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Home , Brand Blanshard, Etiology, Philosophy of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt

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The text in this file has been automatically extracted and may contain minor errors. For the original version please consult the paper copy held in the Swinburne Library.

- FREE AND :

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN

Keith Maxwell Purdie B. A., B. D., Grad. Dip. App. Psych.

Submitted for the degree of ~octorof November, 1997 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page !

Table of contents '1 List of tables vii List of figures viii Abstract XI Declaration xi ! Acknowledgements xii ,

PART ONE

1. The importance of the issue 1.1 Conceptual issue - empirical discipline 1 1.2 Initial definitions of key terms Natural and Non Natural Determinism Metaphysical and Metl~odologicalDeterminism Soft Determinism Near Determinism Non-Rigid Determinism "Superordinate" Determinism Freedom as a "Necessary Fiction" Freedom as an Assumption Active Self Determination Libertarianism and Determinism Causation The Four Causes of 1.3 The significance of fieedom. Freedom and Determinism: Opposing views of Human Life and Autonomy Novelty . . Dignity Conclusion 1 -4 The position I intend to advocate Overall Position Specific Claims

2. Positions in the debate 2.1 Approaches to the issue 2.2 Criticisms of hard determinism 2.3 Limiting the scope of determinism to accommodate freedom Rene Descartes 2.4 Redefining freedom to accommodate determinism Soft determinism An evaluation of soft determinism 2.5 Redefining determinism to accommodate fi-eedom. Blanshard's proposal An evaluation of Blanshard's approach 2.6 Challenging the assumptions underlying the debate as causes Non-linear Dialectical thinking 2.7 Conclusions 3. Kant 3.1 The place of Kant 3.2 The major elements of the Kantian approach The relationship between and objects

. . and The antinomies of pure The two standpoints Freedom as the basis for all reasoning The faculty of judgment A Kantian approach and libertarian concerns The independence of the two standpoints 100 3.3 The value to psychology of a Kantian approach 101 101 Affirms the validity of freedom and determinism I Enables freedom and determinism to be fully and coherently articulated 102 ; i Explains the paradox and provides an intellectual warrant for both sides 103

Encourages a rigorous natural approach to psychology 104 * Provides a justification for which assumes freedom 105 :

Avoids an ontological dualism 105 ! 3.4 Conclusions

PART TWO

4. Psychological theory 108

4.1 Introduction: 108 ; Basis for selection of theorists 108 i I Claims to be established 108 4.2 The first two : Psychology as a deterministic science 109 i 110

B. F. Skinner 118 : 4.3 The reaction: Libertarian theories in psychology Existentialist psychology 4.4 Modifying determinism to accommodate agency -. Albert Ellis Roger Speny Modifying freedom to accommodate determinism D. C. Dennett Cognitive psychology as a form of soft determinism 4.5 Conclusions

5. Psycl~ologicalresearch 5.1 Introduction: 5,2 Claims to be established 5.3 Why an alternative to is required in psychology 5.4 Freedom and Language Purpose Creativity Self awareness Responsibility 5.5 "Understanding" and "explanation": Can cognitive psychology bridge the gap? The Correct Method 5.6 Can a form of inquiry, without the assumption of determinism be cogent? 5 -7 The interpretivist approach in psychological . 5.8 Implications for the unity of psychology

6. Psychological practice 6.1 The rationale for an empirical study 6.2 A review of the empirical literature 6.3 The research questions 6.4 The development of free willldeterrninism scales 6.5 Development of a helpinglcoping styles measure 6.6 Development of a counselling approach measure 6.7 Subjects 6.8 Procedure 6.9 Results: Descriptive 6.1 0 Results: Beliefs of regarding and determinism and a comparison with the beliefs of non psychologists 6.1 1 Results: Relationships between psychologists' beliefs in free willldeterminism and their preference for therapeutic theories and techniques 6.12 Results: Relationship between psychologists' attributions of responsibility and their free wi111determinism beliefs 6.13 Results: Relationship between psychologists' attributions of responsibility and their preference for therapeutic theories and techniques. 6.14 Discussion 6.15 Conclusions 7. Discussion and conclusions 7.1 Review Orientation

- Positions in the debate Kant Theory Research Practice 7.2 Conclusions .7.3 Recommendations

References

Appendices Appendix 1. Copy of materials used in the empirical study Appendix 2. Statistical output for the empirical study Appendix 3. Data files LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Summary representation of four styles of helping and coping proposed by Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza, Coates, Cohn & Kidder (1 982) 196 -. I Table 2. Factor analysis of the freedom and determinism scales 201 Table 3. A Sample means, standard deviations and the possible range of scores for the free will and determinism scales 208 j Table 3. B Means, standard deviations and ranges for the sample of counselling psychologists on the helping styles items 208 Table 3. C Means, standard deviations and ranges for the sample of counselling I I psychologists on preference for theoretical approaches to counselling 208 Table 3. ID Sample means, standard deviations and the possible ranges of the I I specified therapeutic techniques 209 i 1

vii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "Human

make real " 211 ' Figure 2. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "The human imagination brings genuine novelty into the world" 21 1 Figure 3. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "Human has inherent dignity" 212 j Figure 4. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "All the genetic and environmental givens of my life are like the artist's 7 paints and brushes - the raw materials out of which I create my and my " 212 ! Figure 5. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "Whether we avoid environmental disaster depends on the personal choices we I make now" 213 I Figure 6. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "It is fiee will which makes us human" 213 Figure 7. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "I am simply the product of my genetic inheritance and the environmental forces which have acted upon me" 214 Figure 8. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "The great underlying fiee market is that human beings cannot do otherwise than seek their own pleasure" 214 Figure 9. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "If we knew enough we would see that for every decision we have ever made, we could not have done otherwise under those conditions 215 Figure 10. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "As I look back over my life so far, I realise that much of it was determined by factors beyond my control such as my inherited cl~aracteristicsand my childhood upbringing" 21 5

... Vlll i

Figure 11. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "Our choices are not really choices at all but predetermined" ,216 ' Figure 12. Response of sample of psychologists to the statement "A murderer could rarely have done otherwise than commit the deeds he or she did" 216 Figure 13. Percentage allocation of subjects into Helping Styles quadrants 221 Abstract

Free will/determinism continues as an issue of contention within psychology. As a metaphysical problem its resolution does not lie within the province of psychology as an empirical discipline. This project begins with the proposition that psychology needs a which will enable it better to grasp, manage, and control the issue. Of all the approaches available, the work of seems best able to fulfil these criteria. The implications and benefits of this approach were examined in relation to relevant aspects of psychological theory, research, and practice. An empirical study explored aspects of the freedom determinism issue in counselling practice. Scales were developed to measure beliefs in free will and determinism. Freedom and determinism items were found to load on separate factors. This suggests that a Kantian approach corresponds, in important respects, with the way people, without philosophical training, actually handle the issue. Other tools were developed to gauge attributions of responsibility made by psychologists to their clients, and the preferences of psychologists for therapeutic theories and techniques. A sample of 87 psycl~ologistsengaged in counselling were overwhelmingly libertarian in their personal beliefs and attributed high levels of responsibility to their clients. The present situation in which a predominantly deterministic theoretical and research discipline informs a generally libertarian counselling practice was deemed unsatisfactory. A Kantian approach would uphold the legitimacy and value of freedom and determinism in theory, research, and practice. Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any University and to the best of my 1 knowledge and contains no material previously published or written by another person or persons except where due reference is made. i

Signed ...... Keith Maxwell Purdie

Date......

Approval for the empirical study undertaken as part of this project was granted by the Swinbune University of Committee on the 15th of February 1994. There are several people who enabled this project to reach completion and I am deeply grateful to them. Throughout the period of my .candidature I have received unfailing encouragement and help from my supervisors Associate Professor Ken Heskin and Dr. Paul Healy. I regard it as a privilege to have had the benefit of their knowledge, wisdom and good company on this journey. Ken, who had oversight of the venture as a whole, gave generously of his time throughout but particularly in the early stages when I was struggling to clarify the overall shape and direction of the thesis. It was with Ken's encouragement and support that I took the decision to convert from Master's candidature to PhD. Paul displayed remarkable patience in dealing with an amateur philosopher and my work has benefited immeasurably from his challenges, suggestions and expertise. Associate Professor Jim McLennan contributed advice which was crucial to the development of the measure used to gauge preferences for tnerapeutic theories and techniques. More generally, Jim greatly assisted my academic formation as a . I owe him a great deal for his encouragement when I resumed undergraduate level studies after a long absence and for the of the teaching and supervision I subsequently received from him. My wife Rhonda encouraged and supported me throughout. My children Benjamin, Timothy and Catherine were understanding and tolerant in the face of the considerable demands made on family time. I am most grateful to them. Finally I record my thanks to all who contributed their time to act as subjects in the study.

xii

Please note

The text in this file has been automatically extracted and may contain minor errors. For the original version please consult the paper copy held in the Swinburne Library.

CHAPTER 1

1. The importance of the issue

Am I a creature of fate, of gigantic forces beyond my control? Am I a mysterious mixture of body and spirit, part determined and part free? Am I an electronic computer programmed by my environment? Is my of being free to shape my future just an illusion? Is it fair to punish a boy for stealing when his parents taught him to steal? Does it make sense to say that a person could have chosen to act other than the way he or she actually did act? If every a person expresses is strictly determined, why philosophize? (Honer, Hunt & Okholm, 1992, p.8 1)

! 1.1 Conceptual issue - empirical discipline The position one adopts regarding the free will/determinism issue has a critical bearing on far reaching questions about the nature of human beings and human life. The question of determinism and freedom is often cited and sometimes discussed in psychology texts as an issue inherited from philosophy. It is my contention that the issue is of far greater significance than is suggested by the paragraph or so that it customarily receives. As I will show, the issue has been significant in the history of modern psychology and continues to be so. It presents in psychology as an unresolved issue from psychology's philosophical roots. Whether or not free will can be ascribed to human beings is not a question which is generally regarded as amenable to empirical resolution. It is not therefore to be seen as a question which psychology can itself decide. Rather, one's stance on the issue constitutes, as Valentine (1982) points out, a "metaphysical assumption" which is brought, knowingly or perhaps unthinkingly, to the tasks of psychological investigation and practice. I shall argue that the issue has profound implications for theory, method, and practice in psychology. This is so precisely for the reason illustrated in the quotation with which I began. Key questions about human nature and life are not decided by I I psychology itself but presupposed according to assumptions made prior to any CHAPTER 1 investigation. Psychology seeks, through an application of empirical methods, an explanation of human behaviour. Yet starting points, critical to the conclusions reached by this investigation, appear to lie beyond the compass of that investigation itself. These constitute a sort of metaphysical platform upon which the edifice of investigation is constructed. As I intend to illustrate, the position adopted regarding free will and determinism is, for psychology, a critical plank in that platform of metaphysical assumptions. And the platform upon which the work is based tends to influence, often decisively, the theory and method of the investigation, the conclusions that are drawn, and the nature of any practice deriving from them. Perhaps the classic expression of the issue in modem psychology was the debate between Carl Rogers and B. F. Skinner (Rogers, 1956). This famous -piece encounter between two of psychology's greatest figures encapsulated key aspects of the issue. In many ways it represents the centuries old philosophical dispute reappearing in psychological clothing. . I have come to realise that the basic between a behavioristic and a humanistic approach to human beings is a philoso~hicalchoice. This certainly can be discussed, but cannot possibly be settled by evidence. If one takes Skinner as of some years ago - and I believe this is his view today - then the environment, which is part of a causal sequence, is the sole determiner of the individual's behavior, which is thus again an unbreakable chain of cause and effect. All the things that I do, or that Skinner does, are simply inevitable results of our conditioning. As he has pointed out, man acts as he is forced to act, but as if he were not forced. Carried to its logical conclusion, this means, as John Calvin concluded earlier, that the universe was at some point wound up like a great and has been ticking off its inexorable way ever since. Thus, what we think are our decisions, choices, and values are all illusions. Skinner did not write his books because he had chosen to prksent his views, or to point to the kind of he values, but simply because he was conditioned to make certain marks on paper. Amazingly to me, he admitted as much in one session in which we both participated.... My in therapy and in groups makes it impossible for me to deny the reality and significance CHAPTER I 3.

of human . To me it is not an illusion that man is to some degree the architect of himself. (Rogers, 1980, p.56-57) Later I will engage the issues which this quotation raises. Its purpose here is to estadlish a preliminary point. The very different ways in which Skinner and Rogers understood and went about the enterprise of psychology illustrates that what you do as a psychologist differs greatly according to the stance you adopt on matters stemming directly from the free will/determinism issue. I shall return to a detailed consideration of the approaches of both Skinner and Rogers in a later chapter. There I will show that the issue is a pervasive one in approaches to personality and counselling. As a psychologist working in industrial settings, my interest is in the application of psychology to personal and organisational issues and concerns. But I find that in my work I constantly run up against a dichotomy as to how these issues and concerns are to be approached. A dichotomy which in critical respects presents me with competing i views of the nature of human beings and human experience. I detect the same philos.ophica1 motifs of the Rogers/ Skinner debate running through my own professional experience. Are human beings to be understood as determined systems or as self determining persons? The various theoretical models which seek to explain and influence the behaviour of people in the work place provide different answers to this question.

I As the SkinnerIRogers debate illustrates, the free will/determinism issue is still carried along within psychology as unresolved baggage from the philosophical past: a philosophical virus in the psychological system. There is, it seems to me, a need to address the philosophical basis of the issue to see whether the paradoxes, knots, tangles and disputes it tends to produce in psychology are capable of any kind of fundamental resolution. If a resolution is possible from the psychological side it must include a philosophical examination of the issue, for, as was noted earlier, the basis of , the issue is conceptual not empirical. Accordingly, although this is a thesis in psychology, I find it necessary to probe philosophical issues in some depth. I am not a professional philosopher. I can examine philosophical as an informed layman but I am not an expert. At the same time I intend to do sufficient to the I philosophical literature to render my conclusions defensible from a philosophical CHAPTER 1 4. point of view. But my is not to produce a philosophical treatise. My purpose is to examine what I regard as a crucial conceptual issue in psychology, in order to determine whether some way forward might be found which will render it more intelligible and manageable for psychological science and practice. Hence an excursion into the realm of philosophy is a necessary step in pursuit of that aim. In this introductory chapter I will set about three tasks. The first is to lay out the core issues raised by the free will/ determinism dichotomy, including the contexts in which they arise and their significance. Second, I shall indicate in a preliminary way, the position which I intend to advocate and the reasons why. Before attempting either of these however it is first necessary to something of a taxonomy of positions on the issue. This will serve the function of outlining the key terms in the debate. It will also identify the basic range of options available with some indication of their merits and limitations. Substantive argumentation around the various positions will be reserved for later chapters.

1.2 Initial definitions of key terrns The key terms in this thesis are "freedom" and "determinism". An initial task is therefore to define, at least in a preparatory way, what is meant by them. This I propose to do by constructing a spectrum of the major positions in relation to the freedoddeterminism issue moving in a broad general direction from most to least deterministic. The distinctions which I am about to draw are fundamental to the progression of the arguments in the chapters which follow. One notable that this analysis reveals is that the terrns "fieedom"/"determinism" are used in multiple senses. Hence in any given context we need to attend carefully to the specific senses in which the terms are being used. This task is being undertaken at the outset in order to enhance the clarity of what follows. Thereafter the cogency of the main positions will be assessed. At the outset it should be noted that determinism applied to the non-human universe is not usually regarded as problematic. It is the application of determinism to people which is generally regarded as much more contentious and is the topic of this CHAPTER 1 5. thesis. The classification which follows is principally concerned with the major approaches to determinism as they apply to human beings. Nevertheless, as I shall show, analysis of the human case necessarily draws on the analysis of the situation with regard to nature. The basic I have adopted is that put forward by Honer, Hunt, and Okholm (1 992). I have augmented and modified it. In the process of doing so I have drawn on the work of Solomon (1 989), Teichrnan and Evans (1 99 1) and Honderich (1 993). There is a tendency in the literature for a degree of drift in the meaning of at least some terms. I have endeavoured to build this initial glossary around what I believe to be the most commonly adopted usage. Before we consider specific positions in the freedom/ determinism debate, there are two rather more general distinctions which are best met at the outset. The first of these is between "natural" and "non-natural", determinism. Natural aid Non-Natural Determinisnt Natural, or "scientific" determinism asserts that human behaviour may be explained by natural processes such as genetics, physio-chemicaI structures, and conditioning. "Non-natural" determinism on the other hand claims that human behaviour is determined by causes which lie outside of the natural order - like fate or the predestining providence of . The overwhelming focus of concern of this thesis is with natural or scientific determinism (although, one attempt to resolve the freedom/ determinism issue, to be met subsequently, rests on a blending of "natural" with a form of "non-natural" determinism.) Metapltysical aitd Metltodological Determiirisnz The second preliminary distinction to be made is between "metaphysical" and "methodological" determinism. Methodological determinism is the acceptance of determinism on pragmatic grounds as an heuristic assumption. Determinism is adopted because it is useful in understanding the world about us and; in the case of psychology, in understanding ourselves. Metaphysical determinism on the other hand, is the doctrine that the universe, ontologically speaking (viz. in of its own inherent properties), is a determined system. One is a useful assumption for scientific research, the other represents a philosophical world view. CHAPTER 1 6.

One way of illustrating this distinction derives from the field of . Some scientists (e-g. Davies, 1992) appear to believe that the behaviour of certain sub- atomic particles is lawless or random. Others do not. A scientist who was a methodological determinist could accept the thesis of the non-determined behaviour of these particles if he or she considered that the empirical grounds for accepting it were sufficiently strong. A scientist who happened to be a metaphysical determinist could not. A specific restriction is acceptable for a methodological but quite impossible for a metaphysical truth. A metaphysical determinist would be committed, whatever the , to the belief that the want of lahlness in the behaviour of sub-atomic particles must be apparent rather than real. In the context of my thesis this is a significant distinction. The early chapters are principally concerned with determinism as a metaphysical belief. Methodological determinism and its relationship to metaphysical determinism will become important in the chapters which consider freedom/ determinism in relation to theory and in psychology. We-are now in a position to begin a taxonomy of the major stances which have been held in the freedom/ determinism debate, beginning, as I indicated earlier, at the deterministic end of the spectrum. The most significant differentiation at the determinist end is the distinction between "hard" determinism and "soft" determinism. Hard Determinism The word "hard" has, in this context, several related senses. First it signifies a certain tough mindedness, as in "hard headed". A further meaning relates to being unpalatable or at least difficult; as Solomon (1989) puts it, a "hard conclusion to acceptw@. 496). It is a point of view then which requires a certain steeling of the mind to contemplate. Finally there is perhaps a connotation of strength; as in a very strong sense of determinism - continuing all the way down with no exceptions. In its original formulations by such thinkers as Laplace (1 749-1827) and dlHolbach (1 723-1 789), the of physics were seen as being able to explain all natural phenomena - including all human phenomena. I think the following lines from dlHolbach's "System of Nature" (1 797) provide the reader with some feel for all senses of the epithet "hard". Man's life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant. CHAPTER 1 7.

He is born without his own ; his organisation does in nowise depend upon himself; his ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those who cause him to contract them; he in unceasingly modified by causes, whether visible or concealed, over which he has no control , which necessarily regulate his mode of , give the hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. He is good or bad, happy or miserable, wise or foolish, reasonable or irrational , without his will being for anything in these various states. (Solomon, 1989, p.497) Hard determinism has occupied a very important place in modern psychology. Skinner was certainly a hard determinist. Freud probably was, although, as we shall see subsequently, there appear to have been some countervailing trends in his thought. The of hard determinism is the proposition that all human phenomena are caused or governed in every respect by invariant natural laws. Theorists have put forward various views as to what these laws are. But all hard determinist theories of the person have in common a view of human beings as essentially the passive instruments of genetic andlor environmental processes - which determine all aspects of their functioning, mental as well as physical. Whilst we experience ourselves as freely choosing, in actual fact our every thought and action is produced by non- sentient natural causes. As the quotation above illustrates, hard determinism has a devastating impact on a number of our most dearly and deeply held beliefs about ourselves. Simply expressed, our intuitions of freedom and all that derives from them, are mere illusions. These implications of hard determinism will be considered in detail later in this chapter. Soft Deternzirzisnz Soft determinism differs from hard determini& in that it seeks a reconciliation or blending of our intuitions of freedom with scientific determinism. Thus "soft" in this context means qualified, less harsh, more acceptable. Soft detekinism has been an influential position in the history of the freedom1determinism debate. In modern psychology many of the expressions of cognitive psychology, as I shall argue later, are essentially manifestations of this position. There are a number of versions of soft determinism. The most common approach is to define freedom as the absence of CHAPTER 1 8.

1 external coercion. A person's actions are deemed to be free if they flow without constraint from his or her character. By character is broadly meant personality. Our desires, needs, beliefs, ideals, and values, are held to issue from our character. If freedom means acting in accordance with our desires and values, then, say the soft I

determinists, there is no conflict between freedom and determinism. This is because I our character is itself determined by natural causes. A key difference between hard and soft determinism lies in the role assigned to the human mind. For hard determinism, the mind, if it is held to exist at all, is an irrelevance. For the soft

determinist, conscious processes are important. We act in accordance with reasoned 7 1 deliberation. Our thinking is a key determinant of our behaviour. Conscious processes I are the immediate cause of voluntary action. But the desires which prompt our action, spring from our wholly determined character. Soft determinism is also known as "" because it seeks to make freedom and determinism compatible with each other. Its advocates maintain that it enables us to affirm that, in important respects, we are free, without at the same time compromising a natural determinism. Its opponents on the freedom side, maintain that in fundamental ways it t I is no improvement on hard determinism. They stress that the of freedom, in the l context of this debate, is no mere absence of coercion. In some sense freedom implies

a human capacity to transcend, or at least to modify, the chain of natural causation. , Accordingly, they claim soft determinism is no different from hard determinism - human beings remain the passive instruments of natural causes. The soft determinist position will be explored in some detail in the following chapter. The distinction between hard and soft determinism is far and away the most I significant shading within the determinist camp. Before moving on to consider other I i positions, let me briefly introduce two variants within determinism; "near determinism" and "non-rigid determinism". Near Determinisnz In providing an illustration of the distinction between metapl~ysicaland methodological determinism, it was noted that some scientists have concluded that I discoveries such as the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg point to genuine indeterminacy or randomness in the behaviour of sub atomic particles. "Near I CHAPTER 1 9 . determinism" is the term which denotes this position. Determinism is almost, but not quite, universal. The exception is to be found in the realm of quantum mechanics. Non-Rigid Determinisnz "Non-rigid determinism" is a position of clear relevance for psychology. In essence it is the acceptance that the immense complexity of human phenomena precludes the development of a physics of the person. The complexity of it all defies, and may always defy, a total explanation. Even if the underlying causes were all understood, the specifics of their interaction in any given case may be of such bewildering intricacy as to forever limit prediction to broad statements of statistical probability. Natural determinism is universal but so that the best we can hope for in psychology is a looser form of explanation. The sweeping nomic statements found in physics are simply out of reach.

"Superordinate " Determinism In drawing the distinction between "natural" and "non-natural" determinism, I indicated that one attempt to resolve the freedom1 determinism problem involves blending natural with a form of non-natural determinism. The philosopher Bland Blanshard (1958) advocates this line of approach. Blanshard argues that people are only partly determined by natural causes. In addition to natural determinism, human action is partly determined by superordinate . Blanshard identifies three clusters of these principles; logical , the moral , and the precepts of . Human beings are totally determined but the causes which govern them are of two distinct kinds. To the subordinate natural causes Blanshard has added superordinate determining principles which intermittently seize the human mind. His position represents an attempt to hold together two seemingly mutually exclusive positions. First, that there is something about the higher human capacities - for , and art - which is not reducible to the world of natural causation. And second, that determinism is universal. This he achieves by invoking a form of non- natural determinism. Whilst the idea of superordinate forces seizing the mind accords with certain of our intuitions - like being carried along by an idea, or in the grip of an inspiration - it confronts a number of problems. What ontological status do such principles have? What becomes of the meaning of "cause" in his account? Blanshard CHAPTER 1 10. seems to be claiming that, although completely determined, we can initiate action in accordance with the ideals we come to believe in. In the end however, it seems to me that Blanshard's position represents a form of soft determinism. My reasons for this conclusion will be elaborated later in the context of a more detailed examination of this approach. So far we have considered positions which all have in common the idea that human beings are fully determined. We turn now to a consideration of positions which assert that human beings, unlike the rest of nature, are to some extent the cause of their own actions, or at least need to be viewed as such. Freedont as a "Necessary Fictiott " The weakest advocation of human freedom is the view that freedom is an assumption which we need in life and it should be accepted for that reason alone. Even if no doctrine of human freedom is defensible and scientific determinism holds the truth of the , we nevertheless should regard ourselves as free. This is because the assumption of freedom is necessary to make life coherent, and meaningful. Determinism paints such a dismal picture of the human condition, that it has the general effect of stripping life of its zest and richness. Therefore I will decide to assume that I am free. That is, I will adopt the notion of freedom as a necessary fiction. Some people find this position unsatisfactory on the grounds of its perceived want of integrity. If determinism is true then we should not flinch from it. Adopting freedom on these terms seems like turning our backs on reality. Freedom as art Assumption A somewhat stronger version of the view that freedom should be accepted as an assumption, rests on the conclusion that the freedom1 determinism issue is inherently and permanently undecidable. It is not possible to establish conclusive arguments either way. A viable case can be made for both determinism and freedom. But we need to assume freedom because it offers a richer deeper approach to'life than does determinism. This claim for the superiority of the of freedom I will consider in detail in the section which follows. The stance of the humanist psychologist Carl Rogers (1969), as we shall see subsequently, has much in common with this approach. In some respects, one of the fathers of modem psychology, CHAPTER 1 11.

William James (1 979), could also be seen as a representative of this view. James was a passionate supporter of the claim that human beings are free and he strove to establish the cogency of this position. He nevertheless believed that both positions are intellectually viable. We will consider James' arguments in some detail in the chapter which follows. So far we have considered freedom merely as an assumption. The next two positions we shall consider seek to give an account of freedom. That is, to provide some justification for the viability or cogency of the belief. Active Self Deter~nination The first of these is known as "active self determination". This position rejects the idea of the existence of a free will as a metaphysical entity. What it does propose is that (hard and soft) determinists have overlooked an important human capacity. Human beings have the ability to think, to reflect, to become insightfully aware. By developing this capacity people can learn to be free. They can take account of the effects of past conditioning - abstract themselves from it, stand apart from it and act on the basis of self determined goals. Such thinking is itself a causal process through which people become self-directing; able to make new and creative responses. Thus a person is not simply the effect of previous causes, he or she can also be an agent, an active self. Essentially, freedom is understood to be an emergent natural c.apacity of the human mind which lifts human beings to some degree beyond the realm of natural causation. As we have seen, soft determinism holds that reason can only work with the premises presented to it by our determined desires. Active self determination on the other hand proposes that reason is not always the captive of desire. People, through reflection, can create their own premises and become self determining agents. Rychlak (1980) and perhaps Bandura (1989) are psychologists &hose theories represent versions of active self determination. One criticism of this position is that it overturns the scientific world view in that it renders a causal explanation of huAan action impossible in principle. If premises can be created without causal antecedents then we have no way of explaining them. To call them emergent properties is not to explain them but simply to give the notion of contra causal freedom a scientific aura. CHAPTER 1

Irzdetermirzism The second type of account of how freedom is possible is often termed "indeterminism". Meaning as it does a denial of determinism, "indeterminism" is used in twoi-ather different senses. This is because determinism as a universal principle may be denied in two quite distinct ways. The first of these we have already met as "near determinism" - a strand of scientific opinion in quantum mechanics which conjectures the existence of lawless or random behaviour in some natural entities. The second kind of denial of determinism, to be considered here, is not to be confused with randomness. It is the assertion that human beings possess a unique capacity to function as the cause of their own actions. Unlike active self determination, which views freedom as an emergent natural capacity, indeterminism maintains that there is some kind of a metaphysical difference between human beings and natural objects. The one asserts that there is a natural explanation for the capacity, the other, that we i need another framework of thought or existence beyond the natural order to explain it. Indeterminism does not deny that the physical universe is determined - indeed it must be lafilly ordered if human actions are to be efficacious. Indeterminist views then rest on some form of ontological difference between the human world and the world of natural determinism. Perhaps the best known exponent of this approach is the philosopher Descartes (1 596-1 650) who, at the beginning of the modem era, argued that the mind is immaterial and free, whilst the body, like the rest of nature, is a physical mechanism. A very different version of indeterminism, influential in our own time, is put forward by existentialist thinkers such as Sartre (1 905-1980). The existentialist approach is of considerable significance as far as psychology is concerned. As we shall see, existentialist personality theories, and therapeutic techniques stemming from them, enjoy a certain currency among counselling practitioners. Advocates of indeterminist positions argue that indeterminism enables us to fully recognise and engage our l~umanness,a defining characteristic of which is freedom. Opponents argue that indeterminist positions are obscurantist blocks to the of scientific knowledge. Libertariarzism I A key term in the debate is "libertarian". In this context the word refers to a belief in CHAPTER 1 13.

the supposed capacity of human beings to determine their own actions. Expressed negatively, libertarianism is the view that human beings are not wholly determined by natural (or non-natural) causes. Thus active self determination and indeterminism are both forms of the libertarian position. Libertarianism and Determilzism At this point a very broad differentiation between libertarian views on the one hand and determinist positions on the other may help to reinforce some key issues in the debate. Libertarians assert that human beings in some respect are outside the order of universal natural causation. Natural determinists (hard and soft) maintain that human beings are wholly determined by natural causes. A consequence of the determinist position is that the past determines a unique future. At any given time, the natural order being what it is, and the invariant laws which govern it being as they are, only one future is conceivable. Libertarians affirm that because human beings are free, a i variety of alternate futures are possible. The determinist position holds that a particular person facing a particular set of circumstances which require him or her to act in some way, can act only in the way which is demanded by antecedent causes. Thus, for any action we have ever undertaken, we could not have done otherwise, the circumstances being as they were. Libertarians on the other hand hold that freedom conveys real choice and that in considering past actions it is often true to say that we could have done otherwise than to act in the way we did. The implications of these differences between determinist and libertarian perspectives will be considered in detail shortly. Causatio~z Before doing so however, it is necessary to spend a little time attempting to explicate another key term. The whole freedom/ determinism debate turns on the notion of cause - in particular the causes of human desire, thought and action. Some consideration of the meaning of causation is clearly required. unfortunately, this is anything but a simple task. Considerable differences of view exist as to how the notion of causation is to be understood. In what follows I will attempt to outline the major approaches to understanding causation and indicate how I will generally be I employing the term in the context of this thesis CHAPTER 1 14.

The nature of causation is a question which has long been debated in philosophy. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to pursue it in any detail. Kim (1995) in a brief review of recent thought identifies four broad approaches. (1) One approach is known as regularity analysis. On this view cause is understood as the constant conjunction between events. Some thinkers, following Hume (1 71 1- 1776), would deny that it is possible to infer a necessity linking events, such that one brings the other about, or,"causes" it. Hume pointed out that whilst we infer a necessary link between two constantly associated events, this is merely the imposition of our own . We have no logical justification for supposing that such a link actually exists. Others do affirm that we can justify the objective existence of a necessary link and speak of causal laws or "nomological necessity" to which the constant conjunctions testify. One difficulty inherent in this approach is that of logically differentiating "causal" conjunctions from other constant conjunctions where , clearly one would not wish to claim a causal relation. (I may always eat breakfast just before the 7 am news begins. But my eating breakfast is not the cause of the 7 am news.) (2) A second approach is known as "counterfactual analysis". It is held that an constitutes a cause if, in its absence, some other event would not have occurred. Various forms of counterfactual analysis have been proposed. (Thus my eating breakfast could not be held to have caused the 7 am news if, when I failed to eat breakfast, the 7 am news continued to be broadcast.) (3) Manipulation analysis is another approach to causation. What we call a cause is an event which we can use to bring about some other event, the effect. This approach is based on the active manipulation of events to bring about other events. (If my eating or not eating breakfast was able to control the broadcast or non-broadcast of the 7 am news it would count as a cause.) , (4) The final approach is probabilistic analysis. An event is identified as the "probabilistic" cause of another event if it can be shown that the probability of second event occurring in the absence of the causal event was much lower. Thus it is statistical probability which determines whether an event qualifies as a cause. (Here a 1 1 significant statistical relationship between breakfast1 non-breakfast and instances of CHAPTER 1 15. the broadcast would establish a causal link.) There exists a considerable literature on causation in which each of these approaches has been extensively explored. Kim notes that all four of them have unresoIved difficulties and problems. I The attempt to "analyse" causation seems to have reached an impasse; the proposals on hand seem so widely divergent that one wonders whether they are all analyses of one and the same concept. But each of them seems to address some important aspect of the variegated notion that we express by the term 'cause', and it may be doubted whether there is a unitary concept of causation 1

that can be captured in an enlightening . (Kim, 1995, I p. 112) On the basis of this complex situation I shall use the notion of cause broadly in the ,I terms of the regularity (nomological necessity) and counterfactual approaches as these 1 are for the most part reflective of the way the term is commonly met in the literature I associated with the freedoddetenninism literature. A cause then is a necessary relationship between two events or states of affairs where the first is held to bring 1 I about the second or, where without the first the second would not have occurred. It is I generally (but not universally) held that in order to bring about its effect a cause must

I be temporally prior to its effect. The term cause is of course comn~onlyapplied in a I global sense to the natural world as a whole, not just to specific events. Thus it also signifies that the universe as a wl~olemay be viewed as a causal system; ordered by universal and invariant natural "laws" which govern the behaviour of all the entities within it.

Unless specified to the contrary then, it is with this general intent that I will I I employ the notion of "cause" in this thesis. I trust that 6) dealing with specific issues relating to as they arise in the progress of argumentation, I will pay sufficient

regard to complexities to which I have merely alluded here. I The Four Causes of Aristotle A causal schema or taxonomy to which reference will be made in various parts of this thesis is that of Aristotle (384-322 BC). Although only one of Aristotle's "causes" relates directly to the construct we have been considering in the above discussion, two , CHAPTER 1 16. of his other notions of "cause are of considerable importance to the freedoddetenninism issue. Aristotle identified four different forms of explanation which may be given for the occurrence of an event or the existence of an . I will do no more than list and briefly define them. Their relevance to the fi-eedoddeterminism debate will be established as we proceed. (a) The nzaterial cause. An explanation is given for an object based on the material out of which the object emerges. My car is what it is because of the metal out of which it is made. It shines because of the type of paint which covers it. (As we shall see material cause explanations are not infrequently met in psychology.) (b) The foi-nzal cause. An explanation is given for an object based on the plan from which it was constructed. Thus the formal cause of my car was the design or blueprint which determined what it became. (c) The efficient cause. This is something like the modern understanding of scientific causation. Thus the efficient cause of my car could be held to be the various manufacturing processes which brought it into being. (d) Thefinal cause. This is an explanation based on the purpose or goal for the sake of which something is done. Thus the final cause of my forsaking my car and walking could be the good of my health. (Teleological or "final cause" explanations have been advocated by some psychologists in the context of the freedomldeterminism debate.) Having set out, at least in a preliminary way, some of the chief terms and principal positions in the debate my next task is to portray at greater depth the core issues and their significance. I want to demonstrate what is at stake, to explain what it is about this issue that makes the debate so persistent and so passionate.

1.3 The significance of freedom Freedom and Determirtisnz: Opposing viovs of lzrrmarz life The fi-eedoddeterminism issue is more than just a professional problem which confronts us as psychologists. It is a human question which goes to the very core of what we understand ourselves to be. And it is to these deep questions of meaning, provoked by the issue, that I now turn. In drawing to these matters I wish to CHAPTER 1 17.

establish a significant claim in the overall context of this thesis. I will argue that if it can be shown that freedom, in the libertarian sense, is a cogent position, then we should adopt it. I leave to later chapters the task of establishing whether viewing ourselves as free is indeed a viable option. My aim here is a more restricted one. Assuming for the moment that we had a choice, assuming that all positions in the debate possess equal merit as far as cogency is concerned, then I aim to show that a libertarian position is much to be preferred. From the outset it is important to be clear that this is not a dispute about the way the world is, or at least the way the world appears to be. All sides in the debate are in general agreement as to the of our experience. It is agreed by all that we have compelling intuitions about such things as choosing freely and being responsible for our own actions. And, equally, all sides agree that we have strong intuitions, and a body of research evidence, in support of the view that our actions are significantly shaped, even determined, by character and past . Broadly speaking, the facts of the matter are not in dispute so far as human experience goes. The dispute centres on how certain crucial aspects of our common experience are to be understood. So radically different are these understandings, that they result in diametrically opposed conceptions of the nature of human existence. What I propose to do now, is to make a broad division between libertarianism (the belief that humans are to some degree the cause of their own actions) and universal natural determinism; comparing their respective accounts of the nature of human life. My claim that freedom is preferable to determinism is founded on the view of crucial aspects of human existence which each position supports. Dennett (1978) suggests that "The so called free will problem is in fact many not very closely related problems tied together by a name and lots of attendant anxiety." (p.286). He offers what he terms "an incomplete list" of such questions. Included on this list are moral responsibility, autonomy and self authorship, novelty and possibility. The related matters of human dignity, and the meaningfilness of human actions have also been specified (e.g. Skinner, 1971; Williams, 1987) as hinging to a significant degree on the freedom1 determinism dichotomy. An important motif to be developed in relation to these themes is the "anxiety" CHAPTER 1 18.

! mentioned by Dennett and explained by him in the following way. Most people can be brought by reflection to care very much what the truth is on these matters, for each problem poses a threat; to our self esteem, to our 'conviction that we are not living deluded lives, to our conviction that we may ' justifiably trust our grasp of such utterly familiar notions as possibility, opportunity and ability. (Dennett, 1978, p.286) As Dennett observes, determinism entails a denial of what we commonly cherish as our most valuable and distinctive and indeed glorious human characteristics. I am mounting my case that freedom is preferable on these questions of value. Of course, should determinism turn out to be the only cogent position, then we must simply make the best of things. For the moment however, we are confronting two views about life on equal terms, as if we had a choice between them. Moral Responsibility One of our common intuitions is that of moral responsibility. We understand ourselves to have the capacity to choose freely among alternative courses of action. In order to be deemed morally responsible a person must have been able to act other than in the way he or she did. If this were not the case, then the agent had no choice, could not have helped but commit the action and thus, cannot be held responsible for it in anything like the usual sense. It follows from a determinist view of things that we never in fact have such a choice. We can only ever act as antecedent natural causes dictate. For this reason the notions of universal determinism and moral responsibility logically exclude one another. I regard it as reasonable, then, that if determinism is true no man has ever been morally responsible for anything he has ever done, and no man ever will be under any obligation to do anything. (Taylor, 1958, p.214) Few would maintain that human beings are always and everywhere to be held morally responsible. In common sense thinking and in legal reasoning about moral : ! responsibility, it is recognised that people can become dysfunctional in ways which diminish or obliterate their moral capacities. Psychotic disturbance, the influence of drugs, and damage are some of these factors. Moral responsibility is, however,

generally seen as something which pertains to the fully hnctioning human I CHAPTER 1 19.

being. And this determinism denies. Given the totality of environmental factors and the state of the person at that time, for the determinist, one pathway and one pathway alone is possible and necessary. John Hospers (1958), a determinist who approaches the issue from a psychoanalytic perspective, writes of the need to go beneath our everyday language and thinking about moral responsibility to a "lower" and "more accurate" level of discourse of which he has this to say. Instead of saying that it is false that we are responsible for our own characters, I should prefer to say that the utterance is meaningless - meaningless in the sense that it describes no possible situation, though it seenzs to do so.... If this is so, the result is that nloral terms - at least the terms " could have" and "responsible" - simply drop out on the lower level. (Hospers, 1958, p. 130) Moral responsibility, in the ordinary sense of the term, demands that more than one i course of action is genuinely open. As Hospers rightly points out, the notion of moral responsibility cannot coexist in the same realm of discourse as a fully determinist account. Thus two utterly opposed constructions of our experience of moral responsibility

, are before us. On one side the libertarian position holds that our intuitions about moral responsibility are substantially correct. People really do face choices, act well or badly, and may be held accountable for what they have done. Our capacity to choose how we will treat others, ourselves, the non-human animals, and the physical environment, marks us off from the rest of nature. On the other side the determinist position declares that we are as determined as the rest of nature. No one can ever avoid doing what he or she does. Williams (1992), illustrates the kind of difficulty this outlook presents for our ordinary way of looking at moral action. An act of charity seems to be charity only if it is one of a set of possible acts and it really does not need to happen at all. The very notion of "compelled charity" strikes us as oxymoronic. (p.753) We need to be clear about what the adoption of the determinist standpoint entails here. Our whole lexicon of moral terms has, as Hospers points out, at best provisional ' validity. Moral heroism, conspicuous acts of kindness and all the , are not at all CHAPTER 1 20.

what we take them to be. They are, in this crucial respect, at one with the most base, cruel, and inhumane actions, in that alike they too are simply necessary. Our experiences of moral reflection, struggle, and choice, are illusions.

We are presented then with two ways of looking at our experience of ourselves as I moral beings. Moral responsibility is either a defining characteristic of our species, a j mark of human greatness, or it is an illusion. The first view encourages, challenges and sustains us in the living of our lives, whereas the other promotes a fatalistic acceptance of ourselves, in that like natural objects, we can only behave as our governing natural systems decree. Agency arz d A utorzonzy I There once was a man who said "Damn! It is borne in upon me I am

An engine that moves I in predestinate grooves

I'm not even a bus I'm a tram. I

I Attributed to the philosopher R. M. Hare (1919-), this limerick encapsulates the determinist view of human autonomy. Most of us would probably acknowledge that I 1 like trams, much of our living occurs in the well defined grooves of habit. But equally,

, most of us imagine that we have a choice in the matter. We tend to believe that to a ! significant extent we can chart our own course in life. We can take a hand in determining the future. Turning to the theatre for another analogy, we regard ourselves not just as players, but as having a hand in writing the script. So compelling are these intuitions that it can be hard to grasp that we could be mistaken about them. For this reason it may be useful to examine a little more closely I the determinist alternative. / One who endorses the claim of universal causation, then, and the theory of the I causal determination of all human behavior, is a kind of fatalist - or at least he should be, if he is consistent. For that theory, as we have seen, onc'e it is i clearly spelled out and not hedged about with unresolved "ifs" , does entail that whatever happens is rendered inevitable by the causal conditions preceding it, and is therefore unavoidable. (Taylor, 1992, p 96) I We tend to believe that there are many pressing issues and concerns where the I CHAPTER 1 21. outcome is genuinely in doubt, finely balanced. Take for example the impact of green house gas emissions on climate change. We might conclude that things could go either way. Given sufficient effort of will among the peoples and politicians of the world, it might be possible to redeem the situation. Believing that this is a possibility, we might strive and work to bring it about. Universal determinism entails that we are mistaken about this. Whatever the future in relation to world climate, it was determined from the dawn of time. Whatever effort people are devoting and will devote to it, was also determined from the beginning. Our sense that the issue could go either way is an illusion. The green house issue was always going to go in the way that it must. No issue is ever in doubt in the sense that it hangs in the balance. Doubt only arises in relation to prediction. At present we lack sufficient knowledge of all the variables involved in the green house issue to foretell the outcome. The truth is that there are no possibilities and everything is simply unavoidable. If I am working to reduce green house emissions, I am doing so because I cannot help it. And the issue itself is not in doubt, just beyond prediction. I am not at all an autonomous agent. I am a cog in the universal machine of natural causation. A wondrous and extraordinarily complex and amazing machine it is too, but a machine none the less. The determinist denial of autonomy has two consequences for our view of ourselves. First, it denies that we choose to do things, all our actions are caused. We are not agents but sophisticated automata. However brave, adventurous, fine, creative, ingenious, loving, or thoughtful, we may think an action, it was done because the doer literally had no alternative. Such a realisation robs actions of their significance. Indeed the very vocabulary of actions implies that they are chosen from a range of possibilities. It is this that gives them their meaning. It is one thing to believe that my partner chose to prepare my favourite meal, another to believe that she had no alternative. Such a realisation rather takes the point out of human actions - and, many would feel, out of life generally. The second consequence of the determinist denial of human autonomy is total inevitability - as Taylor (1992) points out, a form of . There is no freedom anywhere in the universe and hence no possibilities. Our individual actions serve the production of an inevitable future. To be convinced that all is foredoomed, and that CHAPTER 1 22. one has no real hand in shaping any aspect of it, is, for many, a sombre thought indeed. Novelty those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. (James, 1979, p. 1 17)

William James here draws our attention to the consequences of a determinist view on the status of our intuitions of novelty. We have already broached this theme in the discussion of agency. Now we will attend to it more directly. Novelty for determinism, is necessity unfolding. Let us take the example of the of a new species. A new animal or plant may look significantly unlike its forbears. Yet it has come into being purely as the result of genetic mutation and a supportive environment. In principle at least, its emergence could have been predicted given a sufficient knowledge of these antecedent causes (unless perhaps we admit the possibility of true randomness in mutation). When we consider human actions from the determinist point of view, the principle is the same. No matter how apparently different some human production is from what has gone before, its emergence was always going to happen precisely as it did. It was "locked in" by causal necessity. We do not in any real sense create, we simply mutate. Our intuitions are different. We credit ourselves with the capacity for envisioning fresh possibilities, for reaching beyond the limits of our previous experience, and the "comfort zone" of our personalities, and bringing about the radically new. One arena which springs to mind in the context of novel action is artistic creation. In our ordinary thinking about the matter, we assume that what distinguishes the truly novel is that to some degree at least, it is discontinuous with the past. In the case of a work of art we commonly trace many past influences on the production of the work. The personality of the artist and the impact of his or her environment, we may say, constitute necessary conditions for the work being what it is. But they are not usually seen by us as sufficient. We commonly think that the artist chose to create what he or CHAPTER 1 23.

I she did in pursuit of some meaning or vision. Art, we think, is one of the glories of the human spirit precisely because it points to an imagination which is partly free of . natural constraints. The artist creates his or her own aesthetic vision out of, but not becaus&of, past influences. As a result, events and objects are created which did not I have to be there at all. - Artistic phenomena like ethical phenomena cannot be reduced to natural necessity ! without changing our sense of ourselves. Do our works express human visions or are they the effects of natural causes? If freedom exists, the natural world is constantly being acted upon and its course changed by human purposes ideas and visions. !

If natural determinism is universal, we are the puppets of necessity, doing what we I must. Our visions are genetic/environmental products in disguise. Meaning Our intuitions prompt us to distinguish between human actions and natural events. i We distinguish between them on the grounds of meaning. That is, we look for meaning in human actions in a way that we do not seek for it in natural events. This is because we assume that something was "meant" or intended by the person who performed the action. We imagine that the action was selected from among a range of : possible candidates by the person, as the one which best expressed his or her ideas/values/. Natural events on the other hand happen because they must.

, So unless we are animists, or theists of a certain cast, we do not seek meaning in natural happenings in the way that we do in human actions. The deternlinist construction of meaning is very different. If we are determinists we must, in the end, go behind the world of appearances - purposes, reasons, visions, : values- to world of natural causes. Behind the theatre of meaning is the backstage mechanism which produces the show. Although it may not appear that way, people do what they do because they cannot conceivably do anything else. There : is no real difference between human and natural events, in the sense we have been considering, both are meaning-less. Dignify

I B. F. Skinner (1971) rightly linked the constructs of freedom and dignity. I-Ie saw I that the idea of what he called "autonomous man" is linked closely to the idea of CHAPTER 1 24.

inherent human dignity and worth. This same link was made much earlier by the philosopher Imrnanuel Kant (1 724-1804). Kant considered that human beings, by virtue of their freedom, possess inherent dignity as "ends in themselves" (Komer,

1955). ' Our capacities as free beings - the autonomy of our reason, our capacity to formulate and obey the moral law, our freedom, within limits, to decide who we will to become, our ability to introduce novelty into the natural order, our aesthetic creations - these things set us apart. As Kant pointed out, it is not so much that our freedom establishes us as having a greater value than other entities, rather it establishes us as the creators of value. Other things only have value because we value them. We are, in that sense, above all valuation. This inherent dignity, as Skinner argued, is denied by determinism. Froin the determinist point of view the difference between us and other natural objects is quantitative rather than qualitative. We are in many respects more complex than other creatures. This enables the accomplishment by humans of things beyond even the most advanced of other animals. But the difference is strictly one of degree rather than of kind. . Conclrtsion I should underline that my aim here has not been to establish the viability, or cogency, of freedom. My only aim has been to demonstrate that, given a choice, it is a more attractive view than universal natural determinism. My case against determinism, on these grounds, is that it makes much of what we value most in our lives, and in ourselves, a facade - the mere artefact of natural processes. Whether we are libertarians or determinists, the world remains the same. People continue to make moral choices, decide the course of their lives, devote themselves to high callings and great causes, and create masterpieces. What determinism does with these things is to "white-ant" them. Our intuitions tell us that these things are of great substance. It follows from a universal natural determinism that they have no substance at all, they are mere shadows. The question which now confronts us is whether the case for universal natural I ' determinism is overwhelming. Freedom may be preferable, but is it viable? In CHAPTER 1 25.

evaluating the viability of fieedom I am proposing that for any account of freedom to be viable it must satisfy three conditions. First it must constitute a justification of

, freedom in the libertarian sense. That is, it must enable us to affirm our intuitions of moral responsibility autonomy, novelty and meaning. Second, it must be cogent. By this I mean that in two respects it must be consistent. It must be internally consistent as a theory and, at the sane time, consistent with our empirical knowledge of the world in general and of human beings in particular. Finally, an account of freedom must be able to conform to the aims of psychology as an empirical discipline. That is, in order to be of assistance to psychology in its attempt to manage the 1 f?eedom/determinism issue, such an account must be open to the progress of I empirical knowledge. Specifically, it must not be antithetical to, or seek to minimise the importance of, the application of rigorous naturalistic theorising and research in I psychology. The issue of the viability of freedom will be engaged in the following

chapters. I At the beginning, I set myself three tasks. The first was to set out the major terms I

of the freedoddeterminism debate. The second was to demonstrate the importance of I I the issue as I put the case for a libertarian view. The third was to set out, in a ,1I , : preliminary way, the case I shall be defending. This third assignment remains to be completed.

1.4 The position I intend to advocate

Overnll Positiorz I The development of a strategy for the effective of the . freedom/determinism issue within psychology is clearly needed. My overall aim in . this thesis, is to show that the approach devised by the eighteenth century philosopher

Immanual Kant, can serve this purpose. I will argue that a Kantian approach has a I number of distinctive features of considerable benefit to psychology. And that,

everything considered, it is the best approach presently available. Some major benefits , of a Kantian approach, so far as psychology is concerned, are as follows. I CHAPTER 1 26.

(I) It enables human beings to be regarded, without contradiction, as both determined and free. For this reason, it supports an uncompromising methodological determinism within psychology, whilst avoiding a metaphysical determinism. Similarly, it justifies the study. of people from the standpoint of freedom, without, at the same time, placing any limitations, implied or actual, on the study of humans as wholly determined natural objects. (2) It avoids the conceptual and methodological problems attendant on any form of ontological dualism. (3) It lends conceptual support to both libertarian and determinist approaches to psychological theory, research, and practice. (4) It enables the end of the freedoddeterminism issue as a source of disputation in psychology. In place of fruitless controversy it promotes a tolerant inclusiveness, founded on the conceptual justification it provides for both perspectives. i (5) It enables psychologists, particularly those engaged in practice, to incorporate the fruits of deterministic psychology into their work: Knowing that this will not compromise their metaphysical commitment to the standpoint of freedom.

Specific Clainzs The following specific claims will be established in relation to the overall position. I aim to show that the major positions in the freedom/determinism debate have demonstrable strengths as well as weaknesses, rendering it impossible to adjudicate definitively among them. There is no conclusive answer to the problem. A cogent case can be made for both freedom and determinism. Freedom and determinism however cannot be successfully reconciled or combined. Both determinist and libertarian approaches are inadequate, by themselves, to enable us to fully comprehend human beings. Both approaches are needed.

