r, en � CO} (v) � � � ['-�� � � � (J 0:::: < en :z u.J ::=;) 0::: >< w u � __, � w 0 (..) en c::a u.. � I .. • \() ITINERARY FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL Date Itinerary Time Hours Airline Equipmt St From +Flgt GMT Number Wed. 18 April Lv: London (LHR) 10:30 +1 BA 193 sse 0 Ar: New York (JFK) 08:25 -5 Thu. 19 April Lv: New York (JFK) 09:30 -5 BA 192 sse 0 Ar: Lonaon (LHR) 19:10 +1 or Thu. 19 April Lv: New York (JFK) 13:45 -5 BA 194 ::;::;c 0 Ar: London (LHR) 23:25 +1 Fri. 20 April Lv : Lonaon (LHR) 17:15 +l IB 50S 727 0 Ar: Palma ae 20:12 +2 Mallorca (Hotel Son Vida) or Thu. 26 April Lv: Maaria 12:35 +2 Tw 903 7.;7 0 Ar: New York (JFK) 13:15 -5 end of tlie visfi to -r;ondon. 0477/13 April 1984 SEC RETARY�GENERAL'S TR IP TO LONDON AND MADRID 15 - 26 April 1984 Sunaay, 15 April 1984 10.00 Departure for London PA 100 (747) 22.40 Arrival in Lonaon (welcomea by IML Secretary-General, Mr. Erik Jensen ana Minister of State Ray Whitney) (Hotel Savoy) Monaay, 16 April 1984 09.30 Mr. Gamani Corea (at hotel) 10.00 ACC opens (private session) 13.00 Luncheon given by IMO Secretary-General (Toast by �ecretary-General) 15.00-18.30 ACC (tormal session) 17.00 Secretary-General leaves for 10 Downing Street 17.30 Meeting with Prime Minister (Messrs. B. Urquhart, de Soto) 20.00 Dinner by Prime Minister in honour of ACC at 10 Downing Street (Secretary-General, Messrs. B. Urquhart, Rueaas, Yolah, Ripert, Bi Jilong, Akashi ana ae Olivares) (Toast by Secretary-General) Tu esaay , 17 Apr il 1984 09.30 Se cre tar y-Gener al to addr ess staff of IMO for 5 to 10 mi nutes 10.00 ACC 13.00 Lu ncheon by Lady Young (Foreign Secretar y is in Hon g Kong an a Ch ina) (Th e Secretar y-General, Me ssr s. B. Urquh art, de Ol iv ares, de Soto , Gi uliani , Picco , Er ik Je nsen) (n o Toast) 15.00-18.00 ACC 18.30 IMu Re ce ption for ACC 19.00 Se cr e tary-Gener al le ave s for UNA 19.15-20.00 Se cr e tar y-Gene ral give s br ief spee ct. to UNA-UK an a an swe rs fe w que sti on s Fr ee evening Weanesaay, 18 April 1984 10.30-11.00 Meeting with Sir Donala Maitland, Chairman of the Independent commission for World-Wiae Telecommunications and former Permanent Secretary (at the hotel) 11.00-11.30 Meeting with west German Ambassador von wechmar (at the hotel) 11.30 Meeting with 5 or 6 representatives of the press - "off recora" - not a press conference (at the hotel) 12.00 Italian Senator Giovanni MALAGODI, President, Liberal Parties International Union, Rome (at the hotel) TO BE CO�F I�lliD UPON ARRIVAL IN LONDON* 13.30 Luncheon by Secretary-General of commonwealth Free afternoon and evening *Senator Malagodi wants to speak about: a) protection of the right to privacy, b) treedom of press and information, and c) peace movements ana aisarmament. He can be reached at the Italian Embassy in London, telephone no. 62� 82 00 0 R 10.30 Departure for New York BA 193 SSC (Secretary-General, Mr. B. Urquhart and Mr. breen) 20.25 Arrival New York (JFK) Thursday, 19 April 1984 Lunch with Ambassaaor of Peru in Lonaon 17.15 Departure from London to Palma IB 505 (Minister of State Ray Whitney sees Secretary- General off) 20.15 Arrival in Palma (Hotel Son Vida) 0 R Frida:t:r 20 A,eril 1984 Palma Saturaay, 21 A,eril 1984 Palma Sunday, 22 April 1984 Palma t-'londay, 23 A,eril 1984 Palma Tuesaay, 24 April 1984 Official visit to Spain 07.55 Departure from Palma IB 431 08.50 Arrival in Madrid (Hotel Ritz) 13.00 Meeting with the Presiaent of the Government in the Palace ot Moncloa (Mr. Felipe Gonzalez) 14.15 Lunch offered by Mr. Gonzalez (Palace of Moncloa) (Secretary-General, Mrs. Perez de Cuellar, �essrs. Iglesias, Ruedas, de Olivares, Giuliani ana Miss Vidal) 17.30 Meeting with the Foreign Minister (Mr. Fernanoo Moran) 21.15 Dinner hostea by Foreign Minister (Palacio de Viana) (Secretary-General ana Mrs. Perez de Cuellar and probably rest of the party) Wednesday, 25 April 1984 10.30 Meeting with the President of the Congress of the Deputies (Mr. Gregorio Peces-Barba) 11.00 Meeting with Parliamentarians 13.30 Private lunch offered for the Secretary-General ana Mrs. Perez de Cuellar by the King and the Queen of Spain (Palacio ae la zarzuela) 17.30 Visit to the world Tourism Organization (OMT - Robert Lonati) 18.30 Spain Association for Unitea Nations (at hotel) 21.00 Dinner at Congress of Deputies (without Mrs. Perez de Cuellar) Thursaay, 26 April 1984 09.00 Leave Hotel for airport 10.30 Press conference at Barajas airport 12.35 Departure for New York TWA 903 13.15 Arrival in New York (JFK) 1144E 10 April 1984 Secretary-General's discussion with Mrs. Thatcher (economic issues only) I. POINTS THAT MAY BE RAISED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL It should be recalled that Mrs •.Thatcher will chair the next Summit of industrialized nations. The Secretary-General may wish to concentrate on three key issues namely: i) the continuing difficulties in many parts of the third world, especially Africa and several Latin American countries; ii) the need to take some specific measures especially on aid, debt and trade, at the forthcoming Summit; iii) the role of the United Nations. On i) above - difficulties of developing countries - the Secretary-General may in the first place wish to congratulate Mrs. Thatcher on the recovery in the United Kingdom, but he may wish to express concern at the polarization 1n the economic record of the prosperous industrial countries on the one hand, and the developing countries on the other. No doubt developing countries have to do their maximum to implement sound domestic policies - and the Secretary-General has on every opportunity underlined this point. But the Secretary-General would argue together with .Mr. Clausen that exactly at a moment when many developing countries are responding to the need for internal reforms; support from industrial countriea seems to be weak in terms of finance and access to markets. This is most unfortunate. -2- 0n ii) - the need for action - the Secretary-General may highlight in particular the following; {a) the United Kingdom should press ahead in the battle against protectionism. The European Community is a tremendously important market for goods from developing countries, and ultimately, expanding trade with developing countries is the real answer to several problems. While succeeding Summits have made declarations against protectionism, the real trends are in the opposite direction. The Secretary-General may wish to express his great concern at this situation, and call for genuine halting and rolling back of protectionist measures. b) the need to search for innovative and longer-term solutions to the debt problems,in place of the somewhat ad hoc approaches adopted hitherto. Strong concern could be expressed on the excessive strain in developing countries imposed by the present conditions. The burden of the solution should be more broadly shared between creditors and debtors. (c) aid and other long-term finance to low-income, especially to African countries. In this connection, the Secretary-General may express great disappointment regarding the outcome of the negotiations on IDA VII. Any action that can be taken to redress the effects of this setback should be urgently taken, including increase in bilateral aid. On iii) - role of the United Nations - it could be mentioned that the United Kingdom, being one of the permanent members of the Security Council, have a special interest and responsibility in strengthening the integrity and effectiveness of the United Nations system in the economic and • -3- social epheree. With all its faults - and the Secretary-General is among the first to recognize them - the system has much achievement to its credit. The Secretary-General has done his best within his own competence to meet the criticisms against the Organization. His discussions in London with his colleagues are designed to enhance the coherence of the system. If governments have specific problems with the United Nations they are best raised in a constructive and consultative spirit, without the �se of threats to depart. The principle of universality is an important cornerstone of the United Nations. II. BACKGROUND Economic situation in the United Kingdom There is considerable satisfaction and optimism in Mrs. Thatcher's Government regarding the evolution of the British economy: satisfaction is felt because the nearly 3% growth rate experienced in 1983 with low inflation is regarded as a vindication of the monetarist policies pursued by Mrs. Thatcher since she came to power. Of course there continue to exist considerable unemployment and tensions with trade unions. Optimism is expressed by the Government because there is a feeling that the present overall trend is sustainable in the period to come. In the forthcoming summit of the seven industrial countries (London, 7-9 June), Mrs. Thatcher will no doubt use this positive atmosphere to her advantage. President Reagan will similarly want to take satisfaction from th� United States recovery which is going ahead fairly strongly. Nonetheless, serious question marks continue to be raised in connection with the U.S. recovery, including by Mrs. Thatcher who has publicly questioned the United States policies of la rge public deficit and high interest rates, on the grounds that these affect other countries in a negative manner. _.; -4- Developing countries The United Kingdom, somewhat on the lines of the United States position, have argued that the recovery in the industrial countries will benefit the developing countries, and they - likewise - insist on the need for continued domestic adjustment in the developing countries. '�e ourselves had to go through the same kind of austerity,"- they would say. Similar importance is given to market forces (e. g. deregulation, denationalization) and private direct investment. However, the United Kingdom which is sensitive to pressures from the Commonwealth countries have shown some responsiveness in terms of the need for specific action in favor of the developing countries particularly the low income ones, e. g. in past negotiations over IDA and the IHF resources. They have ratified the Common Fund, and have supported the anti-protectionism element within the European Community. It should be noted though that the United Kingdom overall aid budget is not likely to show much dynamism. Their contributions to the United Nations funds have declined 1n recent years. This is due to the United Kingdom Government's policy of reducing public expenditures. Attitude to the North/South deliberations in the United Nations By and large the United Kingdom is regarded by many as belonging to the camp of "hardliners" on economic usues, together with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, on Global Negotiations and UNCTAD VI. They have also joined the U�ited States in their recent demands upon UNESCO. The United Kingdom would also argue that the United States would have - 5 - to be satisfied on reforms in UNCTAD. The United Kingdom, however, would admit more readily the usefulness of UNCTAD as a forum for discussion and dialogue. That wing of the Conservative Party headed by Edward Heath has been highly supportive of the North/South dialogue. * * * Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Co-operation ... · k, M Q V S QLJ {Z / S :a�l '•he<"'=- f-lo f.-o ' ook. F 1 kf-A:.{-" ... S c£NA L o tJ!)orJ PRIVATE f.tt'l'N; .. . o w·· � l D A Lf , "" ... ., J.Ai.. LoJV'DoN 0t�J) . . -ro ··u �f.'i( .a l'.t- ... - ... . " Maday, 16 April 1984 - 10:00 a.m • . I declare qlE!Il the first regular aess· of N:J: of 1984 am welcane ya.t to Iadm. At the outset cur meeting1 I sha1ld like to thank cur bJst, Mr. C.P. Sri: , am his ool.leagues at lK> far - the· excellalt facilities they ha pl.acai at cur di&p>&a1 • I ahcW.d also like to welcane a new of cur Ccmni.ttee1 Dr. G. o. P. Cbt.si , �. Also, many of you already Jcncw cur Dei Secretary1 Mr. Sotirio is, wiD took up his new respcll&ibilities this IID'lth. en of my colleagues in NX, we welcxme ycu am look fC11:'Wlrd to kiBJ with ycu m matters of ccncem to the Unital Nations . QJr colleague Robert M..ll.ler will net be leaving the ens, far I have asked him to help me in preparing far the Anniversary of the United Naticns. 1. lRlltlpal lritfin« )y\bt ltcntau=Qmtpl At 11 CNr cuatCD, l 1bould like. . to abare a tev th�tl vi th .. I :rou Cll the CNtltt or CNr ••Una a'bout the current poll tloal tituation. (Text to 'be 4rattt4 b7 c. Picco.) I .. Does any aember of the ccamittee wish to ma.ke any cammenta or raise any questions on this political briefing? t 1. ; _, 2 • • '· • . . 4 . . . -� · 5· :.1 Ir there are DO other o�u, let a aon to cur Dext 1 t... l i l .:.J__ . . ------·-·· ------. 2. lrlt[lM)y !!r. Olof lbdbtck, Ce�ltllontr..Y,ntJ!l ot1l!!l!WA I ftOW liYI the noor to Mr. Jl)'d'btck or 1mRWA, who I undtrat&n4 vilhtl to I&J • rev vor41 an tht .. tttr or tht 11tuat1an or the Paleatine letusee• in Lebanon. ["Mr. Rydbeck._7 Doe• any aember of the ccmmi ttee have any questicns ror Mr. R7dbeck or any comments to .ake7 1. 2 • •• . ' \ ' 3. t f' t ' . f ·t · . i ' ' If there are no other c�nta, let ua ta.m to 011r D!Xt it.. ( ' • . J• , -j . ·- __ j __ -:----- · --·· -·· -·--·-� ------·--. -- . ·-· - 4 - 3. Prcblans and Priorities of the Unita:i Natials Systan At Q1I' last aessim,. we bad an ect.ranely uaeful diacussim of tlE prd:Uans ccmfraltiJ¥3 the unital Natiau; ll}'8tan mibJw!2st -· to deal with ...t • .,- . • • • them. I att.ac)q cc:nsiderable inpartance to this iaSJe. Each of Q1l" ' . �tiau; faces increasing criti.cians. 'l'hese are nat problans that can be resolvm cnly � ilxlividual arganizaticms since the issues involve the J:asic principles underlyirx} the United Nat.ials system as a wb::.>le. What is require:l is an ha1est. &elf-appraisal of our strer¥]t.hs am our weaknesses. We aust respald to the pm:cept.ials of manber states, not ally to cauect their misjudgE!tents, blt al� to can:ect our perfa:mance when �iate. While respecting fully the instituticnal characteristics of our systan, we DUSt llddress prOOlans relatej to co--ordinatial mXl hamal.izatim of policy issues 111V:D3 Secretariats and amc::'I¥J gcwern.iJ"¥3 lxXHes. Finally, we III1St look far 11ays to tell rur story to the general p1blic. There is no need to be defensive in this. I sincerely believe that rur recxnd ofreal achievalelts is ocmnemable an1lOll.d gain the SJWOrt of the pecples of the 1«rld if fully lcncwl. I mn aware that tl'Ese are not new isSJes bit I believe that current events len;i a new sense of urgency. CUr di fCllSS ims &lD1ld go beya1d wt:&'ds . It is necessary to fnrn11late usefuland practical initiatives which we might collectively iDplSDent. In pn!paraticn fer this discussi.m1 rur colleague1 Michel Doo �, has preparai a discussim paper m the Jmage of the Unitai Natims. I 1D1ld also call ywr at.tent.im to the policytials aspectsandrec:al1Df!B:1a cxntaine:i in the JUNIC repcrt a1 a cxmlUl public infC'IDII&tim strategy far the syatc, Mlich is also m our fcmoal agema. - 5 - .· l call first al Mr. Dco � to int..raiuce his paper• I now call a1 Mr. Akashi. to say a few wrds a1 the JUNIC paper . £"Mr. ».asru.J The next perscn m my list of speakers is: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. L.Not.e far the Secretary-General: Other questicns whichmay re raiserl by participants dur:inJ this diBCIJ.Ss.im include: a. The situatim in UNEOCO (Mr. M 'Bow to respcni) : b. The situaticn in utC'l7\D (Mr. Corea to respcni):7 critical situatial in ica Afr C.Note far the Secretary-General: You may wish to make this-statEment afterthegeneral discussim m prOOlans and priorities, tut pr-ier to:your cxmclDlil¥3 ranarks.7 - 6 - The current situaticn in Africa prc:wides an qlpal'twlity to daacnat.rate that the Unital Natials 8Ystan can respcnl in an effective, timely am coherent aanner to real proill�·! ..J IIIny of ycu have already da1e 80. art. clearly JDCP:e needs to be &me. I believe that I had the reapcnsibi.lity , as Secr�al of the United Natials, to make El additicnal CM!rall effort in tryiBJ to mbilize the intematimal camunity toward a cxn:eited ectial to meet t:oth the anergency ani the me:dit:rn teen needs of the affected African camtries. Ya1 have befare ycu copies of the statalents � I have JMde am I do not prcp:>se to review them now. I 11Dlld , lxJwever,wish to underline the basic el.anents in my�, ·especially far those of yc:u 1II4D were net involVBi in the meetiBJ of 20 March in New Yark. - The initiative slnlld be seen as an evolving prcx:ess base:i a1 ocnsultatials amm at DDbil.izing addit:ialal Slf{'Crt far am strengthen.in:J the cxnesiveness of existing effarts, nultilateral as well as bilateral. - I do not wish to establish new instit:uti.als ar new layers of co-ard.inati.m; rather, 1111hat is needed is a pra�Jt�atic � aimed at meeting the specific neal& of each camtry. -Finally , I am e mer that the prOOJ.ans of Africa are carplec am not anenabl.e to easy mlutials. an: we llllSt respcn:i m:CJenUy to situatims of jJrmedjate peril to luDan life. In doing so, we mjqtl' establish a l:asis fer attacking the mxe lmg tean problaos. I have a:JUght your a:ivice and guidance tbnuJlmt., mostrecently at the special inter� meet.ing of argani.zat.:ial directly inYolwd, � ws held at UN Helldq.arters m 20 March. - 1 - .. It vaa clear at that meetin@ that ve all appreciate the gravity ot the situation and each or u• :h ·doing V!lat· ve· ean-·. There ,.. ·an· emphaais on the need tor improved eo-ontinatton IKt the cmmt17 leTel and a aenae that the United Rations W.TBtem ahould take leadership in mobilizing the international community. As I have already announced I have instructed resident co-ordinators in Atrica to enter into consultations vith host governments and bilateral and multilateral donor representatives as vell as representatives ot the non-governmental community to try to identity priority needs and gaps in resources. I expressed the hope that all ot you vho have field representatives could send companion instructions asking them to participate constructively in those consultations and that your organizations inform my special representatiTe in the region, Mr. Adeb«Yo Adedeji ot relevant actiTities and assist him in his ettorts on my behalf. In closing, I would like to express my deep appreciation tor your aupport and assure you that I vill continue to conault vith you in this common endeaTOur. 4 ,. Fortieth Anniversay of the United Natims in 1985 I w::uld like to call to ycur attentim the da::is.ial of the last .. . .. -c �J :"'\• • .._ . :...._ � • M; General Assembly to establish a Preparatory Ccmnittee far the Fortieth � ··- .7 Anniversary of the UnitEd Naticns. 'nle Preparatory Ccmnittee ists of manbers of the General Ccmnittee of the AsSEmbly, which incl.W.es all of the permanent nenbers of the security COOncil am is cpen toCCJ:lS all Member States. 43 camtries have already notified of their decisim to participate. me It is intenti.oo to ask all gcwerrments to umertake in-depth review to evaluate ani to express their c:pinicn m the UN after 40 years of existence,a.tr to rea.ffil:m their cx:mnitments and to make , I �an , ccnc:rete and positive proposals far the str� of internatimal oo-q:>eratim. I am cmvinced that many camtries will express their appreciatim ani faith in the UN., and tius that this exercise will provide a mxe balan:::ed view of our activities. As I inii.caterl earlier, I have askai Mr. Rebert �ler to respcnsibility far preparing for thistim. mtusoora I l'q:)e that yw will assist him with ycur ideas and ycur omtrib.lticns. I believe thatassune this CXJlltetDrat.ial provides a un.iq.le q:port:unity to inf the govenments an:i the peoples of the �ld aln.lt our activities, am I look far:wm:i to yaa OC>-qlerat.ial in this regard. acn I wruld like to piqJOBe that inscribe the mrauatmatim ofthe Fortiethversary Anni of the UN m the agema of our next session. we ' . � . - 8 - • - .