Number 20 - Spring 2013
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Beaneyanalyticphil Historyphil.Pdf
King’s Research Portal DOI: 10.1007/978-1-137-30487-2 Document Version Peer reviewed version Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Beaney, M. (2013). Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy: The Development of the Idea of Rational Reconstruction . In E. Reck (Ed.), The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy (1 ed., pp. 231–260). (History of Analytic Philosophy). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-30487-2 Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. -
PAUL KURTZ in MEMORIAM Paul Kurtz, Philosopher, Humanist Leader, and Founder of the Modern Skeptical Movement, Dies at Eighty-Six TOM FLYNN
Jan Feb 13 2_SI new design masters 11/29/12 11:26 AM Page 5 [ PAUL KURTZ IN MEMORIAM Paul Kurtz, Philosopher, Humanist Leader, and Founder of the Modern Skeptical Movement, Dies at Eighty-Six TOM FLYNN Paul Kurtz, founder and longtime chair At NYU Kurtz studied philosophy of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry, under Sidney Hook, who had himself the Council for Secular Humanism, and been a protégé of the pragmatist philoso- the Center for Inquiry, died at the age pher John Dewey. The philosophy of of eighty-six on October 20, 2012. He Dewey and Hook, arguably the greatest was one of the most influential figures American thinkers in the humanist tra- in the humanist and skeptical move- dition, would deeply in fluence Kurtz’s ments from the late 1960s through the thought and activism. Kurtz graduated first decade of the twenty-first century. from NYU in 1948 and earned his PhD Among his best-known creations are in philosophy at Columbia University in the skeptics’ magazine SKEPTICAL IN- 1952. QUIRER, the secular humanist magazine Free Inquiry, and the independent pub- Academic Career lisher Prometheus Books. Kurtz taught philosophy at Trinity Col- Jonathan Kurtz, Paul’s son, told SI that lege from 1952 to 1959. He joined the his father had a “‘joyous’ last day, joking, faculty at Union College from 1961 to laughing, etc. He then died suddenly to- 1965; during this period he was also a ward bedtime. There was no suffering.” A visiting lecturer at the New School for joint CFI/CSI/CSH statement marked Social Research. -
A Traditionalist's Response to the Falāsifa
The Virtuous Son of the Rational: A Traditionalist’s Response to the Falsifa (Conference Paper for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Fordham University, Oct. 14–16, 2005) Nahyan Fancy University of Notre Dame Dimitri Gutas has recently made a strong case for considering the three centuries after Ibn Sn (d. 1037, lat. Avicenna) as the “Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy.”1 He argues that the “originality and depth of philosophical thought” and the “diffusion of philosophical work and influence on society in general” during this period far surpassed that of earlier and later periods.2 He traces the deep penetration of falsafa3 into Islamic intellectual life to the towering figure of Ibn Sn himself, who, by engaging with the religious and theological concerns and discussions of his day, made falsafa relevant for all subsequent discussions on philosophical and theological topics.4 Recent work by Robert Wisnovsky and Ayman Shihadeh has substantiated Gutas’s claim by further illuminating how much Ibn Sn was influenced by and, in turn, influenced subsequent theological discussions in kalm5 and other religious circles.6 What is abundantly clear from these studies is that thirteenth century philosophical and theological discussions had to contend with Ibn Sn’s sophisticated philosophical system, for it rationally defended and interpreted religious doctrines and 1 Dimitri Gutas, “The Heritage of Avicenna: The Golden Age of Arabic Philosophy, 1000–ca. 1350,” in Avicenna and His Heritage: Acts of the International Colloquium, Leuven-Louvain-La-Neuve, September 8–September 11, 1999, ed. Jules Janssens and Daniel De Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), pp. 81–97. -
Affect Vs. Emotion