I Theory and research in psychology have been guided for the most part by the explanatory ideals of natural science. An empirical investigation will be reported which supports the conclusion that psychological practice, at least as far as counselling is concerned, is dominated by the libertarian perspective. This ' lopsidedness within the different domains of the discipline is unsatisfactory. A better CHAPTER 1 27.

approach would encourage theorising, research and practice to proceed from both ! , determinist and libertarian assumptions. The issue can be managed effectively, not by one side achieving victory over the other, but through the recognition of the validity and necessity for both. This solution, '

, which requires two approaches in psychology with incommensurate starting points, I whilst it has its limitations, is the best presently available. A new metaphysics would

be required to enable us to do any better. It remains an open question as to whether we : shall ever be more advantageously placed. 1

Please note

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CHAPTER 2

2. Positions in the debate

The contradiction between free will and determinism is one of those that run through philosophy from early to ow own day taking different forms at different times. (Russell, 196 1, p. 273)

2.1 Approaches to tlze issue My aim in this chapter is, first, to illustrate the immense difficulty that the freedom/determinism issue creates regardless of the standpoint one adopts in relation to it: Second, I aim to show that most approaches to the issue have features which limit their usefulness as providers of conceptual strategies for psychology in its need to find an effective way of handling the problem. Specifically I mean to show that (a) the hard determinist position is not free of difficulties and objections and (b) that proposed solutions to the issue, which have been developed in an attempt to harmonise scientific determinism with our libertarian intuitions, are less than . successful. With the exception of Immanuel Kant, whose approach forms the of the following chapter, those attempts at a reconciliation which I have been able to discover take one of three broad directions. Some argue that determinism is not universal, some that we need to reconsider our notion of determinism, and some that we need to reconsider what we mean by freedom. I shall cluster my review of these attempts accordingly and examine the work of thinkers representative of each. Thus the attempts to reconcile freedom and determinism which I shall consider in this chapter are :- (1) limiting the scope of determinism by creating a window of freedom : in the universe, (2) framing the notion of freedom so as to accommodate' determinism and (3) redefining the notion of determinism so as to accommodate our intuitions of freedom. I shall argue that none of these approaches are well suited to providing

, psychology with a satisfactory strategy for its management of the issue. I I shall conclude with a brief examination of three recent approaches to the CHAPTER 2 29.

freedom/determinism issue by psychologists. These are of interest because each of ' them, in a different way, proposes that the issue may be dissolved by reconsidering key assumptions which have hitherto been accepted unquestioningly by all sides in the debate. I shall argue tliat each of them encounter tensions and difficulties, and I that, in one form or another, each of them resolves into one (or more) of the three solution pathways identified in the previous paragraph. , My purpose in doing this is to prepare the ground in two ways for the chapters which follow. There I shall be arguing that problems undecided in philosophy in relation to freedoddeterminism have continued as unresolved tensions and difficulties in modern psychology. And I shall advance the thesis that the approach proposed by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant ( 1724 - 1804) is best able to negotiate a number of these difficulties and can offer modem psychology a way forward in relation to this issue. i 2.2 Cri,ticisms of hard determinism The case for hard determinism is a formidable one. Determinism provides us with an elegant principle for understanding the universe which seems both necessary and I successful. Necessary, because without it, it is difficult to imagine how we could make sense of the world, whilst evidence for its success is to be seen all around us in . the spectacular progress of natural science. The agreement of so many philosophers indicates the strength of tlie hard determinist position. Without the assumption that "every event has its sufficient natural cause(s)", human knowledge would seem to be without one of its most vital . Not only scientific research but even our most ordinary, everyday beliefs would be forced to an intolerable sceptical standstill. Our every experience would be unintelligible, and our universe would appear to be nothing but a disconnected stream of incoherent happenings, from which nothing could be predicted and nothing understood.... For no matter how it is rephrased or logically altered.... the assumption that every event in the universe, including our own actions, can be I CHAPTER 2

explained and understood, if only one knows enough about it and its antecedent conditions, is a presupposition of all human thinking that we cannot imagine doing without. (Solomon, 1989, p.500) Determinism offers a unified model of explanation which is rational and universal. As ' was indicated in the previous chapter, when applied to human experience, it does so

, at the cost of reducing to "mere appearance" the "higher elements" in human nature. This in itself does not constitute a compelling argument against it, for we may be mistaken in these beliefs about ourselves. Nevertheless, scientific determinism is not ' without its critics. I propose to set out a number of the difficulties which have been

. identified in the hard determinist position. I A persistent criticism of hard determinism is that the position entails the reduction of reasons to causes. It has been argued that the hard determinist thesis, followed through consistently, entails scepticism. The argument proceeds in the following way. If all events have natural causes then all rational thought is naturally caused. It I does not matter whether the determinants of rational thought are conceived as physio- chemical, neurological, or environmental. The point is that all rational thought and

! discourse is reducible without remainder to non rational antecedents and systems. If '

this is true, then no process of thought can be regarded as any more or less valid than ,

any other. All propositions are simply necessary natural events. I Anscombe (1 948) sought to counter this argument, maintaining that, whatever the cause of a course of reasoning may be, we can always examine it to see whether it is rational or not. Some causal sequences may produce more rational logical results than

others. However as Mascall (1956) pointed out, this will only meet the case if we I exclude from the determinist system, the validity of our examination of the argument. I; ' That is, we have to assume that at some level, our thinking produces real insight. Once we do this we appear to limit the universal scope of determinism; that in : addition to natural causes, acts of valid inference also bring about events. If we do not , , say this, then we are bound to conclude that the rules of logical inference are natural events produced by arrational causes and we are back with the reduction of reasons to causes. Any criterion of truth would itself be a product of anon rational cause. And 'I determinism has destroyed the validity of reason, which is the foundation of all i CHAPTER 2 31.

I theory. A determinist might argue that if we adopt as our criterion of validity the efficacy of our reasoning in producing our desired ends, we would have an objective I "reality check". We know that reason is useful, it enables science and technology and that is good enough. Reason has evolved as an aid to practice. One issue which arises ' in relation to this is that universal natural determinism itself, is a speculation which goes far beyond any practice by which the soundness of our reasoning might be validated. Furthermore, the process by which it is established that reason' is an aid to practice is itself a piece of reasoning. Thus it has been argued (Lewis 1966, Mascall . 1956) that in this respect, hard determinism as a universal principle defeats itself. i

If the value of our reasoning is in doubt, you cannot try to establish it by I reasoning. If.... a proof that there are no proofs is nonsensical, so is a proof

that there are proofs. Reason is our starting point. There can be no question , either of attacking it or defending it. If by treating it as a mere phenomenon , you put yourself outside it, there is then no way, except by begging the I I question, of getting inside again. (Lewis 1966 p. 25) Hard determinism has also been criticised on the grounds that in many significant areas it has failed to "deliver the goods". That is, the determinist assumption has done ' . little if anything, in vital areas of human concern, to enhance our capacity for

prediction and control. Barrett (1 958) in an examination of mathematics, art, physics, I : and history, concludes that determinism has established itself only in relatively ' restricted spheres. He out points that a strand of opinion among physicists has denied ' determinism as a universal principle. Whether they are correct or not, this does seem to establish that determinism is not an a priori truth; we do not fall into logical

contradiction if we deny it. In that case, Barrett argues, we should regard it as a i I contingent rather than a necessary proposition and consider the empirical evidence for , I and against. With the problem thus shifted, its nature changes considerably. we should be , engaged in a painstaking examination of those regions of experience where we have established predictability, of the regions where we have not, and of the likelihood of our extending predictability to these latter regions. A good deal I of very antiquated would promptly fall by the wayside. This may be i CHAPTER 2 32.

I laying very rough hands on determinism, but it has been dealing so long in the 1.0.U.'~and promissory notes of hypotheticals - ifall conditions are given (when they so obviously can't be); ifwe knew everything (when we so obviously never shall), etc., etc. - that at long last we may be pardoned for I demanding cash or cutting off trade. (Barrett, 1958, p. 33)

Barrett then proceeds to argue the manifest failure of determinism to establish , predictability in mathematics, history, physics, and artistic creation. He concludes that we live in "a vast shaggy, amorphous mass of unpredictability.... as a total thesis determinism simply remains to be proved." (p.39) ,

Yet another line of attack against hard determinism is that it is impossible to I maintain it consistently. Whatever its cogency as a philosophical position, when it comes to living in the human world, it seems to create difficulties. Honer, Hunt and Okholm (1 992) illustrate this point in relation to the activity of science itself. t What scientists do is not and cannot be adequately accounted for in the I language of scientific determinism. A scientific experiment is purposive, guided by reference to criteria, and liable to error. Its results are verifiable. None of these terms applies to processes. If you stop the scientific activity at any point and ask "Why this step?" you get as an explanation a reason not a cause. Can you stop a brain process or response reaction Ad ask "Why function that way?" Scientific activity, then, is "purposive" and "reasoned" - yet these two terms are not in the vocabulary of the behaviourist or scientific determinist. In short, the theory of behaviourism - scientific determinism - is unscientific in the precise sense that it cannot give an account of at least one important area of human behaviour: scientific activity itself. (Honer, Hunt & Okholn, 1992, p.84) - Thus determinists, somewhat paradoxically, write books to attempt to convince us

; that all our thinking is produced by some non rational set of determinants.'Kelly (1991) points out that theories need to be reflexive. That is, they should, in the theory's own terms, be able to account for the behaviour of the theorist. Determinist theories of the person seem to experience some diff~cultywith reflexiveness. In

' similar vein, Berlin (1969) argues that the determinist thesis requires that we view CHAPTER 2 33.

I ourselves, and others, essentially as natural objects and yet no sane person tends to do ' so. William James (1 979) identifies a dilemma for determinism in our judgments of

, regret. If everything is foredoomed, then judgments of regret are wrong because they imply that what is impossible ought to be. Regrets are "theoretic absurdities and errors". Yet, if this is so, we have no grounds for deeming an event like the Port Arthur massacre bad. If we affirm that the massacre was bad and regret that it happened, we are denying our determinism. The theoretic and the active life thus play a kind of see-saw with each other on . the ground of evil. The rise of either sends the other down.

(James, 1979, p. 127) I

Whatever its cogency as a philosophical position, determinism seems difficult to ,

affirm consistently amid the judgments and activities of "being in the world". I I It is not my intention to pursue in detail these arguments or the attempts made to rebut ; ; them. It is enough to establish that hard scientific determinism, in common with all j I other stances on this issue, produces tensions and is not above criticism. I turn now to a consideration of representative accounts of the three types of attempt

:I to reconcile determinism with human freedom. 1

I 2.3 Limiting the scope of determinism to accommodate fieedom I

; The first of these approaches is to create a window of freedom within an otherwise determined universe. Not even the most ardent libertarian would want to argue that there is no determinism in the physical universe. But various approaches have been put forward which seek to establish that human beings constitute, in some respects at I ' least, an exception to determinism in the natural order. Such accounts seek to draw a i

critical distinction between the human and natural orders and view freedom as a I . decisive factor of differentiation between the two. ! Such accounts, if they are to be cogent, face the following challenges; (a) I

1 specifying the location of this freedom, (b) providing an explanation of how this freedom is able to exist (c) explaining how it is able to operate and interact with the

8 natural order and (d), clarifying what is meant by "freedom" in this context. I L CHAPTER 2 34.

I I shall briefly consider two influential accounts of this type. The first is that of Rene Descartes and second that of William James. Reize Descartes (I 596 - 1650) Rene Descartes.... is usually considered the founder of modem philosophy , ' and, I think rightly. He is the first man of high philosophic capacity whose outlook is profoundly affected by the new physics and astronomy." (Russell, 1961, p.542)

It is beyond the purpose of this thesis to provide a comprehensive outline of Descartes' philosophy. It is however necessary to sketch some of the key elements of his thought in order to fully engage his approach to the free will/determinism issue. .' Copleston (1985a) remarks that in his philosophy Descartes "consciously and deliberately broke with the past" (p.67). And he identifies three respects in which , through his work, Descartes sought a new start for philosophy. (1) He was I ! : determined to base philosophy on reason alone and to exclude appeals to authority. i (2) He aimed to uncover a basis for certainty in knowledge and (3) he was resolved

that his thought would be based on clear and distinct ideas as opposed to the confbsed I

thinking which he detected in the work of his Scholastic predecessors. I

I Descartes argued that there are two operations of the mind which, if a systematic I and orderly method of thought is followed, result in sure and certain knowledge. !

, These are intuition and deduction. Intuition is by far the more important in the I Cartesian scheme. Descartes was a mathematician who made a significant original contribution to the field of geometry (Russell 1961). In mathematics, Descartes discovered something fundamental about the operation of the human mind. Specifically he fastened upon the mind's ability to apprehend directly and clearly certain basic . (Stumph, 1989, p. 239) . This intellectual insight," so clear and distinct that it leaves no room for doubt"

I I (Copleston, 1985a, p. 73) is distinguished by Descartes from ideas which arise from I

I our senses or from our imagination. Whilst a sensory experience may be the occasion, the trigger as it were, for our apprehension of an intuition, it is not its genesis. These . , intuitions are, according to Descartes, innate ideas implanted in the by God. I I CHAPTER 2 35.

Deduction is the process of correct inference from intuitions, which are certain, to ' truths which follow necessarily as implications from our intuitions. The foundation stone then, upon which Descartes' reconstruction of philosophy rested, was the certainty provided by intuition of clear and distinct ideas: '!I judged I that I could take it to be a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true."(Descartes 1968 p.54). He was led to this conclusion (1) , on the basis of the cogito, (I think therefore I am) a clear and distinct idea the

, certainty of which he believed was ; immune from all possible doubt, (2) the self evident propositions in mathematics which he saw as a model for human 1 knowledge and (3) his claim to have proved the . The significance of ; this is that if God exists then even though our intuitions, with the exception of the cogito, may theoretically be doubted, God would not deceive us. Thus our intuitions I

may be trusted to provide us with certain knowledge. I

i Descartes's case for the freedom of the will is built on several of these clear and I I distinct ideas. The most important of these has already been mentioned; it is the , famous cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am). This is related in two ways to I Descartes' case that the will is free. First, it indicates how the idea of freedom arises. \ . Second, it shows how an account can be given of the operation of our freedom. I Descartes arrived at "the cogito", at the truth whose certainty was beyond all dispute, as the end result of a process of rigorous doubt. By doubting everything, he sought to discover what might be believed with absolute certainty. He deliberately set out to question every facet of received knowledge even, for the purpose, inventing an evil to allow otherwise doubt resistant aspects of knowledge to be rendered

amenable to uncertainty. This exercise in itself, Descartes concluded, is a 1 demonstration of freedom, for only a free being could deliberately exercise the effort I required to doubt the most basic verities of existence.

I Finally it is so evident that we are possessed of a free will that c& give or I withhold its assent, that this may be counted as one of the first and most

ordinary notions that are found innately in us. We had before a very clear I proof of this, for at the same time as we tried to doubt all things &d even I supposed that He who created us employed His unlimited powers in deceiving , I CHAPTER 2 36.

us in every way, we perceived in ourselves a liberty such that, we were able to ! abstain fiom believing what was not perfectly certain and indubitable. But that of which we could not doubt at such a time is as self-evident and clear as ariything we can ever know." (Descartes, 1969, p. 235) Thus the method through which the cogito is derived both presupposes and demonstrates our freedom and reveals freedom to be a clear and distinct idea. For in

the very act of doubting everything we find ourselves exercising freedom and being ; unable to doubt that we are. That we posses this freedom is indeed self evident.... The capacity to apply 4 methodic doubt presupposes freedom. Indeed, awareness of freedom or liberty ; is an 'innate idea'. (Copleston, 1985a, p. 139) As well as explaining how the idea of freedom arises, the cogito is important in

Descartes account of how it is that we are free. The cogito reveals that I am a thinking , i and unextended and indivisible thing. At the same time I have a clear and distinct idea 1 I of the existence of my body as a thing which does not think, occupies space, and is composedof parts. The conclusion which Descartes drew fiom this is thai the soul is distinct from the body and can exist without it. I

The whole drift of Descartes' thought is in the direction of dualism - the notion , that there are two different kind of substances in nature. We know a substance , by its attribute, and since we clearly and distinctly know two quite different attributes, namely, thought and extension there must be two different substances, the spiritual and the corporeal, mind and body. Because Descartes ' defines a substance as "an existent thing which requires nothing but itself to exist", he considers each substance as thoroughly independent of the other. To , know something about the mind, therefore we need make no reference to the : body, and similarly, the body can be thoroughly understood without any reference to mind. (Stumph, 1989, p.245) I

, The division of the universe into two substances, unextended thought and extended I bodies, enabled Descartes at once to justify scientific determinism and human freedom. The domain of extended bodies is the province of science. Its operation is I ' rigidly determined by natural causes. \ CHAPTER 2

Descartes proposes to mathematicize science. The material world is simply an ' indefinite series of variations in the shape, size and motion of the single, simple, homogenous matter that he terms res extensa ("extended

substance").Under this category he includes all physical and biological events, I even complex animal behavior, which he regards as simply the result of purely mechanical processes. (Cottingharn, 1995, p. 196)

As a human being however, my existence does not belong to the world of extended

matter. In my existence as I thinking being I am, according to Descartes, entirely I ' independent of the domain of matter occupying physical space. Accordingly I am not subject to the mathematical principles of causation which govern the res extensa. Thus, Descartes' case for the freedom of the will can be held to rest on three "clear l and distinct" ideas. The cogito itself, the intuition that we are free which the cogito , i reveals, and third, the intuition that mind and body are distinct.

I propase to consider separately Descartes argument for the existence df human a freedom and his account of how freedom can exist. I ! Descartes account of freedom as a of immaterial mind separate in kind I from the world of physical entities has been much criticised. Two criticisms in ! 1 , particular have been made. First, if mind and body are ontologically distinct and s completely independent it would not seem possible for them to act upon each other. "Perhaps the most widely discussed difficulty for this view is how states of a non- spatial substance (a mind) can causally interact with states of a substance that is in space (a brain)." (McLaughlin, 1995, p.598). Second, the considerable evidence for j the union of mind and body appears to indicate a much more intimate connection than

Descartes supposes."The mystery of this 'intermingling' was never unravelled by I Descartes and leaves a lacuna in his system that later Cartesians made some elaborate a and bizarre attempts to fill."(Flew, 1979, p.92) It falls beyond the scope of this thesis ' to consider in detail Descartes' solution to the mind body problem. It is however his approach to the mind body issue through which he addresses the question of how freedom can exist. For my purpose it is sufficient to observe that Descartes' mind CHAPTER 2 38.

I body dualism has been generally regarded as unsatisfactory, particularly in its attempt ' to account for mindhody interaction and their close relationship to one another. Descartes' dualism can however be seen as drawing our attention in a compelling way to the apparently irreconcilable divide between the human world of conscious ' existence and the materialist conceptions of modern science which presupposes universal natural causation. In order to make a place for freedom Descartes divorced the human mind from the realm of natural causation. Having, as it were, broken contact between them, he encounters difficulty in trying to reestablish it. Descartes' notion of freedom as an innate idea however, is significant. It calls I attention to the reality of our everyday experience; the fact that we can hardly regard ; ourselves as other than free beings. Even if as determinists we are convinced that we

: are not free, it appears, as we have noted, difficult in the extreme to maintain that conviction consistently in the actual living of one's life. We seem, to some extent, i compelled to live as if we are free. In this respect an important twentieth century heir and successor of Descartes is the existentialist philosopher Jean Paul Sartre (1 905 -

Sartre had to be well aware of the many constraints and obstacles to human freedom, but as a Cartesian, he never deviated from Descartes' classical portrait of human as free and distinct from the physical universe it inhabits.... To be human, to be conscious, is to be free to imagine, free to choose, and responsible for one's lot in life.(Solomon, 1995, p.710) Copelston (1 985a) regards the cogito as the starting point, the "primal truth" @. 15 I), of Sartre's philosophy. The existence of the person as a conscious being, as a free

, being, independent of the determinism of the physical universe, is the Cartesian legacy to the existentialists. In giving his account of how a human being can be free, I Sartre too adopted a form of dualism, contrasting consciousness with the world of i physical objects. Although dualistic, Sartre's approach avoids the positing 'of mind as , 1 an ontological entity or substance. But Sartre does not fall into the Cartesian trap of designating these two types of being as separate" substances". Instead, Sartre describes consciousness as 1 "nothing" - "not a thing" but an activity, " a wind blowing from nowhere I CHAPTER 2

toward the world (Solomon, 1995, p. 71 0) ! Consciousness, on this view, can never know itself as it can know the things of the i physical world. It follows from this that certain aspects (arguably the most important aspects) of human functioning can never be adequately studied by any form of science ' which makes determinism one of its presuppositions. Even though consciousness, for Sartre, is not a substance or thing at all, his account nevertheless clearly stands in the tradition of the Cartesian separation of from the causally determined world of things with the same implications for the scientific study of human beings. I shall return to the existentialist 1 approach in chapter four in the context of its manifestation as a perspective in modern , psychology. From this brief review of the Cartesian approach to human freedom three conclusions might be drawn. I i (1) Cartesian dualism opens up the prospect that the mental realm might not be I i subject to the same deterministic laws as the physical realm. (It is not my concern at this point io produce arguments to show that the mind is not causally determined, I I

merely to establish the possibility.) I

(2) And Indeed if human beings are to be free, in the libertarian sense of that , word, it would seem that we must be detached in some way from the physical world , ' of universal causation. There must be some limitation to determinism; it cannot hold : complete sway over our functioning. And if this is the case, it seems to necessitate ' some kind of dualistic understanding of reality; a realm of natural determinism and a realm beyond it. Descartes and Sartre tell us that to understand ourselves as free

beings requires the recognition of just such incommensurate realms. At the same time , I this partitioning seems to create a number of problems. There are difficulties in explaining how the two realms interact, and, from a methodological standpoint, this

I line of approach seems to require the imposition of a priori limits of some'kind on the , capacity of natural science to explain human functioning. In the chapter which

follows I shall consider a different form of dualism in the work of Irnrnanuel Kant. As : I shall show, Kant's approach has the advantage of not requiring any limitation on

! scientific explanations of human phenomena. I CHAPTER 2 40.

I (3) Descartes' conception of freedom as a very clear and very distinct idea,

p ticularly as it was taken up later in the work of Sartre, emphasises that "freedom" ; is a reality embedded in our existence. It remains so embedded whatever might be its status in oiu formal systems of belief. We are, as it were, compelled to choose 1 whether or not we believe we are. It seems that in our living, whatever our philosopl~icalposition may be, we are forced to reckon day by day with the "fact" of our freedom. Freedom, it seems, is an unavoidable presupposition for living. As I shall subsequently show this has implications for the practice of psychology which is, ar affer all, but another aspect of living. ,

The second account of this type which I shall consider is that put forward by i William James, philosopher, and a founder of modem psychology. In James' view, if ! I higher aspects of our humanity, such as morality and religious experience, are not to

I be mere illusions, three things must be the case. (1) Human beings must be truly free. ,

(2) Our free actions must be capable of introducing genuinely new events into the I ,world. (3) The world itself must be in a state of being open and unfinished. In other words, human beings must be able freely to create a range of possibilities and the , world must be such a place that it is open to being acted upon and changed in any number of ways. Each one of these three propositions is denied by a determinist outlook.

' Determinism entails a "block universe" in which things are either necessary or I .impossible. The past decrees the future absolutely and freedom can only be an i appearance. To that view, actualities seem to float in a wider sea of possibilities from out , of which they are chosen ;and, somewhere, indeterminism says, such I possibilities exist, and form a part of truth. Determinism , on the contrary , ! says they exist nowhere and that necessity on the one hand and impossibility ! on the other are the sole categories of the real. Possibilities that fail to get I realised are, for determinism, pure illusions: they never were possibilities at , CHAPTER 2 41.

I all. (James, 1979, p.118 ) For James, the matter is a crucial one and the choice is stark. He maintains that the issue cannot be decided by science itself or settled by any appeal to facts. It is perhaps in the end; he suggests, a matter of temperament: Of various personality types being attracted to (and repelled by) different world views. Both positions have attractions I and both can, for very different reasons, be offensive. We have already considered the ,

I offensiveness of determinism. James argues that for very different reasons the , libertarian position can also cause offense. "It gives us a pluralistic restless universe in which no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene: and to a mind I

, possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt, remain forever I inacceptable."(James, 1979, p.136). I will examine James' concept of a pluralistic universe following a consideration of the theme of freedom in his psychological writings. :I James argued that a libertarian position is not incompatible with a scientific i account of human beings. In his psychological writings he sets out to produce a scientific Hccount of human functioning which is able to accommodate the view that human beings are free. Writing as a philosopher, James contended vigorously for the !

, freedom of the will. Writing as a psychologist, he did not. As was noted earlier, he believed freedomldeterminism to be an issue not amenable to empirical resolution. He

' did however, in his psychological writings, seek to show that belief in freedom of the : will is not incompatible with a rigorous scientific approach. I accordingly believe freely in my freedom; I do so with the best of scientific coilsciences, knowing that the predetermination of the amount of my effort of I attention can never receive objective proof, and hoping that, whether you I follow my example in this respect or not, it will at Ieast make you see that I such psychological and psycho-physical theories as I hold do not necessarily force a man to become a fatalist or a materialist. ( James, 1971, p.33) I The centrepiece of James' psychology in relation to this issue is his description of I consciousness. He adopted an interactionist view of the relationship between mind I and body. According to this view physical events can cause mental events and mental 1 ' events, physical events. Consciousness is thus efficacious not epiphenomenal. I CHAPTER 2

I Attending closely to our own experience we are able to see that consciousness is a ' continually flowing stream rather than a chain of atomic events. James' stream of consciousness theory is "the core of his psychological study of man" (Dooley, 1974, p.26). In place of Hume's association between atomic elements of experience and ' Kant's notion of the transcendent ego, James substitutes the seamless streanl of on going conscious experience as all that is required to establish personal . In James' view the empirically given "passing thought" has among its aspects : all the functions and distinctions which supposedly require a transempirical Ego.... The unity Hume and Kant seek is empirically given in the stream of , consciousness.... Our empirically given starting point is thought-going-on and ; this thought is not like a train requiring couplings but it is a continuousIy flowing stream. (Dooley, 1974, p. 26-27) Five crucial characteristics of consciousness are identified by James. It is personal, I i changing, sensibly continuous, deals with objects independent of itself, and it is selective. The two most important in relation to freedom are that consciousness is

personal Ad that it is selective. I ! James conceives of as empirically given in the personal nature of ,

, consciousness. The self thus disclosed has two aspects. First, the "me" - the self as I ,

know myself to be. The "me" consists of everything that is mine, my body, I possessions, significant others, social roles, personal history, abilities and character. Inherent in the "me" are "interests" the things that we desire ranged in a hierarchy ' from the biological to the ethico-religious. Interests are given aspects of our natures. 1 The second aspect of the self is the "I". The "I" is the self as knower. The "I" is what : , is conscious. The "me" is one of the things of which it is aware. I That consciousness is selective, James regards as its most significant feature. By a I - selectiveness he means that the "I", the thinker, is able to pluck some one experience i out of the total range presented to it, to hold that experience in awareness,'and to I disregard the rest. Consciousness is an agency of selection. After considering the role I played by selection in , reasoning, aesthetics and ethical choice, James concludes " we see that the mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous I I ; possibilities. Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the CHAPTER 2 43.

I selection of some and the suppression of the rest" (James, 1971, p. 81). Selection is made on the basis of "interests" residing in the" me". That is , our interests provide the purpose for our selective attention. Thus we are able to attend to an element of consciousness because we choose to do so. James further maintains, as a consequence '

of his position on the mind - body issue, that the sustaining of a thought is sufficient , .to produce whatever bodily action is required to give effect to it.

James' analysis of the will turns on the notion of effort. Those occasions when ; thoughts prevail without effort on our part, he regards as being wholly explicable in terms of those natural laws which govern the operation of our interests. An act of will , 1 however, involves the effort in attending to a difficult mental object and persisting in ;

' holding it, steadfastly, in our minds. Though the spontaneous drift of thought is all the other way, the attention I must be kept strained on that one object until at last it grows so as to maintain , i itself before the mind with ease. This strain of the attention is the fundamental j i act of will. (James, 1950, p. 564) ' The function of effort then, is to produce consent to the idea in the mind. This it does ! by holding it in attention and resisting the attempts of other objects of thought to i

4 replace it. Thus will is essentially effort expended to keep affirming and adopting a

I thought which, left to its own devices would simply fade away. , From the perspective of James' psychology, the question of whether the will is determined or free, is decided by how the phenomenon of effort is to be explained. From a determinist perspective, he suggests, the varying degrees of effort which are

' expended in relation to different ideas must be a function of these mental objects themselves and ultimately mechanically determined in the brain. If, on the other hand, j

' the will is free, effort is independent of the object before the mind, it is something we !

' voluntarily create. The question offact in the free-will controversy is thus extremely simple. It , relates solely to the amount of effort of attention or consent which we can at I any time put forth. Are the and intensity of this effort fixed functions of the object, or are they not? (James. 1950. p.571) I As was noted earlier James viewed the freedom/determinism question as incapable of ' I

I CHAPTER 2 44.

I an empirical answer. Although the answer in James' psychological thought resolves

itself into a specific factual question it is a question he considers as, in practice, t forever undecidable due to the overwhelming complexity of the phenomena involved. My own belief is that the question of free-will is insoluble on strictly I psychologic grounds. After a certain amount of effort of attention has been given to an idea, it is manifestly impossible to tell whether either more or less , of it might have been given or not. To tell that, we should have to ascend to

I the antecedents of the effort, and defining them with mathematical exactitude, prove by laws of which we have not at present even an inkling, that the only . amount of sequent effort which could possibly comport with them was the ; precise amount which actually came. whether of psychic or of neural quantities, and deductive reasonings such as this method of proof I implies, will surely be forever beyond human reach. (James. 1950. p. 572) \ James account of the human will, as operating through selective attention with the I application of effort, is claimed by him to be both true to science and to permit, though not to compel, the proposition that human beings are free. a I James' stream of consciousness theory holds that free will and the i consequent feeling of effort be explained in terms of attention. Each mental representation in the stream of consciousness automatically evokes a bodily j response (consciously or unconsciously felt), and our fieedom consists in our ' "selective attention" to mental representation A rather than the conflicting representation B. When we hold before our mind long enough, the representation A (instead of B) the self (mind and body) responds with an

appropriate action .... Thus James holds that his stream of consciousness I theory, utilising the mechanism of selective attention is able to offer a psychologically sound explanation for free will. ( Dooley, 1974, p. 64)

In making an evaluation of James' account my concern is not to assess his I ' psychology. The issue is not whether James offers a correct explanation of human functioning but whether any account of the operation of free will from the

I perspective of natural science is possible and cogent. It is my contention that it is not. CHAPTER 2 45.

A key issue is giving a satisfactory explanation for the origin of our effort of 1

attention. What decides the degree of effort we employ? James offers us a choice. If , we are determinists we can choose to believe that natural causes exist which will furnish us .with a complete explanation from a natural science perspective. Equally however, we are free to believe that the matter is decided not by causal determinants : but by an exercise of the sovereign freedom of our will. We enjoy such a choice because the issue is too complex for ever to resolve. From the perspective of natural science, this situation seems unsatisfactory. Psychological accounts, in as much as they lay claim to being scientific, operate out . I , of our determinist intuitions in which we feel that every event should be accounted ; for by some preceding event, or, from the operation of events in a system governed by invariant la*l relationships. This, it seems, is a necessary methodological presupposition of scientific inquiry. The very heart of the is the ! i search for this type of explanation. Thus viewed from the point of view of the I scientific enterprise, an explanation, if it is complete, will exclude human freedom. It will defink or explain it out of existence. If, on the other hand, the chain of a I explanation does include human freedom, it will appear unfinished. Or, if it is ! ' . claimed that the explanation is complete it will not appear as a scientific explanation at all. It will appear "theological" in the sense that events come into existence from ;

, nothing. That is to say the relevant natural laws, or antecedent events, cannot be counted as sufficient to have brought them about. James' attempt to produce a psychology which could support the possibility of human freedom struggles because of the incorrigibly antithetical nature of our determinist and libertarian intuitions. I conclude from this that psychology as a science cannot accommodate freedom in the : sense that James seeks. By putting the explanation of effort of attention forever beyond the reach of science he has sought to protect freedom. But any scientific ; theory which requires that a critical variable is forever beyond the reach df I , investigation could be seen as defective over and against one which is open to testing and the possibility of refutation. A mher point might be made. The shows that aspects of the I I , functioning of nature, once thought beyond human explanation, have progressively CHAPTER 2 46.

I fallen under the aegis of natural science. To attempt to preserve the notion of human '

I I freedom by consigning it to a gap in human knowledge would not appear XI

, altogether wise course. What appears forever beyond the reach of science in one century, may well be the focus of its concern in the next, and part of its history in the ' one which follows that. Are we then stuck with a "freedom of the gaps" in which the

! notion of freedom (in the libertarian sense) can only be sustained while significant I 1

, voids exist in our knowledge? ,

It could be argued that James' account, no less than that of Descartes, is dualistic. a Rather than escaping a Cartesian dualism James has simply narrowed its scope. James; has placed a great deal more of our functioning, as conscious rational beings, under ;

the scope of the mechanical natural world. All that remains exempt is the freedom of ,

the will to exercise control over effort of attention. This nevertheless entails an ability , I to think and act in ways not wholly determined. On this account there exists some , non-mechanical aspect of our being beyond the reach of naturalistic science. Human i I beings are thus a duality. After the determined aspects of our functioning have been accounted for there remains some quite different element in human beings which is not so determined, or about whose determinism we remain agnostic. The problems of

! giving an account of this element and the way in which it might be supposed to ,I interact with those mechanically determined aspects of our nature would seem to exist j , as problems for James as well as Descartes, although of course Descartes did not develop a psychology as such. Whilst this seems a reasonable conclusion to draw from James' psychological treatment, in his philosophical writings he sought to address the matter of dualism. The whole question of the dualism between the physical and the mental is i I complicated by the fact that James was.... developing a view of physical nature . at large which departed radically from the familiar deterministic, mechanical model. It is often maintained for example, that James's treatment of the will as , irreducible to antecedent mechanical factors creates a dualistic chasm between natural processes and characteristically human processes. This would be true

I only if James had retained the customary deterministic model of nature. I However James did not retain this model; he would sooner have conceived of , CHAPTER I,

I all nature as wilful than of man's will as an exception to nature. (Earle, 1967, p.243) Anything like a comprehensive review of James' philosophy lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Two aspects of his thought however need to be mentioned as they relate ' directly to the issue of dualism and to his approach to freedom. ! (1) His view of reality as '@weexperience ": As we have seen James denies that consciousness is an entity, that is, consciousness can be accounted for without the need to posit a soul or a distinct mental substance. He argues that the world is composed of one primary sort of stuff which he calls "pure experience". All things are , I

thus part of pure experience consciousness is merely one aspect of it. I I James confesses having difficulty describing what this pure, undifferentiated experience is. He says that it is not a general stuff of which experience is made. "It is experience itself; it is a name for all sensible natures " (Dooley, 1974,

I p.136). The construction of reality as pure experience abolishes the ontological I ' distinction between mind and matter, the knower and what is known. The business of knowing thus becomes a particular relationship between two parts of experience I "consciousness is not an unanalysable substance but simply the name which is given ! , to a certain discriminable function within experience, the knowing function" (Earle, 1967, p.248). James seeks to overcome dualism within his system by arguing that / both mind and matter are but aspects of the "primal stuff' of "pure experience". Pure experience cannot be called, for example either physical or psychical: it logically precedes the distinction and is thus 'neutral'. (Copleston ' 1985b, p. 333). (2) His view of the universe as pluralistic. James argues that the world is pluralistic j I rather than the monolithic "block universe" that determinism supposes. By a pluralistic universe he means that reality is essentially as it appears to us. The universe is unfinished with no determined future. Human actions can introduce : I . novelty into it which can change its future course. This means that despite the obvious I unity, connectedness and to which the determinists point, that unity is only I partial. 1 I Pluralism views the world as only a partially unified whole, hence it can I CHAPTER 2 48.

account for our moral experiences of freedom and impugnability. Since our !

actions are not coimplicated with the past, our experiences of activity can be , taken at their face value - I am responsible for my actions for by them I introduce novelty into the world. Finally, since the world is not finished and ' perfect, evil is not a speculative problem; it is a concrete problem awaiting the proper use of human freedom. ( Dooley, 1974, p. 152) James argues that a pluralistic world view is in the end more rational in that (1) it : asserts that reality is as we experience it and (2) it satisfies our needs for aesthetic,

moral and practical rationality which a monistic world view cannot. Against the 7 1 , charge that a pluralistic universe would be chaotic James maintains that it does not ; follow that the only logical alternative to a totally unified determinist universe is a totally chaotic one. So the world may be viewed as malleable, open to being acted I,

upon by the human will. I I i human freedom is eventually interpreted as a special case of universal I I indeterminism. My future, though continuous with my past, is not determined ' biit. Just SO the future of the world; although it grows out of the total past, it I is not a mere result of that past. If I am creative - that is, if human freedom is \ effectual- then the world is creative, if for no other reason than that I am part of the world. (Earle, 1967, p. 248) I I Thus in two respects James' philosophy represents a denial of dualism. First he seeks ' to abolish the mind - matter division. Second he abolishes the bifurcation between a ' free human will and a totally determined universe. With regard to the first of these; the casting of all reality as "pure experience", I

feel somewhat beyond my depth philosophically. I note, however, the conclusion j I ' drawn by Earle (1967) in relation to these aspects of James' thought: "objections can ! be raised against all these contentions especially in the enthusiastic unguarded form in I which James made them." (p.248). Russell (1961), regards James' thought on this , matter as betraying an "unconscious Berkelian " (that is, the reduction of I matter to an aspect of mind) which does violence to our ordinary understanding of the notion of "experience". Dooley (1974), and Copleston (1985b,), observe that there appears to be some uncertainty as to just how James understood his "pure experience" I

CHAPTER 2

human world cannot be reduced without remainder to the world of determined 1

I physical systems. (3) If human beings are free, then no scientific account, alone or in combination with : others, will be unable to give a satisfactory explanation of human phenomena which accounts in every respect for our existence. If human freedom can be understood at all

, it would require a very different kind of "science" to do it. (4) A libertarian position entails that in one respect at least the natural world itself must be indeterministic. It must be malleable and unfinished, if it is able to be acted upon and changed by the free actions of human beings. (5) Accounts which seek to make room for human freedom by exempting specific ; aspects of human functioning from natural determinism, face difficulties. * First: Whilst, to the degree that they are cogent, they deliver metaphysical fieedom, 1 they do so at the cost of methodological determinism. That is, they imply a critical , i limitation on the ability of psychological science ever to discern the causes or laws i I governing human functioning. Psychology, in as much as it proceeds from determin'istic assumptions, can no doubt do useful work around the edges, but the real ' I well springs of human action, being uncaused, are simply beyond its scope. (If human i freedom was in any way explicable it would require an inquiry of some quite different ! form) * Second: The viability of the perspective of freedom is made to rest on what, from a determinist perspective, appear as gaps in human knowledge. The progress of science ' in narrowing those gaps is illustrated by a comparison between Descartes and William James in what each exempted from the domain of scientific inquiry. Theories

which seek to create a "no go" area for scientific inquiry do not look promising. I I * Third: Such theories face the problem of indicating how'something which is non- , physical and non-mechanical can co-exist and interact with those parts of the

3 universe, including our own bodies, which are. I

, I am led by this to conclude that the attempt to isolate some aspect of human functioning as a preserve for the exercise of freedom is not as promising an approach as it may initially seem. What we seem to need is a line of approach which does not ' compel the acceptance of a metaphysical determinism, but at the same time, enables I CHAPTER 2

! us to affirm methodological determinism as a critical basis for psychological science. * A second type of proposal for the reconciliation of freedom and determinism involves a recasting of the notion of freedom.

2.4 Redefining freedom to accommodate determinism

Soft determinism I This position was met in the definition of terms given in the previous chapter. Soft ' determinism has been an influential view in philosophy. Among its many exponents

are (171 1-1776), J. S. Mill (1806-1873), and more recently, Moritz I ; Schlick (1882 -1936) and A. J. Ayer (1910-1989). The term "soft determinism" was I coined by William James, himself a trenchant critic of this position. The word "soft" ,

refers to the fact that its advocates eschew the harsh,"hard", consequences of I determinism without sacrificing it as the principle of universal explanation. The i position is also known as "compatibilism" because it advances the thesis that i determinism and freedom can be harmonised.

As it has been developed by such thinkers as J. S. Mill (1962), M. Schlick (1962) 1 ! and W. T Stace (1992), the position turns on the definition of freedom. It is not the

I case that free actions are to be distinguished from unfree actions in that they are I somehow uncaused. All actions are caused. What differentiates free from unfree : : actions is the type of cause involved. An action may be called "free" when the agent is ; able to act in accordance with his or her desires. An action is unfree when the agent is compelled to act against his or her wishes or prevented from acting in accordance

with them. I Freedom means the opposite of compulsion; a man is free if he does not act 1 under compulsion, and he is compelled or unfree when he is hindered from ; without in the realisation of his natural desires. Hence he is unfree when he is

locked up, or chained, or when someone forces him at the point of a gun to do i

what otherwise he would not do. (Schlick, 1962, p.351-352) I Aside from the actions of others, freedom may be interfered with by additional j circumstances; factors internal to the person such as a psychotic episode or an

i CHAPTER 2 52.

obsessive compulsive neurosis, might also be construed as preventing the agent from

acting in accordance with his or her true desires. If it is true that an agent is free when ; he or she is able to act in accordance with his or her desires, then there is no conflict between fiee will and determinism. It can be allowed that desires themselves are fully

, determined by the agent's character which, in turn, is fully determined by genetic and

I , environmental variables.

Correctly conceived, the doctrine entitled Philosophical necessity is simply -: this: that, given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which Be will act might be unerringly inferred; that if we knew the person ; thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event. (Mill, 1962, p. 342)

'f Thus for the soft determinist our character determines our desires and, if we are not I

coerced by external circumstances, we are fiee to act in accordance with those desires. I ' ~etermiiismis fully preserved in this account because our characters, which are the \ I cause of our desires, are themselves fully caused by antecedent genetic and t environmental events. So it is argued, human beings are fiee and yet, as J. S. Mill I 1 insists in the quotation above, are as fully determined and predictable as physical objects. A key difference between soft determinism and the hard determinism considered earlier is the role of consciousness. Consciousness plays a key role in the soft determinist account, as it must in any account which satisfies our intuitions about our freedom. Conscious processes are not the mere epiphenomena they are in hard I determinist views. For the compatibilist, reasoning plays a key role in the calculation , I of means to ends. Our desires are given by arrational factors which formed our

I characters but the task of calculating how best to give expression to them'is the I province of reason. Reason thus enjoys a certain autonomy of operation. Its rule is I real but limited; for in all things it must serve the interests of our determined desires. "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to I I any other office than to serve and obey them." (Hume, 1973, p. 415). As we shall see I CHAPTER 2 53.

there are similarities between this view of reason and Freud's position. Two important interrelated claims are put forward by the advocates of this position. The first is that soft determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, and the second that, although their characters are fully determined, human beings I have the capacity to change them. When we judge a person as being morally responsible for some action we suppose that the person was a free agent at the time the action was performed. From the I perspective of soft determinism this means that the person was acting in accordance

I with determined desires. I

Thus the feeling of responsibility assumes that I acted freely, that my own I desires impelled me; and if because of this feeling I willingly suffer blame for my behaviour or reproach myself, and thereby admit that I might have acted otherwise, this means that other behaviour was compatible with the laws of

I - of course granted other motives. And I myself desire the existence of I such motives and bear the (regret and sorrow) caused me by my b'ehaviour so that its repetition will be prevented. (Schlick, 1962, p. 354) , \ Soft determinism takes our intuitions seriously. We are not simply deluded in our ! . of being free or about being responsible for our own actions. If I have committed some unworthy act (which has resulted in pain to others), then, from a soft ' determinist perspective, my determined character and the circumstances of the case mean that I could not have done other than commit that act. Appropriately appalled by its consequences however, a change may be induced in my character by the whole experience, such that I will not commit such an act in the future. Thus it was a free act, in accordance with my desires as they then were. It was also an act for which I am responsible and must bear the consequences. Our character is formed by us as well as for us; but the wish which induces us to attempt to form it is formed for us; and how? Not, in general, by our organisation, nor wholly by our , but by our experience - experience of the painful consequences of the character we previously had, or by some strong feeling of admiration or aspiration accidently aroused. I (Mill, 1963, p.345) CHAPTER 2

I An additional light is thrown on the soft determinist construction of human freedom a when we consider the question of punishment. The reasons for punishing a wrongdoer . cannot be to exact retribution, for retribution implies that the agent could have done other than he or she did. Punishment can have only two possible justifications; to I reform the agent and to deter others from like behaviour in the future. Suppose that your child develops a habit of telling lies. You give him a mild beating. Why? Because you believe that his personality is such that the usual * motives for telling the truth do not cause him to do so. You therefore supply the missing cause, or motive, in the shape of pain and the fear of future pain if ,

he repeats his untrustful behaviour.... You assume that his actions are ! determined by causes, but that the usual causes of truth telling do not in him produce their usual effects. You therefore supply him with an artificially I injected motive , pain and fear, which you think will in the future cause him to I I speak truthfully. The principle is exactly the same where you hope by I I punishing one man, to deter others from wrong actions. You believe that the fiar of punishment will cause those who might otherwise do evil to do t I well... Thus we see that moral responsibility is not only consistent with I determinism but requires it. The assumption on which punishment is based is I that human behaviour is causally determined. If pain could not be a cause of truth-telling there would be no justification at all for punishing lies. ( Stace, 1992, p.53-54)

To sum up, the major elements of the soft determinist position are these: (1) A close examination of the way we employ the notion of freedoin reveals that we are free when not constrained by factors external to us. We act freely as agents when our \

I actions spring without hindrance from our desires. (2) Free acts are not uncaused; for j . free acts flow from our desires, which are determined by our characters, which in turn , are the product of genetic and environmental antecedents. (3) Determinism is I

compatible with moral responsibility because, by being exposed to the consequences 1 of our actions, new causal factors may be introduced which alter our character and thus modify our desires. We may be able to change our character if we have a I CHAPTER 2 55.

I sufficiently strong and persistent desire to do so. Whether we have such a desire or ; not is dependant on the present state of our character. The conclusion we are to draw from this is that freedom and determinism can coexist. Our intuitions of freedom and moral responsibility are not delusions, yet no denial of the universality of determinism is needed to accommodate them. I : Arz evaluatiorz of soft determirtism Considered as an attempt to harmonise our libertarian intuitions with scientific 1 I determinism, soft determinism must be judged to have certain strengths. The soft determinists are surely right in their claim that being at liberty to act in accordance with our desires is often what we mean by our freedom. The limited but real autonomy enjoyed by reason in the soft determinist system accords with our intuition that our behaviour is determined by our purposes and intentions. And both these beliefs about ourselves can be maintained without sacrificing the principle of i universal determinism. On the other side of the ledger difficulties and problems exist. As will become clear, o& intuitions of freedom encompass much more than the capacity to act in accordance with our desires. In fact, the equation of freedom with liberty of action, only serves to push the freedoddeterminism problem a step further back. Once we take that step, back behind our desires, all the major difficulties reappear. Desire is the product of character, which is itself the effect of some amalgam of genetic and environmeiltal antecedents. Thus, all actions are necessary, given the character of the agent and the circumstances of the case. William James (1979) argues that the issue turns on the notion of possibility. And considered in relation to possibility, soft determinism is revealed as "a quagmire of evasion under which the real issue of fact has been entirely smothered" (p.117). This is so because soft determinism, no less than hard determinism entails universal necessity. The issue, it will be seen is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogi'stic I terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or I the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false. The question relates solely to the existence of possibilities, in the strict sense of the term, as things that may, but need not, be. Both sides admit that a volition, for I CHAPTER 2 56.

I instance, has occurred. The indeterminists say another volition might have '

occurred in its place: the determinists swear that nothing could possibly have 1 occurred in its place. (James, 1979, p. 1 19) This being so, soft determinism cannot, in critical respects, accommodate our intuitions of freedom. The belief that in my life I am genuinely confronted with an

array of possibilities is false. The belief that the future is not simply a function of the , past but is open to real novelty is mistaken. James points out forcefully, and I think rightly, that soft determinism changes nothing of substance. In its essentials the

freedom/ determinism divide remains unbridged. 7 I The lack of any real rapprochement is clearly seen if we consider the specific issue , of moral responsibility. As we have seen, our notion of moral responsibility hinges on the idea that in the commission or omission of any action we could have acted in some other way. That from among a range of alternatives confronting us we chose I I i this particular act and can thus be held accountable for it. The soft determinist I I construction of responsibility bears little relationship to this. Moral responsibility from the 'soft determinist perspective denies that I could have done anything other than what I in fact did. The action was wholly determined by my determined character j and the circumstances in which I found myself. My being brought to account for my ! I action, rewarded or punished, is simply an attempt to change my character or to i strengthen its laudable or adaptive aspects. It might be objected that under soft determinism we can be regarded as morally culpable should we fail to allow our characters to be appropriately moulded by earlier experiences. This will not do.

Whether our characters are moulded by experience is itself a function of a wholly i

determined desire for change and a wholly determined capacity for such change. i i It follows that far from being in harmony with our libertarian intuitions, soft determinism is, in important respects, actually counter intuitive. Now as science and

: philosophy both demonstrate, common sense is mistaken about many issues. The I . appeal of soft determinism however rests with its claim substantially to reconcile our

common sense notions with universal determinism. In our ordinary, and in our legal, I thinking if a person is considered unable to do other than what he or she actually did, j then that person is judged as being not responsible. If it can be shown that, due to the , CHAPTER 2

effects of upbringing, mental illness or some other cause, the person was unable to

, act other than the way he or she did then that is sufficient to establish a lack of moral I responsibility. To assert both moral responsibility and that a person's action was fully

I caused is, from the point of view of everyday and legal thinking, oxymoronic. Our ordinary thinking may be deluded thinking, but in as much as soft determinism claims

) to reconcile determinism with our intuitions of moral responsibility it cannot in this I matter at least be held to be successful. I ; C. A Campbell (1962) highlights a number of oddities which the soft determinist

' view of moral responsibility produces; including this one: i Again, we ordinarily consider that, in certain circumstances, the degree of a , 1 man's moral responsibility for an act is affected by considerations of his inherited nature, or of his environment or of both. It is our normal habit to I

''make allowances" (as we say) when we have reason to believe that a I malefactor had a vicious heredity, or was nurtured in his formative years in a harmful environment. We say in such cases "Poor chap, he is more to be pitied I than blamed. We could scarcely expect him to behave like a decent citizen I I with his parentage or upbringing." But this extremely common sort of t judgment has no point at all if we mean by moral responsibility what Schlick I says that we mean. On that meaning the degree of a man's moral responsibility j must presumably be dependant upon the degree to which we can favourably : affect his future motives, which is quite another matter." (Campbell, 1962, p.365) Our ordinary notion of moral responsibility assumes that the agent was in some sense I the cause of his or her action. Soft determinism traces the cause of the action back to j I

those genetic and circumstantial factors which fixed the agent's character such that no ! I person is ever in the ordinary sense the cause of his or her own actions. Canlpbell

points out that this divorce of moral responsibility from cause would imply that once , I 1 a person is dead she or he can no longer be held morally responsible for an action

performed while they were alive. This is so because the person, since dead, is no I longer able to be rehabilitated and soft determinism equates responsibility with rehabilitation Yet, commonly, we do make such judgments, imputing moral : . I CHAPTER 2 58.

responsibility to the dead. Another curious implication of the soft determinist position ion moral responsibility is, as Campbell points out, that we are obliged to impute

' moral responsibility to non human animals. Assuming that the animal is capable of I ' behaviour modification, it must be concluded that because of this it is morally I , responsible. Some rather odd things seem to happen to the notion of moral ) responsibility in the hands of the soft determinist. : Similarly, the soft determinist view that character can be changed, needs to be I I heavily qualified. It follows fiom the soft determinist position, that we can only effect character change if we have both the desire and the capacity for it. Both these factors are aspects of our character. That is to say, we may or may not be programmed for a particular metamorphosis of character, given certain environmental triggers. In other words, behind the talk of character change lies a conception of humans as totally passive. Character change is not something we choose, but something that happens to / us under certain circumstances. It is part of the web of natural necessity. I ' Is this to be too harsh on the soft determinist construction of moral responsibility? Let us suppose that a person could reasonably be expected to have learned certain lessons from experience: To have had hisher desires shaped in certain ways. Instead

I however this person takes the path of least resistance, not the morally responsible path. Could not such a person be held to be morally responsible in the ordinary sense of the term? The matter hinges on whether the morally responsible path was open.

I Could he or she, given all the circumstances of the case, have acted in a morally responsible way? From the compatibilist perspective, the answer has to be "no". Such . a possibility did not, and never could, exist. Regardless of previous experiences and I apparent opportunities, the action was determined. The only possible conclusion in I such a case is that the person's salutary experiences were still insufficient to bring about the hoped for reform of character. i Essentially the same kind of passive processes are involved as we noted in hard I , determinism. There is one difference between them. Compatibilism interposes the conscious mind and the means-to-ends calculations of reason between causal determinants and the actions they produce. This difference, significant though it may ) be in other respects, does not change things in relation to this matter. The divide i CHAPTER 2 59.

between our libertarian beliefs and that very different set of beliefs which follow from '

, universal determinism remains to be spanned. No matter how we try to wriggle free of total determinism, it seems as if we I keep finding ourselves enmeshed back in "hard" determinism. We tried to clear a small space within determinism for those acts we want to call "free"

but found such a space hard to find. We suggested that perhaps an act is free if , one of its causes is a decision, but then we saw that if this were so, then the i decision itself must be caused in turn and thus is not really a decision at all.

We suggested that an action is free if it "flows from a person's character"; but j

then we saw that it can be argued that an act that "flows from a person's I character" is no more within his or her control and no more his or her responsibility than any other act .... Soft determinism doesn't seem to make , determinism .... any "softer" after all. (Solomon, 1989, p. 518-519) i Soft determinism achieves a reconciliation between our sense of ourselves as rational beings acting in accordance with our intentions, and universal determinism. To this I extent, it allows us to retain far more of our everyday sense of ourselves than hard I determinism permits. What it cannot include however is possibility. There follows : from this a quite critical inability to accommodate our intuitions of novelty and self ,I determination . An examination of the specific issue of moral responsibility illustrates

, that its attempt to do so results in tensions and counter intuitive oddities. A consideration of the compatibilist stance supports the general conclusion that libertarian and universal natural determinist views of the person are incommensurate. No single view of human existence, it would seem, can simultaneously affirm both. By passing our intuitions of freedom through the needle's eye of universal necessity, I ' so much that is critical is lost or transmogrified. In the end,'the implacable divide , remains.

2.5 Redefining determinism to accommodate freedom The third possibility is to seek a reconciliation between freedom and scientific

f determinism through some modification of the idea of determinism. Such a solution is , CHAPTER 2

I ' proposed by the twentieth century philosopher Brand Blanshard (1958). I shall first : lay out Blanshard's position and then, proceed to an evaluation of it.

, Blansltard's proposal ' Blanshard seeks to accommodate libertarian concerns within a totally determined universe by advancing the notion that whilst universal determinism is true;

. determinism itself takes different forms. He views materialistic determinism as inadequate when proposed as a complete explanation of human phenomena. Our

I experience of reflective choice ought, he suggests, to be sufficient to convince us that here, we are up against something quite different from the mechanical causation of

the natural world. Failure to draw such a conclusion is, he argues, the result of 1 imposing a "preconceived notion" like a template over reality. Instead we should be

open "to consider all kinds of alleged facts on their merits" (p. 10-1 1). Indeed, the I determination not to prejudge the facts of experience is, he tells us, one of the marks i of "empirical methodology". If we allow ourselves such openness, the difference \,i between reflective choice and determined natural processes are revealed as "particul&ly plain". He accordingly rejects a view of determinism, which reduces all I human phenomena to arrational causal antecedents, as "dogmatically antiempirical". 1

If anyone were to show me that determinism involved either or ! mechanism, I would renounce it at once, for that would be equivalent, in my i opinion, to reducing it to absurdity. (Blanshard, 1958, p. 10) In place of a determinism of that kind, Blanshard advances the thesis that whilst all our actions are fully determined, some at least, are not determined in a mechanistic way. The majority of our actions are causally governed by habit, , and association, but not, he insists, all of them. To provide adequate explanation of i I

' reflection and choice, a different approach to determinism is required. I Now, what can be meant by saying that such choice, though not determined , mechanically, is still determined. Are you suggesting, it will be asked, that in

the realm of reflection and choice there operates a different kind of causality ,

from any we know in the realm of bodies? My answer is: Yes, just that. To put ,

I it more particularly, I am suggesting (1) that even within the psychical realm

there are different causal levels, (2) that a causality of higher level may I CHAPTER 2 61.

supervene on one of lower level, and (3) that when causality of the highest level is at work, we have precisely what the indeterminists, without knowing 1 it, want." (Blanshard, 1958, p. 1 1) As I understand him, Blanshard proposes a hierarchy of causes. At the bottom are the causal which govern the behaviour of physical bodies and non sentient

, organisms. Further up are those causal relations which require a mental life - habit, association, and desire. At the summit are those forms of causation which govern the operation of uniquely human functions of reason, artistic creation, and moral action. These "highest" forms of causation are differentiated from those beneath them by virtue of the fact that they are "rational". "Rational" causation refers to the existence of superordinate principles which act directly on human reason. Thus for Blanshard reason is no mere slave of the passions as it was for Hume (1 973) but is directly acted upon by timeless objective entities of ) logic, aesthetic principles, and the moral law. These "highest" forms of causation are able to supervene on those beneath them such that some human actions at least are to be explaihed by timeless principles acting on the rational mind. Our in the

I domains of art, logic, and morals, are, in part, determined from without, by timeless

i principles. What follows is that attempts to explain and predict these higher order human activities with reference only to the "lower" levels of causation cannot.be fully successful. In the case of works of art, any causal account will be incomplete without reference to aesthetic ideals working upon the mind of the artist. There is such a thing as an "aesthetic necessity" which cannot be reduced to anything else. (Blanshard . does not indicate what these aesthetic laws or principles might be.) These "higher order" causes may be directly opposed to lower order causes resulting from reinforcement and repetition. It is these aesthetic principles, acting on the artist in a i causal way, which constrain him or her, to produce just this work and not'some other. I Consider a musician composing a piece of music.... Let us make our musician a philosopher also, who after adding a bar pauses to ask himself, "Why did I add just that? "....his answer, I think, would be something like this:."I wrote i what I did because it seemed the right thing to do. I developed my theme in CHAPTER 2 62.

