DOCSLIB.ORG

Volume 3, Issue 4

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Volume 3, Issue 4 WAR IN ANGOLA Volume 3, Issue 4 27 January 2012 www.warinangola.com THE NEWSLETTER HIGHLIGHTING EVENTS, INFORMATION AND FACTS RELATING TO THE CONFLICT IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) FROM 1975 TO 1989 Operation Packer: 82 Mechanised Brigade March 1988: Cuito Cuanavale, Angola • Supporting elements included: The force for the third attack on the Tumpo area • two troops of 7 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, consisted of 82 SA Brigade and four Unita battal- ions. • six troops of 13 Field Engineer Regiment, and 82 SA Brigade comprised of • five reconnaissance teams of 4 Recce. • two squadrons of tanks from Regiment Presi- dent Steyn, Unita deployed as follows: • an armoured car squadron of Regiment • On the east bank of the Cuito River: Mooirivier, • the 3rd, 4th and 5th Regular Battalions; and • two mechanised infantry battalions - Regiment De La Rey and Regiment Groot Karoo. • the 18th and 118th Semi-Regular Battalions • Two batteries of Regiment Potchefstroom Uni- • On the west bank: versity, one each with G-5s and G-2s; • The 66th and 75th Semi-Regular Battalions • a 120 mm mortar battery of 44 Parachute Brig- Of UNITA’s forces on the east bank, the regular ade; battalions and the 18th Semi-Regular Battalion • a multiple rocket launcher troop of 19 Rocket would work with 82 SA Brigade. The 118th Semi- Regiment. (Continued on page 2) Featured Gallery: The bridge over the River Cuito... Cuban soldier control a Sagger anti- UNITA soldiers on parade—a testi- tank missile mony to their training Inside this issue: Next Week’s Features: • Prelude to the SADF’s participation in the Angolan Training Base Mpupa 2 Civil War: Training base: Serpa Pinto Featured Equipment:The R2M1 anti-personnel mine 3 • Featured Equipment: The POMZ-2 anti-personnel mine Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin Part 28 4 • Operation Packer: The 3rd attack on Operation Packer: The 1st attack on Tumpo Part 1 5 Tumpo Part 2 "WE'VE GOT A RUSSIAN!" Part 3, by Jim Hooper 6 www.sashowcase.com • The English-Afrikaans thing in the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR ARTILLERY SOLDIERS 7 SADF This past week: “Somewhere on the Border…” 9 • Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin Part 29 Last week’s latest topics on the Forums 12 www.warinangola.com Page 2 WAR IN ANGOLA Training Base Mpupa The eighteenth article on Henry Kissinger to inves- about the American af- the prelude to the partici- tigate the requirements terwards at Serpa Pinto. pation of the South Afri- of the FNLA. He was Nothing came of his can Defence Force in the impressed (so he said) promised aid… Angolan Civil War: with the standard of training of the FNLA after Commandant Knoetze On 15 September 1975, only one week. He would had learned that a flood Commandant Breyten- report back favourably. of people were expected bach started training at He explained that the to arrive at the camp UNITA guerillas being trained Mpupa with four instruc- USA was indeed willing during his visit to Mpupa tors. There were 250 to provide weapons, on 15 September 1975. men, and as planned, ammunition, and logisti- This indeed started to divided into a mortar cal support, but not any happen. Within two platoon, a machine gun soldiers because the weeks there were 400 platoon and three rifle USA did not wish to get men at Mpupa, and it platoons. This group involved in another Viet- was foreseen, as included trained and nam-situation. Pedro planned, that a militia Link to this story: half-trained FNLA- promised a lot, amongst and holding forces could http://www.warinangola.com/ supporters, ex-flechas be trained as well. A total Default.aspx?tabid=1272 other things: a thousand and Portuguese. They man-pack weapons com- of 2 000 could be trained were underfed and prising of machineguns, for this purpose, armed poorly equipped with 15 mortars, rocket launch- with Sten sub- rifles of which only two ers as well as logistical machineguns. were serviceable. They supplies for 180 days. “...the USA were therefore com- About half of the FNLA He was well pleased with soldiers at Mpupa were pletely dependent on the the fact that the RSA was indeed RSA for weapons, am- sent on to Serpa Pinto was providing training during the beginning of munition and general and operational planning willing to equipment. October 1975 where to the FNLA, and he another training base provide Some days after the suggested that an Air had been established. A training at Mpupa had Zaire cargo plane be group of 270 remained at weapons, started, Chipenda, Kam- stationed at