G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) been less personal contact between Bradley and Joachim than might have than Joachim been lesspersonalcontactbetweenBradleyand The BertrandRussellResearchCentre,McMasterU. russell: T to Joachim. of internal relations. The paper makes useofRussell’srecentlydiscovered letters against Joachim’s coherencetheoryoftruth, in 1920.Thephilosophicalpartattemp Joachim’s inaugurallectureas of review Joachim, fromRussell’sdaysasanunde philosophical interactionswiththeBrit paperispartlybiographicalandphilosophical.IttracesRussell’s The the windows if his students started tocritic the studentsstarted windows his if rooms oppositeBradley’s. College, Bradley’sown college at Oxford,whereapparentlyheoccupied phy. Hespentmuchofhisphilosop 1935. appointment totheWykeham Chair of Logic, ence, Oxford,July1997.In 1919 Joachim mo Rabin, “HaroldHenry Joachim (1868–1938)”, Academy British Proceedings ofthe on Joachim areinformation H. 1

Cf . RusselltoAlysRussell,22 Oct. 1895 ( he Britishneo-Hegelianphilosop respected as one of the leadingexponentsofBradley’sphiloso- respected asoneof well was notnowwidelyremembered, butinhisdayhe is the JournalofBertrandRussellStudie BERTRAND RUSSELLAND Bertrand RussellResearchCentre/McMasterU. HAROLD JOACHIM Hamilton, ngrif Nicholas Grif 1 Despite this proximity there seems tohave Despitethisproximitythereseems y 24(1938):396–422,andan unpublished paper by Paul W. i. { f w y B. Joseph,“HaroldHenryJoachim,1868–1938”, { in prologue on @ , Canada , Canada mcmaster.ca ize Bradley.Thebest WykehamProfessorofLogicatOxford ts to evaluate Russell’smainargument to ts ish neo-Hegelianphilosopher,Harold n.s.27(winter2007–08):220–44 s hical career hical (1897–1919) at Merton SLBR ved toNewCollegeinconsequenceofhis rgraduate in thergraduate 1890stohis scathing in presented at the Anglo- Confer- theAnglo-Idealism presented at a positionhehelduntilhisretirementin that it isequivalenttothedoctrine that her Harold Joachim(1868–1938) Harold her z 1: 171). It is said that he used to shut to used he that said is It 171). 1: l { f 8 s { in 4 m 2 sources ofbiographical issn 0036-01631 G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) before Joachim’s death. published renowned fortheircarefulness. R. in the area of logic, andhisbest-knownbook, logic, of in thearea weremainly that collection.HiscontributionstoBradleian for completingthefamous to his former Harvard professor, J. to hisformerHarvardprofessor, years after his death, he is mainly known as the translator of Aristotle’s of years afterhisdeath,heismainlyknownasthetranslator him noticed,becameareasonforhisbeingoverlooked. Now, nearly 70 reputation asBradley’sleadingacolyte,whichinitiallyhadservedto get gave atOxford over manythe meticulouslywrittenoutlecturecourseshe published andbasedon years. With the passage of time, Joachim’s JNT 1999). PaulRabin, cluded T. didnoteaching,whichmeantthatwhenstudents,whoin- himself ley been expected,forJoachimwasdi Bradley’s death. Collected WorksofF. Descartes’ (1940), astudy ofAristotle’s (1901), acommentaryonSpinoza’s studyofSpinoza’s important works ofotherphilosophers:an workswerescholarlystudiesofspeci ham professor,Joachim’smain nistic. this appointmentcouldaccuratelybedescribedasanachro- even in1919 the WykehamChairofLogicinOxford,though to appointed be area to Joachimwaseminentenoughinthis position. elaboration ofBradley’s thought ofasan often was , which defendedacoherencetheoryof 1898–1922 Bradley’s posthumouslypublished theyusuallylearntitfromJoachim.Joachimedited ley’s philosophy “most carefulstudiesof pp. 9–10). y G. Collingwood, whose collaboration with G. Collingwood,whosecollaboration 5 4 3 2 With theexceptionof With In1951Stuart Hampshire cited Joachim’s Eliot’sletterscontainmuch information ab Someletters(allbutonefromBradle Oxford: Clarendon P., 1906. The second ed second The P.,1906. Oxford:Clarendon . The second edition was seenthroughth was . Thesecondedition , ed. Valerie Eliot (NewYork:Ha Eliot , ed.Valerie y S. Eliot Logical Studies Rules for the Direction oftheMind the Rules for op y H. Bradley 3 . and BrandBlanshard,wenttoOxford to learn Brad- cit Spinoza inEnglish” ( ., mentionsreportsthatJoachim’ (1948), the latter based on hislecturesasWyke- based (1948),thelatter , Vols. 4 and 5, ed. Carol A. Keene (Bristol: Thoemmes, A.Keene(Bristol: 5,ed.Carol , Vols.4and The NatureofTruth W nal essay onrelationswhichwasincludedin nal Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim Nicomachean y H. Woods. Woods. H. U 5 Most of these were posthumously Mostofthese dent andBradley overbearing. Collected Essays y) have survived and are publishedin are and y) havesurvived rcourt BraceJovanovich,1988). Tractatus de IntellectusEmendatione Spinoza two booksonSpinozaasofthethree out Joachim’s classes, classes, out Joachim’s e presswithsome Joachimontheprojectbeganshortly Cf ition (1939)isusedhereandcitedas . [Harmondsworth:Penguin,1951], The LettersofT. (1957);workswhichwere andtheposthumously s lettersweredestroyedafter The NatureofTruth (1951)andastudyof andwasresponsible minor alterationsby especially hisletters y S. Eliot 2 , Vol.1: Brad- Ethics 221 The W , c 4 G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) for bringingthistomyattention. Williams’ translationintheClarendonAristo married Joachim’ssister,Gertrude. inSurreyand1891 Haslemere in neighbour oftheJoachimfamily forRussell’sfavouriteuncle,Rollo,was a philosophical relationship, he calledthemonisticconceptionoftruth. somewhat ironically,astheimmediateobjectofRussell’sattackonwhat on StudyingPhilosophy”, 23 September1892.ItispublishedinNicholasGri De generationeetcorruptione grif nicholas 222 hard” andBosanquet’s as “Good, butstill harder”. mother. genstein, forthesisterof on 1942, “startedmeonphilosophy”. a substantial readinglist, a substantial adviceaboutphilosop Joachim’s asked Russell wasabouttoenterthe September 1892,as mentor asfarphilosophywasconcerned,forin something ofa as him older thanRussell,Russellevidentlyregarded could switchtophilosophy.AlthoughJoachimwasonlyfouryears he looking forwardtothedaywhen eagerly mathematics atCambridgeand visitinghisuncle.In1891Russellwasunhappilystudying was Russell he andRussellhadplentyofopportunitytomeetwhen Haslemere where spent hissummersat 1907, andatleastuntilthattimeheseemstohave mathematical work.Russell’sphilosophicalreadingbrokeo Ward, his director of studies,stoppedhimbecausehewasneglecting his booksonthelist,butdidnotgetfarbeforeJames the read started to quet’s Bradley’s Russell recalled the list, but remembered onlytwobooksonit:“onewas 347–65. Detailsofhisphilosophicalreadin of themathematicaltripos. 1893 and did notresumeuntilJuly,immediately after the examinations Russell had a personal connection with Joachim which predated their predated which Joachim with had apersonalconnection Russell 11 10 9 8 7 6 Joachim’sletterisundated,butfrominte Russell to Brand Blanshard, 16 May 1942, 16May Blanshard, RusselltoBrand th Walsh pointedouttome that Michael This work stood the test of time well, Thisworkstoodthetestoftime Russellatthistimekeptalistofth

MPD Logic , p. 37. In fact,JoachimrecommendedBradley’s 37. p. , Logic which,hesaid,wasbetterbutharder.” z which,hesaid,was good but hard; the other wasBosan- Russell { f e of Wittgenstein’s great-grandfathers was Joachim’s grand- Joachim’s was great-grandfathers e of Wittgenstein’s { in 8 which,asRusselltoldBrandBlanshardin z 11 n.s.7(1987):119–23. in the OxfordtranslationofAristotle, in W nal year of his mathematicalstudies,he nal yearof eShall IRead?”, books he read,“What being superseded only in the1980s by supersededonlyin C. being 7 g for1892–93canbefoundatpp.350–2. Joachim himself didnotmarryuntil 9 In tle Series. I’m grateful to DavidHitchcock tle Series.I’mgrateful hical reading. Joachim replied with replied Joachim hical reading. is madeRussellarelativeofLudwigWitt- rnal evidence must have musthave evidence been rnal on written ra rec.acq. U My PhilosophicalDevelopment n, “Joachim’s Early AdvicetoRussell “Joachim’s n, Logic 235. as “First rate 10 Russellquickly T inJanuary z — Papers z but very 6 and, y J. y 1: F. G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) sympathetic toRussell. Spinoza’ that Joachim’sinterpretationof Russell Spinozistic EthicsofBertrand reader” ( technical the for ... “admirabl[e] as exegesis Joachim’s onRusselldescribed book. Later brief marginalcomments,butnothingtoin emotion ofahero-worshipper” ( true “the Joachim inOxfordandsawBradley’snameonhisdoorwith venerationofBradley:in1895hestayedwith Joachim’s shared Russell (1996): 131–60 (cited as “RJC (cited (1996): 131–60 Correspondence betweenBertrand of a hero-worshipper, despite alltheirphilosophicaldi of ahero-worshipper, were introduced byG. timeanditwasnotuntil1902thatRussellmethim,whenthey that at afterwards especially in tosupposethatJoachimwas almost anywhere,andthereisno from 13).Butinthe1890sadmirationofBradleycouldbeobtained 12: 2.1 sophical issues.Butquitewhatin years atleast,RussellwouldhavesoughtJoachim’sopiniononphilo- steps inphilosophy,anditseemsquitelikelythatover the next coupleof had littlevisiblee theEthicsofSpinoza of Study andthoughRussellreadhis Aristotle; of any ofhislove not imparttoRussell did study ofphilosophyisnotclear.Heevidently period 1900–06 have survived Nineteenoftheirlettersfromthe 1898. rejected neo-Hegelianismin philosophical di have serious letters wererepliestowhicharenowmissing. extant the of many not meanthatwehavethefullcorrespondence: does numbers oflettersoneachside the in balance the Russell. Unfortunately, Joachim’s letterofSeptember1892 13 12 The storygets more interesting,however,when Russell andJoachim w This correspondence hasbeenpublished This Russell’s copy of it is in the library of library the in is Russell’scopyofit Background Papers z — X 6: 252), but beyond thatleft 6:252),but z was obviously an event of some importance to Russell’s to was obviouslyaneventofsomeimportance uential inimpartingittoRussell. T ect onRussell’sadmirationforSpinoza. 2. y F. Stout,Russellstillfeelingsome of the emotion w ”). Regrettably,theyprovid the debateontruth z (London: Allen and Unwin,1985),pp.121–3,suggests (London: (1901) when it came out, it seems to have T Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim Russell andHaroldJoachim”, Russell erences tonegotiate;thatis,afterRussell z — SLBR X uence Joachim had onRussell’searly Joachim uence s intellectualloveofGodwouldhavebeen z ten from Joachim andninefrom Joachim ten from the University of Yorkandcontains afew by James Connelly and Paul Rabin in “The in Rabin by JamesConnellyandPaul no comment.KennethBlackwell,in dicate Russell’s overall assessment ofthe dicate Russell’soverallassessment z 1: 171).Bradleyhimselfwasaway z — z remembered fondlydecades e virtuallynocommentaryon 13 Allbutthe T erences ( Bradley Studies W 12 rst book, Certainly Papers W W 223 The rst rst 2 A G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) “1903?”, butI’minclinedtothinkthatit,too,isfrom1904. other thingswithG. the nexttwo(dated5 September 1904and13 Stock, ed., maintain he had acoherencetheory;RalphWa Saxena, or Relative?”( Truth andReality extension ofhisownposition.Itisnotablethatinthewhole that BradleywelcomedJoachim’stheoryasaclari assume we theory isidenticalwithit;norshould Joachim’s that assume Candlish, “TheTruthaboutF. that 93–109, pp. P.,1993), ford: Clarendon Coherence TheoryofTrut main critique of Joachim’s theory“ of main critique Bradley’s theory.Russellmayhavecontributedtothisviewbycallinghis that Joachim defended in that Joachimdefended two-year periodwhichspilledoverintothejournals. Truth three of these letters arose out ofJoachim’spublication grif nicholas 224 Russell’s letters are in the Bodleian Library, Library, theBodleian in are Russell’s letters the letters;apromisedsecondarticleofco hard pressedtosaywhatitis. did haveatheoryoftruth,oneis Bradley if that, conceded it isgenerally wrote the main papersin around thetimehe day, develop atheoryoftruth,butratherlateinthe partofthebusinesslogic);otheristhathedid not semantics is atheoryoftruth(andtherewasnoshameinthisbecause had never thoughthere:one(Manser’s)isthatBradley of There aretwoschools win, “The Identity Theory of Truth”, of win, “TheIdentityTheory Russell Archives). The originals ofJoachi Theoriginals Russell Archives). emphasis), whenhereprinted it a few yearslaterin theory. be doubted whether Bradley at this time had a theory oftruthatall. be doubtedwhetherBradleyatthistimehada may it indeed truth, whether Bradleyheldacoherencetheoryof doubtful that therewerenoothers.Itseems tomevery thereby suggesting 17 16 15 14 widespread viewthatthecoherence theoryoftruth Thereisafairly

F. The All options (except ) have Alloptions(exceptpragmatism) Cf in 1906, aneventwhichresultedinintenseexchangeovera in1906, y . Anthony Manser, Manser, . Anthony H. Bradley, Studies intheMetaphysicsofBradley W rst letter(7May1900)isaresponseto Appearance versusReality:NewEssaysonthePhilosophyofF. Papers Essays onTruth and Reality y 3: 222–33, where almostthewholele 3:222–33, E. Moore’sinterpretationofKant z there is only one reference toJoachim. reference thereisonlyone h: aCriticalEvaluation Bradley’s Logic { f { in y Essays onTruthandReality H. Bradley”, The NatureofTruth 16 A corollary of this is that we should not should ofthisisthatwe Acorollary mmentary nevermaterial m’s lettersareintheRussellArchives. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 106. 1983),p.106. (Oxford:Blackwell, The it wasacorrespondencetheory;andStewart it been canvassed: Ha been canvassed: (London:AllenandUnwin,1967),p. 200, z 100(1991):35,holdthatitwasan identity September,bothbyJoachim)dealamong Mind ms engc (Oxford:ClarendonP.,1914),p.107.All lker, “Bradley’sTheoryof Truth”, in G. Monistic Theory of Truth” (my Truth” of Theory Monistic (Beirut: American U.,1961),andS. American (Beirut: Russell’s “Is Position in Time Time in Position Russell’s“Is z 98 (1989): 331–41, and Thomas Bald- 98(1989):331–41,andThomas . Russellhas dated the secondone 20.26 fols.43–101(copiesinthe tter isquotedintheheadnote); wasanelaborationof W cation or evenas an Philosophical Essays ig Khatchadourian, (1914).Eitherway, 14 ized. The originals of y The Natureof H. Bradley 17 Russell,by Essays on (Ox- The y R. 15 , G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) unequivocal identi the book, but Joachim was not aproli not was the book,butJoachim that Russellcitesinhisnotesareid best, andperhapstheonly,neo-Hegeliantheoryavailable. theory contrast, discussedJoachim’s consists incopyingreality.” This is surely damning byfaint praise. forwhichtruth rejected] them well todiscussoncemorethatview[whichbothof that Bradleysaysthereisth su which Ishoulduse”(“RJC”,p.136).Thisishardly the correspondence-theoryisabsurd,butyourargumentsarenotthose Russell commentsonlybrie chapter 1905, the although Russellreferstothemas“t nored. other people’sphilosophy.Itwasa itexhibitedJoachim’sconsiderabletalentsasacommentatoron nally, was thenstilldominantinBritishphilosophy.Fi- which Hegelian camp thatcamefromtheneo- promulgating. Moreover,itwasacritique ofthenewphilosophythatRussellandMoorewere appeared yet had chapter wasthemostextensiveandfundamentalcritiquethat putforwardinthethird)dealtwitherror.Joachim’ssecond the theory fourth (whichsigni the and own coherencetheory; entities”;thethirdputforwardJoachim’s “as aqualityofindependent andMoore’stheoryoftruth Russell’s of of truth;thesecondacritique had fourchapters:the typical theoryoftruth,andnot to attack Mr. Russell”. Russell’s comments,sincehis“primaryobjectwastoexaminea light of he hasnotmade“anysubstantialalterations”inthe notes, however,that commentingonit.(Healso for the prefacetobookthanksRussell published version JoachimreferstoRussell’s notes ( of thepapersJoachimsentRussellwasadraftChapter2,sincein we canbequitecertainthatthesecond case, this In comments. detailed Russell enclosedseveralpagesof at thistime.Onthesecondchapter theory incirculation correspondence the on that hehadasecondpaper it makeshisexhortationtoJoachim proofs,though thepage reading Russellwas stronglysuggeststhat book.This Joachim’s 18 The reasonsforRussell’sinterestarenothardto Joachim hadevidentlysentRussellthe Early inChapter2there W rst oftheirextantlettersonthesubjecttruth.On W cation of the “paper”asadraftof at Joachim’s bookis “interes W rst was a critique ofthecorrespondencetheory a was rst is asimilardisclaimer( Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim entical to the page numbers ofthe page entical tothe “persevere andpublish”ratherodd. X wo papers”inhis reply of 1 February counterattack that could notbeig- could that counterattack y in his letter: “I agree of course that course of agree y inhisletter:“I repeatedly andregardeditasthe W c authoranditseemsunlikely W JNT rst two chapters of his book, his rst twochaptersof ting” andthatJoachim“did... , pp. 32–3). Thepagenumbers W W JNT nd. Joachim’sbook cantly undermined 18 , p.47n.)andin ) Russellsaidin W U rst chapterof W cient fora rst edition of W 225 rst G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) through 1905andmostof1906. This endeavouroccupiedhim he hopedtofreelogicfromtheparadoxes. with which relations and part ofRussell’ssubstitutionaltheoryclasses the world. The reality of propositionsascomplextermswasan essential propositions, considered as complex,mind-independent constituentsof held since1899,truthandfalsehoodwereinde had Russell 5].) Onthe1904theory,anidentitytheoryoftruthwhich May 1906[“RJC”,pp.153– 21 dated it on year. (WehaveJoachim’snotes especially, pp.471–4). 