1 the manner demanded to carry it through in an aesthetically satisfactory way." In other words, the constraint that was really at work in him was not that of association; it was something that worked distinctly against association; it was the constraint of an aesthetic ideal. And, if so, there is a causality of a different level." (Blanshard, 1958, p.11-12) : Causation of the "highest" kind is, Blanshard argues, most clearly demonstrated by logical inference. The rules which govern valid deduction constitute a necessity which !

, governs thought. To deny that in reasoning, we pass from one thought to another under the constraint of logical inference, is "contrary to introspectively plain fact". It 7

is the timeless necessity of logic, not the lower level contingent causes of habit, I association, and desire, which compel the direction of our thought. The timeless rules

of valid inference applied to some object of thought determine the conclusions , reached by the thinker. Blanshard hastens to add that a very great deal of what passes j I ; for thinking is not of this type. Many of our cognitive sequences are brought about by , I "lower level" determinants such as habit. But not all of them. , he effort of both thought and art is to escape the arbitrary, the merely I personal, everything that, casual and capricious, is irrelevant, and to keep to I

lines appointed by the whole that one is constructing. I do not suggest that ! I logical and aesthetic necessity are the same. I do say that they are both,to be I distinguished from association or habit as representing a different level of control. That control is never complete; all creation in thought or art is successful in degree only. It is successful in the degree to which it ceases to be an expression of merely personal impulses and becomes the instrument of a necessity lying in its own subject matter. (Blanshard, 1958, p. 13) I A third form of higher order necessity identified by ~l&shardis the moral law. 1 : Here, Blanshard agrees with the libertarian position, that moral choice is to be

j distinguished from the lower order causes such as desire and habit. oral choice is I 1 determined by moral reasoning which may be directly counter to our impulses habits and desires. Against the libertarians however, Blanshard maintains that to act in accordance with a moral law, does not mean that the action is uncaused. The I

/ determinism is still there. One's actions are determined by ethical principles. It is not I CHAPTER 2 63.

that we choose to obey the moral law, rather, it takes possession of us and compels our actions. For the moral man, like the logician and the artist, is really seeking self surrender. Through him as through the others an impersonal ideal is working, and to the extent that this ideal takes possession of him and moulds him according to its , he feels free and is free. (Blanshard, p.14) Thus Blanshard takes seriously our libertarian intuitions in thought, art and morals. They are not to be dismissed as mere illusions, for they point to the crucial fact that, in these areas, human beings are not determined after the pattern of physical objects. Our intuitions of freedom are, however, not to be seen as freedom from determinism but as indications of the operation of a quite different type of determinism. Transcendent principles exist which act upon our rational minds and so determine the course of our thought and action.

; According to Blanshard, the notion of "higher order" determination satisfies the concerns of libertarians. For whilst it does not deliver contra causal freedom, it does differentiate humans and their creations from the mechanistic physical world. Because in three crucial areas we are determined by superordinate causes, the dignity, glory, and uniqueness, of human kind can be affirmed. We are moved, in part at least, not by the physical causes of nature, but by superordinate principles. Principles

* to which only we, as reasoning beings, can possibly be subject. This being the case

' we can: (1) comprehend our intuitions of freedom and, (2) retain those critical beliefs about ourselves which natural determinism would reduce to "mere appearance". We are not the mere "mechanical puppets" which orthodox scientific determinism would make of us. Our intuitions of freedom are not illusions. They arise within us when we , i become subject to the higher order forms of determinism. In such circumstances we . feel free because we are acting in accordance with our highest desires . Many an artist and musician have left it on record that their best work was I done when the whole they were creating took the brush or pen away from

them and completed the work itself. It determined them, but they were free, I because to be determined by this whole was at once the secret of their craft

I ' I and the end of their desire. This is the condition of the moral man also. He has I CHAPTER 2 64.

caught a vision, dimmer perhaps than that of the logician or the artist, but equally objective and compelling. It is a vision of the good. This good necessitates certain things, not as means to ends merely, for that is not usually a necessary link, but as integral parts of itself. (Blanshard, 1958, p.14) Two points should be reinforced in rounding off Blanshard's account. The first, is

I his view of the relationship between his three higher order causes and the lower order determinants of our actions, such as habit and desire. His view is that "higher order" I or "rational" determinism, exercises intermittent and partial control. Our routine i actions and choices are the product of lower order causes. Even when we are engaged in reasoning, artistic creation, or moral deliberation, our control by "rational" determinism is at best partial. This is not however to diminish the significance of rational causation - "though brokenly and imperfectly rational, rational creatures we still are" (p.13). This intermittent and partial control explains why it is that we fail to i discern the good, or, having discerned it, nonetheless fail to do it. Second, Blanshard recognises that it might be objected that his notion of rational necessity' is quite a different thing from natural causation. Temporal succession is generally regarded as being an essential part of the notion of a cause, whereas . Blanshard's rational necessity is "a timeless link between concepts" (p. 12). To this, Blanshard responds that an examination of our own thinking supplies ample evidence that our actions may be determined by rational necessity. the objection has been raised that necessity is a timeless link between concepts, while causality is a temporal bond between events, and that the two must be kept sharply apart. To which the answer is: Distinct, yes; but always apart, no. A timeless relation may serve perfectly well as the condition of a temporal passage. I hold that in the course of our thinking we can easily verify this fact, and, because I do, I am not put off by pronouncements about what we should and should not be able to see." (Blanshard, 1958,1;.12 -13) . I shall return to this matter in the evaluation which now follows. An evaluatio~tof Blalzskard's (ipproaclt Viewed as an attempt to harmonise determinism and our libertarian intuitions this I approach holds a number of attractions. It has a higher view of human reason than an

CHAPTER 2 65.

does soft determinism. Reason is not merely a slave to the passions. It performs a higher duty in that it is intermittently grasped by lofty timeless principles.'~orality and art are not reduced to outgrowths of natural causes but require a different level of explanation. They must be understood on their own terms as the incarnation of timeless laws of the beautiful and the good. To this degree, Blanshard's universe may be counted as less bleak th the one pictured by the natural determinists. Morality and art are something like the we take them to be. Blanshard's account provides an explanation for our strong intuition that the human world is, in a quite critical way, distinguishabie from the world of natural causation. At the same time his position accommodates our intuition that every event has a cause. Whilst determinism may take different forms, it remains the ubiquitous key to our comprehension of the

: universe. Thus, Blanshard seeks to correct the defects of scientific determinism, without i sacrificing determinism itself as the universal principle of explanation. For our intuitions of freedom to be other than illusions, the universe must be more than a system o.fnatura1 laws. To this extent, Blanshard shares some common ground with William James, Descartes, and Sartre. But in place of a sphere of indeterminism, . Blanshard proposes a different kind of determinism. To this extent his account is dualistic. Timeless rational laws break through into the universe of natural causation, via the human mind, and issue in the creation of what is beautiful, cogent, and good. As the indeterminists face the difficulty of providing a coherent account of how what is non - mechanical can interact and unite with what is, a similar difficulty would

I appear to beset Blanshard. However Blanshard's rational necessities compel, it is not mechanically, as he himself affirms. His approach seems to require that there is something about the human mind which is non mechanical. Timelessness, by itself, would not necessarily differentiate "rational" determinism I from the formulation of natural determinism as "laws of nature". The laws of physics

, describe relationships which are universal and invariant, and hence timeless. Temporal succession is integral to the notion of a natural cause. But not obviously so to the notion of a , of which specific events are but instances. Some I thinkers, for example, hold that the notion of law is a more adequate CHAPTER 2 66.

way of expressing natural determinism than the notion of cause, which has been

: problen~aticalsince the time of Hume. I am aware that Blanshard's timeless objective

I principles locate him within a strand of thought which reaches back to the Platonic

' theory of forms (, 1955). I am also aware that it is an approach which has been much debated. To rehearse this debate lies beyond the focus of my concern. : i One fairly evident objection to his approach does seem to call for comment. Does / not the lack of consensus in the fields of moral standards and aesthetic taste make the 1 1 existence of universal objective principles difficult to sustain? Here Blanshard could, ! I I believe, mount a double defence. First he could remind us that the compulsion exercised by these principles is "intermittent" and "partial" and this may be a factor in I the lack of uniformity. Second, he could point us to evidence supporting the . existence of a considerable tract of common ground in our judgements of the I beautiful and the good; common themes which traverse cultural and temporal divides , (Lewis, 1978). I I I i Putting aside further questions as to the cogency of Blanshard's position I turn to consider 'the degree to which it permits a rapprochement between scientific I I I determinism and our libertarian beliefs. First, an evaluation from the libertarian side: i I I Are we, in Blanshard's world, self determining persons? It might be instructive to ask Blanshard James' question about possibilities. Do possibilities exist? If the degree to i

I which I am grasped by rational necessities depends wholly upon my inherited , character and environmental circumstances, then the answer must be "no". In the end the conclusion must be that we are passive and fully determined. Whatever form determinism may take, if it is universal, it follows that we are not free in the I ' libertarian sense. Forces over which we have no control govern us in all respects. It is i ' not that we choose to submit ourselves to the rational necessities, rather we are grasped by them and they become, for a time at least, more forceful than the lower

I order natural causes. I

, Only if I can elect to surrender to rational necessity, or to disregard it, would alteinative possibilities exist. But if I had that capacity I would have contra causal freedom; a proposition which Blanshard explicitly rejects. Accordingly I cannot agree I with Blanshard's assertion that he has given the libertarians what they most want. j I CHAPTER 2 67.

From the perspective of fieedom what has he given us? I think the answer is that he has given us an enhanced soft determinism. New entities have appeared in the . determinists' universe, objective principles, which affirm the integrity of our reason ' art and morals. The role of reason has expanded to enable us to be grasped and

, inspired by them. We are "free", in respect of certain of our activities, those i concerned with art morals and logical thought, when we are governed by some determinants rather than by others. But in the end it does not rest with us to decide by I ; which form of determinism we shall be governed. That is determined for us. Moral responsibility, for instance, cannot be a matter of selection from an array of possible courses . Rather it is a question of which form of determinism was acting upon us at the time. Whichever one it was, we could not have done other than act in accordance . with it. From the libertarian perspective, while Blanshard's version of determinism i narrows the gap between freedom and necessity (creating a special order of existence for higher order human capacities) in critical respects it does not close it. ' From the perspective of scientific determinism other issues present themselves. First,

,: scientific determinism assumes that all phenomena are governed by natural forces

! which impact in a physical way. Blanshard proposes that forces exist which act in a i non - physical way upon the minds of men and women. Whilst such a proposal seems free of obvious logical inconsistency, or empirical rebuttal, it is not scientific ! determinism. It posits the existence of timeless abstract principles acting as "causes" upon our minds. As a consequence, it is difficult to imagine how methods of i empirical inquiry could be employed in (1) enunciating the non physical laws, (2) specifying the method of their operation and (3), discovering the laws whic11 : determine whether they override or are overridden by natural, non "rational" causes. ; Whatever we may think of Blanshard's version of determinism as a metaphysical j approach to the issue, it does not seem to deliver to psychology a workable

, methodological determinism. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that Blanshard faces the same objection as Descartes, Sartre, and James, in that he has produced an explanation of human functioning which precludes the possibility of full explanation I , by natural science. It is a universal determinism, but it is not a natural determinism. CHAPTER I, 68.

As we shall see in a following chapter, various attempts to resolve the problem by redefining determinism, have also been proposed by psychological theorists.

2.6 Challenging the assumptions underlying the debate In chapter four I will consider freedoddeterminism from within the context of - particular theoretical perspectives in personality and counselling psychology. Here I wish to examine briefly, three, recent, more general metaphysical approaches by , psychologists. Each proposes an avenue for moving forward towards a resolution of the issue. Each proposal proceeds by claiming to identi@ a buried assumption underlying the issue. In each case it is claimed that by questioning this assumption and proposing alternatives, real progress towards a resolution is possible. I will argue that these approaches (1) have not succeeded in loosening the Gordian knot of freedomldeterminism, (2) that each attempt, far from finding a new passage though the issue, ultimately resolves itself into one (or more) of the three broad approacl~eswe have so far been considering in this chapter (limiting the scope of determinism, or redefining determinism, or redefining freedom). Reasons as causes

, G. S. Howard (1993) proposes that the whole freedomldeterminism debate rests on a false dichotomy. Rather than viewing free will as the opposite of deternlinisin, : Howard advances the case for two independent polarities. The first of these opposes the notions of determinism and randomness. Howard defines determinism as "the belief that events (or effects) are produced by some prior events (or causes)" (p. 11 8). This he contrasts with "acausality or indeterminism", the belief that "things occur randomly, spontaneously, and are sometimes uncaused" (p.118). Howard's second (independent) polarity opposes free will and mechanism. He defines free will in the . libertarian sense as "belief in self determination and agency. People are the cause of

6 their own actions" (p.118). Mechanism is the belief that "our actions are the result of

' mechanisms.(e.g., environmental, physiological, genetic, cultural) which are completely coercive" (p. 1 18). Because these two dimensions are independent, he

! argues, it is possible to believe in free will and determinism without falling into self I CHAPTER 2

contradiction. The crux of his argument is that reasons are causes. Given that our : reasons may be seen as the cause of our actions, then our actions are caused, that is, our actions are determined and free at the same time. What'Howard fails to fully confront I think, is what his own definition of determinism entails. For if, as he wants to say, determinism requires that events are ; produced by prior causes, then determinism requires that reasons have causal I i antecedents. This issue Howard does not address. He cannot argue that reasons are : caused by our determined desires or we would be back with soft determinism. He I , could argue perhaps that reasons are caused by the self determining agent. In which

A case the chain of causation stops; as it must, given his own definition of free will. I ; But his notion of determinism requires that "all events result from some cause"; in . which case it is not possible to affirm both free will and determinism as he claims (because he would be stuck with an uncaused cause). Perhaps he could take a i different tack and argue that reasons may be caused by other reasons. This seems I ' problematic on at least two grounds. First, if we rule out the possibility of an infinite regress dfreasons, there must be a first reason standing at the head of the causal chain of reasons and it must have a cause which is not itself a reason. Second, while it . makes sense to think of a reason as the cause of a physical event (like my raising my arm) it seems to strain our use of language to regard one reason as the cause of another. As Lewis (1966) points out, the presumption that a belief is caused, is usually sufficient to discredit it. For example, we would tend to discount a psychotic's belief that he had a vision of God on the grounds that the belief is "caused" by his illness. A reasoned discourse with him about this belief of his, would tend to be seen as inappropriate, precisely because we regard his belief as having been "caused". To discover the putative cause of a belief is to undermine its credibility. Thus we need to be aware that, at the very least, if Howard were to propose one : reason as the cause of another, he would be using the word "cause " in a way which , clouds the normal distinction we make between reasons and causes. We could perhaps speak of "rational causation" as a different type of cause, clearly differentiated from natural causation. But as was noted in the preceding chapter the ' relation between ground and consequent is in so many respects unlike the relation CHAPTER 2 70.

between cause and effect that, were it not for Howard's concern to subsume reasoned action under the rubric of determinism we would not think of doing so. Howard attempts to resolve the issue by redefining determinism in order to accommodate a libertarian position. If free actions are not random, it follows that they must have a cause, hence free actions are also determined. But his attempt to include : reasons as causes seems to create problems of cogency. In particular he faces the problem that free actions, if such things exist, are created by the self and are not the inevitable result of a causal chain, not even a mental causal chain. Even if these problems could be overcome I find it difficult to see how changing the meaning of the terms in the debate advances us very much. The issue remains, even though the terminology has changed. As far as I can see, Howard has defined what we have been calling "determinism", as "mechanism". At the same time he has expanded tlie notion of determinism to include reasons as causes. Yet his proposal would seem to entail ) that reasons constitute causes, without themselves being caused. It seems Howard's proposal, if adopted, would mean that determinists would be called mechanists whilst libkrtarians would become determinists. I cannot see in the end that anything of substance would have changed. Non-linear time A second recent approach is that of B. D. Slife (1994). Slife focuses his attention on the issue of possibility. The abolition of possibility, as we have seen, follows, given a universal natural causation. Slife argues that this antinomy between possibility and universal determinism only exists because of a prior assumption. Once this assumption is confronted and challenged, a resolution becomes possible. The assumption identified and contested by Slife has to do with our view of time. Slife claims that a particular view of time, which he calls "linear' time", underlies most - thinking about freedom/determinism. By "linear" time he means, broadly, the : conception that time is a unidirectional line from past through the present 'to the

, future. It is this view of time which, when coupled with the determinist thesis that all events have causes, does away with possibility. The present is wholly determined by causes from the past. Accordingly, there can be no place for new possibilities in the 1 ' future.

CHAPTER 2 72.

linear (in anything but a metaphorical sense) history as we presently understand it

, simply would not exist. To support the claim that the future is open to possibility, Slife points to our

' capacity to. shape prospective reality through the goals and plans we construct in the

, present. Clearly it does seem to us that we do this. Yet, as we have seen, a number of ! possible explanations may be given - including a soft determinist claim that our goals i are caused in us by our predetermined character; not to mention the hard determinist 1 view that we are simply deluded about having this capacity in the first place. Slife cites a strand of opinion in the field of physics in support of his claim that a

J cause does not necessarily precede its effect - some physicists have argued that cause and effect can be instantaneous. It is beyond my competence to comment on this, except to say that if it is true, it shows no more than that a cause does not have to be temporally prior to its effect. But if time is non linear, as Slife proposes, then ought i not causes sometimes occur after their effects? This possibility Slife himself rejects. Slife has attempted to break the stranglehold of the past as the sole repository of causes and thus to redefine determinism so as to admit possibility. He proposes that our linear view of time is an historical artefact, "because of sociohistorical forces, the . linear view is what Western now calls time" (p.5). We are therefore at liberty to substitute another view. By exchanging non linear for linear time determinism is redefined so as to admit possibility. I conclude that the evidence brought by Slife is not sufficient to establish that there can exist viable options to "linear" time in anything other than a figurative sense. If it were literally true that time is non - linear, it is difficult to imagine how psychology, or any other empirical discipline, could proceed. Dialectical thinking The final approach to be considered is that of Pascal Sauvayre (1 995). Sauvayre i claims that the fieedomldeterminism impasse is brought about by the kind'of thinking : we employ. He distinguishes between what he terms "formal thinking" and "dialectical thinking". Formal thinking involves viewing the world as a collection of atomic facts which exist as independent objects. "facts which are the case I , independent of whatever else is the case, that is, independent of other atomic facts" CHAPTER 2

I (p. 147). Formal thinking, although useful, can cause us to miss and to distort

. important aspects of human functioning. In contrast, dialectical thinking permits the

, view that the parts are constituted and shaped by the whole, just as the whole is shaped by'the parts. I

The whole is as it is because the parts are as they are, and the parts, similarly, are as they are because the whole is as it is, and neither part nor whole is fixed i as itself. The system and its parts continually evolve, unfolding relations I ! I implicit in their current structure, but not yet manifest. (Sauvayre, 1995, p. 148). I ' , Thus the person, instead of being viewed as a collection of atomic parts which act on one another (like the parts of an processor), can, and should, be viewed as an interrelated and evolving whole. Viewing things from this "dialectical" , perspective, enables us to resolve the fieedom/determinism problem. Sauvayre claims i I I that "The assumption of dialectical logic leads to the integration of the two I contradictory claims of freedom and determinism." (p. 149). This is because I dialectical thinking does not oppose formal thinking but "includes and transcends it". I 1 Formal thinking is characterised by analysis and . Dialectical thinking

f proceeds by a synthesis. The freedomldeterminisrn impasse arises because, either the j person is viewed as a subject (freedom) or as an object (determinism). Dialectical I : thinking, Sauvayre claims, enables us to view the person simultaneously as both object and subject. Once the subject/object dichotomy is overcome then "we can accept motives as belonging to both the internal agent and the external world simultaneously" (p. 152). ' Sauvayre draws on the thought of the philosophers Bergson (1859-1941) and 1

I Merleau-Ponty (1908-1 961) as important exponents of "dialectical" thinking in I . relation to freedomldeterminism. He draws attention to Merleau-Ponty's notion of

I I " body subject" as pointing us to the nature of the person who, he claims, "can neither I I be properly accounted for by the concept of matter or spirit because it is simultaneously both.... Matter and spirit inextricably tangled into each other" (p. 15 1). . 1 It is necessary for us to hold subject and object, matter and spirit together in this way, I i otherwise we end up with the unacceptable alternatives of universal determinism on i the one hand or absolute freedom on the other. Sauvayre draws from Bergson's thought the idea that is more than a i5 natural process driven by the blind principle of natural selection. Evolution must also I be seen as a purposive process "driven by an inherently creative life force" (p. 149). I This "life force" is not external to the process of evolution but immanent within it. I ; Thus "evolution is a meaningful process that leaps out of itself to create a new level i 1 of being" (p. 149). The same phenomenon of immanent purposefulness is inherent in I 1 each individual. Immanent within the person (as an evolving capacity) is the creative

. purposeful "soul in its entirety". This is not something additional to, or over and

I against, natural processes but an inextricable part of them. Sauvayre turns to the field of to illustrate how viewing human beings through this "dialectical" lens helps us in a practical way with the freedom1 i determinism problem. He claims that the process of effective therapy represents i : something of a movement akin to that of moving from formal to dialectical thinking. From a kollection of disparate parts (contending beliefs for example), gradually, as the therapeutic process proceeds, a wholeness or sense of identity develops within the . client. This is as an expression of an inherent evolving "true self'. At the end of a successful therapeutic process it is, Sauvayre claims, as if the client is in a position to ' make two paradoxical affirmations. The first is that the successful resolution of the ' problem "felt so natural that it seemed that nothing could have happened in any other way.... It couldn't have been otherwise" @. 156). The second is that the client i "experienced himself as the author of his life. His true self being the author of his

, actions, he was truly free." @. 156). Sauvayre claims that the holistic perspective of : "dialectical" thinking enables us to view people in such a way that we can

; simultaneously affirm both determinism and free will.

I I I have neither the space nor the competence to examine the cogency bf the : notions of "body-subject" or "life-force" which Sauvayre draws on in his analysis. Instead, what I want to focus on, is his assertion that "dialectical" thinking enables a reconciliation between freedom and determinism. He claims that formal thinking is I I included within dialectical thinking which transcends it. A key question concerns how CHAPTER 2 75. formal thinking is to be seen as included within dialectical thinking. I will claim that there is a tension inherent between the two forms such that it is difficult to see how one can be encompassed by the other. Rather each seems to repudiate the other. First.however, there is a need to point out that determinism, in its modem forms, is sophisticated enough to admit many aspects of what Sauvayre identifies as dialectical thought. In his depictions of formal thinking, Sauvayre draws on fairly primitive, time honoured, "billiard ball" conceptions of natural causation. As we shall see subsequently, determinist accounts, such as those developed within some strands of cognitive psychology, have moved a considerable distance beyond these early conceptions. Determinist accounts of the person can be holistic as well as reductionistic. And determinism can accommodate the notion of a complex evolving whole, in which the system as a whole, exerts "downward" causation on the parts. Yet these sophisticated views of determinism do not yield freedom in the libertarian sense. Natural determinism in these accounts is much more sophisticated and varied but it remains universal. Freedom requires some contra-causal capacity in human beings which enables them to stand- in part at least - outside all causal chains and processes. As we have seen in relation to Descartes, James, and Sartre, various proposals have been put to support and account for the existence of such a capacity. Sauvayre (1 995) draws on the notion of to accommodate freedom. That is, the whole is not merely determined by its constituents but operates as a system not fully inexplicable in terms of "atomic facts". As we shall see when considering recent thinking in cognitive psychology, the notion of holism does not of itself deliver freedom. We must shift the focus of explanation and inquire into the determinants of the system as a whole. Broadly two possibilities confront us. Either the system is wholly determined by laws or causes of some kind or it is, to some degree at least, self determining. Thus the notion of holism, although it does seem more friendly to the perspective bf freedom than the "atomic" accounts of determinism, does not resolve the problem. Essentially the problem is moved a step further back. If we want to claim that the system is to some degree self determining, we are once more confronted with reconciling freedom and determinism. CHAPTER 2

Sauvayre's account of freedom also employs teleological causation. He argues . that freedom consists in the unfolding of my "identity" which is a given fact of my i implicit "true self '. The path to freedom is the evolution of this "true self' - much as ' an acorn.must unfold through various life processes until it realises its identity as an oak tree. This is well and good. It has clear similarities with notions of self i actualisation in humanistic theories of psychology. It is a teleological view of the 1 person but it does not of itself deliver a libertarian view of freedom. It cannot be i 1 counted a libertarian position because it seems that the best we can do is realise an I / implicit character. The account does not seem to incorporate the possibility of i , standing outside one's character, or of acting over and against it. According to 1 Sauvayre, freedom is realised when our inherent character is able to unfold and flower ! without let or hindrance. "His true self being the author of his actions he was truly i i free." A soft determinist would make much the same claim. 1 Sauvayre's account enables us to affirm some of our intuitions of freedom, I i but it is not clear that it justifies freedom in a libertarian sense. Sauvayre has I attempted to develop a position which locates freedom as an emergent principle inherent within nature itself. I think it doubtful however that any account of freedom

I can be given as part of the same realm of discourse as a deterministic explanation. I One is the antithesis of the other and they cannot successfully be brought into ' I dialogue. Accordingly, Sauvayre's attempt to weave them together to provide a : seamless account has resulted instead in his calling attention to just how sophisticated ingenious and complex determinist explanations can become. Determinism can admit 1 , holism and emergence, but what it cannot do is admit notions like

, possibility and responsibility in the ordinary sense. Freedom requires some break in ' the web of causation, some point at which a full causal explanation, of whatever kind, cannot be given. We have briefly considered three different proposals for resolving the : freedom/determinism impasse. Each in its own way imaginatively seeks to get behind the problem and see it anew. Yet, as I have argued, each of them seems to encounter problems and finally, each attempt seems to resolve into the same framework as the ! approaches we considered earlier - that is redefining one of the terms to accommodate CHAPTER 2 77.

the other, or limiting the scope of determinism. From our consideration of the work of these thinkers I draw two provisional conclusions. The first is that Slife, Howard, . and Sauvayre, seem correct in maintaining that the freedoddeterminism problem is not soluble within the traditional terms of the debate - we end up with two mutually opposed viewpoints which we are unable to reconcile. The second conclusion is that ! perhaps no single conceptual framework is adequate. It seems that no matter what framework of thought you adopt, the antinomy continues to reassert itself. This is why the "resolutions" advanced by Howard, Slife, and Sauvayre had to be purchased at the cost of giving full and adequate expression to one side or the other. A satisfactory management of the freedoddeterminism problem may require more than one conceptual framework. Both of these conclusions will be developed in the chapter which follows.

' 2.7 Conclusion In this chapter I have sought to illustrate the extreme difficulty of the freedom/determinism issue. First I endeavoured to show that hard scientific determinism, despite its formidable strengths as a world view, is not above criticism.

: Second, I have considered several significant attempts which have been made to

, harmonise human freedom with scientific determinism. In their different ways; these approaches illuminate significant aspects of the question. But viewed as attempts at reconciliation, all are beset with difficulties. Either they fail to satisfy those dearly held beliefs about our nature which, if they are not illusory, seem to require that we are free, or they limit or transform natural determinism in a way that is contrary to a I

I : consistent scientific view of the world. I : I am not here seeking to decide the issue of whether the approach of natural :

: science is the correct or only approach to the study of human phenomena.,The point I am making here is a prior one. I have sought only to establish that attempts to I ' reconcile natural determinism and human freedom in one consistent account cannot be held to have been successful. In Chapter Four I shall examine the ways in which

i theorists in personality and counselling psychology have encountered and attempted i

1 CHAPTER 2 78.

to negotiate the free will/determinism issue. I shall seek to show that the underlying difficulties and tensions observed in the philosophical literature tend to re-surface in

, the psychological literature. First however I shall consider one further philosophical treatment of the issue. I shall argue that in the thought of Immanuel Kant, psychology may find a fruitful : strategy of approach. A strategy which is able to negotiate many of the difficulties which the freedom/determinism issue has posed for psychology in its theory, method, and practice. CHAPTER 3 79.

3. Kant

By common consent Kant is one of the greatest philosophers that has ever lived, but he is also one of the most difficult. (A. J. Ayer, 1955)

3.1 The place of Kant The determinism\fieedom issue, as I have prefigured and shall show in subsequent chapters, exists in psychology, half apparent half hidden, as a source of considerable confusion and conflict. In this chapter I aim to show that a Kantian approach to the free will \ determinism issue offers psychology a constructive way of moving beyond this present state of affairs. It provides the way, if not for resolving the issue, then at least for providing psychology with the basis of a helpful way of understanding it, and, as I shall argue, the best available means for managing it. It falls beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed philosophical justification of Kant's position. Nor am I concerned to defend every aspect of Kant's thought. Furthermore, it is both beyond my competence, and not directly relevant to my task, to enter those controversies of interpretation which his immensely complex body of thought continues to provoke among philosophers. I have, however, sought and received expert guidance in order to ensure that my interpretation of Kant is compatible with authoritative opinion in the field. I am well assured that a Kantian perspective continues to be very influential within philosophy (Warnock 1964, p.3 1 S; Sturnph, 1989 p. 3 19; Hirschberger, 1976 p. 132). My task now is to show that a broadly Kantian approach to the determinism/fieedom issue as it relates to psychology has the advantages I claim. Because of the centrality of the Kantian perspective to this thesis I shall first devote some space to a rehearsal of its major themes. Then I shall outline some specific benefits which his approach is able to confer upon psychology in relation to its management of the fieedom/determinism problem. I shall then further develop and substantiate my case for these claimed advantages in the chapters which follow. SO.

3.2 The major elements of the Kantian approach

1 i The Relatior1 betrveerz Mind arzd Objects Irnrnanuel Kant (1 724-1 804) had a high regard for natural science, the embodiment I of which, in the eighteenth century, was Newtonian physics. At the same time, he was I concerned to uphold the integrity of morality and . This he saw as threatened 1 ; by the postulate of universal natural causation required by the new science. The 1 I contemporary schools of philosophy seemed to Kant incapable of adequately ) supporting the conceptual integrity of religionfmorals or that of natural science, let ' alone providing a resolution for the apparent conflict between them. 1 Kant compared his situation with that of Copernicus (1473 1543). Copernicus I I - ! had discerned that a new starting point was required for astronomy. The difficulties which a geocentric experienced in accounting for observed celestial , phenomena led Copernicus to a bold reversal of its central assumption. Kant saw I i himself as being in a similar situation. The Kantian revolution, like that of I

Copernicus, involved the reversal of a core assumption. Before considering the nature , of the Kantian revolution, let me attempt to indicate, in a little more detail, why it II

was that Kant deemed a revolution necessary in the first place. I

At the time of Kant, two epistemological approaches competed in philosophy. ,j 1 , , stemming from Descartes, regarded the foundation of knowledge as : being given in innate ideas. , on the other hand, denied the existence of innate ideas and grounded human knowledge in the sensory experience of objects. Neither approach seemed to Kant capable of resolving critical philosophical issues. For its part, European rationalism could not yield the kind of progress in empirical I I knowledge that the Newtonian framework did in science. Its speculative metaphysics, I

whilst claiming to uncover important truths, by the exercise of reason produced I instead, rival dogmas, with no empirical means of deciding among them., On the other \ ' hand, empiricism had culminated, with the work of David Hume (1 71 1-76), in a I scepticism which denied both the legitimacy of metaphysics and the knowledge claims of natural science. Hume had argued that the only knowledge yielding propositions are . empirical ones. On this view metaphysical propositions are without meaning, and, I I CHAPTER 3 81.

accordingly, the notion of causation, as it is not empirical, is indefensible. That is, it

, remains a necessary but indefensible assumption on our part, Kant's solution was to propose a new hypothesis concerning the relationship ' between the mind and the objects of experience. What he proposed, was that instead of the mind conforming to objects, objects conform to the operation of the mind. Whilst agreeing with the empiricists that knowledge begins with experience, Kant argued that certain structures exist in the mind which determine the way in which we experience objects. Specifically, Kant proposed to replace the traditional assumption that "all our knowledge must conform to objects" with the assumption that "objects must conform to our knowledge". In other words, he proposed to replace the supposition that our concepts are copies of concepts that exist independently of our minds, with the assumption that the mind (rather than the objects themselves) formally determines the way in which objects appear to us.

I (Healy, 1987, p.200)

' This is not to say that we do not experience the external world of objects. We do. Our perception of the world is however, in quite crucial ways, shaped by the very structures which enable us to experience it at all. He (Kant) wanted to show that our knowledge contained components . contributed by ourselves prior to all experience. These components were common to every thinking mind and strictly necessary (Hirschberger, 1976, p. 134) Kant proposed the existence of a class of synthetic propositions, that is, propositions which are not tautologies, which are known a priori. Our intuitions of ' space and time and the thought categories of quantity, quality, relation and modality all yield such propositions. These propositions derive their necessary and universal nature from the inherent structures of the human mind. They enable us to'synthesise

, and unify the raw data given by the senses into a coherent experience of the world of objects. Our experience of things can be meaningful for us only on condition that it is ordered through these intuitions and categories. These intuitions and categories, and j the synthetic a priori propositions which derive from them, are necessary for us to gain CHAPTER 3 82.

knowledge of the natural world. Indeed we cannot help but employ these intuitions 1 and categories in our everyday and scientific intercourse with the natural world. This ! is so because the concepts and categories are the conditions of the possibility of our i experience of objects and, hence, of "the world". By its very nature, the mind actively organises our experiences.... Just as a I I person who wears colored glasses sees everything in that color, so every j human being, having the faculty of thought, inevitably thinks about things in I 1 accordance with the natural structure of the mind. (Stumph, 1989, p.307 ) I I It was this insight - that objects are in this sense (that is, with regard to these formal

, properties and relations) dependent on mind rather than mind being dependent on 1 objects - which Kant deemed analogous to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus: i A bold overturning of a primary assumption in thought. It was an insight which could I then be applied to the problems of philosophy (as Copernicus had applied his insight i to the problen~sof astronomy) to determine whether it helped to resolve those 1 1 quandaries which had arisen in previous systems of thought.

I Kitowledge and Reality At this point we meet a distinction in Kant's thought which is, as I shall show, crucial to his treatment of freedom /determinism. It is at the heart of his justification

I of both deterministic natural science and human freedom. At the same time it remains a source of continuing scholarly controversy. The distinction Kant draws is between objects as they necessarily appear to us and objects as they are in themselves, apart from our perception of them. The world of objects, as we perceive, them he calls the "phenomenal" world. Things as they might be, apart from our experience of them, he calls the "noumenal" world. My understanding of these constructs derives from the i - commentators I have consulted (Copleston, 1968; Korner, 1955; O'Neil, 1989; Randall, 1965; Walsh, 1964; Warnock, 1964) and seems to represent a broad stream : of scholarly opinion. The distinction between phenomena and nournena flows as an implication from Kant's "Copernican" revolution In its essentials it is as follows. As we have seen, Kant t I argues that we have no possible way of knowing the world of objects other than CHAPTER 3 83. through the a priori categories of thought. These are the only lenses we have through which to view the world. Most notably in this regard, Kant advanced forceful arguments in support of the view that space and time are not properties of objects themselves, but, on the contrary, the structure of mind itself determines that any object whatsoever must necessarily be experienced by us in spatio-temporal terms.... these considerations led Kant to formulate his famous distinction between "appearances" and "things in themselves": it is (only) things as appearances in space and time that we do, and can, experience, things (as they are) in themselves are unknown, and unknowable, by us. (Healy, 1987, p. 20 1) It follows that we can never know what things are in themselves because we can never penetrate our own experience ordering faculties. We cannot know whether things in themselves conform to our intuitions of space and time and the categories of our thought. Because we can never, as it were, remove our conceptual lenses, we can only know the world as it appears when we are looking through them. Knowledge about the world of objects is, in this sense, limited. As we shall see, by means of this distinction Kant claimed to have overcome Humean scepticism and provided a solid conceptual platform for knowledge with the reservation that our knowledge is always knowledge of the world as it must appear to us. The concept of causation, which as Hume had rightly observed, cannot be derived from our perception of objects, can now be justified. Causation is a category which the mind brings, necessarily, to our perception of the world of objects. Where causation had failed to find any justification as an observed fact of nature, Kant found its home by locating it (the concept of causation) as a category of thought. We must see the world in causal terms, it is integral to the only way we have of knowing anything at all. What objects are, apart from our perception of them, we do not know and never could. All that can be said of things in themselves is that it is an intelligible idea, given the structure of Kant's thought. After all, to describe things as phenomena he does not need to assert that there actually are things of a different kind; he needs only the idea of such things. (Walsh, 1967, p. 315 ) CHAPTER 3 84.

The idea of "things in themselves" as other than our perception of them, remain a conceptual possibility; further than that we cannot go. As we shall see however, the idea of a noumenal realm is critical to Kant's justification of the idea of human freedom.. For Kant, there are two forms of knowledge only. Empirical knowledge, which is a combination of sense impressions of natural objects ordered by the structures of our minds. And the knowledge represented by those synthetic a priori propositions which derive from these structures. There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience,.... But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it may well be that even our empirical knowledge I I is made up of what we receive through impressions and of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions serving merely as the occasion) i supplies from itself. (Kant, 1973, p.41) 1 As we shall see, Kant argues that we may have good grounds for believing in the existence of certain things which fall into neither of these categories but we can never claim to know them. We can never experience things-in-themselves because we , cannot experience the world other than through our faculties of thought. There is a I reality external to us and independent of us, but we can only know it as our

1 experiences of it are ordered by the formal a priori structures of thought. 8 Two points should be reinforced with regard to the notion of the or things-in-themselves. First, there are not two distinct classes of objects in the Kantian ; universe. Rather, objects may be considered in two ways, from two standpoints. First . the object as we are able to know it, and, second, the same object, as it is in itself. As it stands this account certainly implies the existence of an unknown and unknowable X which 'affects' our senses with something which is 'transformed'

,I into objective and scientific reality by being 'subjected to certain forms (Korner, 1955, p 91) Second, nothing positively informative can be said of things in themselves. The notion is an intelligible one within the structure of Kant's thought but it can only be defined I negatively, as Korner has done, because, by definition, a thing-in-itself can never be CHAPTER 3 85.

the object of experience. Accordingly we can never be in a position to say that we I kizo~~anything positive about an object as it is in itself - not even that it exists.

, TIze Aiztiizomies of Pure Reason Kant, by claiming that our knowledge is limited to the phenomenal world denied

I 1 all legitimacy to the enterprise of traditional metaphysics. Metaphysical doctrines I I purport to give us knowledge of things beyond experience, God and the soul, for example). But, since such entities have no empirical correlates, able to be experienced i i by us, we can have no determinate knowledge of them. This the plethora of , incommensurate systems, produced by the metaphysicians, would seem to confirm. I ! Although he had in this way called the enterprise of metaphysics in question, Kant i : I had no wish to deny the importance of its subject matter. His aim was simultaneously to establish a firm footing both for natural science, and for morality and religion. The i subjects of metaphysical speculation, the soul, the and God, Kant calls i 1 "transcendental regulative ideas". By this he means that they are concepts which transcend our experience and yet, they are recurring themes because of our need to find ultimate unity and meaning. The essence of the situation, as Kant saw it, is this: It is, understandably and properly, a persistent desire of rational beings to construct some picture of the world and of their own place in it that will be rationally satisfying, will satisfy the demands of reason. But, Kant holds, it is in principle impossible that the corpus of what is known should satisfy these demands; and conversely, it is unavoidable that any picture of the state of things which does seem to satisfy reason's demands should yet have the defect that it cannot be known to be true..... Metaphysics, in Kant's view, is the natural,.persistently repeated, but necessarily vain attempt to supply what our reason demands but can never , have. (Warnock, 1964, p.305)

, For Kant then, metaphysical questions are meaningful but we do not have the perceptual1 intellectual faculties at our disposal to answer them. What happens when we try, is the production of pairs of contradictory propositions known as "antinomies". I , Each proposition can be strongly supported but its opposite can be supported just as CHAPTER 3 86.

strongly (Walsh, 1967, p. 316). Kant identified four such antinomies which were important sources of I metaphysical disputation in his day. The one of critical interest here, concerns f causality: The proposition that natural causality is universal and its opposite, the

, proposition that alongside natural causality, freedom exists. Noting the persistence of 1 these metaphysical questions and the antinomies which result from them, Kant uses I i the distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds to argue the case for the presupposition of freedom. He does this in the following way. Because causation is one of the notions we bring a priori to experience, it is necessarily universal as far as the phenomenal world is concerned. We can only ever experience the world of objects as a causal system. Consequently, all objects of experience are necessarily elements in a system of causes. We cannot assume however that things-in-themselves are as they appear to us. Things-in-themselves could conceivably be beyond the web of causation, though there is no way that, in the world of experience, we could make good sense of this claim. if the world is phenomenal we have at least the idea of a world that is not phenomenal; and natural causality can apply without restriction to the first without precluding the application of a different type of causality to the second. (Walsh, 1967, p. 3 16) Consider what follows when we apply this thinking to human beings. We can only know ourselves as natural objects, as phenomena, and viewed as such, we are wholly determined by natural causation. Our intuitions of freedom and moral responsibility

i must be viewed as illusory. But the possibility to think ourselves at the same time as . nournena makes it at least conceivable that human freedom may be other than an illusion."In the Critique of Pure Reason it has been shown that we can think man a nournenon outside the causal order of nature, and morally freeU.(Korner,1955,

1 p. 152) What we have so far then, is the possibility of freedom. This is given in Kant's demonstration that the idea need not be incoherent or meaningless or incon~patiblewith a rigorous scientific outlook. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant had distinguished between the realm of I nature and the realm of freedom; and, while for speculative reason the concept CHAPTER 3 87.

of freedom remained problematic, it was at least thinkable without contradiction" (Werkrneister, 1980, p. 97)

Practical Reasort The nzoi.al sphere. Having thus established the notion of freedom as coherent and possible, Kant considered the positive evidence which might lead us to view freedom as a necessary presupposition. It was to a consideration of our experience of moral obligation and moral conflict that he turned to make this case. Kant used the terms "pure reason" and "practical reason" to indicate that reason can relate in two ways to its object. The first is to investigative it, or come to know it. The second is to originate it. That is, acting in order to bring it about. Reason he tells us "may be related to its object in one or other of two ways, either as merely determining it and its concept (which must be supplied from elsewhere ) or as also making it actual. The former is theoretical the later practical knowledge of reason."(Kant, 1973, p. 18). Practical reason assumes that humans are not, from a certain point of view, to be regarded as mere objects enmeshed in the causal chains of the natural order but are rather the authors of their own actions. But how is this to be established? Humans as rational beings. How do we know that our moral convictions of choice and responsibility are not mere illusions? Kant set out to establish the case for freedom by means of a carehl analysis of our ethical judgments. He argued that it is the faculty of reason which can be shown to be the basis for our moral judgments. If we are to be considered free, it must be able to be demonstrated that moral judgments do not derive from any element within the phenomenal world. He argues that whilst . experience provides the trigger for the mind to create moral judgments, experience is

, not itself the origin of the judgments we make. Moral judgments are not self validating, but derive their legitimacy from a priori rules and principles which are both universal and necessary. Morality for Kant is therefore an aspect of rationality and has to do with our c~n~ciou~ne~~of rules or "laws" of behaviour which we consider both universal and necessary. (Stumph, 1989, p. 3 1 5) I The categorical imperative. Kant moves to establish the case for freedom on the

! basis of (practical) reason's binding injunctions. He uses the notion of duty as the key moral concept through which to advance his argument. An action is moral, he maintains, if and only if, it is done for the sake of duty. By this Kant wishes to establish clearly that a moral action is to be distinguished from actions originating from the desires of the doer. For if an action originates from desire, then it is not performed primarily out of obedience to the moral law. Instead it forms part of the phenomenal order of universal causation. To be truly moral, he argues, we must adhere to the moral law as revealed by reason and not to desire. Kant advances a supreme moral principle, by which all specific moral maxims are to be judged, which "enables us to draw an absolute distinction between those which are moral and those which are not." (Korner, 1955, p. 137). This principle has an absolute or categorical nature. Kant contrasts it with propositions or principles of a hypothetical or conditional nature. Unlike propositions of the sort " In order to bring about X you should, or must, do Y." the categorical imperative is without condition or qualification of any kind. (Walsh, 1967, p. 318) The categorical imperative is formulated by Kant in several ways, though it has one central theme. Commonly it is expressed as -" Act only on that imzxirn through which you can at the sanze-time will that it should become a universal lalo. " (Korner, 1955, p. 136). The categorical imperative demands actions, not as a means to some end, but as being in conformity with universal moral principles given by reason itself. The categorical imperative is seen by Kant as the universal principle

, underlying all valid moral maxims, the a priori element in moral judgement. It is the a priori law of reason, to which all moral volitions should conform. I The situation as he (Kant) sees it is roughly as follows. Man is a creature who 1 I

1 is half sensual, half rational. Sensuous impulses are the determining factor in I many of his actions, and the role of reason in these cases is that assigned to it I I by Hume; it is the slave or servant of the passions. But there is an identifiable class of actions in which reason plays a different part, leading rather than following. This is the class of moral actions. Such actions have the I i distinguishing feature that they are undertaken not for some ulterior end but CHAPTER 3 89.

simply because of the principle they embody. (Walsh, 1967, p. 317)

: Thus is moral responsibility made to rest upon a rational a priori principle. To be : moral is, in this respect, to do what duty requires. As rational beings we impose upon i ourselves laws which we then experience as imperatives: Laws which are universal in

, scope and demanded by reason. 1 For Kant the categorical imperative imposes the binding obligations of an i ! objective moral law on everyone. He claims that a careful analysis of our moral i i reasoning is sufficient to reveal it as the principle against which the validity of all propositions which lay claim to being moral maxims are to be judged. He has sought to provide a coherent account which rests moral action solely on the a priori claims of reason, divorcing it totally from desire. Having established the categorical imperative as a cogent rational principle, it remains to be shown that it really does exist as a binding principle on all rational beings. Mere analysis of the concept of duty does not establish that such a thing exists. To do so, Kant argues, a connection must be shown to exist between rational beings in general and the categorical imperative. And specifically, that this connection can be shown to be a synthetic a priori proposition and hence, universal, necessary, and, at the same time, applicable to experience.. The connection must be synthetic because, if we make it true by definition that a rational will is a will subject to the categorical imperative, then we have remained within the realm of the analysis of concepts and have demonstrated nothing regarding their existence. There would be no point in first defining the rational will as a will subject to the categorical imperative, and then pronouncing that every rational will must be subject to it. That would be like putting a book into a drawer and then, with a mild gesture of surprise, taking it out again. (Korner, 1955, p. 143) i The connection must also be a priori, because, to demonstrate as a contingent fact that : all rational beings are subject to the categorical imperative, would not show that they must be by virtue of their rationality. To demonstrate that obligation is both real and independent of the phenomenal world of natural causation, it must be shown to be "nothing other than the expression of the mind, of reason itself, which can utter only CHAPTER 3 90.

I what is timelessly and eternally true." (Hirschberger, 1976, p.142) I Such a synthetic a priori proposition, if it existed, would be different from those ! i which operate in the domain of pure reason, as the expressions of the conditions

1 j necessary for empirical knowledge. It would be a synthetic a priori proposition belonging to the domain of practical reason. Kant identifies as the condition for the categorical imperative to be binding on every rational will, that there must exist some ultimate, objective, end in itself. if it can be shown that there is an end in itself or an end which is independent of any kind of desire, then the law to the effect that this end should be pursued would be binding for every rational will. (Korner, 1955, p. 146) Kant locates this necessity in the proposition that human beings, and indeed any other rational beings, if such exist, exist as ends in themselves. Kant distinguishes what he means by an "end in itself' from the ordinary notion of means and ends. In the ordinary way of things, an end exists only as part of an interminable causal sequence of means and ends. Ends are always provisional. They are always themselves means to some further end. When Kant says that man, or any rational being, is an end in hinzseZf (an absolute end) he means that in some sense man stands outside all causal chains and consequently outside every hierarchy of means and ends. In treating man as a means only, we ignore part of his nature - his being a rational being, a person, an end in itself. (Korner, 1955, p. 146-7) Viewed from this perspective, human beings have an intrinsic worth and dignity and so should never be treated merely as means, in the pursuit of some other end. The notion of humans as ends in themselves provides the ground of the categorical imperative as universal and necessary; binding on all rational beings. If it is the case - that humans are ends in themselves, I should act in such a way that my actions will

I never involve treating others, or myself, merely as a means to some other'end. For I

, Kant, this is the equivalent of acting in such a way that you could will the moral

maxims driving your actions to become universal laws. I

He (Kant) argues that that which serves the will as the objective ground i CHAPTER 3 91.

of its self-determination is the end. And if there is an end which is assigned by reason alone (and not by subjective desire), it will be valid for all rational beings and will thus serve as the ground for a categorical imperative binding the wills of all rational beings.... Kant postulates that man, and indeed any rational being is an end in itself. The concept of a rational being as an end in itself can therefore serve as the ground for a supreme practical principle or law. ( Copleston, 1968, p 327-328) I ! Kant has thus sought to establish a principle of practical reason which has the same , synthetic a priori and necessary qualities as those of pure reason. Thus the two forms 1I of reason pure, and practical, can be shown, in this respect, to possess equivalent foundations. Kant's distinction between the "realm of nature" and the "realm of freedom" places the realms in parallel and suggests that they ought to be considered in essentially the same way; and this in fact is how Kant did treat them. (Werkmeister, 1980, p 128.) A critical dissimilarity between pure and practical reason is that human beings are not simply subject to the moral law but are themselves, in a certain sense, the creators of it. That is to say, we make the moral law "our own" because we recognise its intrinsic worth and rational foundation. In this respect, in the domain of practical reason, people are not simply subject to law. They choose to be bound by laws whose rational legitimacy they have come to accept. In this sense they are legislators, i originators of the laws to which they then subject themselves. As we have seen these legislations derive solely from the demands of reason itself. the moral will which obeys the categorical imperative, must not be determined by interest. That is to say, it must not be heteronomous, at the mercy, as it I were, of desires and inclinations which form part of a causally determined series. It must, therefore, be autonomous. And to say that a moral will is autonomous is to say that it gives itself the law which it obeys. (Copleston,

I I 1968, p. 329) i ; Freedonz as the necessary presupposition linking rational beings and the CHAPTER 3 92. categorical imperative. The notion of obligation is not contained within the notion of a rational will. A rational will can respond to the moral imperative, only if it is free to do so. Freedom is thus the necessary presupposition linking the rational will with the categorical imperative. The prescriptive force of the categorical imperative presupposes our freedom to act in accordance with it. In the previous section, it was noted that the categorical imperative constitutes a synthetic a priori proposition. Kant's answer to the question as to how such a synthetic a priori proposition is possible in the domain of practical reason is freedom. The "ought" of the categorical imperative implies or presupposes, "can1'. The moral law presupposes the freedom to act in accordance with it. Kant can say that the categorical imperative reveals a supersensible power of freedom in us such that we must regard ourselves as part of an intelligible world, i.e., a domain determined ultimately not by natural laws but rather by laws of reason. (Arneriks, 1995, p. 403) As was established earlier, freedom, since it is not a demonstrable attribute of (phenomenal) experience, cannot be proven to exist. Yet freedom remains a defensible presupposition of moral action which can be affirmed without contradiction. The practical necessity of the idea that we are free, involves regarding ourselves as belonging, not only to the phenomenal world of determined natural causality, but also to the noumenal, or intelligible, world of rational action. according to Kant, man's subjection to a self-imposed moral law, which he can choose to obey or violate, implies the assumption that man is morally free. This assumption,.... could not be made about the phenomenal world without contradiction and must refer to man as a nournenon (Korner, 1955, p. 163) From the standpoint of practical reason then, human beings may be assumed to be free. Freedom is presupposed as a condition for acting in accordance with the categorical imperative. As moral agents ( as distinct from entities in the pl~enon~enal world), we must be presumed to be free. In this respect we stand apart from the phenomenal world. Whereas speculative reason could think the concept of freedom "only as problematic", as "not impossible", practical reason asserts the reality of CHAPTER 3 93.

freedom (without purporting to understand it) as the necessary presupposition ' of the moral law, "which we do know". Or as Kant also states it, the apodictic : moral law of practical reason and freedom "reciprocally imply each other", reason being the ultimate ground of both. (Werkmeister, 1980, p. 132) I

! The Two Standpoiizts I I From a Kantian perspective we can think of a human being in two different ways. I 1 From the standpoint of pure reason as a phenomenon or thing; from the standpoint of I 1 practical reason as noumenon, as a free, end in him or lter self; as an intelligible

, being, subject to the moral law. The dualism implied here is of quite a different order I from Cartesian-like substances. This distinction is epistemic not ontological; a duality ' not of but of thought. The two standpoints are not to be seen as ontologically distinct realms in which we reside but as alternate frameworks of thought which are i irreducible, distinct, and indispensable. Melchert (1995) helpfully employs a tabular form in order to explicate key ' elements in the distinction between the two standpoints.

Phenomenally Nournenally I armear to myself I am the unknown subject as an object in the world to whom the world appears.

All objects are organised The category of causality by the a ~rioricategory does not apply of causality

I appear to act under causal I may act under rational laws which I do not legislate la'ws which I legislate for myself. for myself.

I do not appear to be free. I am free, in that I can act on laws that I give to myself (Melchert, 1995, p. 409) CHAPTER 3 94.