- -_4 I I ['"� far the Secretary-General: -It is not IUJC}esta:l that. yQ1 invite a genei-al, debl� an )Qir African initiative. However, 8CJE executive he2Kl& may wish to earment cr to raise specificesti (f1 cns.J ·• ['"?t-t the end of the discussim an agE!DJa itan 3: PrOOl.ans am Priorities of the UN Systan: I think that we have lBdagain a very useful di SOlS Sim en the prcblans am priorities of the Unital Natials systan. '1bis is clearly a subject of ccnt.iiu1in:J interest to the members of this Cmmittee am I 11J99est that we plan to ccnt:i.nue this discussim in future private meetin;Js. 4. Appojnt:ments The last matter far us to diEUSS at this private meeting is "RJC>intments of Slbs.idiary lxxlies. The Ck'ganizaticnal camti.ttee has recarmendErl the ect.ensi.al of the awointments of Mr. Isnoine (liD) as Chaiman of xt:IS am Mr. Tassin as Secretary of OCAQ. Mr. Goluhev (UNEP) has been proposed far chail:manship of the Task Farce am Tecmology am Mr. Yeganeh CUN> far the Chail:manship afthe In�ency Grcup en New am Renaable Salroesof Energy. May I take it that the Omnittee is prepara:i to act favalrably en theseticns nanina at cur fazma.l sessim. . � .. - 9 - ·- L� for tm Secretary-General: It is possible that the naninatims far Science am TecmoJ.cgy . ;··- . -� .... and for New and Renewable Sources of Energy might be ccntroversial. Rather than p.�rsue the dia:ussim at the private meeting 1 ya.t may wish to a199est the follawir¥J:J Might l suggest that in the interest of time1 we p.�rsue infaz:mal CCilS.lltaticms oo these t'«> appointments durin:J wr aessim1 so that we can arrive at a decisim by talmrow. L,Note for the Sec:retary=Q:neal: It is possible that referEilCe will be made to the paper oo criteria and prcc�nres for the ael.ectial of caniidates of lllbsidiary lnHes. '!his is en the fOCDal N:r. aqema. Yw may wish to suggest the followi.lvJ:J We will deal with the Q[ganizational Camdttee report en this itan durin:J c:ur facnal sessi.oo. I an a\IIBJ:'e that there remain sane unresolva:l issues am rope that these can be workEd out .in .infa::mal cxmsu.ltaticns p:-iar to cx:.nsi.deratial. Ccnclllsim auess any other manter ofthe Ccmnittee wishes to raise any · other matter in p:ivatel that ccnelmes cur p:-ivate sessial. lA!t us new JDCNe into fa:mal aessi.al. ------0 � L I ) I c-A L- lb�tE-F/N� TALKING POINTS FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S USE IN TALKING TO THE PRIVATE MEETING OF THE ACC IN LONDON 1. IT WOULD NOT BE INACCURATE TO CHARACTERIZE THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WORLD AS ONE OF PERVASIVE AND PERSISTENT VIOLENCE• THERE HAS BEEN NO BREAK-THROUGH TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF ANY OF THE CONFLICT SITUATIONS AROUND THE WORLD AND ONE} THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ THREATENS TO REACH AN EVEN HIGHER I LEVEL OF DEADLINESS, A GOOD BIT OF THIS VIOLENCE ARISES FROM PROFOUND LONG-STANDING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMBALANCES WHICH ) ) • UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES) TAKE MUCH TIME TO CORRECT MEANWHILE THE DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO MOST ) POWERFUL STATES CONSTITUTES A FURTHER COMPLICATING FACTORe I AM CONFIDENT THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE CONVINCED OF THE ABSOLUTE IMPERMISSIBILITY OF ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN THEM• I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR IS IMMINENT• YET THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION ARE EVIDENT, THE TENSION AND SUSPICION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST RENDER MORE DIFFICULT THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS OF MANY REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND INHIBIT ANY REAL PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT, - 2 - IN THIS SITUATION THE ROLE OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY 2. } AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN PARTICULAR CAN BE MOR } ) � RATHER THAN LESS IMPORTANT• IN QUITE A FEW OF FRIDAY'S CRISIS ) SITUATIONS THERE IS NO REAL ALTERNATIVE• THE UNITED NATIONS IS THE ONLY VIABLE INTERLOCUTOR IN THE AFGHAN QUESTION AND THE !RAN-IRAQ WAR• THE UNIQUE ADVANTAGES OF UNITED NATOINS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN VIVIDLY DEMONSTRATED WHEN OTHER MEANS HAVE BEEN TRIED• IT IS EVIDENT ! THINK ) ) THAT A PEACEFUL TRANSITION OF NAMIBIA TO INDEPENDENCE WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE CAPACITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OTHER PROBLEMS MAY REQUIRE OTHER FORMS OF MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE• !N CENTRAL AMERICA THE CONTADORA GROUP DESERVES THE WIDEST SUPPORT ) IN ITS EFFORTS TO BRING PEACE AND STABILITY, THE POINT IS THAT THERE ARE VERY FEW CURRENT PROBLEMS -- POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC- THAT ARE SUBJECT TO UNILATERAL OR BILATERAL SOLUTIONS• - 3 - 3. YET PRECISELY AT THIS TIME SERIOUS DOUBTS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES ABOUT THE VALUE OF MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS• ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN THAT AMOUNTS TO A TURNING AWAY FROM CONCEPTS IN WHICH THE BEST HOPES FOR A BETTER WORLD WERE EMBEDDED• MULTILATERALISM IS NOT A QUESTION OF IDEOLOGY, IT IS QUITE SIMPLY A NECESSARY TECHNIQUE WHICH RESULTS FROM THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF THE NATION-STATE SYSTEM IN A RADICALLY CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT• QUITE EVIDENTLY MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS ARE FAR FROM PERFECT• WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS FAMILY IT IS MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER TO MAINTAIN THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF OBJECTIVITY ECONOMY AND } EFFICIENCY1 I PLACE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE ON THESE MEETINGS BECAUSE All ELEMENTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS FAMILY REPRESENT INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY THE PRINCIPLE THAT HUMAN AFFAIRS ARE SUBJECT TO IMPROVEMENT THROUGH STRUCTURED MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION AMONG NATIONS• IN THIS WE ARE INDIVISIBLE• THE CLOSEST CO-ORDINATION OF OUR RESPECTIVE EFFORTS IN PROGRAMMES AND MANAGEMENT IS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS PRINCIPLE, - 4 - 4. IN NO FIEL D IS THIS MORE NECESSARY THAN THAT OF ECONOMICS AND DEVELOPMENTe WE WILL HAVE ANOTHER OPPO RT U NITY LATER IN THE PUB LIC MEETING TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT SITUATIO N IN THIS FIELD• I WOULD LIKE HOWEVER TO SAY A FEW WORDS ) ) AT THIS POINT CONCERNING THE CONSULTATIO NS ON THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIO NS WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE GE NERAL ASSEMB LY FRAMEWORK• INFORMAL) EXPL ORATO RY MEETIN GS HAVE BEEN HEL D BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING CO U NTRIES SINCE LAST NOVEMBER ) UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF AMBASSADOR MUNOZ LEDO OF MEXICO• THE PURPOSE HAS BEEN TO CLARIFY THE TWO-PHASE APPROACH EMANATING FROM THE NON-ALIGN MENT MOVEMENT IN NEW DELHI AN D TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS TAKIN G INTO ACCO UNT } THE RESULTS OF VER SAIL LES ON THE ROLE OF SPECIAL NEGOTIATIN G FORA• THESE EXPLO RATORY MEETINGS HAVE BEEN USEF UL BUT IT IS BY NO MEANS CLEAR THAT GOVERNMENTS WIL L SOON BE PREPARE D TO ENTER INTO GLOBAL NEGOTIATIO NS• THE PRESENT PO LITICA L CONTEXT DOES NOT APPEAR FAVOURAB LE TO THE LAUNCHING OF ANY IMPORTANT NEW ENDEAVOUR SUCH AS A CONFERENCE ON MONEY AND FINANCEe THE U� IN PARTICULAR DOES NOT SEEM INCLINED TO RECOGNIZE A LE•DING ] NEGOTIATING ROLE FOR THE UN NOR FOR THAT MATTE R TO MOVE FORWARD } } ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES IN GENERALe I INTEND IN MY CONTACTS HERE ) IN ·LONDON AND IN TA LKS WITH THE LEADER S OF OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO CAL L ATTENTION TO THE DIFFICULT SITUATION } OF MANY LEAST DEVELOPED CO U NTRIESe I WIL L CONTINUE TO STRESS THE URGENT NEED TO REVERSE PROTECTIO NIST TRENDS TO ADDRESS } MORE SYTEMATICALLY THE DEBT ISSUE AND TO INCREASE THE FLOW OF CONCESSIONAL RESOURCES FOR LOW INCOME COUNTRIES / PA RTICULARLY IN AF RICA• - 5 - 5. LET ME BRIEFLY REVIEW NOW THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE MOST CRITICAL POLITICAL ISSUES IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS IS INVOLVED• I WILL START WITH AFGHANISTAN SINCE MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL CORDOVEZ ) J HAS JUST COMPLETED A FURTHER SERIES OF TALKS IN THE CAPITALS CONCERNED• (TO BE COMPLETED BY MR. PICCO ON ARRIVAL IN LONDON) - 6 - 6� TURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER-SECREETARY-GENERAL URQUHART } RETURNED EARLIER THIS MONTH FROM THE REGION WHERE HE HAD TALKS WITH LEADERS IN ISRAEL JORDA� LEBANON SYRIA AND EGYPT• } ) IN GENERAL HE FOUND SUBSTANTIAL RECEPTIVITY TO AN INCREASED UN ROLE IN THE AREA• THE PRESENT ISRAEL GOVERNMENT SEEMED TO ENVISION AT SOME STAGE AT LEAST A LIMITED PULL-BACK OF ISRAELI FORCES AND A NORTHWARD EXPANSION OF UN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS• THERE WILL BE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL IN JULY AND APPARENTLY THE OPPOSITION LABOUR PARTY FAVOURS A COMPLETE MILITARY WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON• I SUGGESTED IN A REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL LAST WEEK THE POSSIBLE FUTURE GEOGRAPHIC EXTENSION OF UNIFIL'S MANDATE AS ISRAELI FORCES WITHDRAW AND THE WORKING OUT } OF ARRANGEMENTS SO THAT SOUTHERN LEBANON MIGHT BE A ZONE OF PEACE UNDER THE SOVEREIGNTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT• THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT REMAINS INSUFFICIENTLY RESOLVED TO PERMIT CONCLUSIONS ON THE FUTURE UNITED NATIONS ROLE THEREe I WANT TO PAY A TRIBUTE TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UN FAMILY IN BEIRUT FOR THEIR COURAGE AND STEADFASTNESS• I APPRECIATE THEIR CLOSE CO-OPERATION WITH MY REPRESENTATIVE, MR. AKHUND• I WAS ALSO GRATIFIED THAT All THE REPRESENTATIVES EXPRESSED TO MR • . URQUHAR WHEN HE WAS IN BEIRUT . THEIR WARM APPRECIATION � / OF All THE HELP THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE UN OBSERVER GROUP BEIRUT• - 7 - KING HUSSEIN SPOKE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF AN INITIATIVE BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE DISCUSSION OF A MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT• I FEEL THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD OFFER POSSIBILITIES PROVIDED THE MEMBERS ARE PREPARED TO USE ITe IN RESPONSE TO A GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION) I ASKED THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL EARLIER IN THE YEAR TO QUERY THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS CONCERNING THEIR VIEWS ON A MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE UNDER UN AUSPICES AS CALLED FOR BY THE ASSEMBLY• THE RESPONSES, SUCH AS THEY WERE, DID NOT SUGGEST SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD BE PROPITIOUS FOR THE PRESENT• MY FEELING IS THAT A PERIOD OF GREATER FLUIDITY CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI AND AMERICAN ELECTIONS WHICH MAY OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS ESPECIALLY SINCE BY THEN THE NUMBER ) OF ISRAELI FORCES IN LEBANON WILL PROBABLY HAVE BEEN REDUCED• I HOPE TO DEEPEN MY OWN CONTACT WITH THE MIDDLE EASTERN LEADERS IN THE NEXT MONTHSe ••• (FRENCH TEXT) - 8 - CHERS COLLEGUES J 7. CHERCHANT A AMORCER UN PROCESSUS DE PAIX DANS LA GUERRE DU GOLFE J'AI PROPOS{ EN MARS DERNIE� ) ) QUE MON REPR{SENTANT ENGAGE DES DISCUSSIONS POLITIQUES . DANS LES DEUX CAPITALES ET AILLE EN MEME TEMPS J } INSPECTER LES ZONES CIVILESe R{SERV{ AU D{PART � L'IRAK A ACCEPT{ MAIS L'IRAN QUI VENAIT DE LANCER UNE NOUVELLE OFFENSIVE A REJET{ MA PROPOSITIONe PAR AILLEURS / COMME L'IRAN CONTINUAIT A SOUTENIR QUE L'IRAK AVAIT RECOURS A LA GUERRE CHIMIQUE J'AI DE MA PROPRE AUTORIT{ ENVOY{ UNE MISSION ) J J ENQUETER SUR PLACEe LA MISSION A TROUV{ DES PREUVES D{CISIVES DE L'EMPLOI TANT DE GAZ MOUTARDE QUE DE GAZ NEUROTOXIQUE CONTRE LES FORCES IRANIENNES MAIS NON DE L'ORIGINE IRAKIENNE DE CES ARMES. CETTE AFFAIRE A VIVEMENT M{CONTENT{ L'IRA� TANDIS QUE L'IRAN JUGEAIT INAD{QUATE LA R{ACTION DU CONSEIL DE S{CURIT{f ON OBSERVE MAINTENANT UNE ACCALMIE SUR LE FRONT MAIS ON DOlT ENCORE S'ATTENDRE A UNE GRANDE OFFENSIVE IRANIENNE4 IL.SE PEUT QUE L'IRAK L'AIT JUSQU'A PR{SENT EMPECH{� EN SE SERVANT D'ARMES CHIMIQUES ET EN INTENSIFIANT SES ATTAQUES A{RIENNESe - 9 - CHACUN DES DEUX PAYS CONTINUE D'OCCUPER UNE BANDE {TROITE DU TERRITOIRE DE SON ENNEMI DE PART ET D'AUTRE DE LA FRONTitRE• / DE PASSAGE A NEW YORK LA SEMAINE DERNitRE M. PALME A RENCONTR{ ) LES REPR{SENTANTS PERMANENTS DE L'IRAN ET DE L'IRAK: IL N'A CONSTAT{ AUCUN CHANGEMENT DANS LEURS POSITIONS RESPECTIVES• 8. LA NAMIBIE A DONNE LIEU � UNE INTENSE ACTIVITEt l'AFRIQUE DU SUD A COMMENCE � RETIRER SES TROUPES DE L'ANGOLA DU SUD LE 31 JANVIER SOUS LA CONDITION QUE NI LES FORCES ANGOLAISES } / NI LA SWAP0 NI LES CUBAINS NE TIRERAIENT PROFIT DE LA SITUATIONt 1 EN ACCEPTANT LES TERMES DE CE DESENGAGEMENT L'ANGOLA ET LA SWAPO J ONT L'UNE ET L'AUTRE INSISTE SUR LA NECESSITE DE LE FAIRE SUIVRE } } RAPIDEMENT DE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DU PLAN DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LA NAMIBIE• l'AFRIQUE DU SUD ET L'ANGOLA ONT CR{{ UNE COMMISSION MILITAIRE MIXTE POUR SURVEILLER (AVEC L'AIDE AMERICAINE) L'EVACUATION DES TROUPES QUI DEVRAIT S'ACHEVER FIN AVRILe LEs·[TATS-UNIS ONT INDIQU{ CUE ) SUITE � CE PROCESSUS DE DESENGAGEMENT ILS REPRENDRAIENT / LES CONVERSATIONS BILATERALES AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT DE L'ANGOLA DANS LA DEUXItME MOITIE D'AVRIL POUR DISCUTER DU RETRAIT DES TROUPES CUBAINES ET DE L'APPLICATION DE LA RESOLUTION No. 435 (1978) DU CONSEIL DE S{CURITEt - 10 - TENANT COMPTE DE TOUS CES ELEMENTS LES ETATS / DE LA LIGNE DE FRONT ET LA SW�PO N'ONT PAS JUSQU'� PRESENT _ ) ) INSIST{ POUR REUNIR � CE STADE LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE J / } ETANT ENTENDU QUE DES PROGRtS CONTINUERAIENT D'ETRE FAITS DANS LA VOIE D'UN RtGLEMENTo DANS MES CONTACTS AVEC LE GOUVERNEMENT SUD-AFRICAIN J'AI SOULIGNE QUE LE DESENGAGEMENT ) DEVAIT CONDUIRE NON SEULEMENT AU RETABLISSEMENT DE LA SOUVERAINETE ANGOLAISE SUR LE SUO DE SON TERRITOIRE MAIS AUSSI � L'INDEPENDANCE DE LA NAMIBIE CONFORMEMENT / � LA RESOLUTION 435 DU CONSEIL DE SECURITEe J'AI FAIT PART } � CET-EGARD DES PREOCCUPATIONS QUE M'INSPIRENT L'ABSENCE J DE TOUT£ FORME DE CALENDRIERe 9. EN AMERIQUE CENTRALE LA SITUATION DEVIENT SANS CESSE } PLUS ALARMANTEt lE RENFORCEMENT DE L'ACTIVITE MILITAIRE EMPECHE TOUT PROGRts REEL DANS LA CORRECTION DES DESEQUILIBRES ECONOMIQU£S £T SOCIAUX QUI SONT � L'ORIGINE DES PROBLtMES ACTUELSt LES DIRIGEANTS o'AMERIQUE LATIN£ AUXQUELS J'AI RENDU RECEMMENT VISITE SE SONT MONTRES EXTREMEMENT PREOCCUPESt / lES EFFORTS DU GROUPE ·oE CONTADORA CONSTITUENT ENCORE LE.MEILLEUR ESPOIR ET � MON AVIS PROBABLEMENT LE SEUL ) } / DE PACIFICATION ET DE STABILISATION. CEPENDANT / DU FAIT DE LA POURSUITE DE L'INTERVENTION DES FORCES EXTERIEURE� CES EFFORTS SONT PRATIQUEMENT DANS L'IMPASS� TOUT AU MOINS JUSQU'� LA FIN DES ELECTIONS DU SALVADORe - 11 - AU CON SEIL DE SECU RITE LES ETATS-UNIS ONT OPPOSE LEUR VETO ) A UN PROJECT DE RESOLUTION NICARAG UAYEN QUI CONDAMNAIT LES ACTIONS MILITAIRES AMERICAINES ET QUI AVAIT RECUEIL LI TREIZE VOTES EN SA FAVEURe LE NICARAGUA A MAINTENANT SAISI DE CETTE AF FAIRE LA COUR INTERNATIONAL£ DE JUSTICEt LE SECRETARIAT N'A JOUE QU'UN ROLE PUREMENT TECHNIQUE EN COMMUNIQUANT LA LETTRE AMERICAINE A LA COUR ET AUX ETATS-MEMBRESt 10. l'ETAT PRESENT DES RELATIONS SOVIETO-AMERICAINES ASSOMBRIT CON SIDERABLEMENT LES PE R SPECTIVES DE DESARMEMENTe IL NE SEMBLE PAS QU'IL Y AIT LA MOINDRE CHANCE DE REPRISE PROCHAINE DES NEGOTIATIO NS BILATE RALES SUR LES ARMES NUCLEAI RESe IL SEMBLE / EN REVANCHE Y AV�IR QUELQUE ESPOIR D'ACCO RD A STOCKHOLM / SUR LES MES URES PROPRES A ACCROITRE LA CONFIANCEt A LA PREMitRE SESSION UN COMPR OMIS SEMBLE AVOIR COMMENCE } A SE DESSINER EN VERTU DUQUEL LES OCCIDENTAUX ACCEPTERAIENT DE PREN DRE UN ENGAGEMENT RELATIF AU NON-RECOURS A LA FORC� EN ECH ANGE DE L'APPROBATION PA R LES PA YS DE L'EST DE MESURES SPECIFIQUES DESTINEES A ACCROITR E LA "TRANSPARENCE" DES DEUX ARMEES RIVALES• - 12 - A LA CONF{RENCE DE GENtVE SUR LE O{SARMEMENT LES O{BATS / QUI DEVRAIENT SUSCITER LE PLUS VIF INT{RET ET LE PLUS GRANO ESPOI� SONT CEUX QUI PORTERONT SUR L'INTEROICTION TOTALE DES ARMES CHIMIQUES . l'URSS S'EST O{CLAR{E PRETE � ACCEPTER LE PRINCIPE DE LA V{RIFICATION SUR PLACE DE LA DESTR UCTION DES STOCKS EXISTANTSt LE S AM{RICAIN S VONT BIENTOT PR{SENTER UN NOUVEAU PROJET OONT ON PEUT PENSER QU'IL CONTIENORA DES DISPOSITIONS ALLANT PLUS LOIN EN MATit RE DE V{RIFICATION. UN ACCO RD RAPIDE EST TRtS PEU PROBABLE MAIS UNE N{GOTIATIO N S{RIEU SE SERAIT O{J� PAR ELLE-MEME UN {L{MENT POSITI Ft / / CE QUE JE SOUHAITE AVANT TOUT C'EST QUE L'ON PROGRESS£ / SUFFISAMMENT � STOCKHOLM ET � GENtVE POUR OUVRIR LA VOIE J / � LA REP RISE DES N{GOCIATIO NS SUR LES ARMEMENTS NUCL{AI RES AP RtS LES {LECTIO NS AM{RICAINESe 11. EN CONCL USION J'ABOROERAI L'UNE DES PLUS VIEIL LES QUESTIONS / QUI SE POSENT ACTUELLEMENT ET JE OIRAI QU'UN POINT CRITIQUE SEMBLE / ) UNE FOIS DE PLUS AVOIR {T{ ATTEINT DANS LA RECHERCHE O' UN RtGLEMENT } N{GOCI{ DE L'AF FAIRE DE CHYPREe EN MARS J'AI PR{SENT{ / AU CHEF DE LA COMMUNAUT{ CHYPRIOTE TU RQUE M. DE NKTASH J / LES SUGGESTIONS SUIVANTES: LE S INTERESS{S {VITERAIE NT TOUTE NOUVEL LE O{MARCHE TEN DANT � INTERNATIONALISER LE PROBLtME DE CHYPRE• - 13 - !LS NE DONNERAIENT PAS SUITE � LA DECLARATION CHYPRIOTE TURQUE DU 15 NOVEMBRE 1983 ET NE RENFORCERAIENT PA S LEUR PUISSANCE MILITAIREa VAROSHA SERAIT PLACEE SOUS L'ADMINISTRATIO N PROVISOIRE DES NATIO NS UNIES EN TA NT QU'ELEMENT DE LA ZONE TAMPON CONTROLEE / PAR LA FORCE DES NATIONS UNIES CHARGEE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX CHYPRE. UNE REUNIO N � UN HAUT NIVEAU SERAIT ORGANISE£ SOUS LES AUSPICE S DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL QUI CONDUIRAIT LA REOUVERTU RE DU DIALOGUE INTERCOMMUNAL• VE RS LA FIN DU MOIS DE MAR S M. DENKTASH A RE�U / UN CERTAIN NOMBRE DE CLARIFICATIO NS: ON ATTEND MAINTENANT UNE REPONSE OFFICIELLE DE LA PAR TIE CHYPRIOTE TURQUE• A LA LUMIERE DES EVENEMENTS QUI SE PRODUISENT DANS L'fLE ET ) / EN PARTICULIER DE LA PROPOSITION DE REFERENDUM CONSTITUTIONNEL / AU NORD J'AI DECIDE DE DEMANDER � L'AMBASSADEUR GOBBI DE SE RENDRE / DE TOUTE URGENCE NICOSIE DANS LE CADRE DE LA MISSION A J DE BONS OFFICE S DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL• CE QUI VA SE PASSER DANS LES JOURNEES QUI VIENNENT AURA DE TO UTE EVIDENC� J ) UNE INFLUENCE CAPITALE SUR LES CHANCES DE REGLEMENT• . . •••••••••••••• ,, ReviSEd Draft (J) Malday, 16 April 1984 - aftemoc:ll I declare open the first regular sessial of NX of 1984 and we1cane yoo to I.aldcn. At the wtset of oor meeting, I slnlld like to thank cur mst, Mr. C.P. Srivastava, am his colleagues at lK) for the excellent facilities they have placed at cur disposal. I CCDJratulate hlm m the new headwarters of 1M>. It is a fitting tri.b.lte to the services which the Qrganizaticn ren:iers to the internati.onal catm.mity. I slx:W.d also li.ke to we1cane a new manber of oor Comlittee, Dr. G. 0. P. ctasi, the new Secretary-General of the World Metearological Qrganizatioos. Also, many of }01 already know our new Secretary, Mr. Sotirios .r.blsooris, wh::> . took up his new respcnsibilities this 1t01th. en behalf of my colleagues in N.:r., 'fro1e 'tElcane you am look f of c:crx:ern to the unitEd Nations systan. I Cltl 9.1re that I speak for all msnbers of the Ccmnittee in ress exp ing oor deep awreciat.ial to a,t:ert M.lller for his services , not cnl.y as Secretary of the camdttee b.lt also as a. wise and trusted camsel.ar . We in the UnitEd Naticns are fortunate that he will not be leaving us. I have aska:i hlmto assist me in preparing far the Fortieth Anniversary of the UnitEd Natials, a respcnsibility for which he is uniquely suite:i given his lED;Jthy and d� service en behalf of the United Natia"ls. 1. 