Rundu, Mpupa. Their machine- buta, and an American, a which could be used for gun and mortar training ammunition, so-called João Pedro, logistical replenishment had reached a satisfac- arrived. The last men- during operations. tory level and the plan and logistical tioned were probably a Although Chipenda did was to deploy them op- member of the CIA oper- erationally early in Octo- support...” not seem to doubt the ating under a nom-de- legitimacy of João ber 1975. They still ur- guerre. He claimed, that Pedro, he could not con- gently needed uniforms he, on the initiative of firm that he truly was CIA and boots though, but President Ford himself, when he was asked this was supplied shortly had been ordered by Dr. afterwards. Operation Packer: 82 Mechanised Brigade www.sashowcase.com (Continued from page 1) the east bank by that to confuse Fapla as to date. the direction of the main Regular Battalion was attack. The tank-heavy deployed on the high The intention was to force centred on Gerhard ground at the Cuito- begin with a first light Louw's two squadrons of Cuanavale confluence to attack by 32 Battalion on Regiment President protect the artillery ob- the Fapla elements Steyn, would then attack server there. south of the Tumpo. 32 the main positions using Battalion would be rein- a north-ern approach 82 SA Brigade's mission forced with elements of route. Unita would simul- was to operate in con- Regiment Groot Karoo. taneously launch probing junction with Unita to This attack and a attacks against the Fapla Training of the FNLA had laid the destroy the Fapla forces 'groundshout' operation positions at Cuito Cua- foundation of the future 32 Battal- east of the Cuito by 20 south of the Anhara ion navale from the north March or drive them off Lipanda were intended and south. Images from “Grensoorlog” series, by Linda de Jager, reproduced with kind permission by MNET www.warinangola.com VOLUME 3, ISSUE 4 Page 3 Featured Equipment: The R2M1 anti-personnel mine The South African R2M1 waterproof booster were SADF's Border War, SA- anti-personnel mine was a available for this purpose. truth.Co.Za, copyright modern, high explosive non- ©Omutumua Oshili - text metallic mine developed to Forty mines and eight con- available under the terms of be safely handled but not tainers, each holding five the Creative Commons easily detectable once laid. boosters, were packed in Licence 2.0 Its low metal content made the standard plastic box. it difficult to detect with nor- mal mine detectors, and its The boosters, which were nutria colouring made it packed separately, were A piece of open ground could difficult to see. inserted when the mine was easily have been sown with anti- laid, and the safety clip was personnel mines, virtually un- It was fired by a pressure- removed immediately be- seen, below the surface, waiting for an unwary victim sensitive direct-acting fore it was finally placed. striker fitted with a 6.5g LZY waterproof detonator and designed primarily for use in anti-personnel minefields. From “South African Arma & It was possible to lay this Armour”, by Helmoed- mine in water streams and Römer Heitman; and rivers up to a depth of 1m. A Specifications “Its Country of Origin: South Africa Diameter: - nutria Weight: 90g (oz) colouring Body Material: Plastic made it Charge: 57gm (oz) RDX/TNT 88:12 difficult Fuse: 3 to 7 kg pressure to see.” The R2M1 anti-personnel mine Downloaded from the SADF's Border War, SAtruth.Co.Za, copyright © Omutumua Oshili - image available under the terms of the Crea- tive Commons Licence 3.0 www.sashowcase.com www.warinangola.com Page 4 WAR IN ANGOLA Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel I.A. Zhdarkin, Part 28 This is the twenty-eighth turbing you? It is possi- mal and I shouldn’t worry part of a 52-part series ble that they may kill the – that I was, after all, taken from “We did not others (he meant the Geronimo. Despite such see it even in Afghanistan. advisors), but not you, reassurances, my balls Memoirs of a participant Geronimo”, he said. My dropped in terror. of the Angolan war (1986- mouth immediately 1988)”, by Lieutenant opened wide. “And what else?” I ex- Colonel Igor Anatolevich claimed. “Nothing. They Zhdarkin “You understand”, I said, know you after all, you that it is in fact not nec- speak Portuguese, you Russian advisors assisting with the planning of operations 1987 essary to kill them”. behave normally with the (photo: © Igor Ignatovich) They simply knew me locals” – and, in fact, I here, they had already “Its fine, if you say they was able somehow to seen me more than won’t kill them, but in any get along with them. once, and they knew that case the fact remains I spoke Portuguese and that you have only 20 That is how to explain: that I was an interpreter. minutes to get out of “Here I am, a so-called “Ah, this is “Geronimo”, here,” was the answer.” so-and-so, I would tell let him go! In principle, them, but you will be- “Well”, I exclaimed, have courteously with “Despite they treated most of the “does that mean that interpreters this way and me”.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • SADF Military Operations
