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University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan COPYRIGHT BY MASTER'S THESIS M-687 GRIFFITHS, Leslie Morris SamueL THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE REFUTATIONS OF PROFESSOR AYER'S PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION. The American University, M. A ., 1964 Philosophy University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan COPYRIGHT BY LESLIE MORRIS SAMUEL GRIFFITHS 1964 . THE JUSTIFICATION OP THE REFUTATIONS OF PROFESSOR AYER'S PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION ■ ' Leslie M. sT Griffiths Submitted to the Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Signatures of Committee: Chai rman : /} Dean of the College Date : ^ f Date; / 'T / ^ 7 ~ ■ “'■/ ^ AMEm«vERsnv The American University 'AUG 24:1964 Washington, D. C. WflSHlHGIDH.DC 4- Soi'j THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE REFUTATIONS OF PROFESSOR AYER'S PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION Table of Contents INTRODUCTION p. 1 A. The need for the study of the principle of Verification. B. The neglect of Professor Ayer's philosophy by the critics of positivism. C. Description of Chapters which attempt to rectify this alleged negligence. CHAPTER I -- The Status of Ayer's Principle of Verification............................... p. 5 Section i A. A description of the function of the principle. 1. The status of metaphysical statements. 2. The status of ethical statements. 3 . The status of theological statements. B. The difficulty of formulating a principle of verification. 1. Purpose -- to render philosophy a department of logic. 2. Mathematical and scientific statements acceptable. Section ii C. Professor Ayer's prepositional dichotomy (the a priori and the empirical). 1. The distinction between empirical and super-empirical statements. 2. The notion of 'literal' significance. 3. Definition of a 'metaphysical statement'. 11 D. Ayer's rejection of complete verifiability. 1. Complete verifiability and scientific statements. 2. 'Modified principle' includes 'general laws' of science. S. Ayer's proposal and later rejection of the notion of 'weak' and 'strong' verification. Ï. Ayer's rejection of the Falslflablllty Criterion. Q-. Ayer's 'liberal' approach to verifiability. 1. Allowances for statements about the past. 2. Allowances for statements of science (laws). 3. Ayer's 'liberal' approach as too liberal. H. Ayer's rejection (1946) of his earlier formu­ lation (1936). 1. Terminological difficulties regarding proper usage. 2. The problem of the usage of 'sentence', 'statement' and 'proposition' overcome. I. Emended version of verifiability criterion. 1. Emended version — Ayer's final attempt. 2. Professor Church's logical refutation of the emended version. J. Ayer's more recent view of the possibility of formulating the principle of verification satisfactorily. CHAPTER II — Background of Professor Ayer's Logical Empiricism 1 T~~. I } I T~Z I I . T . .p. 28 A. Ayer's claim to have derived his view from earlier forms of empiricism. B. Ayer and Berkeley: A comparison of phénoméno­ logies . 1. Berkeley's formula -- not a verifiability criterion. 2. Sense-ezperlence for Berkeley and Ayer. ill 3. Ayer's criticism of Berkeley's analysis. 4. Ayer's posit of sense-coAtents rather than physical objects. 5. Berkeley and Hume on the meaning of 'idea'. C. Hume and Ayer: A comparison of methods. 1. Hume and Ayer: A prepositional dichotomy. 2. Hume and Ayer : On ethical statements. 3. Hume and Ayer: Exclusion of metaphysics. D. Language and Meaning: A transition through British Idealism. E. Ayer's dependence on Russell and Wittgenstein's 'logical atomism'. 1. Hume also philosophical atomlst. 2. Russell's atomism — not necessarily connected to his early Platonism. 3. Logical-atomism and perception in Russell. 4. Ayer's adaptation of Russell's logical construction. 3. Russell's analysis of 'fact' (complex). 6. Russell's cautious but positlvistic sympathies. 7. Russell and Wittgenstein -- fact and name. 8. Wittgenstein's 'state of affairs' as 'simples' of perception. 9. Ayer on 'truth' in Russell and Wittgenstein, F. Translation of Logical Atomism to Ayer's Logical Empiricism. 1. Sensible object as construct. 2. Problem of 'relations' . 3. Basic propositions — as verification of verifiers. 4. The problem of ostensive definitions. 5. Problem of relation between language and fact. 6. Philosophy not about statements only. G. Ayer's connexion with the Vienna Circle. 1. Historical survey of the Vienna Circle. 2. The influence of the Circle on Ayer's philosophy. 3. Other influences upon Ayer's philosophy. iv CHAPTER III — Language and Meaning: The Justification of the Refutations of Ayer's Principle of Ÿerifïcailom I . I I I i 7~\ i I . .p. 59 Section 1 A. On the notion that Ayer's amended version requires emended criticisms — critics' generalizations condemned. 1. Warnook's criticism. 2. Copleston's criticism. 3. William's criticism. 4. Walsh's criticism. 5. Summary of positions. Section 11 B. The inapplicability of general critiques to Ayer's Empiricism. 1. The danger of general classification. 2. Ayer’s technical usage — the only defence needed. 