A Third Government in Less Than a Year: Analysis of Tunisia's Political

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A Third Government in Less Than a Year: Analysis of Tunisia's Political A Third Government in Less Than A Year: Analysis of Tunisia’s Political System’s Crisis A Third Government in Less Than A Year: Analysis of Tunisia’s Political System’s Crisis An assessment of Tunisia’s constant political and institutional blockage, governmental instability and parliamentary chaos, paving the way for a necessary political and constitutional reform. RETHINKING ANALYSIS SECURITY IN By Yasmine Akrimi SEPTEMBER 2020 North Africa Research Analyst 2020 SERIES KEY TAKEAWAYS Introduction: Governmental instability has characterized post- Tunisia will celebrate its revolution’s tenth revolution Tunisian politics. Since 2011, the country anniversary this upcoming January. In parallel, its has witnessed nine governments. In 2020 only, there have been three attempts to form a viable ninth government since 2011 assumed office recently. government. On the night of 1st September, the Tunisian parliament granted its confidence to a new The parliament is so ideologically fractioned it is government, the third in less than nine months.1 137 unable to conduct its primary task: debate and vote votes for and 67 against, out of a total of 201 legislations. The current electoral formula prevents 2 the emergency of a clear majority. parliamentarians present and 217 in total. Hichem Mechichi, unknown a few months ago, has risen to There is an insidious presidentialization of the post- power by the choice of Kais Saied having been the 2011 regime as heads of governments are often President’s former adviser, then Minister of Interior.3 picked by the presidents without having tangible The Mechichi government gathered a larger support representation in the parliament. than expected, yet the country’s political crisis has Tunisia needs a more simplified and coherent actually deepened. constitution that allows for the unity of the executive branch and a clear majority within the parliament. 1 https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/09/02/le-parlement-tunisien-approuve-le- 3 https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/decryptages/tunisie-hichem-mechichi- gouvernement-de-hichem-mechichi_6050638_3212.html gouvernement-kais-saied?fbclid=IwAR2-R_7s- 2 Ibid. PeItR_Gy4Atq4AyDhs6Mk2q_f9ibCtu9yz3WlnXNfippZfxLb4 1 A Third Government in Less Than A Year: Analysis of Tunisia’s Political System’s Crisis Saied’s method in designating a Head of Government, completely excluding political parties both in Kais Saied’s Presidentialist representation and from suggesting names, was meant to ensure the alienation of the current Drift: What System of government. Yet, the Mechichi government found itself in confrontation with the President without a Governance is Tunisia in? genuine parliamentarian support at the same time. Tunisia’s 2014 proportional representation with rule of Marketed as a politically neutral formation, the highest remainder formula4, imagined as a guard rail current government was soon denounced by political against a return to presidential authoritarianism, has parties as being under the grip of Kais Saied. Per proven to be highly problematic. In theory, the equation instance, the current Minister of Interior is the Head is simple. The parliament, the country’s supreme of State’s former regional campaign director7 and the power, is directly elected by the people and all winning Minister of Defense, his former colleague at the political formations are represented within the University of Tunis.8 In the course of the negotiations legislative body. The executive branch is bicephalous, on the government formation, Mechichi rebelled shared between a Head of Government and a Head of against the Head of State and obtained the support of State. The latter theoretically only holds “residual” the newly-formed troika9, composed of Ennahdha, prerogatives, mainly related to defense and diplomacy. Kaleb Tounes, and Al Karama. Yet, the reality of Tunisian politics since 2014 has proven different. This support came with the implicit understanding there might be profound shifts in the present Both Beji Caid Essebsi and current President Kais Saied governmental composition to accommodate partisan have been highly influential in the political scene, often demands. This implies that all current ministers are at being in direct confrontation with both the parliament risk of being replaced in a few months, which will and the Head of Government. This situation has become hardly motivate any of them to initiate reforms. Even aggravated since Saied assumed office, having built his if the cabinet reshuffle does not occur, the political acumen around his hostility towards political government will be highly dependent on parties and the necessity to modify the political