I What Kant has sought to show is that the two notions of human beings as (1) part of '

, the causal order of nature and (2) as free beings who (at least from the perspective of : . morality) stand outside natural causal chains, are propositions which may be affirmed simultineously without contradiction. Provided we realise that freedom remains an I idea and can never be an object of knowledge. Kant's stance on the free

; will/determinism issue, while by no means free of intrinsic difficulties and tensions, is I regarded by many thinkers as highly tenable. Kant's solution of the conflict between causal necessity and moral freedom implies, as he admits, 'many difficulties' and 'is hardly capable of being clearly presented'. But he rightly asks, 'is any other which has been or may be attempted, simpler and more easily understandable?' The answer, I think, must be an emphatic no, unless we regard it as a solution of the problem to ignore either morality or science and refuse to consider them together. (Korner, 1955, , p. 157)

From the phenomenal perspective, freedom remains a blank counter, logically possible but unprovable; it means nothing more than the theoretical possibility of independence from the causal laws of nature. This is so in view of the fact that we

, never do, never could, experience things-in-themselves. This Kantian insight helps to make clear why attempts from both philosophical and psychological starting points which attempt to give an account of freedom from within a phenomenal or natural , science perspective are unable to succeed. Because the natural science perspectil.re includes natural causation as a necessary a priori postulate, the idea of freedom, which it contradicts, cannot be accommodated within it. Attempts to incorporate freedom into natural science descriptions will necessarily result in those accounts appearing incomplete. From the natural science perspective (as it has been adopted with psychology) we cannot give an account of the "how" of freedom because our means, I our only means, of giving such accounts are from the perspective of uriiversal determinism. Positive evidence for the existence of human freedom comes from the domain of moral experience. Here Kant has sought to show that we have good grounds for not I I dismissing our consciousness of moral freedom as an illusion. We can infer from an CHAPTER 3 95.

1 analysis of our moral experience that as nouinenal beings we are free, capable of

originating our own actions. We cannot however give an account of how we do this 1 because, as we have noted, our only equipment for giving explanatory accounts consists in the synthetic a priori propositions of pure reason which include universal ' natural causation.

Freedom as the Basis for all Reasoning 1 We have seen that Kant constructed an account of human reason which, although it requires two standpoints, is able to encompass both natural science and moral action 1 without contradiction. In this section I aim to show that the Kantian notion of freedom ; can be claimed to extend not only to moral action but to all aspects of reasoned activity. , I ! A recent commentator (O'Neill, 1989) has advanced argument an, based on a i detailed exegesis of Kantian texts, in support of an expansive interpretation of Kant's i I notion of freedom. O'Neill contends that for Kant, freedom and autonomy are at the heart not just of morality, but of all reasoning. The categorical imperative, she claims, I is the supreme principle of all reason."The Categorical Imperative ....is the 1 ' . fundamental strategy not just of morality but of all activity that counts as reasoned." (p \ 59) Kant, she maintains, argues from autonomy to reason. The claims of reason I

, require that reasoners are autonomous. Autonomy demands an ability to act other than : in response to natural forces of desire and inclination on the one hand, and on the other hand, that human thought and action are not simply random, lawless or arbitrary. ' Autonomy is self determination, as opposed to either (a) determination from "alien", I . that is naturally determined, desires or (b) non determination ,that is, arbitrariness. The / ' i authority of reason derives from the autonomy of rational beings, which enables them ,

I to critique and discipline their own reasoning. Reason, in contrast to desire, "depends on nothing separable from an agent. It is merely autonomy in thinking and acting, ! I , considered in the abstract." (p. 64). For Kant, autonomy is not the achievement of I independence or self sufficiency in living. Autonomy is an attribute of all reasoning , beings. Negatively, it is the capacity to act independently of "alien" desires I i , inclinations and impulses. Positively, it is the capacity to act on maxims which derive i CHAPTER 3 96.

! from universal principles. He argues not from reason to autonomy but from autonomy to reason. Only 1 autonomous, self-disciplining beings can act on principles that we have I - grounds to call principles of reason. Reason has no transcendent authority; it can only be vindicated by critique, and critique itself is at bottom no more than

I the practice of autonomy in thinking. Autonomy does not presuppose but rather constitutes the principles of reason and their authority:

I (O'Neill, 1989, p. 57)

The supreme principle of reason is that of thinking and acting on principles that 1 can hold universally for rational beings, regardless of their contingent circumstances. i This supreme principle of human reasoning is met in the moral sphere as the

categorical imperative but the same general notion underlies all reason. i Both in thinking and acting the self discipline of reason is a matter of asking i , whether the ground of the assumption can be a universal principle. The i I \ supreme principle of reason both emerges from and disciplines human thought, .

action and communication. There is no gap between reason and autonomy I because the authority of reason is grounded in autonomy. 1 (O'Neill, 1989, p. 59)

O'Neil goes on to argue that for Kant, the standpoint of the intelligible world is not I

, only defensible, it is required as a presupposition for the integrity of all reason. It is required as a presupposition even for empirical reasoning. This is so because self discipline, or autonomy, is necessary before any thinking or acting can count as reasoned. The standpoint of freedom is required to uphold the integrity of all reasoned , thought and activity. I Kant has not shown unconditionally that we c-ot be skeptics about freedom and morality. But he has raised the stakes: If we are skeptics about the

practical standpoint, we will also have to be skeptics about knowledge and I science. (O'Neill, 1989, p. 64) ! O'Neill argues that this conclusion follows from Kant's analysis of the antinomies I

, which arise out of theoretical reason and indicate its limitations. The antinomies of I theoretical reason require the idea of freedom in order that they may be resolved. L CHAPTER 3 97.

Freedom, although it can never be an object of knowledge, is a necessary idea because ' without it, theoretical reason by itself can never provide a complete system free of ; . contradictions. (O'Neill, pp. 59 - 63) I All.reason must rest on some presupposition and what reason establishes will be

conditional upon that starting point. The task of the Kantian philosophy is to critique , i these starting points. When we do so, we discover that the idea of freedom is essential i

I to both theoretical and practical reason alike. Kant seeks to show that it is not a ! I ' tenable position in the end to maintain that human beings can reason only

instrumentally, that is, to calculate the most eficient means to realise ends determined 1 by naturally caused desires. Rather, he argues that either reason is autonomous or we i must become sceptics about theoretical reason. This is because theoretical reason, if it I is to be coherent, presupposes autonomy of the will. (A version of this same argument was met in the previous chapter as being among the criticisms which have been made : I of hard determinism.) As I indicated at the beginning, it is beyond both the scope of this thesis and the ' 4 competence of its author, to discriminate among the interpretations of Kantian I scholars. It is sufficient for my purposes to show that there is well informed opinion .I I : which supports the contention that the Kantian notion of freedom extends to all reasoned human thought and action. From the point of view of practical reason then, it I

1 is valid to assume that all reasoned human action can be autonomous and hence free. i 1

The Faculty of Judgmetzt In his "Critique of Judgment" (1 790) Kant sought a means of relating the two apparently totally discrete worlds of nature and fieedom. 1 Between the domain of the concept of Nature or sensible reality and the I domain of the concept of freedom or supersensible reality there is a gulf of I such a kind that no transition from the first to the second is possible by means ,

I of the theoretical use of reason. It appears, therefore, that there are two sundered worlds, of which the one can have no influence on the other. Yet the ' world of freedom must have an influence on the world of Nature, if the I I principles of practical reason are to be realised in action. And it must therefore CHAPTER 3 98.

I be possible to think Nature in such a way that it is compatible at least with the '

possibility of the attainment in it of ends in accordance with the laws of s I freedom. (Copleston, 1968, p.349) Kant claimed to have discerned the link between the two domains in the faulty of I "reflective Judgment". By this means Kant offers an explanation as to how it is that

. our freedom can be efficacious in the world of objects. Broadly speaking, the principle , of reflective Judgment is that nature is fitted to the purpose of our understanding it. , Reflective Judgment has both an objective or teleological form and a subjective or aesthetic form. In both cases the underlying notion is that of nature being fitted to our .I

purpose. Reflective judgment thus adopts the standpoint of the will and hence of I freedom. In its subjective form, purpose is found in the harmony between the phenomenal properties of an object and our cognitive faculties. The product of this , harmony is aesthetic pleasure. Aesthetic judgments are held to be subjective in that , I i they are in themselves unrelated to our knowledge of objects. I I it enables us to think nature as not being entirely alien, as it were, to the realisation of ends. Works of art are phenomenal expressions of the noumenal ] i realm of value; and the beauty which aesthetic appreciation of such works 1 enables us to see in natural objects enables us to regard Nature itself as a I I phenomenal manifestation of the same noumenal reality which Kant I sometimes calls the 'supersensible substrate. (Copleston, 1968, p. 3 55) ! Viewed from the perspective of the idea of reflective judgment "Art is production ' through freedom, through a will that places reason at the basis of its actions."(Randall, 1965, p.175). In its objective form reflective judgment is an a priori heuristic principle of 1 ' . It is a necessary assumption which guides the process of inquiry. I The principle is that we regard nature as ifit were a purposive whole adapted to our j cognitive faculties. ! Kant is not.... enunciating a metaphysical dogma, namely that there are final I causes operating in Nature. He is saying that, because reflective judgment is what it is, all empirical inquiry into Nature involves from the start regarding i Nature as though it embodied a system of empirical laws which are unified i CHAPTER 3 99.

through their common ground in an other than ours and which are adapted to our cognitive faculties. (Copleston, 1968, p. 353)

, Whether this unity within nature is the case or not cannot be determined a priori. If it is true,.it is contingent truth. The physicist Paul Davies regards as striking the fact that our rational abilities seem synchronised to the comprehension of the universe. we find a situation in which the difficulty of the cosmic code seems almost to be attuned to human capabilities. (Davies, 1992, p. 149) I , The critical point is that an analysis of reflective judgment provides a further demonstration that freedom is an element internal to reason. Our reflective judgment in both its objective and subjective forms presupposes freedom. (Hirschberger, 1976, p.142). I Kant regards this a priori principle of reflective judgment as a connecting link between the worlds of nature and freedom, phenomena and noumena. Although we ) can only know nature as phenomena, an analysis of our faculty of judgment leads us , according to Kant, to the idea of nature as the phenomenal expression of a nournenal reality. I take Kant to be arguing that the intelligible, or nournenal, realm is not simply a small island in the vast sea of determinate nature. The realm of freedom seems to

, underlie, the whole of the natural universe. We may suppose then that the natural world itself is so ordered that action undertaken on the basis of our freedom can be

, efficacious in it. Having now set out the major themes of the Kantian treatment of the issue of freedom,determinism, we shall consider it in relation to the issue raised in the concluding section of the first chapter; that is, to determine whether a viable account of freedom is possible.

A Kantinrz Approach and Libertarian Coizcerns i In the first chapter I sought to show that freedom is to be preferred over , determinism. In the previous chapter one key task was to consider whether freedom could be considered viable. The criteria established for viability were threefold. First an account of freedom must be such that it enables the retention of those cherished i , views of ourselves which, it was earlier concluded, make freedom preferable to CHAPTER 3 100.

determinism. Second, any account of freedom must be cogent. That is, it must be free 1 of obvious internal inconsistency and, at the same time, not contradict what is generally regarded as clearly established empirical knowledge about human

phenomena. Finally, from the point of view of , it must be open I to the progress of empirical knowledge. It must not seem to decry or belittle attempts to explain human phenomena from a naturalistic point of view. Nor must it seek in any way to wall off some aspects of human functioning as sacrosanct, or inadmissible to naturalistic investigation. With regard to the first of these, a Kantian view, as we have seen, can support the claim that human beings are free in the required sense and able to exercise this freedom across the whole range of thought and action that require the exercise of reason. As far as cogency is concerned, Kant's system of thought, despite its difficulties and tensions, is still highly regarded among philosophers for its coherence, i subtlety and power. Finally, the Kantian notion of the two standpoints means that no limitation is supposed to the investigation of human phenomena using naturalistic ' empirical methods. We can only seek to know ourselves as determined phenomena. We cannot of course investigate the noumenal realm, although we can attempt to map r or understand our experience of freedom. This idea of the two standpoints, for reasons I shall shortly advance, makes Kant a very useful figure in thinking about fi-eedomldeterminismfrom a psychological perspective.

TIze Irzdeperzderzce of tlze Two Standpoirrts The two standpoints from which humans may be considered are independent of

, one another. What follows from this is that the same action, being regarded in turn I I ' from each standpoint, may be seen at once to be both determined and free. 1 I We cannot therefore make a distinction between two types of experienced

I 1 actions, saying that these are free while those are determined. If then, we I assume that man, as a rational being is free, we are compelled to hold that the same actions can be both determined and free. (Copleston, 1968, p. 335) Although this position seems a curious one, it has, for reasons I shall advance in the I next section, considerable pragmatic merit for psychology. When we consider this ' 1 CHAPTER 3 101.

position in relation to the future of psychology two broadly distinct possibilities suggest themselves. . The first possibility is that we shall one day develop a physics of the person in which the totality of human behaviour will be capable of explanation and prediction. Were this to occur, conceptually, fiom a Kantian perspective nothing would have . changed. Humans could still be described from both standpoints without contradiction and would need to be. When we make a decision, we cannot help but think that it is up to us, in our freedom, to decide. And, if Kant is right, nothing in science -empirical psychology, for instance- could show us that we are wrong. For experimental science can only deal with the world as it appears, not with the world as it really is. (Melchert, 1995, p. 409) The second possibility, which at this stage seems the more likely, is that we shall never progress to anything like a complete natural science of the person after the pattern of physics. It may be, that the best we can hope for in many areas, are broad tendencies and statements of probability rather than precise laws. In this event, a Kantian approach delivers us fiom endless and fruitless debate about whether such : failure is the result of overwhelmingly complex causal systems or human freedom. The beauty of a Kantian perspective, as I shall now move on to indicate, is that it

, allows us to maintain a dual approach without contradiction.

3.3 The value to psychology of a Kantian approach

Affirm tlte Validity of Freedont and Deterntirtism A Kantian approach legitimates a duality of perspectives on the nature of reason and causation. And, as we have seen, provides a closely argued justification for each. It gives us both an explanation as to why we experience the fieedom/determinism issue as a paradox and the means for dealing with it it. By establishing a firm I conceptual footing both for our intuitions of universal causation and our intuitions of I CHAPTER 3

I freedom, it permits us to view human beings as determined and as free without

: contradiction. I Kant's claim is that human agents.... not only inay but must adopt both

I standpoints, and must shift between them.... Neither standpoint is eliminable: the standpoint of the intelligible world is indeed required to grasp that of the I sensible world:.... Nature and freedom are equally necessary

The Kantian approach demands that two incommensurate frameworks of thought are

employed if we are to achieve anything like a comprehensive understanding of human 1 beings. The paradoxical nature of the freedoddeterminism issue can be explained as ; I an inherent limitation within human reason which cannot embrace the totality of I things within a single framework of understanding. Either perspective by itself has ,

inherent limitations. The capacity to embrace both standpoints without contradiction , 1 I : produces a range of potential benefits to psychology. I

Errables Freedonz and Determiizisnz to be Fully and Colrerently Articulated I As I sought to establish in the previous chapter, attempts to combine : freedoddeterminism and to create a unified standpoint, tend either to be 1 conceptually flawed or else they necessitate an unacceptable weakening of the force of i

, one side or the other. Similarly, attempts to suppress one side altogether produce a range of tensions and difficulties. As I shall show in the chapter following, these same problems have beset the attempts of psychologists to resolve the issue.

A Kantian approach can avoid these difficulties. By establishing both sides as I necessary yet incommensurate, both are able to be fully acknowledged. Whilst from a 1 Kantian perspective the existence of two standpoints entails conceding limitations in I principle to human knowledge, this is a price worth paying in order to avoid the I confusions and tensions inherent in other approaches. I

: As I will show subsequently, many psychological attempts to resolve the issue have , endeavoured to accommodate one standpoint from within the general frame of thought

, of the other. These attempts to define one side in the terms of the other are not i , successful. The Kantian analysis both indicates why this is so and proposes instead i CHAPTER 3 103.

that each is irreducible to the other and requires to be treated on its own terms and can be. Thus the Kantian approach contributes inclusiveness and breadth to the endeavour . of human self understanding. Randall (1965) writes of the merits of a Kantian approach in these terms. Hence the ordering of the scientist or physicist furnishes no absolute and final insight into the nature of the universe. The interpretation that makes the experience of the artist or the prophet intelligible affords additional data that have to be taken into account. And the interpretations of them all taken together do not sufice to make clear what the complete story would be. (Randall, 1965, p. 129) As I shall argue in the chapters to follow, breadth and inclusiveness without want of conceptual integrity is a highly desirable state for the future of psychological study and practice.

Explairrs tlze Paradox and Provides ail Iiztellectual Warrant for Botlt Sides The Kantian analysis of the dual forms of human reason as both theoretical and practical provides an explanation for the freedom/determinism paradox which is intellectually rigorous. It enables us to affirm that our intuitions of freedom are not illusions. At the same time we are enabled entirely to support that unified coherent

, account of the world which is predicated on universal causation. A Kantian approach seems able therefore to deliver psychology from an unacceptable either/ or position with regard to the issue. We might view persons as entirely appropriate objects for analysis under the of natural science. In doing so however we expose ourselves to the anxiety and repugnance attendant upon the loss of our of ' ourselves as free. Or we might accept our intuitions of freedom. But in so doing we must substantially surrender our aspirations for a scientific explanation of human : beings. As I sought to show in the previous chapter, with regard to a number of the philosophical attempts to resolve the issue, in the end it seems to come to that sort of hard choice. In the chapter following, I shall argue that psychological attempts to resolve the issue lead in the end to the same conclusion. We are presented with a 1 seemingly intransigent eitherlor. In this respect a Kantian stance would appear to CHAPTER 3 104.

permit us a scholarly tolerance. This tolerance is made possible by Kant's providing ' us with penetrating insights into the source of the problem and how it may be

, resolved. The critical philosophy is hence a philosophy of toleration, of live and let live. ' It effects an intellectual nodu us vivendi between different human enterprises, by distinguishing them from each other.... it is content to allow different men with different experiences to dwell in peace side by side; its problem is to adjust these different interests to each other by carefully delimiting the fields in which their respective principles are valid.... Kant leaves the way open to recognise the validity of every enterprise of human life to which man's nature i impels him, without making the more ambitious attempt to provide a neat pigeonhole for each in a total system. (Randall, 1965, p. 129)

'I E~zcouragesa Rigorous Natural Scie~zceApproach to Psycl~olo~gy A Kantian standpoint entirely vindicates the investigation of human beings as wholly determined natural objects. Indeed as Kant makes clear the enterprise of explanatory knowledge demands that we mount our upon a postulate of universal natural causation. Far from in any way diminishing the importance or scope of natural causation, Kant rescued it from Hurnean scepticism and enshrined it as a

, necessary principle for our knowledge of objects. One of the criteria established at the outset for a viable account of freedom, if it is to be of assistance to psychology, is that it must not call into question the legitimacy and value of deterministic investigations of human phenomena. A Kantian approach satisfies this requirement. The phenomenal/noumenal distinction is not to be taken as in any way belittling or radically qualifying scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge remains nothing less than a rigorous objective quest for knowledge about objects."To the proper work of j the scientist the distinction was, as Kant insisted, irrelevant." (Korner, '1955, p. 95) , A Kantian approach delivers the methodological determinism psychology requires for naturalistic approaches to theorising and research, without at the same time entailing ; a commitment to metaphysical determinism. i CHAPTER 3 105.

I Provides a Just~jicatio~zfor Inquiry wlticlt Assumes Freedom From a Kantian perspective the natural science approach in psychology is

, necessary to explain human phenomena. The question which next arises is whether, given the justification the Kantian system provides for the presupposition of freedom, it is possible to study human beings from the nournenal perspective. Clearly if any

. form of inquiry from the standpoint of freedom is possible it will, in critical respects, , be unlike naturalistic inquiry. It can never yield knowledge anything like the 1 equivalent of natural science for we cannot know ourselves in our freedom. It would

1 however seem congruent with the thought of Kant to suggest that we can explore and ,I

map our experience of acting freely. Kant's emphasis on our experience of our I I autonomy in the exercise of reason would seem to provide the justification for such I an endeavour. Thus it would appear legitimate to inquire into, and seek a closer I understanding of, our intuitions of acting freely, our experience of confronting life as

I autonomous and responsible beings. A form of inquiry which seeks to explore and map this human world would seem a valuable, though incommensurate, complement to the nahual science approach. A critical issue to be confronted later, is what form an inquiry, without the assumption of universal causation, might take. In a subsequent

: chapter I shall consider hermeneutic approaches to human inquiry and explore their I 1 relation to the free will/determinism issue in general and the Kantian perspective in I particular.

Avoids arz O~ttologicalDualism It might be objected that a Kantian approach is itself dualistic. The dualism is 1 . however quite different in kind from a Cartesian dualism. It is epistemological not I I

ontological. That is to say, from a Kantian point of view the phenomenal and the I nournenal do not represent two distinct entities, substances, or essences. There is only j one person who is whatever he or she is. It is the nature of human knowledge , not its , object, which necessitates the two standpoints. It is because of being the kind of subjects that we are that we experience objects as we do. One advantage of this is that the standpoint of freedom can be maintained in i psychology, without the need to consider some aspects of human functioning as I CHAPTER 3 106.

beyond fruitful investigation by naturalistic methods. The perspective of freedom does not have to be wedged into the gaps presently existing in our knowledge of causal

, processes as they apply in the human realm. A Kantian approach denies the validity of any forin of demarcation line which divides the aspects of human functioning between the parts that are determined and those that are free.

! As I shall argue in the following chapter, advocates of different approaches to the i person within psychology, have no need to be critical of one another, on the basis of I their line of approach to the freedomldeterminism issue. All human thought and action ' can be validly considered from both standpoints. Although, as the Kantian analysis . implies, and as I shall show subsequently in a consideration of psychological theories of the person, all such theories, by virtue of the standpoint adopted in relation to : freedomldeterminism, are, by themselves, inadequate.

3.4 Conclusions The great value of a Kantian approach to the freedoddeterminism issue for psychology is that it licenses inclusiveness. It provides psychology with the means to befriend its present state of disunity at least in so far as this pertains to the

: freedoddeterminism issue. It meets the requirements for the viability of an account of

, freedom established earlier. It enables us to affirm a libertarian view of ourselves as

I autonomous beings confronting an open future. It remains highly regarded among philosophers for its coherence and consistency. It is able to accept without qualification the need for, and value of, a rigorous scientific inquiry into those structures, mechanisms and causal relationships which determine l~umanfunctioning.

At the same time it would appear open to the possibility of legitimate and valuable !I

, psychological inquiries which consider people from the standpoint of freedom. I In the three chapters which follow I shall explore in some detail the a freedom/determinism issue in relation to theory, research, and practice, within I

I

psychology. Specifically, I shall argue that Kant's approach provides the best I conceptual tool available to psychology in relation to the free will/determinism ' problem. And above all, that Kant's approach enables the value of both standpoints to I I CHAPTER 3

2 be brought to bear, (through psychology's theorising, research and practice) in the

, promotion of human self understanding and well being. I I

Please note

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CHAPTER 4 108.

4. Psychological theory

Psychology is necessarily the most philosophy-sensitive discipline in the entire I gamut of disciplines that claim empirical status. (Koch, 1981, p. 267)

4.1 Introduction Basis for Selection of Theorists In this chapter I will consider the freedom/determinism issue from a range of

, perspectives in personality and counselling theory. An exhaustive review would be a I : monumental task. This briefer analysis is intended to represent some of the most influential approaches to understanding the person which have emerged in modern psychology. At the same time it seeks to encompass the major positions in relation to fieedom/determinism found in psychological theory, including some recent : developments in thinking about the issue, particularly those which have emerged from

, within cognitive psychology. Accordingly, I shall consider the work of some of the seminal figures in modern psychology, and a number of lesser known thinkers who have contributed to thought about the freedom and determinism issue from the

, perspective of psychological theory. Claims to be Establislted

, The aim of this review is to establish the following claims. (1) That those theories in personality and counselling psychology which affirm one . standpoint and deny or minimise the other result in difficulties. Attempts to suppress either perspective produces tensions of various kinds. ' (2) Similarly, psychological theories which attempt to harmonise or reconcile the two standpoints also provoke tensions or difficulties and fail to do justice to either one or ' both standpoints. Many of the difficulties noted earlier in the philosophical attempts at CHAPTER 4 109.

a reconciliation, reappear in the psychological literature. (3) Although they repel one another as antitheses, both standpoints seem to be required as presuppositions in psychological theory. An account of the person from one perspective cannot be fully coherent unless it is augmented in some way by the opposing standpoint. (4) From this I will establish a broader claim. The Kantian insight that a dual perspective is required to do justice to human life is clearly demonstrated in modern psychology. No single comprehensive account of human beings is possible. A dual perspective is unavoidable. (5) To do full justice to its subject, psychology must sacrifice its hope for theoretical and methodological unity and legitimise its present de facto disunity as far as freedom and determinism is concerned. A dual perspective is required in which methodological determinism is the essence of the one and the assumption of freedom the essence of the other.

4.2 The First two Paradigms: Psychology as a Deterministic Science ' Freudian psychoanalysis and behaviourism, commonly regarded as the first two

' paradigms of modern psychology, both proceed from overtly determinist ' assumptions. I shall consider the work of Freud and Skinner as the seminal figures of psychoanalysis and behaviourism. Despite the cognitive revolution which has overtaken psychology in recent decades, behaviourism and psychoanalysis are far from being of mere historic interest. A study of citation records (Friman, Allen, Kenvin & Larzelere, 1993) showed that citation rates for behavioural 1 psychology were high and with no discernible downward trend. Citation rates for , psychoanalysis, though not as high, showed only a marginal rate of decline. This would seem to establish that psychoanalysis and behaviourism are very much living theories within psychology today. CHAPTER 4 110.

1 Sipzund Freud (1 856-1939)

, The work of Sigmund Freud has not only been of momentous significance for I . and psychology this century but, as was noted in the citation study referred ' to in the previous paragraph, the psychoanalytic tradition continues as a major force in '

, research and clinical practice. Moreover, Freudian ideas have been influential far

j beyond the borders of these disciplines, finding their way into such fields as literature, i philosophy, political analysis, and the language and thought forms of the general , 1! i public. On any reckoning, Freud must be counted as one of the seminal thinkers of the : 1 twentieth century. In this brief consideration, it is impossible to do justice to the depth ' / 1 , and complexity of his thought even from the relatively narrow perspective of the issue , ;

! of freedom and determinism. This said, I will attempt to elucidate the main outlines of , his position on this issue. With justification, Freud has usually been seen as a determinist (Sulloway, 1979; Pervin, 1984; Erdelyi, 1985; Lundin, 1991; McMillan, i 1991) although, as we shall see, there may be some countervailing strands in his I thought. First, to illustrate the prevailing deterministic cast of Freud's approach. Anyone thus breaking away from the determination of natural phenomena, at any single point, has thrown over the whole scientific outlook on the world (Freud, 1952, p. 454) In his biography of Freud, Ernest Jones (1955) quotes Freud as saying of psychoanalysis, "It has taught us that our intellect is a feeble and dependent thing, a plaything and tool of our impulses and ; that all of us are forced to behave : cleverly or stupidly according as our attitudes and inner resistances ordain."(p.368). . (1 961), in recounting the events which led to his eventual break with Freud, ' relates part of a conversation they had regarding Freud's psycl~osexualtheory of behaviour.

q Wherever in a person or in a work of art, an expression of (in the I intellectual, not the supernatural sense) came to light, he suspected it, and insinuated that it was repressed sexuality. Anything that could not be directly interpreted as sexuality he referred to as "psychosexuality". I protested that this i hypothesis, carried to its logical conclusion, would lead to an annihilating I CHAPTER 4 111.

1 judgment upon culture. Culture would then appear as a mere farce, the morbid * consequence of repressed sexuality. "Yes," he assented,"so it is, and that is just a curse of fate against which we are powerless to contend.

'(Jung, 1961, p. 172-173). I The role of reason in the Freudian system seems to be restricted to "the reality

. principle". This "second order" thinking exercises an instrumental function in I

calculating the best means of achieving satisfaction of instinctual drives given the 1 realities of existence. That is to say, because of the complexities of human life "arrangement, planning, and delay" are required if our attempts to satisfy our desires 1 ! are to be successful. Reason is the slave of our desires and our desires have an I organic origin. As the passage from Carl Jung shows, for Freud culture is a mere epiphenomenon, not ultimately to be understood on its own terms but as a sublimation of instinctual drives. The whole human production of civilised behaviour is a thin i veneer beneath which monumental primitive forces heave and struggle. Of these, the i I real well springs of our behaviour, we remain largely unaware. Despite the enormous contributions which the work of Freud has made to I I psychology and other disciplines, his theory has been extensively criticised. Two 1 I a particular directions which this criticism has taken are (1) the scientific standing both I of his theoretical edifice and his research and (2) his account of female I , psychology. Such matters fall largely beyond the scope of this thesis. I wish to point i to difficulties and tensions of a somewhat different order. These difficulties and tensions, I shall argue, stem from the almost total suppression of the perspective of fi-eedo~nin the Freudian account of the person. I The first of these concerns repugnance. Not withstanding the continuing influence Ii ' of Freudian thought, many have found his picture of human existence repugnant. I Second, the theory has been criticised as experiencing difficulty in accounting convincingly for the full range of human phenomena. A final difficulty' concerns : I : consistency. What I mean by consistency in this context is that whilst the theory denies the freedom perspective, for some purposes at least, the theorist seems to require it i Repugnance. As a matter of fact, many, like Jung, have found Freudian I CHAPTER 4 112.

determinism bleak and pessimistic. Indeed Freud himself acknowledged that the

, human situation was far from being a happy one.

I I can at least listen without indignation to the critic who is of the opinion that when one surveys the aims of cultural endeavour and the means it employs, one is bound to come to the conclusion that the whole effort is not worth the 1 trouble, and that the outcome of it can only be a state of affairs which the I individual will be unable to tolerate. (Freud, 1961 byp. 145 ) I I There seems to be a kind of existential tension which hard determinist and near j hard determinist theories of the person provoke. Life seems to be "short changed" and , impoverished by hard determinist explanations. For Freud this "curse of fate" must be I' I endured with honesty and with courage. And, if we are determined as Freud supposed, i then we can do no better than follow Freud's advice and make the best we can out of the hand we have been dealt. If, on the other hand it is possible, with intellectual

I honesty, to see ourselves in a more positive light then, I would argue, we should certainly do so. As I have proposed, given the choice, we should reject as the final I truth of the matter, a view which reduces to mere appearance what we take to be the most significant aspects of our existence. i Indeed, the suppression of the freedom perspective, because it negates our intuitions of freedom, seems to result in our being unable to rest content with it for , very long. It is as if we resist the prisoners of such explanations of I ourselves. The subsequent unfolding of the psychodynamic tradition could be seen as evidence in support of this view. Many theorists who continued in the psychodynamic tradition found Freudian theory zmnecessarily bleak and pessimistic. In important respects the development of the psychodynamic tradition consisted precisely in a

' moving away from the near hard determinist stance of the founder. This trend is ! evident in the work of theorists such as Adler, Jung, Erickson, and Horney. The i following quotation from Karen Homey, for example, portrays a view of the person . which, in its endorsement of the freedom perspective, makes it the antithesis of the Freudian picture. And it illustrates the distance travelled by a neo-Freudian from the views of the founder: I I However great man's possibilities for becoming destructive, the history of CHAPTER 4 113.

mankind also shows an alive and untiring striving toward greater knowledge about himself and the world around him, towards deeper religious experiences, I 1 toward developing greater spiritual powers and greater moral courage, towards 'greater achievements in all fields , and towards better ways of living. And his ' very best energies go into these strivings. By dint of his intellect and the power of his imagination, man can visualise things not yet existing. He reaches beyond what he is or can do at any given time. He has limitations but his limits are not fast or final (Homey, 1950, p. 377). Erdelyi (1 985), in commenting on the reaction against Freud's psychic determinism observes that it even extends to many who would, in other respects, locate themselves squarely within the psychoanalytic tradition. It is noteworthy that so -many of the criticisms of psychoanalysis represent contrary tendencies with respect to the cause-effect issue. A major contemporary school of psychoanalytic thinking, for example, has gone so far as to reject the formal psychological theory of psychoanalysis (often termed ~netapsychology) because its mechanistic (cause-effect) formulations conceptually channel the field into outmoded physicalist notions such as ''force", "energy", "etiology", and "hydraulics" (p. 54) This same tendency is observed from a very different point of view by B. F. Skinner (1971). Writing of the persistence of belief in "autonomous man" into the age of science, Skinner observes the intrusion of the perspective of freedom into the psychoanalytic tradition. Freud was a determinist - on faith, if not on the evidence - but many Freudians have no hesitation in assuring their patients that they are free to choose among different courses of action and are in the long run the architects of their own destinies (p. 26). ( As I shall show subsequently, much the same fate was to befall Skinner himself with : the rise of cognitive behaviourism.) My submission then is that the suppression of the perspective of freedom tends in time to be experienced as inadequate and constricting. A reaction occurs in which there is a "rediscovery" of aspects of human existence for 1 I , which the determinist perspective alone seemed unable to account adequately. i CHAPTER 4 114.

Narro~vzessof scope. A second tension, related to the first, is the widespread I

conviction that the theoretical apparatus of Freudian theory struggles to encompass, in , . a convincing way, the full range of human phenomena. Many psychologists and others find some Freudian explanations forced. Not withstanding that a primary aim of science is to explain as much as possible with the smallest number of concepts, the 1 terms of the theory have seemed to many subsequent psychologists, too narrow a I platform on which to rest the breadth and complexity of its subject (Pervin, 1984, p.

I 140). In particular the theory seems unable to do justice to the " higher order

"dimensions of human experience. 1 Kelly (1991) proposes that all theories have what he calls a "range of convenience". By this he means " a range within which it (a theory) serves the user collveniently for the job of predicting events." (p. 95). All psychological theories he maintains are of this type, "miniature systems", useful within restricted fields but less so when inflated i beyond them. Freud's psychoanalysis started out as a psychotherapeutic teclmique but was progressively enlarged into a personality system and, by some, into a religio- philosophical system. This kind of inflation of miniature systems is not necessarily a bad thing, but it does cause trouble when one fails to recognise that what is reasonably true within a limited range is not necessarily quite so true outside that range. (Kelly, 1991, p. 8). A second notion proposed by Kelly, in relation to psychological theories, is "focus of convenience". By this he means that theories have, within their range of convenience, certain points or realms in which they work best - usually the particular events, the explanation of which, was the primary concern of the theorist. The free will/ determinism issue constitutes, I maintain, an important a priori limitation on the range and foci of convenience of psychological theories. To be : coherent, a theory must adopt one or the other standpoint as a meta-theoretical

, assumption. This decision itself will significantly determine the range and focus of convenience of the theory. The adoption by Freud of something very close to a hard determinism, built upon efficient causation after the model of the physics of his time,

I , is generally acknowledged as an outstanding contribution towards identifying and I CHAPTER 4 115.

accounting for important areas of our functioning - the role of sexuality, the unconscious, and the mechanisms of ego defence. On the other hand, significant

, strains arise in satisfactorily accounting for those aspects of life which we associate with the exercise of agency. My argument is that in relation to the freedom/determinism issue, the stance which : the theorist adopts towards it, will significantly determine what areas of human functioning tend to lie within the range of convenience of the theory and which will tend to lie beyond it. That is, Freud's conviction that psychological explanation I should proceed from a hard determinist perspective decides in an a priori way that his work will have the potential to provide certain kinds of worthwhile explanations. At the same time, it will produce corresponding strains. The assumption of hard determinism is a perfectly valid starting point for psychological theorising. But the denial of the freedom perspective inevitably gives rise to the conviction that t something of great significance is missing. It is my contention that the suppression of the freedom perspective is an important factor engendering this conviction of narrowness. As I shall show, the same tension is evident in psychology's second paradigm for the same reason. A Kantian approach provides us with a way of understanding and dealing with this. It is possible and demonstrably useful to consider the human realm as a set of wholly determined natural phenomena; to consider ourselves as objects. But the standpoint of the intelligible world, is required in the living out of our lives. The terms of any determinist account of the person, Freud's or any one else's, is, in this sense, uni-dimensional. Another framework of understanding, another dimension is needed in addition to enable us to make sense of other facets of our experience, and to create colour and motion in our view of human functioning as opposed to the black and white stills of hard determinism. : Consistency. There appears to be some measure of tension in the thought of Freud , himself between the almost negligible role assigned to reason in his psychological theory and his high view of scientific endeavour. As to his view of science, Freud , did, it seems, regard the future progress of science as an avenue of hope, hope that i , reason might yet triumph over human captivity to the . CHAPTER 4

We may insist as often as we like that man's intellect is powerless in comparison with his instinctual life, and we may be right in this. Nevertheless, there is something peculiar about this weakness. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind, but it is in itself a point of no small importance. (Freud, 1961a, p. 53) Freud seems to propose that reason can function autonomously, but as a matter of fact, it hardly ever does. The possibility that it one day might do so exists for him as hope. He proposes a social evolution of human beings in which is succeeded by religion and finally, religion by science (Freud, 1961a, p. 54-56). His own system of thought, and the rise of science generally, is to be seen as a possible beginning of the rule of reason. The rule of reason is, if I understand his position, in its infancy, as i an emergent capacity in the social evolution of humanity. If this construction of his thought is correct, an apparent difficulty exists in ' reconciling his deterministic psychological theory with the notion of reason as anything other than the paltry ego seeking to balance instinctual demands with those

! of the external world. As we have seen, Freud appeared to maintain that all other domains of ratiocination are determined in the sense that their products are the illusory manifestations of underlying psychic forces. But scientific thought must constitute an exception. We must have good grounds for trusting in the scientific enterprise. If not, we have no justification for Freudian theory itself. Yet there does

' seem to be something of a tension here. Given a strict determinism in which all psychical phenomena are held to result from physical phenomena it is difficult to ' understand whence comes the "soft" but insistent voice of reason. For if all psychical events have organic and environmental causes, how is the transition to be made from

: cause and effect to ground and consequent? If, as Freud insists, we carhot "at any ! single point" break away from natural determinism without overthrowing the scientific : 1 outlook, how are we to justify the hope in reason's emergence? I Freud is perhaps aware of this as a potential difficulty and proposes that one ground I I for believing that science is not an illusion is that it works. "But science has given us ; CHAPTER 4 117.

1 evidence by its numerous and important successes that it is no illusion." (Freud, 1961a, p. 55). But without a belief in the integrity of reason even scientific success is a

, problematic ground for its justification. (1) It involves declaring as essentially illusory what scientists imagine then~selvesto I

: be doing in the closely reasoned and strenuous processes of scientific activity. It j seems to set at nothing the integrity of scientific processes of thought and activity. , (2) As a matter of fact, the criteria often used to judge the success or otherwise of I ' scientific endeavour is not popularly apparent accomplishment but the close reasoning and experimentation of the . That is to say, the very grounds on which scientific work is judged hinges on scientific reasoning itself. Freud seems wise in predicating the integrity of science on something more than its demonstrated success. Whist its success may testify to its integrity, its integrity appears to demand the independence of reason. And this Freud appears to

i acknowledge. The tension, it seems to me, lies in juxtaposing the existence of such a faculty with the proposition that all psychical events have efficient natural causes. It seems anomalous that in this one area, natural science, the cause-effect explanation of human thinking is replaced by the logical connections of consequent and ground. : If I am right about this, then it is perhaps an illustration of Kant's claim that we seem ! unable to construct systems to explain the phenomenal world without recourse at I some point to the intelligible world. It appears to constitute a challenge to all hard determinist theories of the person, consistently adhered to, to be reflexive at this point. Some commentators on the work of Freud have claimed that a divergence exists . between Freud as determinist theoretician and Freud as therapist. The existentialist I psychologist Medard Boss (Moss, 1978, p.313) for example, discerns two theories of i ' the person in Freud's work: An explicit determinist view in his theoretical writings, and an implicit rather different view, which employs the language of freedom, which i emerges in his works which deal with therapy. To explore this claim wduld require i

space and expertise I do not possess. But that such a tendency has been noted by some , I commentators may be an indication of the difficulty pointed to in the Kantian analysis ; , - of avoiding the idea of freedom when one moves from the "pure reason" of scientific I explanation to the "practical reason" of actual living. It may point more generally to a CHAPTER 4 118. ,

! difficulty in applying deterministic theories consistently in therapeutic contexts. I conclude that Freud's suppression of the freedom perspective creates both , existential and conceptual tensions. His view of the person has seemed to many, to be narrow &d needlessly tragic. Conceptually, a rigid application of his psychic I

I determinism seems to create a prima facie difficulty in accounting for the integrity of , ! reason (and perhaps the humanity of his patients). This is not to deny the great value i , of Freud's work, value which stems in no small way from his assumption of psychic . I ' determinism. It is rather to assert that a comprehensive account of ourselves, which I suppresses the perspective of freedom, cannot be wholly satisfactory. It is almost as if , the standpoint of freedom stubbornly reasserts itself despite our efforts to excise it. I Much as Freud's "instincts" are held to surface, in some form or other, despite our efforts to contain them. I

I B. F. Skinner (1904- 1990) I I ! Do I mean to say that Plato never discovered the mind? Or that Aquinas, Descartes, Locke and Kant were preoccupied with incidental, often irrelevant ! by-products of human behavior? Or that the mental laws of physiological I psychologists like Wundt, or the stream of consciousness of Willianl James, or ! I ! the mental apparatus of Sigmund Freud have no useful place in the \ understanding of human behavior? Yes I do. (Skinner, 1973, p. 49) In the "empty organism" theory of B. F. Skinner the notion of the mind departs and behaviour is entirely shaped by the environment. It is critical to note the manner in which the mind disappears. It is one thing to maintain that good science demands that all its objects are observable and that mental constructs, being , have no place in scientific explanations. (Although it should be noted that even in physical science, constructs like the force of gravity, whilst not directly observable, play a : crucial role.) It is quite another thing to maintain that the mind plays nireal part in the production of behaviour. Whilst the second proposition if true, makes the first necessary, the reverse is not the case. The first is a proposition about methodology in psychology, the second a proposition in metaphysics. It is clear that Skinner's denial of I mind was not just an heuristic strategy. Skinner maintains that all language which CHAPTER 4

i refers to mental states, and appears to presuppose an originating mind, is a necessary . r

fiction in ordinary life but he seems to imply that the mind has no ontological status ; ! . beyond this. In face to face contact with another person, references to an initiating self are ' unavoidable. There is a 'you' and there is an '1'. I see what 'you' do and hear what 'you' say and you see what 'I' do and hear what 'I' say. We do not see the t of selection responsible for what is done and therefore infer an

I internal origination, but the successful use of the vernacular in the practice of psychology offers no support for its use in a science. In a scientific analysis, histories of variation and selection play the role of the initiator. There is no place in a scientific analysis of behavior for a mind or self." (Skinner, 1990, p. 1209). It seems difficult to interpret Skinner in any way other than that he is denying the ! validity of the concept of the mind not just within psychological science, but within human self understanding generally. His (1971) work "Beyond freedom and dignity" illustrates this broader program. As a work intended for a general readership its purpose was to replace the idea of "autonomous man" (with its attendant notions of

I freedom and dignity) in our ordinary thinking with the idea of an organism shaped by its environment. The notion of human freedom requires the idea of mental events as crucial determinants of behaviour, thus any view which denies this must be a determinist view. Furthermore, it must be a hard determinism for it entails a denial of even the instrumental (means to ends) calculations of reason. Skinner holds that the notion of the human being as an autonomous agent is essentially pre-scientific. Just as the ' attribution of agency to non-sentient natural objects has given way to scientific explanation, so the progress of behaviourist science will bring about the same : realisation as far as people are concerned. Skinner would seem to be a inetaphysical , , as well as a methodological determinist. I As a science of behaviour adopts the strategy of physics and , the autonomous agent to which behaviour has traditionally been attributed is i replaced by the environment-the environment in which the species evolved and i CHAPTER 4

1 in which the behaviour of the individual is shaped and maintained. (Skinner, 1971,~.184) Freud and Skinner could hardly be further apart with regard to their views regarding the nature of mind, the determinants of behaviour, the function of consciousness, the

nature of scientific method and the role of theory in science. In one thing however I j they were agreed; both theorists were determinists.

Freud deplored behaviourism. Its crude mechanistic beginnings in the dawn of ' I the twentieth century had only one feature in common with the philosophical basis of psychoanalysis: a reliance on determinism as the final foundation of 1 scientific method." ( Stafford-Clark, 1967, p. 196) I The difficulties noted in the case of Freud who seems to regard hard determinism as a I metaphysical truth, are all the more clearly apparent in the work of Skinner who i undoubtedly does. As was noted in the case of Freud, the suppression of the freedom i I I I perspective seems to create problems of consistency. It follows from hard determinist i theories that our behaviour and point of view are not the outcome of reasoning. They i are the outcome of whatever natural causes are held to produce or shape them. I I Whether these causes are held to be instinctual forces or the environment is , I f immaterial. Reason does not, play an active or independent role, reasons are the ! artefacts of non-rational natural antecedents. Such a view, as established in the case \ i of Freud, seems to produce conceptual tangles. How can we evaluate a theory if, on the theory's own terms, our evaluation itself is the result of non-rational causes? illustrates this issue by pointing to the difficulties that arise when one tries to account, on Skinnerian terms, for reading a 1 : book in which Skinner presents his theory for our consideration. i If Skinner's thesis is false, then there is no point in his having written the book or our reading it. But if his thesis is true, then there is also no point in his having written the book or our reading it. For the only point could be to I

modify behaviour, and behaviour, according to the thesis, is entirely controlled I by arrangement of reinforcers. Therefore reading the book can modify

1 behavior only if it is a reinforcer, that is, if reading the book will increase the i CHAPTER 4 121.

probability of the behavior that led to reading the book (assuming an appropriate state of deprivation). At this point we seem to be reduced to gibberish. ( Chomsky, 1973, p. 68). It is precisely the denial of the independence of reason which brings about these conceptual tensions and tangles. The theory seems unable to be reflexive, struggling to : give an adequate account of itself. If reason has no place why does the theorist persist 1 in reasoning with us none the less? 5 1 I A further criticism which has been made of Skinner's position is that, like I , Freudian theory, it seems too narrow a platform to accommodate the variety and complexity of human phenomena. Chomsky (1973 ) undertakes a detailed analysis of ' Skinner's attempt to account for "higher order" human functioning in the terms of his

: theory. He concludes that Skinner is only able to do so by so altering the meaning of his key theoretical constructs that they become homonyms for ordinary language constructs which assume human agency. ! The careful reader will discover that in each case a literal interpretation of Skinner's statements, where terminology is understood in something like the technical sense, yields obvious falsehood, and that a loose metaphorical interpretation does permit the translation of the familiar descriptive and evaluative vocabulary of ordinary discourse into Skinner's terms, of course wit11 a loss of precision and clarity, in view of the poverty of his system. (Chomsky, 1973, p. 73) It is concluded then that the same kinds of tensions, related to consistency and : range of convenience, which were observed in relation to Freudian theory, emerge . also in the work of Skinner. The contribution of Skinner's work to our understanding ' of certain aspects of , and its applications to therapy and education has been considerable to say the least. On the other hand, as we have seen, the theory seems j less than convincing in its attempts to explain higher order human funcfioning. We I might conclude from this that hard determinist theories are likely to be restricted in their range of convenience by virtue of that assumption. In particular they struggle to account convincingly for those aspects of our lives which, in the popular mind, are i attributed to "autonomous man". More broadly then, psychological accounts which CHAPTER 4 122.

proceed by a total suppression of the freedom perspective, whatever contributions they 1 may make within their foci of convenience, cannot be wholly satisfactory as an all I : embracing account of the person. As with the case of Freud, many of those who followed after Skinner departed radically from his hard determinist views. The rise of cognitive behaviourism, which views cognition as being the most crucial determinant of behaviour, returned the issue of human agency to centre stage. Two hard determinist views of the person dominated the first half of the century. Both portray human beings as the essentially passive instruments of natural determinants. And, whatever their other deficiencies as theories, it was, as I have argued, their suppression of the freedom perspective in itself which was important in producing difficulties for them and provoking reaction against them. The assumption of hard determinism necessarily results in a judgment that higher order human hnctioning does not sit easily within the range of convenience of such theories. Hard determinist views of the person produce useful explanations of certain aspects of our behaviour. Paradoxically however, they seem to require the perspective of the intelligible world. They deny it, yet seem inadequate (both from a conceptual and an existential point of view) without it. The distinction between methodological and metaphysical determinism can come to our assistance at this point. Adopting a methodological determinism enables us to affirm the value of such theories without being either disconcerted by their conceptual tensions or affronted by their existential ones. The assumption of hard determinism has, as Freud and Skinner show us, immense heuristic value. Regarding human beings as if hard determinism is true, but without a metaphysical commitment to it, enables us to tolerate the tensions and appropriate the benefits. A Kantian framework provides us with a justification for adopting this strategy. It does this by explaining how we can have a methodological determinism without a metaphysical commitment and why it is that the tensions are inevitable while the perspective remains highly valuable. It also provides support for the need for a quite different approach to understanding human beings proceeding from the assumption of freedom. It was in no small measure due to the hard determinism of psychoanalysis and CHAPTER 4

behaviourism that the existentialist and humanist movements arose within psychology. ;

, It is to these approaches that we now turn.

; 4.3 The reaction: libertarian theories in psychology 1 The most ardent advocates of a libertarian approach within modern psychology I 1 j have been the humanistic and existentialist theorists. A critical factor in the ! development of these approaches within psychology was a reaction against the /I determinism embodied in psychology's first two paradigms. Theorists from these 1

a perspectives have sought to do justice to our intuitions of ourselves as self I determining, creative and responsible beings. Indeed they have regarded these as the

defining characteristics of our humanity; the critical elements for which a theory of the 1 person must account. ; In various ways, thinkers from these perspectives have sought to come to terms with what the affirmation of human freedom in the libertarian sense might mean for a , scientific study of human beings. Writing of the humanist /existentialist approach ! generally Tageson (1 982) remarks: I

It generally rejects the inherent biological tacitly or explicitly I 1 assumed by orthodox analysts and neo-behaviourists alike, and is groping \ towards a broader, open-at-the-top perspective toward the science of human experience and behaviour. @. 10) I shall confine my review of these approaches to the work of Carl Rogers as a representative of the humanist approach and to European existentialist psychology with special reference to Victor Frankl, whose "" has been an influential . Ij

, form of existentialist therapy. I

Curl Rogers (1902 -198 7)

There is no beast in man. There is only man in man, and this we have been , able to release." (Rogers, 1953, p. 67). 1

I Rogers espoused a positive, optimistic view of human nature and human potential. I

, CHAPTER 4

There is, he maintained, a strong tendency in human beings towards growth and 7 : development. The goal inherent in human beings is self-actualisation. Rogers employs : b analogies drawn from the world of plants to illustrate his notion of an inherent self- actualising drive. Just as seedlings, given a conducive environment will release their ' latent potential and grow into robust adult plants, so too people will grow towards a i realisation of their unique inherent capacities. Freedom emerges within Rogers' I i thought as a key aspect of a developed personality which has the capacity to transcend I the influences of early conditioning. Rogers justified his acceptance of human 1 I freedom on the grounds that choice and possibility are irreducible elements of , human experience (Rogers 1956). What makes Rogers a theorist of particular interest, ! i so far as the fieedom/deterrninism issue is concerned, is his attempt to hold together the determinist/ natural science approach to psychology, with an empathic : "phenomenological knowledge" which accepts our intuitions of freedom. Pervin (1984) identifies this as a pervasive theme in Rogers work. 1i j Throughout his career, then, Rogers has attempted to bridge the gap between the subjective and the objective.... Within this context, Rogers has been concerned with the development of psychology as a science and with the

j preservation of people as individuals who are not simply the pawns of I ! science ....Therapy is a lawfbl (determined) process in which individuals I achieve greater freedom to will. @. 158) I His concern to address this tension is clearly seen in the following quotation fiom Rogers in which he addresses the freedom and determinism problem. I share this conviction that we must live openly with mystery, with the absurd. Let me put the whole theme of my discussion in the form of a contradiction. A part of modern living is to face the paradox that,'viewed fiom one perspective man is a complex machine. We are every day moving toward a more precise

I understanding and a more precise control of this objective mechanism which we call man. On the other hand, in another significant dimension of his existence, man is subjectively free; his personal choice and responsibility account for the shape of his life; he is in fact the architect of himself. A truly I crucial part of his existence is the discovery of his own meaningfill I CHAPTER 4

commitment to life with all of his being. If in response to this you say "But these views cannot both be true".... my answer is,"This is a deep paradox with which we must learn to live." (Rogers, 1969, p. 275) The points Rogers makes here are significant in the context of this thesis. : First, he identifies the freedom/ determinism issue as the crucial one in differentiating between the views of humans as persons and as natural objects. For the reasons I have given in my first chapter I believe he is right about this. The assumption of determinism closes off the vista of humans as responsible, self determining agents. Second, he identifies the issue as paradoxical; recognising that the two positions are incommensurate perspectives or standpoints. Both freedom and determinism appear to exclude each other and yet for different reasons both seem required for a full understanding of human beings. Neither standpoint by itself seems wholly tenable, such that to choose between them involves surrendering beliefs critical to our understanding of ourselves and the world: hence the paradox. The similarity of this outlook to the Kantian analysis is obvious. The difficulty for Rogers, I think, lies not with his analysis of the problem but wit11 the way he seeks to deal with it. Rogers attempts to hold the two perspectives in tension and, at the same time, to produce a single coherent unified theory of the person. The problematic nature of such an enterprise is clear. How can a theory, predicated equally on a pair of antithetical assumptions, remain wholly coherent? It is difficult to imagine in principle how such an endeavour could succeed. A Kantian approach would support the view that it cannot. A person may appropriately be viewed from either standpoint but the resulting views are incommensurate. As we have seen, the two standpoints seem to possess mixing properties analogous to those of oil and water. ' The difficulties Rogers encountered in attempting to consider human beings from

I both standpoints at once are perhaps illustrated in the following pair of quotations. Therapy is the experience in which I can let myself go subjectively. Research is the experience in which I can stand off and try to view this rich subjective experience with objectivity, applying all the elegant methods of science to I determine whether I have been deceiving myself. The conviction grows in me CHAPTER 4 126.

that we shall discover laws of personality and behaviour which are as i. significant for human progress or human relationship as the law of gravity or ' I the laws of thermodynamics." (Rogers, 1961, p. 14) If explanatory laws, akin to those of physics, were to be found in psychology, then it ; would follow that freedom could no longer be affirmed as part of the same

! explanatory system. Some years later Rogers was to assert a radically different view of human beings which appears to affirm the freedom perspective by means of a psycho- i , j physical dualism. I now consider it possible that each of us is a continuing spiritual essence 1 lasting over time, and occasionally incarnated in a human body. (Rogers, 1980, P. 92) The earlier quotation seems to affirm the natural determinism side of Rogers paradox. The second, just as clearly, seems to affirm a position congruent with the libertarian side. ( I am not of course suggesting that the libertarian position presupposes or requires something like a Cartesian dualism, only that it is congruent with it.) Rogers central notion of self-actualisation could be held to embody within it the fieedom/determinism tension. As Rogers explains it, self actualisation is the tendency to become what you latently are - he uses biological analogies (seaweed and potato shoots) to illustrate his notion (Pervin, 1984, p.165,). A potato shoot has the potential to become a potato plant. Clearly the potato plant does not have the potential to become a tomato bush. It is the way with analogies that they can be pushed beyond the ,

., point of utility. Nevertheless, to see freedom as one of the fruits of a process whose : result is the production of a pre-determined person is a view which seems somewhat

: at odds with itself. , I Slife and Williams (1 995) distinguish three forms of'teleological thought. What ! I : they call "deity teleology" is the belief that events are determined by the purposes of God. "Natural teleology" assumes that developmental "purposes" are iriherent in : I : nature itself - "that nature in its evolutionary movement is "headed towards" the goal I of higher development." @. 11 6). Finally "human teleology" is the notion that humans , can behave for the sake of their own purposes. The teleology in the Rogerian notion of self actualisation is a form of "natural teleology". I I CHAPTER 4 127.