1dc:¢ial of the agenia 'lh:!provisialal agerda fer curial sess is befcre us in doc\.Jnent NX/1984/8 as drawn up by oor Ckganizatialal camli.ttee. May I take it that the camu.ttee wishesto adopt the agema as presente:i in that clocuDslt? It is so dec:ided. If 2. P,velC!II!!!nt and 1ntemat1onal •conca�ic eo-mration Let us take up tint thit artemoon the itl'lll concerning development and international •conca�ic c�operation. We bave ·before us, as a focus tor our discusaion, a paper an emplo1JDent which has been prepared by the Director-General or ILO. I pve him the noor to intro4uce the paper, which 1e before in Conference Ro0111 Paper 1. ["Mr. !lanchard.J Ul I thank colleague, Mr. !lanchard, for his excellent introduction and paper which ill, I sure, assist us in our discussion. ourThe first speaker my list is: v am 1. on 6. 2. 7. 3. e. 4. 9. • 0 5 • 1 . . 1 I II - 3 - t:_At. the em of the discus.siaa: You may wish to ask Mr. Blanchard ifhew::W.d like to make any cmcl.ui:in.J ranarks smna.rizin;} thessialJ discu I think we have had a very profitable exchar¥Je of views am , again, I thank oor colleague, Mr. Bl.arx:hard, far providing a useful paper which has serve:i as focus far oor discussioo. li) light of this experience, I would suggest that in the future we cootinue the practise of focusing oor dis=ussims of develq::ment am internatialal ecaxmic co-operatioo en specific thanes based oo discussioo papers to be cir culate:i in crlvance. If this is agreeable, we cculd ask the Organizat.i..ooal camuttee to make the necessary arrai¥janents based en prqx>sals subnitte:i by organizations. It is so agree:i . - 4 - 3. Ecalanic and tecmical �atial c!OCI'!J develq?in;J countries I.et us now turn to the third itsn m cur agerda, namely, the review of the lJ!lited Nations systan \IIOI'k in the areas of eccnani.c ani technical CC>-qleratim Cl'tDI'r:J develq>i.D3' countries. Yru will recall that we ccn1ucted a prel:iminary exc� of views at our last sessim. Since then cur progranme camti.ttee has preparei a draft of a report far oor apprcwal , which is before us in Ccnference Roan Paper 2. [""Note far the Secretary-General: If there is time, yru may wish to ask the Chairman of CCSQ(mo:;), Mr. Hansen, to make a few ccmnents an the repart:J I do not think at this point we do neal to anbark upcn a new dis::ussim of these cpestialS. I wculdse, prq:o therefore, that N:J; awrove the report am serrl it to the camli.ttee far Prograrme and co-ordination as requested by the Ecalanic and SOcial c.am::il in its resolution 1983/50. If I hear no abjecticn, it is so decidei. •· Perecnnel 9;aelt15!!• ' ... -... Let us now �� up the aatter of peraannel queaUons, a topic to which I am aure ve will 4evote a lot of tiM thil ;year. .la rou vil l aee in the agen4a, thia topic ce�priaea three parte. a. Review of the 'basis and level of remuneration of the Professional and h18her categories b. Post adjustment questions c. Questi ons concerning pensions and pensionable remuneratiex'l To assist us in our discussion of the first topic ( salaries), we have before us � report of the Ccnsultative Ccmnittee en Adminsitrative ()lestialS (CCAQ) as cootaine:i in a:nference � Paper 4. As far as the organiation of our discussion is concerne:i, I would suggest that at this stage we aim to have Bl'l initial exchange of view Cl'l these three interrelated questions, bea!'in4; in mind that it seems that we shall have to retum to then in�•• at a special eessic:11 in earl y July. '' - 6 - It has been -raxmtetdEd that' Mr. Mnir Ali, the Chai.J:man of the Coosultative camdttee m Administrative ()lest:i.als, stDuld atterxl this sessial to participate in cur dis::ussion. I wa1l.d prqa;e that he first of all brief us on the work of the a:1!0 ani em the report before us. We wwld then invite the Chainnan of the Intematianal Civil Service carmi.ssian am the President of FICSA. ani the COOVenar of the Co-ordinating Ccmnittee to join us arrl to exchim}e views with us en these �est:ials. I � tlel prqx>se that � ccniuct cur ew1 discussi.cn of these �estims. · May I take it that these prqxlSals are acceptai? It is so decided. I fOil invite Mr. Aamir Ali to lrief us en the work of the ·• l thank Mr. Auir Ali an4 �Ugelt bear the Cba11'1118.1) or the IntemaUonal Civil Se ice CCIIIII1tl1cn, Mr. Akvei. ve n011 rv ...rMr. Akvei.- 7 I thank Mr. Akvei. Let us now he r the views or the starr issues or concem to them. I first call on Mr. McLur,, the President or the Federation or Internationala Civil Servants• Associ&on tims. fMr. Mc1urg._7 ,- � ? I now call upon Mr. Irving, the Convenor or the C:>-c:"dinating C amDittee. ["Mr. Irving.?_7 - 8- Doe• any anber or the C�1 ttee vilh to addre11 any ocamenta or queetiana either to the Chairman or the International Civil Service CCIIIII1i111on or to the repreaentat1vea of tbe 1ta!t? 1. 6. 2. 7. e. 5. 10. If there are no further questions or cc:aments for the :hainu.n o! the International Civil Service Commission or the representatiYes of the staff, I thank them for their participation in this diseussiao. f:Tne Chaiman of the ICS: and the representatives or t.� starr leave the JCC roaiiJ._7 ·. - '- Let 111 nov ocn4uct an excbanre or Yieva ucnc CNrttl'Ytl en thelt three QU .. ticns cn aalariea, post a4jultments an(! pens1cns. The first epeaker en •Y lilt 11: l. 6. 2. �. e. 5. 10. ["At the end of the discussion, the Secretary-Gene:-al may vish to call an either the Chairman of CCAQ or Mr. Ruedas to summari u the vievs: Ro specific outccae is required of ACC at this time, but it would be usef'ul to indicate that this exchanp of views could provide . f a starting point for the work of CCAQ._7 ; Tbeee are ce���plicated and difficult questions fo:- all or us. As I indicated at the outset of our diacuesicm, ve ahall retam to these items at our aeeting to be held in Jul:r, at vbich time ve ahall be called upon to aake specific deciaiana. - 10 - 5. Criteria ani p!'CIC8"tnres far eel.ectim of can:iidates farposts within the 10:.machinery lA!t us turn to the nert itan oo cur agen::la tllich CCilOemS the eelect.ial of caMidates for the posts within the 10:. machinery. You will recall that we recpest.Ed our crqani.zaticmal Ccmni.ttee to prepare such criteria and prooaiures in view of the a�Dmt of time we seen to spen:i m these matters. Cl1r Ckganizatialal. Catrni.ttee has made a reolil!ematicn to us, as CCI'ltained in the �ema. r'l'o be revised inthe light of �ent CXIlSUltat.ials.7 .· ' . - 11 - 6. O!e!ticn& relatilvJ to 1nfoz:maUm We shall take up the tepett of cur infODDatial camdttee. We have a paper � far us as ccnt&ined in Q:mference ltxm Paper 3. We have already diSOlssed in mr pt"ivate aessial the policy aspects ofthat paper and I do not think that we need to reiterate that discussial. You will see in yQJr aqema that mr CE"ganizatimal camdttee has rbXiiiuended to us the adcptim of a draft decisial which takesnate of the p:tq:osed oc 1'1111'1 strategy in respect of operatialal activities far devel.qment amof the p:togress n:part oo the ilrplBIISltatim of KX decisim 1982,182. May I take it that the draft decisicn is adopted? It is so dec.idai. In addit.ial , the report allmittai to KX by JUNIC cxntains specific rec-m•eJdati.clls to guide future l«lrk in theic plb] infat1Dat.ia1 field. Is the Cmmittee preparai to adeptticns? theserecciiiDI!Dia CI£ .DOt, may I �that we�JUNIC to rwiew ani , as �iate , rwise the reomnerdatials in the light of cxmnenta to be DlllliJie:l - u- 7. Other matters The last itan before us at this sessioo in itan 8 1 other matters. Under this itan, cur attentim is drawt to five decisioos adoptEd oo cur behalf by tb:! Ck'ganizaticna.l Ccmnittee , as cmtained in tb:! annex to oor agenda. May I take it that tb:!se decisims meet with the awrc:wal of tb:! Ccmnittee? It is so decided. I understarrl that agreement has l:een reached an tb:! following appointments : a. Mr. Golubev of UNEP as Olaiiman of tb:! TaskFarce oo Science and Technology far Devel.q:ment : b. Mr. Yeganeh of the Unital Naticns as Chail:man of the Interagency Grcup oo New and Renewable Srurces of Energy. If I hear no objectials1 it is so decided. ••• y � " • cmclua1on ·� Thatbrinp to t.be encS or t.be vork or t.hil lelli I thank 70U for a aoetuaetul ancS interestinc exchl.np ot Yieva . Once &pin I ahoulcS\ll like to thank Mr. Sriftstava ancS hi• en.colle &BUe• tor the excellent �menta they have aacSe tor t.hi1 aessian. All t.hat remains is tor ae to Wilh :r� banvo)'&P • . . . - .· -· •' DEPARTMERT OF POLITICAL ARD CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY COUNC IL AFFAIRS POLITICAL AFFAIRS DIVISION PAS & LA: va 10 Apr il 1984 SPAIN SPAIR Re lat ion sh ip to the Un ited •at ion s Spain was admitted . to Un ited •ations membe rship on 14 December 1955 . The country previous ly had been exc luded from the 8K and other intergovernmental organ izations because of its world war II link to the Axis Powe rs and th e authoritarian nature of th e Franco r6gtme . Vp unt il a decade ago, an �portant involvement of the UR with Spain was the deco lonization process, since Spain possessed the non-self-govern ing territories of Fernando P6o and Rio Mun i (now merged as the independent State of Equatorial Guinea ), Ifni (now incorporated into Morocco ), and the Spanish Sahara . Since coming to power in October 1912, the Soc ialist Gove rnment of Pr ime Minister GonzAlez has sought to win for Spain a more in fluential vo ice in world affairs . To th is end, it has attempted to pu rsue a more broadly-based, activist fore ign policy reflecting the country 's size as a medium power and its historical links with Latin America and the Mediterranean . On issues before the UN, the Government 's foreign policy frequently reflects the influence of the Socialist International, of wh ich Mr . GonzAlez has been for severa l years a Vice Pres ident and whe re he developed close ties with such Soc ialist leaders as Willy Brandt and Olof Patme . �e GOnzAlez Government has re affirmed th at Spain is integra lly part of the We stern world and shares and defends its values . At the same tt.e, it has sough t greater autonomy for Spain within the We stern all iance and has pledged to he lp de fuse confrontationa l bloc politics, particularly in the fields of disarmament and regional disputes . Madrid remains proud of its ro le as host to the fo llow-up meeting of the Con ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (esc: . . . from 19!1 through 19!3 . Spain has dec lared it shares the Secretary- General 's be lief that for all its defects, the VR is the "best ava ilable international in strument" for achieving peace, stability and justice . Spain served two te rms on the Security counc il, in 19,9-70 and recently fro. 19!1 to 1982 . The country at present is a meaber -2- inter alia of the COmm ission on Ruman Rights, Special Committee on the UN Charter, Special Comaittee on Peacekeeping Operat ion s, --Ad Hoc committee on the world Disarmament COnference, committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Committee on Information, Special committee on the Bon-Use of Force, Commission on Ruman Settlements, committee on Batural Re sources, and the Committee on fte lationa with the Bo at Country . A membe r of virtually all UR and inter-governmental agencies, Spain sits on the governing bodies of the URDP, PAO, URESCO, VREP, WHO , MMD, UPO and ITU, as well as UMCTAD 'a Trade and Deve lopment Board and URIDO 'a Industrial Development Board . It is also a non-r89ional member of the African Development Bank , the Inter-American Deve lopment Bank, and the UM Economic Commission for Lat in America . Spain is one of on ly sixteen countries which pay over one percent of the regular UN budget . Asses sed at 1.93 percent, Spain 's gross contribution for 19!4 is $12, 538, 92 9. A major focus for Spain 's voluntary contributions is URDP, to wh ich it promised $2 , 640, 000 at the Bovember pledging conference, and URKWA, to which it has ·pledged $1 million for 1984 . Under the socialist Government, other voluntary contributions or pledges have increased sign ificant ly They include : $440, 000 to mtiCEF (1984) : $400, 000 to WFP (1983-U biennium) : $328, 161 to UREP (1984) : $176, 000 to UHBCR (1914) : $100, 000 to UNITAR (19!4) : $88, 000 to UNPPA (1984) : $15, 000 to the UN Education and �raining Programme for southern Africa (198 3) : and $3, 667 to the UR COmmittee for Elimination of aac ial Discrimination (1984) . Spain 's Permanent Representative is Don Jaime de Pini6s, who presented his credentials on 18 September 1973 . High-rank ing Spanish nationa ls serving with in the U& system include Patricio auedaa, Un der-secretary-General for Admin istration and Management, and Santiago �rres-Bernardez, Registrar of the International co_urt of Justice . As of February 1984, thirty-nine Spanish nationa l• (seven · of whom were women ) filled geographical posts at the Ul, out of a des irable range of 31 to 51. Spain hosts the World !'our i Organization, based in Madrid, and the �vernment has expreased willingness to cooperate with the Un ited Rations in opening a -3- UR Information Centre in the Spanish capital . ro re ign Policy on Qu estions before the Un ited Rations Prime Minister GonzAlez frequently visited Central America as a Socialist International envoy, and he bel ieves Spain has unique leveraqe to help resolve th e area 's outatandinq conflicts . His Government has qiven full support to the Contadora Group and ita Document of Ob jectives wh ich at ,pre sent, in Spain 's view, ia the only initiative wh ich has a qenuine ch ance of success . Spain advocates establishment of qenuine pluralist democracies in the reqion, scrupulous respect for human riqhts, rejection of th e threat or use of force, el�ination of any outs ide interference, armaments control, and gradual removal of fo reiqn military bases and advisors . Madr id contends that not all the necessary conditions were met to validate the election s in Bl Salvador, but it ha s endorsed the ho ldinq of elections next November in •icaraqua, wh ich several Socialist party members from Spain reportedly will he lp orqan ize . The GonzAlez Government sharply condemned the US intervention in Grenada and was invo lved in efforts to negot iate the return of Cuban prisoners . Spain supports a dialogue between Washinqton and Cuba, and th is February it became the first we st European country to receive President castro . Spain has supported all UN resolutions on the Falk landsjMalvinaa dispute, and it stronqly believes that neqotiations between Arqentina and 8ritain "should culminate in the restoration of Argentinian territorial inteqr ity ." Foreiqn Minister Moran declared recently that the difficulties Spain experienced with Britain over Gibraltar as a result of th e South Atlantic conflict have now been overcome, and that proqress has been made by commissions of experts meetinq on technical topics . POlitically, hOwever, the stalemate persist• . Spain nonethe lesa hopes th at the issue will be resolved in the context of its planned adhes ion to the European commun ities in 198' and therefore appears not to want to brinq the dispute squarely before the UN at this juncture . Favourinq a req�onal solution to the Sahara question, Spain continues to endo rse UR and OAU resolutions callinq for the S&hiaoui -determination people to be allowed to exerc ise its riqht to self -4- through a referendum . At the same time, the Socialists appe ar to have angered POLISARIO by the ir re fusal to grant diplomatic status to the Front •• projected information office in Madrid and by the ir efforts to stabilise Spain •s de licate re lat ion s with Mo rocco . Spain has underlined the priority it accords disarmament issues by formally declaring its candidature for the Conference on Disarmament, in who se work it currently participates as an invited non-member. The main areas of Spain 's concern are re f lected in the resolutions it co-sponsored at th e 38th General Assembly, on ch emical and bacter io log ical weapons, regional disarmament and the need fo r a comprehensive nuc lear-test-ban treaty . Spain also attaches great tmportance to guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States (although it does not be lieve it will be feasible for such guarantees to take th e form of a treaty) , preventing an arms race in outer space, and the regular study of the reallocation of military resources to civilian purposes . When joining NATO in 1982 , the storage or transport of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory was proh ib ited by th e cortes . However, the Soc ialist Government, contrary to expectations, has not acceded to the Nuc lear Non-Pro liferation Treaty, reportedly because of its interest 'n manufacturing nuc lear eng ines for sUbmarines . Spain has long contended that the Palestinian prob l .. con stitutes th e core of the Middle East conflict . While supporting resolutions 242 and 338, Spain has urged the Security Counc il to supplement them "by a statement clearly and unequivocally reaffirming the inalienable righ ts of the Palestin ian people , inc luding its right to self-determination" . Spain advocates creation of a Palestinian state and was one of the few We st European countries to attend the ON Conference on Palestine last August. Spain traditionally has had close re lations with the Arab countries and in March, Mr. GonzAlez visited Saudi lting Fahd, Jo rdan ' a King Hussein and the PLO • s Arafat . !fhe only We st Buropean country without diploaatic relat ions to Israel, Spain has indicated it is likely to norma lise ties with the Jewish state prior to joining the EC. �e Socialist eovernaent has frequently dec lared ita support for Lebanon 's Pres ident cemaye l and his att ..pts at national reconciliation, but it reportedly dec lined a Lebanese -s- invitation in 1982 to participate in the Multinational Force in Be irut . Spain qualifies its re lat ions with both Iran and Iraq as "excellent" , and it consistently has supported UR appeals for the two countries to negotiate an end to the ir confli ct . The Spanish Government endorses the Secretary-General 's efforts towards a resumption of intercommunal talks on Cyprus . It has condemned the �urkish Cypr iot declaration of independence as a move that wo uld increase tens ion in the eastern Mediterranean . Spain has given "determined support" to UN resolut ion s on Afgh an istan and Kampuchea, calling for a withdrawa l of fore ign troops and for the peoples to be able to choose the ir own future without outs ide interference . ae peatedly calling for the speedy independence of Namibia in accordance with re so lution 435, Spain has condemned the illegal presence of south Africa and th at country 's delaying · tactics . It has also been outspoken in characterizing apartheid . as "one of the most hateful forms" of mas s ive human rights violations, although it has expressed reservations about the use of armed struggle in th is context . Spain has ratified the international conventions re lating to aparthe id and has taken measures to break economic contacts with South Africa, but press reports last Octobe r alleged that in 1982 Spain sold to Pretoria $2 million worth of small arms, arms that are not covered by the 1977 UR arms embargo resolution . Upon its inauguration, the GonzAlez GOvernment affirmed it would active ly promote the New International Economic Order . Spain, it has stressed, is particularly we ll qualified because of ita own intermediate level of development and its special political and cultural ties with broad regions of the deve loping world . Spain recently ratified the Agreement Establishing the common Fund for COIIIDOdities . At UHCTAD this February, Spain introduced the first part of the "Group B" dOClDlent on the review and illlpleaentation of the International Development Strategy for the �ird UR Develo�t Decade . Spain has signed the Pinal Act but not the Convention on the Law of the Sea, apparently because it objects pr�ar ily to certain provisions on transit passage through straits used for international navigation . As one of the thirteen States wh ich _,_ have acceded to the Antarctica �reaty without decis ion-aaking powers, Spain is believed to be reticent to see the General Assembly take up the issue . Mr. GonzAlez has pledged to be " increas ingly more aggressive in the international arena in de fence of human rights . " Spain has co-sponsored Ge nera� Assembly resolutions on internation al cooperat ion to avert new flows of refugees and supports the right to development, the rights of migrant workers, and efforts to eliminate discr�ination against women . Although Spain opposes taking a se lective approach to human righ ts violations, it has expressed part �cular concern ove r deaths, disappearances, and persecutions for polit ical be liefs in Lat in Ame rica . In January, Prime Minister GonzAlez renewed his call for an internat ional conference on terrorism . Spain reportedly was one of the 24 industrial countries wh ich th is March pre sented th e UNESCO Director-General with a list of proposals advocating 1) a change in the voting sy stem regarding budgetary spending, 2) the non-politiciaation of issues, and 3) limitations to the scope of the New International Information Order . Spain 's act ion was sign ificant in that the country sits on UNESCO 's 45-member Executive Board . The Dome stic Political Situation �at democ racy in Spain has attained, in the nine ye ars since General Pranco •s death, a remarkable deqree of political stabi lity is due in large part to the leadership qualities of King Juan carlos, des ignated by General Franco as his successor . The King, along with Ado lfo suArez, the pr ime minister he appointed, he lped unite political opinion around the pr imacy of .conso l idating Spanish democracy, wh ile at the same time liberalizing the new regiae . In 1982 , the Government survived an attempted ailitary coup . In the elect ion s held later that year, an orderly transition was aade fro. the centrist configuration of the �diate post-Franco years to essentially a two-party syst.. wh ich .are accurately re flects the pol itical reality in Spain . After over a year in office, the Government of Prt.e Min ister -7- GonzAlez has retained a high level of pub lic conf idence . Yhia is due in part to the Socialiata ' moderate, praC)Dlatic approach to Spain •• severe economic criaia, ita diatruatful ail itary, and deep-seated conservatism throughout much of the country . Criticia from both right and left has been restrained, although the unions and Catholic Church have adamantly opposed certain Government measures . Mr. GOnzAlez baa given priority to modernizing industry and tr�ing inflation . His GOvernment can cla� some economic successes in that Spain 's foreign currency reserves have increased substantially and its growth rate has been tw ice the Europe an ave rage, but the economy still auffers a 17 percent unemployment rat� and a burgeoning deficit . Violence in the Basque region has troUbled the Government, although it has benefited fro• greater anti-terrorist cooperation with Prance . concerning RATO, de apite recent indication s that a •ajority of Spaniards opposes Spain • s full integration, there is little domestic pressure on the Soc ialists to tmplement the ir election promise to ho ld a referendum on the matter� Spanish public opinion appe ars to support the Government 's handling of the EC entry negotiations and of th e Gibraltar dispute, although it is impatient over delays in both cases . . \ - 8- Li•t of Princ ipal Government Of ficials Chief of State, Commander in Chief Xinq Juan Car los I of the Armed Forces Prime Minister • • Fe lipe GonzAlez MArquez Deputy Prime Minister . . Alfonso Guerra GonzAlez Min . of the Pres idency Javier Moscosco de l Prado MUftoz Min . of Fo reiqn Affa irs •• Fernando MOrAn LOpez Min . of Interior Jo s6 Barr ionuevo Pefta Min . of Economy and Finance Mique l Boyer Salvado r Min . of Defense &arci•o Serra i Serra Min . of Ju stice . . Fernando Lede sma Bartret Min . of Aqriculture, Fisheries Carlos Romero He rrera and Food Min . of Labor and Soc ial Secur ity Jo e� Jo aquin A�unia Amann Min . of Industry and Enerqy Carlos Solchaqa CatalAn Min . of Culture . . Javier Solana Madariaqa Min . of Education and Science Jo s6 Marla Maravall Herrero Min . of Transportation, Tour ism Enrique Carlos Bar6n Crespo and commun ications Min . of He alth and consumer Affairs Ernest Lluch Martin , Min . of Te rritorial Adm in istration TomAs de la Quadra Salcedo Min . of Ptiblic Wo rk s and City Ju lian Campo Sainz de Rozas Planninq - u Rt-·c� ._ "_ Jt. c:.c... -· APR 6- NOte f� tba. Secretary-General Subject : United Na tions .Irtformation- centre in Madrid The negotiations on the approval have progressed to the point where there is only one item outstanding . Unfortunately , that item - a tax question � is a sticky one . The Spanish Government will exempt UN employees from taxation on their UN emoluments ; but , with respect to any other income , they wish to apply the tax percentage applicable to the total amount , i.e. if the UN employee should - earn $10, 000 and had $10,000 outs ide income , they would tax only the $10,000 outside income , but at the rate applicable to $20,000. Mr . Scott is dealing with th is matter with Mr. Artacho at the Spanish Mission , but I feel the solution will not come in time to permit signing the agreement for your visit. P. Ruedas 6 April 1984 cc : Mr. Akashi Mr . Scott Note : Dictated to HEM. over the telephone from Mr. Ruedas who wa • at the airport. Fact Sheet SPAIN Geogr aph ical Repr . Range : Weighted Range (30 June 1983 data) : Des irable range: 38-51 Desirable range: 1475-1995 Midpoint: 44 .14 Midpoint: 1735 Staff on board: 39 (7) Staff position : 1503 USG D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/P-2 Levels of staff members on boa rd: 1 6 6 ( 1) 4 12 (5) 10 ( 1) 1984 APC/APB recommendations : !( 1 1 Staff reaching age 60: 1984-85: 0 Candidates on the compu terized roster : 83 (9) 1/ Level Name Functional Title Status P-4 Rubiato, J. UNCTAD Economic Affairs Officer APC 16/l/84 Lead ing candidate : P-2 Zapico, E. Intrnl Audit (Geneva) Asst Auditor To be pr�sented to APC Note : Numbers in pa rentheses represent female staff members or cand ida tes Prepared 11 Apr il 1984 /MIM ECE 29 March 1984 A NOTE ON THE · SPANI$H ECONOMY TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 I. Genera l developments, 1940-1983 2 II . Some ma jor problems of the Spanish economy 5 1. Sav ing and investment 5 Fore ign payments and energy imports 5 3. Unemployment 7 2. 4. The public sector deficit 8 5. Inflation 8 Indu strial re structuring 8 7. Spain and the Common Market 9 6. - 1 - A NOTE ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY Introduction The last three decades have witne s sed the mo st rapid period of change ever to have taken place in the economy of Spain . In th is country , the long period of economic expan sion which fo l lowed the end of the second world war started somewhat later than in the rest of we stern Europe . The rate of expan sion of the Spanish economy wa s part icularly rapid between 1960 and 1974 when output per head grew by 5. 9 per cent a year, a rate only exceeded among the ma jor industrial countries by Japan . The expans ion of the Spanish economy wa s great ly affected by the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 and by the general re cession prevai l ing in mo st we stern countries since 1973 . The annual rate of growth of total output, which had accelerated from 5.7 pe r cent in the period 1954-1 964 to 6.4 per cent in 1964-1974, fe ll to 1.6 per cent between 1974 and 1983 . The rapid ra te of output growth during the 1960s and ea rly 1970s had brought the level of rea l output per head (based on purchasing power parities) to 72 per cent of the OECO average in 1975, but th is had fa llen to 66 pe r cent in 1982 . The economic trans formation of Spain during the last decade is re flected by the rad ical changes in the distribution of output and employment between 1954 and 1983 : Employment Outpu t 1954 1983 1954 1983 (Per cent of total) Agriculture 45 18 25 6 Industry 29 34 31 35 Serv ices 25 48 43 58 The shift from an ag rarian to a serv ice and manufacturing econo-y wa s accompan ied by a process of great strateg ic importance, name ly, the open 1ng of the Spanish economy . In 1954 the share of exports of good s and serv ices in gross domestic product was 5 per cent : in 1983 it was 21 per cent . The share of import s also ro se from 5 to 21 per cent of GOP . Howewer, cons idering its popu lation (39 mi llion) and its GOP per capita , $6,9 70 in 1982, - 2 - Spain is still a re latively closed economy . The pre sent note prov ides a very brief. historical rev iew of deve lopments in the · spanish economy and then focusses on some of the main prob lems confronting it. I. General developm ents, 194Q-1983 The years from 1940 to 1959 are generally referred to as the autarchy pe riod of Spain's economic development . Th is period was characterized by moderate ra tes of growth of output (3 to 4 per cent ) and a very weak fore ign sector greatly dependent on exports of ag ricu ltural products . The economy was isolated behind very high protectionist barriers . Labour reserves were plentiful (due to demographic factors and to the untapped labour reserves in ag riculture ) and wages were low, but labour re lat ions were contro lled and re stricted by an authoritarian and paternalistic state . Industrial policy, mostly implemented through state enterprises, was based on a philosophy of import substitution particu larly in the primary industrial sectors . The main obstac les to further expansion under this reg ime originated in the narrowness of the interna l market : new forms of consumption with high income elasticities (such as consumer durables or cars ) could not develop due to the low levels of income and economies of scale cou ld not be reaped . C.pita l investment wa s hampered by the impos sibi lity of importing .adern technologies : export earnings were small and imports were anyway �pared by a system of direct controls and cumbersome administrat ive practices . For� ign capital was kept out by administrative controls . The weakness of th is system cu lminated , not surpris ingly, in a foreign payments and liquid ity crius in 1959 . Then , the stabil ization plan of 1959 wa s introd uced on the advice of I�F and OECD experts . It was essentially a policy aimed at opening the S�nish economy to market forces and fore ign competition . After a per1od of ad justment (1959/60) there was a rapid acceleration in the rate of econo11ic expans ion : from 3.6 per cent per year in the period 1954-1960, GOP (in volume) grew by 9 per cent a year between 1960 and 1964 . Private con,�tion rose at 8. 8 per cent and gross fixed capita l formation at nearly 14 per cent per year . - 3 - There are several reasons for the success of the 1959 po licies , many of them deriving from the general prosperity and expansion then prevai l ing in the industrial countries of western Europe . I� the first place the excess labour supply in Spain found emp loyment in the more industrial ized economi es ; this led to a large inf low of emigrants ' remittances wh ich contributed to the virtual disappearance of the fore ign payments bottlenec k. Second ly , west European prosperity brought to Spain growing numbers of tourists who made the largest sing le contribution to ba lanc ing the current account . The disappearance of the fore ign exchange shortage led to an expans ion of imports of ad vanced capital good s, and between 1959 and 1973 fixed capital investment in manufac turing grew by about 18 per cent a year. As a result industrial output and productivity rose sharply and manufactured exports grew rapid ly in a number of sectors (ships , textiles and footwear) . Fore ign capital also began to enter the country , bringing with it new technologies . The only unfavourable feature of economic development in this period was the low growth of total employment (only 0. 9 per cent per year) . Agricultural employMnt decreased (by 3 pe r cent per year) but industrial employment increased re latively slow ly (1 .8 per cent per year) wh ile employMnt in serv ices increased by 3.5 per cent per year . Th is shift in resources from sectors of low productivity (agriculture) to sectors of high productivity (serv ices and industry ) explains a great part of the except ional g!"owth of output in this period . As can be seen in the attached diagram , investment decelerated fro. the mid-1 960s . The main reasons for this were that capacity had been exPAnd ing much faster than demand during the ea rly 1960s and that ri sing labour costs cou ld no longer (as during the early 1960s ) be absorbed by produc tivity increases . A new phase of recovery started in 1971 and lasted to 1973 , although a fa irly high rate of expansion continued unti l 1974 as ad just.. nt to the first oi l price crisis was pos tponed for political reasons . During the 1964-1974 period of expans ion , unemployment was al..,.yt low (less than 2 per cent of active popu lation , thanks to emigrat ion) , CAPAc ity uti lization was high and inflation moderate . - 4 - The first oi l crisis caught the Spanish economy in a period of high expans ion and no ad justment measures were taken unti l 1977 (Moncloa agreements) . From 1974 onward s, howgver, the effects of the economic cri sis were clearly fe lt . Output and productivity decelerated rapid ly , and investment fe 11 from 1975 unti 1 1980. Unemployment increased rapidly (to over 11 per cent of the active popu lation in 1980) , inflation accelerated to 24 per cent in 1977 and the current · account deficit reached 3.5 per cent of GOP in 1976 . The po licy changes in 1977 inc luded two important innovations . The first was that , under the new democratic regime, trade unions and employers ' organizat ions for the first time sat together at the negotiating table . The second was that trade unions were ready to accept wage settlements which took into account not past rates of inflation but expected (and lower) rates in which the effect of the new oi 1 prices was excluded . The economic policies of 1977, which inc luded devaluation (by nearly 20 per cent) , li•its to monetary expansion , and controls of publ ic spend ing·, were quite effective in reducing inf lation and in eliminating the current account deficit . Unemployment, however, conti nued to rise . The most difficult period of ad justment was over by 1979 , and policy makers were ready for a new pe riod of expansion when the new oil shock upset � al l the ir forecasts . The ma in difference between the two oil shocks �s the ! speed at which po licies reacted to them . Wh ile the negat ive aspects of the I I fi rst oil shock were only ab sorbed in 1977-1 979 , the po licy reac tion in ··' . 1979-1980 was to let the effects of higher oil pri ces pa ss into the pr ices of inputs and final consumer good s as qu ick ly as po ssible. fhe main re sults of this choice were that inf lation did not acce lerate but on the contrary slowed down , and the import surplus of good s and services began. to decline in 1983 . In spite of the changes of government there has been a continuity in qenera l po licy between 1977 and 1983 , particu larly in re spect of the contai.,..nt of money wage growth below the increases in prices , and in the implement•t ion of a monetary po licy based on the strict contro l of the money supply . - 5 - II . Some major problems of the Spanish economy 1. Saving and investment Savings have been severely affected by the 1973-1983 recession . Before 1974 income growth had allowed rising levels of consumption and growing savings ratios . But net sav ing then fe ll from 18 per cent of tota l national disposable income in 1973 to only 8.8 per cent in 1982. Thus in spite of the deceleration of investment, increased borrowing abroad was needed to finance capital formation (particularly during 1974-1977 and again in 1980--1983 ). Although several factors have influenced the dec l ine of savings, one of the most important is that consumption has not fa llen in spite of an increa se in the petro l bi ll which ro se from 1.4 per cent of GOP in 1970 to 5.8 per cent in 1980 . As real total consumpt ion has not decreased , the income transfer re sulting from higher oil prices has fa l len on domestic sav ings and the profits of enterprises . Gross fixed capital formation was the component of domestic demand most affected by the crisis and fell sharply after the first oil shock . In volume terms, in 1983 it was some 8 per cent below its level in 1973 . 2. Foreign pay ments and energy imports The fore ign sector has been a traditional constraint on the possibi lities of economic growth in the Span ish economy . During the late 1960s and early 1970s , rapid ly increasing fore ign receipts from tourism and em igrants ' remittances removed the previously existing foreign exchange bottleneck and for the period 1968-1973 the current account was slight ly in surplus wh ile the trade deficit was on average about $2 billion . The dependence of the Span ish economy on impo rts of energy and raw materials was clearly revealed by the first oil price shock : the trade deficit ro se from an average of $2 bi ll ion in 1968-1973 to one of $7 bi lli on in 1974-1977. At the same time the current account deficit increa sed to over $3 bi llion and although net travel and transfer receipts cont 1 nued growing they only covered 60 pe r cent of the trad e gap. The strong corrective action of 1977 lead to a reduction of the trade defic1t in 1978-1979 to an average of $4 .9 billion and to the r&-emergenca of a current - 6 - account surplus. The 1974 scenario wa s repeated in 1980 when the second oil crisis led to a doubling of the trade deficit (from $6 billion in 1979 to $12 billion in 1980) . Unlike 1974 . howev�r, corrective action was taken immed iate ly and the trade deficit was reduced to $7 bi llion in 1983 . Although the high energy and raw material import dependence of the Spanish economy is the mo st important element in its balance of payments problem, there are other negative factors wh ich could become increasingly important in the future . Among these are the rising payments abroad of investment income due to the ris ing level of fore ign indebtedness. Tota l gross foreign debt increased from $3 .5 billion in 1973 to $30 billion in 1983 ; in the latter year, interest and amortization payments reached some $7 billion . Payments of ro yal ties consequent on technology i•ports have also been rising rapidly . Commod ity exports have developed vigorously during the last decade and Spain has increased its share s in most foreign urkets ; nevertheless, it would be premature to suppose that the fore ign pay.ents constraint will evolve favou rably in the near future . -- Rapidly ris ing labour costs during the last decade have eroded the comparative advantage of export products based on cheap labour costs (in which some NIC' s have become increas ingly competitive). At the same time the technological content of Spanish exports is still low. Income from tourism has proved part icularly - . resilient in the present crisis, bu t in recent years tourist expenditures abroad by Spaniards has been increas ing rapid ly and might do so even fa ster in the future . Also the closing of emigration outlets may i•ply a stagnation in the level of remittances . . , ... .... - As already mentioned , the trade and current accounts have been greatly · . ... - influenced by trade in energy products . The fo l lowing table shows i•port ... _. _..,...... dependence of Spain in energy products ; . �� Average the Percentage s 1970-1973 1974 1980 1983 Share of energy imports in total imports 14 .2 25.4 38.• 40 .1 26 .0 55 .2 63 .1 Energy imports as per cent of total exports '>9·. 3 Trade deficit in energy as a share of total trade deficit 26 .4 U.2 104.2 lH .• Trade deficit in energy as a share of GOP 1.5 3.9 5.9 6.3 - 7 - Th is dependence on energy imports origi nated in the fact that between 1963 and 1973 domestic production of primary energy remained pract ically stagnant so that the rapid increase of dom�stic demand for energy was mo stly su ppl ied by oi 1 imports . The policy re sponse to the energy problem was slow and on ly in 1979 wa s a Nationa l Energy Plan drawn up. It aims to reduce import dependence to 54 per cent by 1987 (compared with 70 per cent in 1980) . The re structuring of the energy sector is based on a shift of supply toward s nuc lear energy , gas and coal and the promotion of domestic sources of �·· energy . Even if this ambitious plan , which involves massive investments , is ... - .... ""' fulfilled the dependence on energy imports will rema in high, at over 54 per ..... 