1910). Thebook’snewedition(London:A Monistic Theory of Truth” inRussell’s Parts 2000), p. 184. W. the end. But thishad But the end. his debate with Joachimwasnotthetheoryoftruth he was defending at in thethirdchapterof ter; thethirdattackedJoachim’scoherence theory of truth as presented propositional paradoxes inthesubstitutionaltheoryled Russell to aban- three times: reviewingitin three book waspublished,herespondedtoitpublicly the when reply. Infact, his letter that if Joachim publishedthesecondpaperhewould probably grif nicholas 226 Oxford U.P.,1998). Joachim that the third of his 1904 articlesonMeinong his of Joachim thatthethird thesecond.Inhisletterof1February1905Russelltold equally against objections thatJoachimbroughtagainstthe main siderations internaltohisownphilosophy,and,moreover,allofthe change in Russell’stheoryoftruthcanbecompletelyexplainedbycon- of Truth”, “The Natureof Truth”, in the October 1906 issueof in theOctober1906 “The NatureofTruth”,which,thoughitappeared in defended Russell was this1904theorythat It Truth”. on views my serious attempttostate Society inboth length it atgreater y Ironically, the theory oftruthwhichRusselldefendedatthestart the Ironically, 22 21 20 19 J. Mander, ed., J. Mander, “Meinong’sTheoryof Respectively:“WhatIsTruth?”, For details see Gregory Landini, Fordetails Contrary to what Ralph Walker suggests in “Joachim on the Nature of Truth” in Truth” of Nature the on “Joachim in suggests Walker Ralph what to Contrary 1 and . 19 OnlythesecondofthesewasareplytoJoachim’schap- Proceedings oftheAristotelianSociety Proceedings ii of“OntheNatureTruth”were re Anglo-American Idealism,1865–1927 Anglo-American Mind { f The NatureofTruth ComplexesandAssumptions, nothing { in z n.s. 15 (1906): 528–33 (cited as “RNT”); “On the Nature n.s.15(1906):528–33(citedas“RNT”);“Onthe The IndependentReview Mind Mind todowithJoachim’scriticisms. The IndependentReview Philosophical Essays Russell’s HiddenSubstitutionalTheory 22 , was written probably inMayofthat written was , But, late in 1906, the discoveryof 1906, But,latein llen and Unwin, 1966) is cited hereas cited 1966)is llen andUnwin, and n.s.7(1907):28–49(citedas“ONT”). printed with slight omissions as “The as omissions slight with printed Proceedings oftheAristotelian . (Westport,Ct.:GreenwoodP., z (London:Longmans,Green, W iii W rst theory wouldhold z and commenting on andcommenting 9( ”, nable propertiesof Papers z June, 1906): 349–53; June, 1906): 21 washis“most 4: 461–74 ( (Oxford: 20 The PE 2 cf . ., G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) di advocating and Falsehood”,nowexplicitly eliminated the third section and replaced it (“RJC”, p.159). by furtherre hethought,was“adi relation, correspondence multiple-relation theoryveryneatlysolv the multiple-relationtheory,butdidnotyetde November), Russelltentativelyformulated Moral SciencesClubearlyin to theCambridge written inOctoberthepreviousyear(itwasread whichwaspublishedaroundJuly1907butprobably Truth”, of getting ridofthem.Inthethirdand of was more certainthat propositions had to go than he was of the means advocated inprint theory ofjudgment(aformthecorrespondence of truth), , somethingeventuallyachievedwithhismultiple-relation waystoeliminatepropositionsfromhis for don thetheoryandtolook and ridiculoustravesty”( is worriedhisaccountofitmightbea“crude he prevailing views”that the theoryoftruthheisabouttodiscuss“sodi inChapter2bysayingthat one another.Joachimopenshisdiscussion positions thattheywerehavingagooddealofdi 2.2 vited himto“becomea‘Hegelian’ (namely the di theory on thechange,reiteratedhisobjectiontocorrespondence paper toRussellon21November1906)jumped the on notes sending (in out in “On theNatureofTruth”,weresentin advance to Joachim, who as set proposals, new His defended. Russell wasabandoningthetheoryit Ironically, therefore,justas“TheNature of Truth”wasbeingpublished, ong’s Theory”, theory had always been that it seemed to make false belief belief in nothing ( nothing in belief belief false seemedtomake it beenthat always had theory claims andtryingtorefuteeach of them. Eachphilosopherthoughtthe listing to nonetheless, oftenreduced been raisedinit,is, understanding theneo-Hegeliantraditionhaving T 24 23 By 1905 Russell andJoachimweresofarapartintheirphilosophical Russell By 1905 erent form to the theory sketched in 1906. erent formtothetheorysketchedin w WhenRussellreprinted“On Russellreplied(24November)thathis Strategy X ection. Ithasneverbeenmyreas Papers U culty ofde 4:471–2),butthatthisnolong Principia Mathematica z JNT W ning thecorrespondencerelation),andin- Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim the Nature ofTruth”in Nature the , p. 31); while Russell, though surerof , p.31);whileRussell, ed it.) By contrast,theproblemofde z ” (“RJC”,p.158). multiple interpretationsofJoachim’s by a new paper, “On the Nature of Truth by anewpaper,“OntheNature the multiple-relationtheory,thoughina U main W culty ofdetail,whichmightbesolved on against correspondence-theories” on against nal sectionof“OntheNature er seemed to him compelling. (The er seemedtohimcompelling. z objection tothecorrespondence objection . Atthe end Russell of 1906 T U W erent fromanyofthe culty understanding nitely advocate it. nitely advocate 24 Philosophical Essays cf W . “Mein- ning the W 227 he rst 23 G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) some essentialpartofthe positioncanbededuced. ofakindwhichit inferences only using refuted intheeyesofonewhopreviouslyhe was alsodriventore W andthelesschancetherewasof appeared further apartthetwosides the levelofanalysis, suade theother;indeed,morefundamental reveal anysigni to case made. Suchaproceeding,however,wasveryunlikelyinthis side thefundamentalassumptionsthateach identify Russell wasanxiousto he took to beJoachim’spropensityforbeggingthequestionagainsthim, view thatrelationsmodifytheirterms”(“RJC”,pp. 139–40). Givenwhat places, youproduceyourresultbyunconsciouslyattributingtomethe per se anargumentonadistinctionbetweentruth Joachim’s attempttobase Forexample,apropos Hegelian doctrinesthatheinfactrejected. assumingthatRussellembracedneo- tions arosefromunconsciously each other’smisinterpretations. of timecorrecting as existing,and,inevitably,bothspentagreatdeal not recognize did simply other other wasensnaredinproblemsthatthe grif nicholas 228 Russell notes that even this sort of sort Russell notesthateventhis form orotherofthe I think the onlypossibleargument...,onall such asituation: chapter, thoughtthatRussell’smethod thesis” ( “the inadequacy of the thesis isshownbythefactthatitimpliesanti- pearance andReality the throughout arguments areusedconstantly for philosophers, convincingly thatitismadebyneo-Hegelian all philosophers( by does notimpedearefutationsinceitisanassumptionmade says, sell Rus- this, whatever impliesitsownfalsityisfalse.But that namely tion, nding anydecisiveargumentwhichdidn’tbegthequestion. Russell found this “curious and discouraging” (“RNT”, p. 532). He foundthis“curiousanddiscouraging”(“RNT”,p.532). Russell thoughtthatagreatmanyofJoachim’sobjec- Russell, inparticular, Interestingly, Moore, who madehisownreplytoJoachim’ssecond Interestingly, Moore,who and truth as known, he told Joachim: “Here, as in many other ibid .). W cant areaofagreementfromwhicheithersidecouldper- ibid z reductio adabsurdum ; andasRussellpointsout,intheHegeliandialectic, X .). Whether this is so or not,hecanatleastargue or so .). Whetherthisis ect on what sort of arguments couldbee ect onwhatsortof { f { in reductio admitstobevalid,thefalsehoodof was undulyrestrictive:“Butsure- . That is to say, apositioncanbe . Thatisto ld it if, assuming it to be true, and true, be ld itif,assumingto (“RNT”, p.532;emphasisadded) z argumentrestsonan assump- fundamental W rst partofBradley’s questions,issome T ective in reductio Ap- G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) truth is contained in the proposition ‘no partial truth is quite true’ truth iscontainedintheproposition‘nopartialquite quite truethatnopartialtruthistrue;“unless indeed the whole of partial truth canbequitetrue.Thus,asRussellpoints out, it cannot be 16 (1907):411. “neither Absolutelytruenor to absurdity and after Mr Russell’s amusing