 4168, Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. 362

Track III not only provided the definition of “democracy” in Cuba, but also transferred from the President to the Congress the final authority pertaining to determination about its political system. The implication was ominous for Alfredo Durán, lawyer and former chair of the Florida Democratic Party, who claimed that Track III would create “the image of a new Platt amendment.” Because anti-Castro groups in the

United States could mount “tremendous pressure” on the Congress, they could

“determine, or at least define what is politically correct.” Durán worried that should

Miami and Havana disagree on the transition process in post-Castro Cuba, the United

States would automatically side with Miami through such pre-set legal arrangements.976

At congressional hearings chaired by Dante Fascell, there appeared numerous other concerns by individuals who never sympathized with Castro. Ramón Cernuda, spokesman for the largest Cuban dissident association, condemned Track I as an attempt to “starve our people to death in the name of human rights, in the name of democratic ideals.”977 George McGovern, former senator from South Dakota, noted that the bill would be counterproductive since Castro, whom he called a “dictator,” would use it as “a political scapegoat to blame the problems of Cuba on the United States.”978 Many others also referred to international opposition. “Is it really worth it for the United States,” asked

Susan Kaufman Purcell, vice president of the Americas Society, “to risk seriously

976 Testimony by Durán, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, pp. 99, 126, 132-33. Fascell conceded that Durán made a good case but said nothing to assuage his worries. 977 Testimony by Cernuda, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, pp. 87-88. See also, Cernuda, et. al., to Senators and Representatives of U.S. Congress, February 14, 1992, included in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, pp. 164-66. 978 Testimony by McGovern, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, p. 151. 363 damaging its relations with important allies in order to achieve its policy goals in

Cuba?”979

Torricelli, Fascell, and other congressional supporters of the bill were not deaf to these criticisms. Rather, each time they had difficulty in explaining their position, they sought refuge in the presence of Cuban Americans. When Durán pointed out that the U.S.

Congress legislated democracy in Cuba, but not in Eastern Europe, Torricelli defended their special treatment of the island. “Cuba is different,” he exclaimed, “because the

Cuban-American people want it to be different, because our traditions, because of , we want a better relationship with Cuba.”980 When McGovern asked Fascell why the United States traded with the Soviet Union and China, but not with Cuba, Fascell too mentioned geography and Cuban American advocacy, noting that “those who fell [in

Cuba] had ‘relatives who now live in the United States’ and kept their memories for a while.”981 At one point, Purcell accused supporters of the bill of prioritizing Cuban issues due to their Cuban American constituencies. The comment irritated Torricelli, but not

Fascell. “As a politician and a congressman,” he said, “I do not see anything wrong with that.”982

979 Testimony by Purcell, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, p. 184. 980 Torricelli apparently forgot that Durán was a Cuban American. Comment by Torricelli, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, pp. 126-27. 981 Comments by Fascell, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, pp. 167-68. 982 Ibid., pp. 194-95. 364

Miami’s “War” against Havana, Miami’s Victory over Washington

Unlike these U.S. congressmen, the Bush administration weighed international opposition to CDA. Up to the last minute, the State Department sought to mend fences over the drafted bill with Mas Canosa. But when he chose confrontation over compromise, the administration found little choice but to declare its opposition to the internationalization of the embargo.983 In his testimony before the Congress, Robert

Gelbard, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, expressed the administration’s concern about international reactions, warning that the bill would cause a paradigm shift by “changing the focus from Castro and Cuba to the United States.”984

U.S. public opinion apparently sided with the administration, as a poll in February 1992 indicated that as many as 65 percent opposed extraterritorial application of the U.S. embargo on Cuba.985

Beneath Washington’s discussion over CDA was the escalation of tensions between Miami and Havana. On December 29, 1991, Commando L, a militant group in

Miami, conducted a raid against Cuba, leading to the capture of three fighters. They confessed a plan to cause an insurrection in a sensational trial broadcast on Cuban television.986 Although several countries, including Spain, Mexico, Argentina, and the

United States, asked for clemency, Havana executed one and sentenced two others to

983 Vicki Huddleston to Distribution, January 16, 1992, in folder “H.R.4168,” box 2828, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. For details of State Department opposition, see Non-paper, attached to Vicki Huddleston to Distribution, January 16, 1992, in folder “H.R.4168,” box 2828, Dante Fascell Papers, UM-SC. 984 Testimony by Gelbard, in U.S. House, Cuban Democracy Act, p. 402. 985 Only 19 percent favored such measures. MH, February 11, 1992, pp. 1A, 9A. 986 MH, January 14, 1992, p. 1A. 365 thirty-year prison terms. The execution did little to defuse tensions. Whereas the Cuban government intensified mobilization of the Cuban population and military vigilance over the country, Miami Cubans rallied to Armando Pérez-Roura, an overzealous manager of a local Spanish radio, who campaigned for 100,000 signatures to request the recognition of their “belligerent rights” by a U.S. president.987

Unsure about what “belligerent rights” meant, NSC officials grabbed a piece of the digest of international law. What they found was that regardless of varying interpretations, most theorists agreed that the recognition followed facts and constituted more than symbolic actions. The insurgent group claiming the status of belligerent power must have a government and military organizations that were capable of mobilizing forces and resources in accordance with rules and customs of war within the territory that it claimed. Only under such circumstances could the foreign government recognize the group’s belligerent rights and enter commercial and diplomatic relations as a belligerent power in an equal status to the government against which it was fighting.988 In short, a group of people in civilian clothes rhetorically calling for war on radio stations outside the territory without actually showing intentions and capabilities of conducting war could not be a belligerent power. Recognition of the group as such would be mockery of international law.

987 For Havana, see the Mexican embassy in Havana to Mexico City, January 20, 1992, III-4929-1, AHGE; and el Departamento de Caribe to Raúl Valdés, February 18, 1992, III-4929-1, AHGE. 988 Italicized mine. Digest of International Law, prepared by Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser, the Department of State, volume 2, pp. 498-521, in folder “Cuba (General) January 1992- June 1992 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. 366

The whole situation horrified top State Department officials, who suspected that

Miami Cubans had become almost out of control. Trying to cool down the temperature, they reiterated the U.S. intention of enforcing the Neutrality Act, requested Cuba’s information on the raid for a FBI investigation, and briefed the Miami Herald on

“ongoing” U.S.-Cuban cooperation on terrorism. “We condemn any efforts to use the territory of the United States to prepare or promote violence in Cuba,” stated publicly a

State Department official.989 Yet such a declaration only bolstered Cuban American defiance. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen sent an open letter to Baker claiming that the Neutrality

Act was inapplicable since the United States was never “in peace” with Cuba since

1959.990 Others called into question the sincerity of the U.S. interpretation of the law, pointing out that U.S. actions in Nicaragua, Vietnam, Grenada, Angola, and the Bay of

Pigs were the “flagrant violations of the Neutrality Act.” The U.S. government enforced the act only when it satisfied American interests. These voices of protest apparently remained unchanged since 1970.991

Put on the defensive, Bush sent an opinion column to the Miami Herald, as well as its Spanish-language version El Nuevo Herald. Here, the U.S. president again employed tough rhetoric to cover the gap between Washington’s policy and Miami’s

989 MH, January 24, 1992, pp. 1A, 6A; and MH, January 25, 1992, p. 1A. See also, ARA Press Guidance, “Cuba: Paramilitary Operations from the U.S.,” January 24, 1992, in folder “Cuba (General) January 1992-June 1992 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. The MINREX received a State Department note that the FBI was investigating the case of the captured three members of Commando L and asking for additional information. Sánchez-Parodi a Malmierca, January 26, 1992, Caja “Bilateral 36,” MINREX. 990 Ros-Lehtinen to Baker, January 24, 1992, in DLA, January 29, 1992, p. 1B. 991 Italicized mine. Andres Vargas Gómez, “Exiled Cubans’ Right to Fight for their Country’s Freedom,” MH, March 9, 1992, found in folder “Cuba (General) January 1992-June 1992 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. See Chapter One for the parallel development in 1970. 367 expectation. To promote a “peaceful” transition to democracy in Cuba, he declared, he would do “everything possible” within the “confines of the existing laws of the United

States.” 992 Behind the scenes, however, Jeb again played a critical role. When Pérez-

Roura requested a meeting with his father to hand over a letter with over 250,000 signatures in favor of recognition of belligerence rights, Jeb not only delivered their plea to his father’s eyes, but also urged him to change his stance on CDA. “There must be a way to overcome the concerns of our allies and tighten the noose on Castro,” Jeb wrote.