    SADF Military Operations 1975 -1989 Contents 1 List of operations of the South African Border War 1 2 Operation Savannah (Angola) 3 2.1 Background .............................................. 3 2.2 Military intervention .......................................... 4 2.2.1 Support for UNITA and FNLA ................................ 5 2.2.2 Ruacana-Calueque occupation ................................ 5 2.2.3 Task Force Zulu ........................................ 5 2.2.4 Cuban intervention ...................................... 6 2.2.5 South African reinforcements ................................. 6 2.2.6 End of South African advance ................................ 6 2.3 Major battles and incidents ...................................... 6 2.3.1 Battle of Quifangondo .................................... 7 2.3.2 Battle of Ebo ......................................... 7 2.3.3 “Bridge 14” .......................................... 7 2.3.4 Battle of Luso ......................................... 7 2.3.5 Battles involving Battlegroup Zulu in the west ........................ 8 2.3.6 Ambrizete incident ...................................... 8 2.4 Aftermath ............................................... 8 2.5 South African order of battle ..................................... 9 2.6 Association .............................................. 9 2.7 Further reading ............................................ 9 2.8 References ............................................... 9 3 Operation Bruilof 13 3.1 Background .............................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Final Phase of South African Transborder Operations Into Angola: Regiment Mooi River and Operations Modular, Hooper, Packer and Displace (Handbag), 1987-1988
    JOERNAAL/JOURNAL OOSTHUIZEN THE FINAL PHASE OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSBORDER OPERATIONS INTO ANGOLA: REGIMENT MOOI RIVER AND OPERATIONS MODULAR, HOOPER, PACKER AND DISPLACE (HANDBAG), 1987-1988 GJJ Oosthuizen* 1. BACKGROUND Various national and international factors resulted in South African transborder operations in Angola. The retaining of South West Africa (Namibia), which was entrusted as a C-mandate territory to the mandatary South Africa in 1918, and the "communist danger"1 may be presented as the primary reasons for this. The bush war and the involvement of the South African Defence Force (SADF) may be divided into five phases: the beginning of the conflict (1958 to 1966); support by the South African Police (SAP) and the Portuguese (1966 to 1972); escalation of the conflict (1972 to 1976); South West African as well as Angolan pre-emptive operations (1976 to 1983); and the final phase (1983 to 1990).2 The SADF and SAP were involved for the full duration of the bush war, and since 1 August 1980 they were supported by the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF). The South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO, founded in 1960), with the Ovamboland People's Congress (founded in 1958 in Cape Town by Herman Toivo Ja Toivo as an organisation for dock workers) as its precursor, in contrast, had the liberation of South West Africa as objective. In 1962 SWAPO (who in the meantime had established its headquarters in Lusaka) decided to combine the political liberation struggle with a military offensive against the South African forces. For this purpose a military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), was created.3 * Subject Group History, Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education.
    [Show full text]
  • From Soweto to Cuito Cuanavale: Cuba, the War in Angola and the End of Apartheid
    Saney, Isaac Henry (2014) From Soweto to Cuito Cuanavale: Cuba, the war in Angola and the end of Apartheid. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/18258 Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination. From Soweto To Cuito Cuanavale: Cuba, the War in Angola and the End of Apartheid Isaac Henry Saney Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in History 2014 Department of History School of Oriental and African Studies University of London Declaration for PhD thesis I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.