www.thecine-files.com Affect Vs. Emotion Steven Shaviro Affect theorists tend to distinguish between affect and emotion. I will start with the latter, because it is easier to explain. Emotions are personal experiences or states, like anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise: these are the six basic emotions catalogued by the psychologist Paul Ekman (2012), though we may well dispute his claims that this list is either exhaustive, or invariant across cultures.1 There are also more complex emotions, like humiliation, contempt, relief, jealousy, exhaustion, and so on; it is unclear whether these can be broken down into combinations of the more basic ones, or whether more specific cultural contexts need to be involved. It also isn’t easy to delineate the boundary between emotions and moods (which might include such conditions as melancholy, despair, and contentment). Presumably emotions are acute and momentary, while moods are longer-lasting and more stable, providing a general background to our more immediate experiences. But in spite of all these difficulties, we are generally able to recognize emotions in ourselves and others. Indeed, emotions are always attached to subjects or selves. They are conditions that come over us, or in which we find ourselves. They are states of mind that we experience directly. They tend to color and inflect—or even set the conditions for—nearly all of our other perceptions and actions. Cognitivists and evolutionary psychiatrists understand emotions largely in functional terms. Emotions, they tell us, are shortcuts which aid us in making judgments necessary to our survival. If something tastes disgusting, I immediately spit it out; I might well die if I only rejected a given piece of food after having rationally determined that it was poisonous. -
The Principles of Psychology: V. 1 PDF Book
THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY: V. 1 PDF, EPUB, EBOOK William James | 696 pages | 01 Dec 1957 | Dover Publications Inc. | 9780486203812 | English | New York, United States The Principles of Psychology: v. 1 PDF Book His style is hard to follow. Please click the button below to reload the page. Viewed this way, reaction and seeking are active components in the service of survival. Philosopher Helmut R. Read it if you must. Career Development Quarterly, Vol. Volume III includes extensive notes, appendixes, textual apparatus, and a general index. Flavell , Ellen M. In the use of the comparative method, James wrote, " instincts of animals are ransacked to throw light on our own Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. Rating details. Mark Davis rated it it was amazing Oct 14, Case in point: Mind Dust from the Soul. He believed that the universe was not static and orderly but ever-changing and chaotic. I do have Volume 2 waiting in my queue and will get to it at some point, not soon though. His works blew a dent in my resolution to read 50 books this year, but with good reason. Elsewhere, he states that we love adulation, we desire to please, and we are ambitions and vain. As someone who has a big interest in psychology, I decided to order this volume and the next using a gift card I received. Error rating book. There are four methods from James' book: stream of consciousness James' most famous psychological metaphor ; emotion later known as the James—Lange theory ; habit human habits are constantly formed to achieve certain results ; and will through James' personal experiences in life. -
Following the Argument Where It Leads
Following The Argument Where It Leads Thomas Kelly Princeton University [email protected] Abstract: Throughout the history of western philosophy, the Socratic injunction to ‘follow the argument where it leads’ has exerted a powerful attraction. But what is it, exactly, to follow the argument where it leads? I explore this intellectual ideal and offer a modest proposal as to how we should understand it. On my proposal, following the argument where it leaves involves a kind of modalized reasonableness. I then consider the relationship between the ideal and common sense or 'Moorean' responses to revisionary philosophical theorizing. 1. Introduction Bertrand Russell devoted the thirteenth chapter of his History of Western Philosophy to the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. He concluded his discussion with a rather unflattering assessment: There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better: If he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece or of modern times (1945: 463). The extent to which this is a fair assessment of Aquinas is controversial.1 My purpose in what follows, however, is not to defend Aquinas; nor is it to substantiate the charges that Russell brings against him. -
Making the Premises About Constitutional Meaning Express: the Ewn Originalism and Its Critics Andre Leduc