“If it can be done then the Torricelli bill will disappear.” On the next day the U.S. president congratulated his son. “Well Done! You did a terrific job.” He asked Scowcroft to set up the meeting. The “State [Department] might have some problems with my meeting…But I would like to do it unless there is a compelling reason not to.”993

Seeking reelection, the U.S. president felt it necessary to do something to pacify

Miami Cubans. Reading an April 10 piece from the Miami Herald, Bush highlighted the paragraph that said: “Torricelli, who has made no secret of his intent to embarrass Bush for what he considers a stagnant policy, seized on the opening.” This passage obviously irritated Bush, as he dictated to Baker and Scowcroft: “I do not want to be out gunned by

Torricelli on this issue.”994 A week later Bush appropriated two elements of the bill to bar foreign vessels from docking in U.S. ports within six months of their having docked at a

992 Bush, “A Challenge to Hold Free Elections,” MH, February 27, 1992, p. 19A; and Bush’s Declaration, DLA, February 28, p. 5A. 993 Pérez Roura and Vargas Gómez to Bush, March 6, 1992; Jeb to George H. W. Bush, March 9, 1992; George H. W. Bush to Jeb, March 10, 1992; George H. W. Bush to Scowcroft, March 11, 1992, all in folder “Cuba (General) January 1992-June 1992 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. For Jeb’s radio appearances, see MH, January 25, 1992, pp. 1A, 12A. 994 Bush to Baker and Scowcroft, “Torricelli and Cuba,” April 10, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Torricelli Bill [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. 368

Cuban port and to authorize family-to-family shipments of food, medicine, and other

“humanitarian” items via charter flights directly from Miami to Havana. “With the appropriate changes,” he added, “I expect to be able to sign this legislation.”995 Bush’s declaration of his commitment to the bill elated its supporters, including Mas Canosa.

The issues of subsidiaries remained “the main problem,” he commented, “but I think that will be overcome.”996

The Bush administration completely reversed its opposition to CDA after Mas

Canosa’s meeting with Bill Clinton, in which the latter declared his support for the bill.

As the existing scholarship notes, the meeting was a decisive factor in the administration’s turnaround on U.S. policy toward Cuba.997 Yet, Bush’s crisis of confidence among Miami Cubans preceded this event, especially regarding the controversy over the Neutrality Act. By the time Clinton met Mas Canosa, Bush felt extremely vulnerable to the fear of losing much of their electoral support for his 1992 reelection campaign in Florida, a crucial swing state with a large number of electoral votes.998 In the eyes of the U.S. president and Jeb, the Clinton-Mas Canosa meeting was not an isolated occurrence but the culmination of a chain of events, which progressively compelled them to reconsider the administration’s position on CDA.

995 Statement by Bush, April 18, 1992, APP. 996 Mas Canosa, quoted in MH, April 19, 1992, pp. 1A, 10A. 997 Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business, pp. 47-48; Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo, p. 88; and Schoultz, Infernal, pp. 447-48. 998 Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo, pp. 88-89. 369

Pyrrhic Victory

On October 23, 1992, only a few weeks before the election, Bush signed CDA in

Miami, pledging that he “will be the first American President to set foot on the soil of a free and independent Cuba.”999 Although Bush lost reelection and failed to deliver on this promise, anti-Castro Miami Cubans remained convinced that they stood on the right side of history. On November 4, Mas Canosa borrowed the language of Bush in writing to president-elect Clinton. “You will be the first President to set foot in a free Havana.”1000

Convinced that their victory was just around , CANF developed a contingency plan, “Operation Encounter.”1001 If the military expulsed the Castro brothers from the island, CANF would immediately dispatch a special delegation, present its transition plan, and enter into negotiations with those in power. If the Castro brothers left the island without a military coup, then the foundation would enter the island to be “the first cohesive force of the people” to be counted in post-Castro Cuba. To this end, it was necessary to bring in extra equipment, such as guns, jeeps, and provisions for CANF forces. If Cuba entered a civil war, the foundation would wait and see to determine whether and when it would conduct a landing. The existence of such plans indicates how far this organization was disposed to go in order to achieve its objective around this pivotal moment.1002

999 Remarks by Bush, October 23, 1992, APP. 1000 Mas Canosa and Francisco J. Hernández to Bill Clinton, November 4, 1992, folder “Letter 1992,” box 7, The New Republic/ Jorge Mas Canosa Collections, Special Collections, Florida International University Libraries. 1001 Contingency Plan, July 31, 1992, in folder “Operation Encounter,” box 1.82, CANF Archive. 1002 Memorandum, n.d., in folder “Operation Encounter,” box 1.82, CANF Archive. 370

For Mas Canosa, however, the enactment of CDA was a Pyrrhic victory. The

Bush administration refused to consider any further requests from Mas Canosa and his allies, who wanted to see a substantial update of Radio and TV Martí. Complaining of

“the lack of strong commitment by the [Bush] administration,” CANF’s leader sought an appointment with Bush to little avail.1003 Likewise, his group tried to change the VOA guidelines for Radio Martí, which prohibited the “broadcast of any material which would amount to or could be reasonably construed as incitement to revolt or other violence.”

The revision was necessary to send to Cuba something like Mas Canosa’s June 14, 1992, speech calling for the Cuban military not to allow Fidel Castro’s plane to land as it returned from abroad.1004 The State Department managed to prevent these moves.

Criticisms of CANF floated for a while, but became almost unstoppable after the passage of CDA. The U.S. media repeated numerous episodes of Mas Canosa’s “bully” character, his alleged ambition to be president of Cuba, as well as CANF’s responses to a

Miami Herald editorial against CDA.1005 After accusing the Miami Herald of being a mouthpiece of Havana, the foundation launched a campaign, leading its supporters to make bomb threats against the Herald executives and to vandalize the newspaper’s vending machines.1006 According to Americas Watch, these phenomena

1003 They wanted the addition of 530 kHz to Radio Martí broadcasting, as well as the daylight broadcasting of TV Martí. Minutes of Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting, June 30, 1992, in folder “Minutes,” box 1.61, CANF Archive. 1004 Rolando Bonachea to Chase Untermeyer, “Suppressed Broadcast Material on Radio Marti,” June 26, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Radio Marti 1992 [2],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. 1005 See for example, Economist, March 28, 1992, p. A24; MH, October 11, 1992, p. 21A; Time, October 26, 1992, pp. 56-57; NYT, October 29, 1992, p. 18A; and Gaeton Fonzi, “Who is Jorge Mas Canosa?” Esquire, January 1993, pp. 86-89, 119. 1006 Economist, March 28, 1992, p. A24. 371 constituted human rights violations through suppression of freedom of expression, for which CANF was mainly responsible.1007 Although the foundation blamed Havana’s

“defamation campaign” for all these faults and fought back for its reputation, public relations problems took their toll thereafter.1008

In Cuba, CDA was politically counterproductive since it gave the Cuban government a convenient scapegoat for its economic ills. Because most of Cuba’s trade with U.S. subsidiaries was in foodstuffs, Cuban leaders easily could blame food shortages on the tightened U.S. embargo. Millions of Cubans endured the shortage of food, electricity, and jobs. Thousands of them even suffered from the epidemic of optic neuropathy due to malnutrition.1009 The government intensified its efforts to collect hard currencies by opening hotels, shops, boutiques, clubs, and convenience stores for tourists, and tried “almost anything” no matter how “un-socialist” it might have been.1010 Like

Chinese counterparts, Cuban communists apparently accepted economic change without reversing the political system. Fidel Castro remained in power. Few Cubans risked their lives to rally to Mas Canosa, a person whom they had never met and whose idea of a laissez-faire economy was at best unfamiliar.

1007 Americas Watch, Dangerous Dialogue: Attacks on Freedom of Expression in Miami’s Cuban Exile Community (New York: Americas Watch, August 1992). 1008 For Mas Canosa’s belief in Havana’s shadow, see Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, December 13, 1991. On U.S. media, Mas Canosa commented that the media not only had been supportive of Fidel Castro but also had been “unwilling to admit” that the Cuban American community was “right about Cuba.” Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 20, 1992, p. 6, box 1.04, CANF Archive. 1009 Pérez-López, Second Economy, esp. 137-142; and Pérez, Reform and Revolution, pp. 293-98, 315- 17. 1010 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, February 1, 1993, vol. 24993, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 39, RG25, LAC. 372

By ignoring international opinion, furthermore, Miami Cubans and their congressional allies achieved the opposite of what they viewed as the internalization of the embargo. Major U.S. trading partners protested, and some passed counter-legislation to prevent the enforcement of CDA in their territories. Public opinion in these countries opposed CDA. So did almost all major newspapers across the political spectrum. Like diplomats, many non-U.S. journalists dismissed the act’s enactment simply as election- year politics, neither based on principle nor moral standpoints.1011 Such international perception of this act was a diplomatic blessing for Havana. In the fall of 1991, for example, Cuba failed to include the U.S. blockade on Cuba in the discussion at the UN

General Assembly. Cuba accused the United States of mounting pressure on member states to foil this initiative.1012

World opinion trends shifted in 1992. Following Bush’s April announcement in favor of CDA, the Cuban foreign ministry denounced the tightening of the blockade and reminded the UN member states that the discussion was reopening.1013 This time, U.S. efforts to block the Cuban initiative were no longer effective. In November, for the first time ever, the UN General Assembly passed a Cuban resolution that condemned the U.S. embargo on Cuba with a decisive 59-3 vote, with 71 abstentions. Canada, France, Spain,

Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, China, Indonesia, and many more