1 Carl Rogers.... hypothesised the existence of an organismic wisdom of the body that naturally "behaved for the sake of' improvement in one's ! personality.... However Rogers said relatively little about capacities that allow liumans to formulate their own goals and behave for the sake of them. (Slife & Williams, 1995, p. 1 16-1 17). I ! Whatever we are to make of the idea of "goals" inherent in nature, it is clear that such I I 1 a view represents a natural determinism, albeit one founded on final causation. It has I i little if anything to do with free will which belongs within the notion of "human i teleology". "Self actualisation is the process by which we become what we are, by 9

: which we fully develop and realise the blueprint of our potentialities and iI endowments." (Weisskoph-Joelson,l978, p.279). To see the development of freedom ! as one element in the realisation of an organismic "blueprint" seems to constrain the : notion of freedom. What of the freedom of a person (within the limit of her i circumstances) to create his or her own blueprint, to, in words from Rogers already j i cited,"become the architect of himself'? It could be argued that the notion of self i actualisation does less than sufficient justice to the perspective of freedom. And it

, might be concluded that by attempting to locate freedom within the context of a I natural "drive" inherent in the organism (even so lofty a drive as self actualisation), I the result is a conflation of the two standpoints which is ultimately unsatisfactory to ; both. It is unsatisfactory from a determinist perspective because it exists as an acausal I hole within the theory. Equally, it is unsatisfactory from the perspective of freedom because, as Slife and Williams (1995) point out, freedom is limited to being : something of an appendage of Rogers7 natural teleology.

, What I think we learn from Roger's approach to the free will/determinism issue is ' that the attempt to hold the two perspectives in tension ahd, from that position, to ! produce a single unified and coherent account of the person is problematic. The two j perspectives, being, as Rogers acknowledges, incommensurate, cannot easily be : combined in this way. Rogers theory of the person has made a vast contribution to the field of counselling psychology. From the perspective of the free will/determinism : issue however, there are tensions within it. Rogers attempt to combine the two I standpoints has resulted in a theory which, for all its merits, is not hlly satisfacto~yto ; I CHAPTER 4 128. either.

Existe~ztialistPsycJsology The most clearly libertarian of all the major strands in psychology, the existentialist approach, arose in Europe out of the work of philosophers such as Soren Kierkegaard (1 813 -1 855), (1 889-1 976), and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). There are a number of different strands and approaches in existentialist philosophy. And this same diversity is reflected in the existentialist approach to psychology. " is an approach that many people are deeply moved by, yet there is no single representative figure, nor is there agreement about basic theoretical concepts." (Pervin, 1984, p. 198). A number of underlying themes link these different approaches giving to existentialism its identity as a distinct movement in psychology. One of the most significant of these common themes is the emphasis on human freedom. The diversity within existentialist psychology makes it impossible, within the confines of this thesis, to do more than sketch in a general way the existentialist justification for the affirmation of freedom. It will not do justice to the complexity and subtlety of the various formulations of existentialist thought, but it will have to do. The one concept that holds it together as a movement is that of existence. It directs its attention not to the essence of things but to their existence. Traditionally, philosophy has been concerned with essence, "that which makes things as they are." The existentialists on the other hand, deny that essence is primary. Existence is the only concrete thing, the rest is mere abstraction. (Lundin, 1991, p. 3 63) It is life as we live it that is regarded by existentialists as the primary reality. Not the nature of things but the reality of our existence, is the right vantage point from which to investigate what human life is about. Central among the features of our lived existence is the experience of choice, responsibility and possibility. Taking existence as the ontological starting point produces a very different perspective on the fieedom- determinism issue. CHAPTER 4 129.

Adopting it leads us to see that a person cannot be considered apart from the world, l~eor she inhabits. Our being, the existentialists insist, is a "being-in-the-world". There is an indissoluble link between a person and hisher world such that a person cannot.meaningfully be considered apart from the world in which helshe dwells."It is via the world that the very meaning of the person's existence emerges both for himself and for others." (Valle & King, 1978, p. 8) By " world" the existentialists mean reality as lived by the person - given directly and immediately to our experience. This is not the external entity studied in natural science. It is the "life-world", the given reality of our existence and the world we live and act in. All other constructions of reality are, the existentialists maintain, abstractions from it. The hyphenation in the expression "being-in-the-worldMisto indicate both the indissoluble connection between the person and the "life-world" whilst, at the same time, preserving a degree of separateness between them. It illustrates the pivotal idea that our "autonomy"can only be properly understood in the context of our "world". Choice, and hence freedom, reveals itself as an inescapable element of our being-in- the-world. Life confronts us unceasingly with possibilities, choices we must make. Existentialists emphasise that we have no choice other than to choose; our freedom cannot be evaded. Once this notion of a dialogal relationship between people and the world is understood, other insights begin to appear. For example, people are seen by the existential-phenomenological psychologist as being "condemned to choice". Within the world (ie the world as situations that are presented to each of us which we did not necessarily request), one must always make choices. The only "choice" one cannot make is the choice of'not choosing (which is really choosing not to).(Valle & King, 1978, p. 8) Existentialist psychologists acknowledge that freedom is bounded;'we do not have absolute freedom. Rather ours is a "situational freedom" limited by our genetic and environmental circumstances. We are "thrown" into a particular existence constrained by a set of predetermined conditions. Our genetic and environmental estate does not however bind us, still less does it constitute who we are, as determinist theories CHAPTER 4 130. would insist. Rather than removing the dimension of choice and responsibili&, our genetic/environrnental circumstances actually provoke it. We can, indeed we must, continually choose how we will deal with the particularities of the existence into which we have been "thrown". Victor Frank1 (1965), the founder of Logotherapy who shares much of the existentialist outlook, reflecting on his experience as a prisoner in Nazi concentration camps expressed it this way: Is this to imply that I deny that man is subject to conditions and determinants? I-Iow could this be possible? After all, I am a neurologist and a psychiatrist and as such, of course, I am fully aware of the extent to which man is not at all free from conditions and determinants. But apart from being a worker in two fields ( and psychiatry) I am a survivor of four camps, that is, concentration camps, and as such I bear witness of the inestimable extent to which man, although he is never free from conditions and determinants, is always free to take a stand to whatever he might have to face. Although he may be conditioned and determined, he is not pan-determined. (p.54) Frankl goes on to define human existence as a "self creating act" in which we create or invent ourselves by our own choices and actions. The possibilities we face are always shaped and limited by determinants but we are not "pan-determined" in that we are not simply the passive instruments of these factors but always presented with choice in relation to them. As Frankl testifies from his experiences, this continues to be true even when the determinants are apparently overwhelming. What then is the relationship between "being-in-the-world" and the natural world of cause and effect investigated by natural science? The core subject matter of the determinist approaches to psychology, instinctual drives, environmental experiences, genetic are not, the existentialists insist, the constituents of the person. When all these things have been described and studied, what is most essential about a person remains; being-in-the-world. Being cannot be studied as one would study a natural object. As we have seen, the human world can only be known as existence not as essence.

In fact, the existential-phenomenological psychologist rejects the notion of CHAPTER 4 131.

causality in its linear or additive form (ie. rejects the belief that change is initiated and directed by external events). Thus, the individual is studied without the proposing and experimental testing of cause-effect relationships. These cause-effect relationships have no place in the elucidating of the life- world (and, in fact are meaningless in such a context) since the person and his or her world co-constitute one another rather than events in one realm causing events in the other." (Valle & King, 1978, p. 14) Essentially the claim is that our being-in-the-world cannot be studied as one would study the world of natural causation. For, from the existentialist point of view, our being is not an object or a substance at all. The existentialist thinkers put forward various ontological analyses to justify this assertion. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to elucidate them. A brief indication of one of them will serve as an example. Jean-Paul Sartre distinguishes two incommensurate realms of being corresponding to the being of objects and the being of existence. The existential world, unlike the world of objects, has no definable essence; it is a "no thing" and hence as it is non mechanical and non material. Accordingly it is not amenable to study by natural science. Phenomenological methods, which seek to understand and map the structure of being-in-the-world are considered the appropriate means for the study of our existence. What follows from this is the denial of deterministic natural science as the most important paradigm for psychology. This denial of determinism allows the existentialists to do full justice to our intuitions of freedom. Existentialist psychologists have devoted themselves to such matters as human relationships, values, and the . Major concerns have been to identify and treat human problems which arise by virtue of our being-in-the- world; the anxiety which arises out of the emptiness of life; our need to discover or create meaning in our lives; our awareness of our finitude; dread in the face of our coming death; the guilt we suffer as beings "condemned to choose" an'd, equally condemned, to live by the choices we make. An important theme is our need to live an "authentic" existence - finding meaning in our freedom and finitude and not surrendering to the circumstances of our "thrownness". From this it can be seen that existentialist psychology engages fully with those libertarian themes of possibility, CHAPTER 4 132.

novelty, self determination, responsibility and meaning.

I My contention is that there are difficulties for existentialist psychology which I stern from its suppression of the standpoint of determinism. Just as the denial of the 1 ; standpoint of freedom by hard determinist psychologies made them appear strained

, and forced, the same is true of the denial of determinism by the existentialist 1 approaches. From an existentialist point of view our freedom is constrained by genetic and environmental "determinants". But constrained here does not mean caused. Rather these constraints ( the thrown aspects of our existence) provide the arena for freedom's exercise - the context in which it is played out. It is in this sense that for existentialists, determinism is denied. Three particular interrelated tensions seem to arise: First, the denial of our intuition that our behaviour, or at least a significant part of it, is caused: Second, the relegation of the natural science approach to, at best, a subsidiary role within psychology: Third, the inability of existentialist psychology to produce "knowledge" after the pattern of natural science. (1) Existentialist psychology denies our intuitions of determinism. These approaches affirm a "human teleology" in which we determine ourselves by our choices. Yet we have intuitions that our behaviour is caused in the sense that explanations built on material and efficient causation can account for what we do. It is not uncommon for us to look back at past behaviour and to discern causes for it. Causes of which, at the time, we were perhaps largely or even totally unaware. Modern psychology has produced a considerable body of evidence which supports these determinist intuitions. To deny the significance of determinism seems to run counter to these intuitions about ourselves. It is not uncommon, in reflecting on some circumstance, to conclude that " given the situation and the way I was at the time I could'hardly have done anything different". (2) Existentialist psychology moves the natural science approach to theSmarginof psychology. The centrality of freedom to existentialism essentially overthrows the view of psychology as a natural science because it denies its cardinal assumption of universal natural causation. Yet approaches to psychology which have proceeded on . the basis of determinism have produced advances in our knowledge about ourselves. CHAPTER 4 133.

The assumption of determinism as an heuristic principle does seen to have been a

! fruitful one. Natural science has shown itself to be the means through which we have

, vastly expanded our understanding of the natural world. The denial of determinism by I existentialist psychology would seem in this respect to turn the clock back and return psychology to pre-scientific times. Certainly criticism in this vein has been widespread. "With existentialism psychology has gone the full cycle - from the complete of the Middle Ages, through objective , and back to subjectivism." (Lundin, 1991, p. 372). The consequence of an existentialist approach is that we must "abandon hope of predicting behavior in a lawful way" (Pervin, 1984, p.200). This line of criticism stems from the assumption of freedom by existentialism which, were it universally adopted, would wall off human behaviour from the kind of explanatory methods which have been so fruitful in other domains. (3) Existentialist psychology has been criticised for producing little that can be counted as knowledge. Lundin, for example, complains of a "lack of an objective methodology and principles that can be operationally defined" and of "vague suppositions and obscure language" @. 372). There are two points I would like to make about this form of criticism. The first is that in one significant respect it is justified criticism. To the extent that human beings are regarded as free, their behaviour cannot be explicable by efficient or material-efficient means. As the ' Kantian analysis makes clear, universal natural causation provides both the conceptual means through which knowledge is garnered and the terms in which it is expressed. Without this assumption, quantifiable lawfUl relationships and rigorous taxonomies of

, the kind produced by the natural are not to be had. My second point is that a the assumption of freedom does not preclude useful research. This is a theme I shall I ; develop in the chapter which follows. For now suffice it to say that it is possible to I probe the understanding people have of their experience of choosing and the : meanings which they discover and create as they do so. Clearly such descriptions and interpretations are not like the research programs of natural science. The issue becomes one of defining what we mean by "knowledge". If we follow a Kantian path ! I and reserve the term for the kind of results predicated on natural determinism then we CHAPTER 4 134.

would agree that research mounted on the assumption of freedom cannot produce : knowledge but it may produce telling insights into our lived experience of being-in- i the-world. I conclude that existentialist psychology provides an inadequate pattern, by itself, for the future of psychology. It honours the standpoint of freedom and engages hlly wit11 it. Yet much that is valuable and revealing has emerged and continues to emerge from the application of a determinist assumption to the study of the person. And to all this the existentialist approach can, by virtue of its libertarian assumption, add nothing : this constitutes a critical limitation to the range of convenience of existentialist theories. To this point I conclude that determinist approaches to psychology (Freud and Skinner) seem to require the perspective of freedom, that libertarian perspectives (existentialism) seem incomplete without the perspective of determinism and that attempts to build a single theory whilst simultaneously embracing both perspectives (Rogers) cannot in the end be fully coherent because the two standpoints are unable to be successfully harmonised. I turn now to some representatives of the cognitive approach to personality and counselling psychology. As I shall show, cognitive psychology presents a variety of attempts to synthesise human agency and a deterministic science.

4.4 Cognitive psychology The cognitive approach within psychology deserves considerable attention. In their recent review of developments in cognitive theory, Dobson and Pusch (1993) cite i studies which show the prominence of the cognitive approach within psychology at i present. They maintain that four of the seven most significant contributors ever to ! I psychotherapy are cognitive behaviourists. They cite the results of surveys of I 1 psychologists which show that "cognitive behavioural" was by far the largest self I description of theoretical orientation; a proportion which is continuing to rise. It should also be noted that cognitive psychology consists of several lines of approach.

I Lundin (1 991) identifies four theoretical groupings; European structuralisn~, I i , information processing, the "new" , and cognitive behaviourism. It is beyond our scope to consider more than a few representative thinkers from what is a i ! vast and diverse field. In selecting theorists I have chosen some on the basis of their i 1 influence on psychology generally and other, lesser known figures for their . contribution to the freedoddeterminism issue from a cognitive point of view. Cognitive psychology is particularly rich in attempts to blend or reconcile the two 1 standpoints. That this should be so is readily understandable. On the one hand, cognitive psychology, for the most part, sees itself as remaining within the framework of the natural science paradigm. On the other hand the position rests on three cardinal assumptions (Dobson & Pusch, 1993): (1) cognition affects behaviour, I! (2) cognition may be monitored and changed, and I j (3) behavioural change may be brought about through cognitive change. j I Thus, unlike the hard determinist approach of Skinner, cognitive behaviourists and I j cognitive psychologists generally, view the behaviour of human beings as / substantially determined by their thinking. Conscious processes are not ) epiphenomena1 (Skinner), or peripheral (Freud). Humans act in response to their 1 thoughts, values and goals. There is both an acceptance of humans as active agents and an adherence to the goal of a rigorous scientific explanation of human I! I ! phenomena. I shall argue that there is an inherent tension in this position and in 1 response to it theorists tend to move in opposing directions. Some seek to reconcile the two perspectives through a conception of agency which will fit within a

I deterministic world view. Others seek to modify the scientific paradigm in some way

! in order to accommodate a fuller conception of agency. i I aim to show that attempts to combine the perspectives encounter difficulties I regardless of which of these two approaches is adopted. I shall produce as evidence I for this a variety of predicaments which these attempts engender. Due to limitations j of space I shall confine this part of my review to the work of Bandura, Ellis and

: Sperry as theorists representative of the strategy of modifying the scientific paradigm to accommodate agency. I shall consider Dennett as a representative of the other i I i tactic; that is, of seeking to accommodate agency within a determinist world view. CHAPTER 4 136.

I shall argue that, despite significant exceptions, the cognitive movement in i psychology is best understood as a form of soft determinism and, accordingly, I ] ultimately finds itself in tension with the standpoint of freedom. -. I

. Modifyiizg Determiizism to Accommodate Agency i Albert Bandura. Pervin (1984) observes that social learning theory "emphasizes a view of the person as active, using symbolic (cognitive) processes to represent events and communicate with others, and capable of choice and self-regulation."(p.407). Bandura (1 989), in addressing the issue of freedom and determinism, rejects the view of human beings as autonomous agents on the one hand, and the notion of their being mere mechanisms on the other. Instead he proposes what he calls a model of "emergent interactive agency". By this he means that people are part of a system of reciprocating causes composed of the external environment, intrapsychic factors, and their own actions. As agents, people bring about events in their own behaviour and the external environment, and, in turn, as agents, are impacted on by both of these. Bandura goes on to identify the "mechanisms" of personal agency which enable it to operate as a determinant. Important among these are self-efficacy beliefs ( that one has the ability to control events which impact on one's life) and the exercise of forethought (anticipation of events, goal setting, and planning). Having thus rejected environmental determinism in favour of a view of the person as an active, at least partly self determining agent, Bandura turns to a consideration of how this position might satisfactorily be justified whilst avoiding a Cartesian psycho- physical dualism. He proposes that thoughts are to be understood as higher brain processes rather than psychic entities; suggesting that the terminology of thought and the terminology of neural processes are simply different ways of describing the same phenomenon. That is, 11e subscribes to that solution to the mind-body problem known / as the "identity theory". He then proceeds to a strenuous denial of reductionism

, claiming that psychological laws can never be derived from neuro-physiological ones.(In so doing he sacrifices the putative strength of identity theory - it enables 1 i reduction from psychological to physical laws.) CHAPTER 4 137.

Bandura is very much alive to the contradictions inherent in his position. If thoughts are simply brain processes then how can people create what is genuinely novel he wonders, and how can actions be intentional? Intentionality and agency raise the fundamental questions of how people activate the cerebral processes that characterize the exercise of agency and lead to the realization of particular intentions. In addition to asking how people originate thoughts and actions, one may also ask the intriguing question of how people occasion self-perceiving and self-reflecting cognitive activities. (Bandura, 1989, p. 1182). The language in which these questions are posed suggests that humans are in some way superordinate to rather than simply the equivalent of their brain processes. What then for Bandura is the relationship between brain and mind? Not that brain processes are responsible for thoughts, for this takes us back to a mechanistic view which Bandura rejects. Not that thought produces brain processes for this would appear to confront us with a psycho-physical dualism which Bandura also rejects. My understanding of his position is that thoughts are brain processes in the following sense. The brain is a sui generis natural object in that it supports emergent cognitive processes. These processes (a) depend on the operation of the brain and are served by it but (b) they are not altogether determined by the neuro- physiological laws which govern it. One must distinguish between biological laws governing the mechanics of cerebral systems and psychological laws of how cerebral systems can be orchestrated to serve different purposes.... The influences needed to produce the neural occurrences underlying complex human behavior include events external to the organism acting together with self generated ones. ( Bandura, 1989, p. 1 182) The problem with this position is its inability to accommodate universal natural determinism. Bandura clearly wants to maintain that these emergent processes allow a person to be, in part at least, a self determining agent. For this to be so the emergent processes cannot be wholly subject to any form of natural causation; a denial of determinism. This problem Bandura seeks to resolve by redefining the meaning of CHAPTER 4

determinism. He offers as a definition of determinism - "the production of effects by events" (p. 1 182). This definition is able to accommodate his view of the human mind and determinism. But only because it is so loose. It does not specify that all events are themselves effects and, therefore, is able to tolerate the proposition that some at least are not. So a thought, considered as an event, need not, on Bandura's definition, have an explanation based on material/eff~cientcausation. Now one could argue that our concepts can and ought to be revised in the light of 1 the needs of science as these emerge. New problems, or the recasting of old ones into : new (Kuhnian) paradigms, may require us to revisit familiar notions like determinism. I 1 At the level of quantum mechanics (as some scientists appear to believe) the familiar i : concept of determinism will not serve us. Equally it might be argued, at the level of human consciousness where (as far as we know) the universe reaches the highest point I in its evolution to date, determinism is also found wanting. Our notion of determinism needs to be refashioned if it is to become a really efficacious tool for the investigation of human life. I would argue however that determinism cannot be satisfactorily amended in the way Bandura proposes. Bandura's redefinition of determinism ("the production of effects by events"), so weakens it, that it becomes all but useless as an heuristic operational concept for science. It is the assumption of universal natural causation upon which natural science has been based and from which its derives. With regard to the assumption of determinism, the natural science paradigm does riot seem malleable. Loosen the grip of deternlinism and you lose the power of the paradigm. Much has changed in recent years in our thinking about the nature of natural science (Phillips, 1992; Polkinghorne, 1983). It is recognised that the lawful relationships in the universe may be much more diverse complex and subtle than the relatively crude mechanistic notions of earlier days. Determinist explanations these days can incorporate notions like holism, emergence and natural teleology. Yet despite these expanded conceptions, it seems to remain the case that the very basis of the scientific enterprise resides in the conviction that "natural laws" of various kinds exist I which, given the structure of objects and organisms, allow us to explain and predict phenomena. It is this underpinning assumption which makes natural science a coherent quest. If events exist in the universe which are truly uncaused then natural science is impotent before them. Bandura's proposed "self generated influences" seem to represent just that. Effectively Bandura's approach consists of a sacrifice of determinism in the cause of freedom. Nothing, I suggest, is served by holding to determinism in name only. Essentially determinism is mortally wounded by Bandura's proposal. If an amendment of this type were to be proposed to a motion before the chair at a public meeting, the chairman would be justified in deeming it a direct negative, ruling it out of order, and suggesting to Bandura that he vote against the . motion. I would argue that a better strategy is to preserve the various forms of I I universal determinism and continue to seek explanations for human bebaviour from I . these perspectives, whilst, at the same time, considering human beings from the perspective of freedom. In this way no option is closed off. Our self understanding is f enriched by considering ourselves from all points of view. Albert Ellis The founder of the much practised Rational Emotive Therapy, Albert Ellis has been a seminal figure in counselling psychology for several decades. It (RET) fully accepts human beings as fallible, limited, biologically rooted animals. But it also accepts them as unique, symbol producing and thought- creating persons who have unusual potentials, in most instances to build or rebuild their own emotions and behavior. (Ellis, 1975, p. 130) As this quotation serves to illustrate, Ellis attempts within his theory of the person to combine both the determinist and libertarian outlooks. He seems to borrow selectively from each to suit his purposes and, as I shall show, this results in serious inconsistencies in his approach. Ellis owns a debt to the existentialists, and places primary emphasis on the reality of human existence in the world and the capacity of humans to exercise'some real freedom. He affirms that humans have a capacity, within limits, to create and direct their own destinies. Cognitive therapies squarely put man in the centre of the universe and give him a somewhat wider range of choice, of existential freedom, than do many other therapies. RET holds that man's behavior, although to some degree 1 determined and limited by his biological nature and his history, is considerably I t less determined than the orthodox Freudians or behaviorists seem to think it is. , (Ellis, 1973, p. 10) On the other hand he also claims that logico-empiricism is a foundation of his ! system. Indeed he regards a rigorous empiricism, and something approaching logical I I , not only as correct epistemologically, but as beneficial therapeutically. Not 1 only is it good, but it is good for you! As far as empiricism in science is concerned he has this to say.

I Any hypotheses which cannot be backed by evidence that ordinary humans can i I I observe and replicate is deemed to be theological, supernatural, or magical and I cannot be considered in the field of general or psychological science. (Ellis, 1 , 1973, p. 3). I 1 A clear tension is already apparent. On the one hand, Ellis holds that a proposition ! which is incapable of empirical examination cannot be considered scientific and, is ) thus ineligible as a construct in any theory in psychological science. On the other ! hand, he produces a psychological theory which rests on the proposition that human I i beings are, to some degree, free. The presupposition of freedom, as we have seen, is 1 not only incapable of being established empirically, but, if it is true that people can I i justifiably be regarded as free, then, to the extent that they are so regarded, the i scientific method ( with its axiom of universal determinism) itself has limited applicability to the explanation of human phenomena. On his own terms, freedom : cannot be a valid construct in psychological theory: yet Ellis seems to make it a key componeilt of his psychological theory. This tension becomes even more evident

1 when Ellis turns his attention directly to the question of free will. 1 1 The idea that certain people are bad or wicked springs from the ancient

1 I theological doctrine of free will, which assumes that every person has the freedom to act "rightly" or "wrongly", in relation to some absolute standard of truth and justice ordained by "god" or the "natural law"; and that if anyone uses his "free will" to behave "wrongly" he is a wicked "sinner". This doctrine has I I no scientific foundation, because its key terms - including "absolute truth," CHAPTER 4 141.

"god," "free will," and "natural law" - are purely definitional and can neither be I proven nor disproven in empirical, scientific terms. (Ellis, 1975, p. 65-66) . Ellis defines free will out of court with something akin to the verification principle of i . That is, if a proposition is not empirical it is either tautological or meaningless. In thus extinguishing free will he has clearly placed himself at odds with his own view of the persoil as not fully determined. And so, it is not altogether surprising to find that in his next paragraph, free will is allowed a grudging limited resurrection. Moreover, considerable psychoanalytic findings of the last century indicate that if we operationally define "free will" to mean the individual's (relative rather than absolute) ability to make his own choices of conduct instead of his being compelled to act in accordance with various biosocial influences that are continually exerted on him, then we must realistically accept the fact that human beings in our time have surprisingly little ( though not necessarily zero)

I free will. (Ellis, 1975, p. 66) I It is clear that Ellis recognises that freedom is limited. Our freedom, he tells us is bounded about by many determinants. The difficulty he faces is that freedom remains central to his theory even though it is a highly conditional freedom. But he has already, by means of his use of the verification principle, defined freedom out of court in his previous paragraph. In disposing of freedom in this way he has disposed not merely the aspects of it he finds objectionable, but all of it. If not all events are strictly determined, then the scientific paradigm is inadequate to explain the universe of events. Ellis' therapy which, he insists, is based on rigorous adherence to the scientific paradigm both epistemologically, and as therapeutic strategy, makes this conclusion unacceptable to him. The confusion he seems to face is both metaphysical and methodological. From the metaphysical point of view his theory requires freedom for it is based on self determination. And yet freedom, he maintains, fails the verification test and is thus inadmissible as a postulate within a . Methodologically, he encourages people to exercise self determination via the conceptual framework of the scientific paradigm - a paradigm i , which denies existential freedom. Ellis' theory seems confused at this point. His approach is grounded on a rigorous adherence to a positivist . At the same time it clearly implies that I1 1 humans are not able to be completely described or explained by this world view. / Despite the ambivalence and ambiguities, Ellis seems to attempt to resolve the agencyldeterminism tension by modifying the scientific paradigm. He does this by making it less than universal - free will is "not necessarily zero". Human beings enjoy a partial exemption from natural determinism. The difficulty he then faces is giving an account of this freedom in terms of his own epistemological position. Ellis' attempt to hold the two perspectives together in this way results in tensions which are clearly evident. The causal scientific paradigm, as we have already noted, does not seem malleable. Neither Bandura's attempt to change its terms, nor Ellis' (somewhat ambivalent) attempt to narrow its scope seem satisfactory. Roger Sperry. I turn now to a consideration of a further attempt, from a cognitive perspective, to modify the scientific paradigm in order to accommodate human agency. Roger Sperry (1988, 1993) proposes that the cognitive revolution in psychology is creating a new

) paradigm, not for psychology only, but for science generally. i A main theme I want to stress concludes that in the cognitive revolution psychology is leading the way among the sciences to a new and improved, that is, a more comprehensive, adequate, and valid conceptual foundation for scientific as well as for all causal explanation and understanding. (Sperry, 1993, p. 878) Sperry claims that this new conception, which is emerging out of cognitive psychology, supplements the traditional reductionist view of determinism. In the traditional scientific understanding of the world, complex entities are governed in their behaviour by the causal laws which determine the behaviour of their constituent parts. Science proceeds, as it were, "bottom up". Scientific understandings, Speny maintains, have proceeded by analysis. By understanding what governs the behaviour of the parts, we will be able to explain what determines the operation of the whole. Sperry proposes that there has been evolving within cognitive psychology a complementary view which he terms "top down" causation. On this view, complex CHAPTER 4 143.

entities are seen as having a life of their own. They themselves become the causes of

I some of their own behaviour and exercise a degree of causal determination over their I own constituent parts and over other entities. ( To this extent Sperry's proposal is ! ' congruent with Blanshard's notion of superordinate causes and the Aristotelian conceptions of formal and final causation.) The behaviour of human beings is not fully explicable using only the analytic "bottom up" causal paradigm. This is because the traditional paradigm cannot capture that causation which moves in the other direction; from above down. Sperry maintains that such a conception is integral to the view of

1 the person put forward in cognitive psychology.

Subjective agency may thus be viewed as a special instance of downward control, a special case of emergent causality in the reciprocal up-down paradigm for causal control. (Sperry, 1993, p. 822) Determinism, according to Sperry, is not qualified, still less abandoned, rather it is re- conceived. More than one form of determinism may be held to exist within the universe. Entities, including the human mind, having attained a certain level of complexity, develop emergent properties. In the case of humans, these emergent properties are dependant for their existence on the functioning brain but unable to be reduced causally to its operations. (In this respect his view is similar to the approach of Bandura.) Sperry uses the analogy of a television program to illustrate his ,position. A simple analogy for the kind of higher (supervenient, downward) control envisaged compares it to that exercised by the programs of television from different channels over the flow of electrons in a TV receiver. Much as a TV program controls the electron flow, a train of thought in the brain, with its own cognitive dynamics and laws of progression, controls the brain's neuronal firing . No interference with the underlying physics of neuronal I discharge or electron emission is involved. Notling in electron physics, i however, can explain the sequencing of the TV program, that is, the plot t I development in a movie, the content of the news, or the comedian's delivery. Similarly, the laws of biophysics and biochemistry are not adequate to account for the cognitive sequencing of a train of thought.... the brain can generate or CHAPTER 4 144.

create, largely from within itself, its own mental programs. (Sperry, 1988, p. 609) A most important consequence of this altered scientific paradigm, Sperry maintains, is that it creates a whole new outlook regarding the nature and function of beliefs and values. This is so, he maintains, because the new paradigm allows science to take beliefs and values seriously as entities in their own right, rather than seeing them as ultimately meaningless phenomena with physical causes. The notion of downward causation provides the conceptual/methodological tool which allows us to affirm beliefs, values and intentions, as initiators of significant human behaviour, without, at the same time, necessitating any departure from the principle of universal causation. We can now harmonise the perspective of psychological science with our commonsense view of the role of beliefs, values, and intentions, as decisive shapers of the quality of human life and the natural environment. Reversing previous doctrine in science, the new paradigm affirms that the world we live in is driven not solely by mindless physical forces but, more crucially by subjective human values. Human values become the underlying key to world change." (Sperry, 1993, p. 883) Among the fruits of this new scientific paradigm is the opportunity for a healing of the rift between science and the because the new paradigm enables the existence of "directedness, purpose and meaning" to be affirmed as irreducible forces within the universe. Thus, within this new approach to science, Sperry tells us, lies the possibility of a resolution to the free will/determinism question. The will remains determined, but it is determined in critical respects by the "subjective conscious self'. By this I take it he means that the revised scientific paradigm is able to endorse the perspective of freedom. That is, that to a significant degree humans are to be seen as the creators of their own meanings; the authors of their own actions. I do not believe that Sperry, through his re-conception of the scientific paradigm, has reconciled freedom and determinism, although Speny clearly thinks he has. The crucial issue remaining is: What determines the operations of the "subjective self'? Sperry tells us that the emergent property of thought operates according to "its own cognitive dynamics and laws of progression".Does this mean (a) natural causal laws of CHAPTER 4 145.

some kind, (b) something akin to Blanshard's superordinate determinants (c) something like the categories and dimensions of our being-in-the-world which the existentialists identify to map the features of our existence of inevitable choice and possibility, or (d) some combination of these? If he means to include something resembling (c) then the "subjective self is, in part at least, self determining in which case the scientific paradigm, is inadequate to describe human beings fully. This is because science assumes that its object is fully explicable in terms of causes or natural laws of some kind and indeed it can only deliver explanations of this sort. A self determining agent, from the point of view of natural science, represents creatio ex nihlo - the origination of events without reference to antecedent causes or causal laws. If human beings are, viewed as self determining, then psychology, conceived of as a natural science can have only limited explanatory power. On the other hand, if the self is wholly governed by superordinate (yet to be i discovered) laws then, even if these laws are different from, and irreducible to, the laws of "bottom up" causation, we are back with a universal determinism of some kind. Perhaps they may turn out to be natural laws which science can accommodate or perhaps something more like the superordinate logical, moral, and aesthetic laws

, proposed by Blanshard (1 958) - which give us a determinism, but not a natural

' determinism. There seems to be a lack of clarity in Sperry at precisely this point. He says that the human person is a special instance of "top-down" causation, but fails to indicate what "special" means. Yet this is crucial. If we consider the case of some other highly complex entity where top down causation might be held to operate - say global weather patterns - then we would not conclude of them that they are self determining (and therefore beyond the aegis of science). We would conclude rather that in the - exercise of their top down causation they are themselves acting according to natural

I laws or causes. In the case of human beings it is difficult to see how we can avoid a similar conclusion - either we are wholly naturally determined or we are, at least in part, beyond the scope of natural science (excepting of course a Kantian solution which enables us to affirm both propositions). Speny may wish to argue, that we are I determined by our beliefs and values and it is that which makes us "special". But this will not help, for (1) either our beliefs and values have natural determinants, in which case freedom is lost or (2) beliefs and values are part of our existence as self determining beings, in which case natural determinism is lost or, (3) they are produced in us by superordinate determinants of the kind Blanshard (1 958) postulated, in which case both freedom and natural determinism are lost. Where Sperry fails to assist us, is in giving an indication of how the subjective self can function in such a way as to satisfy the demands of science for natural causation and the demands of freedom for self determination. This underlying conceptual tension between the two perspectives appears unresolved at this point. . Sperry succeeds in providing us with a modification of the scientific paradigm : which can accommodate a necessary condition for a libertarian account of the person. I : That is, he enables us to affirm that mental events exert downward causation and, in part, determine the behaviour of our own bodies and, through them, objects in the 1 ! environment. It is when we seek to go behind that and press him about the causes of ; mental events that he seems unable to assist our progress. It might be objected that this ' is to push Sperry too far and that it is not productive to seek ultimate causes. Yet the whole matter of the freedom/determinism problem hangs on just such a quest. Sperry's i "top down" causation is congruent both with libertarianism and soft determinism and I it is a matter of no small significance to seek to push the issue that extra step.

I It is as if Sperry has taken us to the brink of a reconciliation between the perspectives but we seem unable to make the final crossing from one to the other. A Kantian perspective helps us to see why we can go so far but no further. The 1 antinomial nature of the perspectives of freedom and determinism precludes it. The two perspectives cannot co-exist within the same realm of discourse. ' We have so far examined three different attempts from the perspective of cognitive i psychology to modify the determinist paradigm in order to accommodate human agency. The conclusion reached in each case was that difficulties stahd in the way of : pronouncing the attempt an unqualified success. 1 turn now to consider the alternative strategy which has been adopted within the cognitive movement that is, of fitting , human agency into the scientific paradigm. CHAPTER 4 147.

Modifying Freedonz to Accommodate Deternzirzism D. C. Dennett Dennett (1 978) has reflected on the philosophical underpinning of the information processing model within cognitive psychology. He posits a hierarchy of "stances" from which a person may be viewed. At the base of the hierarchy is the "physical

I stance". From this perspective the human being is viewed as a physical organism,

I subject to the laws of nature. Next is the "design stance". Knowing how the mental I system is designed to function enables predictions to be made. Using the analogy of the computer, if we know how the system is wired and programmed, then we can predict how it will behave. The final position is the "intentional stanceU.Thisstance is adopted when the subject (human, animal, or machine) can be presumed to be rational to some degree. That is to say, this stance is appropriate when one can ascribe to the system the capacity to process information and can suppose it to be directed by certain i goals. Dennett adopts the reductionism of the traditional paradigm: In Sperry's (1 993) terms "bottom up" causation. Thus, the intentional stance may be reduced without remainder to the design stance. And likewise, the design stance may be reduced to the physical stance. For ease of prediction however, it is often preferable to operate at one of the higher level stances. In the case of human beings, the intentional stance is the ' one at which we normally operate. We do however make an exception to this and operate at one of the lower level stances when the person's rationality is seriously impaired. Dennett puts forward a possible way of accounting for our intuitions of freedom without compromising his mechanistic view of the person. He proposes that human beings could be endowed with a mechanism for the generation of random possibilities.

I The random ideas so generated, could then be subjected to the determined rational i processes of our information processing equipment. Dennett points oht that this

, position does not compromise a mechanistic determinism. We are all familiar with the capacity of machines to generate random numbers. Such a machine, whilst its output is random, it is produced by a completely mechanistic process. ! When a system designer or programmer relies on a "random" generation CHAPTER 4 148.

process, it is not aphysically undetermined process that is required, but simply 1 apatternless process." (Dennett, 1978, p. 298) If indeed we are equipped with such a facility, Dennett holds, it would be sufficient

to explain our intuition that we are the authors of our own decisions. He claims that I "the essence of invention is the intelligent selection from among randomly generated I I candidates." @. 297). At the same time the mechanistic view of the person is not compromised. "Free will" can readily be accommodated at the level of the "design stance" and the "physical stance". Thus Dennett claims, an account of human agency can be given which affirms self determination, without in any way compromising the scientific outlook. I Isn't it the case that the new improved proposed model for human deliberation can do as well with a random-but-deterministic generation process as with a causally undetermined process? Have we in fact given the libertarians what .... I i they really want without giving them indeterminism? Perhaps. We have given I ! ,I the libertarians the materials out of which to construct an account of personal I authorship of moral decisions, and this is something the compatibilist views , I have never handled well. ( Dennett, 1978, p.298) I

I r Dennett's "stances" are languages to aid prediction. The "intentional" stance, he tells j us, represents a very useful shorthand way of describing and predicting human action. ! ' \ Description and prediction could be undertaken at the more basic levels of the design and the physical stances. At these lower levels however , the descriptions whilst more ! profoundly analytical, and in that sense more accurate, would be extremely ; cumbersome.

The point is, that the intentional stance does not imply any ontological difference I ' I from the other stances. It is simply a convenient language of description and I I \ prediction for entities of sufficient complexity to have achieved a measure of i rationality. What follows, is that the constructs of the "intentional" stance, such as ! I 1 beliefs, values, and so on, are all reducible without remainder, to their mechanistic ' underpinning. Dennett speaks of "intelligence loans" in making the point that I ultimately psychology cannot use terms which imply personhood and agency. He i maintains that it is the business of psychology to analyse personhood into its design 1 i components, none of which can imply such personhood. The use of terms in : psychology which do imply personhood, can only be an interim measure (intelligence : loans) until the underlying mechanisms are understood. This means that the language of freedom is provisional. It is reducible to the language of mechanism. Intentional language has no status over and above that of its

' 1 utility as a convenient shorthand for description and prediction. The freedom i perspective however requires that the language of agency is not reducible to i I mechanistic language. As Williams (1987) points out, meaning and necessity are ? !' ! antithetical. If personhood is viewed as mechanism, human actions cannot be

, meaningful because they are simply necessary. ( In this context it is not logical / meaningfulness but intentionality to which the term "meaning" refers.) Thus, an action j is meaningful, if it is freely selected fiom a range of possible candidates to express a self determined intention. If notions such as "responsibility" and "charity" are able to

( be reduced to a structural (design) level of explanation and ultimately to a physical I (natural law) level of explanation, and lose nothing in the process, then, from the perspective of freedom ( in anything like the libertarian sense), they are meaningless illusions. Dennett's randomiser will not help the situation. After the randomiser has

, thrown up a range of options in relation to some decision which we are confronting, we have to select from among them. On Dennett's view, the selection is made by our information processing apparatus. This equipment is a determined system. It follows that the decision we eventually make ( though the selection process may be highly complex) will have been determined by the system itself, or, if we choose to descend to the "physical " stance we can, at least in principle, have an exhaustive explanation at the level of physical natural causation. Dennett (1978) has proposed a determinism in which the outputs of the cognitive system, whilst fully determined, are unpredictable. It should be noted that the issue between freedom and determinism does not turn on the question of predictability. As Dennett has shown, the output of the cognitive system may be determined yet unpredictable. Equally, it has been argued (Sappington, 1990; Howard & Conway, 1986) that the predictability of behaviour does not by itself constitute evidence against the proposition of freedom. CHAPTER 4 150.

If I scatter $5 bills on the floor in front of my office, I can predict with a high

I I probability of success that passersby will pick them up-but this would not prove that they did not choose to do so. (Sappington, 1990, p. 23)

I It is not the case that only behaviour which so far defies prediction represents evidence for the libertarian position. Nor is predictable behaviour to be seen as evidence for the i ultimate truth of determinism. As I indicated at the outset, the issue is not one that i i lends itself to an empirical resolution. It is not unpredictability that the libertarians I ; require but genuine possibility. That is, to be able to say of an action "I could have I j done otherwise". The randomiser does not introduce possibility, it only makes some

, aspects of the causal system unpredictable. I shall consider further the issue of i prediction in the following chapter in the context of and I freedoddeterminism. i Cogizitive Psyclzology as a form of Soft Deterntinism I ! I believe Dennett is correct when he observes that the acceptance of natural I determinism makes the elimination of agency assuming terminology, other than as

, convenient shorthand, an essential part of psychology's task. The language of agency

; carries within it an assumption of some degree of contracausal self determination. Accordingly, as it stands, it can never be the language of an empirical science ' predicated on any of the forms of universal causation.. And this is the paradigm in which the various formulations of cognitive psychology seek to operate - hence the tension between the perspectives in many expressions of cognitive psychology. Essentially the task wl~ickcognitive psychology, in its various manifestations, sets itself, is to answer the question "How does the cognitive system work?". The mind is regarded as a computational system capable of explanation. The task is to identify the processing systems which underpin language, values, beliefs, and all other features of : the mental landscape. And whether the cognitive system is thought to be ultimately i j reducible to physical processes or is viewed as emergent and irreducible, governed by laws of a different type, is largely beside the point. This issue is a matter for discussion between the advocates of contending conceptions of determinism. I I Cognitive psychology has been prepared to see the human mind as a distinct, i species specific, phenomena. And to acknowledge that to study it requires some

, modification of the natural science paradigm. Specifically, it has been prepared to admit non-physical causes (thoughts as the cause of behaviour ), and conceptually has admitted this view into scientific discourse with notions like the 'top down" causation of emergent systems and processes. This has certainly resulted in some real easing of

I the tension with the perspective of freedom so apparent in hard determinist accounts 1 like that of Skinner. Despite these modifications however, the paradigm is, for the i 1 most part, faithful to natural science. Though, as we have seen, some thinkers have j : attempted to modify the paradigm to accommodate freedom, generally speaking the human being is regarded as a determined system; the functioning of which is, in principle at least, fully explicable. Thus Margolis (1 984), describes cognitive psychology as " the latest and most resilient phase of modern attempts to construe psychology as a science."@.68). Williams (1987) commenting on the freedom 1 determinism issue in relation to cognitive psychology proposes that the essential approach has not changed. I will contend that careful consideration of the theoretical and philosophical grounding of this perspective will show that the difference between cognitive and behavioural psychology is at best one of degree, and not one which rests on any important metaphysical disparity. (p. 210) ' Cognitive and libertarian psychologies can both affirm the proposition that the conscious choice of people is the critical determinant of their behaviour. The difference between them is that cognitive psychology, because of its underlying

, assumption of determinism, is committed to discover the determinants of choice - however complex ( and unexpected) these may be. Data suggesting that conscious choices can account for the bulk of variance in human behavior do not alter the basic issue of whether the choices themselves

I are ultimately determined by factors outside the person. If cohscious choices can ultimately be explained in terms of factors such as environmental stimuli, genetic structures, or past learning history, then this would support the soft determinist position. Because the data on conscious choice do not address the I issue of the origin of choice they do not allow one to decide between the CHAPTER 4 152.

libertarian or the soft determinist position. (Sappington, 1990, p. 26)

I Recognising that the natural science explanatory paradigm - albeit with significant i modifications - provides the underlying charter of cognitive psychology helps us to ! ' see more clearly the source of the awkwardness in the Bandura and Ellis approaches to agency. It also helps us to see the tension with the perspective of freedom inherent in / cognitive psychology. Because it proposes a determined view of the person it is I ; unable to accommodate the proposition that our intuitions of possibilities are other I I than illusory. Without possibility, self determination and responsibility cannot exist in I i any real sense. Meaning must be an illusion because what we mean by meaning, in

, relation to human action, is bound up with a supposed ability to give expression to one particular intention out of a range of possibilities. The meaning in a human action . resides expressly in the belief that one might have done something different. We contrast human actions and natural events precisely on the grounds that natural events i happen because they must, human actions happen because of the meanings we intend. If we assume human behavior to be really meaningful, on the cognitive account that meaning must necessarily come from nothing. This is the

! intellectual form of "creatio ex nihilo." The other alternative is that human

I actions do not really have meaning after all. (Williams, 1987, p. 21 8-219) Whatever the truth about freedom and determinism, it is clear that human beings : generate meanings and attach the utmost importance to them. What the issue of freedom/deterrninism brings to this is the status of the meanings we create. It would seem the only model of the person open to cognitive psychology, if it is to remain within the paradigm of natural science, including the new constructions of that paradigm which cognitive psychology is developing, is a mechanistic one (Margolis, ' 1984; Polkinghome, 1988; Williams, 1987). The only apparent alternative, some kind ; of self determining capacity within the person, entails the acceptance of limitations on

I psychology as an explanatory science. That is, it requires the accept&ce that its : (psychology's) paradigm of inquiry is unable in principle, to deliver a comprehensive explanation of its object. The attempts of Ellis and Bandura to avoid this position, whilst incorporating the libertarian standpoint, are, as I have shown, less than i / successful. CHAPTER 4 153.

Cognitive psychology, in as much as it remains hndamentally within the natural ? scientific paradigm, appears to be a psychological expression of the philosophical position of soft determinism. I maintain this because the cognitive approach proposes I

that while we choose our behaviour in conformity with our desires, in the end we are I determined systems ( granted that the mechanism may be different in significant : respects from other mechanisms). With cognitive psychology, as with soft I determinism, we choose everything but our choices. That is to say, what we intend, ' purpose, create, or will is ultimately decided for us (the environment), and within us (physical andlor emergent structures and systems) but not by us ( in the sense of self

, determination). Cognitive psychology, as a soft determinism, generally attempts to I explain human phenomena within a determinist framework. I need hardly add that I am not in any way criticising cognitive psychology for this. I All I am seeking to do is to establish clearly that, despite the efforts of some theorists I I i (Ellis, Bandura, Speny) to admit the perspective of freedom, cognitive psychology to I this point, belongs essentially to the deterministic standpoint. I have shown I previously that determinism and freedom are two equally desirable sides of the fence I but that the fence itself cannot be straddled or sat upon. It is simply a matter of f ] becoming clear about the side on which cognitive psychology is located. Soft determinist accounts of the person treat our intuitions of agency with respect. ' Because much research and therapy which derive from cognitive approaches concern the role of as determinants of behaviour, it is, as we shall see in the following chapter, congruent in this respect with the perspective of freedom. But once we go behind our cognitions to inquire into their causes, the differences between

, cognitive psychology and the standpoint of freedom become apparent. I concluded as a result of an examination of the approaches of Bandura, Ellis, and : Sperry, that the scientific paradigm seems highly resistant to modifications which will : accommodate the perspective of freedom. Our analysis of the approach of Dennett j suggests that the opposite is true. The perspective of freedom is highly resistant to incorporation within the scientific paradigm. Even Dennett's ingenious randomiser cannot in the end be held to have advanced the cause of a rapprochement between the perspectives. The essence of freedom is not unpredictability but possibility. i1 CHAPTER 4 154.

Cognitive psychology overall, approaches its task from the determinist standpoint. To the extent that it does so, it remains in tension with our intuitions of freedom, although the important modifications which it makes to the scientific paradigm make these. tensions less immediately obvious. 4.5 Conclusions In this chapter I have sought to show that no single approach to the freedomldeterminism issue in psychological theory can be adequate. A dual approach is required. The findings resulting from our review of various approaches to personality theory support this claim. Specifically we seem justified in drawing the following conclusions. (a) That theories constructed round one perspective excluding the other are, by themselves, inadequate. (b) The standpoints are truly incommensurate and cannot successfully be blended or harmonised. (c) Once it is accepted that the two standpoints are incommensurate and the validity of both is accepted, then it is clear that a single comprehensive and coherent view of the person cannot be constructed. It is impossible in principle to construct a single comprehensive and coherent theory of the person (one that allows the person to be seen as both determined and free). (d) Only by approaching theory building from both perspectives can psychology adequately encompass the human world. Two quite different starting points with different assumptions are needed. I should stress that I am not claiming that theories of the person are not viable. Only that, if a theory of the person is to be coherent, it must issue from one or other standpoint. It must have some meta-assumption in relation to the freedom1 determinism issue. Whatever that assumption is, whether libertarian or deterministic, the theory will inevitably experience some form of tension precisely from the fact that it has suppressed the opposing standpoint. What follows from this is that no theo~y can in principle be wholly adequate. In relation to the free will/ determinism issue at least, theoretical pluralism is unavoidable. CHAPTER 4 155.

At the conclusion of the last chapter it was proposed that psychology would do

: well to befriend its disunity and pursue two incommensurate forms of theorising and ' research. One form predicated upon the assumption of universal natural causation, the ' other, upon the assumption of freedom. The findings of this chapter support this proposal as far as theory is concerned. In the chapter which follows, I shall seek to establish that, from the point of view of research, the same strategy of a dual approach is viable and has much to commend it. CHAPTER 5

5. Psychological research

In the psychological studies, the attribution to any paradigm of a preemptive I finality has the force of telling human beings precisely what they are, of fixing ' 1 their essence, defining their ultimate worth, potential, meaning; of cauterizing away that quality of ambiguity, mystery, search, that makes progress through a 7 I biography an adventure. (Koch, 1981, p. 269) I

5.1 Introduction I

I i In the preceding chapter I sought to establish (1) that both the free will and ! determinist perspectives are required within psychology (2) that human beings cannot I

be satisfactorily accounted for from one perspective alone and (3) that attempts to q I combine or coalesce freedom and determinist perspectives to produce a unified view I of the person run into a number of difficulties which seem to threaten their coherence. ' ! If these findings are themselves regarded as premises, a broader conclusion would l appear to follow. Attempts from the perspective of personality or counselling ' psychology to produce a single satisfactory overarching account of the person is I impossible. This is because, as we have seen, to be coherent the account must proceed .

: either from the perspective of freedom or of determinism. But no such account can be , i complete, for, as we have seen, human beings may legitimately be viewed from both

: standpoints. i I I i Taking this as the starting point for the present chapter, I propose to argue in favour ; of the idea that a worthwhile direction for psychology would be to proceed with I separate forms of inquiry with opposite starting points so far as freedom and ! determinism are concerned. Just as two sets of presuppositions are required in psychological theory, so likewise in the case of empirical inquiry, no one set of / metl~odologicalpresuppositions can do justice to both standpoints. i CHAPTER 5

5.2 Claims to be established i Specifically I aim to justify the following claims. -. I (1) That in order to do justice to human phenomena an alternative to the natural

. science paradigm is required in psychological research. By the natural science paradigm I mean specifically, research which proceeds with the underlying

1 assumption that all human phenomena are attributable to efficient physical andlor I psychical causes.

I (2) Psychological inquiry which does not proceed on the basis of methodological , determinism can meet the criteria for rigorous academic inquiry. (3) The development of hermeneutic approaches provides a necessary counterpoint to the paradigm of natural science in psychological research. (4) Research in psychology can and should proceed on the basis that human beings are i , wholly determined, and, equally, it can and should proceed on the basis that they are not. (5) The free will/determinism issue is clearly a factor in the disunity within psychology as a research discipline. To this extent at least, disunity is not a deficiency I to be overcome, but the necessary feature of a discipline which aspires to a full comprehension of the human world. A duality of approach is required if the freed0111 / : determinism issue is to be managed satisfactorily within psychology. I shall begin by considering the case which has been made for an alternative to the natural science approach in psychology. I shall then consider whether such an alternative paradigm of inquiry is cogent and whether or not it constitutes "science". I shall conclude by considering the implications of this for a Kantian approach to j I freedom and determinism in relation to psychological inquiry.

5.3 Why an alternative to natural science is required in I psychology For some time certain philosophers, psychologists, and others have argued for a I distinction between the goals of "explanation" and "understanding" in the approach to !' i CHAPTER 5

the study of human behaviour and action ( Polkinghorne, 1983; Valentine, 1982; . Woolfolk, Sass & Messer, 1988). This distinction was first drawn by the German philosopher and historian Wilhelm Dilthey (1 833-1911). The goal of "explanation", in i the context of this differentiation, is the goal proper to natural science. "Explanation" seeks to uncover general causal laws by which natural phenomena may be explained,

I predicted and controlled. The goal of "understanding" is based on the proposition that / a different approach is required for the study of human beings. Rather than causal I explanation, an "interpretive understanding" is necessary, that is, a form of inquiry ! aimed at uncovering the structures of life given in lived experience. It has been argued that only an approach of this kind can grasp those features both unique and central to I the human world such as value, meaning and agency. A fair degree of consensus has I I emerged that these approaches need to be seen as complementary. However the relative importance of each, and their relationship to one another remains in dispute. i The word "hermeneutics" is often used as an umbrella term to refer to forms of ! , inquiry in the human sciences which are based on "understanding" rather than

I "explanation". The word "hermeneutics" derives from the Greek word for "an interpreter" (8p~qv~uzqo).As a method of scholarly inquiry hermeneutics began , within as a procedure for the interpretation of ancient texts. Woolfolk, Sass 1 and Messer (1988), identify three distinct branches of hermeneutic thought: ! (1)" Methodological hermeneutics" which seeks to develop and implement new i I methods, based on interpretation, into the study of human phenomena, (2) "ontological hermeneutics" which is concerned with the philosophical underpinning of ; an interpretive approach to human phenomena and (3), "critical hermeneutics" which examines the socio-political implications of all social practices including research into : human beings. It is with "methodological hermeneutics " that I am chiefly concerned : here.