3. Unemployment The number of unemployed in Spain increased from an average of 434,000 in 1973 to 2.4 mi llion in the third quarter of 1983 ,·-:or fro• 3.2 per cent of the .. active popu lation to more than 18 per cent . -:· !h�·: latter rate . is we ll above - :-:: . - the average in OECD Europe (10. 7 per cent) ..� ...... f'loreover, the official . . ! .. . unemployment rate understates the problem insofar as it does not take into account - the number of discouraged work ers (i.e . · workers who have left the -. labour force due to lack of employment opportunities). If these work ers are taken into account , the unemployment rate can be esti��ated to increase by at least a further 8 po ints . The reasons for the deterioration of the labour situation in Spain are mu ltiple and include demographic causes and the .. reversal of the emigration flows to the industrially advanced countries . But ::'! • '!: the main cau se has been the reduction of employment by 1110re than 2 •i 11ion _. . -. persons from 1974 to the end of 1983 . The unemployment rate is part icu larly high among the young ( 43 per cent of those (in 1983) aged 16 to 24 years ) and women (21 per cent) . No solution to the problem of unemployment seems likely in the near future sinc e. even as suming stab le activity rates, the rate of growth of production requ 1red to reduce unemployment would have to be above 5 pe r cent . - 8 - 4. The pu blic sector deficit Another key problem of the Spanish ecc:momy in recent years has been the growing deficit of the publ ic sector, which has moved from a po sition of modest surplus in 1973 to a deficit of somewhat less than 6 per cent of GOP in 1983 . In 1973 both receipts and expend itures represented rough ly 23 per cent of GOP , but in 1982 receipts were 31 per cent and expenditures 37 per cent . The increase 'in the public sector deficit is due to the very ra pid increase in .• ' � total expend iture during the period 1977-1982, particularly on soc ial j transfers (unemployment benefits , pensions , transfers to health service, i • etc.). The increase in the deficit thus appears to be more a consequence of 4 the cri sis than a cause . However, its longer tenD solution wi ll depend not on ly on a recovery of economic growth but also on the successful completion of the fiscal reform initiated in 1977, wh ich ailled at a more rat ional and equ itable fiscal sy stem . ...... 5. Inflation �..... - '. During the last 20 years , the inflation rate ·. in Spain has generally been . we ll above ·.those of other industriallly advanced ... western countries . Apart from the inad equacy of demand management, deeper structural causes of this performance are to be found in the supply rigidities of the productive sy stem . In the period 1973-1980, consumer prices rose at a rate of 17 per cent , more than twice the rate in the prev ious seven years (7 per cent ). A po licy of wag e re straint , initiated in 1977, broke the wage price spiral and seems to have been a major factor behind the dece leration of inflat ion . In 1983 the cost of 1 iving increased by 12 per cent (compared with ov er 24 per cent in 1977 and with an OECO average in 1983 of about 6 per cent) . 6. Industrial restructu ring The Span ish economy has suffered particu larly sharp ly from the post-1973 wo rld recession because Spanish capacity had expanded at high ra tu in a number of sectors faced with sharply fa lling levels of world demand (such as shipbuilding or steel) . The Spanish po sition beca.e even more vu lnerable . - 9 - because the wage explosion in the period 1969-1977 had caused an unprecedented increa se in labour cost; moreover, the expansion of capac ity had not alway s been optimal or efficient . Several mea sur�s have been taken since June 1981 to re structure ailing sectors . Presently, 11 industrial branche s are subject to the measures and the re structuring (which covers the period 1981-1986} is expected to re sult in a loss of 80 ,000 jobs or 12 per cent of employment in the affected sectors . The state has contributed in the period 1981-1985 with a financ ial tran sfer of 620 billion pesetas of which 232 bi llion were direct .. ... "' state subsidies (the first figure represented roughly 3 per cent of GOP in 1982) . The sectors receiving most of the aid are , in descending order: steel, textiles , shipyards and certain household appliances . 7. Spain and the Common Market In 1984, the decision on Spanish membership of the EEC wi ll be taken. The EEC prov ides roughly one-third of Spanish imports and absorbs about half · of its commod ity exports . It seems clear that the interest of the different governments· .of Spain in joining the Common Market . is based not only on · economic but also on po litical factors derived from the wish to consol idate .. :. �,:, the democrat ic structures of the state . . ·At �pre sent , the most i11portant , .., ·o.-: :;-ii· obstac le to entry is French opposition arising from the vested interest of .- : _ French farmers who fear, not without reason, the competition of Spanish fruit, vegetable, olive oil, and wine exports. In the agricultural sector, the main danger for Spanish products seems to be increased competition in wheat , sugar, dairy products and catt le meat . -· . The possible effects on trad e in manufactured products of Spain joining .:: the EEC are as yet unc lear . Various estimates of the trade effects shou ld be ... ··.: - treated with some scepticism, but it shou ld be noted that fo llow ing Spain's preferential trad ing agreement with the EEC (in 1970) the share of the EEC in the Spanish market has tended to decline wh ile Spain has gained markets within the Community . In considering the likely effects of Spain' s membership in the EEC, mo st studies pay insufficient attention to the "dualistic" cMr•cter of most sectors of the Spanish economy : many semi-artisanal, high cost f1rms ·. - 10 - co-exist with a few med ium and large size concerns of high levels of productivity and internationa l competitivenes s. The social costs of a likely increase in unemployment due to these smaller concern s being destroyed by foreign competition need to be taken into account when cons idering the po ssible export gains from Community membership. � i I• :.. :. t""' • ,. Chart 1i CYCLICAL INDICAT ORS ; (p�n:entrates change �·r Pf8!i�. yar)� " '\GROSS FIXED CAP ITAL' I \ FO RMATION. of I 10·· I \ l I - - - - \/�"� · -·- ··- -- � - · I � . I �ro� ��ro ���� SERVIC�� - /. . !.�. : - - .· : -I - - .. - .. .. - · . . ' . . - · · ...... -30 .- -.-�,r. -----=-----:.�.,_--T-::o��-....;··;.o..;;:�o·"-CP�� 5 . ,- . . i < o PRODUCTlVIlY : - -- -· - -- , (OutputsEmp loyment): _.J ___ -,--, 2014 • If I 10 I I 12' I 4 1 a: I 06 I . -...... CONSUMER PRICES .. 2 . :· 15 I 2510 ":.� I 20 II 0 ! -- � -! -· -· -· - - 1 S/»in N•riOMI Institur. 5 65 66 67 ea 69 101 n 73 74 75 76 11 7879 so 11 12 83 Soun:•: of Sta ristit:6 l - CONFIDENTIAL NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF NAMIBIA South Africa 's offer of disengagement 1. On 15 December South Africa informed the Secretary-General th at it was prepared to begin the disengagement of its forces from )ou thern Angola on 31 December , provided that the resu lting situation was not exploited by Angolan forces, SWAPO and the Cubans . Stateme nt by the Prime Minister of South Africa in Parliament on 31 Janua!1 1984 2. un 31 January , Prime M1nister Botha confirmed to Parl1ament South Africa 's decision to beg in disengaging its forces from Angola with effect from the same day. The decision to proceed with the disengagement was made on the basis of assurances received from the United States in respect of Angola's commitment to the terms of the disengagement . Tripartite Meeting in Lu saka (United States /Angola/South Africa) 3. At the 1:ripar1:ite Meeting he ld in Lu saka on 16 !ebruary , ::;ou'th Africa and Angola decided to set up a Joint Military Comm1ssion , which might include the United States, to mo nitor the disengage�ent of ::;outh African for ces from sou1:hern Angola. 4. Following the tr1partite meet1ng , the Un1ted States opened a l1aison off1ce in Namibia (Windhoek) to monitor the ceasefire in sou thern Angola. Implerrentat ion of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) 5. Mr. Chester CrocKer has 1nformed the Secretary-General that the current United States diplomatic initiative wou ld take up the following issues in successive phases , as listed · below : (a) Disengagement ot South Afr1can forces from southern Angola based on the cond1tions specif1ed . (b) Bilateral discussions Detween the Un1ted States and Angola regarding the withdrawal of Cuban forces. (c) Final1zation of arrangements for the implementa tion of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) . Mr. Crocker has not. commited himself to a time-frame for these negotiat ions . He has emphasized that conditions laid down in • - 2 - .· re spect of all the above issues must be me t before the establishment of a time-frame for the imp lementation of the United Nations plan for Nam1bia. Schedu le for the compl etion of the disengagement of Sou th African forces from southern Ango la 6. On � April , Mr. Ch�ster CrocKer 1nformed Mr. Ahtisaari that the disengagement wou ld be completed by the end of April . The mandate of the Joint Commission wou ld be extended for a further month after the disengagement in order to enable the Government of Angola to consolidate its hold on southern Angola. Mr. Crocker stated that the main reason for the de lay in the disengagement was that the Angolans did not have the capacity to meet their commitments under the Lu saka agreement . He said that FAPLA lacked the ne cessary logistic support to �eep pace with the original schedu le for the completion of the disengagement at the end of March . Mr. Crocker indicated that the disengagement had been slowed down by mutual consent in order to enable ·FAPLA to consolidate its pos'ition in sou thern Angola prior to the final withdrawal by South Africa. Bilateral discussions between the United States and Ango la 7. Mr. Crocker informea Mr. Ah�isaar1 on 2 April that the b1lateral d1scuss1ons (which were to have been re sumed before the end of March ) wou ld now taKe place "in coming weeks" in Apr1l. He had indicated that the talxs might be preceded by a summ1t ot Portuguese-speaking states , as we ll as a summit of the Frontline States , wh ich had been postponed oecau se of Pres ident SeJ Havana Communique 8. un 19 March Pres�dent dos Santos and Castro issued a joint declara�ion in which they stipu latea they wou ld in�tiate act1on for the gradu al withdrawal ot CUoan troops from Angola, as soon as the fol lowing requirements are met : (a) Un1lateral w1thdrawal of South African troops from Angola. (b) · Strict implementation of Security Counc1l resolut1cn 435 \1978) , the accession of Nam1bia to 1ndependence and the total w1tharawal of South African troops from Nam1bia . (c) cessat 1on of any act ot direct aggression or threat of aggression against the People 's Republic of Angola. (d) cessat1on of all a1d to UNITA . I . - 3 - Position of the Frontl1ne States 9. The Frontline States have informea the Secretary-General that they supported tne d1sengagement exerc�se as agreed to by Angola on tne understand�ng �ha� it wou ld facilitate the implementat 1on of Security Counc1l reso1ut1on 435 . (1978) . However , they have expressed concern a� the lack of any inaication ot a clear time-frame for tne negot1at1ons and processes elaborated by the Un1ted States (see para. 4) . They have 1nformed tne Secretary-General that in the inter1m they wou ld not insist on a Security Council meeting in order to piovide adequate time for the negotiations . In this connex1on , they made clear to the Secretary-General that unless the negot1ations soon snowed v1siole progress leading to a settlement 1n Namioia, they woula no� be able to contain tne pres sure to proceed to �he �ecuri�y Council. Posi�ion of SWAPO lu . SwAPu has endorsed the pos1tion of the Frontline States and informed the Secretary-General tnat 1t wou ld ab1de oy tne terms of �he disengagement in �he nope that i� would lead to an early settlement 1n Namioia. It nas suggested to the Secretary General to convene a meeting oetween SWAPO and South Africa to discuss arrangement s for the ceasefire for the implementation of Security Council re so1ut1on 435 (1978) . The Secretary-General has indicated to SWAPO that the only ou tstanding 1ssue in regard the ceasefire was the fixing of a date for its commencement . I 11. In exchanges cf views w1th �he �ecretary-General , �he I sou�h Atrican Ambassador nas stated that the present s1tuation i . was too fragile and that talks aoout a ceasefire at th1s stage I wou ld oe premature and perhaps counter-product1ve 12 . SWAPO nas also proposed cilateral �alKs w1th oou�h Africa to oe held on neutral ground �o d1scuss the 1mplementation ot Secur1ty �ouncil resolution 435 \1978) . The SWAPO offer was · made in response to a Soutn African proposal for SWAPO �o meet with the Admin�strator-General and the internal parties . · 13. In present circumstances , United Nations participation 1n any such talks is not recommended . So far as the United Nations 1s concerned , the only outstand1ng 1ssues 1n regard to the imp lementation of Security Counc1l resolution 435 relate �o tne cnoice ot the electoral system and the fixing of a date for tne ceasefire and the emp lacement of uNTAG in Namib1a . Otner uevelopments 14. On 2 Marcn , Toivo Ya Toivo was released from detent1on oy Soutn Africa, atter serving 16 years in j ail . He is considered to _be the founder of SWAPO . . ·- - 4 - 15. On 14 March Lhe For�ign Minister ot South Afr1ca 1ssued a clarification s�atement reaf firming its willingness to coopera�e in the �mp!ementation ot Secur1ty �ouncil re solu t ion 435 (1978) . The statement was issued af�er �he �ecretary-General had protested to the South Afr1can Ambassador about press repor�s indicat1ng �ha� South Afr1ca 1ntended to circumvent the United Nations plan by proposing a ' reg 1cnal conference on the Angola/Namibia confl1ct , wh1ch wou ld include UN ITA. 16 . On 16 March , Sou th Africa signed a non-aggression pact w1th Mo zamb1que , known as "The Accord Nkomati" . cc : Secretary-General Mr. Urquhart Mr. Farah Mr. Dayal Mr. Ahtisaar 1 FOR IliFO.RJ.1AT ION OF UNITED NAT IOi�S SEC.RETA..,IA'£ OiiLY Not for Distribution or Disseminat ion P!lE SS CONFERENCE BY UNDER-SECRE TAHY- GENERAL FOR SPEGIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS , Br ian E. Urquhart , Und er-Jecret ary-:Genera l for Special Po litical Affairs , told correspondents today , regdrd ing his recent trip to the ,·fiddle Ec1s t, that he had gone there for three ma in reasons : to talK on behalf of the Secretary-=General to the various Govermn�nts aoout all ma tters of common concern ; to see Un ited Na tions peace-keeping forces and outfits in the c1rea ; and to discuss matters speci fically relating to south Lebanon oefore the Secret ary-3ener.l l reported to the Security Counc il on the quest ion of the mandate of the Un ited L� a tions Interim Force in Le o anon (UNIFIL) . (Tne report of the Secre tary-General on U�IFIL is in document S/ 16472 , �ated 9 Ap ril. The Fo rce 's current mandate expires on 19 April .) Mr . Urquhart said he had gone to Israel, Syr ia , Jordan , sou th Le�anon , Egypt and Lebanon in that order . As for south Lebanon , �e nad noth ing to �dd beyond wh at was said in the Secre t ary- General 's re�ort . Othe�wise , he had discussed the wider situation as we ll as var1ous concerns in tne �iddle East. A corres pondent , re ferring to the Secretary-Genecal 's report , c1sked if i4r . Urquhart could clarify wnere exactly the Secretary-General t-1a nted tne Force to be deployed , and when and how did he propose to get the•n there . Hr . Urquhart said the report was qu ite clear . The Secretary-General was suggesting that the Security Counc il should consider at .the appropr ia te time what more UNIFIL could do in order to secure tne ob jectives that would be in everyone 's interest in south Lebanon . The Secretary-General 's ·p roposai co.lta ined three e le.nents, •'4r . Urquhart �,ent on . The first t-1 as tne no tion that ele.uents of mHFIL, together with elements of the Lebanese Army and the interna l security forces-, would be dei>loyed in areas evacuated by Israeli forces . Secon.Jly , it drew part icular attention to tile Sidon area , wh ich \la s a place of great concern so fa:r as the security of the population was concerned � espec ially for the inhab itants of the re fugee camps . And thirdly , it suggested the wo r�ing ou t of necessary arrangemen ts to ensure that south Lebanon beca.ne a zoile of peace under the autho�ity and sovereignty of the Leoane se Government . Asked if th is was not , in effect , merely a proposal for U�IFIL to carry out its 1978 mandate , clr . Urqunart repl ied , yes , it wa s , out in different terms , because the situat ion wa s not the same now as it was in 1973. dr . Urquh�rt t-1 as asked if, when he was in Israel, he had received any idea of when Israel mi gh t be willing to evac uate some of the terr itory it now occupied in southern Lebanon . He replied tnat that issue was a ma tter of a very high degree of public debate in Israel itself, apart from everywhere else . Mo reover, the decision to nave elections in Israel on 23 July had co;ne after his first visit th ere , and he did not know wh at effect tnose elections might have on any decisions the Governme nt might take . Everyone knew , as the Secretary-General had stated in his report , tm at the COLtc erns of Israe l we l."e (IJlore ) Urquhart Press Con ference - 2 - 11 April 1984 re gard ing south Lej>anon . The interest of the Un ited ti ations �-1as in trying to propose something that l A cor·responderit ·s aid the recept ion given to the Secretary-General's proposals 1-1a s "rather coo l" on the part of the Israe li i1ission in New York . Ha d .1r . Urquhart received any signals "from Jerusalem" that Israel might be rec�ptive to ' tho�e proposals? �r . Urquhart replied that he had not �po�en to the Israeli i1. ission in New York sinc e re turn1ng , but he had had extensive discuss ions wh ile in Israe l with President Ch aim Herzog , Prime Minister Sh amir, De fense Minister Arens , ·ch ie f of Staff General Levy , and the head ·o f the Israe li Fore ign· Office. 'It t�Ta s a mat ter of pu�'l ic record that Israe l had' certain concerns and opinions about how it \�Tou ld like 'to see soutn Lebanon - just as everybody else had on the ma tter. He wo llld no t like to comme nt on any statement issued in New York by the Israeli dission because he had not seen it . He had o'nly read a report of it in a Lei:>anese news paper . �sked if the Sec re tafy-Genera l's recommendat ions to the Security Counc il on U�IFIL wou ld bi ac�epted , �r . Urquhart said that that question ��s better addressed to the Council .· 'fh e ob Ject of the Sec retary-General's reports wa s to prov_ide the oas is for discuss ion in the Security Counc il. It wa s up to the Counc il to decide wh at to do . �le said he imagined that the m3ndate as it was t-1ou ld be renewed , but wh at the Counc il wou ld do with the other sugges tions by the Secretary-Gener.al was for the memoer$ of the Council to dec ide . Asked '"h at the att itu.de of the "donors" ,., as toward the Force, .:1r . Urquh �rt replied tnat , like everyone else, they wou ld like to see progress .1n rea lizing the aims of the origin& l mandate of UNIFIL. The t:coop-contributing count ries had stood by U�IFIL with great cons istency in quite a difficult period , and the Lebanese Government attached great importance to the presence of UNIFIL in southero Lebano.J1 . It �o� as clear that the Force -;m s no t at the moment fu lfilling the wh ole of the task for wh icn it t-1a s established, and that wa s a ma tter of conc ern for the Secretary-General , the troop contr�butors and the Secur ity Council . de had no ind ic ation that the troop-contrib�ting countries would no t go on support ing UNIFIL , even though they riad from time to time -- both publicly and privately -- expressed their concern that the ir parti!