1011 Daily Digest of Foreign Media Reaction, November 2, 1992, in folder “Cuba: Torricelli Bill [1],” NSC: Charles A. Gillespie Files, GHWBL. 1012 Cuba’s memorandum, August 19, 1991; U.S. demarches to member states (unknown), n.d. (ca. fall 1991); and Address by Alarcón, November 13, 1991, all cited in Michael Krinsky and David Golove, eds., United States Economic Measures against Cuba: Proceedings in the United Nations and International Law Issues (Northampton, MA: Aletheia Press, 1993), pp. 18-20, 26-29, 344-45, 347- 355. 1013 MINREX statement, April 22, 1992, cited in ibid., pp. 363-65. 373 nonaligned nations voted for it. Other major U.S. allies in Western Europe and Japan abstained and expressed concerns about the extraterritorial clauses of CDA.1014 An editorial of Granma called this turnaround “the victory of principles.” Against

Washington’s menace, Havana declared that the world was on the side of Cuba and the

Cuban people.1015

Conclusion

With the January 1992 resolution of a twelve-year civil war in El Salvador, a conflict between counterrevolutionary Miami and revolutionary Havana became the last major battleground of Latin America’s Cold War. Since its establishment of July 1981,

Mas Canosa’s CANF kept expanding its political power and assumed the role of a

“government-in-exile.” The foundation was popular among Miami Cubans who dreamed of establishing a new regime on the island. Its project to develop political and economic plans for “post-Castro Cuba” gained much support from its allies in the U.S. Congress and Corporate America. To advance its cause, the foundation played a critical role in persuading the Bush administration to launch TV Martí and endorse CDA. CANF advocated both the tightening of the embargo and the selective expansion of engagement.

Due to the turnaround of domestic politics, Bush ultimately yielded to Mas

Canosa’s CANF by giving up what he might have thought as the best interest of the

United States. In explaining Bush’s policy toward Cuba, some scholars emphasize

1014 Transcript of the General Assembly Debate, November 24, 1992, cited in ibid., pp. 52-84, 366- 377. 1015 “La victoria de los principios,” Granma, November 26, 1992, p. 1. 374 political necessity, noting that the U.S. president was pragmatic by nature yet vulnerable to political pressure at home.1016 Others pay more attention to Bush’s ideological hostility toward Castro and his triumphalist worldview after the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the socialist bloc, they argue, revived Washington’s “dreams of rolling back the Cuban revolution.”1017 This chapter suggests that both theories have merits of their own, although they need more elaboration by focusing on Bush’s relations with Miami Cubans.

In particular, this chapter highlights the growing divergence of interests between

Washington and Miami. At the beginning Bush carried forward Reagan’s policy, paying close attention to Cuba’s internal politics such as human rights. Combined with his electoral political needs for Miami Cuban votes in Florida, the U.S. president’s connection with Miami Cubans through Jeb Bush was particularly strong. George Bush was hardly pragmatic in Cuba as shown in his denial of dialogue with Castro, his demand for internal change in Cuba, as well as his support for TV Martí. Yet once he launched the television broadcasting, Bush largely took a wait-and-see policy. Although Bush never rolled back TV Martí as demanded by Havana, his preference afterward for the status quo frustrated Miami Cubans calling for the immediate fall of the Castro regime.1018

It is clear that Miami Cubans demanded much more than Bush could tolerate. By pledging the TV Martí startup to Miami in his 1988 presdential campaign, Bush no doubt

1016 Brenner and Landau, “Passive Aggressive”; Haney and Vanderbush, Embargo; and Morley and McGillion, Unfinished Business. 1017 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p. 225. See also, Schoultz, Infernal, p. 432, 564-67. 1018 This position is similar to the one advocated by Wayne Smith, former chief of the USINT in Havana. Quoted in U.S. House, Cuba in a Changing World, p. 9. 375 wanted to oversee Cuba’s “transition to democracy.” Yet, he also believed that the change had to be “peaceful” and come from inside, including the initiative of Castro. This was what set him apart from thousands of Miami Cubans who fiercely demanded more of

U.S. actions, including symbolic recognition of their “belligerent rights.” When he received the petition’s letter from Pérez-Roura, Bush responded, “I don’t know whether this will be helpful.” While appreciating the letter, the U.S. president reiterated his commitment to peace and democracy.1019 Neither did Bush want to see the outbreak of an armed conflict or a migration crisis involving the United States. His administration kept in touch with Havana on issues of mutual concern, including the curtailment of terrorism and the control of migration.

At a critical juncture of history, many actors, including Miami Cubans, tried to chart a new course for U.S.-Cuban relations. Yet, all these attempts largely failed to break the impasse that had appeared in the late 1980s. Nothing was more responsible for this deadlock than Washington’s contradictory attitudes toward Miami and Havana. In her farewell memorandum after her service in Havana in 1992-1993, a Canadian ambassador made a similar point. “I realize that…Cuba is a domestic issue in the United States, valued mostly in terms of numbers of votes and potential votes,” she lamented. “Still, one would think that the United States would be doing everything it could to avoid a denouement which involves turmoil and bloodshed, especially in a country only ninety

1019 Memcon, “Meeting with Cuban-American Community Leaders,” May 6, 1992. 376 miles away.”1020 In terms of U.S. policy toward Cuba, Bush was far below Havana’s expectation. Yet, neither was he as close to Miami Cubans as they wished.1021

1020 Canadian embassy in Havana to Ottawa, February 1, 1993, vol. 24993, 20-1-2-Cuba, part 39, RG25, LAC. This information was for Canadian Eyes Only. 1021 Morley, interview transcript, p. 97, FAOH. 377

CONCLUSION

For Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American affairs from 1993 to 1996, the most important thing about Cuba was to prevent change. “The biggest issue for me,” he recalled, “was to avoid a situation where some sort of changes

[occurred] in Cuba, perhaps very dramatic and rapid changes in Cuba.” He worried that it would trigger a “conflict within Cuba between the partisans of the Castro regime and [its] opponents.” The envisioned scenario would be disastrous. “This might end up on the one hand sucking Americans into it, either volunteers would come charging out of Miami and elsewhere and join the fray and help to feed the monster or the remnants of the situation there,” he stated. The conflict might even “produce a huge migration again of Cubans which we all remember was so problematic when we had the Mariel migrations.” Watson had to think “very hard about how to manage all these things.”1022

His comment captured the essence of contradictory U.S. attitudes toward Cuba.

In the two decades after the Cold War, the U.S. government maintained a confrontational stance against revolutionary Cuba and enlisted anti-Castro Miami Cubans as allies. But

U.S. leaders also feared the outbreak of chaos in the Caribbean and kept—and quietly restored, if broken—contacts with Havana on issues of mutual concern. There were

1022 Watson, interview transcript, p. 251, FAOH. It is unclear whether he was aware of CANF’s emergency planning. 378 numerous high-profile incidents, such as the 1994 migration crisis, the shoot-down of the

Brothers to the Rescue airplanes, the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, and the infamous Elián González saga. Yet the basic tenor of bilateral relations remained unaltered. The status quo was the best word to describe U.S.-Cuban relations until

December 2014, when Barack Obama and Raúl Castro announced a “historical” shift.1023

This study has explained why U.S.-Cuban relations deadlocked so long by analyzing its recent past. Throughout its narrative, this study has stressed that the Cold

War was important for both the United States and Cuba. Far from being Moscow’s puppet, Cuba engaged actively in the Cold War in Africa and Latin America, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. It was the Cubans who assumed a leading role and persuaded the

Russians to intervene in Southern Africa, not the other way around. For its part, the U.S. government justified its refusal to normalize diplomatic relations by citing Cuban troops in Africa and other forms of Cuban solidarity with revolutionaries elsewhere. The two governments defended rival forces, pursued conflicting missions, and used the Third

World’s political-economic trends as markers in the ideological competition between capitalism and socialism.

North-South imbalances in power and resources, as well as fundamental differences in worldviews, also characterized U.S.-Cuban confrontations. Since the War of 1898, the United States intervened in Cuba on numerous occasions, played a dominant role in the Cuban economy and culture, and occupied a military base in Guantánamo Bay.

In the wake of the Cuban Revolution, the United States imposed an economic embargo

1023 For Clinton-Bush years, see LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, chaps. 7-8; and Schoutlz, Infernal, chaps. 13-14. 379 on Cuba, not the other way around. Because of its sheer volume of power and resources,

Washington was capable of taking unilateral measures to demand unilateral concessions, whereas Havana was not. In Havana’s view, Washington’s posture almost always appeared “imperial” and antithetical to others’ pursuit of national sovereignty. Havana’s revolutionary pride, its sense of injustice, and its refusal to yield to Washington’s demands in turn narrowed the space for dialogue.

Yet, U.S.-Cuban relations grew even more complex because of the intricate interaction of diplomacy and human migration. Since 1959, more than a million Cubans left the island for the United States. Due to their political activities, abundant economic resources, and linguistic and cultural advantages, Cuban émigrés in South Florida not only helped to build a , Miami, but also helped to complicate the course of

U.S.-Cuban relations. Despite its internal contradictions and changes in tactics and strategies, this military and political movement of Cubans, the so-called anti-Castro politics, ensured the long-time endurance of Cuban strife across the Florida Straits. By situating Cuba-to-U.S. migration into the larger context of the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, this study illustrates how human migration acted as a critical element of international politics.

