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Applying Military Force for Political Ends : South Africa in ·South-Western Africa: 1987-1988

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Applying Military Force for Political Ends : South Africa in ·South-Western Africa: 1987-1988 APPLYING MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS : SOUTH AFRICA IN ·SOUTH-WESTERN AFRICA: 1987-1988 by ANDREAS GERHARDUS VELTHUIZEN submitted in fulf'tlment of the requirement for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the subject STRATEGIC STUDIES at the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA SUPERVISOR : PROF D F S FOURIE JOINT SUPERVISOR : DR M E MULLER NOVEMBER 1994 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To my study leader Prof Deon Fourie and joint-study leader, Dr Marie Muller, my sincere gratitude for their guidance. To my wife, Sarie, for her general support and assistance : this study would not have been possible without it; and to my children Andre and Anel, who had to do without my attention at times they probably needed it. To the South African National Defence Force for fmancial assistance and other support. To Barbara Bradley who took care of the language. To Dina, Drienie, Anelise, Antoon, Eddie, Leon, Rodney and other colleagues for their support. DEDICATED TO THOSE MEN AND WOMEN WHO SPEND THEIR LIVES IN AN ATTEl\'.IPT TO CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE PEOPLE OF AFRICA. ABSTRACT The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition. The concept of 'inhibitive war', refers to the severe .restraint on the use of military force, resulting from the influences of environmental conditions on political ends, so that the political ends themselves become a restriction on the achievement of military aims. KEY TERMS: Angola; Cold War; Cuba; Military Force; Military Strategy; Namibia; National Security; Military Intervention; SADF; UNITA. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AG ...................Administrator General of Namibia ARMSCOR •••••••• Armaments Corporation of South Mrica CIA •••••••••••••••••• Central Intelligence Agency COIN ••••••••••..••• Counter Insurgency CP••••••••••••••••••• Conservative Party CPSU ••••••••••••••• Communist Party of the Soviet Union DMC ••••........•••• Demilitarized Zone DTA •••••••••••••••.• The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance F APLA •••••••••••••• For~s Armadas Populares de Liberta~o de Angola IDAF •....•••..••••.. International Defence and Aid Fund JMC ••••••••••••••••• Joint Monitoring Commission JMMC ••......••••••Joint Military Monitoring Commission MAOT ••••••••..•••• Mobile Air Operations Team MPLA ••••••••••••••• Movimento Popular para a Liberta~o de Angola NDF ••••••••••••••••• Namibian Defence Force NGK ••••.••••••••... Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reform Church) NP................... National Party PLAN ••••..•••.••••• People's Liberation Army of Namibia RSA ••••••••••••••••. Republic of South Mrica SAAF ••••••••••••••• South Mrican Air Force SADF .......•.•••••• South Mrican Defence Force SANDF ••••••••••••• South Mrican National Defence Force SWA ••••••••••••••.• South West Mrica SW APO .••••••••..• South West African People's Organisation SWAPOL•••••••••. South West Mrican Police SWATF .••••••••••• South West Mrican Territory Force TGNU •••••••••••••• Transitional Government of National Unity UN •••••••••••••••••• United Nations UNA VEM ••••••••• United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNITA •••••••••••.• Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola UNSC •••.......•••• United Nations Security Council UNSG •••••••••••••• United Nations Secretary General UNTAG •••••••••••• United Nations Transition Assistance Group USA ••••••••••••••••• United States of America CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 1.1 Backeround 1 1.1.1 The Origin of South African Involvement in the Conflict in South-Westem Africa 1 1.1.2 Insurgency in Namibia and South African Military Intervention in Angola 4 1.1.3 Unsuccessful Diplomacy and Escalating War (1981-1987) 8 1.1.4 The Final Intervention in Angola 14 1.1.5 Summary 16 1.2 The Problems and Hypotheses 17 1.2.1 Approach to the Study 1.2.2 The Problem 18 1.2.3 Hypotheses 19 1.3 Definition of Main Concepts 19 1.4 Delimitations j 1.5 Reasons for the Research 1.6 Framework 22 1. 7 The Collection and Treatment of Data 23 1.7.1 The Maintenance of Ethical Standards 23 1. 7 .2 Collection Technique 23 1. 7.3 Evaluation of Data 24 1. 