Democracy and Tunisia

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Democracy and Tunisia Democracy and Tunisia 27 August 2021 Image 1: Fethih Belaid/AFP via Getty Images. A protester lifts a Tunisian national flag during an anti-government rally in front of the parliament in Tunis, Tunisia, on 25 July 2021 Introduction President Kais Saied decided to enact Article 80 of the constitution on 25 July. Some Tunisians hailed it as a necessary intervention into a broken and stagnant political system. Others called it a coup, signifying the possible end of Tunisian democracy. Saied invoked emergency powers and suspended parliament for 30 days, a deadline which has since passed. He dismissed the prime minister, Hichem Mechichi, the defence and justice ministers. Saied called in the military, who surrounded the parliament. COVID-19 restrictions were extended, a nighttime curfew continued, and Saied reinforced a long-existing rule whereby gatherings of more than three people are not permitted. The president's move followed months of deadlock and disputes pitting him against prime minister Hichem Mechichi and a fragmented parliament as Tunisia sank into an economic crisis worsened by one of Africa's worst 1 Democracy and Tunisia COVID-19 outbreaks. This situation resulted in Saied claiming control over the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government. Parts of the population drew together in large crowds and took to the streets once more to support Saeid's decision. This reaction reflects some Tunisian's anger towards the moderate Islamist Ennahda, the biggest party in parliament, and the government over political paralysis, economic stagnation, and the pandemic response. Initially, parliament speaker Rached Ghannouchi, the historical head of Ennahda, condemned Saied’s actions as an assault on democracy and urged Tunisians to take to the streets in opposition; he and the party swiftly changed their stance and called for communication rather than confrontation. Background Tunisia is often referred to as the one true democracy to emerge from the Arab Spring at home and abroad, because it peacefully held two elections, preserved women's rights, and avoided military interventions. Since 2011, development aid has poured in to support the international community's vision of what Tunisia could look like. Yet, as in neighbouring Libya, the technical assistance provided in conjunction with the aid primarily focussed on areas that served the interests of Europe and the United States, such as counter-terrorism training and border patrol management to stem the flow of irregular migration. Protests have taken place throughout the past decade as the Tunisian people continued to rally for greater freedoms, better jobs, services, and their future. The pandemic exacerbated the economic and social crisis, triggering further demonstrations, such as those seen on the Sunday before Saied's decision. Tunisians took to the streets, calling for the dissolution of parliament and government. Then Saied announced his power grab, referring to the corruption that has worn the country down and prosecutions to come. Many Tunisians are disappointed by foreign analysts and media outlets who refer to the current situation as the 'end of the Tunisian democratic experience'. This shock from abroad has been seen as naive and somewhat self-serving as Tunisian youth, academics, activists, and jurists have not left the streets or muted their voices in the decade since the revolution. They have done this in the face of police batons or mass arrests and intimidation, as seen in recent times. Tunisians have not rejected democracy; instead, the 2 Democracy and Tunisia democratic template in its current form was not working for them. The causes behind this crisis were party politics, alleged corruption and years of successive perceived ineffective government, which has damaged the economy and citizen's welfare. Tunisia's independent institutions, watchdogs, unions and academics have their own ideas to improve the governmental system of their country. Since this particular political crisis began, they have started to propose their roadmaps out of the current situation, including ways to address the grievances of the Tunisian people. Image 2: Zohra Bensemra/Reuters. Protesters demonstrate against Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunis, January 14, 2011 Governmental shifts and democracy take time; several governments have failed to remove the threat of corruption or revitalise the economy in the past ten years. Covid-19 has added to this strain, seeing the economy shrink by 8.6% last year. While the Arab Spring brought long-awaited freedom of expression and space for democracy, Tunisians say the ten major government changes since have been unable to deliver tangible fixes for widespread unemployment, poverty, inflation, and poor social services, says Monica Marks, Assistant Professor of Arab Crossroads Studies at New York University in Abu Dhabi. 3 Democracy and Tunisia "This year has probably been the hardest year yet since the revolution, economically speaking," Marks stated, and as a result, Tunisians are desperate for radical change. "They want radical shock therapy for Tunisian democracy because they see their system as locked in a deep political paralysis and they're desperate for any kind of solution." But she warns Saied's followers that drastic changes could have potentially severe consequences in a fragile and new democracy. The solution Kais Saied is posing now will change the day-to-day living of Tunisians, but it may also affect their access to democratic processes in the long term. The Power Grab President Saied was elected two years ago amid feelings of frustration against Tunisia's political elite. A former constitutional-law professor with no prior political background won 73% of votes, attracting support from young Tunisians and others who saw him incorruptible. The same election delivered a fractious parliament, with no party or coalition declaring a majority. Saied has endeavoured to perform a more prominent role in domestic policy, previously preserved for the prime minister and government. Since January 2021, the president has declined to swear in 11 new ministers. Kais Saied helped write (and later criticised) Tunisia's constitution. He wants to change the political system of the country and has suggested that Tunisians elect local delegates based on their merit, not their ideology. These delegates would appoint regional representatives, who would then appoint members of a national assembly. However, according to the constitution, two-thirds of parliament would need to approve any charter revision. Notably, Tunisia does not yet have a functioning constitutional court, so experts' opinions on the legality of Saied's decision vary. According to Article 80 of the constitution, "in the event of imminent danger threatening the nation's institutions or the security or independence of the country, and hampering the normal functioning of the state," the president "may take any measures necessitated by the exceptional circumstances, after consultation" with the prime minister and speaker of parliament and "informing the president of the constitutional court." However, the latter is impossible to fulfil, given that Tunisia has yet to institute a court that oversees a legitimate implementation of the constitution. In addition, per Article 80, the president must also ensure that such measures guarantee a return to the normal functioning of state institutions and services as soon as possible. The adopted measures should 4 Democracy and Tunisia be suspended once the reasons for their implementation have ceased. The Article does not confer unrestricted powers to the president. It implies that the state of emergency does not settle a constitutional dictatorship, which would have concentrated all three branches of government in the president's hands nor allow the suspension of the separation of powers. Judges and the Judiciary Since the president announced the implementation of exceptional measures, fears have grown about the possibility of the executive authority taking over the judiciary, especially after the president decided to freeze the work of the legislative power in the country. The Tunisian executive authority has been accused of abuse of power due to their precautionary measures against numerous judges, purportedly on suspicion of corruption. Several Tunisian judges were barred from travelling while others were placed under house arrest following a decree issued by the minister of interior, Rida Gharslawi. This decision against judges holding judicial immunity came without prior approval from the Supreme Judicial Council, who should be informed in advance when judges are accused of public security and order charges. The council is the only constitutional institution authorised to take disciplinary actions against judges. Ennahda A party that now styles itself "Muslim democratic", Ennahda has been a political force since 2011. Many Tunisians blame it for the state of the country's current social and economic affairs. Rachid Ghannouchi, was a central part of the last national dialogue in 2013-2014. In the immediate aftermath of Saied's announcement, outside the parliament building that the army prevented him from gaining entry to, 80-year-old Ghannouchi denounced the president's unilateral take-over, stating, "I am against gathering all powers in the hands of one person". He then repeated a call for Ennahda supporters to stand up against Saied and his followers. The party has now called for another national dialogue and
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