    [Show full text]
  • South African Foreign Relations with Angola
    SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA, 1975 - 1988: A STRUCTURAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE by L.J.D. Devraun Thesis submittedUniversity in fulfilment of Cape of the requirements Town for the degree of Masters of Arts in International Relations in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town Cape Town Republic of South Africa September 1996 ~o:·•;:r.~c-.7".""-.x-·-..,··:;r.·,·,....-·-··c-:-;;-:e:r,.-::=-~ t~ Tht·: f?1·: ·r ... ,... ~{,· ri' ri·. · ·r,.-,.•:-, }.,_."~ !\··2-n ni"·nn ~ ~th~:;;;_·;~!_,:~:) .i::i~:i~·:\>.,.:,f:~>'.:;,~~.~---'_:1 _.·?;:~:~ ~ I or lfl r--·"· C,1,.•/ ';-;,h !,, ·---U ,_.,, .-.,.,.,.,r. ~ ·)~..);".:,.::.· :._-.·-~..,.,..- ;;,,";~,-~·;·t.• :,$>1'~·~-·."f·:--· •n.~w.... ·; ,,'•'•: The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non- commercial research purposes only. Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. University of Cape Town SOUTH AFRICA IN ANGOLA 1975 -1988 Copyright (1996) by L.J.D. Devraun D.D.D. to my Russian forbearers ABSTRACT: There are an enormous number of competing interpretations of South Africa's apartheid era policies both in the region and towards Angola. With South Africa's role in the Angolan civil war as its case study, this paper evaluates the relative utility of certain selected approaches to international relations theory. This paper evaluates the relative utility of system level versus unit level theories to explain the nature of South African involvement in the Angolan conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • The Lessons of the Border War Leopold Scholtz
    318 Scientia Militaria vol 40, no 3, 2012, pp.318-353. doi: 10.5787/40-3-1039 The Lessons of the Border War Leopold Scholtz • Abstract A quarter of a century after the end of the Border War, the SANDF’s institutional memory of the conflict is slowly fading. And yet there are several lessons emanating from the war, which are relevant to the Defence Force. This article attempts to map out some of these lessons. These lessons are as follows. (1) The need for combined arms units such as 61 Mechanised Battalion Group and 4 SAI, being a mix of mechanised infantry, armoured cars, tanks, artillery and support troops on battalion level. (2) The importance of logistic support, something that was not always sufficient during Operations Moduler, Hooper and Packer in 1987–1988. (3) Reserve force units must be adequately retrained when utilised in operations. (4) During the war, there was a gap in the Army’s anti-aircraft capability. This gap has not been rectified since. (5) In order to be able to command the air above a battlefield, an aerial refuelling capability for the SAAF is essential. (6) The Army needs a proper air assault and maritime amphibious capability. (7) When deciding to engage in a warlike operation, avoid the incremental commitment, which characterised both Operation Savannah in 1975 and Moduler in 1988. (8) While the field units fight on the battlefield, do not micromanage things from above. As long as the units keep within the political and operational parameters set by the politicians and generals, let the field commanders exercise their own initiative.
    [Show full text]
  • Applying Military Force for Political Ends : South Africa in ·South-Western Africa: 1987-1988
    APPLYING MILITARY FORCE FOR POLITICAL ENDS : SOUTH AFRICA IN ·SOUTH-WESTERN AFRICA: 1987-1988 by ANDREAS GERHARDUS VELTHUIZEN submitted in fulf'tlment of the requirement for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the subject STRATEGIC STUDIES at the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA SUPERVISOR : PROF D F S FOURIE JOINT SUPERVISOR : DR M E MULLER NOVEMBER 1994 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To my study leader Prof Deon Fourie and joint-study leader, Dr Marie Muller, my sincere gratitude for their guidance. To my wife, Sarie, for her general support and assistance : this study would not have been possible without it; and to my children Andre and Anel, who had to do without my attention at times they probably needed it. To the South African National Defence Force for fmancial assistance and other support. To Barbara Bradley who took care of the language. To Dina, Drienie, Anelise, Antoon, Eddie, Leon, Rodney and other colleagues for their support. DEDICATED TO THOSE MEN AND WOMEN WHO SPEND THEIR LIVES IN AN ATTEl\'.IPT TO CREATE A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE PEOPLE OF AFRICA. ABSTRACT The aim of the research was to consider the relationship of political ends and the use of military force and, using empirical data gathered from South Africa's experience from 1987 to 1988, to consider whether there might be any implications for existing theory. The question that was formulated for research was: What relationship could be distinguished between the South African government's use of military force in Angola and the government's political ends? The conclusion was reached that the relationship of the application of military force by the South African government to the attainment of political ends was one of inhibition.