= ipat ion could not be an open-ended propos ition; and the irs i..ra s a concern tl:nt all sha;red . A corre spondent asl During his talks in the area , had he discussed the question of deploying ' Un 'i.ted Na tions Ob servers or troops in Beirut itself? i-lr . Urquhart wa s aslted . He re plied that the question inev itably came up in conversation, out that he (more ) Urquhart Press Conferente - 3- had not specifically explored that possibility , in view of 'tl'le decision made in the Secur ity Cou�t il jost be fore he had le£2 on his missi6n to tn• area . He had , ho\.rever, spent a gobd deal of tiine with the SO.;.man Oo server gt'cup in the area ·who, in a situation of cons iderable difficulty , were performing an admirab le· job tif keeping' a ·presence there and were circulating in a way so as to be helpful ·t9. all people in Be irut� Continuing , 1"1 r . Urquhart said i"l e had also spent a lbt of' time w'i th the head s of the- various civilian Un ited Na tions agenc ies in .Beirut -- "p�ople who sometime s tend to -be forgotted" and discussed tneir· various· probl ems , wh ich were quite considerable .: Asked wh at exactly Un i ted Na tions Ob servers in Lebanon �id, �r . Urquhart replied tliat they 'lle re in- a rather strange situat ion . ·They had 'been put in place by a Security Counc il resolution �-1h ich upplied to a ·previous situation , and the ir job <·las to ·monitor the situat ion irt and around lle'irut in the context of how it had been in August 1982 ; of course that situation was not quite the same any more . Basically , what they did was to patrol , to keep, ill touch with everyone ' and to ac t ·as "friends of the- COIIII.non interest"'. Spe�ifically' they · paid a .lot of attent ion t6 t.he re fugee camps , and they kept i�1 touch o;.l ith ail the various parties. Tbey did 1'\ot t however , have a mandate to monitor the current cease-fire or efforts to establish a cease�fire ; tnat was the responsibility of the · Higher Se cur1ty Coillmittee , wh i-ch wa s an organization set up ander completely different . .'auspices . They we re , thus , a Un ited Na tions presence doing wh atever they could to be a help -in a humanitarian. way to evet:ybody concerned ; their mandate ;'laS 1 imited . Asked if the Observers should not be pulled out if they could no t do the · task for wh ich they �-Je re mandated , Hr . Urquhart replied that thal: was a question that shou ld be addres.sed to 'the Sec.u rity CounciL He ,.,a� asked wh "!t had b�come of the proposal by 'the United Kingdom for a limited expansion of the ·number of Un ited Na tions Observers.-in Be irut . The British delega te in the Security Counc il had made th.a t suggestion; riad it ever been fo llowed up? . ·t1r . Urquhart repl ied tnat it had been fo llowed up in a very long series of consultations and deb.ates in the Security ·Counc il and , in a: sligh tly different form, it had also been part of the French initiative . That init �at ive had contained a paragraph about a possible cease-fire , and a paragraph about �he pos sibiiity 9f replac ing the mu ltinational force . tie added that the Secretary-General could not chartge the stand idg ·of the Ob servers in Be irut or their numoer without the concu rrence of the Seclir it.y Counc il , and that· concurrence had ·not·· ·been forthcoming ·a·s ye t. : .. Asked if he had talked with any of the various factions in Leoanon about the proposals of the Secret�ry-Gen�ral, Mr . Urquhart replied that he had no t spol · (more) Urquhart Press Conference � 4 - 11 Ap ril 1984 been said pub licly , however , by some of the le!lders , he thought there was a wide feeling in support of the Lebanese Government 's seated view that it would be helpful to have '"a ·more ·effective ro le" by ULUFIL in southern Lebanon . A correspondent said there had been de·uands tnat Security Counc il re�olutions 508 and 509 be imp lemented before any further progress could be made . How did the Secretary- General intend to deal �ith 'that demand? Would resolutions "506 and 503 just be "bypassed"? How could Sidon be dealt wit� · without the implementation of those resolutions? l.'lr . Urquhart replied that the Secretary-General had made very clear in his report that the various resolutions of the Security Counc il -- particulariy 425 , 426, 508 and 509 - were the. gu iding prl.nciples urider 1m icn all were trying to operate . However, he added , it was one thing for the Security Counc il to make decisions on various controversia l subjects all over the world , and another th ing to ge t those dec isions implemented . t�at the Secret�riat was interested in was in trying to suggest ways wherein it might be possible to implement them in a construct ive way . �at could he answer to factions in Lebanon, as we ll as to those members of the Counc il , who insis ted that 508 and 509 be implemented before any th ing else could be done? he was asked . de replied that he had no argument with that request. The Se cretariat nad to respec t the dec isions of the Secur ity Council, and those decisions t., ere very clear . The troub le t11 as how to achieve those dec isions . That was the troub le in every other part of the world too , and that was the jo0 of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat : to find practical means for ach ieving practical results. And to do that , one had to take into account the interests and the. concerns of everybody involved ; it was a very long process , but he did not �now any alternative . Mr . Urquhart wa s then asked why Hugo Juan Gobbi, Spec ial Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus , had been requested by the Secretary Ge neral to undertake an "urgent" visit to Cyprus a.t this time. lie responded that the Secretary-General spent a great deal of energy and effort in carrying out his mission of good offices with regard to Cyprus , and that he probab ly had conc luded that this \faa a good time to make an effort to clarify ma tters , and for that purpose to have i1r . Goi>bi return to Cyprus , to talk to everyo�e there , and to make �n assess�ent of the si't uation. Asked if anything specific were "impending", t'f r. Urquhart said that there wa s always sor�th ing impending with regard to Cyprus , even if that meant on ly statements by all sides on some issue . At this ·point the Secretary-Gener�l had felt it would be a good idea to have Mr. Gobbi, who kne\'1 the situation extremely we ll, to return to Cyprus , talk to every ne , and see what could be · � done . Asked why the miss ion of l-tr . Gobbi was deemed "urgent" at this time , Mr . Urquhart said that although he had been out of touch with the situation in Cyprus for abeut four weeks , owing to his mission to the Middle East, he believed that a good deal of time had gone by since the las t assessment of the situation in Cyprus , and the Secretary-General had decided that it was time for a reassessment . He said he believed it was urgent , since the situation wa s very active , and many statements and announcements were being made . (more ) Urquhart Press Conference - 5 ll Apr il 1984 Asked if tension in the Be irut area had lessened sinc e the withdrawa l of the multinationa l. force , 1"lr . Urquhart repl ied that ne ·had happened to be in :Be irut on "two relative ly quie.t 4ays", and it \'lould not be \'l ise t:o try to .nake a comparison . The proo lems fac 1ng the people and tne Governrneot of Lebanon , arid all ��e leadership, were imme1 1sely complicated . Til e situation in Be irut wa s. "obv ious.ly tense"� It went without say ing that if · people fe lt the need to bombard one another , it was a fairly tense situat ion , as t'le ll· as· "very serious and very · tragic". l1r . Urquhar t t-1as asked about the f1nanc ial situa t ion of the peace-Keeping operation in Lebanon . He replied that financ ing peace-keeping was always very difficult . UiUFIL, as we ll as UHFICYP, were in arrears to some of the troop-c ontributing Governments . "lie nave not yet so lved tne prob lem of financ ing peace-Keeping"., he said . The actual sums concer.1ed "' ere relative ly small in relation to normal military defence budgets , but for various po litical reasons , it had proved very diffi�ult to get a com�lete ly satis fac tory me thod for financ ing peac e-keep ing operations . As far as the Secretary-General was concerned it ·: ·l as a ma tter of great conce rn thr:tt countries that �ere prepared to provide the ir troops under qu ite Jifficult and even dangerous circums tances snould also i1 ave to &)ear a disproportiona te financ ial �urden . One hali to keep a sense of proportion wh en talking about defic its in the Un ited i'lations . At the same time , it was a very serious :natter because it impinged on tile notion of collec tive respons ib ility taken by the Security Council , ,.and it was an inc onve11ienc e and a hardship for some countries , espec ia lly smaller countries lil:(e Fiji, �11here the sums owed the1n v�e re very important in relation to the size of the ir nat iona l budget . A very gre.lt tribute should be pa id to Governments wh ich cont inued to suppo rt I.Jn ited �la t io11s peace-keeping operations because they believed t11ey '17ere important . As ked if there had oeen any response fro•n Governments as to wn ether they mi ght be w� lling volun tar ily to co�tribute more money to UNIFIL, as proposed by the Secretary-Genera l in h�s report , dr . Urquhart ans-;·Je red tnat tne report . had only come out yesterday and that obv ious ly tnat question �as a cons tant source of discussion between the Secret�ry-Genera l and various Governments . A correspondent asked if Mr . Gobbi's visit to Cy prus was at all re lated to the upcomin5 constitut1ona l referendum .and the elections on "the Tu rKish side11 , a,1d if so , \'I Ould he try to dissuade them from go ing ah ead wi th those �rocedures? Mr . Urquhart repl ied tndt Mr . Gobbi 's vis it �as ''re lated to the 1m ole situation" . Mr . Urquhart was asked if, during nis v1s1ts to Damascus , the Syrian Government· had shown "any kind of interest" regard iag U!UFIL. He re plied that , during his t\'IO stops in Da1nascus , he had discussed TJNIFIL and eve�ything else with the Syrian Government . :Hs impress ion wa s that 3yria wa·s certainly interested in a Un ited �a tions role in south Lebanon , although Syria did not have any th ing direct to do with it . Asked if there had been any change in the Syrian attitude since he had last spoken with them , he said , no , Syria had always been in hvour o_f the United Na tions effort in south Leb anon . (more) Urquhart Press Con ference - 6- 11 Ap ril 1984 If the Un ited Na tions were go ing to play a greater role in south Lebanon , a correspondent asked , wo uld that not requ ire another agreement between Israel and Lebanon at the very least,.along the lines of the agreement that had just been brok en? Mr . Urquhart answered that wh at had o.een mentioned in the Secretary-Ge nera l's report was an over-all me ans of ach ieving the aim in south Lebanon , t� ich wa s to produce a no rma l and peaceful situat ion there under th� control· of the legitima te Governme nt of Le'banon ., The ach ieveme·nt of such an ai1u wou ld be the best guarantee for the security of ev eryone concerned , and it was up to the Government of Lebanon, the Security Counc il and others to see how they might achieve that go al . A correspondent asked wnat Syria 's response had -0een to the Secretary General 's proposal for replac ing the Israe li forc es in south Lebanon with UNIFIL. He repl ied that the matter had not been fo r1nu lated exactly that way wh en he spoke with ·tbe Government of Syr ia . However , his impression wa s that Syria had no ob jection t·o the Secretary-General ··s proposals on 'that ma tter. * *** * c y p r u s The Secre tary-General met with Mr . Gobbi on Saturday , 14 April, a.m., before his departure for London . CONFIDENTIAL KAMPUCHEA Up date on recent developments 1. After several months of relat ive quiet , fighting erup ted along the Thai Kampuchean border on 25 March , when 300-500 Vietnamese troops reportedly crossed into Thailand , in an apparent attemp t to outflank a Khme r Rouge stronghold in the area . Thai troops clashed with the Vietnamese and announced several days later that they had been pushed back into Kampuchea . Tha iland claims there we re casualties on both sides and that it took some prisoners . Vie t Nam has denied any incursion into Thailand but reaffirmed it s right to protect the Phnom Penh regime against attacks from the Khmer Rouge. The hostilities led to the evacuat ion of about 5,000 Kamp ucheans to a temporary site inside Thailand , but the border encampmen ts have no t been directly affected . The fighting has now . subsided . 2. On 5 April , the Secretary-General issued a statement expressing his concern and calling for restraint . In December 1983 and January 1984, he had approached the Vietnamese Amba ssador , to express the hope that the usual recrudescence of tension during the dry season would be avoided this year . 3. Over the last three months , the Khmer Rouge have claimed a number of successful attacks on Vietnamese troop s and military in stallations in maj or towns deep in side Kampuchea . These ·attacks have been partly confirmed by independent sources . 4. On 2 Ap ril, China announced for the first time this year that , following incessant provocations by Viet Nam , it had launched a "counter-attack" along the border between the two countries . On 6 Apr il , Be ij ing pointed out that coun ter attacks , by Thailand on the Thai-Kampuchean border and by China on the Sino Vietnamese border , wo uld be "necessary" until Viet Nam agreed to wi thdraw its troop s from Kampuchea . 5. As regards a political solution of the Kamp uchean question , China ha s recently indicated that it wa s not encouraging a return of the Khmer Rouge to power . Th is was confirmed by Foreign Minister Wu Xueq ian dur ing a visit to Kua la Lumpur in February . He stated that , in the event of a Vietname se withdrawal from Kampuc hea, China would suppor t the continuation of the Coalition Government presided ov� r by Prince Sihanouk. Beij ing still in sists , however , on an •·unconditional" V let n.tme se withdrawal . 6. Vietnamese Foreign Minis ter Co Thach paid official visits to Jakarta (11-13 Ma rch) and Canberra (14-19 March) . Dur ing a mee t ing with the Secretary-General on � Ap ril, Indone sian Foreign Minister Mochtar ind icated he had been somewhat "d isappo inted" by his talks with Mr . Co Thach. He also expressed doubts about an ap parent sh ift in the Vietnamese position during the talks held in Canberra . Austral ian Foreign Minister Hayden had then announced that Viet Nam had agreed to a five-po in t formulat ion of "p rior ity" issues to be addressed in eventual negotiat ions on �ace and security in Southeast Asia . This formulat ion provides for the withdrawa l of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and a process of self-de termination through free elections, on the understanding that "Pol Pot and his assoc iates" would some h,,w be "eliminated as a polit ical and military force", and excluded from the elec t ions . It also calls for the adoption of measures to guarantee the security of the Tha i Kampuchean , Sino-Vietnamese and Laot ian borders. - 2 - 7. Thailand , also , has questioned the sincerity of Viet Nam' s intentions but the ASEAN countr ies have not ye t taken a common stand on th ese proposals . The main difficulty , from ASEAN 's point of view , is the prop osed exclusion of the Khmer Rouge and the fact tha t ASEAN obviously has no authority to discuss the secur ity of the Sino-Vie tnamese and Sino -Laotian border s. 8. In pursuanc e of the Secretary-General 's good offices , Rafeeuddin Ahmed wi ll unde rtake a new mi ssion to the area in May , when he will visit Jakarta , Hano i and Bangkok. Co nfidential 9 Apr il 1984 IRAN- IRAQ Bac kgr ound UN efforts to end the conflict, now in its fourth year , have been made through the Secur ity Counc il and the go od offices of the Secretary-General , and they rema in the only viable med iation effort now. Iraq has accept ed · all the Council's resolutions , wh ile Iran has not , being · convinced the Counc il is pr o- Iraq. Iran showed some co- operat ion with the Secur ity Council in October 19 83, but felt that its concerns we re not heeded , and rejected resolut ion 540 as also being pro- Iraq. Mr . Olof Palme , accompanied by Mr. Diego Cordovez, has visited Baghdad and Teheran five times , last in February-1982, when he informed the two sides that he would return only wh en both demonstrated the political will for a negotiated settlement. Wh ile Iraq since 19 82 has encouraged all pr oposals for negotiations and ha s offer ed var ious formulas for a cease-fire , Iran has rema ined rigid on its conditions. These are: condemnat ion of the "aggressor ", payment of repa rations by Iraq, and repa t riat ion of expelled Iraqis of Iranian or igin. In ear ly 19 83 , Iran accused Iraq of deliber ate attacks on civilian areas. A UN mission visited both countr ies in May , and found heavy damage to civilian areas in Iran, wh ile similar ar eas in Iraq had susta ined only light damage . In late 1983 , Iran resumed allegations of continu ing attack s, includ ing the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and repeatedly r equested another inspection mission, with no link to resolut ion 54 0. Iraq den ied the allegations and ins i sted on a po litical mission to reactivate his med iation effo rts in compliance with resolution 540. Present Pos ition In an effort to initiate movement , and satisfy the requirements of both sides , the Secretary- General pr oposed in March 1984 a "dual pu rpo se mission" to hold po lit ical discussions in the capitals as well as to inspect civilian areas. After in itial reservations, Iraq agr eed to the ...I 2 - 2 - mission. However , after initial acceptance, Iran took the posit ion that the mission could not hold political discussions because , just at that time , Iran had launched a new offensive. Therefore this mission could not be sent. Iran continued allegations of chemical warfare by Iraq and, after widespread resports of a ma jor counterattack by Iraq using chemical weapons, the Secretary-General pr omptl� decided to send a mission solely to investigate these allegat1ons. The Secretary-General acted on his own authority and without consulting the Security Council or resorting to GA resolution 37/98. The mission, consisting of specialists from Australia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland , found conclusive evidence that both mustard gas and nerve gas had been used against Iranian troops near the Iraqi border, but could find no conclusive evidence that the weapons had originated from Iraq. On receiving their report from the Secretary-General, the Security Counc i1 agreed to issue a declaration by the President strongly condemn ing the use of chemical weapons and calling on the Secretary-General to continue his mediation efforts. Iraq has been most dissatisfied with these developments. Iran appears satisfied by the report but considers the Security Council's action to have been inadequate. At present there is a lull at the front , although the major Iranian assault is still anticipa ted . It may have been held up by the use of chemical weapons and intensified air attacks by Iraq. Both countries continue to occupy narrow strips of each others' territory along the frontier. Fears that Iraq might widen the war to the Gulf by attack ing Iran' s Kharg oil installations, and perhaps provoking Iran to attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, have not mater ialized so far . Last week Mr . Palme , who was passing through New Yo rk, met the Permanent Representatives of· Iran and Iraq, and found no change in their pos itions. Iraq continues to urge "active" med iation on the basis of Security Council resolutions, wh ile Iran's position rema ins that it will not enter into negotiations unless its conditions are fulfilled . - • UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR TO: Mr . Virendra Dayal cAn: 5 Apr il 1984 A: Chef de Cabinet Executive Office of the Secretary-General REFERENCE: ------THROUGH: S/C DE: f'ROM: \ 1l DE: Iqbal Riza suBJ ECT: . Mr. Palme ' s Talks on Iran/ Iraq OBJET: The gist of Mr . Palme 's talks with the Permanent Repre sentatives of Iraq and Iran are given below in case you consider it appropriate to brief the Secretary-General . Mr . Palme started both meetings by asking for the views of the respective governments. Meeting with the Permanent Representative of Iraq (Wednesday, 4 April , 4:00 p.m. ) Ambassador Al-Qaysi reiterated that Iraq had accepted all Security Council resolutions and had always shown readiness to enter into negotiations . It wa s Iran which was intransigent l and whi£_h shouls,i be forcecl:ta: Mcmtn �rem�t'r 't!m' M-at!t::t�e" _ I efforts olr the Secretary-General. For �nstance , the sendjps ' of the mission on cpemical weapons should have been maae _d�nt!