Washington, Havana, and Cuba-to-U.S. Migration

Cuba-to-U.S. migration was an important component of diplomatic strategies for policymakers. From very early on, Washington employed the outflow of Cubans from the island as a foreign policy tool. Aiming for the immediate overthrow of the revolutionary

380 regime, Washington sponsored massive emigration through visa issuances, paroles, and legislation. The U.S. presidents intended to use Castro’s “victims” not only for clandestine operations orchestrated by the CIA, but also for propaganda campaigns to denounce “the Cuban model” and undermine Cuba’s appeal to the rest of the world. This

U.S. migration policy persisted throughout the Cold War. Despite the increasing volume of internal criticism, Washington did not repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, which secured a special path for Cubans reaching U.S. shores to their settlement in the

United States.

Havana condemned Washington’s manipulation of Cuban migration in the strongest possible terms. For the Cuban government, Washington’s open-door policy for

Cuban migrants, including those who murdered citizens, those who embezzled public funds, and those who defected through illegal departures, was a deliberate attempt to lure the remaining Cubans to capitalist evils and destabilize Cuba’s revolutionary society.

Despite much moral indignation, however, emigration also served Havana’s interests in alleviating internal discontent. Because the revolutionary society was the one formed by people who chose to be revolutionaries, Cuba claimed that it had no objection to the exit of “anti-socials.” In the end, migration helped to make U.S. policy toward Cuba self- defeating. The departure of disgruntled Cubans lowered the discontent that the embargo aimed to increase.1024

The control of Cuba-to-U.S. migration itself emerged as a critical foreign policy goal, especially in the aftermath of the Mariel boatlift of 1980. Washington and Havana

1024 When it comes to migration, Havana readily admitted that Cuba was a poor country and its people, as in the rest of the world, were vulnerable to the appeal of wealth in North America. 381 exchanged verbal attacks, disputed the share of responsibility for the crisis, and disagreed over the solution to the massive inflow of Cubans into the United States. Washington’s loss of this diplomatic battle had a more far-reaching impact on U.S.-Cuban relations than previously recognized. Analysis of declassified U.S. records demonstrates that

Ronald Reagan paid enormous attention to Mariel-related issues, especially the return of

Mariel “excludables,” thousands of Cubans whom the U.S. government was determined to return to the island. The lack of alternatives, even military ones, compelled the most hawkish U.S. president to accept the inevitability of talks at one of the most perilous times in the history of U.S.-Cuban relations.

Havana’s acceptance of migration talks reflected its desire to improve the image of the revolutionary regime and increase Cuba’s influence in the United States. But the inflow of Cubans into the United States also frustrated Havana’s diplomatic design, especially since May 1985. By persuading Reagan and George H. W. Bush to launch

Radio and TV Martí, CANF became the vanguard of the anti-Castro movement attacking

Cuba’s internal politics, in addition to Cuba’s foreign policy. As U.S. presidents accommodated the concerns of former Cuban counterrevolutionaries-turned-U.S. citizens, Cuba’s “freedom” became “nonnegotiable,” as seen in Bush’s rejection of James

Baker’s proposal for a U.S.-Cuban dialogue at the 1990 Washington Summit. Because

Washington’s catering to Miami’s needs was unacceptable to Havana, it also undermined bilateral cooperation. More than the endurance of the Castro regime, the United States thus feared an outbreak of chaos and a migration crisis.

382

Miami, Washington, and Contingencies in International History

For scholars of U.S. ethnic groups and the making of U.S. foreign policy, the case of Miami Cubans may be nothing new. The United States received millions of immigrants who became naturalized U.S. citizens but kept their ties to countries of origin.

Even second-, third-, or fourth-generations might remain attentive to the political, economic, and cultural development of their ancestral countries. They formed ethnic organizations that lobbied politicians at the local, state, and national levels. At various times in history, these migrants exercised “significant,” if not determinative, influence on

U.S. policy toward their homeland and beyond. By mostly taking a Washington-centric approach, foreign policy scholars use as evidence the number of votes and the volume of financial contributions, as well as the ideological affinity of the migrants’ political positions with the existing lines set by U.S. policy elites.1025

A careful analysis of historical records in Washington, Miami, and Havana illuminates contingency in international history, an important element that has not received adequate attention in the existing scholarship. First of all, it is important to note that migrants engaged in a wide range of transnational politics. The formation of a lobbying group was simply one of many ways migrants participated in international relations. Cuban counterrevolutionaries fought on the battlefields, spent time in prison, and tied their fate to the United States in support of a losing cause. When the U.S. government opposed their invasion plans, some resorted to indiscriminate terrorism

1025 It is important to note that political scientists, not historians, have conducted most studies of the topic. All too often, they lacked access to historical records, especially on the side of ethnic lobbying organizations, whose analysis required “foreign” language capabilities as well as ample knowledge of ethnic history. 383 against innocent civilians. Others, such as Bernardo Benes and Charles Dascal in the late

1970s, focused on their efforts on personal diplomacy to solve human rights issues.

Thousands of Miami Cubans joined the Mariel boatlift to bring their loved ones to the

United States. Each action had a varying degree of political impact. Rather than focusing on ethnic lobby alone, it is thus necessary to appreciate this diversity of migrant political life when appraising its impact on international relations.

Second, this study makes clear that the rise of the so-called Cuban American lobby was far from pre-determined. Miami politics itself was an inflection of the ebb and flow of Cold War tensions and U.S. politics. Of particular importance was the triangular dialogue of the late 1970s, in which Jimmy Carter worked with Fidel Castro to neutralize anti-Castro opposition among Miami Cubans. By containing terrorism and addressing human rights issues, they sought to transform the community into a political bloc more amenable to the idea of improved bilateral ties. It was the failure of this endeavor that paved the way for the rise of CANF and its collaboration with Reagan Republicans. In the aftermath of the Mariel boatlift, Reagan’s message of “freedom” was enormously effective in courting Miami Cubans to enter U.S. politics and cementing Jorge Mas

Canosa’s leadership position in the community. Despite shared anti-Castro ideology, it is undeniable that each U.S. president pursued different political goals in Miami. The relation between migrant politics and U.S. foreign policy was less ideological than political and personal.1026

1026 It also bears emphasizing that ideological factors cannot differentiate Reagan’s thinking from Shultz’s in the wake of Radio Martí startup. Bush also differed from Baker in denying Castro an opportunity to open a U.S.-Cuban dialogue. 384

Third, by addressing contingency in international history, the study of

Washington-Havana-Miami relations helps to assess Miami’s ultimate importance in

U.S.-Cuban relations. This research shows that Washington was not as close to Miami as the latter desired. Anti-Castro leaders in Miami leveraged political power by mastering rhetoric, assembling allies, and withdrawing constituency service from U.S. politicians.

Yet, U.S. presidents also made their own judgments on the merits of each policy, as seen in Reagan’s decision to open migration negotiations with Cuba and Bush’s rejection of armed confrontation with the island. Nevertheless, from Havana’s perspective,

Washington was far biased toward Miami. As long as U.S. presidents referred to Miami

Cubans as “agents of freedom,” Miami’s advocacy would possess more of Washington’s attention than Havana’s demands, thereby complicating the latter’s efforts to increase its influence in U.S. society. This finding reinforces an argument that scholarship on migrant politics and foreign relations needs to look beyond Washington. What may be unimportant for U.S. policymakers may have grave implications for ethnic groups, as well as policy elites in their homelands.

Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggle—Havana and Miami

Along with Washington’s relations with Havana and Miami, this project highlights how Havana and Miami also interacted on their own. The two engaged in what political scientist Damían Fernandez called the “politics of passion,” politics construed as a moral imperative for absolute ends. The political game was winner-takes-all, zero-sum.

The stakes were highest, not infrequently life and death, inclusion or exclusion from the

385 political community, honor or dishonor. Opponents were more than adversaries; they were enemies, traitors, evil, and inhuman.1027 As if such were the case, the revolutionary government and its counterrevolutionary foes used Manichaean language against each other, as the battle they fought was good versus evil.

Despite such “bitter struggles,” however, Havana and Miami also forged

“intimate ties.”1028 As the Cuban population split across ideological lines, the ideas and sentiment among separated Cuban families resonated with state-to-state interactions. In the late 1970s, when Fidel Castro radically shifted his policy toward Cubans abroad, their aspiration for family reunification took on special importance. Impressed by Carter’s emphasis on human rights, the Cuban leader hosted Diálogo, released thousands of prisoners, permitted their departure with their families, and allowed over 100,000 Cubans living abroad to reunite with their families on the island. These accomplishments in turn stimulated new momentum in favor of change in the lives of ordinary people on both sides of the border. The dynamics culminated in a migration crisis of unprecedented scale, for which neither Havana nor Washington was prepared.

It also bears emphasizing that adversaries in Havana and Miami also took actions that responded to one another. To cultivate favorable opinion in the United States, the revolutionary government made efforts to win allies in Washington, to improve its image with the U.S. public, and to rectify the distorted information it perceived originating from counterrevolutionary foes. Havana’s success on this front triggered Mas Canosa to do

1027 Damián J. Fernández, Cuba and the Politics of Passion (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), pp. 19-20. 1028 The author borrows these phrases from: Alan McPherson, Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006). 386 exactly the opposite by forming CANF, whose original purpose was to counter the perceived ascendancy of pro-Cuban lobby in Washington. In turn, because Mas Canosa thought the Mariel boatlift signified the vulnerability of the revolutionary regime to ideological penetration, he promoted Radio Martí as a tool of regime change from the very beginning. Aware of his intentions, Havana suspended the migration agreement of

1984 in the wake of the radio station’s startup. Cuban officials often saw Washington’s catering to Miami’s advocacy as a demonstration of intense hostility toward the revolutionary government.