essay [“ONT”] it is di is it [“ONT”] to absurdityandafterMrRussell’samusingessay script “OnTruth”:thecoherencetheoryoftruthis“veryeasytoreduce ology inaction.AsRamseywrotehis posthumously published manu- all be erroneous, for they may dependuponthefalseaspectofidealism all beerroneous,fortheymay on topointout,thedeductionswemakefromidealistphilosophymay idealist philosophyitselfcannot be quite true.Butthen,asRussellgoes 25. already forms part of hissystemornot.” ofconvincinghim,whetherthepropositioninquestion a goodchance that, ponent willadmittobetrue,andwithregard which he will also admit ly,” he wrote, “if you can he wrote,“ifyou ly,” sell deploysfour (“ONT”, p.30 for Joachim’s consideration. for Joachim’s mode,proposesthreesuchpropositions World” “Proof oftheExternal to see how anyone can still clingtoit.” can anyone to seehow truth isaspectacularexampleofhis of theory Joachim’s 2.3 W on,arepre- later proaches tophilosophy,whichbecamemoreevident tion. Agoodmanyofthedi into a fender ofthepositiontoconvertproposed to thede- refuted. Withoutthelastcondition,itisobviouslyavailable unlesstheyarealreadyan ositions, pessimistic thanMooreaboutthepossibilityof more gured in this apparently slight divergence in their responsestoJoachim. gured inthisapparentlyslightdivergence (1) On Joachim’s theory only thewholetruthiswhollytrue,sono only (1) OnJoachim’stheory 27 26 25 Whatever the merits of Moore’s approach,Russell’sattackon Moore’s Whatever themeritsof w “Mr.Joachim’s

Tonoavail.Joachiminhisreplydeni The attack On Truth if modus ponens zz itistrue,theviewyouwishtorefutemustbefalse, then you have , ed. Nicholas, Rescher and Ulrich ; PE reductio Nature ofTruth 2 oneanddenythefalsityof the proposition in ques- , p. 133). And thus, in general, the partial truthsof partial the 133). Andthus,ingeneral, arguments: W nd anypropositionwhatever,whichyourop- T 26 Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim erences betweenRussell’sandMoore’sap- z ”, Russell,fairlyclearly,wouldbemuch false” caveat: “A Reply to Mr. Moore”, Mr. to false” caveat:“AReply Mind essential z n.s.16(1907):229. es themall,thoughwithhisubiquitous 27 25 AgainstJoachim’stheoryRus- Moore then, verymuchinhis Moore Majer (Dordrecht:Kluwer,1991),p. z part of the position to be to partoftheposition modus tollens W nding suchprop- reductio argument method- Mind U cult 229 n.s. z ” G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) signi a signi Against this Russell arguesthat,onthisview,itfollows that each part of as contributoryfeaturesinasingleconcretemeaning”( cally involve one another, or reciprocallydetermineoneanother’sbeing signi self-ful rather thanthetrue(“ONT”,p.36 grif nicholas 230 there canbeone If Ia error.... accepted, nojudgmentisanerror;as soon rejection ofthemonistictheo in solely and Now thisviewhasonegreatmerit,name falsity” ( his knowledge...[that]convertsapartial apprehension of thetruthinto ing toJoachimitisthe“erringsubject’scon is quitetrueandnone quite false. What then constituteserror?Accord- (“ONT”, pp.32–3 ofthetheory” pensable forthetheory,cannotbeexplainedbymeans though indis- [which], more usualmeaningoftruthandfalsehood... “a presupposing by only coherence theorycanescapethisproblem The perience”. Moreover,heinsiststhat ni sible. Joachimtriestoblockthisbyimposingstronger conditions on sig- will bepos- no guaranteethatonlyonecoherentsystemofpropositions Bishop Stubbswashangedformu philosopher, rememberingthatall gait episcopal Bishop Stubbsusedtowear involves theothers 31 arbitrary whichwedescribeasthe whole and whichthepart(“ONT”,p. whole.Itisthus the then asconstitutiveofthepartsare is reciprocally involveseachofitsparts.Moreover,thewhole whole the ; W (2) The centralcontentionofJoachim’stheoryisthattruthformsa The (2) (3) Every proposition on the coherence theory is partiallytrue–none Everypropositiononthecoherencetheory (3) (4) Without appealingtothismore PE cant wholes.Asigni W W 2 cance ofwhichisself , p. cant whole, thatis,awholealloftheelements of which “recipro- W W lment, cant whole is ascomplexanyother is cant whole z JNT 134). U , p.162).Russellpouncesonthis: rm, witha“con absolutely and onlyone z ; — PE z and each part is as complexthewhole itself 2 { f , p. self-contained signi W { in cant whole, he says, is “anideallycompleteex- cant whole,hesays, -contained inthesens -contained 136). such experience:or W dent belief in thetruthofmyknowledge”,that rder, thatisnotanerror. W nite truth is only partially true,a nite truthisonly ; PE ly, that it makes error consist wholly consist ly, thatitmakeserror usual meaningof“truth”,we have as itisrejected,everyjudgmentan 2 ry of truth. As long as this theory is theory this longas As ry oftruth. , p. ers, thatisanerror;ifamonistic W 139). cance, thatispostulated;and W only one e required.Foritis dent belief inthetruthof z — (“ONT”, p.32 z since signi { eachreciprocally W cant whole, the cant whole, z JNT ; PE U , p.66). 2 rms that absolute , p. z — 135) z for G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) what Russell meant by external ones. Thediscussionofrelationspervades meant byinternalrelations;andJoachimcouldn’tunderstand Joachim nothing shortof di relations. Itwasonthispoint,however,thattheyhadthegreatest otherstartedtofallintoerrorwashistheoryof the the pointonwhich situation here,however,forRussell absurdity thelineofthoughtwhichleadsto where “is thattheydonotreveal 2.4 its e tosee howthislittlerhapsodycanbecertainofachieving hard it’s But meaning of“truth”. (Oxford: OxfordU. P., 2001), Mass.: (Cambridge, experience none ofthemcitesRussell. Philosophy of The Encyclopedia ments placed bysomethingmoreplausible.Nonetheless,twoofRussell’sargu- Similarly,Joachim’saccountoferrormightbere- a coherentwhole. beequippedwithamoretractablenotionof might theory itself,which upondoctrinesthatarenotstrictlypartofthecoherence to depend example, seems for fence ofthecoherencetheory.Thesecondargument, truth “experience” hastobeunderstoodas“apprehensionof wholes, coherent additional of creation in thesensewhichitisneededtoblock out, But,asRussellgoesontopoint here. work ence” thathastodoallthe to “experi- lished bytheuseofitalics.AsRussellnotes,itisappeal wholes cannotbothbeabsolutelyself-ful which itcannotexplain argument thatthetheory presupposes a non-coherentistnotionoftruth coherence theory. U 28 “[T]he defect of all refutations by “[T]he defectofallrefutations More couldbesaidaboutallfourarguments w

culty understanding eachother:Russellcouldn’tunderstandwhat culty understanding T Internal andexternalrelations Cf z ” (“ONT”,p.35 ect z — ., for example, Richard L. Kirkham, L.Kirkham, Richard ., forexample, z — z the argumentfromapluralityofsigni z — W z nothing has actually been donetoshowthattwodistinct nothing hasactually rst goesastray”( z a aif hspsuae ( can satisfythis postulate. absolute mit 28 P.,1992),pp. 107–9; Michael Williams, ; z PE individuality z — pp. 118–23; Alan R. White, “C pp.118–23;AlanR.White, 2 , ed.PaulEdwards(NewYork , p. z now constitutethestandardobjectionsto 138), which brings us back to themoreusual back 138), whichbringsus Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim On Truth z — reductio ad absurdum and Joachim were each agreed that and Joachimwereeachagreed z nothing shortof Theories ofTruth: aCriticalIntroduction , p. 25). This was hardly the hardly , p.25).Thiswas W lled: a conclusion isnotestab- z — oherence TheoryofTruth”, W z : Macmillan,1967),2:131; some of it even in de- some ofiteven cant wholesandthe the Problems ofKnowledge z completelywhole z ”, Ramseysaid, zz JNT , pp.78–9) 231 G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) Mind “ in truth of thetwokinds discusses 79–83). Joachim ( acknowledges Joachim as recognition-transcendent, clearly is truth whole the “ideally complete which wealwaysdeal.The (“RJC”, p.154). only reply:“Idespairofmakingyouseemypointaboutrelations” after morethanayear’sintensediscussion,Joachimcould May 1906, February 1905(“RJC”,p.136).Andon21 1 of letter told Joachiminhis understand thesenseinwhichIholdthatrelationsareexternal”,Russell their entireinteractionthrough1905and1906.