    [Show full text]
  • Appendix 9C SA Army Unit Histories1
    Appendix 9C SA Army unit histories1 Infantry Infantry School The Infantry School, now at Oudtshoorn, was established in November 1953, after a chequered career dating back to the South African Military School in Bloemfontein, established in 1912. It is the Infantry’s “centre of excellence” and offers a number of infantry-specific courses to regulars and Reservists. Current role: Corps school. Current base: Oudtshoorn Battle honours2: none Motto: Exerce Perfectioni (Strive for excellence) 1 SA Infantry Battalion Established as 1 SA Infantry Training Battalion at Oudtshoorn on January 26, 19513, the unit became part of the infantry corps with its establishment in January 1954. The unit was reconstituted as 1 SA Infantry Battalion in November 1967 and moved to its current base at Tempe4, Bloemfontein, in November 1973. The unit mechanised in 1976 and the first 1 Compiled from personal knowledge, various official publications and Major G Tylden’s The Armed Forces of South Africa, City of Johannesburg Africana Museum Frank Connock Publication No 2, Johannesburg, 1954. Note that there is many a dispute between sources and, in particular, the Reserve regiments, as to seniority. Artillery and air defence unit details also drawn from LTC CJ Nöthling (editor), Ultima Ratio Regum, Artillery History of South Africa, Military Information Bureau, Pretoria, 1987. 2 The custom has been to award, to those units who took part, the right to display the name of a particular battle, campaign or war. Since the 17th century, units of the British and British Commonwealth armed forces, including their forebears of the Empire and the Dominions: ships, Regiments and Air Force squadrons, have been granted this right by authority of the sovereign in order to commemorate meritorious participation in a notable action or campaign.
    [Show full text]
  • Contested Historical Interpretations and the Narrative of the Angolan-South Africa War 1987-1988 - a Military Outcome?”
    “Contested Historical Interpretations and the Narrative of the Angolan-South Africa War 1987-1988 - A military outcome?” by Stephen James Beck Thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of History at Stellenbosch University Supervisor: Prof. Bill Nasson December 2018 1 Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za Declaration By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. December 2018 Copyright © 2018 Stellenbosch University All rights reserved Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za Beck, Stephen, Contested Historical Interpretations and the Narrative of the Angolan-South Africa War 1987-1988 - A military outcome?, Master of Arts (History), January 2018, Univeristy of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, Western Cape. Abstract The end of the 1980s brought abought great changes throughout the world, the end of the Cold War – globally, as well as the end of apartheid in South Africa. For South Africans these two events can be seen in the narratives which surround the Angolan Border/Civil War, as it contained all the elements of a Cold War struggle and is heralded by some as a turning point towards the end of apartheid. The outcomes of this conflict are hotly contested, each side claiming a victory for themselves.
    [Show full text]
  • Evaluating the Final Military Phase of the Border War in South-Eastern Angola 1987 -1988 by Janet Szabo the SABC
    Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 47, Nr 1, 2019. doi: 10.5787/47-1-1266 Evaluating the final military phase of the Border War in south-eastern Angola 1987 -1988 By Janet Szabo The SABC Abstract The assessment of the final military phase of South Africa’s border war in southern Angola from 1987 to 1988 in terms of victory or defeat is not without controversy. The mobile engagements on the Lomba between the South Africans (in support of UNITA) and the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA), saw a clear victory for the SADF when assessed in terms of achievement of objectives, equipment captured and destroyed as well as enemy casualties. South Africa’s offensive manoeuvres on the Chambinga River - particularly regarding the Angolan 16th Brigade as more recent information indicates - were also successful in inflicting significant losses of men and equipment and damaging morale. However, once the SADF switched from mobile warfare – which allowed it to effectively engage the Angolans who had superior numbers – to positional warfare against larger numbers of Angolan and Cuban forces in well-prepared and defended positions at Tumpo opposite Cuito Cuanavale, the picture changed. Tumpo can thus be regarded as a stalemate. South Africa had achieved its objective of preventing UNITA’s annihilation and inflicted sufficient losses on FAPLA. But it had not managed to completely dislodge the Angolan and Cuban forces from the east bank of the Cuito River. Introduction Although 30 years have passed since the final military phase of South Africa’s Border War in south-eastern Angola in 1987 and 1988, the facts are still largely unknown and as a result, frequently misrepresented.