After the end of the Cold War, revolutionaries in Havana and counterrevolutionaries in Miami presented two conflicting visions of Cuba. CANF designated itself as “The Opposition,” judged the revolution as a failure, and promoted its plan for post-Castro Cuba. In response, Fidel Castro denounced their machinations, called them “Miami mafias,” and declared his intention of defending the revolution against the evil of capitalism. Beneath these seemingly endless exchanges of diatribes, however, the nature of Miami-Havana relations gradually changed due to the generational shift, the continued flow of Cubans into the United States, and remaining human ties. Along with

Barack Obama’s and Raúl Castro’s leadership and their calculation of the changing dynamics of U.S.-Latin American relations, one may conclude that the demographic transformation of Cubans on both sides of the border was among the most important factors in undoing the Gordian knot.

Cuba’s conflict was part of Latin America’s Cold War, in which Latin Americans played major roles. Such acknowledgement does not mean that the historical record of

387

U.S. intervention in Cuban politics was unimportant. Even before the end of the Cold

War, Washington resigned itself to the existence of the communist government in

Havana and explored opportunities for bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as migration issues. Yet, as Miami Cubans engaged in U.S. politics with the hope of toppling the Cuban government, Reagan and his successors found themselves constrained by an avowed commitment to “freedom” in their homeland. The U.S. government ended up interfering in Cuban politics but satisfying no one. Havana regarded Washington with intense suspicion while Miami Cubans complained that Washington was too “soft” on

Castro. Still, as Watson’s recollection suggests, Washington apparently had sought to keep the volatile Miami-Havana conflict under some degree of control by finding a new equilibrium.

The implications of the international movement of people for foreign relations have become increasingly more important in the age of so-called globalization. The growing volume of the flow of capital, goods, technology, and communication has already captured scholarly attention across disciplinary boundaries. Yet, no movement is more complicated than human migration, since it speaks about the countless number of people who exercise agency in their everyday lives and cause a small yet cumulative change in local, state, and international politics.

However powerful it may be, the United States is no exception. More than the simple transfer of population into the United States, the movement of migrants accompanies the gradual yet ongoing transformation of U.S. politics and, thus, the

388 making of U.S. foreign policy. As defined by historian Robert J. McMahon, the history of

U.S. foreign relations is a “Janus-faced field,” looking inward at the internal sources of power and culture that shape U.S. foreign relations while, at the same time, looking outward at the external forces that influence and constrain U.S. relations with the rest of the world.1029 The study of migration and its implications for diplomacy is within the realm of such endeavor, with a particular focus on the mixture of the internal and external dynamics of U.S. foreign relations.

As we move on the surface of the globe, we also carry particular historical baggage rooted in specific places and cultures. The story of U.S.-Cuban relations, burdened by memories of bilateral bitterness, may appear somewhat exceptional due to its unique trajectory of the past and geographical proximity. Yet, the themes in this study—the Global Cold War, the North-South conflicts, and the intersection of human migration and diplomacy—may be similarly relevant for the rest of the world. State-to- state relations vibrate not only through diplomacy but also through the increasingly more frequent, lively, and sustained transnational links of people and their activities. Analysis of the meeting spots where diplomacy encounters migration is an effort to capture such elements of contingency in international history.

1029 Robert J. McMahon, “Toward a Pluralist Vision: The Study of American Foreign Relations as International History and National History,” in Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 45. 389

BIBLIOGRAPHY

** The following are only those cited in this dissertation.

Databases, Collections of Documents, Microfilms

American Presidency Project, University of California at Santa Barbara (APP)

Castro Speech Data Base, Latin American Network Information Center, University of Texas, Austin (LANIC)

Cold War International History Project Bulletin

Central Foreign Policy Files, Record Group 59, Access to Archival Databases at the National Archives (DOS-CFP)

Cuban Information Archives (CUIA)

Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS)

Digital National Security Archive (DNSA)

Discursos e intervenciones del Comandante en Jefé Fidel Castro Ruz, Presidente del Consejo de Estado de la República de Cuba. [Speeches and Interventions of the Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the State Council of the Republic of Cuba] (Discursos)

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)

The United States and Castro’s Cuba, 1950-1970: The Paterson Collection, Microfilm

U.S. Department of State, Freedom of Information Act Virtual Reading Room (DOS- FOIA)

Wilson Center Digital Archive, History and Public Policy Program (WCDA)

390

Archival Materials

CANADA

Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa (LAC) Department of External Affairs (RG25)

CUBA

Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba [Central Archive of Cuban Ministry of External Relations] (MINREX), Havana

Biblioteca del Centro de Estudios Hemisféricos y sobre Estados Unidos, Universidad de la Habana [Library at the Center for Hemispheric and United States Studies, University of Havana]

MEXICO

Archivo General de la Nación [General Archive of the Nation], Mexico City (AGN) Fondo Dirección Federal de Seguridad [Department of Federal Security] (DFS)

Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores [Genaro Estrada History Archive, Foreign Ministry], Mexico City (AHGE)

UNITED KINGDOM

National Archives, Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey (PRO) Records of the Ministry of Defence (DEFE) Records of the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Records of the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM)

UNITED STATES

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Freedom of Information Act

Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (GFL) National Security Adviser’s Files (NSA) Office of Public Liaison Files (OPL) Staff Secretary’s Office Files

Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia (JCL) Domestic Policy Staff Files (DPS) National Security Adviser’s Files (NSA) Office of the Assistant for Public Liaison (OAPL) Office of the Staff Secretary Records Plains Files (PF) 391

Records of the Cuban-Haitian Task Force Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor (RNSA) Records retrieved through the RAC system (RAC) Vertical Files (VF) White House Central Files, Subject Files Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection (ZBC)

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA (RRL) National Security Council Files (NSC) White House Staff and Office Files White House Office of Records Management (WHORM), Subject Files

George H. W. Bush Library, College Station, Texas (GHWBL) Brent Scowcroft Collection (BSC) Bush Vice Presidential Records (BVPR) Memcons and Telcons National Security Council Files (NSC) White House Office Files White House Office of Records Management (WHORM), Subject Files

U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA) Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool (CREST) JFK Assassination Records Collection (JFK) Record Group 59: State Department Records (RG59)

UNITED STATES (FLORIDA)

Cuban American National Foundation Archive, Miami, Florida (CANF Archive)

Florida International University Libraries’ Special Collections, Miami, Florida (FIU-SC) The New Republic/ Jorge Mas Canosa Collections

Florida State University Libraries, Tallahassee, Florida (FSUL) Claude Pepper Papers

State Archives of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida (SAF) Records of Governor Chiles’s Office

University of Miami Libraries’ Cuban Heritage Collection, Coral Gables, Florida (UM- CHC) Bernardo Benes Collection Diana Kirby Papers Cuban Refugee Center Records Mirta Ojito Collection

392

University of Miami Libraries’ Special Collections, Coral Gables, Florida (UM-SC) Dante Fascell Papers

Winter Park Public Library, Winter Park, Florida (WPPL) Paula Hawkins Collection

Published U.S. Governmental Records

STATE DEPARTMENT

Department of State Bulletin (DOSB)

State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs. “Case Study of Cuban Hypocrisy: The 1981 Dengue Epidemic in Cuba,” December 1985.

CONGRESS

House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Consideration of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 18 and 25, April 2 and 8, May 21, June 4 and 5, 1992.

House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Western Hemisphere Affairs. Cuba in a Changing World: The United States-Soviet-Cuban Triangle. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., April 30, July 11 and 31, 1991.

House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. Issues in United States-Cuba Relations. 97th Cong., 2nd sess., December 14, 1982.

House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. Recent Development in the United States-Cuban Relations: Immigration and Nuclear Power. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., June 5, 1991.

House. Committee on Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law. Cuban/ Haitian Adjustment. 98th Cong., 2nd sess., May 9, 1984.

House. Committee on Judiciary. Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees. Cuban and Haitian Immigration. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., November 20, 1991.

House and Senate. Committee on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979. Report. 96th Cong., 2d sess., 393

February 4, 1980.

Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Cuba: a Staff Report. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., August 2, 1974.

Senate. Committee on Judiciary. Annual Refugee Consultation for 1982. 97th Cong., 1st sess., September 22, 1981.

Senate. Committee on Judiciary. Caribbean Refugee Crisis: Cubans and Haitians. 96th Cong., 2nd sess., May 12, 1980.

Senate. Committee on Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Refugee Consultation. 97th Cong., 1st sess., September 29, 1982.

Senate. Committee on Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. Terroristic Activity: Terrorism in the Miami Area, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., May 6, 1976.

Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Reports of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations. 94th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 1975.

OTHER GOVERNMENT RECORDS

Carter, Jimmy. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980, vol. 3. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981.