I I will approach the explanatiodunderstanding issue from the perspective of free willldeterminism. My purpose in doing so is to establish that strong conceptual links exist between the two sets of distinctions. I shall do this by means of a brief review of the major concerns which have been raised about the adequacy of "explanatory" \ social/behavioural science as the sole approach to the study of human beings. I shall CHAPTER 5 159.

then link these concerns with major methodological principles which hermeneutical , thinkers propose as the foundations for a "science" of "understanding". Finally I shall link these concerns and principles with the freedom/determinism issue.

5.4 Freedom and hermeneutics From the beginning of modern psychology there have been those who have proposed that the paradigm of natural science is not the best or only way of approach to the study of human beings. Whilst some aspects of human functioning, perception for example, lend themselves very well to an inquiry derived from the physical or biological sciences, other human phenomena, specifically all human processes that involve meaning making, understanding or intentionality, have been widely thought to be less accessible to these approaches. For this reason, many have argued that a unique science, or at least a distinct methodology, must be created for the study of human beings. Polkinghorne (1983) identifies and William James as prominent early advocates of this position in modern psychology. A number of reasons have been put forward in support of the creation of a science which seeks to "understand" rather than to "explain" human action. All of them are I founded on the proposition that human beings are, in respects of their meaning making and intentionality, qualitatively different from non-human things..

, Consequently, those approaches to inquiry which have been fashioned to study non- human phenomena are deemed deficient, by themselves, as tools for the investigation of people. Hermeneutic thinkers have constructed a range of alternative tools based on methodological principles distinct from those of natural science. A considerable body of literature exists around this topic. All I essay here is a brief treatment of it. I will: (1) review some of the recurrent themes which hermeneutic ! I thinkers commonly cite as sui generis aspects of the human world requiring a unique

a method of inquiry, (2) link these to major methodological principles proposed as the constituents of such a form of inquiry and, (3) consider both in relation to the freedomldeterminism issue. These factors or themes are interrelated and consequently attempts to separate and i I CHAPTER 5 160.

group them are somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless I shall order my review of this . material under five headings: language, purpose, creativity, self awareness, and responsibility.

I

Language i The medium of human meaning making is language. Through language, abstract ideas are created and shared. Through the spoken and the written word human beings i I develop and transmit understandings of the world and their place in it. Human / interaction is only explicable on the basis of linguistically transmitted meanings. , Phillips (1992) argues that language is the medium through which we exist as persons: / the necessary prerequisite for entry into the intelligible world. Further, he maintains, j language is the means through which we experience the world. The linguistic i structures of understanding enable us to experience a coherent and meaningful world.

I i Without language the world of ideas, or meaning, is not open to us. I 1 In support of his conclusion that psychology may well be methodologically and i ontologically different from the physical sciences, Margolis (1984) has this to say . about language.

I Language appears to be sui generis; essential to the actual aptitudes of human

I i beings; irreducible to physical processes; inexplicable solely infrapsychologically; real only as embedded in the terms of an historical i I society; identifiable consensually or only in terms that presuppose consensual practices linking observer and observed; inseparable as far as meaning is concerned from the changing, novel, nonlinguistic experience of a people; incapable of being formulated as a closed system of rules; subject always to the need for improvisational interpretation and, therefore, subject also to I ineliminable psychological indeterminacies regarding intention and action. , These features of language infect all distinctly human aptitudes, since the latter are "lingual" even where they are not narrowly linguistic - that is, insofar as, I like waging war, dancing, and building bridges, they are aptitudes which presuppose linguistic ability. (Margolis, 1984, p. 90) I As I understand it, the case for "human" science so far as language is concerned CHAPTER 5

includes at least the following three points: i (1) Language is a kind of which enables us to experience the world

' as meaningful. (2) Language is fundamental to the existence of human persons as creators of meaning. Therefore if humans are to be comprehended fully then their linguisticality i/ must be taken into account. j (3) Language points beyond itself to other aspects of the human world - such as the 1 volitional, the reflexive and the ethical - which seem to mark the human world off in 1 I a decisive way from the rest of nature. On these grounds hermeneutic thinkers argue that a method of inquiry into human i beings is required that is primarily interpretive; concerned with meaning and its i interpretation. Numerical methods are clearly the best for dealing with lawful, or law- like, relationships between events or variables. These methods are not however suited j to understanding complex nuances of meaning. A major principle of hermeneutic ! methodology is that the data studied are primarily linguistic as are the tools employed I to analyse it. While this linguistic interpretive approach does not of itself presuppose

, or demand the assumption of freedom, it is certainly consistent with it. For if people , may be viewed as free it is the meaning of their actions which becomes the focus for understanding them. And language, as we have seen, is the medium of meaning.

Purpose Unlike the objects studied by the physical sciences, people are impelled by ideas, 1 hopes, and desires. We experience ourselves as having intentions, abstract goals and

, long term aspirations. Approximations to purposeful action exist in the non-human : universe. First there is the behaviour of the higher animals. And there is also the i behaviour of complex machines (manifestations of ), i programmed to achieve "goals" (such as winning chess matches). The advocates of a : "human" science argue that neither of these approaches the human world sufficiently to provide a satisfactory case for a sole reliance on the methodologies of natural science. What marks off the human realm is that goals are self-determined, framed for I 1 reasons, involve values and beliefs, represent a confluence of reason and passion and CHAPTER 5 162.

can attain a remarkable degree of abstraction. This constellation of qualities calls for a , different approach. If, in the future, a machine was constructed, indistinguishable from i a person in relation to all these characteristics, I would imagine that a hermeneutic scientist might propose that some kind of threshold had been crossed and that meaning had appeared for the machine as an emergent property. And, as a consequence, it was : a valid subject for hermeneutic study. Such a development is a matter for speculation. I I For the moment at least, human beings are agents, machines are objects. Being 1 / volitional, humans, it is argued, cannot be studied adequately by a methodology / oriented towards the explanation of causal processes: 1 Human agency as a conceptual and methodological focus allows for a different

1 image of humanity and of professional inquiry (Hoshrnand, 1989, p. 9) i The sui generis nature of human purposiveness requires a research paradigm that . is equipped to explore it on its own terms. Hermeneutics has sought to provide this by

; likening purposive human action to literary texts which require interpretation to be I ! understood. Thus the underlying metaphor of the person is that of author. We "write"

! or "compose" our own actions and correlatively interpret those of others This figure ' contrasts with the mechanical and organic analogues of the natural science approach.

, It enables the notion of purpose to be treated as an irreducible feature of the human : world. It is also clearly consonant with the perspective of freedom; viewed as

1 composers of texts, people may be regarded, in part at least, as the creators or i i originators of their own actions.

Creativity Polkinghorne (1 983) writes of the "unfinished" quality of the human realm as something which marks it off from the rest of nature. I We are caught in a web of internal and external structures, and yet at times we

I seem to transcend these structures and produce novel and creative ideas.

I (Polkinghorne, 1983, p.7) The claim here is that, unlike the rest of nature, we seem to possess a capability for understanding ourselves and our world in novel ways and for translating these visions I ! into such things as new systems of thought, works of art, and organisations, CHAPTER 5

tools and . This is not to deny that the highly complex structures and

! processes of the natural world (evolution for example) do not produce new structures I and emergent systems only that human inventiveness, being consciously deliberated, is of a different order. It is argued that we cannot hope to capture this structure- transcending capacity in its fullness using any paradigm of study which is designed ) specifically to explain the operation of natural structures according to natural 1 eficientlmaterial causal processes. Hermeneutic approaches, on the other hand, have ; as their focus the actions of human beings. The realm of meaning is "an activity not a thing" (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 7). The focus is on existence as it is lived and experienced. Thus creativity becomes a given aspect of "life". i The interpretive paradigm adopts a holistic rather than an analytic approach. The founder of hermeneutics as a methodology for the human sciences, Wilhelm Dilthey (1 833-1 91 I), maintained that unlike the analytic approach of the natural sciences, i human life must be understood as an interrelated whole. I At the centre of Dilthey's work is an all encompassing, irreducible concept of , "life" which is known from within and which cannot be further analysed into more fundamental constituent parts. ( Woolfolk, Sass & Messer, 1988, p. 8)

, From the perspective of freedom, the issue of possibility and novelty is of primary importance when considering human inventiveness. The adoption by hermeneutics of : this holism as a methodological principle is significant in this regard. It would seem I 1 congruent with the acceptance, as irreducible, of our intuitions of possibility and novelty. ; Sewwnreness It is claimed that yet another unique marker in the human world is the possession ; of a consciousness which is self aware. We are able to be aware of the universe in a ; way which, as far as we know, is unique to human kind. We comprehend through i scientific discovery more and more about how the universe is constnicted and how it i ) operates. As Davies (1992) points out, we are that part of the universe which has become, to a significant degree, transparent to itself. While Sauvayre (1995) observes that the human race is no longer simply the product of evolution but is increasingly its i guide and creator. We possess not simply a remarkable capacity to know but to know CHAPTER 5 164.

that we know. Our knowing is reflexive. Whilst our knowledge of the physical world,

I of itself, does not change the physical world, our knowledge about ourselves ( not : least knowledge claims regarding the causes of human behaviour), appears able to I change our self understanding and our actions. Advocates of a "human" science argue that these uniquely human capacities require investigative approaches additional to i those employed in the physical and biological realms.

I I As the existentialist philosophers and psychologists have reminded us, our ability / to reflect upon our own actions and our own existence creates a host of questions, i I issues and puzzles, both great and small about the meaning of our lives and how we

, ought to live them. Koch (1981) refers to this as the "antinomial" character of huriian ! existence. Life's most real and pressing questions are, he argues, undecidable by any I empirical means. He writes scathingly of the presumption that the human situation can be fully grasped, much less resolved (or even assisted to any significant degree), i by employing "explanatory" methodologies as an approach to the human world. Koch

I views the attempt to use the "explanatory" models and techniques in this way as a form of denial of our true situation. Antinomality, in sum, is at the basis of the endemic human need for crawling into cozy conceptual boxes - any box, so long as it gives promise of relieving the pains of cognitive uncertainty or easing problematic tension. This poignant human need, at any cost, for frame, an abacus, a system, map, or set of rules that can seem to offer the wisp of a hope for resolving uncertainty makes all of us vulnerable - in one degree or another- to the claims of simplistic, reductive, hypergeneral, or in other ways -distorting frames, so long as they have the appearance of "systematicity". (Koch, 1981, p. 264) : This conscious awareness, including our self awareness, marks us off decisively from ! no11 human entities. Advocates of a "human" science maintain that self awareness cannot be ignored as behaviourism sought to ignore it. Nor can it be fully accommodated by any psychological research program predicated on natural science. Perhaps what makes the human realm most difficult to investigate is its unique character: it is a sphere of awareness. It is conscious, and consciousness i permeates experience with meaning which, in turn, creates a second-order, no11 CHAPTER 5 165.

physical reality of ideas. Consciousness searches for and interprets perceptual interaction with the environment, and this gives a multilayered depth to experience and provides a context in which action takes place. (Polkinghorne,

- 1983, p. 260) A "sphere of awareness" is a person to be understood rather than an object to be explained. The hermeneutic perspective emphasises that human actions are inherently meaningful and so we must comprehend their meaning to understand them properly. Meanings should, to this extent, be regarded as significant objects of study in their own right. Clearly they are not "real" in the sense that physical objects are real. For one thing, their "existence" is entirely dependant on the human beings who create and 1 sustain them. From a hermeneutic perspective meanings are a special kind of 1 phenomena in the human domain. You cannot study the phenomena of meaning using explanatory methods without losing meaning itself in the process. This is because the i explanatory paradigm seeks answers to all questions put to it in terms of ! i efficienumaterial causation. Whereas hermeneutic thinkers claim it is impossible to go i behind the realm of meanings without sacrificing the essence of "life". From a hermeneutic perspective meanings are seen as the basic units of study in a human

, science. The emergence of human beings from life in general to reflective consciousness and language is a threshold change that has brought about a unique level of reality that I will call "the order of meaning"." (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 2) ' Interpretivist methodology then sets out to study the rich diverse "antinomial" world

, of meaning on its own terms, not attempting to sift it through the analytical "explanatory" filter of natural science. This is not to say that hermeneutic approaches i need be critical of the methods of natural science being applied to human behaviour.

1 The claim is not that the methods of explanation/prediction are invali'd in the human context but insufficient. Explanatory methods, it is claimed, are not well suited to the comprehension of meaning as such. This strategy of adopting meaning as the basic focus of study makes hermeneutics I compatible with the assumption of freedom. The perspective of freedom regards the CHAPTER 5

"antinomies", in Koch's (1981) sense, as irreducible realities which pertain to our humanness; requiring of us hour by hour, to choose among many possible futures -

' and bearing responsibility for the choices we make.

Respo~tsibility

I Woolfolk, Sass and Messer (1988) cite the denigration of the epistemological status of i ethics and aesthetics as a consequence of a total reliance on the natural science 1 j approach. Casting the notions of moral responsibility and aesthetic creation into the i , thought forms of natural science produces a decisive sea change. Considered on their own terms, ethics and aesthetics raise what seem like great and important questions into the nature of the beautiful and the good. Considered as phenomena with physical I or structural causes, these questions are reduced to the non human world of drives, schedules of reinforcement, evolutionary utility, and so on.

I It is often pointed out ( and has been since the time of David Hume, 171 1- 1776) that ethical questions lie outside the realm of science, that ethical and scientific questions are incommensurate- that facticity and value represent different orders of discourse. Science is concerned with ascertaining the facts of the matter, concerning either natural or social phenomena, while ethics is concerned with what ought to be the case. To this extent, hermeneutic science cannot decide ethical questions any more than can natural science: neither can bridge the gap between what is, and what ought to be. The point is, that the methodological assumptions of a natural science approach consider ethical phenomena as if they are totally reducible to natural causes and events. This is no doubt a very necessary and fruitful line of approach, but it needs to be balanced by a science of "understanding" which can take ethical issues on their own terms. A hermeneutic approach, whilst it cannot decide ethical questions, can accept the ethical domain as an area of meaning to be understood. "Explanatory" science cannot readily do this. It can only reduce the issues out of existence or declare them beyond its scope. The nub of the matter, according to advocates of "human" science, is that in ! seeking to inquire into ethics and aesthetics, we must recognise the limitations of natural science and employ other forms of inquiry as well. For a methodology to be

, capable of treating questions of ethical action and aesthetic creation,appreciation on ; their own terms, the knowledge it seeks must be of a different order than the causal ' laws-and systems of the natural sciences. In identifying the goals of hermeneutic research, Polkinghorne (1988) draws just such a distinction.

I The goal of research into the production of meaning is to produce clear and i accurate descriptions of the structures and forms of the various meaning i 1 systems. This type of outcome does not provide information for the prediction l and control of behavior; instead, it provides a kind of knowledge that

I individuals and groups can use to increase the power and control they have 1 over their own actions. (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 10) ! The hermeneutic approach to the worlds of moral responsibility and aesthetic experience is to "understand" them as important facets of "life" rather than to explain i them in other terms. Such an approach to "knowing" seems similar to Kant's position. 1 : We cannot know ourselves in our freedom because we cannot have knowledge of the

I noumenal realm. But we can study the facts of our experience on such matters as ethical decision making and aesthetic experience. Our apprehension of ourselves as

, free is different from the knowledge we have of ourselves as part of the physical I world. Three general conclusions might be drawn to this point. (1) A social science guided by the assumption of universal natural determinism will yield certain kinds of worthwhile results. But it will exclude other kinds of results that are equally worthwhile and important. The point of interest in the context of this thesis

, is that the catalogue of issues presented by the advocates of "human" science is virtually identical to that presented by the opponents of philosophical determinism. 1 ! The methodological determinism of natural science produces the same view of the ; person as a philosophical metaphysical determinism and provokes tlie same reaction. : (2) It can be concluded that basic methodological principles underpinning the hermeneutic approach to research, are congruent with the standpoint of freedom. Human existence is regarded as inherently meaningful and the effort is made to study 1 ' human behaviour as meaningful. It is viewed as an activity rather than an object, its CHAPTER 5 168.

basic metaphor of the person is as a writer of texts, and it aims to produce insights into

I lived experience rather than to uncover causal relationships. (3) The perspective of freedom provides a justification for "human" science. Meaning is the-underlying theme which links the five aspects of humanness we have just considered and, as Williams (1987) points out, meaning is closely related to freedom. Whatever the truth about free will and determinism, as a matter of fact, we do say and intend things which we experience as inherently meaningful. And the "meanings" which we "create" are of the utmost importance to us in the living of our lives. Williams' (1 987) argument tums on the status of the meanings we make. Meaning assumes intentionality and possibility. If we are wholly determined then our meanings are not ultimately themselves meaningful: meaning is an illusion. It is simply masked necessity. If we cannot with justification regard ourselves as free, then our actions and indeed our very existence is, "meaningless" (ultimately devoid of purpose and significance). Thus the presupposition of freedom is highly congruent with a hermeneutic approach. Whilst a hermeneutic approach does not require the assumption of freedom, that assumption provides, as it were, solid ground and substance to the meanings which it studies. It enables the "human" world of meaning to be viewed as, to some extent, independent of and irreducible to the world of universal natural causation. On the other hand, if the assumption of freedom is justified, then something like an hermeneutic approach is required to enable us to ' explore our lived experience. Given that (a) human beings are makers and interpreters of meaning and that (b) i the presupposition of freedom is defensible and (c) that the basic principles of hermeneutic research are congruent with the assumption of freedom, we need to discuss in greater detail methodology for studying people from this perspective. I shall proceed with this in a three- fold way.

I First I shall briefly consider some approaches to research undertaken within

, cognitive psychology. This is of interest because some of these approaches seem in certain respects to blur the "understanding/"explanation"distinction and to suggest the possibility of a rapprochement between them. I shall argue that specific research I ' programs may involve no tension between the perspectives. But because the "explanation"/"understanding"distinction seems related to the prior distinction of

! freedom/determinism, such a bridging can not be brought to completion. Second I shall examine the implications of recent major revisions in thought about knowledge and its acquisition. I shall argue that in the light of these revisions, universal natural determinism as a methodological principle is not a necessary 1 condition for empirical inquiry.

I Finally I shall consider, with reference to an example, elements of the practice of I hermeneutic research, arguing that as well as being tolerant of the perspective of ii freedom it displays a satisfactorily rigorous empirical methodology. I shall conclude with a short reflection on the implications of this for the issue of ! unity in psychology.

1

, 5.5 "Understanding" and "explanation": Can cognitive i I psychology bridge the gap? I Meichenbaum (1988) has questioned the need for a separate interpretive social I ' science on the grounds that cognitive psychology is now able to incorporate the concerns underlying the call for a "human science". A consideration of this claim 1i i provides an opportunity to consider a number of issues and points in relation to determinist and libertarian assumptions in research. I Briefly, Meichenbaum (1988) points out that cognitive psychology studies the meaning structure of people and includes the use of hermeneutic methods to aid its

a inquiry. Cognitive psychology acknowledges both the centrality of meaning to human functioning and employs hermeneutic research methodologies. He concludes that the

: gap between hermeneutic approaches and explanatory approaches, so pronounced during the era of behaviourism, is, with the advent of cognitive psychology, being 1I closed. 1 This issue is a complex one and much of it falls beyond the focus of this thesis. I ' will confine my treatment to aspects of it which relate to the freedoddeterminism question. I shall first outline three developments which seem supportive of / Meichenbaum's claim. Then I shall raise a matter, highly significant for the CHAPTER 5 170.

freedom/determinism issue, which indicates that at least one profound difference

, remains between the understanding and expl ' ation approaches. (1) Cognitive psychology, as was noted in the"i. previoCs chapter, accepts the centrality of beliefs and intentions as the causes of human behaviour. To this extent it would

, appear to share common ground with hermeneutics. Both approaches recognising the I significance of meaning as the key to understanding human action. : (2) As Meichenbaum (1988) points out, cognitive research has drawn heavily on i hermeneutic methods in order to explore the domain of meaning. To take but one I

I example, Lazarus and Folkrnan (1 984) in their seminal work on stress and coping,

, make extensive use of phenomenological methodology. People's commitments and I beliefs, including their existential beliefs, are regarded (together with the environment) as the cause of the appraisals they make of events (p.80). Thus in order to explore the antecedents of action Lazarus and Folkman adopted an interpretive understanding approach to the investigation of meaning. (3) The revised conception of the natural science paradigm developed within cognitive psychology proposes that mental events, such as meanings and intentions, are causes of behaviour (and thus of physical events) and that such a causal nexus may be examined empirically. Two points may be made in relation to this claim. First, there is no necessary disjunction of view here between the freedom and determinist perspectives. A causal sequence from meaning and intention to action would seem congruent with the perspective of freedom. Both soft determinist and libertarian views of the person require a determinism of this kind. If we are not able to give expression

to OK meanings and intentions in this lawful way then we are not free either from a libertarian or soft determinist point of view. Second, the investigation of the link between beliefs and actions may involve the use of quantitative methodologies. The relationship between a belief and an action may be empirically operationalised, then measured and expressed quantitatively - say as a correlation coefficient. The j perspective of freedom does not preclude this kind of prediction and . It ' is entirely in keeping with the freedom perspective that human beings should act in

; accordance with the meanings they create and exhibit regularities (predictable I statistically) in their behaviour and action. The discovery of quantifiable law-like CHAPTER 5 171

relationships between beliefs and actions is of itself quite congruent with a libertarian

I perspective. As noted in the previous chapter, the standpoint of freedom does not I require that behaviour is unpredictable, only that it is freely chosen. What follows ! from this is that quantitative methodologies are not of themselves in conflict with the

, standpoint of freedom. Just as interpretivist methods are being used by cognitivists to i explore meaning, there would seem no reason why the links between meaning and 1 action should not then be explored quantitatively. In this matter too it seems i reasonable to agree with Meichenbaum that the hermeneutic approach and the revised ) natural science approach of , if not on the way to convergence, are at least , complementary. / But another aspect of the hermeneutic approach to research, and one which is of I ! critical importance to the standpoint of freedom, is yet to be considered. In order to

I describe this issue it is necessary first to remind ourselves that cognitive psychology 1 is a diverse movement. As the previous chapter served to show, apart fi-om some very I general principles about the importance of cognition to human behaviour, few blanket generalisations can be made about cognitive psychology as a whole. Underlying this diversity are different conceptual models of cognition. Williams (1987) reviews the I various types of theoretical models which have been proposed. As a result of this ,8 / review he concludes that at least one significant generalisation can be made. Overall, he maintains, cognitive psychology is mechanistic. Specifically Williams makes the 1 : following three claims. 1) Generally speaking cognitive psychology has retained the behaviourist S - R i (stimalus-response) model of behaviour separating them by the addition of cognition j to produce "a mediational model wherein many sophisticated processes and processors ' are interposed between the stimulus and the response which affect the response." (p. 1 213). I i 1 (2) Conceptually this cognitive "box" may be viewed in one of two ways. (a) It may be j seen as a mechanism. Williams identifies two mechanistic approaches. The first is . He cites the approach of Piaget as a paradigm case of structuralism within cognitive psychology. The second type of mechanistic approach is exemplified 1 in the work of Dennett (1978). This approach has already been discussed. In essence it CHAPTER 5 172.

proposes that ontologically human beings are mechanisms but that mentalistic language is a convenient short hand way of giving descriptions. As a result of his review Williams (1987) concludes that most cognitive psychology (implicitly or explicitly) issues from one or other of these mechanistic approaches. (3) The only alternative Williams can see to a mechanistic approach is to regard the

I cognitive "box" as a metaphor for the person. This would mean that "we simply have a homonculus in the machine." (p. 214). Williams notes that such a view would be ' regarded as unacceptable by most cognitive psychologists. Cognitive psychologists, for the most part, do not want mentalistic homunculi to have the determining role in the rational system any more than the behaviourist does. (Williams, 1987 p. 214). I Other alternatives, not directly considered by Williams, but discussed in the previous chapter include those of Bandura (1989), and Speny (1988, 1993). It was i concluded that Bandura's attempt to modify the notion of determinism appears I problematic. SpenyMs"top down" determinism seems ambiguous at a crucial point. What Sperry fails to indicate is whether the "the subjective self' is self-determining or is governed by superordinate causes. If the first, then from the point of view of

, cognitive psychology it is an expression of Williams' "homonculus in the machine" alternative. If it is the latter, then it represents a modified mechanistic model in that 1 the system as a whole is determined - albeit by "top down" causes. If we, with Williams, set the "homonculus in the machine" model aside as generally unacceptable to a natural science then we are left with several kinds of mechanistic 1 expla9ation. Williams (1987) concludes that cognitive psychology is unable to do

, justice to the world of meaning on its own terms because it is grounded on the paradigm of natural science - the modifications it has made do not change the : ontological status it accords to meaning. In the end meaning is an artefact of i necessity. As was concluded in the previous chapter, as far as the free will/determinism issue is concerned, cognitive psychological theory overall equates most nearly to the position earlier described as soft determinism. What we are now bringing to the fore is the impact of this on its approach to research. CHAPTER 5 173.

A number of the principles of hermeneutic research noted earlier decisively differentiate it from the predominant "explanatory" strategies of cognitive psychology. (1) In hermeneutics the guiding image of the person has been an author of texts (with the task of the scientist being that of correctly readinglinterpreting these texts). In cognitive psychology it has typically been an (extremely complex) information I processor. The first image is able to admit notions of creative meaning making while 1 the second suggests a determinate natural system. ! I ? (2) Hermeneutic approaches are capable of supporting the nature of meaning as ! irreducible to natural causes. For the most part cognitive psychology holds to the , assumption that meanings are the product of environmental1 systemic ( or perhaps I superordinate) causes. j ; (3) While hermeneutic research proceeds from the holistic conception of lived experience, cognitive psychology, for the most part, works from the assumption that human experience can be analysed into constituent parts governed by underlying

I mechanisms. As a generalisation it is concluded that we are confronted with two distinct sets of methodological assumptions. For hermeneutics the human world of meaning is seen , as distinct from the world of natural causation. When the natural science approach I 1 (even the modified versions developed by cognitive psychology) attempts to adopt something like this position, the nearest it can come is an oxymoronic "homonculus in the machine" - in which the whole paradigm falls into a kind of self contradiction. (That is, the production of an explanation which is a denial of the possibility of explmation.) This has its roots in the freedom/ determinism antinomy. The assumptions of natural science are excellent for viewing ourselves from the various deterministic perspectives but the perspective of freedom requires a different lens in so far as the creationlinterpretation of meaning is at issue. I conclude that despite the importance of meaning to cognitive psychology, overall it remains critically different in its approach to research from hernleneutic perspectives. And the difference is crucial to the free will/ determinism issue. That is, cognitive psychology undertakes inquiry which, for the most part, stems from compatibilist assumptions. Whilst some specific research programs may equally meet CHAPTER 5 174.

the assumptions and serve the needs of both approaches, in the end some key research

; principles are incommensurate. The cognitive research paradigm enables us to explain i ourselves from a soft deterministic standpoint. Whereas hermeneutic approaches,

: because they regard meaning as irreducible, seem able to accommodate the standpoint of contra causal freedom. Williams (1987) concludes "The fundamental starting point ; of cognitive theory eschews genuine agency and possibility while meaningful human i action require them." (p. 209). This reinforces one of the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter. The perspective of freedom cannot be affirmed with integrity from within the general framework of natural science. At the same time both hermeneutic and natural science methods are of value within cognitive psychology where they complement each other within the general framework of a compatibilist view of the person. The general claim is that, in as much as cognitive psychology is deterministic, it employs hermeneutic methods but has detached them from a core presupposition of the hermeneutic paradigm, that meaning must be regarded as irreducible to natural causes. To truly reflect the libertarian perspective in psychological research a form of inquiry is required which, like hermeneutics, can, tolerate the assumption of "genuine agency and possibility". One which can accept on its own terms the "antinomial" texture (in Koch's 1981 sense) of human existence. The question which next faces us is whether such an approach to research is possible within psychology. Without the assumption of universal natural determinism, which has been at the core of science, what sort of inquiry would it be? What validity would it have?

1 i 5.6 Can a form of inquiry, without the assumption of 1 determinism, be cogent? 1 The is a large and complex field of study which has, over the i j last few decades, undergone very considerable change. One of these changes I suggest ' is that determinism is no longer a necessary assumption for scientific (in the sense of empirical and rigorous) inquiry. This is a vast subject to which I can pay only cursory attention within the confines of this chapter. Nevertheless I shall seek, by means of 1! CHAPTER 5 175.

reference to some major developments, to cover sufficient ground to substantiate

; my claim. It is one thing to establish that human beings can, with justification, be regarded as ' free. It is quite another to establish that it is possible to mount a rigorous and fruitful empirical inquiry without the assumption of universal natural determinism. As we I have observed, the assumption of determinism underpins the quest after causal laws

j and natural structures; the essence of the natural science paradigm. Without the ; : assumption of universal natural determinism it is clear that any paradigm of inquiry ' will be significantly different from natural science. But can it be cogent? I shall proceed initially by means of a form of via negativa. First I shall set out the reasons why, until a few years ago, the idea of a freedom assuming inquiry, would ; have been supposed untenable. Then I shall indicate briefly how recent thought has : changed this situation. i Four conditions which would preclude a research program predicated on the i assumption of freedom are as follows.

I Certainfy The positivist conception of science has its roots in a definition of knowledge whicl~holds that only those things of which we are absolutely certain can be counted as knowledge. If a knowledge claim fails the test of certain truth, then it cannot be included within the body of scientifically approved statements. (Polkinghome, 1983, p. 1) As we shall see, the notion that scientific knowledge claims can attain certainty has little if any currency today. If certainty were to be the standard against which knowledge claims are to be assessed, then freedom assuming research could not be valid. The very assumption of freedom militates against certainty. If possibility and

I novelty are admitted, then, in significant respects, what is "real" is in constant flux.

I I-Iypothesis testing and replication become problematic. The understzinding of

, meaning cannot hope to bear the same timeless exactitude as the explanation of physical or organic phenomena. The attempt to understand the labile and evanescent phenomena of the human world would appear to preclude the stable certain character I ' of physical or organic laws and structures. CHAPTER 5 176.

The Unity of Science the advancement of knowledge would lead to a progressive unification of science. This would come about as separate laws and theories were linked through inclusion in broader and more general theories, and the progression would continue until all knowledge would be derived from few basic axioms. (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 97) If in order to be valid all inquiry must conform to the unity of science program then the assumption of freedom would be impossible in bona fide research. This is because inquiry from the standpoint of freedom cannot be woven into the fabric of deterministic natural science. Proceeding from another standpoint entirely, it constitutes a quite separate and incommensurate approach; an approach which, as I aim to show, nonetheless complements the natural science perspective in a valuable way.

Correct Metlzod

There is a strong reformist flavor to the positivist movement; its members preach a gospel of good news in which all human problems would finally be solved by applying the one correct method. Traditional beliefs and practices were to be cast aside and replaced by prescriptions developed by applying to human problems the methods that had succeeded in uncovering the secrets of the natural world." (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 19) Up until a few decades ago it was commonly held that the methods which derive from natural science are the only ones which produce worthwhile knowledge. This, now generally forsaken belief, renders a freedom supposing inquiry invalid. This is because a freedom assuming inquiry is concerned with the realm of meaning, accessed principally through the interpretation of linguistic data, it would not proceed primarily with methodologies developed to investigate causal relationships between non sentient entities. Thus, if it could be shown that only these methods yield reliable knowledge, then the standpoint of freedom, even if valid in itself, is not open to empirical investigation. CHAPTER 5

any non-tautological proposition, that is in principle unverifiable by any

I , is ipso facto devoid of meaning." (Flew, 1979, p. 214) If it can be shown that, aside from tautologies, only empirically measurable or testable propositions are meaningful, then a freedom assuming inquiry would not be possible. The very standpoint of freedom itself is, as we have seen, not decidable by , empirical means. Furthermore, those antinomial preoccupations (Koch 1981) I attendant on being-in-the-world which would constitute primary subject matter of I such a study, are also (considered on their own terms) beyond the reach of empirical operationalism. Thus if all metaphysical propositions are indeed logically vacuous then it follows that the standpoint of freedom and all its attendant objects of concern have no reality and could not possibly constitute a subject matter for investigation. Until twenty of thirty years ago there was broad agreement that these four i propositions were among the defining features of scientific endeavour. They constituted significant elements of an epistemology known as logical positivism which dominated the field in the middle decades of this century. In recent years a revolution has occurred in thinking about the nature of human knowledge and its acquisition. We f have considered four objections to the very possibility of research predicated on the assumption of freedom. The new outlook has virtually swept them all away. As far as the unity of science program is concerned there is a substantial body of scholarly opinion which holds that the reductionist goal is unattainable. By reductionism in this context I mean the proposition that knowledge in the social/ human / behavioural disciplines, if it is to count as knowledge at all, must, at least in principle, be able to be reduced without remainder to the terms of the biological sciences, which in their turn must be reducible to the terms of the physical sciences. For one thing, the notion of emergence, has now become commonplace. This is the view which holds that systems evolve to a level of complexity such that their !

' operation is no longer explicable in terms of their component parts. Speny (1 993) and i Bandura (1989) are examples of thinkers promoting this view in psychology. Broadly , the notion of emergence is the contention that whilst some systems are wholly I i

I I I explicable by analysis of their constituent parts, not all are. Some must be studied holistically as well. This view has wide acceptance among biological scientists and even physical scientists. We now appreciate that scientific progress requires both reductionistic and holistic approaches. It is not a question of one being right and the other wrong, as some people like to assert, but the need for two complementary ways of studying physical phenomena." (Davies, 1992, p.78) Although the unity of science program has not everywhere been abandoned, it is certainly no longer an irrefragable tenet of bona fide science. This means that inquiry predicated on the assumption of freedom cannot be ruled out of court solely on the grounds that its findings are irreducible to other empirical findings. Striking among the revisions to our understanding of knowledge has been the virtual abandonment of the notion that science can and should achieve certainty.

This central feature of the change that has been occurring is a release from the requirement that science (knowledge) must be able to withstand all skeptical criticism. According to logical positivism methodology had to produce certain (apodictic) knowledge.... Knowledge was indubitable or it was not knowledge.... The postpositivist period begins with the acceptance.... that scientific knowledge is part of the realm of assertoric knowledge, some knowledge claims are better than others, but none is beyond doubt." (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 279) Once it was believed that sense experience and the canons of deductive logic could I yield apodictic knowledge. In recent times this belief has largely given way to "non- 1 foundational" epistemology which recognises that we have no certain foundation for i 1 our knowledge claims. I It is now recognised that there is no absolutely secure starting point for

I knowledge; nothing is known with such certainty that all possibility of future t revision is removed." (Phillips, 1992, p. 65) (It should be noted that the abandonment of the of the standard of certainty does not necessitate a loosening of the canons of accuracy and precision in theorising or the i , CHAPTER 5 179. conduct and reporting of research.) All claims to knowledge are accorded a provisional status, accepted inasmuch as they enable us to explain predict and control phenomena better than any rival explanation. This does not necessarily dispel the idea that there is an objective truth to be known, only that we have no certain means of knowing when we have it. , one of the foremost architects of post positivist thought about science, expresses it in the following way. The status of truth in the objective sense, as correspondence to the facts, and its role as a regulative principle, may be compared to that of a mountain peak which is permanently or almost permanently, wrapped in clouds. The climber may not merely have difficulties in getting there - he may not know when he gets there, because he may be unable to distinguish, in the clouds, between the main summit and some subsidiary peak. Yet this does not affect the objective existence of the summit.... The very idea of error, or of doubt.... implies the idea of an objective truth which we may fail to reach." (Popper, 1968, p. 226) If no form of inquiry can produce certainty then a freedom-assuming inquiry cannot be disqualified on the grounds that unlike natural science it is unable to "prove" its claims. Like all other forms of inquiry, however, it might be expected to be able to justify its knowledge claims so as to escape the charge of arbitrariness and . I shall return to this question in the following section. If certain knowledge is not possible, then the tools of natural science, once regarded as the sure and only means to knowledge, can be accorded this status no longer. No longer are the methods of natural science regarded as the standard by which all other methodologies are to be judged. That is, the degree of approximation to the methods of natural science, is no longer the criterion by which research methodologies are generally to be evaluated. The new climate of thought about knowledge is marked by a greater openness to a plurality of methods. Science is not seen as an activity of following methodological recipes that yield acceptable results. Science becomes the creative search to understand better, and it uses whatever approaches are responsive to the particular questions and subject matters addressed. (Polkinghome, 1983, p. 3) There are two implications for the viability of a freedom assuming inquiry: (a) the CHAPTER 5

assumptions and methods of natural science are not the only valid assumptions and methods for valid inquiry and (b), methods of research developed in the humanities, such as hermeneutics, with which a freedom assuming inquiry might be expected to I have a good deal in common (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 1 O), cannot with justification be considered dubious because they are unlike natural science methodologies. ! A plurality of methods is one thing, another is a plurality of incommensurate ! i metaphysical assumptions. We have seen that any conception of determinism, including the new approaches which have emerged in cognitive psychology, is conceptually at odds with the presupposition of freedom in the libertarian sense. For a freedom assuming inquiry to be seen as valid, the new understanding of knowledge must also be able to accommodate metaphysical starting points incompatible with those of natural science. It will be recalled that the final reason which might be thought to preclude an inquiry assuming human freedom centred around metaphysics. The centrepiece of logical positivism was the "verification criterion". It was held that if a proposition was (a) incapable of empirical testing and (b) was not a tautology then it was logically meaningless. This view is no longer widely held (Phillips, 1987, 1992; Polkinghorne, 1983, 1988; Roth, 1987). On the contrary it has been accepted that a sharp distinction between empirical and metaphysical propositions is difficult to sustain. Not all theoretical propositions entertained by scientists are directly amenable to testing. Second, it has been widely accepted that there may be no such thing as a pure empirical observation. are now thought to be coloured by the

I researcher's theoretical predilections. Third, the enterprise of science itself proceeds on the basis of metaphysical assumptions which are not themselves subject to empirical checking. One of these is the assumption of universal natural determinism. I ; Indeed, the principle of "verification" itself could be regarded similarly, for there

i seems no possible way in which it can be examined empirically. This'has led some 4 j commentators to the conclusion that verificationism is a self defeating notion. As it is neither tautological nor empirical it cannot survive its own test of logical meaningfulness. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that all forms of inquiry rest I on metaphysical assumptions. A freedom based inquiry would simply employ CHAPTER 5 181.

somewhat different metaphysical starting points from those of natural science. But it

1 is mistaken to imagine natural science as a metaphysics-free zone. Thought about scientific methodology has moved a long way in recent decades. I 1 ' am aware that what I have had to say in this section may be seen as a simplified and unremarkable traipse down a well trodden path. Nevertheless I am also aware, having ; undertaken most of my study of psychology in the last decade, of the tenacity with which the positivist framework of thought continues to retain a powerful, if not always articulated, influence within academic psychology. It seemed like ground worth i clearing - again. So far then I have considered objections to the proposition that a freedom- ' assuming inquiry is viable. I now propose to examine aspects of the herrneneutic ' approach in greater detail. My aim in doing so is to show that it appears to be a methodology which not only accommodates the standpoint of freedom but can be i counted a valid form of empirical inquiry.

5.7 The interpretivist approach in psychological research Earlier I argued that the basic principles underpinning the hermeneutic research are congruent with the standpoint of freedom. I then reviewed the dissolution of grounds which were, until relatively recently, widely regarded as sufficient to preclude a priori

: the possibility of a freedom assuming inquiry. Now I will consider the rigour and the value of the hermeneutic tradition as a means to the study of human beings from the perspective of freedom. At the outset I should : stress that an examination of all aspects of this approach lies outside the scope of my : task. The first issue to be examined is whether the methods and techniques of

, hermeneutics possess the rigour to enable it to be seen as academically respectable as ! an approach to research. In order to confront this question I shall begin with an ' outline of the general components of hermeneutical research and then consider in a little more depth the issue of the status of knowledge claims as it relates to research of this type. 1 CHAPTER 5

It is important to establish that hermeneutic methods have sufficient objectivity to I be considered as legitimate methodologies for psychological research. Phillips (1992) I I points out that whilst non foundational epistemology means that no method can i guarantee that the researcher will arrive at "truth", "it does not follow from any of , these recent developments in epistemology that the notion of objectivity has been i undermined."(Phillips, p. 66). Phillips maintains that what distinguishes an objectively 1 derived conclusion from one lacking in objectivity is that the former has been arrived i at via a process of assembling and analysing relevant and carefully gathered evidence. I( "Objective" seems to be a label that we apply to inquiries that meet certain procedural standards, but objectivity does not guarantee that the results of I inquiries have any certainty. (It implies that the inquiries so labelled are free of gross defects, and this should be of some comfort-just as a consumer prefers to buy an item that has met rigorous inspection standards, although this does not i absolutely insure that it will not break down.) (Phillips, 1992, p.67) I As a general principle, objectivity requires that the results put forward are well ' supported by evidence appropriate to the type of research in question. In order to illustrate the claim that henneneutical research can possess objectivity I shall refer to a piece of research with which I am personally familiar. First it is necessary to make the point that objectivity will take a somewhat different form in hermeneutic research than it does for natural science. This is because a distinctive type of evidence is collected in pursuit of a research aim different from that of nomological science The purpose of alternate research paradigms may be characterised by an emphasis on understanding or the illumination of meanings.... By comparison with the tradition of experimentation, there is more emphasis on description and discovery as opposed to theory testing and' verification alone. (Hoshrnand, 1989, p. 13) For reasons already alluded to, many of the strategies used for attaining objectivity in the natural sciences are not available in the same way to hermeneutic research. (This is to be expected of any form of research methodology which is capable of adopting the standpoint of freedom. As Kant has pointed out we cannot have knowledge of I I ourselves in our freedom.) The linguistic, ever-changing, activity of meaning making, precludes some techniques and requires the modification of others. This does not

1 mean that rigorous standards of objectivity cannot be set and adhered to. What is does I 1 i mean is that such standards are of necessity different and in some respects weaker ! i than those of natural science. In a study of 22 people who understood themselves to have experienced a "nervous 1 breakdown", Purdie and McLennan (1993) noted anecdotal themes reported in i biographical and self-help literature which suggest that (a) people "break down" when I ; their meaning system collapses and (b) that the process of recovery involves some I I significant revision of meaning which tends to be construed as an improvement over

, that which they held prior to the "breakdown". 1 The research sought to determine the degree to which these themes are common I : to people who have passed through such an experience. That is, to see whether, in telling their stories of the experience, this is the meaning people generally make of it. { Subjects were interviewed. The questions were open ended and structured I I in temporal sequence - from prior to onset of symptoms through to post recovery. Thus people were encouraged to tell their story. A comparison group of people who had undergone some major life crisis other than a "breakdown" were also interviewed. All subjects were then asked to complete a Q sort (Block,1961); first as

, they recalled themselves prior to the "breakdown" or stressful event, and then as they

, presently saw themselves. The interviews were taped and the data later transcribed. Written summaries of the transcriptions of interview were sent to each subject with request for comments. The interview data was examined in a search for common I patterns and themes. In addition to examining the movement of individual adjectives, the Q sort data was correlated ( pre and post "breakdown") and the two groups of subjects compared. I Major methodological features of the hermeneutic approach are illustrated in this i study.

, (1) The research question is centred around the illumination of meaning. The attempt is not to uncover causal laws but to determine the meaning people make of their experience. I (2) The data is gathered by means of interview methods. This is a collaborative CHAPTER 5 184. process between interviewer and interviewee. (3) The data is primarily linguistic in form. (4) The analysis is essentially a search for patterns and themes both within and across subjects' accounts. (5) Quantitative analysis is used but occupies a secondary place in the scheme of things. (6) The results are reported in a scholarly form - conclusions are argued on the basis of the evidence. (7) The interview transcriptions are made available for the scrutiny of other researchers. In the natural science approach to psychological research the demonstration of validity, reliability, and significance, are crucial supports respecting the objectivity of knowledge claims. Polkinghorne (1988) considers the meaning of these notions as they apply to hermeneutic research. Validity. Whilst the technical meanings of the term as it is used in logic and measurement theory are both applicable within hermeneutic research, Polkinghorne maintains that the essential meaning of the term is that which it has in ordinary language, "well grounded and supportable". That is to say, the knowledge claims of hermeneutic research are defended by what Polkinghorne calls "informal reasoning".

The researcher presents evidence to support the conclusions and shows why alternative conclusions are not as likely, presenting the reasoning for this by means of which the results have been derived. (Polkinghorne, 1988, p.175) One strategy for enhancing the "supportable" status of findings is to employ a process of checking back with the participants in a study to ensure that the researcher has correctly "understood" the meanings. In the Purdie and McLennan (1 993) study this was done by means of a summary of a tape recorded interview being returned to participants for comment and possible correction. Polkinghorne maintains, an argument is valid when it has the strength to resist challenge or attack. Results in this kind of research do not produce "truth" in the sense of an exact correspondence to actuality (any more than can natural science research). Instead the aim Polkinghorne CHAPTER 5 185.

maintains, is "verisimilitude". Narrative research then uses the ideal of a scholarly consensus as the test of verisimilitude rather than the test of logical or mathematical validity. I (Polkinghome, 1988, p. 176) The aim of the research is a demonstrably objective understanding of the phenomena in the study. This objectivity is to be tested at the bar of scholarly scrutiny. So for example in the Purdie and McLennan (1993) study the interview transcriptions were

I made available for the scrutiny of other researchers. SigniJicance. Whist in the natural science paradigm "significance" refers to a statistical test of probability, in hermeneutic research it retains its ordinary meaning. That is, a result is significant if it is important in assisting people in the living of their lives and that it is shown to be well supported by the data (not withstanding the fact that the data is qualitative in this instance). i Reliability. In hermeneutic research the primary meaning of reliability is I dependability. In particular the dependability of the data. Unlike the statistical procedures employed in "natural science" psychology to evaluate measuring instruments, hermeneutic techniques do not have formal proofs of reliability. They rely instead "....on details of procedure to evoke an acceptance of the trustworthiness of the data".(Polkinghorne, 1988, p.177). Thus close attention is paid both to data ' generation and transcription. The questions which are asked, their sequence, the ' psychological and physical contexts in which interviews are conducted, and the methods used for transcribing interviews are all important issues of reliability in this ' kind of research. All should be carefully recounted in the published report of the

, study. Refutation. Phillips (1 992) maintains the importance of a Popperian emphasis on i 1 refutation in testing the knowledge claims of findings (Popper, i 1968). Clearly this would be a much weaker process than that open td natural science. j For one thing, unlike timeless and universal natural laws, meanings are made, changed, and unmade, and can differ among people. For this reason contrary findings might not have the same force as refuting evidence. Nevertheless, as Phillips maintains, it would seem important to consider what would potentially count as I CHAPTER 5 186.

evidence against the findings of a piece of hermeneutic research. Popper, in various places makes the telling point that any fool can find confirmations for an hypothesis, but what is crucial is whether or not confuting evidence can be found. (Phillips, 1992, p. 118) Strategies which have been employed in hermeneutic research which might j approximate this to some degree include these. j (1) Wherever possible hermeneutic research should be open to replication by other I j researchers and thus to the possibility of contradictory findings. These could be held j to cast doubt on the original conclusions. At least when these conclusions were held to

, be universal or at least sufficiently generalisable to include the subjects in the second I 1 study. i (2) As mentioned earlier, in studies based on the elicitation of meanings from people, i it is possible to check with the subjects the accuracy of the researcher's understanding. This raises the possibility of the participants denying that the interpretations captured jI I ' what they were seeking to convey. (3) Perhaps another kind of "refutation" is provided when people for whom the research is intended, in the Purdie and McLennan (1993) case, folk recovering from a 1 nervous breakdown and their therapists, find the interpretations made by the researchers not helpful or illuminating in the actual living of their lives (as breakdown jI : recoverers or therapists). That is, if such people find that the interpretation made of the breakdown experience does not "ring true" for them then this could be held to cast doubt on the knowledge being claimed. This would be "refutation" by a kind of : naturrl selection. Those understandings which "work" for people will live, others will

, not. That is to say, given that the conclusions were well supported by the empirical ' data in the first place, their in vivo application results in a kind of "trial and error" i : process which in a way "tests" the knowledge claim. ! This brief sketch of some of the features of hermeneutic approaches to research i I suggests that not only can hermeneutics accommodate the assumption of freedom but notwithstanding that assumption, it seems able to satisfy requirements as regards cogency and objectivity for scholarly empirical endeavour as these are presently I ! understood in philosophical and scientific quarters. It must be recognised however that CHAPTER 5

the knowledge claims of such non-nomological research are inherently of a different 1 order from those stemming from the paradigm of natural science. Value. As an illustration of the value of this kind of research I refer again to the Purdie and McLennan (1993) study. In becoming more aware of the meaning which

, many people create following the experience of having a "breakdown", counsellors / should be better placed to assist their clients. There would seem to be a real benefit to i j be had in understanding and building on the positive meanings people commonly ; make as they seek to reconstruct their lives. The findings of this study do not compete I with the approaches to therapy which stem from the assumptions of natural science. Again suggesting that these approaches (not withstanding their underlying conflicting , I assumptions) are in fact complementary. We are not suggesting that traditional theoretical formulations I ( psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural, family-systemic) of counselling and I i psychotherapy are faulty. Rather, we are drawing attention to the apparent need I

I I for individuals to come to believe that they can make some personally meaningful 'sense' of a (painful and disruptive) breakdown experience. I (Purdie & McLennan, p.25)

I . It would seem that hermeneutic research can be of practical value despite the fact that it does not produce the elegant taxonomies and law like relationships of the natural !

' science approach. We are now in a position to state three general findings. (1) There exists a substantial chorus of dissent from an exclusive reliance on the natural science paradigm in psychological research. The reasons underlying this dissent are

, substantially the same as those which underpin the philosophical protest against a 1 ' determinist view of human beings. (2) Vast changes have occurred recently in our I f understanding of knowledge and its acquisition. These have undermined the case for i nomological natural science as the only valid research paradigm for psychology. There I : seems no compelling reason to preclude a plurality of approaches including those which can accommodate the assumption of human freedom. (3) An interpretive human science approach has been developing which (a) seems to meet the revised I ! criteria for academic rigour and (b) is able to carry as an underlying assumption the 1 I CHAPTER 5 188.

proposition that human beings are free. It seems reasonable to conclude that a dual Kantian type of approach to the issue of free will and determinism in psychological research is a viable one.

, 5 -8 In~plicationsfor the unity of psychology It might be objected that a plurality of approach in research would damage the unity of psychology as a discipline. Yet the unity of psychology is hardly one of its distinguishing features. Disunity is widely acknowledged and discussed. (de Groot, 1990; Koch, 1981; Kukla, 1992; McNally, 1992; Roth, 1987; Sclmeider, 1992; Staats, 1983,1991). Various reasons have been put forward to explain it. Remedies have been proposed to deal with it. Some have bewailed it as a state of affairs unworthy of a scientific discipline. Some like Staats (1991) maintain the (surely increasingly attenuated) thesis that we are in a Kuhnian (Kuhn, 1970) pre-scientific, pre- paradigmatic era. Some seek answers in a return to positivism. Staats (1991) for example proposes a program for unification which shares many of the features of positivism including the assumption that psychological knowledge is unifiable. Still other commentators like Koch, (1981) have held that deeply rooted differences of 1 approach based in divergent philosophical and religious positions make the quest for unity both hopeless and undesirable. Green (1992) observes that as a matter of

i empirical fact it may turn out to be the case that the diverse subject matters of psychology are incapable of unification. Some welcome a plurality of approaches as fi-uitful and constructive (McNally, 1992; Polkinghorne, 1983). As I have sought to show, the freedo~ddeterminismissue, whether acknowledged I or not, has been a substantial cause of disunity in psychology. A Kantian approach ; assists us to a deep appreciation and acceptance of a disunity which, I have argued, is

, necessarily embedded within our discipline. Human beings may validly be considered both from the standpoint of freedom and the standpoint of determinism and further, as I : I have shown, it is possible, indeed profitable, to study human phenomena from both standpoints. Human beings are a special case and must be viewed through more than

I one lens. ! CHAPTER 5 189.

It could be argued that psychology would enhance its prospects for unity by drawing lines of demarcation so as to exclude all but positivistic assumptions and methodologies. In this way the freedom standpoint would be excised. The revised understandings which have emerged in the philosophy of science would suggest however, that from an epistemological point of view, such line drawing would be a largely arbitrary exercise. In an earlier chapter attention was drawn to William James (1979) suggestion that one's response to the freedom /determinism issue may be partly a matter of temperament. It (freedom) gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene; and to a mind possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt, remain forever inacceptable. (James, p. 23). This preference dichotomy, identified in relation to the freedomldeterminism issue, could also be held to apply to two competing visions for the future of psychology; for indeed the first issue, in part at least, underlies the second. The adoption of a dual approach to research would enable psychology to do justice to the standpoint of determinism: Affirming the physical and biological nature of human beings and psychology's links to the physical and biological sciences. It would also enable us to do justice to the standpoint of freedom: Affirming the intelligible world of meaning and agency. It could assist a rapprochement between psychology and the humanities. Such a bond, as Sperry (1988,1993) rightly points out, is urgently needed to enable psychology to address, directly and meaningfully, important issues of our time. I conclude that the quest for unity is unhelpful and should be replaced by a recognition that diversity is required. The more effective way forward is to embrace a plurality which celebrates the immensity and complexity of the human world. We have considered the impact a Kantian approach to the free will / determinism issue might have on psychology's self understanding and practice as'a science. The subject of the chapter which follows is an exploration of how the free will/determinism issue is presently handled in the practice of psychology in counselling contexts. CHAPTER 6

6. Psychological practice

. .