    [Show full text]
  • MILITARY CHRONICLE of SOUTH WEST AFRICA (1915 - 1988) Compiled by Col C.J
    MILITARY CHRONICLE OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA (1915 - 1988) Compiled by Col C.J. Nöthling and published in the South African Defence Force Review 1989 Introduction The acceptance of UNSCR 435/78 (Resolution 435) by the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation (UNO) in September 1978, was the prelude to an independent South West Africa/Namibia (SWA). Notwithstanding the optimistic prospect that SWA would become independent by the end of 1978, the implementation of a settlement plan for the territory was delayed for more than a decade. The signing of a tripartite and bilateral agreement by the United Nations in New York on 22 December 1988, was an important milestone in the constitutional and historical development although considerable obstacles impeded the course of independence for SWA. After these agreements were signed, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, remarked that the heavy losses inflicted by the South African forces on the enemy (the forces of the MPLA government and the Cuban troops) at the Lomba River in Angola (1987) was the turning point which resulted in the tripartite agreement. Mr Botha's statement was a confirmation of previous statements by political leaders and military experts. The Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan unequivocally indicated on several occasions that the military successes of the South African forces in Angola, forced the Cuban government and the MPLA authorities to the conference table. At a wings parade at the Central Flying School (Dunnottar) on 1 December 1988 he remarked as follows: The battles at Lomba River and Cuito Cuanavale forced the Cubans and the Luanda regime to the conference table.
    [Show full text]
  • A3079-D20-001-Jpeg.Pdf
    1 Sarel Theron 1 SAI / 4 SAI / Citizen Force, Regiment de la Rey 13/02/08 Missing Voices Project Interviewed by Mike Cadman TAPE ONE SIDE A Interviewer Tell me a bit about your background. Sarel We had a big family. I’ve got three sisters and one brother. Basically grew up in Phalaborwa. We moved around a lot, Pretoria, then we went to Free State, we stayed there. There I got called up, did my matric there and then got called up. Then I moved to Newcastle, after which I came here. Interviewer Did you move because of your dad’s work? Sarel Yes. Interviewer What did your dad do? Sarel He was a…well he’s still an electrician. He did a lot. Moved all over the place. Interviewer And then you said earlier that your family, your mom’s side was English, so you got brought up sort of half English, half Afrikaans. Sarel No, more Afrikaans because Afrikaners is nou ‘n bietjie van nonsense. They wanted…but anyway, yes…my mom’s family is totally English, came from Rhodesia. Actually my cousin that was in Rhodesia was in the Selous Scouts and he actually came down, he was five years older than me, and he came to visit us here in the seventies and always used to tell me, you must do your National army and you must do your National Service for your country. Interviewer And what did you think of him? Did you admire him? Sarel Yes, definitely did. I still do. He’s about seven years older, he’s 50 now.
    [Show full text]
  • {FREE} the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale: Cold War Angolan Finale
    THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE: COLD WAR ANGOLAN FINALE, 1987-1988 PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Leopold Scholz | 64 pages | 13 Oct 2016 | 30 Degrees South Publishers | 9781909384620 | English | Johannesburg, South Africa The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale: Cold War Angolan Finale, - Le | Bushwar Militaria & Books Who were these men? Twenty-five years have passed since South Africans were being shot, hacked or burned to death in political conflict. The memory of the trauma has faded where some 20 people were killed between and Conventional wisdom claims that they died at the hands of a state-backed Third Force. The more accurate explanation is that they died as a Botha, working in the Security Branch, This war is not fought with bullets or artillery shells, not with tanks or bombers, but rather with words. The war is, in effect, fought again on paper. Ever since This work is a serious, non-fictional autobiography, which inter alia is an expose of the times and personalities involved during the thirty years the author spent in covert operations with the Nationalist Party government of South Africa from General Jannie Geldenhuys is widely regarded as one of the leading military commanders South Africa has ever produced. As Chief of the South African Defence Force from to he brought his experience to bear on the South African Border War, and was part of the negotiating team which brought an end to the conflict in In this This is the concise story of the first ten years of service from to of the Buccaneer aircraft of 24 Squadron including all the tragic aircraft losses during this period, the Tip-to-Top race, sinking of the Wafra, Operation RSA and the beginning of the Hanto bomb project.
    [Show full text]