“Idonotthinkyouquite grif nicholas 232 he heldanuntenable(infact,incoherent)theoryofrelations. thefactthat in truth of each sidefoundthebasisforother’stheory debate, however, Russell–Joachim the properly speaking,truthatall.In not, was that aconceptoftruthwasnotrecognition-transcendent that theideaofrecognition-transcendenttruthwasincoherent;Russell, modern debatesintruth theory on the same issue:Joachimmaintained as Russell andJoachim’sdebatefollowsverymuchthesamepattern ( makesnodi tal assumptionthat“experiencing makes nodi assuchornot nition-transcendent, thenwhetheratruthisrecognized fundamentaldi most theory oftruthitselfwent,thiswastheir theory, bycontrast,itwasnotrecognition-transcendent. Joachim’s that truthontheirtheorywasrecognition-transcendent; is terms, property of“independententities”.Whatthismeant,inmodern claimthatRussellandMooremadetrutha here istonoticeJoachim’s help totryandidentifythegeneralissuesinvolvedhere.Thekey will could bederivedfromhistheoryofrelations.Beforewegettodetailsit claimedthattheother’stheoryoftruth each Russell (“RNT”,p.37) ( and una also leavesthemcompletelyuntouched and its characterissuchthatitholdstherelated factors together, and yet inanexperience; ‘object’ relation whichobtainsbetween‘subject’and apprehensionofasensiblequality”,is“peculiar,distinctive sentient of them form “nogenuinewhole,butamereexternaladjustment.The of themform z z JNT JNT 29 both Joachim( Despite thismutualincomprehension, Joachim led thecharge.Ine Joachim At least this is true of the partial whol partial Atleastthisistrueofthe z n.s. 14 (1905): 1–14. n.s.14(1905): , pp. 39, 55). On Russell’s theory, heclaimed,sensation,“the , pp.39,55).OnRussell’stheory, , p. 34). Onthisview, , p.34). he continued, the facts and the experiencing T erence to it. Russell’s theory was built uponthefundamen- was theory erence toit.Russell’s { f { in T ect, hearguedthatiftruthisrecog- experience”whichforJoachimconstitutes es whichconstitutethepartialtruthswith z ‘Absolute’ and‘Relative’Truth’’, T T ected bytheunion” erence tothefacts” z JNT 29 As far as the , p.39)and T z JNT erence. , pp. G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) inconvenient fortheoryofknowledgeareconvenientor whether itsconsequences on, “is notfundamental;onemustdecideone’slogic without considering think perceptionalways trustworthy.” The theoryofperception,hewent force” in the “accusation ofanewoccasionalism”,“exceptthatIdonot more thantheunderlyingissues. haschangedmuch Joachim’s daytothis,thelanguageofdispute a conceptoftruthleavesnoe there isnogroundforthinkingweever have reliable access to it, sosuch that iftruthisrecognition-transcendentthen ern anti-realistswhoclaim pendent” ( it was,viz.absolutelyinitselfandinde- what precisely tains, leaveseach maybe,related;buttherelationwhen,oras,itob- or are, two factors (“RNT”, p.529). (“RNT”, form “as much a genuine whole as anythat realism/anti-realism dispute. launched whichlinksacceptanceorrejectio year 30 by 20, 21,whereheanticipates nized, or of the time atwhichitwasrecognized( ofthewayinwhichitcametoberecog- dividual’s recognitionofitor possible. Hecouldadmitthattruthwasindependentofaparticularin- Truth theory ofknowledge. upon truth,thenhowonedecides one’s logicwill be constrainedbyone’s depends logic and If truthisnotindependentofknowledge, knowledge. toac- seems course, begsthequestion,asRussell,byhislastremark, in itself Joachim alleged.Ifqualitieslike without the cidence” andmadeRussell’sphilosophylike “an extreme Occasionalism, miraculous “a not others,whentheywerepresentbecame related toamind,asRussellclaimed,thefactthat I perceivedthem,and nothing” ( a merenamefor is and knowledge, ... foritremainsbeyondallandany p. 44). Russell’s replyinhisnotesonJoachim’sdraftacknowledged“some 32 31 30 ForcriticismofthesesortsargumentsseeKhatchadourian, ApointwhichRussellrecognizedyearslaterin Onthisremark,Russellcommentedthat , pp.43–6,47–50. 31 z , truthneitherknown nor recognized, may beanythingyouplease This is essentially the so-called “access objection”urgedbymod- Thisisessentiallytheso-called z JNT z JNT Deus exmachina z — , p. 51). Knowledge on such a theory became miraculous, , p.51).Knowledgeonsuchatheory , p.41). z at least, so it seems to me” (“RJC”,p.138).This,of to at least,soitseems 32 30 As for the view that “experiencing makesno Asfortheviewthat Joachimwas unable to conceive how this was to renderOccasionalismplausible”( Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim T ective defence against scepticism. From ective defenceagainstscepticism. greenness s thedebateDummettissupposedtohave this theory[i.e.Russell’stheory]willadmit” n of the law of excluded middle to the n ofthelawexcludedmiddle the facts and the experiencing ofthem theexperiencing and the facts Inquiry intoMeaningandTruth wereentitiesonlyexternally z JNT , p.21),but“[t]ruth Coherence Theoryof Coherence de facto coin- z JNT , chs. 233 , G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) sophistically, hecouldarguethat,giventhat did, that“ correct”tosay,ashesometimes “strictly acknowledged thatitwasnot (“RJC”, p.136).Buthowshouldthisbeunderstood?Russell terms” doctrine that “relationsdonotmodifytheir general more case ofhis di grif nicholas 234 relation he foundtherewasnowaythatthis could be of the point).adox Embracing, as he didat encyclopedia ofthesciencesarosefrom hefoundas for manyoftheproblems importance toRussellafewyearsearlieras (Oxford: ClarendonP.,1922;1stedn.1883), could begrounded( ha they hold betweensimpletermsbecause indeed be changed if they did not have it, for theywouldnotbe for it, nothave theydid bechangedif indeed the suppositionthatthey point. Since R identical with entities whichdo it werenotdeniedbyall who are in any way a relation 136–7). maintain that,when Joachim didnotwishtodenyatautology.Whathewanteddowas p. 136). misgivings) went along with,namely,thatinorderfor sometimes adoptedadi also somethingelse”( them, evenifitbe atleastquali relation “every relatedat all.AccordingtoJoachim were in imaginingthattheterms casionalism objectionindicates,withoutsuchachangehehaddi oc- his As more thanmerelythefactthattheynowhadrelation. b involve oneanother”( whole suchthatthedeterminatenaturesofitsconstituentsreciprocally z it had to enter into their “natures”, andthat “natures”, ithadtoenterintotheir y T ” for“[i]f 34 33 In theseterms,itisdi erence to thefacts”,Russellpointedoutthatthiswasjustaspecial to erence Russell, rather curiously, usestheparado Russell,rathercuriously, One consequence of this, which Joachim ex Joachim which ofthis, Oneconsequence 33 R R Russell’s preferredstatementofhispositionwas:“Whenthe Russell’s zz z a holds.” “I should havesupposedthisatautology,”hesays,“if holdsbetween a z z and and a a z just in case it shares all all shares it case justin z and b b z z dohavetherelation JNT z would be unchanged if they did not have the relation the have wouldbeunchangediftheydidnot not b z havetherelation do not” (“RJC”,p.137; , pp.11–12,43). havetherelation a { f z and { z in JNT T erent formulation, which Russell (withsome erent formulation,which U a z and cult to get at the issue that dividedthem. that cult togetattheissue b , p. 42). W z wererelated by es itsterms,andissofaranadjectiveof a b z Cf ’s properties,includingrelationalones. he attemptedtoconstructhisneo-Hegelian R z , thenitisbetween , then“all consequenc he fought hiswayclearofneo-Hegelianism, he d nocomplexnaturesinwhichtherelation need torelatesimple . also Bradley’s 1: 289n. The point hadbeenofconsiderable The 289n. 1: the time,doctrineofinternalrelations, done.Thiswasthepivotalpointonwhich a 34 z and R xes ofmaterialimpli Thetwoformulationsarenot R , itisofcourse obvious that any cf plicitly draws,is th arenot . also “ONT”, p. 41; b z JNT z dohavethe relation U R , pp.11–12).Buthealso liated to Hegel”(“RJC”, , theywerechangedby Principles ofLogic a a z and z and elements (e.g.thepar- es followequallyfrom a R a b z cation tomakehis z and at relationscannot b and z torelate z must form “a z ” (“RJC”,pp. PE R 2 b , p.143).Less b , theywould . An item is z that the that , 2ndedn. U a culty and G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) adjectives (i.e.intrinsicproperties)oftheterm nature. So it would seem that the nature of a termexcept infollowinganopponent”(“RJC”,p.137). must include only it noted he clear aboutit,though Joachim hetriedtoget to notes lastic essence”(“RNT”,p.530).Inhis thing. Russellsaidderisivelythatitseemedtobe“the ghost of the scho- ofa and thesecondraisesunansweredquestionsabout“nature” not obviouslyidenticaleither), are they obviously incompatible(though on which his rejectionofneo- which on there arenorelations(NR).Now,itiseasytoshowthatNRimplies neo-Hegelian philosophy:thatthereisonlyonething () and that Russell claims that IR entailstwoimportantthesescharacteristicof much Idealist Apprenticeship rocally involve”oneanother.Whatcouldthismean?If they must form a wholethenaturesofconstituentswhich“recip- about “reciprocal involvement”. Hispositionisthatif says he what is relations now aboutJoachim’ssecondaccountofinternal return). Butwhatispuzzling will we which to point maybe onlysome(a whole, thentheconstituentsofthatwholeare whole, lation between relation betweenthenaturesof soundslikearelation: surely It but whatisreciprocalinvolvement? natures of of a wholethenaturesofwhose constituents (i.e. the natures of the natures 2.5 what onearthcoulditbe? on anin a “nature”withhisotherviewthatrelationquali of notion axiom ofinternalrelations”,combiningJoachim’s “the calls he REveryrelationisgroundedinthenaturesofrelatedterms. IR states itthus: a On painofin Not surprisingly,Russellevadesthesedi w z and The mainargument b W z nite regress. Butifreciprocalinvolvementisnotarelation, regress. nite ) must reciprocally involve one another, and weareembarked another, ) mustreciprocallyinvolveone a z and a z b and W (Oxford: Clarendon P.,1991),pp.360–9. (Oxford:Clarendon z that reciprocally involve one another. Sofarsogood, one involve thatreciprocally nite regress, aterm’srelationscannotbepartofits nite regress, b z possible. But thenthenaturesof But possible. Hegelianism in 1898turned. Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim a z and was “aphrasewhichI should not use b , which makes the original re- , whichmakestheoriginal U (“ONT”, p.37; culties and formulateswhat z — a Cf z and z perhaps all of them or perhaps allof . z NicholasGri W es itsterms.Russell a b z and , andsoitisthe a z and a z and b PE z arerelated U b 2 n, , p.139) z forma b Russell’s z form 235 G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) criticisms of neo- p. 39 in the‘natures’ofdiverseterms”(“ONT”, grounded not i.e., jectives, any diversity, theremustbediversitynotreducibletodi any diversity, “if thereistobe argument: his of conclusion blurs thisdistinctionatthe oftheirterms.Russell but entirelyreducibleto,theintrinsicproperties relations; itwould only do so ifrelationswerenotmerelygroundedin, of theirtermsobviouslydoesnotonitsownimplythatthereareno monism. Thefactthat relations are grounded in theintrinsicproperties express thediversityof if wetryto reduced totheirnon-relationalproperties(oradjectives).For diverse things, monism. Supposethatmonismisfalse.Thenthereareatleasttwo grif nicholas 236 that assumptionmonism aban short timeafterhe terms, lation musthaveatleasttwodistinct view thattherearenorelationsatall”( the distinctionisnotveryimportant since “both meaningslead...tothe stituted really readings ofIR,onewhichholdsthat“everyrelationis possible argument thatthereweretwo his of start the Russell himselfhadnotedat Butthecuriousthingisthat them infavourofintrinsicproperties. tion betweengroundingrelationsinintrinsicpropertiesandeliminating distinc- necessary the make the neo-Hegeliansthemselvesdidnotoften an position,Russellwaswarrantedinrunningthese two things together; what sensethisistrue. of identitytoitself. hold, sinceeveniftherewerejustonething,itwouldhavetherelation be relations; so NR impliesmonism.Theconverseimplicationdoesnot ship regress (“ONT”,pp.38–9 further di of diversity bymeans arediverse;andifwetrytoexpressthis assume thattheiradjectives these natures” (“ONT”, p. 38; these natures”(“ONT”,p.38; and anotherwhichholds“merelythateveryrelationhasa 36 35 But nothingRussellhassaidsofarshowsthatIR implies either NRor A similarproblema , pp.323–4. Neo-Hegeliansoftenreject Elsewhere Ihavein his criticized earliest himfor notmakingthis distinction ; PE z bythenaturesoftermsor whole which theycompose” 2 , pp.141–2 Hegelian theories a z and ). Itmaywellbethat,asanaccountoftheneo-Hegeli- 35 doned neo-Hegelianism ( doned and NRareequivalent. { f T b { in a , thediversityofwhichcannotultimatelybe ects Russell’s claim that IR both entails andis entails ects Russell’sclaimthatIRboth z and ; PE this possibility,becausethey ofrelations. 2 PE , p.141 b z by means oftheiradjectives,wemust by 2 , p. 141). Hemaintained,however,that verse adjectives,westartanin a viewthatRussellcontinuedtoholdfor ). So if monism isfalse,theremust monism ). Soif Cf ibid cf . Gri . Papers .). U 36 n, We shall see shortlyin Weshall 2:142,278).Obviously,on Russell’s Idealist Apprentice- presuppose that anyre- that presuppose T erence ofad- ground W con- nite z in G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) unity of well be more to signi to well bemore truth isasigni argument thatIRandtheclaim is neededtounderstandRussell’s of another is that from a full knowledge of the of knowledge of anotheristhatfromafull those test fortheintrinsicpropertiesofoneparttruth’sdetermining intrinsic propertiesofeveryotherpart. And Itakeitthatonereasonable ofeachpartwhichdetermine the properties a whole,theintrinsic Joachim’s position,Itakeitthatheisclaimingatleastthis:truthforms grotesquelytravestying, not to otherparts.Simplifying,butIhope a part’sbeing,hemeansthepartas it is in itself and notasitisinrelation merely “in other words”.AndIshallassumethatwhen Joachim talks of lessen myexegeticlabours,thatthe “or” is not a disjunction,butmeans back, unfortunately,toreciprocalinvolvement.Ishallassume,ifonly tory features in a singleconcretemeaning” ( contribu- as or reciprocallydetermineoneanother’sbeing another, one de Joachim’s constituent elements,torepeat one bigtruthwhose only but there arenotmultifariousparticulartruths, “signi a forms truth that and isentailedbytheclaim means thatIRentails he entailed byJoachim’stheoryoftruth.Bythis signi from[IR]thatthewholeofrealityortruthmustbea once at follows It outline of it; he just said it is “evident that, if reality ortruthisasig- if outline ofit;hejustsaiditis“evidentthat, evenan provide seemed sostraightforwardtoRussellthathedidn’t straightforward,indeedit seems The secondpartofthisargument be true.Hencetheaxiomisequivalent a signi therefore ofthenatureea of each part,andtherefore whole werecompletelyknown,that would known; part wouldalsobecompletely any onepartwerecompletelyknown,the exhibits itsrelationstoeveryotherpart be possible(foranidealratiocinator)toinferthesecond. Russell’s argumentfortheequivalenceisswift: 37 This is rather di W cant whole in Mr. Joachim’s sense. For each part will have a nature which nature a have will part each For sense. Joachim’s Mr. in whole cant W cant wholeinMr.Joachim’ssense, feeling . Itwouldbeimpropertotalkof W cant wholearelogicallyequivalent. T erent fromBradley’sposition.Brad W cant wholes thanthis,butthisis,Ithink,allthat cant ch part. It is also evident also is ch part.It the relations ofeachparttootherpart,and relations the Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim tothemonistictheoryoftruth. and tothewhole;hence,if nature of while conversely,ifthenatureof nature ofthewholeandeveryother involveknowledgeofitsrelationsto the axiom of internal relationsmust the axiomof logicalrelationsbetweenitsparts. W z nition, “reciprocally involve “reciprocally nition, JNT (“ONT”, p.37; W ley’s Absoluteisarelationless rst itwouldinprinciple , p. 66). Thisbringsus 66). p. , that, ifrealityortruthis W cant whole”; that 37 Theremay PE 2 , p. 140) 237 G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) to the natures ofitstermsandmerelybeing that thereisadistinctionto be made betweenarelation’sbeing Assuming IR,if “ the naturesofparts that assume simply can natures”, Idon’tthinkwe their in But justbecausetherelationsofallpartsare“grounded nature which exhibits its relations to everyotherpartandthewhole.” the result that each part of reality or each part of the truth “willhave a o For example,if truth), it would be possible to infer acompleteknowledgeofanyother. partial particular any a completeknowledgeofanyparttruth(i.e. ment, I think,runsasfollows:Iftruthisa signi ni grif nicholas 238 a of natures the termsofrelation,includingalltruthsabout about so and , other all truth itwillbepossibletoinfer argument. bu relations forms ofthedoctrineinternal W internal relations isarguedin great detail a not necessarily the same in each case, on which on case, each in not necessarilythesame relation of fortiori that the groundingpropertieswhichwouldenableonetoinfer is nothingin as Icanseethere far so but each havetherequisitegroundingproperties; fact that would beimpossibletoinferall truths about the natures of would enable one to infer all the to one would enable the factthat from Joachim’s claimthattruthisasigni Joachim’s from follows IR truth. ThusIthinkRussellisrightinclaimingthat constitutes have understoodthatclaimcorrectly. exhibit nd book, z z T and and W 38 The otherpartofRussell’s argument seems moreproblematic.Russell a ers a number of steps to his conclusion. From IR, Russellclaimstoget From conclusion. ers anumberofstepstohis cant whole...theaxiomofinternalrelationsmustbetrue.”Theargu- z