: 6.1 The rationale for an empirical study I have argued for the adoption of a Kantian based approach to the free I will/determinism problem as a way forward for psychology in the management of : this vexing issue. So far we have considered this proposal in relation to psychological theories and research methodologies. We need now to consider its usefulness in the context of the actual practice of psychology. How would a Kantian approach manifest itself in the context of psychological : practice? Broadly, it would seem to entail practitioners recognising the value and

. legitimacy of both standpoints in their work. And, as a consequence, freely i j transferring their approach from one standpoint to the other in order to best meet the needs of their clients. It would also, I suggest, involve adopting the standpoint of freedom as, in a sense, the goal or end point to be striven for in the treatment of clients. I think this for two, interrelated, reasons canvassed earlier. First, freedom is the standpoint we necessarily adopt in the activity of living and the aim of much

. psychological practice is to equip people for a return to ( and possibly the ' ' enhancement of the normal and successful living of their lives. Second, freedom is the standpoint which best allows us to affirm the worth and value of life ( as

. pregnant with possibility, shaped by our own choices, marked by responsibility, and redolent with meaning). All this raises the question as to what psychologists presently think and do in relation to this issue in their work. In order to examine this I conducted an empirical inquiry. This study was designed to gain some understanding of what~psychologists ' actually believe about free will and determinism, and then to explore, at least in a preliminary way, whether and how these beliefs relate to aspects of their professional approach.

I I selected counselling as the area of practice for my investigation. I made this CHAPTER 6 191.

choice for three reasons. First because it is an area which directly confronts the issue. The various approaches to counselling present practitioners with a range of ways of viewing the client, reflecting deterministic and libertarian perspectives. Second, having worked as a counsellor for some years myself, it is an area with which I have some familiarity. Finally, my professional network is more extensive in this area of practice than in any other and this assisted with the recruitment of subjects. The study that I undertook was exploratory in nature. An investigation of psycl~ologists'beliefs about free willldeterminisrn and the relationship of these to their work is not one which, as far as I was able to discover, had ever been undertaken before. This absence of any direct predecessors to the proposed study became apparent when, as a first step, I conducted a search of the literature. My quest was for empirical studies which examined beliefs about free willldeterminisrn and relationships between these beliefs and other aspects of people's lives. I begin the report of my study with a review of this research.

6.2 A review of the empirical literature I discovered that empirical literature on the subject of free will and determinism is fairly sparse. This is understandable as the issue is primarily conceptual rather than empirical. There is the considerable literature associated with the construct of locus of control (Rotter, 1966,1975) which, at first sight, seems to bear some relation to it. In fact, however, both conceptually and empirically the two sets of ideas can be shown to be more or less independent of each other. The belief that one's locus of control is internal, whilst it is congruent with a libertarian position, is also explicable in terms of soft determinism (that is, that whilst it is possible to control life's events, the kind of control one wishes to exert is determined). From the libertarian side, as Sappington (1990) has pointed out, it is possible to believe that one's actions are free and yet that they are rarely or never efficacious in influencing the events of life. Empirical evidence has also been found in support of a clear difference between the two sets of ideas. Waldman, Viney, Bell, Bennett and Hess (1983) compared CHAPTER- 6

subjects' scores on a scale designed to measure beliefs about free will and / determinism with their scores on a locus of control measure. A statistically 1 significant but very weak correlation was found in the expected direction (freedom : with an internal locus of control). A factor analysis of the data revealed that items on : the free will determinism scale were factorially distinct from the locus of control : items. Stroessner and Green (1990), in a study of American undergraduates, found i no significant correlation between a measure of libertarian beliefs and locus of i control scores. A moderate relationship was found between beliefs in natural ' "psycl~osocial"determinism and external locus of control. A very weak relationship : linked beliefs in "religious-philosophical determinism ( the belief that one's life is i controlled by God or fate) and an external locus of control. These relationships were strongest amongst subjects with very high scores on the two determinism measures. A number of studies have been conducted which examine the phenomenology of I I freedom. A review of this literature was conducted by Westcott (1988). Of course the experience of being free or of feeling free, may, as we have seen, be accounted for by all of the major philosophical standpoints on free will and determinism. Thus, for the purposes of this study, this work is not of relevance. f One study which related free will/determinism beliefs to an overall view of the person was conducted by Kalliopuska (1985). This researcher investigated implicit

I personality theory; the notion that have a theory of personality even though it may always remain unarticulated. Following earlier work in the area, Kalliopuska proposed that the kind of theory people develop is a function of the position they

: adopt in relation to a set of philosophical issues about the nature of human beings.

) Taken together, these beliefs constitute the rationale for an implicit theory of

, personality which people then use to appraise themselves and others. The subjects, (psychology undergraduates), were confronted with eight such constructs as pairs i of opposites ( eg. rationality - irrationality , free will - determinism), provided with ' some explanatory material, and asked to indicate a position in relation to each pair on an eleven point rating scale. Kalliopuska found that for the subjects of the study,

I belief in free will constituted an important aspect of their implicit personality theory. I CHAPTER 6 193.

Moderate significant correlations were found between beliefs in free will and rationality ( the belief that human beings act in accordance with reasons as opposed to irrational causes) and between free will and holism ( the belief that personality should be studied as a whole rather than though an analysis of each of its components). Determinism and heterostasis ( the belief that people are motivated towards growth, stimulus seeking and self actualisation) were negatively correlated. Several studies have investigated the links between free will/ determinism beliefs and views about punishment. In research conducted by Viney, Waldman and Barchilon (1982) participants (psychology undergraduates) completed questionnaires designed to measure attitudes to punishment and beliefs about determinism and free will. Contrary to the expectations of the researchers, it was the subjects who scored higher on determinism who advocated more punitive measures than did those who reported a more libertarian outlook. The authors conjectured that a belief in freedom might make of the administration of punishment a "burdensome moral responsibility" requiring that it be administered with scrupulous attention to "justice and fairness". A different explanation for these results could be advanced to do with a confusion between theory and practice. For the determinist, whilst in theory it really was not the wrong-doer's fault, in practice however, the punishment will be an important determinant of future behaviour. Libertarians on the other hand may perhaps take the view that punishment will not necessarily engineer desired change in the miscreant's activities. What is required is a freely chosen change of life direction. A subsequent study however (Viney, Parker-Martin & Dotten 1988) failed to find any reliable relationships between beliefs about free will 1 determinism and either the advocated magnitude of, or the rationale for, the punishment of offenders. Stroessner and Green (1 990) found that subjects who scored highly on measures of both determinism and libertarianism were more punitive than those with less . A strongly held views. They concluded; "It may be that both belief in free will or determinism and attitudes toward punishment are more complex than was originally suspected and that the complexity of the belief systems involved make the relationships difficult to identify or understand."(p. 791). CHAPTER 6 194.

Howard and Conway (1986), conducted a series of experiments in which human volition was admitted as a variable. Believing that human behaviour is determined by a combination of self direction and non-volitional factors, they were concerned that psychology, because of its determinist outlook, almost always excluded volitional factors a priori in its explanations of behaviour. They found that volition accounted for the greater part of the variance in their experimental findings and that when combined with non volitional factors, it was possible to explain between 80% and 90% of the variance. Such a study does not of course demonstrate the existence of free will. If it is granted that as human beings we exercise conscious choices which determine a great deal of our behaviour, the issue turns on what lies behind such choices. A soft determinist would argue that our choices determine our behaviour but our choices are themselves determined by material or efficient causal factors. As this review of the empirical literature serves to indicate, beliefs about the degree to which human beings are determined and the relationship of such beliefs to other issues have not been widely examined. And the relationships which have been investigated seem complex and somewhat equivocal.

6.3 The research questions My first aim was to examine the beliefs of psychologists engaged in the practice of counselling regarding free will and determinism. Given that psychology has been predominantly deterministic, both as regards personality theory and its research paradigm, the question arises as to the extent that this outlook is reflected among those who practise in the counselling field. For Kalliopuska's (1985) second year psychology undergraduates, belief in free will was a significant aspect of their implicit personality theory. I was interested to know whether such beliefs are generally maintained or significantly changed among those who have completed their professional education and training in psychology. A second focus of interest was to explore what relationship might exist between psychologists' philosophical position on the one hand and certain significant aspects CHAPTER G

of their approach to their clients on the other. Here I proposed to consider two , related matters; attribution of responsibility to clients, and preference for therapeutic

' modalities. First with regard to therapeutic modalities: although a relationship might be : expected on the basis of the assumptions made in each counselling theory, I : conjectured that inconsistency between meta-theoretical assumptions and i professional approach could equally be the case. Westcott (1988), a confirmed i libertarian, indicated a preference for behaviourist techniques because he found them : efficacious, although he had no liking for behaviourism as a theory of the person. Second, the studies already conducted (and reviewed above), had disclosed an

, equivocal relationship between free will/determinism beliefs and other variables. It seemed therefore unwise to anticipate a consistency between theoretical orientation and specific therapeutic techniques utilised in practice. To investigate this issue, I i ' decided to consider the preferences of psychologists for a range of specific helping techniques drawn from each of the major approaches as well as preferences for the theories themselves. The issue of counsellor attributions of responsibility to clients was examined by : Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza, Coates, Cohn and Kidder (1982). On the basis of an

, extensive survey of the empirical literature, they proposed four models of helping : and coping based on attributions of responsibility for problems and for the solutions to those problems. They proposed that such attributions, made both by counsellors and clients, are significant determinants of helping and coping behaviour. Each of the four models may, they suggested, be adaptive or non- adaptive

. depending on the situation at hand. Each model is represented by helping modalities a which incorporate its assumptions. Deeming a person responsible for both their problem and for the,solutions to it is ( dubbed the "Moral" model. People are regarded as being totally responsible for their past and future lives. Brickrnan et al. regarded rational emotive therapy and as embodiments of this model.

! I The view that people are not to be held responsible for having created their CHAPTER 6 196.

problems but that they are responsible for solving them is named the "Compensatory" model, so called because people have to compensate for some adversity which has befallen them, through no fault of their own, by a special effort or by receiving special help. They may then be regarded as being in a position to take responsibility themselves from that point on. Cognitive behavioural therapy is held to manifest the assumptions of this model. The "Medical" model is exemplified in the practice of modern where, typically, the patient is not deemed responsible for having created his or her disease and is the passive recipient of the prescribed treatment. (It must be said however, that this is less than universally true of modern medicine. Such ailments as the AIDS virus and diseases associated with cigarette smoking are not uncommonly regarded as the consequence of the freely chosen behaviour of the sufferer.) Behaviourism and psychoanalysis are identified, by Brickman and his colleagues, as modalities which hold the client responsible for neither problem nor solution. The final possibility is that people are not responsible for the solutions to their problems but are responsible for having caused them. This is termed the "Enlightenment" model because the major emphasis in helping is in informing people of the true nature of their situation and what needs to be done about it. This involves clients accepting a negative view of themselves in as much as they are responsible for having created a problem from which they are now powerless to extricate themselves. Finding a solution requires a submission to agents who will treat them. Brickrnan et al. saw this model as manifest in therapeutic communities such as Alcoholics Anonymous and certain weight control organisations. A summary of this model of helping and coping styles appears as Table 1. Table 1. Melnin~and coningi stvles

Responsibility Medical Moral Enlightenment Compensatory Problems No Yes Yes No Solutions No Yes No Yes Summary representation of the models proposed by Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza, Coates, Cohn, and Kidder (1982). CHAPTER 6

Consistency would appear to demand that views about determinism and free will relate in certain ways to these models of attribution. Strongly libertarian psychologists might be expected to make attributions consistent with the moral I . model. Out and out determinists, on the other hand, should find the medical model i to their liking because no real responsibility is ascribed to the client at all. Those : accepting a real but more circumscribed self determination might well favour one or I I I other of the two remaining models. That is, either that misuse by clients of their I agency has created a situation in which they have effectively lost it and become powerless to help themselves (enlightenment model), or, circumstances having 1 created a situation in which they are without the capacity for self determination, they I

, require assistance to (re)gain it (compensatory model).

However no hypotheses in line with such reasoning are proposed in this I

exploratory study. The empirical work reviewed in the previous section found that I I beliefs about freedom and determinism and their relationship to other variables are I

not straightforward. And the libertarian outlook of psychology students reported in , the Kalliopuska (1985) study raises the possibility of an hiatus between the personal \ i I

philosophy of psychologists and their professional approach. Accordingly the aim I was to conduct a general inspection of the way psychologists organise their thinking , and professional action around these questions. A subsidiary interest was to investigate the extent to which psychologists' reports of their attributions of responsibility to clients are consistent with their preferred theoretical approaches to counselling in the manner that Brickman et al. suggested . These then are the four foci for investigation in the present study. I (1) To explore the beliefs of psychologists engaged in the practice of counselling I regarding free will and determinism and to compare them with a group of non 1 psychologists. (2) To determine whether any relationship exists between psychologists' beliefs I about free will and determinism and their preferences for counselling theories and their preferences for some specific techniques deriving from these theories. , j (3) To examine the attributions of responsibility psychologists make regarding their CHAPTER 6 198.

clients' problems and the solutions for those problems and to determine whether any systematic relationship exists between these attributions and their philosophical stance.. on the free will - determinism issue. (4) To investigate whether psychologists' attributions of responsibility regarding their clients are consistent with their preference for counselling modalities in the way Brickman et al. proposed

6.4 Development of free will/determinism scales Initially a search of the literature produced one previous attempt at the creation of an instrument to measure people's beliefs about freedom and determinism (Viney, Waldman & Barchilon, 1982; Viney, McIntyre & Viney, 1984). It was decided however to develop a new instrument for the following reasons. (1) Viney et al. reported difficulties in achieving reliabilities (coefficient alphas) of sufficient strength with non-philosophically trained subjects in the absence of an introductory lecture on the free will/determinism issue to precede test administration. Such a procedure was not seen as practicable in the present study given that the subjects, unlike the groups of students used by Viney and his co- workers, were widely dispersed practising psychologists. (2) The Viney et al. scale concentrated almost exclusively on the issue of moral responsibility, and seemed not to tap other aspects of the free will 1 determinism issue identified in the philosophical and psychological literature as being of co~~siderablesignificance. These have been discussed in previous chapters. They include possibility and novelty (William James), self determination and self creation (Victor Frank1 and Carl Rogers), and the inherent dignity possessed by human beings (as ends in themselves) by virtue of their freedom (Immanuel Kant). As these themes have been identified as key aspects of human freedom, it was thought important to attempt to incorporate them into a measure of libertarian beliefs. (3) One of the intentions of the present study was to examine how people, who might be assumed to be unversed in the philosophical intricacies of the debate, think about the issues associated with determinism and free will. One might expect well CHAPTER 6 199.

educated human services professionals to ponder the question in the day to day context of their business. Even so, it remained a considerable interest to see how people think about the issue without having been specifically alerted to its philosophical complexities. (4) The Viney, Waldman and Barchilon (1982) instrument presented freedom and determinism as polar opposites and encouraged respondents to locate themselves on a continuum ranging from total determinism at one end to complete freedom at the other. The Kantian perspective adopted in this thesis suggests a rather different line of approach. If we may with justification regard ourselves as both determined and free, then presenting freedom and determinism as diametrically opposed would not be reflective of this. Accordingly it was decided to develop a measure which would encapsulate the possibility of a Kantian outcome. For these reasons then, an empirical study was undertaken to develop a satisfactory and suitable measure. First an initial group of forty items was generated. These items took the form of single sentence propositions with face validity regarding the issue. Many of these were derived from philosophical, psychological and literary sources. Some of them were direct quotations. Others were developed and refined in discussions between the author and the first supervisor. The items were intended to be a fair representation of the principle contentions and implications relating to the issue. The instrument was titled "The Personal Philosophy Scale". Responses to each proposition were to be made on a five point Likert type scale. At this point, the group of items was passed for comment to several academic psychologists experienced in item construction. As a result of this advice, a number of the forty original items were deemed unsuitable b,ecause of their philosophical complexity, ambiguity, or archaic language and were deleted or reshaped. The remaining items were then administered on a pilot basis to 78 subjects. These people were recruited from a variety of sources. Most were family, friends and colleagues of the author. A number were members of staff from several faculties within the Swinburne University of Technology. All subjects were aged 18 years and above and all were educated to at least year twelve level. CHAPTER 6

A principal components analysis with Varimax rotation was carried out on the 28 remaining items of the reworked questionnaire. Only two factors were found to account for more than 10 per cent of the variance (Factor one 21.8% and factor two . 10.1%). Apart from several items which cross-loaded, an examination of items : loading on these factors at .3 or above disclosed that agreement with factor one ! items conceptually was an affirmation of free will. Agreement with factor two items

I supported a determinist position. It was decided to omit items which did not load significantly on one or other of the first two factors or which cross - loaded on more than one factor. Further items

, thought to be irredeemably ambiguous were also omitted. On advice from an . authority on scale construction, two items couched in universal terms were made particular ("ever" being relaced by "rarely" and "everything" by "much of it"). As a result of these processes sixteen items remained to form the Personal i Philosophy Scale and were subsequently administered to the sample. In order to enhance the psychometric integrity of the instrument a further four items were subsequently deleted. This resulted in a two factor scale. Six items loaded on to each factor. Conceptually, all items in factor one are propositions agreement with which ' indicates a determinist position , and the six factor two items assert the libertarian , position. Thus, freedom and determinism are regarded and measured as'discrete ' variables. Each is represented by its own scale rather than being measured by a single score on one scale (which was the approach of Viney et a1 1982 and Viney et al. 1984). A copy of this instrument is included in Appendix 1. The results of a factor analysis on the final twelve items of the Personal Philosophy scale

: administered to the scale development sample (n=78) appear in Table 2. CHAPTER G

Table 2. . Factor analysis of the "freedom" and "determinism" scales

ITEM FACTOR ONE FACTOR TWO (Determinism) (Freedom) : Human beings make real choices . The human imagination brings genuine novelty into the world.

Human nature has inherent dignity.

All the genetic and environmental givens of my life are like the artist's paints and brushes - the raw materials out of which I create my being and my history

Whether we avoid environmental disaster depends on the personal choices we make now.

It is free will which makes us human.

I am simply the product of my genetic inheritance and .6 1 the environmental forces which have acted on me.

'I No murderer could ever have done othenvise than commit the deeds he or she did.

As I look back over my life so far, 1 rcalise that everything was determined by factors beyond my control such as my inherited characteristics and my childhood upbringing.

Our choice is predetermined. .69

If we knew enough we would see that for every decision .73 .19 we have ever made, we could not have done otherwise under those conditions.

The great truth underlying free market economics is that .63 .03 human beings cannot do othenvise than seek their own pleasure.

The six items which loaded onto factor one, agreement with which supported a determinist position, was termed the "determinism" scale. The six items which loaded onto factor two and were supportive of a libertarian position formed the ! "freedom" scale. The determinism scale had an Eigenvalue of 3.73 Ad accounted for 3 1.2% of the variance. The freedom scale, with an Eigenvalue of 2.05, accounted for 17.1 % of the variance.

I In order to determine scale reliabilities, Cronbach's alpha values were computed.

Satisfactory results were obtained; freedom scale alpha = .72, determinism scale CHAPTER 6 202.

alpha = .78. This compares favourably with the reliabilities reported by Viney et a1 (1982) for the their measure (.62 for non philosophically trained psychology undergraduates and .64 for psychology undergraduates following some instruction in the free willldeterminism issue). This work had been completed before the author became aware of a similar approach adopted by Stroessner and Green (1990). These researchers hypothesised that determinism and libertarianism would be shown to be factorially distinct: "We viewed libertarianism not as the absence of support for determinism, but as an independent belief in its own right."@. 791). Stroessner and Green found that this was indeed the case. The four libertarian items in their scale loaded on one factor, whilst items measuring natural determinism and religio-philosophical determinism loaded onto different factors. The present study thus replicates the key finding of Stroessner and Green (1990) which suggests that people have independent views about freedom and determinism, rather than negatively correlated views. In two significant respects however the scales developed for this study differs from the Stroessner and Green measures. Stroessner and Green measured libertarian beliefs with four items. Each contained the expression "free will". The items affirrned belief in free will as (a) life long, (b) independent of social conditions, (c) independent of group expectations or pressure, and (d) total. The present study adopted a different approach. Seeking to enter or "unpack" the notion of "free will", items were employed which affirmed (a) choice, (b) novelty, (c) inherent dignity, (d) free will, and (e) self determination1self creation and (f) possibility. As we have seen, these themes are identified in the philosophicallpsychological literature as key aspects of freedom, even though at first sight they might appear heteronomous. Significantly however, these items combined to form a factorially valid and reliable scale when administered to subjects, the great majority of whom could be presumed to have little or no philosophical training. A second point of difference is the strong theological interest in the work of Stroessner and Green (1990). A feature of their study was the differentiation of theological ("religious-philosophical") determinism from natural (or "psychosocial") CHAPTER 6 203.

determinism. This seems a useful and interesting distinction to examine in the context of their study. But I have some concern about their measure. Four out of the six items which measure "religious philosophical" determinism contain the word "God" and another implies hisher existence. As we have seen in the work of

, Blanshard (1 958) and as the astrological columns of our newspapers and magazines seem to indicate, a non-natural or "philosophical" determinism need not be theistic.

I Atheistic or agnostic "philosophical" determinists would seem to have difficulty

I expressing themselves in the terms offered by the Stroessner and Green (1990) scale. The focus of interest of the present study was confined to natural determinism as the underpinning assumption of a scientific world view. Incidently Stroessner and Green give the unfortunate impression that determinism is the construct associated with religious belief. But libertarianism, no less than determinism, can be (and is) upheld for theological reasons (Macquarrie 1977). i I Libertarian views may be held by believers for religious reasons and equally by atheists or agnostics drawn to such as or existentialism. And if it was of interest to Stroessner and Green to delineate different kinds of determinists, it would be of no less interest to distinguish similarly among ; libertarians. It is at least conceivable that Stroessner and Green (1990) may have . found systematic differences between "religious" and "philosophical" libertarians on ; their dependant variables. The significant contribution made by Stroessner and Green as far as the present study is concerned remains their discovery of the factorial independence of determinist and libertarian items. This adds to the credibility and robustness of the

: findings reported here. The same conclusion was aqived at here independently with a different set of scales. It would appear from these results that people-in-general think in a Kantian-like way, exercising a capacity to view themselves from both standpoints.

6.5 Development of a helping /coping styles measure ! The second measure developed for this study was designed to position subjects in CHAPTER 6 204.

relation to the four styles of helping and coping enunciated by Brickman et a1.(1982). My concern was to keep such a scale as short and simple as possible whilst remaining true to the model which Brickrnan and his co- workers had proposed. Eventually a measure was evolved which seemed to meet these criteria. This took the form of only two items. These were preceded by around 100 words of explanation intended to orient respondents to the subject under investigation. The two items were to be rated on a one to ten scale. First, respondents were asked to give an overall rating of their attribution of responsibility to their clients for having created their own problems. The response options ranged from 1= " not at all responsible for creating their problems", to 10= " totally responsible for creating their problems". Second, subjects were asked for their overall rating of the degree to which they attributed responsibility to clients for the solution of their problems. Respondents were presented with response options equivalent to the previous item. Conceptually, scores on the two items, taken together, may be held to yield a measure of the four models enunciated by Brickman and his co-workers. Responses of 5 and below on both items were deemed to correspond to the "Medical Model", whereas scores above 5 on both items were deemed to indicate a preference for the "Moral Model". Scores 5 and below on the "Problems" item and above 5 on the "Solutions" item were deemed to equate to the "Compensation Model". The opposite result, a rating of above 5 on the "Problems" item paired with a 5 or below score on the "Solutions" item were deemed to indicate a preference for the "Enlightenment Model". This instrument was titled the "Helping Styles Scale". A copy appears in Appendix 1.2

6.6 Development of a counselling approach measure Consultation with a leading figure in the field of counselling psychology in Australia suggested that no measure existed which was sufficiently recent to encompass all the major counselling modalities in current use. Once again it was found necessary to create a measure for the purposes of the study. On the basis of CHAPTER 6 205.

anecdotal evidence it was considered a possibility that some counsellors may work conceptually from a certain theoretical framework whilst at the same time making

use. - of specific techniques derived from very different theoretical approaches. For this reason it was considered necessary to devise a measure which incorporated both the major theoretical approaches to counselling in widespread current use and some of the specific techniques which derive from them. This was found to be no simple task. On the one hand the major theoretical traditions have spawned a plethora of offshoots often with considerable variation in their metaphysical assumptions, (including assumptions about free will and determinism) and between them, these approaches have generated a vast array of specific techniques. On the other hand it was felt important to produce something which would not overtax the time and goodwill of busy practitioners. After considerable thought and reflection and a further consultation with the authority in counselling psychology referred to earlier, a scale was produced which seeks to strike a reasonable balance between comprehensiveness and compactness. The measure was titled the "Counsellor Modality Preference Indicator". This lists seven of the theoretical approaches to counselling judged to be in widespread use with provision for respondents to write in an eighth modality if they wished. The listed modalities are (1) Gestalt Therapy, (2) Person Centred Therapy, (3) Existential Therapy, (4) Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, (5) Behaviour Therapy, (6) Psychodynamic Therapy and (7) Systemic Therapy. Below each of the theoretical approaches were listed three specific techniques which derive from that standpoint. Provision was made for respondents to add a further technique if they wished. The measure asks respondents to indicate on a

Likert type scale , (where 1 = "never" and 5 = "always") the extent to which they make use of each of the broad theoretical approaches and the associated techniques in their counselling work. A copy of the scale is provided in Appendix 1.2. CHAPTER 6

6.7 Subjects

TWO groups of subjects were used: the scale formation subjects and a group of psychologists. The scale fornzation group. The heterogenous sample of 78 people used to develop the "freedom" and "determinism" scales was used as a comparison group. This group was described earlier in relation to the development of the measures of determinism and freedom. Group of counselIingpsychologists. The total number of subjects in the group of psychologists was 87. All subjects were registered to practice as psychologists in the state of Victoria, with the exception of a small number who had fulfilled the academic prerequisites for registration but were completing supervision i requirements. All subjects were engaged, either full, or part-time , in the practice of counselling in a variety of settings. Of these, 27 were in private practice, 26 were enlployed by public sector bodies, 14 worked in community agencies and 12 in church related organisations. The remaining 5 subjects fell beyond the range of these

: categories. , The group comprised 54 females and 33 males. The ages of the subjects ranged

, from 25 to 63 years. The mean age was 42.61 years with a standard deviation of 9.36 The subjects' years of work as counsellors ranged from 1 to 33 with a mean of 10.21 and a standard deviation of 8.16. Subjects were enlisted in a variety of ways. Some were recruited directly from the personal and professional network of the author and others from the networks of friends and colleagues. Several private and public organisations employing psychologists were visited by the author which resulted in a number of additional ! participants. Some qualified psychologists enrolled part-time in the Masters degree

I program in counselling psychology at Swinburne University also took part. CHAPTER G

6.8 Procedure ~ntendingsubjects were presented with a letter from the author. This letter (1)

, indicated the purpose of the study, (2) explained what was required of participants, . (3) gave an assurance of confidentiality, (4) assured readers that they were under no obligation to participate, (5) provided the telephone numbeis of the first supervisor and the author as sources of furt11er information about the project, (6) invited subjects to indicate whether they wished to be provided with a summary of the results of the study ,and (7) requested participation. A copy of this letter is included in Appendix 1. Attached to the letter was a request for personal information. Respondents were asked their age in years, sex, employment details and number of years experience as : a counsellor. Also attached were copies of the three measures described in the preceding sections.

6.9 Results: Descriptive statistics Means, standard deviations and the possible ranges of the freedom and

, determinism scales for the group of psychologists are presented in Table 3 A. The a means and standard deviations obtained by the scale development sample on the freedom and determinism scales also appear on this table. Descriptive statistics for the helping styles items and preferences for therapeutic theories and techniques are presented in Tables 3.B, 3.C and 3.D. No significant relationships were found to exist between scores on any of the variables of interest and the gender, age or years of counselling experience of the subjects. CHAPTER 6

Table 3. A Sample means, standard deviations and the possible range of scores for the free will and determinism scales.

VARIABLES POSSIBLE SAMPLE SAMPLE RANGE MEANS SD

freedom scale (scale development sample) 6 - 30 23.78 3.66 N=78 freedom scale (psychologist sample) 6 - 30 24.24 2.68 N=85 determinism scale (scale development 6-30 12.76 4.30 sample) N=76 determinism scale(psycho1ogist sample) 6 - 30 12.95 3.0 N=84

Table 3. B Means, standard deviations and ranges for the sample of counselling psychologists on the helping styles items.

VARIABLES POSSIBLE MEANS SD RANGE

responsibility for problems 1 - 10 6.29 1.38 responsibilitv for solutions 1 - 10 7.95 1.23

Table 3. C Means, standard deviations and ranges for the sample of counselling psychologists on preference for theoretical approaches to counselling

VARIABLES POSSIBLE MEANS SD RANGE behavioural theory 1-5 2.52 1.04

cognitive behavioural theory 1-5 ' 3.20 1.04 existentialist theory gestalt theory person centred theory 1-5 3.98 .6 1 psychodynamic theory 1-5 3.02 1.19 1-5 2.79 .99 CHAPTER 6 209.

Table 3.D Means, standard deviations and the possible ranges of the specified . therapeutic techniques

THEORY POSSIBLE MEAN SD TECHNIQUE RANGE

Behaviourism 1-5 2.12 1.1 Systematic desensitisation

1-5 2.7 1.08 Modelling

1-5 2.82 1.13 Behaviour rehearsal

cognitive behaviourism 1-5

1-5 Mental rehearsal

1-5 Positive self- statements

Existentialism 1-5 Authentic self disclosure i 1-5 Values clarification 1-5 Focus on meaning

Gestalt 1-5 Empty chair

1-5 Dream work

1-5 Fantasy

person centred 1-5 Reflection of feeling

1-5 Self disclosure

1-5 Unconditional warmth

psychodynamic 1-5 Interpretation of symptoms

1-5 2.47 1.23 Interpretation of transference

1-5 3.56 1.03 Explore childhood experiences

systems 1-5 2.12 1.04 Paradoxical , interventions 1-5 2.89 1.10 Directions and homework CHAPTER 6 210.

6.10 Results: Beliefs of psychologists regarding fiee will and determinism and a comparison with the beliefs of non psychologists The results obtained by the psychologists on the freedom and determinism scales were compared with those obtained by the scale formation group. A comparison of the means and standard deviations are set out in Table 3.A. An analysis of variance was used to compare results for the sample of psychologists with those of the scale development group on the freedom and determinism scales. No significant difference was found between the groups on either scale. In order to examine more closely the specific patterns of belief among the psychologists, frequency distributions were also calculated for all individual items of the freedom and determinism scales. These results are reported in Figures 1 - 12. This presentation of responses to the individual items indicates the general predominance of libertarian views among this group of psychologists. On all of the 12 items the majority of the psychologists (for most items it was an ovenvl~elming majority) answered in a way consistent with the libertarian standpoint. CHAPTER 6

Figures 1 - 6 Responses by the counselling psychologists to the Freedom scale items presented at percentages.

Figure 1 "Human beings make real choices." (N = 86)

Figure 2 "The human imagination brings genuine novelty into the world." N = 87 CHAPTER 6

Figure 3 "Human nature has inherent dignity." N = 87

Figure 4 "All the genetic and environmental givens of my life are 1 like the artist's paints and brushes - the raw materials I out of which I create my being and my history." N = 86 I CHAPTER 6

Figure 5 "Whether we avoid environmental disaster depends on the personal choices we make now." N = 86

Figure 6'It is free will which makes us human" N = 86 CHAPTER 6

Figures 7 - 12 Responses by counselling psychologists to the Determinism scale items expressed . as percentages

Figure 7 "I am simply the product of my genetic inheritance and the environmental forces which have acted upon me. " N = 86

Figure 8 "The great truth underlying free market economics is that human beings cannot do otherwise than seek their own pleasure" N= 85 CHAPTER 6

Figure 9 "If we knew enough we would see that for every decision we have ever made, we could not have done otherwise under those conditions" N = 86

Figure 10 "As I look back over my life so far, I realise that much of it was determined by factors beyond my control such as my inherited characteristics and my childhood upbringing." N = 87 CHAPTER 6

N=8/ I i Figure 11 "Our choices are not really choices at all but predetermined." N = 87 ,

Figure 12 " A murderer could rarely have done otherwise than commit the deeds he or she did." N = 86 CHAPTER 6 21 7.

A copy of the frequency distributions for the individual items of the freedom and I , determinism scales appears in Appendix 2. Responses to several of the individual I propositions are particularly revealing and call for comment. Among the freedom I scale items, reactions to the assertion that "It is free will which makes us human." is worthy of note. The form of the statement makes it very clear that the claim is not

simply that free will exists, but that it is a defining property of humanness (something ,I like a necessary condition). Of the psychologists 62.8% agreed that this is so, whilst disagreement was registered by only 15.2%. Another item from the freedom scale deserves to be singled out is the fourth. Only 5.9% of the sample disagreed with the I proposition that "All the genetic and environmental givens of my life are like the artist's paints and brushes - the raw material out of which I create my being and my history." This item essentially corresponds to the existentialist's claim, discussed in ' previous chapters, that the "thrown" aspects of our existence determine the context of j i I ' free choice, they do not obviate it. That an overwhelming 86.1% of the sample could

affirm such a proposition is a striking indication of how little the naturalistic , paradigm of determinist thought has permeated the personal belief systems of these I i practitioners. I This becomes clearer still when one considers expressions of view in response to , 1 , one of the items on the determinism scale, "A murderer could rarely have'done : otherwise than commit the deeds he or she did.". The fact that no one could agree with this proposition is a striking repudiation by the sample of the determinist

, perspective. (This is of particular note when it is remembered that the expert opinion of psychologists is presented as evidence in our courts of justice from time to time in ' support of mitigation on the grounds that wrong doers would have been at least hard 1

I put, or, more likely, quite unable, to do other than what they did.) Responses to item 10 are also revealing. This item does not affirm a strict , determinism but the weaker position that "much" is determined by genetic and I environmental causes. One might have thought that such a statement would have ! almost "motherhood" status among a group of psychologists. yet just over half

I i (5 1.7%) disagreed with it, while a further 17.2% were unsure. CHAPTER 6 218.

Our interest now is to determine whether this overwhelming affirmation of the ; perspective of freedom at the level of personal belief is related in any way to : professional practice. In particular, whether a nexus exists between the beliefs of

I practitioners and their preference for specific therapeutic theories and tools.

1 6.11 Results: Relationships between psychologists' beliefs I : about freedom and determinism and their preferences for I therapeutic theories and techniques: 1

I

I Correlations, Pearson's "r," were calculated between the freedom and determinism / scales and the questionnaire items relating to preference for therapeutic theories and techniques. A number of relationships were found. These are reported with the strength of the relationship and the results of a two tailed test of significance. 'I i (a) Correlations between thefieedom and deternzinisnz scales and the reported use of therapeutic theories: The freedom scale: A weak inverse relationship was found, -.26 (p = .03), between freedom and the use

: of systems theory. ; The determinism scale: : A weak inverse relationship was found to exist between determinism and a preference ! for person centred theory, -.28 (p = .02).

, (b) Con-elations between the fieedom and deternzinisnz scales and the reported use of specific therapeutic techniques: I : The freedom scale: i No significant relationships were found. I ; The determinism scale: : The determinism scale was positivelv related to the psychodynamic technique I "interpretation of transference": .27 (p=.02) I Further, the determinism scale was negatively related to the following five 1 techniques. An inverse relationship was found with two of the cognitive behavioural i CHAPTER 6

techniques. I I "cognitive restructuring": r = -.26 @=.01)

"mental rehearsal": r = -.27 @=.02 ) Negative relationships were also found between determinism and (a) one of the existentialist techniques,"values clarification": r = -29 (p=.01)

(b) one of the nominated person centred techniques,"reflection of feelings": r = -.27 @=.02), and (c) one of the behaviourist techniques "modelling": r = -.24 (p =.02). In total then, relationships were found between the freedom and determinism scales and only two of the seven specified theories and six of the twenty one nominated techniques. Furthermore, none of these correlations exceeded .29. Nothing was found therefore to support the existence of any emphatic impact of personal beliefs ( on freedom/determinism) on the selection of professional approaches and i tools.

6.12 Results: Relationship between psychologists' attributions . of responsibility and their free will/deterrninism beliefs The means and standard deviations for the attributions of client responsibility are

; presented in Table 3.B. Cross tabulations of responses to the items measuring attribution of responsibility for problems and solutions are presented in Appendix 2. The response format was a continuum ranging from 1 (not at all responsible ) to 10

(totally responsible). Figure 13 presents the distribution of subjects according to the , Brickrnan et al. (1982) quadrants of helping styles. Cut off scores for the allocation of 1 subjects into quadrants is a score of 5 and below as indicative of a low attribution of , responsibility to clients. i The inability of the "enlightenment" model to attract inore than one of the 87 I

I respondents is perhaps not surprising. It does not appear to correspond to the assumptions of any of the influential theoretical approaches to counselling. That the medical model should attract only one respondent is conceptually congruent with the !, ' general rejection of determinism noted in the analysis of personal beliefs. The I CHAPTER G 220. prevalence of the moral model, over 75% of the sample, is striking. For the moral model represents not only a general affirmation that clients can become responsible fortheir actions given the right circumstances, but the much stronger assertion that they are to be held responsible regardless of their circumstances. In a consideration of the full range of human service practitioners, Brickman's four models of helping and coping may well be a reasonable proposition. But considered from the more restricted perspective of counselling psychology in Australia, the data suggests that what we have is a two model reality. The libertarian outlook uncovered in our examination of the personal beliefs of psychologists, seems to match their preference for the "moral", and to a lesser extent, the "compensatory" models of the Brickrnan et al. (1982) schema. A next step was to determine whether this conceptual congruence is in fact a systematic relationship Responses to both items on the "Helping styles scale" (client responsibility for problems and client responsibility for solutions to problems), were correlated with scores on the "freedom" and "determinism" scales. Two relationships were found. The freedom scale was weakly associated with scores on the responsibility for problems item I= .23.(p=.04).The determinism scale correlated inversely with the responsibility for solutions item r= -.32 @=.002). It may be that the relationship between these variables is obscured somewhat by the limited range of scores attained on the measures themselves. Anastasi ( 1988 p. 130-13 1) points out that correlations between measures administered to homogenous samples are, for that reason likely to be low. The homogeneity of scores on the freedom and determinism scales in particular was discussed previously, where it was noted that the group overwhelmingly adopted a libertarian standpoint. Whilst the relationships are in the direction which consistency would demand, they lack any great strength. While not losing sight of the possibility of some obscuring due to homogeneity, the best we can show is that a weak relationship exists between the personal beliefs of practitioners and their attributions of responsibility. CHAPTER 6 221.

Figure 13. Percentage allocation of subjects into Helping Styles quadrants

Sample of psychologists (N = 87)

I 1

Medical Model N=l Compensatory Model N=18 Enlightenment Model N=l Moral Model N=67

6.13 Results: Relationship between psychologists' attributions of responsibility and their preference for therapeutic theories I and techniques Correlation coefficients were calculated between the two items designed to measure I : attributions of responsibility and the items indicating preferences for therapeutic theories and techniques. A few weak relationships were found. (a) Attribution of respoizsibili& made for the creation of~roblems and preference t : for cozirzselliizg theories and speczJic techniques: \ cognitive behavioural technique "mental rehearsal" r=.26 (p=.02), cognitive behavioural technique "positive self statements" ~.22(p=.05), existentialist , / technique "values clarification" ~.24(p=.03). CHAPTER 6

(b) Attribution of responsibility made for the solutions-for problems and preference

1 for counselling theories and specijc therapeutic. techniques: ' "person centred theory" ~.32(p=.01), I existentialist technique "values clarification" r=.22 (p=.05), person centred technique "reflection of feelings" r=.21 (p=.05). The attributions of responsibility items related in total only to 6 of the 21 specified I I , therapeutic techniques. The strongest of these correlations was .32. The best causal I: I hypothesis we could conjecture on the basis of these results would be that such attributions of responsibility play a very slight role in determining which techniques 1 psychologists employ. It should be remembered however that psychologists were asked to make a global attribution of responsibility. They were asked to consider clients across the board as it were. It is possible that attributions of responsibility vary to a significant degree on a client by client basis. It may be that choice of technique is somewhat contingent on a case by case attribution of responsibility. By calling for a global measure of attribution the relationship may have been somewhat obscured. Whether this conjecture has any foundation in fact only future investigation can determine.

6.14 Discussion In this section I propose to comment briefly on the major findings of the ' investigation, indicate some of its limitations, and propose some possible directions ; for future research. Some general conclusions will then be drawn. i I The findings of the study: ! I Both the group of psychologists and the scale development sample scored \ substantially higher on the "freedom" scale than they did on the "detkrminism" scale.

1 This result accords with the anecdotal claim that most people find the perspective , of freedom more convincing than the perspective of determinism. It is only with the benefit of philosophical training that the very strong claim of determinism becomes i ! i apparent. Second, this result could also be held to support the commonly held view i CHAPTER 6

that most people find the stance of freedom more appealing and the determinist stance less appealing. Viewing this from the opposite perspective, the results could be held to support the , validity of the scales themselves. The overwhelming anecdotal evidence that people find the stance of freedom preferable to determinism, would predict such a result on a valid measure of these constructs. The scores on the freedom and determinism scales for the general sample were not significantly different from that attained by the sample of psychologists. It might be concluded from this that, psychologists engaged in counselling work have a stance on human freedom which is about the same as that of people in general. It is of interest I that scores on the determinism scale were not significantly different between the groups. Given that freedom and determinism appear to function in people's thinking as j I independent notions, a difference in outlook was conceivable: The psychologists, as a 1 ! result of their training, exhibiting a greater acceptance of the determinist point of view. i

This was not the case however. As the item by item analysis of the "determinism" , scale revealed, the degree to which determinist notions were rejected was surprising in ,! ! its magnitude. I

It cannot of course be assumed that the outlook of psychologists engaged in ,1 counselling, accurately represents the beliefs of psychologists in other areas of work. It ! could be conjectured that practitioners working in fields heavily grounded in natural : science ( for example) would have a more pronounced deterministic orientation. This possibility remains to be tested. The relationships which were found between the freedom and determinism scales ! and the preferences of psychologists for counselling theories and specific counselling 1 techniques were, it will be recalled, weak and patchy. The determinism scale was : related far more strongly than the freedom scale to these measures. wereas "determinism" correlated significantly with use of 1 of the 7 theories (person centred I theory) and 6 of the 21 specified techniques, "freedom" correlated with one theory (negatively with systems theory) and none of the techniques. With the exception of the inverse relationship between the determinism scale and

1 CHAPTER 6

one of the behaviourist techniques ("modelling"), the direction of the relationships seem consistent from a conceptual point of view. The positive correlations of "determinism" with one of the psychodynamic teclmiques and the inverse I relationships with one each of the existentialist techniques ("values clarification") and person centred techniques ("reflection of feelings"), accord with the general i standpoints of the parent theories. The inverse correlation between "determinism" and , the cognitive behavioural techniques can also be seen as consistent in as much as (a) at ' least some cognitive behaviourist theorists (for example Bandura 1989) avow something akin to a libertarian standpoint and (b) even given the soft determinist I

I outlook of cognitive theory generally, the actual practice of the techniques (they all involve changing the client's thinking), accommodates both libertarian and soft determinist points of view. ,

A reasonable conjecture, on the basis of these correlations, is that pl~ilosopl~ical I I beliefs about freedom and determinism play a feeble role in determining a 1 psychologist's use of therapeutic tools. Such a conclusion would be consistent with the , proposition that psychologists select therapeutic modalities for a variety of reasons, I

1 their own history of training for example, and the point already made in relation to 1 Wescott (1 988), that techniques can be cut adrift as it were from their theoretical I underpinnings. Techniques may be favoured by counsellors who have no'commitment i to their theoretical1 philosophical basis. The lack of a strong clear cut relationship between beliefs in free willldeterminism and the therapies chosen by psychologists is similar to the results of investigations into the relationship between free will/determinism beliefs and punishment. It led the researchers who investigated the issue of punishment to a similar conclusion to that reached here; that people's beliefs 1 are complex and the relationships among them are not simple (Viney, Waldman & Barchilon, 1982 p.945; Stroessner & Green, 1990 p.791). It was earlier concluded that people view themselves and others, to some degree at ' least, as determined and free. This too could constitute a reason for the lack of a clear i and strong relationship between these beliefs and preference of modes and methods of therapy. It would seem almost as if the psychologists' libertarian standpoint may be I CHAPTER 6 225.

"taken as read" whatever their approach to counselling. Whatever influence does exist , . between beliefs and therapy is perhaps more related to the degree to which they also ' j adopt.the standpoint of determinism. I It may be that the "tough minded" explanatory1causal outlook of determinism i would be better captured by items eschewing altogether the "practical" context of "being-in-the-world". The items in the "determinism" scale with one exception I / employ personal pronouns and engage the domain of lived experience. More j I "impersonal" items with a more overt focus on the scientific world view might better j enable respondents to assume the determinist standpoint and answer more positively. ' ! I Items of this sort might be more successful in tapping our positive intuitions of causal : : explanation. This conjecture might be explored in future attempts at scale

: construction. i I The two relationships which were found between scores on the attribution of i j j responsibility items and the freedom and determinism measures were weak but i

conceptually consistent. The association (.23) between the freedom scale and , responsibility for problems is consistent with the moral model as the most libertarian of the four Brickman et al. (1 982) helping styles. It is also congruent with the enlightenment model (which proposes that whilst people freely get tl~emselvesinto difficulties they then become powerless to extricate themselves). That is, as free, people must bear the consequences of the choices they make. The inverse relationship between scores on the determinism scale and the responsibility for solutions item (--32) is also consistent with the assumption of responsibility for solutions contained in both the moral and compensatory models. Conjectures may be hazarded as to why further relationships were not forthcoming between the freedom and determinism measures and attributions of responsibility. It may be that personal philosophy and one's method of professional approach are seen as more or less unconnected, different worlds of thought and activity. This said however, the overwllelming preference of the psychologists for the moral and compensatory categories of the Brickman et a1 (1982) taxonomy of helping styles, does indicate the very considerable extent to which psychologists regard their clients CHAPTER 6

! "as if' they were free to exercise responsibility. The relationship between attributions of responsibility made by psychologists to their clients and the psychologists' preferences for counselling theories and techniques was not a convincing one. The few statistically significant correlations which were ' found were conceptually consistent. The overall paucity of relationships between these I measures does little to support the thesis advanced by Brickrnan et a1 (1982). This I 1 study however included only counselling psychologists. In the broader therapeutic community it may well be that the "medical" and "enlightenment" models would find 3 their representatives. Further, as was suggested in earlier discussion of the "freedom" I , and "determinism" measures, the severance of theories and techniques from broader

, conceptual issues may account for the lack of strong relationships between attribution of responsibility and therapeutic approach. It might be conjectured that such matters as the training received by the psychologist and the perceived efficacy of techniques are i II I what counts. 1

t I I 6.15 Conclusions I

I : Two general conclusions can be drawn from the study in relation to the overall

1 focus of this thesis. ' The study provides us with additional grounds for the adoption of a Kantian perspective on the issue in psychology. We have found that a Kantian approach, as well as providing an elegant philosophical solution to the freedom/determinism issue, is also broadly reflective of the way that people in general, including counselling psychologists, do actually think about it. Being, as it may be supposed, largely in : ignorance of the contradictions between determinism and freedom, pointed out by the i philosophers, people see them as largely unconnected. The two sides of the antinomy : seem to function like separate language games, each belonging to a distinct activity or I "form of life" (Wittgenstein 1968). Seeking causal explanations is one thing, the constant experience of having to make free choices in the context of living one's life is (for the most part at least) quite another. Kant provides us with a conceptual license I ! for treating the issue in the way we in fact do treat it. This confers on a Kantian CHAPTER 6 227.

! approach the additional benefit that it justifies ordinary thinking. There are surely

, advantages to be had here when it comes to the work of psychologists. Invidious ' choices do not have to be made. Integrity does not demand the surrender either of I critical intuitions on the one hand or of a scientific world view on the other. Providing

; psychologists with a conceptual (Kantian) rationale for the two standpoint approacl~, I which it appears, is already part of their ordinary thinking would seem highly

, desirable. A major theme revealed by the study is the overwhelming use made by counselling practitioners of the libertarian standpoint. This study was limited to the Australian context. It may be that there are cultural factors which predispose Australian practitioners to reject the determinist standpoint more comprehensively than their counterparts in other parts of the world. Some anecdotal evidence exists supportive of

, the proposition that Australian academic psychology is somewhat "middle of the road" i i in comparison with traditions which prevail elsewhere. In some overseas universities radical behaviourism and genetic models of personality are thought to be more prominent. This raises a suspicion that the empirical outcomes reported here may, to some extent, be culture specific. Psychologists who during the course of their training

; were exposed to more emphatic deterministic views, might respond differently on

, measures of fieedoddetenninism beliefs. In particular it might be speculated that ; their scores on a determinism scale could be higher than their Australian counterparts. The Australian Government is understood to be promoting the growing trend towards the internationalisation of education services. The present study has highlighted the philosophical situation in Australia. Things may be seen differently : among those with other traditions and histories. A major difference in approach to the

i freedomldeterminism issue could conceivably constitute a hidden impediment to the I

: achievement of the close level of international collaboration envisaged for the future. I ' Further studies might be undertaken in order to explore cultural relativities among I

psychologists in relation to their freedoddeterminism beliefs. i Even so, a striking difference appears to exist between the dominant deterministic i paradigm in psychological theory and research, and the beliefs and attributions of ! I CHAPTER 6 238.

practitioners in the field. To the extent that psychology employs only naturalistic I models it plays down, even denies, the experience of freedom and so fails to do justice , : to its counselling practice - an application towards which much of its theorising is . directed. A gap between the academic and practical wings of psychology on this issue,

: though readily explicable in terms of the Kantian "pure" 1 "practical" reason : distinction, is not satisfactory. An integration is called for such that the dual perspective is adopted and valued at both the academic and the practical levels. It is this integration of both perspectives at all levels , rather than the hegemony of one, which in my view, is the form of unity to which psychology should aspire. With this in

I mind, given the sweeping endorsement of the libertarian outlook among counselling practitioners, it could be hypothesised that a greater recognition of the value of the determinist point of view in counselling practice would be beneficial. For one thing, it

, might encourage psychologists in the field to attend more closely to the research and I theorising carried out from the determinist perspective, which may then become more fruitful in practical contexts. A Kantian perspective would facilitate this by enabling practitioners to see that no surrender of their libertarian beliefs, and their preference

I for a generally libertarian approach to their practice would be required in order to I : accommodate it. For it is as much a feature and advantage of a Kantian approach, that i I , the benefits of deterministic thinking are released into psychological practi'ce, as it is

I that libertarian perspectives are employed in theorising and research. In the brief concluding chapter which follows I will integrate these conclusions

, with those arrived at in the preceding chapters and put forward some proposals for the better management of the f?eedom/determinism issue in psychology. I CHAPTER 7

7. Discussion and conclusions : 7.1 Review

At the beginning it was established that the free will/determinism problem is significant not only within our professional lives as psychologists but to our lives 1

, generally. This is because it is an issue which exerts a decisive influence on what we think is the essence of being human.

For the most part, the freedom/determinism issue is held to be undecidable on 7i empirical grounds, a metaphysical issue. Accordingly it appears in psychology as a 1 presupposition for theory, research, and practice where it exerts a critical influence. It

is a pivotal assumption in psychological theory because it sets fundamental parameters 1 within which theorising takes place. It is equally significant to research, where it is i I i influential in determining in advance the kinds of inquiries which are made, how they \I are made, and the kinds of conclusions which are drawn from them. As far as practice , is concerned, it looms large in determining what one takes a client to be and hence I what psychological interventions are about. f 1

: The issue seems to be a conceptual or philosophical one and so, although it bears I

considerably upon psychology, it is not within the province of psychology, as an II

, empirical discipline, to resolve it. Nevertheless, it is of considerable importance for I psychology to find some effective way to negotiate or manage it. The present situation, in which sometimes apparent, sometimes buried, it constitutes a source of division and confusion within areas of psychology, such as counselling and personality, is clearly unsatisfactory. i In order to confront the hll force of the issue, a broad distinction was drawn between deterministic and libertarian views of human beings. This analysis revealed

I the catastrophic effect of the perspective of determinism on our self understanding - ! reducing what we regard as our most distinctive and wondrous human capacities to the status of mere illusion. On this basis it was argued that, assuming we had a choice : , in the matter, that both approaches were viable options, we should choose the I , perspective of freedom. At the same time it was established that determinism is an I CHAPTER 7 230.

I assumption that gives us the conceptual means of rendering the world coherent and ' explicable. It seems a powerful, fruitful, even necessary assumption. . Positioizs iiz tJze debate In order to come to terms with the major issues and positions in the debate, the I work of some representative thinkers was examined. It was concluded that, as far as . cogency is concerned, whilst all positions have their strengths and attractions, none is i

wholly immune from criticism. No one position emerges as a clear winner. There ! seem to be no "knock down" proofs such that one position has a decisive edge over

the others. 1 Aside from cogency however, other problems were identified. All positions seem ; less than well suited to assisting psychology in its attempts to manage the issue. Considered as conceptual foundations for methodology, all seem to have deficiencies. The various strands of determinism were found to exact a severe cost to our self

I i understanding. To a greater or lesser degree they seem to struggle to do full justice to I I the self initiating nature of our functioning as human beings. There also seems to be a

sense in which, paradoxically, determinist views seem to require the standpoint of I freedom to attain cogency. Libertarian views, on the other hand, were found to suffer ! : a disadvantage in that they seemed to impose limits on a scientific understanding of ! human beings. In different ways they seemed to necessitate some exclusion of the ,

, human world from empirical investigation or to minimise the significance of such 1 I investigation. Given the history in science of attempts to create empirical "no go" areas, or to deny the relevance of naturalistic investigation, views of this type were considered inadequate. Approaches which attempt to unite the two sides of the debate were examined. It ' was concluded that these run into severe difficulties. Rather than bringing about a reconciliation, they were found to distort or weaken one, or other, (perhaps both) of i the competing viewpoints. It was concluded that what seems desirable is a form of solution to the problem which allows us, as psycl~ologists,to employ methodological determinism, as an

, heuristic postulate in naturalistic empirical psychology. But a way forward is needed ' which does not, at the same time, result in a conceptual slide such that metl~odological CHAPTER 7 231.

determinism results in our adopting a view of human beings which derives from metaphysical determinism. . Some recent conceptual work by psychologists was then considered. What makes ' these approaches interesting is that in different ways each seeks to approach the issue : afresh by going behind the debate to examine aspects of its foundations or conceptual i assumptions. Three specific proposals of this kind were examined; a revised

I conception of time, a revised conception of causation so as to admit reasons, and an i I expanded framework of thought which could include both freedom and determinism. I ' It was concluded that none of these approaches could be counted as wholly success~l 7

in reconciling freedom and determinism. Nor, it was concluded, did they seem to offer I a clear and workable conceptual way ahead for psychology in relation to the issue.