3. R. M. Hare -- a criterion of empirical!ty? 4. Difference between literal and factual significance. 5. Warnock's criticism unjustified In Ayer's terms. 6 . William's critique — Ayer's 'lumping' - and William's 'lumping'. 7. Rejection of Walsh s criticism. 8 . Felgl's defence of Ayer on 'metaphysics'. 9. Copleston's criticism unjustified. 10. Ferre's criticism not applicable to Ayer's criterion. (a) Austin's performatives not 'true' or 'false . (b) Literal significance -- verifiable propositions by reduction. (c) Austin's debt to Hume (hitherto not acknowledged). (d) Austin's 'performatives* -- their possible classification. 11. Passmore's failure to use verifiability as 'demarcation line'. 12. Church's criticism justified -- but not general critiques. Section 111 C. Importance of the question — whether or not the Criterion is self-verifiable,. 1. Analysis of Ayer's criterion: Is it empirical or a priori? 2. Breakdown of the attempts to 'name' the criterion Itself. 3. Breakdown of prepositional types as possible answer. 4. The problem of the criterion — is it metaphysical? CHAPTER IV — Language and Fact; An Analysis of the Applicability o t the Criterion . I ! T . .p. 96 A. Restatement of Ayer's emended version. B. Another criterion needed to remove uncer­ tainty of the relation between language and perception. C» Analysis of 'actual observation' and sense- data terminology. 1. Sense-data: a means of referring to appearance. 2. Metaphysical entailment of extra- linguistic sources. D. Ayer's implicit acceptance of modal relationships. 1. 'Word' and 'empirical fact': a relation of possibility. 2. Multiple relation of possibility. 3. Statements via observation of facts: Inconsistency of Ayer's claim that philosophy consists of talk about things. E. Terminal point of the principle -- 'sense- contents' or 'verifiers'. 1. Ayer's philosophy not purely contextual definition. 2. Non-verlflcation of extra-linguistic referents. vi 3. The language-sense-perceptlon relation — metaphysical. 4. Ayer's does have 'first principles'. CHAPTER V — Can we Have a Principle of Verification?, p. 115 A. Principle of Verification unsuccessful. 1. Inadequacy of Ayer's definition of meaning. 2. Principle is conceivably linguistic solipsism. 3 . Support for a metaphysical problem in Ayer's phenomenalism. 3. What the Principle of Verification did for philosophy. 1. Job of philosophy Is to raise ques­ tions (Ayer). 2. Meanings of words, etc., 'in use' (context-dependent). 3 . Existence of verifiers Important (reductionism). 4. Philosophers now have clarity (an un­ written criterion of meaning). C. Concluding remarks. 1. Verification principle if metaphysical not in need of another label. 2. Notion of anti-metaphysical metaphysics. 3 . Verification method or principle is 'universal maxim' (perhaps even self­ destructive) . THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE REFUTATIONS OF PROFESSOR AYER'S PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION ^ Introduction This study is essentially an attempt to trace the develop­ ment of the principle of verification presented by the philosophy of Professor A. J. Ayer and some of its criticisms in one com­ prehensive study. It is characteristic of journal articles, books and other philosophical works that they have not sufficiently dealt with this testability criterion in terms of Professor Ayer's philo­ sophy alone. For in recognising the importance of logical empiricism, most philosophers have advanced their criticisms in the form of passing comments and only then as a means of justifying some other viewpoint. This is not to say that these, which I shall now call 'standard criticisms' are inadequate, rather it is only to say that for the most part they are too general and wide in scope to do justice to any one particular view. To rectify this negligence is the thesis of the following five chapters. The intention behind the first chapter will be to describe what Professor Ayer's principle of verification Is, and from there to go on to evaluate what the various modifica­ tions of the criterion purported to do; from this point I shall go on to analyse these principles as to whether or not they suc­ ceed in doing what it was originally supposed they could. —2— The purpose of the second chapter is to describe briefly the background of Ayer's logical empiricism^. This includes something of the philosophies of Berkeley, Hume, Russell and Wittgenstein from which the basis of Ayer's position is derived. This is not intended to be an exhaustive historical evaluation, for this is a problem for a history primarily devoted to the subject. Rather what I have done only constitutes a brief des­ cription of some of the terminology of these philosophers and of how Ayer redefines such usage in terms more compatible to his own view. Occasionally, as is the case in dealing with Hume's moral philosophy, I have found it necessary to "go out on a limb" and state what 1 think was the primary intention of the philosopher in question. While such notions could perhaps be established more conclusively, I have, for the purpose of expediting mat­ ters, had to state them much too abruptly.
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