The claimthataneo-Hegelian coherenc and aRb b b , there is nothing in the grounding propertiesof grounding the , thereisnothingin z andtheirintrinsicproperties.Thus zz , whichmeansthat ” theirrelations.Thisisexactlytomissthepointmadeearlier R z from even a complete knowledge of thenatures fromevenacompleteknowledge a b The CoherenceTheoryofTruth The z and holdingbetweentwoterms . Suppose,onthecontrary,thatthere were even one external aRb b arerelatedby R aRb . Butthen z relates z is true,thenfromacompleteknowledgeofthis { f { in a z and aRb a z and R is not part of the signi b , itwouldbepossibleto infer that they , then inKhatchadourian’slittleknownandhardto b , Chs.2and3.Hedealswithmanydi z each have some intrinsicproperty, t, curiously,makesnoreferencetoRussell’s other relationsofeachterm.The 38 a e theoryoftruthentailsadoctrine R z and z isgroundedinthenaturesof W R cant whole z is groundedinthenatures b grounded . Then, by hypothesis, it . Then,byhypothesis, R W z isgrounded.Fromthe cant wholethen,from a fortiori W z inthosenatures. z — cant wholethat a z a at leastifwe z z and and a alltruths and reducible b b z from T z that erent b . A G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) the nature of all other terms and of the whole of which they are part, are they the natureofallothertermsandwholewhich namely that, from aknowledgeofalltherelations a term, we can infer are “exhibited” by itsnature.Butfromthis,wecannot get the next step: So wegetthe all of thenatureanyterm In thatcase,completeknowledge reducible to the naturesofrelatedterms,weget only a little further. at leastasIRissofarstated,asu grounding propertiesareanecessarycondition for the relation, but not, not giveallthepropositionsthataretrueofthingde A de true ofthething”oritcouldmean“theadequate analysis of the thing”. suggests twomeanings:itcouldmean“alltheprop[osition]swhichare Russell,however, notion. with Russell,doesheexpandonthiscrucial book, norinhisdiscussion his some? Joachimisnohelphere.Neitherin all ofthemoronly intrinsic properties)oftheterm.Butdoesitcontain adjectives(i.e. decided abovethatthenatureofatermcontainsonly W they havesomerelationto that fact the by be otheraspectsoftheirnatureswhicharenotimplied knowledge ofthenaturesotherterms.Theremay well complete relation to is related,namelythatitincludes the properties necessary to ground that lations willtellussomethingaboutthenatureof term(s) towhich term, sincetheserelationssuperveneon a relations. Westartfromcompleteknowledgeofthenature some term, term, weknowallthese whole) andthat,inthecaseofatleastone despite thefactthateveryterm is related to everyotherterm(andthe sense. tobedeci question admit. The everything else,thesumtotalofallthings inwhichallthepart whole a that thereis able. these twonotionsareindistinguish- ans”, hegoeson,“consider...that , and from this we can infer can we , andfromthis rst requires us to look more closely at what the nature of atermis.We nature the what rst requiresustolookmorecloselyat z On the other hand,ifwetakeIRtobeassertingthatrelationsare other the On 39 There are two waysinwhichRussell’sargumentcanberescued.The the relations of the term, for therelationsofterm, Itmightbethoughtthatthisbegsthe W They nition, he explains, should give an adequate analysis,butwould adequate nition, heexplains,shouldgivean z give noreasonforthisview;butit follows from the principle a . Butwecannotsupposethatcanacquireinthisway W rst step of Russell’s argument: all the relations of a term step ofRussell’sargument:alltherelationsa rst ded is whether it formsasigni whetherit ded is a . all Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim z therelationswhich all U z cient condition. its relations superveneonitsnature. its forms a whole, in the only sense Russellwill sense only the whole,in forms a s cohere?Butsinceeverythingisrelatedto question. Aren’twesu question. a z ’s nature.Eachofthesere- W cant wholeinJoachim’s a z hastoevery other pposed tobeproving W ned. “Hegeli- will z exhibit 239 39 a G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) Beaney, ed., Beaney, analysis in“Some Remarks on Russell’s EarlyDecompositional Style of Analysis”, inM. sumes (New York and London: Routledge, 2007), pp.75–90. London: Routledge,2007), (New Yorkand property to a thing, then then property toathing, to it;andlet an adequate analysis of athing; let the naturesof de some externalrelation all external relations canbeeliminated.Suppose, indeed,thattherewere canbeeliminated, completely eliminated.Andifallrelations the termsincludeonlyintrinsicproperties,relationscanbe of natures oftheirterms,andsincethe duced topropositionsaboutthenatures be re- can propositions all relationalpropositions.Thustrue that willincludealltruepropositionsabouteither,including,ofcourse, other,and any possible toinferacompleteknowledgeofthenature be will from acompleteknowledgeofthenatureanyoneterm,it that follows then,sinceeverythingisrelatedtoelse, It other. ofthe knowledge knowledge ofonenaturecouldinferacomplete then itfollowsthatfromacomplete decided itdidafewpagesback, we their natures“reciprocallyinvolve”eachother.Ifthismeanswhat related, are terms two if the former.NowrecallJoachim’sclaimthat with needed foritsadequateanalysis,wecanidentifythenatureofathing between thesetofpropositionstrueatermand the setofpropositions properties areamongitsparts. else whereheisquitesoclearthatallathing’s anywhere of aware am not distinctionbetweenpropertiesandrelations;butI major metaphysical himtoendorsea expect properties andaccidentalones,wealso expect thatRussellis not going to endorseadistinctionbetweenessential relations) areamongitsconstituentparts.We,ofcourse, (but notits an analysisintoitsconstituents,itfollowsthat the properties of a thing (but thing the propertiesofa 137). TheremarkabouttheHegeliansissigni mydistinction”(“RJC”,p. subject. Idenythisprinciple,andmaintain the attributionofapredicateto in that everypropositionconsists grif nicholas 240 adequate analysisofthething. W If we take seriously Russell’s claimthatHegeliansdon’tdistinguish If wetakeseriouslyRussell’s 40 nition, itwouldnotbegroundedinthenaturesof Theproofisbytransi P = A The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early in The AnalyticTurn:Analysis . Ihavediscussedthei T z be the set oftruepropositionsabou a and T tivity ofidentity.Let = { b f include { in R P z . Fromthis,Russellcanshowthat holding between twoterms, between holding P z be the set oftruepropositions attributingproperties the be mplications of this remark for Russell’sconceptof for mplications ofthisremark not 40 And, since the analysis of a thing means And, sincetheanalysisofathing z its relations) should beincludedinan relations) its all truthsabout A Analytic Philosophy andPhenomenology Analytic z bethesetofpropositionswhichgive t it. If every proposition attributes a W cant, forit implies that all z a a thing’s properties thing’s a and T a z = or b A a , itfollows, and b , only if he as- . But since . But a fortiori b . By all z G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) our knowledgeof everything isrelatedtoelse, otherwise anin have natures,for themselves not do natures be charitabletoassumethat contrary toourassumption,that“ some otheraspectof of IR, thisrelation(callit indeed itiscapableofbeingrepeated it looksasiftheargument has merely namely that it hastobesuchascangroundthe relation edge of is that,fromthisknowl- argument the nature ofeveryterm.Thegapin the natures of the related terms,fromthattoinfersomethingaboutthe everything isrelatedto since and, term, that term wouldenableonetoinferalltherelationsof ofthenatureone knowledge of itsnature,itfollowsthatacomplete from acompleteknowledge inferred be can tion thatallaterm’srelations it. Ontheassump- argument requirestakingacloserlookatthegapin for Russell’s not Joachimhimselfwoulddoso.Thesecondrescue this additionalview,whetheror reject to It isopentoproponentsofIR by whatRussellidenti of truth.Onthepresentargumentitdoessoonlyifsupplemented theory stated it:namely,thatIRentailsJoachim’s Russell as yield theconclusion terms ormerelygroundedinthem. their of claim thatrelationsareconstitutedbythenatures neo-Hegelians relations.Itisinthissensethatitunimportantwhether external no each level.However, Suppose that necessary) assumptionsifweapplyIRatadi theory oftruth.Thegap,however,canbebridgedonminimal(perhaps complete knowledgeofthe nature of everytermasrequiredbyJoachim’s of some aspectofthenature b z ’s nature, The weakness ofthis line of argument, however, is that it does not a b . From that knowledge we can infer both that both infer . Fromthatknowledgewecan 1 wecaninfer part b z of the nature of every term, there is no way toarriveata no is there ofthenatureeveryterm, 1 aRb . We have not so far been able toshowthatthere isnot able been . Wehavenotsofar W nite regress will result and (arguably) no relations will nite regresswillresultand(arguably)norelations z and that we have a complete knowledge of the nature andthatwehaveacompleteknowledgeofthe b b 1 b . But now suppose that there issucha that . Butnowsuppose 1 b r W 2 ’s nature, b is itself part of the nature of of nature the of part itself is ed as the Hegelian view of the nature ofaterm. ed astheHegelianviewof r 2 z ) must be internal.knowledge Thenour from andalsosomethingaboutthenatureof b Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim necessary toground b aRb 2 else andall relations aregroundedin say, which cannot beinferredfrom say,which been repeatedwithanewgap;and z ” is not a truth. Thustherecanbe a not is ” ad in b 2 mustberelated to W nitum T erent level of analysis. erent level aRb R , withanewgapat b . Call that aspect of . Callthataspect , anditmightwell z andthatthereis r . Atthispoint b b 1 , and,by 2 . Since 241 b 2 , G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) of thenature a edge of thenature one level down, as it were, then itseemsreasonabletoassumethat one leveldown,asitwere, ever begrounded. grif nicholas 242 grounds notonlytherelation grounds plied thistimetoterms. of that asked thequestionwasexplicitly that reply on21May1906makesitclear thing heconsideredo of hisreplyin manuscript the preserving thecivilityofexchangetosendJoachim correspondence remainedcordial. Russell was concerned enoughabout public toneofthedebate,RussellandJoachim’s the Despite polemical. is as goodhegot,andhischapteronRussell’stheoryoftruth the toneofdebate.Joachimgave sell’s side.NordidRussellinitiate was notallonRus- ings. ThoughRussellhasareputationforsarcasm,it e enormous to it legacy ofBradley,whoused journaleditors.Partofthiswasthe unmistakablestylistic respectable ragging whichmodernauthorswouldbebeggedtotonedownby surprisingly polemical.Therewas,onbothsides,a degree ofsarcasmand Russell’s publicdebatewithJoachimaboutthenatureoftruthwasquite relations impliesJoachim’stheoryoftruth. from acomplete knowledge of ( Joachim quoted( Russell and three from Joachim) mention the matter. But withthisex- Russell andthreefromJoachim)mentionthematter. soothe hisru hehadnot.However,itwasnot easyto him, which, Joachimassured ingly, took umbrage atthis,thinkinghehadbeenaccusedofarrogance, capacity”.Russell,rathersurpris- with a“highdegreeofphilosophical Papers will give us a complete knowledgeof complete a willgiveus 41 There was one very curious exception to this. It concernedapassage It There wasoneverycuriousexceptiontothis. b This looks like a parallel to the famous Thislookslikeaparalleltothefamous z ’s nature. Thus we can achieve completeknowledgeof achieve ’s nature.Thuswecan b z — 1 hasto z 4:469)tothee z and thattheanswerwasno.) V Mind b ed feathers:nolessthan 2 b . On this view, acompleteknowledgeofthenature this . On . Fromthatwecaninfer z JNT 41 Ifwetakethislineandassume that natures goonly z (“RNT”)andtoaskhim whether it contained any- a T wecaninferthat , p. 44n.) from Russell’s 1904 paper on Meinong on , p.44n.)fromRussell’s1904paper T { f ensive. (Russell’sletterismissing,butJoachim’s ect that the discovery of simplesrequiredamind discovery ect thatthe { in 3. w R a epilogue that z ’s nature. Thusthedoctrineofinternal Bradleian regressaboutrelations,but ap- Bradleian a W hasto ve of the extant letters (two from the extant letters(two of ve b aRb . Forfromacompleteknowl- b , andthenceinfer 1 r b T b ect throughouthiswrit- 2 , but also the relation relation , butalsothe , foranyother part, b b ’s nature 1 W aspart ercely b b 2 r , 1 z G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) “The Meaning of‘Meaning’ Wykeham ProfessorofLogicat Oxford. Then therewasasymposiumon in The schrift Appointing Joachimtoachairoflogic,40yearsafterFrege’s to remakeeverythingafresh. and born be and aneworderstrugglingto after theFirstWorldWarbetween the old order trying toreassertitself of thegreatculturalbattle part philosophy; andmostgenerally,itwas century andmodernformallogic; between neo-Hegelianismandanalytic di several of someone withexpertiseinmodernlogic.Thebattlewaspart fortheappointmentof hoped versial, someattheuniversityhaving Joachim’s inaugurallecture. reviewof polemics. Thereason,verylikely,wasRussell’searlier lackofthegoodhumourthatappearedintheirearlier an evident neutral monism; it was entirely, and indeedcarpingly,critical.Therewas which to criticizingRussell’sviewsonimages ception, theyevidentlytookeachother’spublicjibesingoodpart. Joachim’s inaugurallecture, the pagesof in philosopher. First, 1920 thereweretwoconcludingsalvoes,onefromeach In after 1906. becausethereisnoextantcorrespondencebetweenthem in 1920, changes They AreandHowMean”. Russell hadputforwardthepreviousyearin“OnPropositions:What that and Joachim,devotedmainlytothenewphilosophicalposition of thedoctrineinternalrelations.Heendedwitha brief surveyofthe use his complained ofJoachim’sdeferencetoHegeland(oncemore) ingly “TheWisdomofOurAncestors”( his place rightatthebeginning”. his and putJoachim“in vited RusselltoreviewJoachim’sinaugurallecture days, in- himself andaradicalmodernistfromhispre-warundergraduate ford’s reputationasthehomeoflostcauses. T Papers Joachim’s appointment to the Wykeham chair wasevidentlycontro- Wykeham Joachim’s appointmenttothe 43 42 I’m notsurewhetherthisremainedtrueaftertheir John Middleton Murry,theeditorof John erent wars: between the establishedidealisticlogicsof nineteenth MiddletonMurrytoRussell,8 Mind

Aristotelian Society,SupplementaryVolume andtenyearsafter 9:88–93. symposiumappearedinn.s.29:385– Principia Mathematica z ” in Bertrand RussellandHaroldJoachim Immediate ExperienceandMediation December 1919,quotedin Mind 43 42 Russell obligedinareviewcalledtell- Joachim’s contribution was devoted Joachim’scontribution The Athenaeum , betweenF. 2 (1919),reprintedin 414; Russell’s contribution isreprinted 414; Russell’scontribution Papers Athenaeum W 9: 403–6). Init,Russell 9: , tendedtocon gure largelyinhisearly y C. y Papers S. Schiller,Russell, Russellreviewed , an Oxfordman W Papers nal public ex- nal public 9:398. 8:278–306. W Begri rm Ox- , as 243 V s- G:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell 27,2052.wpdG:\WPData\TYPE2702\russell March 12, 2008 (9:27 pm) for ments ofparticipantsattheconferenceand, appear inaFrench translation in Pascal Réception”, attheUniversitéBlaise 244 n.1and2472) he manages totreat as tions” the onesin sumption without which reasoningwouldbecomeimpossible. which sumption without he had beenrashenoughtoassertthatEuclid’sparallel axiom was an as- phers” ( all ofwhich,hesaid,had been “opposed orignoredbyorthodoxphiloso- advances recentlymadeinmathematicallogic, physics and psychology, grif nicholas 244 he did. to Russell’s“OnPropositions”in his reply of tone we mayneverknowforsure,butthegriping,sarcastic attack on his competence forthejob. attack onhiscompetence vailing acknowledgement of Joachim’svirtues,itcanonlybereadasan in a review of Joachim’s inaugural lecture,andbalancedbynocounter- W ten byaProfessorofLogic”( no other university in theworldwherethesewordscouldhavebeenwrit- probable”, Russellreplied,“that(withtheexceptionofLhassa)thereis ercer than had appeared elsewhere in their public debates, but coming debates, public ercer thanhadappearedelsewhereintheir Logical Studies 46 45 44 Russell Joachim got his revengeinthelectureshe got Joachim Joachim, Anearlierversionofth z — 46 z as onetheory.Notsurprisingly,he Papers z whosefriendlysuggestionsprovok The PrinciplesofMathematics Immediate ExperienceandMediation z (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1948), where in two sweeping footnotes(pp. twosweeping P.,1948),wherein (Oxford:Clarendon 9:405).Joachim,alas,gavehimampleammunition,for { f is paperwasreadatthe { in Philosophiques Papers , Mind The ProblemsofPhilosophy z three ofRussell’stheoriespropositions 9:405).The sarcasm was perhaps no especially, to one of one especially,to , Clermont-FerrandinJune2006andwill W ed a marked improvement in §2.5. in improvement marked ed a nds itinconsistent. gave atOxford,publishedposthumously 45 . In revising it, I am indebted to the com- the to indebted . Inrevisingit,Iam z afewmonths later suggests that WhetherJoachimtooko z (Oxford:ClarendonP.,1919),p.19. phier conference, “Bradley et sa the anonymous referees theanonymous , and“OnProposi- 44 T “Itis ence z — z