Argument was then brought in support of the proposition that the approach of II Immanuel Kant seems to offer a promising way for psychology to manage the issue. i Whereas many approaches argue the case for free will or determinism a Kantian I approach accommodates our intuition that both sides of the issue are real and I important. It does this by providing a rigorous conceptual justification for both 1 : freedom and determinism. And whereas many approaches seek to express one side in 1 the terms of the other, and as a consequence, critically weaken one side or the other, a 1 Kantian approach provides a conceptually satisfying explanation for the paradoxical nature of the issue which enables both sides to be seen as possessing a solid intellectual warrant. Many approaches adopt a position on the issue which, to varying degrees, affirms

I one standpoint and denies legitimacy to the other. This results in the imposition of I limits and constraints on the way in which human beings are to be viewed and studied. I The benefit of a Kantian approach is that it enables both freedom and determinism to i be adopted as valid approaches to comprehending human phenomena: The nature of , human phenomena can be fully and coherently articulated and explored from both standpoints. A Kantian approach validates the standpoint of freedom without the need for any

I . form of ontological dualism and hence without the need for positing or implying any , CHAPTER 7 232.

3 form of "no go" area for naturalistic psychology. That is, from a determinist point of ' view, human phenomena, including all mental phenomena, can be studied as wholly

, subject to natural causation. Similarly a Kantian approach validates the standpoint of deterrriinism without the need to negate or weaken the substance of our intuitions of self authorship, meaning and responsibility. This approach seemed able to produce a number of specific benefits for psychology in its attempt to manage the issue: c (1) Inclusiveness It provides a comprehensive approach to the study of human phenomena. It does this by providing a rationale for deeming that human beings may validly and profitably be studied from the perspective of determinism and from the perspective of freedom without contradiction. It does this by providing a cogent explanation for the freedoddeterminism paradox. (2) Clarity and order It provides the means to end much of the difficulty and i disputation which the issues had produced in psychology. Simultaneously, it gives recognition to the value of both approaches and affirms the inadequacy of each without the other. (3) Hunzun wellbeing It enables the necessity and value of both standpoints to be recognised and applied to the study and care of human beings. , (4)The unity ofpsychology It produces a new way of thinking about the issue of the ,! ' , unity of psychology. I shall comment further on this later. For now it seems reasonable I to assert that a form of unity after the pattern of physics seems quite unattainable in psychology. For even in the unlikely event that the totality of human thought and : behaviour was able to be subsumed under physical laws of some kind, human beings * would still need to be considered from the standpoint of freedom. Psychology cannot j I ' resemble physics because in a quite crucial way its subject matter is unlike that of physics. This is not a deficiency in psychology as a discipline but a reflection of the

i sui generis nature of human beings. Freedom is not a construct which can only exist I

, while gaps remain in our knowledge. Rather two different forms of inquiry are I required with different methodological assumptions regarding freedom and I determinism.

I These provisional conclusions regarding the merits of a Kantian approach were i CHAPTER 7 233.

then subjected to closer scrutiny. This was done by taking a focussed look at the way 1 in which the freedom/determinism issue has impacted on theory, research, and . practice in psychology and the specific implications a Kantian approach might have

for each. I TJzeory

: A review was undertaken of some of the major theoretical approaches in the history of , modem psychology. As a result it was found that issues and tensions noticed in the philosophical treatment of the issue re-emerge in psychological theorising. The

following conclusions were drawn. 7 I (1) Theories constructed from the point of view of either a determinist or a libertarian ; assumption are valuable but are by themselves inadequate. Paradoxically each perspective excludes the other, yet each seems to require the other. I I (2) The standpoints of freedom and determinism are truly incommensurate and cannot , 1 be successfully blended or harmonised. Attempts in this direction seem to lead to the weakening of one or both of the perspectives. (3) It is impossible in principle to construct a single, comprehensive theory of the person. This is because any theory must have as one of its conceptual starting points

I an assumption regarding freedom/determinism. Because the standpoints of freedom/determinism cannot be successfully coalesced, and because both standpoints are, from a Kantian perspective, valid, it follows that no single theory can encapsulate the experience of what it is to be a person actively engaged with hisher world. (4) Psychology would do well to recognise the need to approach theory building from the two valid but incommensurate starting points of freedom and determinism. Theories from both perspectives can be valid and useful but the range of convenience a (Kelly 1991) of all theories is limited a priori by the starting point they adopt on the freedom/determinism issue. As a way of illustrating this position, we might consider the thought "I'll make a note". From the determinist perspective this thought may be regarded as wholly

caused. A determinist account would also need to consider the causes of the thought : and how, if at all, the thought is related to any subsequent action. If thoughts are ' viewed as the immediate cause of action, as they are in cognitive psychology for I CHAPTER 7 234.

example, some account, presumably a neuro-physiological one, would be required to explain how a mental event was given physical expression - how it brought about a . physical action - in this case writing several words down. The discovery of the causal nexus between the mental and physical worlds would be a significant and valuable I advance in our knowledge of ourselves. The quest for causal explanations belongs to

the deterministic standpoint. From the standpoint of freedom however, the same 1 thought "I'll make a note" could form the subject of a different kind of inquiry. From , the standpoint of freedom the inquiry might well concem the meaning of the note itself. Perhaps the way in which the thought, once jotted down, illuminated or changed , the broader patterns of my understanding. The realm of discourse in which we describe our experience of free action is different from the realm of discourse in which explanatory accounts are given. Research 1 The position of research in psychology was considered from the point of view of a Kantian approach to the freedom/determinism issue. Given the validity and necessity of both standpoints, it would seem desirable if research in psychology could proceed from two starting points. The first adopting deterministic assumptions, and the second the presumption of freedom. Deterministic psychology would resemble the physical

and biological sciences in that it would employ natural determinism as a !

, methodological postulate - allowing for the fact that it may include conceptions of determinism somewhat different from those employed in other natural sciences. The ' second starting point would adopt the methodological presupposition of freedom, or at ' least be compatible with it. It would concem itself with our experience of being-in-

' the-world. Whether this second form of inquiry could be called a "science" depends 1 on how the word is used. It would be a quite different enterprise from natural science. To be valid however it would need to be able to demonstrate that it possessed and 1 applied rigorous objective empirical methodologies. ! . The viability of such a program was assessed, and the following conclusions were reached. (1) It was found to be the case that, on the basis of present understanding of the nature of knowledge and methods of inquiry, natural science does not constitute the only : I CHAPTER 7 235.

valid mode of investigation. Accordingly natural determinism does not seem to : constitute a necessary assumption for valid research as such, however integral it may I be to the paradigm of natural science. (2) Tlie hermeneutic tradition in research, although it does not presuppose a stance on the freedom/determinism issues, was found to be highly congruent with the standpoint of freedom. The concern of hermeneutics with the investigation of meaning led its advocates to conclude that the natural science approach, by itself, is inadequate. When the specific limitations and problems identified by the hermeneutic thinkers in relation to the natural science approach were examined, they were found to be strikingly similar to the areas of concern identified in the philosophical literature in relation to metaphysical determinism. (3) The claim that cognitive psychology, given its concern with meaning, is bridging the explanatiodunderstanding distinction was considered with the fieedom/determinism issue in mind. It was concluded that although natural science approaches can and do benefit fiom the use of hermeneutic methodologies and vice versa, at a deeper level the distinction remains. For many hermeneutic thinkers, the realm of meaning is not considered reducible to causal explanations. Thus in a way, corresponding somewhat to the Kantian dual perspectives on fieedomldeterminism, understanding and explanation, as approaches to research, have different conceptual starting points and cannot be combined. It was conjectured that the understanding/explanation duality in psychological research may in fact constitute an instance of the intelligible/phenomenal distinction identified in the work of Kant. Thus the incommensurate nature of the two standpoints seems to assert itself in the field of research as it does in psychological theory. (4) The hermeneutic tradition, in that it regards the realm of meaning as irreducible to the realm of natural causation, is able to accommodate both the assumption of

freedom and meet requirements for scientific objectivity and rigour. ' (5) By means of an example, the value of hermeneutic inquiry in psychology was 1 illustrated. The phenomenon of a mental "breakdown" may be considered in the terms I t of objective psychiatric criteria. It may also be considered in very different terms, as a ,1 I . crisis of meaning. The benefit of considering the same phenomenon from both i CHAPTER 7 236.

perspectives was established. On the basis of these conclusions it was judged that a Kantian dual standpoint . approach to research is both possible and desirable. The implications of a Kantian approach for the unity of psychology from the point of view of research was then considered. It was concluded that far from being an

. indictment of psychology, a multiplicity of approaches/methodologies, inasmuch as these stem from the freedomldeterminism issue, is a mark of maturity; it a necessary feature of a discipline which aspires to adequately study human existence. Practice It was considered that a Kantian approach to practice would be desirable in enabling practitioners to move between the presuppositions according to the specific needs of clients. The standpoint of freedom would, in a sense, constitute the goal of therapy. For the goal is to return people to the normal living of their lives where freedom, as i we have seen, constitutes the basis of "practical reason". In order to determine how psychologists working in counselling settings do in fact view and manage the issue, an empirical study was undertaken. Instruments were developed to measure beliefs about freedom/determinism, counsellor attributions of

: responsibility to their clients, and counsellor choice of therapeutic methods and techniques. Eighty seven psychologists working as counsellors in the state of Victoria

, participated as subjects in the study. The study produced a number of significant findings. (1) First, it produced evidence in favour of the conclusion that Kant's approach actually accords, in quite a significant way, with everyday thinking. Analysis of freedom and determinism questionnaire items revealed that freedom and determinism appeared as separate factors rather than simply being negatively correlated. This result, which replicates the findings of a previous study, suggests that people in : general, including psychologists, tend to treat freedom and determinism as , independent of each other rather than as polar opposites. In this respect a Kantian approach, in which freedom and determinism may be viewed as separate and valid ways of looking at the world, seems to accord with the way people in fact do manage ! the issue. Thus the adoption of a Kantian perspective has a further merit. It requires CHAPTER 7 237.

nothing more of psychologists than that they go on treating the issue in the way they do already. And it provides an elegant and powerful justification for it. (2) The results support the view that people in general overwhelmingly agree with a libertarian view and tend to disagree with a determinist view. In this regard it was found that counselling psychologists are similar to people in general as far as their j beliefs about freedom and determinism are concerned. 1 (3) Limited relationships were found among beliefs about freedom/detenninism, I , attributions of responsibility to clients, and choice of therapeutic modalities. But

I relationships among them were patchy and at best moderate. In this respect these # , results are similar to those found in other studies which examined the relationships I between freedomldeterminism beliefs and locus of control and attitudes to punishment. (4) Counselling psychologists, for the most part, attribute responsibility to their clients

i for having caused their own problems and for finding solutions to their problems. It was conjectured that this emphasis on a libertarian standpoint by psychologists in the field may be as detrimental as the equally pronounced emphasis of their colleagues in theory and research to deterministic assumptions. It was concluded that . the determinist standpoint is valuable in the explanation and treatment of psychological ill health. A reluctance to adopt it may impoverish treatment. Just as the necessity for the perspective of freedom is required to be accepted among theorists and researchers so the standpoint of determinism would benefit the work of those in the field. A Kantian approach may be able to assist practitioners to use a deterministic ' standpoint. It would enable them to view determinism as a heuristic /therapeutic device; to see its adoption as a matter of method, not necessitating a metaphysical

' commitment. One of the key aspects of the present disunity of psychology as regards ; freedomldeterminism is the tendency for determinism to rule over theory and research I , and freedom over practice. Unity for psychology in relation to freedom/determinism is I reconceived in the following way. It is argued that rather than requiring a final victory ,

I of one standpoint over the other, a more fruitful approach is an acceptance of the need for both standpoints at all levels of the discipline. A unity of this kind would require a : I CHAPTER 7 238.

recognition of the value of the deterministic standpoint at the level of practice and a f

! corresponding willingness by theorists and to recognise the value of an assumption of freedom. This would produce a common approach at all levels of the ' discipline. It contrasts favourably with the present unsatisfactory state of affairs in I which a largely deterministic academic discipline seeks to support and inform an overwhelmingly libertarian practice. j I

; 7.2 Conclusions (1) There is a need for two types of psychology. One needs to operate primarily in ' causal deterministic terms. The other needs to examine human phenomena using notions of intentionality, purpose and responsibility as irreducible. As we have seen there are compelling reasons for both approaches and yet they are antithetical. They cannot be combined within one theoretical or methodological paradigm. Accordingly i , there is a need to reassure both theoreticians and practitioners that the two approaches can be fruitfully entertained without contradiction. I (2) The two disciplines would be complementary and yet in significant respects incommensurate. This would mean the various explanatory strands within psychology, I such as , information processing models, and cognitive behaviourism, being seen as rounded out by theories and methodologies predicated on , an assumption of freedom. This situation can be seen not merely as tolerable but as highly desirable once it is appreciated that an elegant explanation can be given to justify the employment of contradictory assumptions. i (3) Perhaps this is only an interim solution and that eventually some new metaphysic 1 will enable psychology to proceed with a satisfactory unified resolution of the I , antinomy. Certainly the solution I have proposed creates what many will perceive as problems. It produces a discipline which must maintain a double focus, one which

A embodies within itself contradictory theories and the possibility of conflicting research I ' findings. But it is better than the present situation in which various metaphysical i positions contend, in which the value of approaches can be overlooked or minimised

I because of the freedom/determinism assumptions which underlie them. By enabling i I CHAPTER 7 239. '

the value of all presuppositions on the freedom /determinism issue to be seen as potentially fruitful and in particular by enabling us to affirm deterministic explanations without the need for an ultimate metaphysical commitment, the adoption of this.position is a considerable advance on that which presently pertains. I have argued the merits of a Kantian management of the problem not on the grounds that it represents the ideal solution but that it is the best to hand. (4) Psychology could be seen as a discipline in search of a new metaphysics. The movements in some sections of cognitive psychology towards a new conception of determinism may be an early sign of the emergence of this. Although, as we have seen, to date these have not satisfactorily overcome the freedorn/determinism divide. At the moment we appear to lack the metaphysics to do better than adopt a Kantian solution. It remains an open question as to whether we shall ever find ourselves better placed. (5) The ideal solution would seem to enable a holding together of both sides of the antinomy in a way that permitted a single set of assumptions to underpin theory, research and practice. It may be that this is too much to hope for - ever. Certainly, in the meantime, Kant provides us with the conceptual means to justify an open, tolerant and inclusive approach to the study of human beings.

, 7.3 Recommendations Essentially I have only one recommendation wit11 three aspects. It concerns the way ' f in which psychologists are introduced to this issue and the way in which they are 1

encouraged to think about it. I

. . ; (1) Philosophical training for psychologists There is a need to recognise that we do 1 not have the metaphysical wherewithal to unify psychology in the sense of producing 1 a single approach on the freedom1 determinism issue. What we do have is an ability to ' I 1 justify both a determinist and a libertarian approach. Hence disputes which uphold the , I CHAPTER 7

validity of one approach at the expense of the other are futile. Both approaches are , ! i valuable and necessary. Each, on its own, is inadequate. In relation to this issue it is possible to be liberated from the myopia which results from defending an entrenched position. For such changes of outlook to occur in any widespread way, the "philosophy sensitive" nature of psychology needs to be more fully acknowledged. A step in this direction might be the addition of a unit into undergraduate courses. The freedom/ determinism issue should form a significant module in such a course and Kant's approach should be a major element within that segment. The issue will not resolve itself or go away. And it is far too important to be ignored, which is, to a large extent, the present way of things. A proactive approach is needed. (2) Moving beyond the scientist-practitioner model The prevailing scientist- practitioner model has been frequently criticised. Sheehan (1 984) identified the lack of continuity between science and practice as a core problem confronting the profession. More recently Page (1 996) pointed out that such is the present diversity of opinion about the nature of science that the term "scientist" in the expression is virtually devoid of content. John (1997), in a study of practising psychologists, identified a substantial drift away from the traditional scientist-practitioner view and a drift towards the endorsement of a practical knowledge, the suggestion being that actual experience triumphs over the influence of academic formation. John found that for some of his respondents this practical approach eclipses the scientific view whilst for others it augments it - even though conceptually the two views are mutually opposed. John observes that two incommensurate conceptual frames are used alternately according to context. Some striking prima facie links appear between John's findings and those reached here - two epistemic approaches the pure and the practical - the prevalence among practitioners of the practical approach - the ability of some practitioners to move between incommensurate conceptual standpoints. The findings of this thesis seem to throw additional light on the difficulties underlying the notion of scientist-practitioner identified by John and, more generally, on the apparent failure of the model to achieve coherence and stability. CHAPTER 7 241.

In the realm of actual living, the standpoint of freedom is inevitable. Once this is accepted, then the inherent weakness of the model and the need for its modification, become obvious. Counselling involves more than naturalistic scientific knowledge. It includes aesthetic, ethical, and spiritual (meaning of life) elements. As an instance of practical reason, a counselling interview is necessarily a meeting of free rational

1 beings, ends in themselves. It cannot successfully proceed for very long in any other way. The Brickman et al. (1982) medical model, the most "scientific", claimed only one adherent among the sample of counselling psychologists. The scientist- practitioner model seems an admirable way of encapsulating the deterministic standpoint. It clearly fails to do justice to the standpoint of freedom. The tension and I' difficulties which John (1997) and the present study illustrate, point to the need to move beyond it. Rather than persevering with the present model, we would do well to replace it with one which acknowledges this reality. i (3) Freedom and determinism in theory andpractice in psychology Utilising \ methodological determinism does not commit us to metaphysical determinism. Kant has provided us with a resolution which has clear practical benefit to psychology. His approach enables us to transcend the antinomy in order to appropriate the benefits of , both sides to the understanding and care of people. For psychological practice this means that practitioners can and should utilise the knowledge and therapeutic technologies deriving from deterministic approaches as the needs of clients demand. ! With regard to the academic wing of the discipline there is a need for a general recognition of the legitimacy and value of theory and inquiry which proceeds on the

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Please note

The text in this file has been automatically extracted and may contain minor errors. For the original version please consult the paper copy held in the Swinburne Library.

Appendix 1.

Copies of materials used in the empirical study 1. I The freedom and determinism scales Copies of

a. Original pool of 40 items to measure freedom and determinism beliefs 252. I

I b. Letter to accompany pilot questionnaire 255. , i c. Pilot questionnaire used to form the freedomldeterminism scales 256.

; d. Letter to accompany questionnaire materials for psychologists 259. 1

e. Freedomldeterminism beliefs questionnaire administered to psychologists 260. !

i 1.2 Other measures copies of

, a. Helping styles scale b. Counsellor modality preference indicator c. Demographic questions f~,,I The humen imagineii~nbrings genuine ~rrv~Ttyints 'r8t.z w~r-id. -- ~

r. ill- < !.;; & ~5~525f s s msc~~~~jsr~~

(22) Hgmen Seings are 2 2-jystery-

- j2E) "There is ns sgcf: thjna- as fras wj!!. :he rctrnb is 'rndticsb to wish thjs 3~ tkr;i kt. ssme ceuse, and kita4, cacsz is %' determined hy aocther cmse and s;1: 03 beck to in-ri.ini'r2.' f Spi nozsb t.?a)i-. WhetR~rwe a?~it$er:viesnmeno,sl disaster &gens% cn ?fie

Tc,;rs~r;~i ,A r?~rjices we make czl?~- Swinbuscne University of Technology

J : My name is Keith Purdie. I am a Masters by research student in Psychology , at Swinburne University. My supervisors are Associate Professor Ken Heskin and Dr Paul Healy. i f At the moment, I am in the process of developing a questionnaire to be used ',: in my study. The purpose of the questionnaire is to examine the beliefs 1 people have about certain aspects of life. As part of this process of J development, I need to pilot this instrument and to get the responses of a number of people to it so that I can improve its design for the main study. ! 1 ~1,, Would you help me by completing the attached pi!ot questionnaire, please?

I I ,! I do not need to have your name on the questionnaire - it is sufficient for you : simply to complete it (this should take around 5 minutes only) and return it to: , i .- .L I: Ken Heskin, Department of Psychology (Mail box on 10th Floor) or ;1 !!., Keith Purdie, 39 Sackville Street, Kew 31 01. . i ' 1 1 , I would really appreciate your assistance in the pilot study. Thanking you in I 1 advance. i I ; I I ? 1 Keith Purdie I .i. j

Swinburne Telephone 03 819 89i 1 University of Technology Fax 03 819 5454

Hawthorn Campus Address all correspondence to John Street Hawthorn PO Box 218 Hawthorn Victoria Australia V~ctoria3 122 Australia SWNBURNE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY FACULTY OF ARTS I DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY I PERSONAL PHILOSOPHY SCALE FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS PLEASE INDICATE ON A 1-5 SCALE YOUR LEVEL OF AGREEMENTIDISAGREEMENT WHERE:

Strongly disagree = 1 Disagree = 2 Unsure = 3 Agree = 4 Strongly agree = 5

(1) In principle human behaviour could be totally predicted if we had sufficient knowledge of antecedent causes. b8brSd Morality is simply a label used to describe behaviours which accord with society's norms. dbb$id

(3) Human behaviour can never be fully understood without a study of people's intentions and goals. dbbbd

(4) Human beings make real choices. (5) People have potential to create their own lives. bribbd (6) There is nothing new under the sun. bBbBd

(7) No person should ever be held responsible for his I or her own actions. b8bBd I (8) Freedom of choice is an illusion. hbbBd (9) The human imagination brings genuine novelty into the world. bh8bBd I Given the 19th Century, the 20th Century had to happen exactly as it has. bhbbd (11) History is humanity continually reinventing itself. b8b86 257. I am simply the product of my genetic inheritance I and the environmental forces which have acted upon ' Bbbd me. I can step outside my own character. bsib86 A person is a mechanism. bbb86 The success of the natural sciences proves that everything in the universe is caused by preceding natural events. b8$86 Evil people should be punished.

Art has nothing to teach us which science cannot. BbbBd i Human nature has inherent dignity. bhbbb

I People who behave in ways which damage others should be reprogrammed or reconditioned. b8bBd ; Human beings are a mystery. bBbBd ; I If we knew enough we would see that for every I decision we have ever made, we could not have done otherwise under those conditions. bbb86 1

Unconscious processes are much more important in I determining our behaviour than the conscious mind. bbb86 As I look back over my life so far, I realise that everything was determined by factors beyond my I control such as my inherited characteristics and I my childhood upbringing. bbbbd ;

! Our "choice" is predetermined. bBb86 I "Sir, we know our will is free and there's an end on't." bBb8d I 258. . "There is no such thing as free will. The mind is induced to wish this or that by some cause, and that cause is determined by another cause and so on back to infinityu. (Spinoza) b 8 6 $6 No murderer could ever have done otherwise than to commit the deeds he or she did. bbbbd i Art, music and poetry bring genuinely new creations into the world. b86Bd All the genetic and environmental givens of my life are like the artists' paints and brushes -the raw materials out of which I create my being and my history.

Religious questions are meaningful.

Whether we avoid environmental disaster depends on the personal choices we make now. bhbbd It is free will which makes us human.

I Gamblers could stop gambling if they chose. b8bhd , I The result of all effective psychotherapy is to I enhance or restore the freedom and dignity of the client. bBbBd

! The great truth underlying free market economics is that human beings cannot do otherwise than seek their own pleasure. bbbbb 1. Swinburne University of Technology Department of Psychology ~~~~ti~~~~$,f;~~~fj~~~~~$~,~~~$;~~~,g:~jg~$~~$~~~~~,;$~~~~~J~~~~~~~~~$~g~>~$j~~~~~g~~~~~;i'~~#~g;f~~~#~~;@$~~$~~J~$;;fg~~f;~$~~~g~~j$~$~;~~~~~

:h of rlze following statements please indicate on a 1-5 scale your level of agreernent/disagreenzel~t ing the number in the box provided where: Strongly disagree = 1 Disagree = 2 Unszr re = 3 Agree = 4 Strongly agree = 5

Human beings make real choices.

People have the potential to create their own lives.

The human imagination brings genuine novelty into the world.

I I am simply the product of my genetic inheritance and the environmental forces which have acted upon me.

Huinan nature has inherent dignity.

' I People who behave in ways which damage others should be re-programmedlre- conditioned.

If we knew enough we would see that for every decision we have ever made, we could not have done otherwise under those conditions.

As I look back over my life so far, I realise that much of it was determined by factors beyond my control such as my inherited characteristics and my childhood upbringing.

Our choices are not really choices at all but are predetermined.

"There is no such thing as free will. The mind is induced to wish this or that by some cause, and that cause is determined by another cause and so on back to infinity." (Spinoza). I : A murderer could rarely have done otherwise than commit the deeds he or she I Art,music and poetry bring genuinely new creations into the world. . All the genetic and environmental givens of my life are like the artist's paints and I brushes - the raw materials out of which I create my being and my history. 0 Whether we avoid environmental disaster depends on the personal choices we make now.

It is free will which makes us human.

The great truth underlying free market economics is that human beings cannot do otherwise than seek their own pleasure. Swinburne University of Technology Department sf Psychology

aspect of being a professional helper is the view one adopts the responsibility of clients for their own lives.

~oLnsellorsdiffer in their views about the extent to which people are fponsible for creating their own difficulties. Some would say that ey should generally be seen as totally responsible whilst others bild maintain that the causes of people's problems are generally jeyond their control ( or even conscious awareness). illy, helpers differ regarding the exent to which they regard heir clients as responsible for creating and implementing solutions lor their difficulties. Some would maintain that clients have no bgponsibility beyond co-operating with the prescribed treatment. Ithers would see the client as primarily responsible for creating and pplementing the solution. I

illowing for the fact that clientf s circumstances differ widely, dease indicate the extent to which, overall, you would attribute esponsibility to the clients you see for the problems 'they have and br the provision of solutions for those problems. I ' j I b 8 him, CLIrnTS ,: - i'b------2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 bf a: all somewhat totally 'esponsible responsible responsible jor creating their for creating their for creating their koblems problems problems I i

-----2------3------4------5------6 -----7------8------9 ----10-- - ot at all somewhat totally esponsible responsible responsible 3r the for the for the olut ions solutions solutions 'their problems to their problems to their problems S WINBURNE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY Department of Psycholo,g

(~ormse~orModality Preference Indicator

Please indicate the extent to which you make use of both (a) the following broad theoretical pproaches (indicated in capitals) and (b) the associated techniques (indicated below each approach in letters) in your work as a counsellor.

n each case, circle the number that provides the best indication of the level of use you make of each pproach and technique. Ibylle1-e: I 1 - never. 2 = occasionnlly 3 - som etinzes 4 = n good deal 5 = nl~vc~ys

never always PTALT THERAPY 5 se of :-

empty chair technique dream work ......

ERSOLV CENTRED THERAPY I:se of :- eflection of feelings elf disclosure rovision of unconditional warmth t$er......

~x~sTENTIAL.THERAPY

self disclosure SWINBURNE UWVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 263' :i Department of Psychology i

Cou~zsellorModality Preference Indicator continued...... never always . COGNITIVE BEHAVIOUR THERAPY 1 2 3 4 5 use of :-

cognitive restructuring mental rehearsal self statements other......

BEfIA VIOUR THERAPY Iuse of :- [systematic desensitization modelling behaviour rehearsal other...... i PSYCHODYNAMIC THERAPY use of :-

interpretation of symptoms interpretation of transference Iexploration of childhood experiences other......

SYSTEMIC THERAPY Iuse of :- interventions

...... OTHER. . ("cify) ...... other...... (spzcify) ......

~ther...... '$ecify) SWINBURNE UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY Department of Psychology

GENERAL rn0RMATION

Your age in years ......

Your sex ......

Your employment (A) self employed

(B) employed by an organisation Please specify

......

Your n~unberof years of experience as a counsellor ...... Appendix 2.

Statistical output for the empirical study

a. Demographic statistics for the sample of psychologists b. Cross tabulation between attributions of responsibility for problems and solutions c. Factor analysis of the freedom and determinism scales d. Correlations between freedom scale, determinism scale, attributions of responsibility for problems and solutions e. Correlations between freedom scale, determinism scale, attributions of responsibility for problems and solutions and preference for counselling theories f. Correlations between freedom scale, determinism scale, attributions of responsibility for problems and solutions and preference for therapeutic techniques g. Frequency distributions for the individual items of the freedom and determinism scales Valid Vslue Frequency DcrC=------*LC

Total

Std dev 9 . 359 Range 38.000

V21Fd cases Ylssing caes 0 OF RSS FONDEST

Valid Cum Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent

1 3 3 37.9 37.9 37.9 2 5 4 62.2- 62.1 ------__- -______100.0 Total 67 100.0 100.0

Missing cases 0 rm: LM TYPZ OF ZMPLOYMTNT

Valid' CL~ Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Ptrcent

SELF EMPLOYED 1 2 7 31.0 31.4, 31.9 DUSLIC SECTOX 2 2 6 29.9 30.6 62.0 CBUXCH 0RGPNISF.TIONS 3 12 13.8 14.1 76.5 COMMUNITY SETTINGS 4 14 16.1 16.5 92.9 OTHER 5 6 6.9 7.1 100.0 9 2 2.3 Missing ------_- ______Total 8 7 100.0 100.0

Valid czses 8 5 Missing cases 2 OF YELSS AS A COTJNSELLOR

Valid Cum Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Total

8 7 Missing cases 0 RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROBLEMS by SOLRES RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLUTIONS

SOLRES Page 1 of 1 Count

Row Total

of Missing 'Observations: 0 . ?.nalysis number 1 Listwrse deletion of cases with missing -~alues

Extrac=ion 1 for analysis 1, Principal Components Fnalysis (PC)

Variable Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var

FC extracted 2 factors

P~ctorMatrix:

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Faceor 2

Final Statistics:

Variable Cornmunality * Factor Eigenvalue Pct of Var Cum Pct * TtID1 * 1 FWD3 * 2 FF7D 5 * FWD 1 3 * FiD14 * 7dD1 5 * FWD 4 7 FtID 1 6 * Eli3 7 * F37D 8 t FdD9 * DID1 1 *

V.X?.IMF\X rotation 1 for extraction 1 in analysis 1 - Kaiser Normzlization.

~J>?.I?Ln-X converged in 3 iterations.

R,ztatsd Factor Matrix:

Factor 1 Factor 2

-48785 .59673 .66651 .67787 .64738 .79731 - .I3552 -03412 FP-CTO?. ANALYSIS

Factor 1 Faccor 2

-73963 .I9300 .76593 -. 31271 -69174 -.32334 -68451 -. 18821

Factor Transformation Matrix:

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 .72760 - -68601 ' Factor 2 .68 601 .72760 DET LIB C?.ORES SOLRES

PRORES -.1284 .2323 1.0000 -1515 ( 84) ( 85) ( e7) ( 87) F= .244 ?= .032 ?= . P= .I60 . . SOLRES -. 3281 .O456 .I519 1.0000 ( 84) ( 85) ( 87) ( 87) ?= -002 ?= .675 ?= -160 ?= .

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance)

I7 . )1 is printed if a coefficient cannoc be! computed - - Correlation Coefficients

DET

DET

LIB

?T(ORES

SOLRES

aZi.:AVT?I

COGETE

SXISTTH

GSSTTX

DZENT'IH

PSYDYTH

1: (Coefficient (Cases) 2-tailed Significance) : / / I I 1 I, " . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed - - Corrtlaticn Coefficients - - DET L19 PRORZS SOLRES BEHP-VTH COGBTI: SYSTTH .0052 -.2636 .0156 .0035 .07 69 -2052 ( 62) ( 62) ( 62) ( 62) ( 61) ( 60) ! P= -968 P= -038 P= .SO4 P= .978 P= .556 P= .I16 (Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed significance)

I , . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed

EXISTTH GESTTH PCENTTH PSYDYTH

DRORZS .I375 - -0537 .2278 -.0477 ( 59) ( 69) ( 62) ( 62) P= -299 P= .662 P=.075 P= .713 SOLRES -2093 .0537 .3232 -.0436 ( 59) ( 69) ( 62) ( 62) P= -112 P= .5€1 P= -010 P= .736

EXISTTU 1.0000 -2560 .3945 -3455 .2735 ( 59) ( 59) ( 56) ( 55) ( 561 P= . P= .050 P= .003 P= .010 P= .O41 I (Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance)

" . " 1s printed if a coefficient cannot be computed 1 ! Significance) coefficient cannot be computed - Correlation Cotffisienzs - I DET LIB PF.0F.SS SOLRES DET

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) " . " is printed i? a coefficient cannot be computed DET LIB PR3P.ES SOLRES 3ZHPJ1

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) " . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed - - Cor~=$ationCoefficients - -

DET

1 !

SOLRES -1378 .I316 -1813 .I386 .I311 ( 85) ( 86) ( 86) ( 86) ( 84) P= .209 ?= -227 P= -095 P= .203 P= .234 I - - Corrslation Coefficients - -

OTHTB -.1360 - -2722 -. 2995 - .2320 .I966 ( 25) ( 26) ( 26) ( 26) ( 26) P= -517 P= .I78 P= .137 P= .254 P= .336

( (Coefficient / (Canes) / 2.-tailed ~ignificznce) I " . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed . - Correlation Co2fficients - -

COGS 3 EXIST3 GEST1 GEST2 GEST3. OTRTH PCENT 1 I DET -. 0871 .0965 -.0257 -.1302 .3495 ( 84) ( 81) ( 77) ( 82) ( 26) .?= .a31 P= .391 P= .825 P= -244 P= .081 I LIB .0359 ( 85) P= .7n4

P?.OF.ZS .2465 ( 86) P= .022

SOLRZS .2017 ( 86) P= .063

I !: (C~efficient/ (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) 1: . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed . - Correlatiori Coefficients - -

GESTl GZST2 GEST3 OTHTH

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) ! " . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed ficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance)

is print.ed if a cosf ficient cannot be computsd DET

LI9

PRORES

SOLRES

EEEAV1

3 Z F?V2

BZEAV3

COG31

CGGB2

COG33

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance)

11 . ,t is printed if a coefficient cannoc be computed - -

- - Corr=la=ion Coefficients - -

PCENT2 PCZNT3 PSDYl PSYDY2 .7442 .2296 -1313 .0163 ( 83) ( 831 ( 84) ( 79) P= .OOO P= .037 P= .234 P= .887

.2926 .3299 -3626 .I735 ( 95) ( 85) ( 95) ( 80) P= .007 ?= -002 P= .001 P= .124

.I609 .I925 -4818 .3231 ( 85) ( 85) ( 85) ( 80) P= .I41 P= .078 P= .OOO P= -003

.048l .0138 .05 64 .0276 ( 83) ( 83) ( 84) ( 80) P= -666 P= .902 P= -610 P= .808 .0325 -.1169 .3551 -2439 ( 77) ( 76) ( 77) ( 73) P= -779 ?= .315 P= .001 P= .038 .I877 -.0665 .I725 .0262 ( 83) ( 82) ( 82) ( 77) P= -089 P= .553 P= .I21 P= .921 - .0521 .2842 .0298 .23sr ( 26) ( 26) ( 26) ( 251 P= -801 P= .I59 3= ,885 P= .257 .I378 .2368 .07 32 -.0413 ( 86) ( 85) ( 86) ( 81) P= -206 P= .028 P= .SO3 P= .714 1.0000 .I806 -.0213 -.0511 ( 56) ( 85) ( 85) ( 80) I?= . P= .098 P= .847 P= .653 -1806 1.0000 -.0491 -.0475 ( 85) ( 86) ( 85) ( 80) P= -098 P= . P= .655 P= -676

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) . is prlnted if a coefficient cannot be computed . - Correlation Coefficients - -

PCENT3 PSDYl PSYDY2 PS'IDY 3

(Cotff Fcient / (Cases) / 2-taiied Significance)

I, . ,I 1s printed if a coefficient cannot be computed - - Correlation Csefficitnts - -

DET

LIB

PRORES

SOLRES

9 z KRV 1

a~i.:.l-v2

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) " . " is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed - - Correlation Cctfficients - -

OWTH

?CENT1 - - Correlation Coefficients - -

SYST3

PSDY 1 .2054 .2980 ( 85) ( 85) P= -059 P= .006

.0798 ( 80) P= .482

-0579 ( 85) P= .373

.5326 ( 82) P= .ooo SYST2 1.0000 .5464 ( 85) ( 85) P= . P= .ooo SYST3 .5464 1.0000 ( 85) ( e5) P= .ooo P= .

(Coefficient / (Cases) / 2-tailed Significance) coefficient cannot be computed Valid Cm Value Frequency Percent Perctnt 2~rctnt

DISP.GREE 2 1 1.1 1.2 1.2 UNSURE 3 6 6.9 7.0 8.1 AGREE 4 41 47.1 47.7 55.8 STRONGLY AGREE 5 39 43.7 44.2 100.0 9 1 1.1 Missing ------Total 87 100.0 100.0

Valid cases 8 6 Missing cases 1

m3The human imagination brings genuine novelty into the world

Valid Cum Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percenc

ur.sure 3 4 4.6 4.6 4.6 agree 4 3 7 42.5 42.5 47.1 scrongly agree 5 46 52.9 52.9 100.0 ------Total 8 7 100.0 100.0

Valid cases 87 . Missing cases 0 :,,~4 I am simply the product of m17 gznscis inheritance and the environmancal forces which have asted upon rnt I -- Valid Cm Value firq.xncy Ptrrent Pzrcent Psrcsnt

STRONGLY DISP-GRZE 1 26.7 26.7 DISP-GREE 2 54.7 81.4 UNSURZ 3 5.8 87.2 P.GREZ a 9 -3 96.5 STRONGLY P-GREE 5 3.5 100.0 9 Missing ------Total 100.0 I Valid cases 86 Missing cases 1 27DS Human nature has inter2nt dignity

Valid Cum Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent I srrongly disagree disagree unsure agree scrongly agree ------Total 87 100.0 100.0 295.

~f we knew enough we would s~?chat fsr every decision we have ever made, we could not have done otherwise under those conditions

Valid Cum I ~alueLabel Value Frequency Perctnt Percent Percent i

1 strongly disagree 1 12 13.8 14.0 14.0 i 2 4 6 52.9 53.5 67.4 I 3 13 14.9 15.1 82.6 4 13 14.4 15.1 97.7 \ strongly agree 5 2 2.3 2.3 100.0 ! 9 1 1.1 Missing ------I Total 87 100.0 100.0 II Valid cases 8 6 Missing cases 1 i 1 ____---_----_-_-_------I \ 3iD8 P.s I look back over my lifz so far, I realise that much of it was I determined by factors beyond my control such 2s my inherited characteristiss and my childh i

Valid Cum 1i Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent 1 scrongly disagree 1 6 6.9 6.9 6.9 I 2 3 9 44.8 44.8 51.7 3 15 17.2 17.2 69.0 II 4 2 5 28.7 28.7 97.7 strongly agree 5 2 2.3 2.3 100.0 ------Total 8 7 100.0 100.0

8 7 Missing cases 0 I -.~. . . ~ . ~ -- -- . .- . -

-u -- - Our choices are noc really chsices at ail but predetermined

Valid Cum Vzlue Label Value Fr2qutncy 2ercsnt Percent Percezt

strongly disagree 1 3 5 40.2 . clsagree. 2 4 1 47.1 unsure 3 8 5.2 agree 4 2 2.3 strongly agree 5 1 1.1 ------Total 8 7 101).0

I Valid cases 8 7 Missing cases 0

nlD11 A murderer could rarely have done otherwise than commit the deeds he or she did

Valid Cum Value Label Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent

szrcngly disagree 1 a 3 45. a 50.0 so.o disagree= 2 3 8 43.7 44.2 54.2 unsure 3 5 5.7 5.9 100.0 9 1 1.1 Fissing ------Total 8 7 100.0 100.0

Valid cases 8 6 Mlssrng cases 1 r,E13 All the grnet~cand envirormentai givens cf my life are likt the artist's paints and brushes - the raw materials OCt of whish I creztt my being and my histor

I Valid C un Valuf Frequency Ftrsent Perctnt P~rcfnc

s~ronglydisagreo 1 1.2 1.2 disagree 2 4.7 5.8 unsure 3 8.1 14.0 agree 4 57.0 70.9 scrongly agree 5 29.1 100.0 9 Missing ------Total 100.0

Valid cases 3 6 Missing cases 1

ma14 Whether we avoid enviro~mentaldisaster depends on the personal choices we make now

Valid Cum ,Valuz Label Value Frequency Percent Percsnt Percenr

'strongly disagreo 2.3 2.3 disagree 12.8 15.1 'J?lSure 15.1 30.2 agree 53.5 83.7 scrsngly agree 16.3 100.0 Missing ------Total 100.0

Missing czses r3JD15 It is frse will which mhkes us liuman

Valid C urn Value Label Value Frrquenlzy Perc.;r.c Percent Pezcent

STXONGLY DIS.E-GXEE 1 1.1 1.2 1.2 DISAGREE 2 13.8 14.0 15.1 UNSURS 3 21.8 22.1 37.2 3.C-XEE 4 35.1 34.5 -10.7 - STXONGLY AGREE 5 23.0 23.3 100.0 4 1.1 Missing - .------___ Total 100.0 100.0

Valid caszs 8 9' Missing caszs 1

D7D16 The great truth underlying free market economics is that hman beings cannot do otherwisz than seek their own pleasure

Valid C uin Value Label Value F~equency Percent Percenc Psrcenc strongly disagree 1 13 14.9 15.3 15.3 disagree 2 3 6 4i.4 42.4 57.6 unsure 3 2 3 26.4 27.1 84.7 agree 4 11 12.6 12.9 S7.6 stzongly agree 5 2 2.3 2.4 100.0 9 2 2.3 Missi~g ------__-____ Total 87 100.0 100.0 .. valid cases a 5 Missing cases 3- Appendix 3.

Data files a. Data file for freedom and determinism scales construction b. Data file for sample of counselling psychologists / id 1 age 1 sex 1 ernploy i ysouns j fwd1 j fwd2 1 fwd3 I fwd4 j fwd3 i fwd6 fwd7 j 14 1 4j 51 51 II I 4; 1 1 ! I 251 31 41 4j 2 ! 4 1 4l 3l 1 / 51 41 41 11 51 21 I! 71 4i 41 41 21 3 31 3;

31 41 41 41 2/ 41 31 2

161 51 51 41 l/ 41

101 51 41 51 11 5) 21 2 4 4i 41 41 21 41 21 251 5/ 5 5 2 5 1 21

101 51 4 5; 21 41 2l 2i 12 / 5 / 41 2 4 2 21 121 41 51 51 21 51 51 21

5

191 31 31 51 21 51 31 31

15 41 41 41 11 21 41 21 61 51 41 51I 21 31 I/ 11 lol 2i 41 51 11 5i 2i li 51 41 41 41 51 51 41 2

I 10 4 41 41 2j 4l 21 31 301 51 41 41 ll 4! 2l 101 31 41 41 21 31 21 2

41 51 51 51 21 21 21 2

51 51 51 4j 91 41 21 21

I6l 4l 4/ 41 2/ 41 3l 21 11 111 4/ 51 4/ 11 31 21 21 I 101 4 i 201 51 41 51 21 51 4i 4 1 I I I 4, 51 51 51 4/ 1 21 31I 1 241 51 51 5;I 51 21 2 11 I I 18 4 4: 51 21 3 / I I ll 21 I 15 4; 51 21 4/ 3 ! i ! 21 I 4 12 ; 4 I 1 4 I I j 5/ 2/ i 21 4i I fwd8 1 fwd9 / fwd10 j fwd1I j fwd1 2 I fwd13 fwd14 i fwd15 ( fwd16 j prores I I I I 2i 1 /' i I 1 5! 41 / 1 I 7 1 I I 1 2[ 21 41 2/ 21 ! 5 I 3l 2j 1 3l 21 I I I/ I! 51 41 51 51 I 51 41 21 31I 3 1 i 4 I 1 3l 2l 3iI 5 I 4/ 4/ 4I 6 51 31 21 11 lj 4 / 6 11 1 / 21 I( 41 41I 5 / 5\ 3\ 7 7) 4/ / 21 51 3I 4/ 4 / 1 2 8I 41 2I 2/ 4! 3I I( 5 g1 2/ I 1 I[ 2) 51 41 41 51 3i 7 i 101 3 1 I ! 11 21 41! 4/ 41 41 21 7j 21 21 2l 2l 4 1 41 4/ 4~ 4i I i 12/ ll 2l l~ I 41 41 I 4 1 2 1 5 131 I\ 2 I 2l I 11 51 3l 4l 4/ 3 I 3j I 161 21 31 31 11 51 41 41 31 ! 1 ijj 11 I) I 5/ 4/ 3I 4I 21 / 161 21 1 / 11 I/ 51 31 41 ! I I 5 / 17i 31 I I I/ 11 51 51 21 i I ! 13i 41 21 3l 21 5l 5l 2/ 2! 3( 4 151 3/ 21 2) 2j 4l 4i 41 4~ 2 6 1 20 4' 31 21 41 7 I 11 / dl 31 I 2 2 4 4 1211 2 2 4 4! 21 81 I221 41 21 2) 31 41 51 41 2~ 4~ 6

I 23 / 4! 21 41 41 4 41 31 6 221 41 21 21 I 41 41 4i 5l 91 I 23 ( I I 11 41 41 41 4l 21 7 5 1 4 31 8 4 ( 1 2l ! / 27 1 51 2i 3~ 4 5 11 i I 8 4 21 1 I ! I 1 5j 41 4! 5 1 ! 6 1 29 / 41 21 2 / 7 j I I 51 5! 31 i I 30 I 1i 11 2 / 1 51 41 4: lL I i 5 1 1 I I I !311 21 4 1 5, 4 1 8 / I1 I 4 1 / I j I i32 1 1 1 2 j 2/ 4! 2 I 3 1I / / 5i '331 3! 31 5 5 Ii 7 ! I / 1 1 i / /

I I I cogbl I cogb2 / sogb3 1 cogb4 1 bahavth 1 behsvi 1 bchav2 ( behav3 i behsv4 1 1 1 I 11 3 ! 4 / 41 9i 1 / 21 3~ 9 1 2 3 1 I1 9! I ! i I! / / I 31 31 41 31 4 1 ! 4 j I 1 I I 3 11 41 01 21 41 3 jI i i / 5 4 4' 1 4 91 i 1 1 I I1 I 6~ 4~ 5 51 91 j!I / I 5 I 9/ 2 71 2l 11 91 / 3 1 / I I 9 SI 91 91 9 I I I 3 I 4 I 9 I 9 9 1 3 1 31 3! 1 ! 21 ! I 101 31 31 31 PI 4 1 / 4 I 9 I ,I1 1 4i 3~ 4~ 9i 4 I I 21 31 I

l2 51 51 51 9 3 I1 I I i I I 1 '3 / I 2l ! I 1 2 1 1 1 31 21 2 g I 31 1 I1 / g I I 15 1 5 I 5 I 51 5/ I / I I 3 15 1 / 2 / ~1 9i 91 9 1 9 1 9 I -I' I 41 41 3l I I I 31 i 9 1181 21 21 41 21 I 1 I 41 I I 19 I 41 4i 41 4l 4 I 4 l 4 I 2G 2 I 2l II I 1 1 1 1 , 21 !3 51 I I 4 I 4 I 41 9 I 221 11 9 11 I I 9 23 1 4 4l 9 9 2 Cl I 9 4 I gl I I 2E 1 3 I 31 3l 91 91 11 / 1 9 2i1 41 41 41 91 I / 1 I 9 I 261 1 II 2l 21 91 2 1 I 21 1 g 1 I 271 2 2l 2/ / I I I 1 91 2 8 41 41 31 91 9 1 4! 4 1 4 9 29 1 I 1 2~ 9~ 2 i 2 !I $1 / 9 jI ZI I , 30 1 I 1 ! 11 I/ 1 I 1 1 I / l131! I I 2 I 31 91 I; I) / 'II 9 i i I , 32 / 31 31 3! / 3~ 1 91i 9 i / II331 4 1 9 4 I 1 3i I 3 I I \ 1-5 I

i I [ ryst4 / ofhth I othl / oth2 I ofh3 i oth4 / lib / det i 1 id / age 1 sex 1 employ ycouns 1 fwd1 1 fwd2 / fwd3 / fwd4 I fwd5 I fwd6 / fwd7 i 34 1 34 ! 52 / 1 I 35 35 1 j 1 ( 36 36 1 / 1 55 / 371371 461 1) I 15) 51 51 51 2\ 51 91 11

I solres 1 aestth / gestl / gost2 / gert3 1 gest4 I pcentth I pcentl 1 pcent2 / 3C I 7 I 2I 2! l/ 2/ / 41 I/ 35 1 I I I\ I I/ I/ I 5i 3! 36 / 7 I 11 li 9i 4 I I ! I 37 1 9 1 11 (I 3: 91 41 4 ! 4 38 / I 2l 2iI 2/ 3! I/ 4l I 2 8 I 91 41 2 I! 2 1 39 I I 41 91 I 2 40 1 9 I 91 2/ I\ I\I / 9 1 41 1 41 I 1 II 11 II 11 9I 4 i 2 42 1 I 3 1 ! 3 31 91 I 5! I 43 / I 1 / I 21 I1 I i 3 2 44 / i 21 21 31 41 9: 1 4 45 1 9 3~ 91 9 5 3 I 1 41 3 I 9 46 I 1 3/ 4I 9 1 9 I / 4 47 1 9 1 91 2l 11 11 I 9 1 41 2 48 1 I i I 21 41 1 51 3- 49 1 1 I 3 3 1 21 21 2! 3 I 2 1 3I io-1 I I / 91 9 9 I I 4 1 9 I I 51 2 21 1 5 I 9I I I I 41 1 2 -52 / I I i 53 ) 8 2 2 2 3 3 ! 4 I 4 l 54 I 3 I 8/ 2 / 21 21 91 9 51 2 5 5 2 5 2 / 3/ 4/ 2 9 I 3 I 5E / 2/ 21 I 11 91 / 1 4 57 I 1 21 31 31 3! 91 I 41 2 sa i 9 4 - I 11 91 I / I i 59 1 8 9 1 3l I 4 1 1 2 60 / 81 4~ I 2~ 31 4 I 3 61 I 1 2 1 2 1 9i 21 1 9 1 / 2 ! 62 j 81 I/ 3 1 ! 21 31 i ! 2i I 63 1 2' 1' 2 / i I 2l 2I I I 3 li 64 I 8 / 9 1 i 11 I/ 2: 1 I ; i I I 651 I ! 31 2 I1 1 g I s 1I 5/ 3 I I 66 ' j 3 1 1 5 2 9 I I I Ii / 5 I

I 1 syst4 I othth I othl oth2 / oth3 / oih4 1 lib det I I 24.00 11.00 34 9 . j ( i 1 / I i 27.00 1 12.00 / 20.001 17.00 36 1 9 E 91 9 . .I / 41 21 . 28.00 9.00 37 91 41 1 . 1 1 / 25.00 I 13.00 1 39 I 9 1 91 41 9 I .i . i 26.00 1 18.00 I

I I psent3 1 pceni4 1 existth 1 exist1 I exist2 1 exist3 I exist4 1 cogbth i' I 4' 67 j 2j 1 i ! 4 I 4; 3 I1 4 / 6 8 i 1 I 3 I ! I l 69 1 3 i 9 1 9 1 2 I 2 I 2 I 9 ! 9 I / cogbl 1 cogb2 1 sogb3 cogb4 I behavth behavl behav2 / behav3 behav4 1 1 1 I I I I I 67 1 31 . 41 4 r 3 / 3 I 3 j 2 I 1 I ! I 68 / 11 I/ 1 g! 1 I I i I 1 9 / 4 4 1 9 69 I 41 41 41 9 I 9 4 1 1 I I 70 1 2 9 / 21 21 i ! I I '1 71 4 4 2 3 1 9 1 5 j 9 I ! / I 72 41 I 31 I / 41 / I I I 4 1 91 73 j 4'I ! 21 41 21 1 I i I 9 741 31 31 41 91 1 I 2 I 9 75 j 31 / 4 I 9l 31 21 ! 4i / I 751 31 21 1 I 1 1 i I I I ! 77 1 5 2 I I 41 41 1 1 I I I 91 781 31 21 21 3: 4 / ! ! 31 9 / 73 j 41 41 41 / I 1 i 4 1 I i 2 8n I 3 1I 31 31 91 9 I I I / 9 all 51 51 5/ 9 I 4 I 41 / g 821 31 31 3 1 9 I I / 3 I 2/ 9 1 831 41 41 4l 91 1 1 i 1 9 EL 1 4i 4i 91 9 1 ! 1 1 9 85~ 4~ 4 4l gi ! 1 21 i 9 1 86 1 9 1 I 3~ 21 2~ 91 I I 9 31 31 I ! 2 1 3l 1 9 / psydyth psdyl psydy2 psydy3 PSY~Y~ systth systl syst2 syst3 i i 1 I 1 1 67 1 3 j 21 41 1 I 31 4 I j 3 i I I I 68 1 3 4 1 3 1 2 / 1 1 9 I I 1 59 ( 91 2 2 3 1 I / / I ! j 11 Ij 2 / 70 1 9 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 9 1 9 1 2 1 4 1 4 1 1 syrt4 1 othfh / oth1 / oth2 / oth3. / oth4 / lib det I

I fwd15 fwd16 dataset lib det ,1 1 1 i ( I 1 1 4 / 31 ; 24.00 1 21.00 1

I fwd15 fwd1 6 datsret lib det I I / 1 / / 34 . 26.00 10.00 / 1 1 1 1 I/ 35 2 2 I 18.00 j 16.00 1 / I 36 1 / I . i 19.00 i 18.00 1 I I 4 2 37 / / / 1 25.00 1 10.00 I 38 I 4! / 1 25.00 1 13.00 1 39 I 4~ 3 I . i 20.00 I I 1 . I 40 1 I 24.00 ) 12.00 / 4! 21 I I I 41 1 / 25.00 9.00 1 5 I I / I 42 1 5~ 21 ( I 24.00 / 9.00 1 43 1 5 28.00 8.00 / 3 1 .I / 44 ' 4 1 4 . / 24.00 1 16.00 -I I I 1 I

( fwd15 1 fwd16 1 dataset 1 lib 1 def / I 67 j / 3 I 28.00 1 23-00 / 68i I 2 / I 29.00 I1 8.00 I I I I I i 69 i 4 I . 1 24.00 1 20.00 / I I , 70 i 2 1 21.00 1 13.00 j I I i 71 20.00 13.00 1 / i . I / I 72 I 22.00 1 12.00 4 I 2 I i I I 1 73 5 I 4 1 28.00 18.00 i , I I i 1 I I 74 1 26.00 I 6.00 / I i ! I I 75 / 28.00 14.00 / , I 51 21 . I I' 1 21.00 j 12.00 1 76 I I 2 1 ' I 77 1 4 1 I 24.00 1 15.00 4 I I ' I / I I 78 1 2 16.00 / 13.00 1 -- 4 I