�t'"ionarori'"'"fr?n "'s··-ag_ree�in."g to n�egot��e· :·orc·nl. ·5fli�r issues · ·- · · · :trr--tfr'e · ·conflict . ·. - · --� \ T�:�E� �-�- sa_do� �P-�-�� �.gr �a�- - deal in an imp.. ' roper manner . .. � -...... ,....., Meeting with the Permanent Representative of Iran (Thursday, 5 April , 11 :00 a.m. ) Amba ssador Rajaie said that the latest press statement by h�s government h d mad� ct.eaz. •;i.;t� �:...t;ermir:a.��2�!� rs e the <7 ..� � "J\.\St a�? def�_.':_w,�;..:.. There wa s therefore pQ QQQQi'fl'l;J:rtt'J' �!: . preserit tor _ a _m�_d i�io.n-� f �Q-{_� . Reports that Iran had �riaia and Algeria for fresh initiatives w� in£�rF ��� ...I 2 ""' • - 2 - Detailed notes on the meetings are being prepared by Miss Shimura and will be available by the time the Secretary General returns . cc : Mr . D. Cordovez A f g h a n i s t a n Brief by Mr . Giandomenico Picco . UK pos ition on disarmament matters As stated b7 the Minister of State, Mr. Richard Luce , in the First C�ttee on 21 October 83 19 , Britain's attitude is that the search tor seeurit7 should be the first priorit7 of the United lations . UK polic7 is one ot defence and securit7 : sufficient defence forces to aeet all reasonable defence needs, and a continuous search tor worthwhile interna tional agreements wh ich will diminish those needs. Within this approach, the UK vill support a disamaaent process that ha s substance but not one that is based on "siaplistic postures" or �eaningless declarations". Attitudes on specific is sues '!'he UK has expressed the following Tievs : - Against a nuc lear treeze , which would serve to make pel"'I&Dent existing iabalance. In favour ot drastic reductions in nuclear weapons. - Support tor equality at the lowest possible level between the USA and USSR in intermediate-range missiles . - Against the inclusion ot British nuclear forc es in US/Soviet discussions, on the · grounds that they are independent weapons ot last resort• Prepared to reconsider .its nuclear forces it US/So'riet strat egic arsenals were very substantiall7 reduced. - Against non-first-use ot nuclear weapons , as being an unreliable basis tor securit7 and leaving open the risk of first convent ional use . Energetically in favour ot a total ban on cheaieal weapons (hav io« abandoned its ovn in the late 1950s ), including satistactor7 provisions tor veri fications . Support for mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe , subj ect to proper veri fication. Support tor the IfP'1' and hopes tor a succ.esstul NPT Review. The UK has not been enthus iastic about the World Disaraament Caapaign and has not contributed tunds. The UK is not persuaded that the act ivities ot the Caapaign can real..l7 be "balanced, taetual and objective" and vortb vhile given the differing natures of gavern.ent openness and aecess to public opinion in various parts ot the vor�d . Spanish pos ition on disaraaaent aatters As a meaber ot BA'l'O (joined in Mq 1982 ) 9 Spain holds a siailar position on disaraaaent matters as it a Western allies , particularly on the questions of nuclear dis&rll&llent 9 ch•ieal weapons ud conTentional disaraament . Spain has expressed concern about the current deteriDration ot internat ional relations between the two .-Jor Powers and their allies and has urged that eTerything possible be done to reTi'Ye the process ot detente. In order to promote international East-West relations , Spain baa played an actiTe role in the Madrid follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe . Attitudes on spec ific issues Although Spain baa not initiated any specific proposal on disaraaaent issues, it has expressed interests on certain subj ects in the field ot disaraaaent . - Attaches great iaportance to the OTerall reduction ot nuclear weapons and urges concrete solution regarding the two sets of USSR-USA bilateral negotiations on nuclear forces. Calls for early conclusion ot a co�rehensiYe nuclear test ban vith an ettectiTe and coaprehensiTe international Terification syst•. Considers it urgent to speed up negotiations on etfectiTe international arrangeaenta to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nu clear weapons, particularly in the fora ot a treaty . - Supports the negotiation of appropriate measures to preTent an arms race in outer space. - Attaches great iaportance to the early conclusion ot a ca.prehensiTe conTention banning cheaical weapons vith ettectiTe Teritication system. Expresses int erest in the question ot relat ionship between disaraaaent and deTelopaent and urges etfectiTe measures tor dis&rmaaent so that Tarious resources thus saTed could be channelled to the needs tor economic and social deTelopment . Partic ipates as a non-aeaber in the work ot the Conference on Disarmament in GeneT& and has offered ita candidacy tor aeaberahip. Austrian pos ition on diaaraaaent .atters Otticial Au strian stateaent s on foreign polic7 stress that its securit7 depends on stabilit7 between East and West and its wish to contribut e to that stabilit7. While it vas understood that Austrian neutralit7 would be .adeled atter the Swiss exa.ple, it ha s pursued a leas isolationist policy , retlected b7 its active membership in the United Wations . At titudes on specific issues - Emphasizes the role ot the United lat ions in di saraaaent and belieTes it should be further intensified, with particular reference to the role ot the Conference on Disaraaaent in Geneva . - 'l'vo general probleas are stressed : (1) security polic7 baaed prillari17 on nuclear deterrence is short-sighted and dangerous , and ( 2) arms control and disaraaent ettorts ll11st not be postponed to a ti.Jae ot better international cli.Jaate. - Welcoaes genuine popular aoveaent s calling tor ettectiTe •easures to promot e di sarm.saent , and belieTes the7 can plq a crucial role . - BelieTes that the objectiTe ot negot iations on the tactical nuclear arsenals should be ( 1) to greatl7 reduce the stockpiles , ( 2) to &TOid further blurring ot the borderline between conventional and nuclear vartare , (3) to rai se the nu clear threshold , and (�) to reduce the dependence on nuc lear weapons . - �hasizes the need to address the qual itatiTe diaension in the negotiations on strategic nuclear aras;perceiTes the danger that today 's "bargaining chips " •ight becoae toaorrov 's nuclear arsenals and that the arms control ettort s might degenerate to a aere codification ot the •ilitar,r buildup . Sees merit in the treeze proposals . - laphasizes the illportance ot a coaprehensiTe test ban treat7 , particu1arl7 in Tiev ot the need to strengthen the non-prol ifera tion regime , the .c>st ettecti Te barrier against & further spread ot nuclear weapons . - Attaches great iaportance to a ban on ch.. ical weapons , and supports the ongoing ettort s to set up a aechanism to monitor COIIPliance vith the 1925 GeneT& Protocol . Believes proiiPt action should be taken to preTent an aras race in outer space. / ... - 2 - Conference on Security and Co-operat ion in Europe and the Stockhola Conference Austria welcaaed '\lae auccesstul conclusion of the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid. Ita Yiev vas that ia spite of a criaia ia East Vest relations , all part ies had deaonstrated their interest in a continuat ion of detente. The next CSCI follow-up conference will take place in Vieaaa in 1986. It has shown actiYe interest in the Stockhola conference on confidence- &Dd security-building aeaaurea in Europe . In this conference, as during the CSCE process in general , Austria has ch&DDelled it s contribution through participation in the group of neutral and non-al igned countries , Viich recently subaitted a proposal to the conference. Vieaaa talks on force reductions The Austrian capital has been the host of the talks on for ce reductions in Central Europe between a nuabe r of ••ber States of IA'l'O and the Varsav 'l'reaty Organization, which inspite of seYeral rounds since 1973 haYe remained largely unsuccessful . The latest round of talks resWied on 16 March this year . Austrian initiatiTes During the 37th and 38th sessions of the General Assembly , Austria submitted a dratt resolution entitled "Measures to prOTide objectiYe informat ion on military capabilities". �e resolut ions adopted (37/99 G and 38/188 C) by TOting aimed at facilitating objectiTe assesnent s on military capabilities . •..J UNITED NATIO:'fS INTEROFFiC E MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR : The Secretary-General o ...n:, 1.1 January �984 \ . REI"ERENCE: ------: " THROUGH \:r ,,A SIC \ TO \ ' \ •t... 1 ,, '.. -:-...,:a.. ' :·-r A: � .• • ...... • -1 • � ·• Jan Martenso n, Ond er-Secretary-General Department, for Disarmament Affairs OE: , .: ��. ' Non-Prolif erat ion Treaty Review Conf erence FROM:···�-� .. - OE: SUBJECT: OBJ ET: 1. The General Assembly has adopted a resolution noting that in 1985 the part ies to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will hold a conf erence to review the impleme ntation of that Treaty and have set up a preparato ry committee , the secre tary-General is requested to render the necessary assistance and to provide such service s as may be requ ired for the Conf erence and its preparation. 2. The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee is planned for 2 to 6 April 1984, in Ge nev a. Upon your return from your present trip, shall submit , for your approval,_proposals for the way in which the requested suppo rt might be give n. Me anwhile , initial prepa rations have beg un. 3. The Conference will have important po litical consequences. WidespreaI d criticism of the impleme ntation of the Treaty amo ng non-nuclear States raises some doubt about its future viability . A lack of tang ible results at the conf erence would have a very negative effect on the effo rt to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons and th us on internat ional stability and security. In your encounter s with political leader s in the coming months, you might have occasion to underline the import ance of do ing whatever may be done , to help the 1985 Review Conf erence to succeed . 4. A brief background note on the NPT is attached for your information . NPT 11 January 1984 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuc lear We apon s The fear of the sp read of nuclear weapon s has existed since the beg inning of the nuclear ag e. Al ready in the autumn of 1945, the Un ited States, the United Kingdom and Canada proposed the establishme nt of a Un ited Na tions Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of "eliminating the use of atomic energy for de struct ive purposes• . The Baruch plan of 1946, drawn up by the Uni ted States when it was the sole State possess ing nuclear weapons , wa s intended to avo id. proliferation by putting all nuc lear ·material, facilities and information under international ow nership and control. Th is at tempt fa iled . By the mid-6 0s there were four further nuclear-weapon States (USSR 1949, Un ited Kingdom 1952, France 1960 and Ch ina 1964) and it had become obvious that other States would sooner or later be capable of acquiring the technological know-ho� to develop nuclear weapons, whereas th e material needed wa s less scarce than had originally bee n supposed . An increasing number of States were acqu ir ing nuc lear reactors which contained or produced material th at might be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and concern about th is possibility grew with the awa reness that the possession of nuclear weapons by further countries would pose a th reat to wor ld security. Th is concern prompted nuc lear Powers as well as non-nuc lear-weapon States to ta ke in itiative s to h'lt the spread of nuc lear weapons to States that did not yet possess them. One step in th is direction wa s the Partial Te st Ba n Tr�aty of 19 63. In 19 61 the Assembly unanimously approved a resolution submitted by Ireland calling on al l States, pa rt icularly the nuc lear Powers, to conclude an international agreement to refrain from the transfer or acqu isition of nuclear weapon s. For several years the ma tter wa s discussed in the Eiqhteen Sat ion Disarmame nt Co mmi ttee (ENDC) in Geneva and negotiated bilaterally betwee n the United States and the SOv iet Union and in Ma rch 19 68 ag reeme nt was reached in the ENDC.on a draft for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuc lea r Weapon s. On June 12 , 196 8, the General Assembly approved a resolut ion commend ing the text and request ing the depos itary gove rnment s to open the · Treaty for signature. Under the Treaty th e nuc lear-weaporr States parties undertake not to transfer nuc lear weapons to any rec ip ient and no t to help any · non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire such weapons. No n-nuclear-weapon States parties undertake neither to obtain nuclear weapons nor to manufacture th em. (The Treaty equates nuclear weapons with any other nuclear explos ive device , in the assumption th at no technical distinct ion can be made between a nuclear explosive for peaceful or for military purposes) • To help ensure �� at non-nuclear-weapon States do not diye rt nuc lear ma terial from peaceful to weapons use the Treaty provides for safeguard s to be app lied by the Internationa l Atomic Energy Agency . To offset th is obl igat ion the Treaty provides th at pa rt ies shall have the fullest poss ible ac cess to materials and informa tion for pe aceful purposes (Article IV) . The , ,. - 2 - renunciation of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States is balanced by the commitment of the nuclear powers "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date •••" (Art icle VI) . The assurance sought by a number of non-nuclear-weapon States th at nuc lear weapons wo uld not be used aaainst non-nuclear parties to the Treaty ("negative security guarantees") , was not inc luded in the text . To date, 120 non-nuclear-weapon States have become parties to the Treaty , as have th ree nuclear-weapon States: USSR , OK and the USA . France has not joined but has dec lared that it would behave lilce a party . Of the non-nuclear-weapon States th at have significant nuclear capabilities Arc;rentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa are not parties. IAEA safeguards are applied pursuant to the NPT in forty States. Ever since its initial conclusion the Non Proliferation Treaty has been the obj ect of cr itic ism: it has been called discriminatory and one-sided in its approach, consolidating a distinction between nuclear "Haves• and "Have-nots" . Ind ia in part icular is prominent among non-aligned nations in pointing to "vertical proliferation" (i.e. the growth in the nuclear arsenals of the Super Powers) as the principal danger , which the NPT not only does not prevent but would even seem to accept. Against th is background the lack of progress in giving effect to Art icle VI - espec ially the absence of any advance towards the concl�sion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban - has been a source of major cr iticism at the first NPT Review Co nference in 1975 and even mo re so at the second one , in 1980. The implementation of Art i�le IV has been another ground for co ntroversy. A number of non-nuc�ear-weapon States, espec ially among the Group of 77 , hold the view th at States wh ich give up the military nuclear option and accept the bu rden of safeguards should benefit by full access to nuclear information and have the right to acqu ire the nuclear installations they consider necessary for their peaceful nuclear development , preferably on privileged financ ial terms. Nuclear suppl iers, on the other hand , tend to be restrict ive in the ir export policies J considering that safeguards may not in themsei�;e s �::atJent States from "going nuclear" in a milita ry sense , a number of both Eastern and Western States, members of the so-called "London Suppliers Group" , have ag reed on various cond itions and restrictions o� the ir nuclear supplies which apply equally to recipients that are pa rties to the NPT and to others. In reaction to th is :policy of denial" develop ing nations have been seeking a forum to discuss the promotion of international nuclear co-operation,_ where the non-proliferation aspects would be secondary. In that context , several develop ing nations criticize the IAEA for stressing its safeguards functions at the presumed cost of its promotional tasks. The ent ire issue has led to th e idea of hold ing a Onited Nations Conference on the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) • The purpose and working method s of that co nference were subjects of dispute between develop ing and developed nations at several inconclus iye meetings of the prepa ratory committee and the Conference itself has been put off until 1986. Meanwhile, in the framework of the IAEA , efforts .a.re be ing . made to internationalize aspects of the nuc lear fuel cycle , by such means as a multinational storage scheme for excess pluton ium and arrang ements to assure a reliable supply of nuclear ma terial and facility . , ' , - 3 - There is _justified concern about the future of the NPT . At th e first Review Conf erence, in 19 75, a final document could be adopted only with great difficulty. At the second Conf erence, in 1980 , no agr eement was reached on a final document although ag reement on the part of the text dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was close . Unless extended , the Treaty will expire in 1995 and the Review Co nference of 19 85 may therefore be dec isive for the long-term viability of the NPT. The effective survival of th e Treaty should be of keen concern to the internat iona l community in general, whose security is already at great risk as a result of the present arms race but would be even mo re endangered in a state of nuclear anarchy. Th e security co nsiderations of the nuc lear Power s are predicated to a large degree on the cont inuation of the present balance. Since the Treaty thus serves the ir strateg ic interests , the nuc lear-weapon States should be ready to make substantive concessions to strengthen its implementat'ion, for instance by the conc lus ion of a Comprehensive Nuc lear Test Ban. The non-nuclear-weapon States that have become part ies to the Treaty have done so in the clear re alization that th is would serve the ir security interests1 it is obviously to their interest to cont inue their adherence to the Treaty and to he lp strengthen it. International exchanges in the nuclear field are po ssible only when there ex ists an effective system of assurances ag ainst nuc lear proliferation. Th erefore , be sides serving a general secu rity interest , the NPT is an -important element in the promot ion of peaceful nuclear energy and efforts to reconc ile th at promo tion with the ma intenance of an . effective non-pro liferation syste� within the framewo rk of the Tr eaty deserve the ac tive and co ntinuing support of all the part ies. Nota pa ra el Secretario General America Central 1. El 4 de abril, Nicaragua present6 en el Consejo de Seguridad un proyecto de Resoluci6n que recibi6 13 votos a favor, la abstenc i6n del Reino Unido y el voto negativo de los Estados Unidos. Dicho proyecto de adoptarse , habria inter alia condenado el minado de los principales puertos de Nicaragua, violando con ello el derecho internacional. El 6 de abr il, los Estados Unidos, en una acci6n preventiva, anunciaron que durante dos afios no aceptaran la jurisdicci6n de la Corte Internacional de Justicia, sobre casos relativos a sus acciones en centroamer ica. Tres dias mas tarde , Nicaragua acusaba a los Estados Unidos ante la Corte Internac ional de la Haya de violar multiples leyes inte rnac ionales, de agredir a esa naci6n cent roamer icana y de "matar , herir y secuestrar ciudadanos" nicaragilenses. El Gobierno Sandinista ha recurrido a la Corte para que ordene el cese del minado y otros ataques realizados contra su pa is por los "contras" respaldados por los Estados Unidos . 