City of Miami. Blue Ribbon Committee Report on Miami Cuban Demonstration of January 16, 1982. Miami, FL, July 28, 1982.

Elliston, Jon, ed. Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1999.

Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. Final Report. September 30, 1982.

Published Cuban Records

A Battle for Our Dignity and Sovereignty. Cuba: n.d., 1980?

Castro, Fidel. 2nd Period of Sessions of the National Assembly of People’s Power: City of Havana December 24, 1977, Year of Institutionalization. Havana: Political Publishers, 1978.

394

Castro, Fidel. Cuba: La situación internacional. Informe al 3er. Congreso del PCC. Febrero de 1986. Buenos Aires: Editorial Anteo, 1986.

Castro, Fidel. Declaration of Santiago, July 26, 1964. Toronto: Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 1964.

Castro, Fidel. An Encounter with Fidel: An Interview by Gianni Minà. Translated by Mary Todd. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1991.

Castro, Fidel. “Fidel Castro’s Address to the National People’s Government Assembly.” World Affairs 143, no.1 (Summer 1980): 20-64.

Castro, Fidel. Nada podrá detener la marcha de la historia: entrevista concedida a Jeffrey Elliot y Mervin Dymally sobre múltiples temas económicos, políticos e históricos. Havana: Editora Política, 1985.

Diálogo del gobierno cubano y personas representativas de la comunidad cubana en el exterior, 1978. Havana: Editora Política, 1994.

Entrevista Concedida por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro a la Periodista Norteamericana Barbara Walters, 19 de Mayo de 1977. Havana: Oficina de Publicaciones del Consejo de Estado, 1977.

Reed, Gail. Island in the Storm: The Cuban Community Party’s Fourth Congress. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1992.

El regreso de Fidel a Caracas, 1989. Caracas: Ediciones de la Biblioteca de la Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1989.

Vázquez Raña, Mario. Raúl Castro: Entrevista al periódico El Sol de México. Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1993.

Walters, Barbara. “An Interview with Fidel Castro.” Foreign Policy 28 (Fall 1977): 22- 51.

I Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba. Informe Central: Presentados por el compañero Fidel Castro Ruz Primer Secretario del Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba. Havana: Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba, 1975.

Published Cuban American Documents

Cuban American National Foundation. Bush on Cuba. Washington, DC: CANF, 1991.

395

Cuban American National Foundation. Radio Martí ya es una realidad…! Washington, DC: CANF, ca. 1984.

Cuban American National Foundation. Reagan on Cuba. Washington, DC: CANF, 1984.

Cuban American National Foundation. Towards a New U.S.-Cuba Policy. Washington, DC: CANF, 1988.

Mas Canosa, Jorge. Jorge Mas Canosa en busca de una Cuba libre: Edición completa de sus discursos, entrevistas y declaraciones, 1962-1997, vols. 1-3. Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press, University of Miami, 2003.

Miró Cardona, José. Exaltacion de Jose Marti. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editora Horizontes de America, 1974.

Other Published Documents

Americas Watch. Dangerous Dialogue: Attacks on Freedom of Expression in Miami’s Cuban Exile Community. New York: Americas Watch, August 1992.

Amnesty International. “Cuba: Silencing the Voices of Dissent,” December 1992, available at http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/AMR25/026/1992/es/ec33ae5f-ed96- 11dd-95f6-0b268ecef84f/amr250261992en.html (accessed December 20, 2014).

Central American ambassadors to the UN General Assembly, August 31, 1987, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CR%20HN%20GT%20N I%20SV_870807_EsquipulasII.pdf (accessed October 18, 2015).

Committee of Santa Fe. A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties. Washington, DC: Council for Inter-American Security, 1980.

Commission on United States-Latin American Relations. The United States and Latin America: Next Steps. New York: Center for Inter-American Relations, 1976.

National Security Archive. “Bush and Gorbachev at Malta: Previously Secret Documents from Soviet and U.S. Files on the 1989 Meeting, 20 Years Later,” http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/ (accessed October 31, 2014).

Seabury, Paul, and Walter A. McDougall, eds. The Grenada Papers. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984.

396

Newspapers, Magazines, and Other Periodicals

CUBA (Spanish)

Bohemia, Havana; Granma, Havana

SPAIN (Spanish) El País (Madrid)

UNITED KINGDOM (English)

Economist, London; Guardian, Manchester; Times, London

UNITED STATES (English)

Chicago Tribune; Cuba Update, New York; Esquire, New York; Forbes, Jersey City, New Jersey; Fort Worth Star Telegram, Texas; Los Angeles Times; Miami Herald (MH); Miami News; Newsweek, New York; New Yorker; New York Times (NYT); Wall Street Journal, New York; Washington Monthly; Washington Post (WP)

UNITED STATES (Spanish)

Abdala, Miami, Florida; Areíto, New York; Diario Las Américas, Miami, Florida (DLA); La Nación, Miami, Florida; El Nuevo Herald (Miami, Florida); Patria, Miami, Florida; RECE, Miami, Florida; Réplica, Miami, Florida

Memoirs and Bibliographies

Baker, James A. III, with Thomas M. DeFrank. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992. New York: Putnam’s, 1995.

Bosch, Orlando. Reflexiones. n.d., 2006 [?]

――. Los años que he vivido. Miami, FL: New Press, 2010.

Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Vintage, 1998.

Carter, Jimmy. White House Diary. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010.

Castro, Fidel, and Ignacio Ramonet. My Life. Translated by Andrew Hurley. London: Allen Lane, 2007.

Chernyaev, Anatoly S. My Six Years with Gorbachev. Translated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 397

2000.

Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.

Díaz-Balart, Rafael. Cuba: Intrahistoria. Una lucha sin tregua. Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 2006.

García Iturbe, Néstor. Diplomacia sin sombra. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2007.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. Memoirs. Translated by Georges Peronansky and Tatjana Varsavsky. New York: Doubleday, 1995.

Haig, Alexander M., Jr. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1984.

Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.

――. Years of Renewal. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999.

López Portillo, José. Mis tiempos: Biografía y testimonio político, 2 vols. Mexico City: Fernández Editores, 1988.

Llovio-Menéndez, José Luis. Insider: My Hidden Life as a Revolutionary in Cuba. Translated by Edith Grossman. Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988.

McFarlane, Robert C., and Zofia Smardz. Special Trust. New York: Cadell & Davies, 1994.

Ojito, Mirta. Finding Mañana: A Memoir of a Cuban Exodus. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.

Pankin, Boris. The Last Hundred Days of the Soviet Union. Translated by Alexei Pankin. London: I. B. Tauris, 1996.

Palazchenko, Pavel. My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

Posada Carriles, Luis. Los caminos del guerrero. n.p., 1994.

Reagan, Ronald. The Reagan Diaries Unabridged. Edited by Douglas Brinkley. 2 vols. New York: HarperCollins, 2009.

Reagan, Ronald. An American Life: Ronald Reagan, The Autobiography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.

398

Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State. New York: Scribner, 1993.

Skoug, Kenneth N., Jr. The United States and Cuba under Reagan and Shultz: A Foreign Service Officer Reports. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.

Smith, Wayne S. The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic Account of US- Cuban Relations since 1957. New York: Norton, 1987.

Valladares, Armando. Against All Hope: Prison Memoirs. New York: Knopf, 1986.

Vorotnikov, Vitaly. Gavana—Моskva: pamiatnye gody. Moscow: Fond imeni I. D. Sytina, 2001.

Walters, Vernon. The Mighty and the Meek: Dispatches from the Front Line of Diplomacy. London: St. Ermin’s, 2001.

Oral and Interview Transcripts

Bosworth, Stephen. U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, 1981-1982, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of Congress (hereafter FAOH).

Eidenberg, Eugene. Assistant to the President for inter-governmental affairs. Interview by David Engstrom, Cupertino, California, June 17, 1988, and telephone interview by David Engstrom, , , March 22, 1991.

Ferch, John. Chief of U.S. interests section in Havana, 1982-1984, FAOH.

Flanigan, Alan H. Chief of U.S. interests section in Havana, 1990-1993, FAOH

Gillespie, Charles A. Executive assistant for Assistant Secretary of State for inter- American affairs, 1981-1985, FAOH

Glassman, Jon David. U.S. State Department policy planning staff, 1981-1983, FAOH

Hughes, G. Phillip. Deputy foreign policy adviser to George Bush, 1981-85, FAOH

Mas Canosa, Irma Santos. Widow of Jorge Mas Canosa. Luis J. Botifoll Oral History Project, Cuban Heritage Collection, University of Miami (hereafter LBOHP)

Morley, Robert B. U.S. State Department’s coordinator of Cuban affairs, 1988-1991; and NSC specialist for Latin American affairs, 1991-1993, FAOH

399

Newsom, David D. Under Secretary of State for political affairs, 1978-1980. Telephone interview by David Engstrom, Las Vegas, Nevada, July 17, 1987; also in FAOH

Padrón González, José Luis. Senior aide to Fidel Castro in charge of Cuban policy toward the United States, 1977-1985. Interviews by Elier Ramírez Cañedo. Havana, February 10, 2010, November 4, 2013, and December 6, 2013.