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law Volume 31 | Issue 1 Article 13 11-1-2016 Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning Express: The ewN Originalism and Its Critics Andre LeDuc Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Andre LeDuc, Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning Express: The New Originalism and Its Critics, 31 BYU J. Pub. L. 111 (2016). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol31/iss1/13 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017 6:51 PM Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning Express: The New Originalism and Its Critics André LeDuc*1 ABSTRACT Perhaps the hottest front in the half-century-old debate over originalism turns on the introduction of semantics, pragmatics, and other techniques from the philosophy of language and linguistic the- ory. While in some ways these arguments simply build on the now familiar distinction between interpretation and construction defended by the New Originalism, the newest of the New Originalists purport to break new ground in the debate. The originalists argue that they have rehabilitated originalism so as to avoid the criticisms that had been leveled against earlier versions, including those leveled against earlier versions of New Originalism. The newest critics argue that the sophisticated tools of linguistic philosophy, when properly ap- plied in their hands, offer new and decisive challenges to originalism, including the newest of the New Originalisms. -
Reconsidering the Theoretical/Practical Divide: the Philosophy of Nishida Kitarō
University of Mississippi eGrove Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 2013 Reconsidering The Theoretical/Practical Divide: The Philosophy Of Nishida Kitarō Lockland Vance Tyler University of Mississippi Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Tyler, Lockland Vance, "Reconsidering The Theoretical/Practical Divide: The Philosophy Of Nishida Kitarō" (2013). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 752. https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/752 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RECONSIDERING THE THEORETICAL/PRACTICAL DIVIDE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF NISHIDA KITARŌ A Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy University of Mississippi by LOCKLAND V. TYLER APRIL 2013 Copyright Lockland V. Tyler 2013 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ABSTRACT Over the years professional philosophy has undergone a number of significant changes. One of these changes corresponds to an increased emphasis on objectivity among philosophers. In light of new discoveries in logic and science, contemporary analytic philosophy seeks to establish the most objective methods and answers possible to advance philosophical progress in an unambiguous way. By doing so, we are able to more precisely analyze concepts, but the increased emphasis on precision has also been accompanied by some negative consequences. These consequences, unfortunately, are much larger and problematic than many may even realize. What we have eventually arrived in at in contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy is a complete repression of humanistic concerns. -
Paul Kurtz, Atheology, and Secular Humanism
Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism The American Humanist Association vol. 21, no. 2 (2013), 111–116 © 2013 Paul Kurtz, Atheology, and Secular Humanism John R. Shook Dr. John Shook is research associate in philosophy and instructor of science education at the University of Buffalo. He has worked for several humanist organizations, including the American Humanist Association and the Center for Inquiry, over the past eight years. Paul Kurtz will be long remembered as the late twentieth century’s pre- eminent philosophical defender of freethinking rationalism and skepticism, the scientific worldview to replace superstition and religion, the healthy ethics of humanism, and democracy’s foundation in secularism. Reason, science, ethics, and civics – Kurtz repeatedly cycled through these affirmative agendas, not only to relegate religion to humanity’s ignorant past, but mainly to indicate the direction of humanity’s better future. The shadow of nihilism or cynicism never dimmed Paul Kurtz’s bright enthusiasm for positive ways to enhance the lives of people everywhere. His many manifestos and editorials along with his full-length books, in concert with his organizations’ agendas and projects, continually sought a forward-looking and comprehensive vision for grappling with the planet’s urgent problems. He was an atheist knocking down superstitions and faiths with his philosophical “atheology” in order to clear the way for humanist plans about more intelligent ways of secular living. Kurtz never left religion in peace, and he surely never rested easy in atheism. He was even more interested in activating and guiding the energies of liberated peoples than he was determined to liberate them in the first place. -
UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Al-Ghazālī and Rasā'il