system. parliamentarians. It will need to build a majority for The President’s constitutional expertise5 coupled with every vote. Without the support of the Head of State, his wide popularity allowed him to self-proclaim as the as it was at least the case for the last government, interpreter of the constitution, in the absence of a Mechichi and his ministers are starting their mandate much-needed constitutional court. This leverage on a rough path. allowed him to push for two Heads of Government against the will of the parliament’s majority parties, especially Ennahda and Kaleb Tounes6. An Unviable Political System The 2014-born political system does not allow for a A New Government Lacking a clear majority in the parliament, which pushes for counter-natural fragile alliances. This is aggravated by Political Bedrock … Again the extreme polarization of the local political scene, and the recent revival of the old Islamists vs. anti- Since 2011, it has been common for Tunisian Islamists friction through the rise of the Parti governments to either lack political support at the Destourien Libre (PDL). This polarization has been a parliament or to be in direct confrontation with the permanent characteristic of Tunisian politics since Head of State. In the case of the Mechichi government, 2011 but has never been as paralyzing as in the it is both. Being a government of announced present parliament in which debates are almost technocrats, a formula used before in the era of Mahdi impossible to hold, and every draft law falls victim of Jemaa, political parties are excluded from being a partisan logic. In parallel, a government that lacks represented in the present government. Moreover, Kais the support of the parliament in a semi- 4 https://www.turess.com/fr/leaders/30545 D1he2ZI06Mpgm011bhJd57w 5 Kais Saied used to be a long-time constitutional law professor before running for office. 8 https://www.webmanagercenter.com/2020/08/27/455098/qui-est-brahim-bartagi- 6 The two winning parties of the latest legislative elections. propose-au-poste-de-ministre-de-la-defense-nationale-dans-le-gouvernement-mechichi/ 7 https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/En-Tunisie-gouvernement-haute-pression-2020-09-02- 9 In reference to the country’s first post-revolution tripartite government, which Ennahda 1201111942?fbclid=IwAR1CvCFPoZosgGpG3lPrw329RFeiDV_Di7q- was part of. 2 A Third Government in Less Than A Year: Analysis of Tunisia’s Political System’s Crisis parliamentarian regime is a government that cannot enact laws in addition to being permanently at risk of a censure motion. A Constitutional Reform: The Tunisian parliament is currently paralyzed as it is neither possible to debate nor enact laws due to the The Way Forward? deep ideological fractures between represented political formations, principally opposing the Islamists The current system is self-sabotaging. It results in of Ennahda and Al Karama to the PDL, and the absence unstable and fluctuant parliamentarian coalitions, an of a clear parliamentarian majority. Additionally, the incapacity for the parliament to carry out his open struggle between the Head of State and political legislative function, a dangerous dualism of the parties, mainly Ennahdha and Kaleb Tounes, is executive characterized by regular episodes of tension preventing the formation of any viable government. between the heads of state and government, a chronic governmental instability, a chronic absence of The Mechichi government is a perfect example of the parliamentarian support for the government, and an insidious presidentialization of the system as most incoherencies of the system. The possibility for the 17 current government to be dismissed in the upcoming proposed governments are presidential creations. months and, by default, to move towards anticipated elections remains a reality. In less than a year following The 2014 electoral law is a copy of the format chosen for the 2011 national constituent assembly (ANC), in the October 2019 legislatives, consecutive political .18 failures occurred: in January 2020, Ennahda, the itself hardly an authentic parliamentarian system elections’ first winner and hence in charge of forming a government, failed to gather sufficient votes for its Parties are not clearly and strongly represented but chosen formation to assume office10; the same month rather form a mosaic within the parliament, an option the Head of State, who then had to choose the ‘best that worked for a process of constitution-making that candidate’ in consultation with political parties, opted is inclusive of the multiple ideological facets of post- for a personality that was far from being favored by the revolutionary Tunisia but that fails to be a long-term, parliament’s parties11; in July the parliament spent viable representative system. A remedy should weeks discussing a censure motion against
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