Palmieri, Victor. U.S. coordinator for Refugee Affairs, 1979-1980. Telephone interview by David Engstrom, New York, February 22, 1988.

Renfrew, Charles B. Deputy Attorney General. Interview by David Engstrom, San Francisco, California, June 17, 1988.

Skoug, Kenneth N. U.S. State Department’s coordinator of Cuban affairs, 1982-1988, FAOH

Tarnoff, Peter. Executive secretary of the State Department. Telephone interview by David Engstrom, Las Vegas, Nevada. July 20, 1988.

Taylor, John J. “Jay.” Chief of the U.S. interests section in Havana, 1987-1990, FAOH

Watson, Alexander F. Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American affairs, 1993-1996, FAOH

Watson, Jack. Chief of Staff to the President, 1980. Interview by David Engstrom, Atlanta, Georgia, March 7, 1988.

Wick, Charles Z. USIA director under Reagan, 1981-1989. Presidential Oral History, Miller Center, University of Virginia (MC-UV)

Wilson, David Michael. Executive assistant to deputy director of USIA, FAOH.

Poll Results

Gallup, George H. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1980. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1981.

Grenier, Gullermo J., Hugh Gladwin and Douglas McLaughen. The 1993 FIU Cuba Poll: Views on Policy Options toward Cuba held by Cuban-American Residents of Dade County, Florida, July 1, 1993, https://cri.fiu.edu/research/cuba-poll/1993- cuba-poll.pdf (accessed January 6, 2015).

Heise, J. Arthur, Hugh Gladwin, and Douglas McLaughen. 1989 FIU/ Florida Poll. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1989). 400

――. 1991 FIU/ Florida Poll. Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991.

Pew Research Poll. “Most Support Stronger U.S. Ties with Cuba.” January 16, 2015, http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/01/1-15-15-Cuba-release.pdf (accessed October 25, 2015).

Secondary Works

Aja Díaz, Antonio. Al cruzar las fronteras. Havana: Molinos Trade S.A., 2009.

Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999.

Alzugaray, Carlos. “Cuban Foreign Policy during the ‘Special Period’: Interests, Aims, and Outcomes.” In H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds., Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy: The Impact of the ‘‘Special Period,’’ 49-71. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006.

――. “Cuban Revolutionary Diplomacy 1959-2009.” In B. J. C. McKercher, ed., Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft, 169-180. New York: Routledge, 2012.

――, and Anthony C. E. Quainton. “Cuba-U.S. Relations: Terrorism Dimension.” Pensamiento Propio 34 (July-December 2011): 71-84.

Ambrosio, Thomas ed. Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

Arboleya, Jesús. The Cuban Counterrevolution. Translated by Rafael Betancourt. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 2000.

――. Cuba y los cubanoamericanos: El fenómeno migratorio cubano. Havana: Fondo Editorial Casa de las Américas, 2013.

――. Havana-Miami: The U.S.-Cuba Migration Conflict. Translated by Mary Todd. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1996.

――. La ultraderecha cubano-americana de Miami. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2000.

Armony, Ariel C. Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in Central America, 1977-1984. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997. 401

Azuma, Eiichiro. Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Bach, Robert L., Jennifer B. Bach, and Timothy Triplett. “The Flotilla “Entratns”: Latest and Most Controversial.” Cuban Studies/ Estudios Cubanos 11, no. 2, 12, no. 1 (January 1981-January 1982): 29-48.

Bain, Mervyn J. Soviet-Cuban Relations, 1985 to 1991: Changing Perceptions in Moscow and Havana. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2007.

Blight, James G., and Philip Brenner. Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.

Bohning, Don. The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations against Cuba, 1959-1965. Washington, DC: Potomac, 2005.

Bon Tempo, Carl J. Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Boswell, Thomas D., and James R. Curtis. The Cuban-American Experience: Culture, Images, and Perspectives. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983.

Brands, Hal. Latin America’s Cold War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Brenner, Philip, and Saul Landau. “Passive Aggressive.” NACLA Report on the Americas 27, no. 3 (November 1990): 13-25.

Buajasán Marrawi, José, and José Luis Méndez. La República de Miami. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2003.

Capó, Julio, Jr. “Queering Mariel: Mediating Cold War Foreign Policy and U.S. Citizenship among Cuba’s Homosexual Exile Community, 1978-1994.” Journal of American Ethnic History 29, no. 4 (Summer 2010): 78-106.

――. “It’s Not Queer to be Gay: Miami and the Emergence of the Gay Rights Movement, 1945-1995.” Ph.D. diss. Florida International University, 2011.

Castro Mariño, Soraya M. “Cuban-U.S. Relations, 1989-2002: A View from Havana.” In H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds., Redefining Cuban Foreign Policy: The Impact of the ‘‘Special Period,” 305-332. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006.

Cobbs Hoffman, Elizabeth. “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a Global American History.” Diplomatic History 21 (Fall 1997): 499-518. 402

Coltman, Leycester. The Real Fidel Castro. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.

Connelly, Matthew. A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Copeland, Ronald. “The Cuban Boatlift of 1980: Strategies in Federal Crisis Management.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 467 (May 1983): 138-150.

Craig, Campbell, and Fredrik Logevall. America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Croucher, Sheila L. Imagining Miami: Ethnic Politics in a Postmodern World. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997.

DeConde, Alexander. Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992. de la Fuente, Alejandro. A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth Century Cuba. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. de la Garza, Rodolfo O., and Harry P. Pachon, eds. Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy: Representing the “Homeland?” Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

Didion, Joan. Miami. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.

Dinges, John, and Saul Landau. Assassination on Embassy Row. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Knopf, 2008.

Domínguez, Jorge I. “Cooperating with the Enemy? U.S. Immigration Policies toward Cuba.” In Christopher Mitchell, ed., Western Hemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy, 31-88. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992.

――. To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.

――. “U.S. Policy toward Cuba in the 1980s and 1990s.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 533 (May 1994): 165-176.

――, and Rafael Hernández, eds. U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s. Boulder, CO:

403

Westview, 1989.

Eckstein, Susan E. The Immigrant Divide: How Cuban Americans Changed the US and Their Homeland. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Engstrom, David W. Presidential Decision Making Adrift: The Carter Administration and the Mariel Boatlift. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997.

Erisman, H. Michael. Cuba’s Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000.

Escalante, Fabían. The Secret War: CIA Covert Operations against Cuba 1959-1962. Translated by Maxine Shaw. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1995.

Espino, María Dolores. “Tourism in Cuba: A Development Strategy for the 1990s?” In Jorge F. Pérez-López, ed., Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress, 147-166. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994.

Fagen, Richard R., Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O’Leary. Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968.

Farber, Samuel. The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006.

Fernández, Damián J. “Continuity and Change in Cuba’s International Relations in the 1990s.” In Jorge F. Pérez-López, ed., Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress, 49-54. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994.

――. Cuba and the Politics of Passion. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000.

――. “From Little Havana to Washington, D.C.: Cuban-Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy.” In Mohammed E. Ahrari, ed., Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy, 115-134. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987.

Fernández, Gastón. The Mariel Exodus Twenty Years Later: A Study on the Politics of Stigma and a Research Bibliography. Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 2002.

Fontaine, Roger. On Negotiating with Cuba. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975.

Forment, Carlos A. “Political Practice and the Rise of an Ethnic Enclave: The Cuban American Case, 1959-1979.” Theory and Society 18 (1989): 47-81.

Franklin, Jane. Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History. Melbourne: Ocean 404

Press, 1997.

Frederick, Howard H. Cuban-American Radio Wars: Ideology in International Telecommunications. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1986.

Fursenko, Alexander, and Timothy Naftali. “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: Norton, 1997.

Gabaccia, Donna R. Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Penguin, 2005.

García Iturbe, Nestor. De Ford a Bush. Havana: Editora Política, 2008.

García, María Cristina. Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Gerson, Louis L. The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1964.

Glad, Betty. An Outsider in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisers, and the Making of American Foreign Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009.

Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

――. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

――. Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013.

Grandin, Greg, and Gilbert M. Joseph, eds. A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America’s Long Cold War. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.

Greenhill, Kelly M. Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.

Grenier, Guillermo J., and Lisandro Pérez. The Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the Unites States. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2003. 405

Grow, Michael. U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008.

Guerra, Lillian. Visions of Power in Cuba: Revolution, Redemption, and Resistance, 1959–1971. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012.

Hahn, Peter L. Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945–1961. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

――. “Terrorism.” In Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier, eds., The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Haney, Patrick J., and Walt Vanderbush. The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign Policy. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005.

Harmer, Tanya. Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.

――. “Two, Three, Many Revolutions? Cuba and the Prospects for Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1967-1975.” Journal of Latin American Studies 45, no. 1 (February 2013): 61-89.

Hernández, Rafael, and Redi Gomis. “Retrato del Mariel: el ángulo socioeconómico.” Cuadernos de Nuestra América 3, no. 5 (January-June 1986): 124-151.

Hoganson, Kristin. “Hop off the Bandwagon! It’s a Mass Movement, Not a Parade.” Journal of American History 95 (March 2009): 1087-1091.

Hull, Christopher. British Diplomacy and US Hegemony in Cuba, 1898-1964. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Huntington, Samuel. “The Erosion of American National Interests.” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 28-49.