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles Al-Ghazālī and Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’: Their Influence on His Thought A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Islamic Studies by Abdullah Ozkan 2016 © Copyright by Abdullah Ozkan 2016 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Al-Ghazālī and Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā’: Their Influence on His Thought by Abdullah Ozkan Doctor of Philosophy in Islamic Studies University of California, Los Angeles, 2016 Professor Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, Chair In his Munqidh, al-Ghazālī states that there were four classes of seekers of truth at his time: the theologians, the followers of the doctrine of Ta‘līm, the philosophers, and the Sufis. He depicts himself here as a Sufi who denounces the others, especially philosophy. This image of al-Ghazālī became the major perception of him from the beginning. But this perception changed completely in the twentieth century. The most recent scholarship challenges this image and views him as a kind of scholar who was heavily influenced by philosophy and disseminated its teachings in disguise. However, the concentration is given mostly to the philosophy of Ibn Sīnāwhile searching the source of this influence. While not denying the influence of Ibn Sīnā, this study argues that Rasā’il Ikhwān Ṣafā’ must be taken ii seriously as a major source of philosophical influence on al-Ghazālī’s thought despite the negative remarks he makes about them. It tries to prove its argument first by situating al- Ghazālī’s negative remarks in the political and social conditions of his time and second by comparing his works, especially his Mishkāt al-Anwār, with Rasā’il. -
Here Are Many Heroes of the Skeptical Movement, Past and Present
THE COMMITTEE FOR THE SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION OF CLAIMS OF THE PARANORMAL AT THE CENTER FOR INQUIRY-INTERNATIONA! (ADJACENT TO THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO) • AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION Paul Kurtz, Chairman; professor emeritus of philosophy. State University of New York at Buffalo Barry Karr, Executive Director Joe Nickell, Senior Research Fellow Lee Nisbet, Special Projects Director FELLOWS James E. Alcock,* psychologist. York Univ., Thomas Gilovich, psychologist, Cornell Univ. Dorothy Nelkin, sociologist, New York Univ. Toronto Henry Gordon, magician, columnist, Joe Nickell,* senior research fellow, CSICOP Steve Allen, comedian, author, composer, Toronto Lee Nisbet* philosopher, Medaille College pianist Stephen Jay Gould, Museum of Bill Nye, science educator and television Jerry Andrus, magician and inventor, Comparative Zoology, Harvard Univ. host, Nye Labs Albany, Oregon Susan Haack, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts James E. Oberg, science writer Robert A. Baker, psychologist, Univ. of and Sciences, prof, of philosophy, Loren Pankratz, psychologist Oregon Kentucky University of Miami Stephen Barrett, M.D., psychiatrist, author, C. E. M. Hansel, psychologist Univ. of Wales Health Sciences Univ. consumer advocate, Allentown, Pa. Al Hibbs, scientist. Jet Propulsion Laboratory John Paulos, mathematician. Temple Univ. Barry Beyerstein, * biopsychologist, Simon Douglas Hofstadter, professor of human W. V. Quine, philosopher, Harvard Univ. Fraser Univ., Vancouver, B.C., Canada understanding and cognitive science, Milton Rosenberg, psychologist. Univ. of Irving Biederman, psychologist, Univ. of Indiana Univ. Chicago Southern California Gerald Holton, Mallinckrodt Professor of Wallace Sampson, M.D., clinical professor Susan Blackmore, psychologist, Univ. of the Physics and professor of history of science, of medicine, Stanford Univ. West of England, Bristol Harvard Univ. -
Explored Countless Lab- Oratories, Interviewed a Myriad of Scientists, and Prepared Thousands of News Releases, Feature Articles, Web Sites, and Multimedia Packages
Explaining Research This page intentionally left blank Explaining Research How to Reach Key Audiences to Advance Your Work Dennis Meredith 1 2010 3 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offi ces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2010 by Dennis Meredith Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meredith, Dennis. Explaining research : how to reach key audiences to advance your work / Dennis Meredith. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-973205-0 (pbk.) 1. Communication in science. 2. Research. I. Title. Q223.M399 2010 507.2–dc22 2009031328 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper To my mother, Mary Gurvis Meredith. She gave me the words. This page intentionally left blank You do not really understand something unless you can explain it to your grandmother.