7 .4 Interpretation of Data 25 CHAPTER 2 : REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Military Intervention 28 2.2.1 Propositions on Military Intervention and Political Ends 28 2.2.2 Military Intervention and Political Ends in Africa 31 2.2.3 Summary 34 2.3 A Review of Empirical Literature 2.3.1 Anti-Western and Anti-South African Government Literature 36 2.3.2 Pro-South African Literature 38 2.3.4 Compromise Literature 40 2.4 Conclusion 43 CHAPTER 3 : THE POLITICAL ENDS PURSUED BY SOUTH AFRICA REGARDING SOUTH WESTERN AFRICA 3.1 Introduction 44 3.2 Namibia as Focus of National Interests for South Africa 44 3.2.1 Securing South Africa against the 'Total Onslaught' 45 3.2.2 The Promotion of 'Apartheid' School 48 3.2.3 The Establishment of a 'Protective Shield' 50 3.3 Domestic and International Conditions Influencini the Choice of Intermediate Political Ends in 1987 53 3.3.1 The South African Defence Force in 1987 54 3.3.2 Economic Constraints on the Conduct of War 56 3.3.3 Domestic Political Pressures 56 3.3.4 Continued Namibian Resistance to South African Occupation 58 3.3.5 Superpower Co-operation on Regional Issues 59 3.3.6 South African Perceptions of the Situation in Angola 61 3.3.7 The Presence of the Cuban Military Contingent 62 3.4 The Intermediate Political Ends to be Promoted by the Military Intervention in 1987 65 3.4.1 The Official Goals of the South African Government 65 3.4.2 Anti-Apartheid Views on South Africa's Intermediate Political Ends 70 3.4.3 Compromise Views on the Intermediate Political Ends of the South African Government 71 3.5 Summary and Evaluation 73 CHAPTER 4 : THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA: 1987-1988 4.1 Introduction 76 4.2 Events that Gave Rise to the Intervention 76 4.2.1 The Threat 77 4.2.2 Clandestine Operations and the Request by UNITA 79 4.2.3 South Africa's Immediate Aims with Intervening 82 4.3 The Course of the Intervention 82 4.3.1 Command and Control 82 4.3.2 Neutralizing the F APLA Offensive 83 4.3.3 South African Escalation 86 4.3.4 The Cuban Counter-Intervention 88 4.2.5 The Strategic Impasse 90 4.3 Summary and Evaluation 96 CHAYI'ER 5 : CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERVENTION 5.1 Introduction 99 5.2 The Achievement of Immediate Military Aims 99 5.2.1 The Pro-South Mrican View 99 5.2.2 The Alternative View 101 5.2.3 Evaluation 101 5.3 The Compromise on Political Goals 103 5.3.1 Public Opinion in South Mrica 103 5.3.2 The Submission to International Pressure 106 5 .3 .3 Evaluation 109 5.4 Escalation of the Cuban Counter-Intervention 109 5.4.1 Geographical Escalation by Cuba 109 5.4.2 Intensification of the Conflict 111 5.5 The Creation of Secure Conditions 115 5.5.1 Termination of the War 115 5.5.2 Continued Military Conflict in Angola 118 5.5.3 The Guerrilla Threat to Peaceful Elections 119 5.6 The Impact of a New Government in Namibia on South African Interests 123 5.6.1 Strategic Implications 123 5.6.2 The Political Implications 124 5. 7 Summary and Evaluation 126 5. 7 .1 Short Term Results 127 5.7 .2 Long Term Results 128 CHAPTER 6 : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 131 BIBLIOGRAPHY 141 Appendix A : Sketch Map of South-Western Africa and South African Military Intervention in the Cuando Cubango Province of Angola : 1987188 1 CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND South Africa conquered German South West Africa (SWA) during World War I with the newly formed Union Defence Force and governed it in terms of a mandate from the League of Nations after the war. After the disbanding of the League and the formation of the United Nations after World War II the mandate of the League was ended and South Africa was called upon to grant independence to Namibia. The events surrounding the South African claim to Namibia are set out in the following pages as background to this study. 1.1.1 THE ORIGIN OF SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH-WESTERN AFRICA (1914-1956) On 4 August 1914 Great Britain declared war on Germany and on 7 August the Government of the Union of South Africa offered to employ the Defence Force of the Union for any duties entrusted to it. This offer was in response to a cable from Britain and an agreement in 1911 at a conference of Imperial Prime Ministers which provided for the occupation of German territories by British colonies and dominions. On 10 August the Union agreed to seize Swakopmund, Liideritzbucht and the radio stations situated there, as well as objectives in the interior if necessary. The decision to intervene created dissension in Afrikaner ranks but by the 1950's most Afrikaners perceived SW A as an integral part of South Africa and as part of the Afrikaner heritage. Even before the campaign was over General Smuts confirmed that SWA would never be handed back to Germany as Germany was regarded as an undesirable neighbour for South Africa and the occupation of SWA by Germany as detrimental to British interests. 1 General Botha invaded SWA at Keetmanshoop in the second week of February 1915 to reach Windhoek on 20 May 1915. General Smuts took over Liideritzbucht in order to advance to 1Du Pisani, A.
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