Immerman, Richard H. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.

Jacobson, Matthew Frye. Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination of Irish, Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Johns, Andrew L. Vietnam’s Second Front: The Domestic Politics, the Repubilcan Party, and the War. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010.

Jones, Howard. The Bay of Pigs. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

406

Joseph, Gilbert M., and Daniela Spenser, eds. In From the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008.

Kami, Hideaki. “Creating an Ethnic Lobby: Ronald Reagan, Jorge Mas Canosa, and the Birth of the Foundation.” In Andrew L. Johns and Mitchell Lerner, eds., The “Tocqueville Oscillation”: The Intersection of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016, currently revising for publication.

――. “Ethnic Community, Party Politics, and the Cold War: The Political Ascendancy of Miami Cubans, 1980-2000.” Japanese Journal of American Studies 23 (2012): 185-208.

Keller, Renata. Mexico’s Cold War: Cuba, the United States, and the Legacy of the Mexican Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Kirk, John M., and Peter McKenna. Canada-Cuba Relations: The Other Good Neighbor Policy. Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1997.

Knapp, Laurence F., ed. Brian de Palma Interviews. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2003.

Kramer, Paul A. The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006.

Krinsky, Michael, and David Golove, eds. United States Economic Measures against Cuba: Proceedings in the United Nations and International Law Issues. Northampton, MA: Aletheia Press, 1993.

LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd ed. rev. and expanded. New York: W. W. Norton, 1993.

Larzelere, Alex. The 1980 Cuban Boatlift: Castro’s Ploy—America’s Dilemma. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988.

LeoGrande, William M. Central America and the Polls. Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 1987.

――.“‘The Cuban Nation’s Single Party’: the Communist Party of Cuba Faces the Future.” In Philip Brenner, Marguerite Rose Jiménez, John M. Kirk, and William M. LeoGrande, eds., A Contemporary Cuba Reader: Reinventing the Revolution, 50-62. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.

――. Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992. Chapel

407

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

――, and Peter Kornbluh. Back Channel to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations between Washington and Havana. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014.

――. “Inside the Crazy Back-Channel Negotiations That Revolutionized Our Relationship with Cuba.” Mother Jones, August 12, 2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/secret-negotiations-gross- hernandez-kerry-pope-obama-castro-cuba (accessed August 13, 2015).

Leonard, Thomas M., ed. Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010. (E-Book)

León Cotayo, Nicanor. Crimen en Barbados, 5ta ed. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006.

Levine, Barry B. “Miami: The Capital of Latin America.” Wilson Quarterly 9, no. 5 (1985): 47-69.

Levine, Robert M. Secret Missions to Cuba: Fidel Castro, Bernardo Benes, and Cuban Miami. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

López Blanch, Hedelberto. La emigración cubana en Estados Unidos: descorriendo mamparas. Havana: Editorial SI-MAR S.A., 1998.

Lorrin, Thomas. Puerto Rican Citizen: History and Political Identity in Twentieth Century New York City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.

Masud-Piloto, Felix. With Open Arms: Cuban Migration to the United States. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1988.

――. From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-1995. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996.

McKeown, Adam. Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.

McMahon, Robert J. “Toward a Pluralist Vision: The Study of American Foreign Relations as International History and National History.” In Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed., 35-50. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

――, ed. The Cold War in the Third World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

408

McPherson, Alan. Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006.

Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.

Méndez Méndez, José Luis. Los años del terror (1974-1976). Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006.

Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981.

Mohl, Raymond. “Miami: The Ethnic Cauldron.” In Richard M. Bernard and Bradley R. Rice, eds., Sunbelt Cities: Politics and Growth since World War II, 58-99. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983.

Morley, Morris, and Chris McGillion. Unfinished Business: America and Cuba after the Cold War, 1989-2001. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Mujica, René. “The Future of Cuban-US Relations: A Cuban View.” In H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk, eds., Cuban Foreign Policy Confronts a New International Order, 63-76. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991.

Newsom, David D. The Soviet Brigade in Cuba: A Study in Political Diplomacy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.

Ngai, Mae E. “Immigration and Ethnic History.” In Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, eds. American History Now, 358-375. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011.

Olson, James, and Judith Olson. Cuban American: From Trauma to Triumph. New York: Twayne, 1995.

Oñate, Andrea. “The Red Affairs: FMLN-Cuban relations during the Salvadoran Civil War, 1981-1992.” Cold War History 11, no. 2 (May 2011): 133-154.

Parker, Jason C. Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937-1962. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Pastor, Robert A. “The Carter-Castro Years: A Unique Opportunity.” In Soraya M. Castro Mariño and Ronald W. Pruessen, eds., Fifty Years of Revolution: Perspectives on Cuba, the United States, and the World, 237-260. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012.

Paterson, Thomas G. Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

409

Paul, David M., and Rachel A. Paul. Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009.

Paul Friedman, Max. “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations.” Diplomatic History 27 (November 2003): 621-636.

Pavlov, Yuri. The Soviet-Cuban Alliance, 1959-1991. New Brunswick, NY: Transaction, 1993.

Pedraza, Silvia. Political Disaffection in Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Pedraza-Bailey, Silvia. Political and Economic Migrants in America: Cubans and Mexicans. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985.

Pérez, Lisandro. “The Cuban Population of the United States: The Results of the 1980 U.S. Census of Population.” Cuban Studies/ Estudios Cubanos 15, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 1-18.

Pérez, Louis A., Jr. On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture. New York: Ecco, Harper Collins, 1999.

――. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

――. Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008.

――. “The Personal is Political: Animus and Malice in the U.S. Policy toward Cuba, 1959-2009.” In Soraya M. Castro Mariño and Ronald W. Pruessen, eds., Fifty Years of Revolution: Perspectives on Cuba, the United States, and the World, 137-166. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012.

――. The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

Pérez-López, Jorge F. Cuba’s Second Economy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1995.

Portes, Alejandro, and Robert L. Bach. Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the Unites States. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

――, and Alex Stepick. City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

410

Poyo, Gerald E. Cuban Catholics in the United States, 1960-1980: Exile and Integration. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.

Prieto, Yolando. The Cubans of Union City: Immigrants and Exiles in a New Jersey Community. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2009.

Rabe, Stephen G. The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

――.“U.S. Relations with Latin America, 1961 to the Present: A Historiographical Review.” In Robert D. Schulzinger, ed., A Companion to American Foreign Relations, 387-403. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003.

Ramírez Cañedo, Elier, y Esteban Morales Domínguez. De la confrontación a los intentos de “normalización”: La política de los Estados Unidos hacia Cuba. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2011.

――. De la confrontación a los intentos de “normalización”: La política de los Estados Unidos hacia Cuba. 2da edición ampliada. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2014.

Rivera, Mario Antonio. Decision and Structure: U.S. Refugee Policy in the Mariel Crisis. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991.

Rivero Collado, Carlos. Los sobrinos del Tío Sam. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1976.

Robbins, Carla Anne. “Dateline Washington: Cuban-American Clout.” Foreign Policy (Fall 1992): 162-182.

Rytz, Henriette M. Ethnic Interest Groups in US Foreign Policy-Making: A Cuban- American Story of Success and Failure. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Sánchez-Parodi, Ramón. Cuba-USA: diez tiempos de una relación. México, DF: Ocean Sur, 2011.

――. “The Reagan-Castro Years: The New Right and Its Anti-Cuban Obsession.” In Soraya M. Castro Mariño and Ronald W. Pruessen, eds., Fifty Years of Revolution: Perspectives on Cuba, the United States, and the World, 261-278. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012.

Schoultz, Lars. That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.

Scott, James M. Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign

411

Policy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.

Shain, Yossi. “Multicultural Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy 95, no. 100 (1995): 69-87.

Siegel, James C. Moscow-Miami Dialogue: The Mini-Summit. Occasional paper series III, no. 4. Miami, FL: University of Miami, Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, 1990.

Small, Melvin. Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Smith, Tony. Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Stepick, Alex, Guillermo Grenier, Max Castro, and Marvin Dunn. This Land Is Our Land: Immigrant and Power in Miami. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Suárez Feliú, Nestor. El Rescate de una Nación. Miami, FL: Fundación Nacional Cubano Americana, 1997.

Suri, Jeremi. Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Sweig, Julia A. Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.

Szapocznik, José, Raquel E. Cohen, and Roberto E. Hernandez, eds. Coping with Adolescent Refugees: The Mariel Boatlift. New York: Praeger, 1985.

Szulc, Tad. Fidel: A Critical Portrait. New York: William Morrow, 1986.

Taffet, Jeffrey F. Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America. New York: Routledge, 2007.

Talleda, Miguel L. Alpha 66 y su histórica tarea. Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 1995.

Torres, María de los Angeles. In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the Unites States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.

Valdés-Dapena Vivanco, Jacinto. Pirates en el éter: la guerra radial contra Cuba. 1959- 1999. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2006.

Vargas Llosa, Álvaro. El exilio indomable: historia de la disidencia cubana en el destierro. Madrid: Espasa, 1998. 412

Walsh, Daniel C. An Air War with Cuba: The United States Radio Campaign against Castro. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2012.

Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Ziegler, Melanie M. U.S.-Cuban Cooperation: Past, Present, and Future. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007.

413