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The State of Play US Space Systems Competitiveness

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The State of Play US Space Systems Competitiveness Prices, Productivity, and Other Measures of Launchers & Spacecraft Edgar Zapata NASA Kennedy Space Center Presentation to the Future In-Space Operations (FISO) Seminar October 11, 2017 Purpose • Collect space systems cost and related data (flight rate, payload, etc.) over time • Gathers only public data • Non-recurring and recurring • Minimal data processing • A few adjustments, mostly for apples to apples comparisons • Inflation to current year dollars • Same orbit, etc. • Graph, visualize, add context • Focus on US space systems competitiveness • Keep fresh – update as data arises, launches occur, etc. • Keep fresh – focus on recent data, indicative of the future 2 Caveats & Terminology • The “price” to a customer is the “cost” to the customer (NASA, DoD, NRO, private sector, etc.) • Other government agency “costs” are personnel, government management, etc. • Occasional “asterisks”– included or not • Uncertainties are inevitable • Anecdotal evidence some launch pricing actually higher than publicly announced (Russia/Proton, etc.) • Some public data is processed more – different contracts, phases, multiple partners, not yet final, age of the data, etc. (Apollo, Commercial Crew, SLS, Orion, etc.) 3 Source Data Source data for this report is available in the NASA Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Model Contact [email protected] The NASA Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Model 12/7/2016 Updates NASA Scenarios Model Launch System for Human Exploration & Operations Life Cycle Cost Model Budgets vs. Life Cycle Costs Data 4 From “508_CFO_presentation.pdf” March 2014 As of 7/5/2017 10/1/17> US Commercial Crew dates http://spaceref.biz/agencies/commercial-crew- 4/14/15> SpaceX-13> 14 US Major flight-dates-delayed-to-2018.html Launches in 2017 6/28/15> SpaceX-14> (failed) st ULA 4/08/16> SpaceX-15> 1 SLS Demo Flight TBD. 3 Atlas (2 DoD, 0 NASA, 1 ISS cargo, 2019 0 commercial, 0 NOAA) 10/28/14> Orb ATK-9> SpaceX-16> https://spaceflightnow.com/2017/04/28/nasa- 1 Delta IV (1 DoD) Antares (failed) TBD confirms-first-flight-of-space-launch-system-will- 0 Delta II (0 NASA) Orb ATK-10> SpaceX-17> 12/06/2015 (Cyg./Atlas)> slip-to-2019/ TBD SpaceX 10/17/16> 7/18/16> ? > SpaceX-18> 10 Falcon 9 (7 commercial, 2 ISS Antares RTF TBD “The uncrewed Orion will travel into cargo, 0 NASA, 1 DoD) 5/05/15> Or March ‘18? 2/19/17> ? > SpaceX-19> Distant Retrograde Orbit, breaking the Landing Success / Attempts Dragon LA Test https://spaceflightn TBD % Sea / %Land / %Average Nov. ‘17> distance record reached by the most ow.com/launch- 6/3/17> ? > SpaceX-20> 62% / 100% / 72% SpaceX remote Apollo spacecraft, and then schedule/ TBD 1/31/15 Peg. XL> 30,000 miles farther out (275,000 total Orbital Sciences 8/10/17 > Delta II> 12/15/16 0 Antares miles). The mission will last 22 days 12/5/14 Delta 3/12/15> 3/23/16> Rideshare > and will test system readiness for Heavy> Atlas Laser (Atlas) TBD future crewed operations.” = Next 4/18/17> Comm. 4/18/14> Was aboard 6/15/17> -as of 4/9/2016 Green = Planned (Atlas) rideshare SpaceX-8> Peg. XL http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/systems/ Black = Actual May ‘18> w. TBD 9/20/14> TBD SpaceX +Crew F 9> commercial sat. 7/2/14> June ‘18> st 1/10/15> Mounts> 1 Falcon Heavy Delta II Boeing onto ISS Delta IV-H Aug. ‘18> 1/9/14> ? Aboard +Crew Delta II> 2018 Flight Demo TBD SpaceX-? Boeing Antares Nov. 2017 Mid 2017? 7/13/14> Sub-orb.?> Atlas 401> Atlas V> Asteroid Antares 2/11/15 > May ’18 9/8/16 sample 1/23/14 Atlas> Falc. 9/AF (Mars) 2017 Germany return 02/17/16 (Japan) 11/18/13 Atlas> 1/17/16> Delta II> Falc. 9 2018 ESA Late ‘17 2/28/14 HII-A> 5 11/19/16 Atlas> TBD> Atlas> Mar. ‘18 The NASA Budget – Purchase Power Drop Since 2003 = 9% E. Zapata NASA 05/02/2017 Cross Agency Support, Education & IG (+2010 fwd, $20,000 Construction & Environmental) Actual NASA budget increases = 1.95% Aeronautics per year average (compound) since 2003 $18,000 Science Space Flight Support (incl. SCaN, LSP, et al) $16,000 ISS R&D $14,000 ISS (Construction thru 2011, then Ops) Science Cx ('07-'10), then SLS & Orion & Grd.Sys. ('11 Fwd) $12,000 Exploration R&D (was Shuttle Upgrades, SLI, BioSci, HSRT...) $10,000 Space Technology $8,000 US Commercial Crew for ISS Cx Budget Shift Begins ISS Crew (Soyuz) & Cargo (Commercial) Before 2003 $6,000 > Reusable Launch Diverse R&D Shuttle > Hypersonics Orion & SLS Development > SLI, NGLT, etc. $4,000 +Other R&D Earmarks > Technology $Millions NASA Budget (Nominal Dollars) $Millions Budget NASA > + Shuttle Upgrades Shuttle Rescissions (2012a/small) $2,000 Production & Ops 2003 Columbia <-- US Commercial Crew ISS - Boeing & SpaceX Spacecraft Rescissions (2012b/small) Return $- To Flight Purchase Power in 2003 $, per NASA Inf. Index 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 <-- US Commercial Cargo ISS - Orbital ATK & SpaceX Launchers Last Shuttle Decision: End Shuttle post-ISS & Dragon & Cygnus Spacecraft & ISS Crew Soyuz --> Year Flight 6 Recent Launch Prices as $/kg of Payload (2017$) US Medium Launch + Scout, Shuttle, SLS, Falcon Heavy Scout-ref. See Notes below Pegasus XL Shuttle-ref. (cargo SLS-ref. only) ULA DoD (2 flts / year, Atlas V 401 Only +% of grd NASA Sci. ops, no EUS) Minotaur 1 Antares NASA ISS Cargo Atlas V 401 Private Sector Delta IV Heavy Atlas V 541 NASA Sci. NRO+ELC Atlas V 551 Private Sector Falcon 9 DoD Falcon 9 NASA LSP Falcon 9 NASA ISS Cargo Falcon Heavy Falcon 9 Private Sector Private Sector Customer • The line is a power curve fit ONLY to the points indicated with-> • For NASA and DoD, data are prices to the government, that is procurement costs only, excluding government management, personnel and related. • For the Space Shuttle, to give a more consistent CARGO comparison, total recurring costs from life cycle cost data (1983-2013) were adjusted to remove crew at a Soyuz price rate, NASA management (civil service) and related were removed to leave procurement dollars only, and R&D years 1981-1982 were excluded as non- 7 operational. Similarly, for SLS the NASA management (personnel) and related costs are also excluded, but unlike Shuttle, ground ops are excluded. Recent Launch Prices as $/kg of Payload (2017$) US Medium Launch - NO Scout, Shuttle, SLS Pegasus XL ULA DoD Atlas V 401 Only NASA Sci. Minotaur 1 Antares NASA ISS Cargo Atlas V 401 Private Sector Delta IV Heavy Atlas V 541 NASA Sci. NRO+ELC Atlas V 551 Private Sector Falcon 9 DoD Falcon 9 NASA LSP Falcon 9 NASA ISS Cargo Falcon Heavy Falcon 9 Private Sector Private Sector Customer 8 Recent Launch Prices as $/kg of Payload (2017$) With Available US Small Launch / Services NanoRacks as of 12/7/2015 SpaceFlight Services as of 12/7/2015 Pegasus XL See Backup slides for data sources ULA DoD Atlas V 401 Only NanoRacks SpaceX NASA Sci. 1U PPOD Spaceflight Minotaur 1 Services Antares NASA ISS Cargo SpaceX Atlas V 401 Private Sector Delta IV ESPA Heavy NanoRacks Atlas V 541 NASA Sci. NRO+ELC 50kg Atlas V 551 Private Sector Falcon 9 DoD Falcon 9 NASA LSP Falcon 9 NASA ISS Cargo Falcon Heavy Falcon 9 Private Sector Private Sector Customer 9 Recent Launch Prices as $/kg of Payload (2017$) With Available US Small Launch / Services + In Development Rocket NanoRacks as of 12/7/2015 VG Launcher Gen-Orbit Labs One SpaceFlight Services as of 12/7/2015 Pegasus XL Virgin Galactic Launcher One as of 9/14/2015 ULA DoD Atlas V 401 Only NanoRacks SpaceX NASA Sci. Rocket Labs as of 8/10/2015 1U PPOD Spaceflight Minotaur 1 Services Generation Orbit as of Antares NASA ISS Cargo 6/5/2015 SpaceX Atlas V 401 Private Sector Delta IV ESPA Heavy See Backup slides for data NanoRacks Atlas V 541 NASA Sci. NRO+ELC sources 50kg Atlas V 551 Private Sector Falcon 9 DoD Falcon 9 NASA LSP Falcon 9 NASA ISS Cargo Falcon Heavy Falcon 9 Private Sector Private Sector Customer 10 Recent Launch Prices vs. Payload Capability (2017$) 16. Delta IV 28,790 kg $389.1M ULA Avg. w. ELC DoD Only 6. Delta IV 28,790 kg Incl. ELC $ RED = NASA 11. Antares +Cygnus Spacecraft To High/ISS Orbit 7. Atlas V 541 17,443 kg Blue = DoD 3. Atlas V 401 9,797 kg Prices$ 10. Falcon 9 +Dragon Spacecraft 13. Ariane 5 $187M Black = 17. Atlas 401 & 551 21,000 kg To High/ISS Orbit Private Sector Private / 15. Ariane 6-Proposed $95M @~LEO Cap. non Gov’t 2. Antares 4,900 kg Falcon 9 22,800kg 9A. Falcon Heavy 12. Proton M $68M 4. DoD Private Sector 1. Pegasus XL 22,000 kg 8A. NASA LSP/Sci. Customer 443 kg 14. Soyuz 2.1a $84M 8B. NASA ISS 63,800kg 5. Minotaur 1 8,200 kg 9B. Private Sector Customer 580 kg Maximum Payload (kg) to Low Earth Orbit (200km, 28.5 circ.) - except as noted 1. NASA price contracted for one 2017 launch (ICON) 10. Price to NASA; higher orbit, plus includes providing the Dragon spacecraft for carrying / 2. NASA price contracted for block of launches as a service (ISS cargo, derived price, minus Cygnus Spacecraft) placing the customers cargo (pressurized, unpressurized, return, etc.) 3. NASA price contracted in 2010, launched in 2013 (MAVEN) 11. Price to NASA; higher orbit, plus includes providing the Cygnus spacecraft for carrying / 4.
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