2. El Senado Nor teamericano aprob6 el 5 de los corr ien tes una ayuda mili tar de 61.7 millones de d6lares para el Gobierno de El Salvador y de 21 millones para los rebeldes nicaragilense . Es probable que la Camara de Representantes no apruebe la suma destinada a los "contras". Informe s sobre la participaci6n de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) en las operaciones de minado de puertos nicaragilenses , han provocado declarac iones de rechazo de pa ises aliados de Washington, incluido el Re ino Unido y multiples condenas en el Congreso sobre todo de parte de los dem6cratas. La constataci6n de dichos operativos han provocado ind ignac i6n en el Senado , al punto que , el 10 de los corrientes , se adopto por 84 votos a 1 2 una resoluc i6n oponiendose a la utilizac ion de fondos fede rales para ese fin. El 11 de abr il el Comite de Asuntos Exteriores de la Camara de Representantes, por su lado , aprob6 una resoluc i6n simi lar por 2 3 votos a 1. Funcionar ios ·de la Administraci6n nor teamericana han anunci ado que como consecuencia de la oposic i6n del Congreso, los Estados Un idos habian terminado sus operaciones de minado aunque voce ros "contras " han declarado que el minado continuaria. Aparentemente , en los ultimos dias se ha desencadenado la mayor ofensiva por parte de los "contras" hasta la fecha. Dichos combates se libran en cuatro provincias nicaragilenses . ' -2- 3. El Gobierno nicaraguense anunci6 nuevamente sus intensiones de llevar a cabo las elecciones del 4 de noviembre. Nueve partidos con personeria juridica tienen el derecho de partic ipar en las elecciones, en forma ind ividual o en alianzas . Los partidos politicos y medios diplomaticos de Nicaragua temen un aplazamiento de las elecciones del 4 de noviembre , si continua la agresion militar contra este pais y las tensiones internas en el Frente Sandinista. 4. El 4 de abril, bajo estrictas medidas de segur idad militar , el Cong reso Hondurei'io elig io unanimemente al General Walter Lope z Reyes, como nuevo Jefe de sus Fuerzas Armadas , quien reemplaza al General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez. Este ultimo fue expulsado de las Fuerzas Armadas el 31 de marzo, en un incidente que orig in6 las renuncias de cinco de los seis generales que componian el Estado Mayor. 5. Los resultados oficiales de los comicios celebrados el pasado 25 de ma rzo en El Salvador , tuvieron el siguiente resul tado : Partido Democrata Cristiano ( PDC) con el 43.4 po r ciento de los vo tos, contra el 29.8 de la Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) y el 19.3 para el Partido de Conciliac ion Nacional (PCN) . No habiendo obtenido ninguno de los partidos la mayoria simple , el PDC y ARENA entraran a una segunda vuelta electoral que tendra lugar el 6 de mayo . 6. En Guatemala, la reanudac i6n de las actividades de los grupos guerrilleros en los ultimos 15 dias, asi como la ofens iva "contra-insurgenc ia" lanzada por el ejircito guatemalteco, han originado un fuerte movimiento de tropas de ambos grupos . La reactivaci6n de la guerrilla en tres departamentos del pa is ha sido calificada, por observadores militares, como un "repunte ", despues de varios me ses de inactividad , que dio lugar a que las autoridades guatemaltecas anunciaran el total control de la guerrilla . 7. El Presidente de Mexico , Miguel de la Madrid , afirm6 que coincidio con sus colegas de los 5 paises que recientemente visit6 (Colombia, Argentina, Brasil, Ve ne zuela y Panama) , en que sus gobiernos deben coordiriar sus esfuerzos para inf luir en la comunidad internacional con el fin de mitigar las tensiones existentes . 8. El Presidente Reagan , el 28 de marzo , ratific6 en su cargo al Comisionado Especial para Centroamerica, Sr. Ha rry w. Schlaudeman, quien en la actualidad se encuentra visitando los paises centroamericanos. En un futuro prox imo emprendera una gira a los paises que confo rman el Grupo de Contadora. • t -3- 9. El 8 de abr il, se reunieron en Panama , los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores del Grupo de Contadora con el proposito de evalua r la situacion en el area centroamericana, asi como el avance de los trabajos de las Comisiones que deberan finalizar antes de la reunion conjunta de cancilleres, el 29 del mes en curso. Los Ministros de Relac iones Exteriores senalaron su preocupacion por el grave deterioro que muestra ultimamente la region: intenfisicac ion de acciones por parte de fuerzas irregulares; introduccion de armamento sofisticado; minado de puertos; presencia ostensible de tropas y asesores militares. A todo esto , los Canc illeres exhortaron nuevamente a los pa ises centroamericanos a mantener un clima mas propicio en la region . 13 de abril de 1984 ;I f cc . · Ff / Conf idential 11 Apr il 1984 CENTRAL AME RICA Backgr ound Endeavours to reduce the high tensions in Central Amer ica have centred on efforts by the Contadora Gr oup, formed by Colombia, Mex ico , Panama and Venezuela in January 1983 . In May 1983, the Secur ity Council, by resolution 530 , expressed support for the Group' s efforts. In July 1983, the Pr es idents of the Contadora Gr oup adopted the Cancun Declaration . In September 19 83 , the Contadora Group and the five Central Amer ican States adopted a 21-point Documert of Oj ec tives , based on pr inc iples of self-de�ermination and non- intervention , and with the goal of restrict 1 �� the pr esence of for eign troops and adviser s and import of �a teign military supplies. The Secretary-General, as requested t� resolut ion 530 , has kept the Security Counc il informed of these developm ents. It is gener ally recognized that the tens ions in the region ar ise from pr o found histor ical economic and soc ial imbalance s. The recent intensification of th is struggle has pr ovoked fears in cer tain quarters, notably in the US , that third countries are subverting the region . The US reaction has been to covertly s uppo rt, despite Congressional non-co-operation , ant i-Sandin ista "contras" based pr imar ily in Honduras (FDN) w ith smaller groups in Costa Rica (ARD E) . In add ition, the us launched ma jor joint mi litary exerc ises with Honduras . The us is following a "two- track" po licy comb ining military pr e ssur� with dipl omatic moves , appo int ing a Spec ial Envoy to negot 1at� with regional Gover nments and the Kissinger Commission to recommend long-term measures. The fact that Nicaragua has shown flexibility in co-operating with the Contadora proposa ls, offer ing amnesty to the contras , announc ing the departure of large number s of Cuban adv isers and the liber alization of internal policies, are seen by the US as the result of its po lic of pr essure. The US intervention in Grenada increa s�� appreE ens ion in Nicaragua of US mot ives , although earlier f�ars of an actual invasion have receded . . ..I 2 .� � - -2- ; Present pos ition Opt imism for a trend toward stability and decreased tens ion was raised w ith the declaration by the Contadora Gr oup on · 8 January 1984 that the five Centr al Amer ican countr ies had under taken commitments to implement the measures requ 1red by the Document of Objectives. Howeve r, compla ints by Nicaragua to the Security Counc il in Febr uary of aer ial attacks and in Apr il of continu ing attacks and min ing of its po rts demonstrate that the difficult and compl ex situa tion in Central Amer ica continues to be unstable . New major US/Honduran jo int exerc ises have been launched and will cont inue despite the change of mi litary leadership in Honduras. Th e Kissinger Commiss ion , wh ich pr oposed an $8 billion economic assi stance programme , also recommended military measures. On 4 Apr il the US vetoed a Nicaraguan draft resolution condemn ing the mining of Nicaraguan ports. The US then attempted to pre-empt Nicaragua 's recourse to the Internationa l Court of Just ice by rejecting the Cou rt 's jurisd iction over us disputes with Central Amer ica for the next two year s. France and Mexico offered to assist Nicaragua in clearing the mine s. Th e US Senate has pa ssed a non -binding resolut ion calling on the Administration to cease such ac ts wh ich the Cha irman of the Intelligence Committee labelled an •act of war•. The Nicar aguan Government has advanced elections from 19 85 to November 1984 . Hopes that these would help to ease tens ions are dependent on the future actions of the •contr as• and on developme nts in El Salvador . c Ft {f"Y� 1:¥ jJA- ) UNITED NATIONS -�\.� NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR 84 DATE: _9_A-"p� r_i_l_l_9_____ TO: The Secretary-General A: REFERENCE: ------ THROUGH: S/C DE: FROM: Carl-August Fleischhauer DE: The Legal Counsel sUBJECT: ICJ : Nicaragua vs . the United States OBJET: A. Letter dated 6 April 1984 from the United States Secretary of State 1. In his letter dated 6 April 1984 the United States Secretary of State informed you of a modification made to the United States 1946 acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice . That declaration already contained a number of reservations ..� � - - __.._. ...·- ----._-- - including , in particular , the so-called Connolly amendment which reserves disputes with regard to matters which are essentially with�? the domestic jurisdiction of the United States as_ det�rn.ined. .'b.� -�he UnUed States. The letter of 6 Ap ril 1984 has the effect of removing from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court disputes with any Central American state or arising out of or related to events in Central America . 2. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is �-.- <.! 1 for parties to the Statute not autoQaticaly established but requir�s � S?ecific recognition. In accordance with Article 36(2) of its Statute , �t�t�s parties �ay at any time make general declarations accepting the co �?ulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Such �eneral declarations have been ..!a ue l»y 47 States at the present time , many of them containing reservation� of various kinds. 3. As a general declaration under Article 36(2) of the Statu£� is a sovereign act , it is quite lawful for a State at any time to t�r:Jb.I te or amend its declaration . This has been done in past instances (e.�. irance in connexion with t:1e Australian �uclear Test cases). It has , however , to be noted that the United States declaration provides for a six ...ont h period of notice of termination. It is silent on modification. - 2 - 4. The Un ited States communication has been addressed to you in accordance with Ar ticle 36(4) of the · Statute . The ICJ has been informed by us about the change in. the United States declaration and ...... ___ - ·-· --·-----... - all States are also being no tified in accordance with the same provision . ,_____ .. -- -- ·-� B. The acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court by Nicaragu a Nicaragua deposited in 1929 a declaration of acceptance of the jurisdiction of the predecessor of the present Court , the Permanent Court of International Justice . In this declaration Kicaragua recognized "as compulsory unconditionally the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice" . According to Art icle 36(5) of the Statute of the Court , such declarations made to the Permanent Court carried over to the International Court of Justice . There seems to be , however , an uncertainty as to whether Nicaragua was in 1929 a party to the Permanent Court. The Nicaraguan declaration is published in the Yearbook of the / International Court of Justice with a footnote regarding this question . I C. The Nicaraguan Application . L The International Court of Justice has informed you by a cable of today's date that Nicaragua has filed an application against the United States of America on the grounds that the United States is using military force against Nicaragua and intervening in Nicaragua 's internal affairs , in violation of Nicaragua 's sovereignty , territorial integrity and political independence and of the mo st fundamental and universally accepted principles of international law . Nicaragua has also requested the indication of provisional measures wh ich are designed to stop the alleged United States intervention . It has to be noted that the International Court of Justice has .in a few rare instances dealt-...... with I ------··-·-�...... '�""- · - -.--_..,..-- . the questio_n pr i r to a decision as to its __ �- �� �-� _?.��-l:�EE��.R.t�o , ., jurisdiction although this had been challenged . - �s I - 3 - 2. The Registrar of the Court informs us that the Court is being convened immediately wh ich , however , seems to encounter some difficulties as the President is in Morocco and the Vice President is in Brazil . - Tof�t �fc§�iA���e�ij�:lLG�rE'�� tBol�NygEggR�es!§Rq8y MR . )E C RETARY-GENERAL, DEAR COL LEAGUES, I SHOULD LIKE FIRST OF AL L TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR VE RY KIND WOQ�S AND FOR YOUR GENEROUS HOSPITALITY HERE TODAY . I T�INK I SPEAK ON BEHALF OF ALL MY VISITING COLL EAGUES, MP . SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHEN I EXPRESS WARM APPRECIATION or TH£ PROFESSIONAL AND EFFICIENT MANNER IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR STAFF H A�� ORGANIZED THIS SESSION OF THE ACC. THE HIGH STANDARD QF T H E ARRANGEMENTS IS A FINE TRIBUTE TO ALL YOUR HARD WORK OV�� RECENT MONTHS . WE APPRECIATE VERY WE LL THE BURDEN WHICH THE EXE RCISE MUST HAVE PLACED O N A RELATIVE LY SMALL ORGANIZATION SUCH AS YOUR OWN . - 2 - I THINK IT IS FAI R TO SAY THAT THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IS AT PRESENT TRAVERSING A PERIOD OF UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE . DURING SUCH A "CRISIS OF FAITH • IT IS, I BELIEVE, AL L THE MORE VITAL THAT WE , ALL OF US, DE MONS TRATE BOTH THE KEY RELEVANCE AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM OF MULTILATE RAL COOPERATION EMBODIED IN THE UN SYSTEM. WE MUST RISE TOGETHER TO MEET THE CHALLENGE WHICH FACES US AL L. IN THIS GENERAL CONTEXT IT IS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT WE MEET AT THIS TI ME UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION , ONE OF WHOSE FUNCTIONS IS THE PROMOTION OF THE HIGHEST ST ANDARDS OF SAFETY AT SEA . '· - ., - 3 - OUR DELIBERATIONS HERE IN LONDON HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE AND AGREEABLE ATMOSPHERE. THIS IS AS IT SHOULD BE FOR A SYSTEM WHICH CALLS ITSELF A FAMILY . IN THANKING YOU , DEAR COLLEAGUES, FOR YOUR POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MEETING , I SHOULD LIKE , IN CLOSING, TO WISH YOU ALL CONTINUED SUCCESS IN YOUR IMPORTANT WORK . MAY I NOW ASK YOU TO JOIN ME IN RAISING YOUR GLASSES I N A TOAST TO MR . SRIVASTAVA, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF IMO AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. TOAST BY THESECRETARY-GENERAL AT DINNER TO BE GIVEN BY H. E. MARGARET THATCHER FOR MR�BERS OF tHE. ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE ON COOROINATION LONDON - 16 APRIL 1984 MADAME P� IME MINISTER, EXCELLENC IES, lAD IES AND GENTLEMEN: I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR VERY KIND WORDS, MADAME PRIME MINISTER, AS WELL AS THE WARM HOSPITALITY YOU HAVE EXTENDED TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE VAR IOUS SPEC IALIZED AND RELATED AG ENC IES OF THE UNI TED NAT IONS SYSTEM MEET ING HERE IN LONDON , - 2 - WE GREATLY VALUE ALL TH IS, PARTICULARLY AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE UNI TED KINGDOM' S STEADFAST SUPPORT FOR THE UN ITED NATIONS, WE RECALL THE HISTOR IC RELATIONSHIP OF THE WORLD ORGAN IZAT ION WITH TH IS COUNTRY, TH IS CITY AND, INDEED , TH IS HOUSE, IN ADDITION TO PLAY ING A LEAD ING ROLE IN· THE FRAM ING OF THE UNI TED NATIONS CHARTER, BR ITAIN HAS BEEN A DIRECT AND MOST IMPORTANT CONTR IBUTOR TO THE PROCESS WH ICH HAS ENLARGED THE COMPOS ITION OF THE UN ITED NAT IONS, GIVING IT ITS PRESENT UNI VERSAL REPRESENTATIVE CHARACTER, -- - 3 - I ALSO RECALL THAT IT WAS IN LONDON, AT A HISTOR ICAL TURN ING POINT IN WORLD WAR I l, THAT THE FIRST STEP WAS TAKEN IN TH E PROCESS WH ICH LED TO THE ESTABLI SHMENT OF THE UN ITED NATIONS . TH IS WAS THE INTER-ALLIED DECLARATION OF 1941. THAT DECLARATION SPOKE OF THE WILLING CO-OPERAT ION OF PEOPLES IN A WORLD IN WHICH, RELIEVED OF THE MENACE OF AGGRESSION , ALL MIGHT ENJOY ECONOM IC AND SOC IAL SECURITY AS THE ONLY TRUE BASIS OF ENDURING PEACE. THAT IS THE CENTRAL TAS K WH ICH PREOCCUPI ES THE HEADS OF THE UNITED NAT IONS AG ENCIES WHO ARE YOUR GUESTS TH IS EV EN ING. - 4 - I RECA LL ALSO THAT IT WAS A SHORT DISTANCE FROM HERE, AT CHURCH HoUSE, WESTMINSTER , THAT THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NAT IONS MET IN 1945 TO ORGAN IZE AND SET UP TH E UN I TED NATIONS . THE BAS IS OF THE UN I TED NAT IONS SYSTEM IS TH E REALI ZAT ION THAT IT IS ONLY THROUGH TH E MECHAN ISMS OF MULTILATERAL RESPONSE TO THE COMPLEX CHALLENGES OF TH E MODERN WOR LD THAT PEACE CAN BE FUL LY ASSURED AND SOC IAL AND ECO NOMIC PROGRESS ACH I EVED . OUR MEETING HERE AND YOUR WARM WELCOME TO US TONIGHT UNDERLINE THE VAL IDITY OF THAT PR INCIPLE, ENUNC IATED HERE IN LONDON IN THE MIDST OF A WO RLD WAR MOR E THAN FORTY YEARS AGO . - 5 - ExcELLENC IES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN , I NOW PROPOSE A TOAST TO TH E HEALTH OF HER EXCELLENCY TH E RIGHT HONOURABLE MARGARET THATCHER, PRIME MINISTER OF TH E UN I TED KINGDOM, TO HER MAJ ESTY' S GOVERNMENT, AND TO TH E WELL-BEING AND PROSPER ITY OF TH E PEOPLE OF TH E UNITED KI NGDOM . * * * * * * * * * * * r I �I I t I r • ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE STAFF OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION LONDON - AP RIL L984 MY DEAR COLLEAGUES; I HAVE COME HERE TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY DEEP APPRECIATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR ORGANIZATION. YOU ARE RUNNING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. FAR FROM BEING AN ISOLATED AGENCY , IT IS A KEY UNIT IN THE GLOBAL NETWORK OF ORGANIZATIONS, EACH WITH ITS OWN DEFINED SPHERE OF INTEREST AND OPERATION BUT ALL BOUND TOGETHER BY THE COMMON MISSION OF BRINGING ABOUT A BETTERMENT OF HUMAN LIFE . I AM ALSO ANXIOUS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO WASTAGE OF EFFORT DUE TO DUPLICATION, OVERLAPPING OF RESPONSIBILITIES OR NEEDLESS BUREAUCRATIC COMPETITION . YO U ARE , I HAVE NO DOUBT, FULLY AWARE THAT IN THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS , THE WHOLE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM IS BEING SUBJECTED TO MOST CRITICAL SCRUTINY . WE SHOULD NEITHER FEAR SUCH EXAMINATION NOR TRY TO BE DEFENSIVE REGARDING OUR ROLE. RATHER, WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO ANY IMPERF ECTIONS IN OUR WORK AND PROCEDURES AND READY TO CORRECT THEM. ALSO, ALL OF US IN OUR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF SPECIALIZED ENDEAVOUR SHOULD VIEW OURSELVES AS PART OF THE WHOLE ORGANIZED STRUCTURE OF MULTILATERAL CO-OPERATION. LET THERE BE NO DOUBT THAT THE VIABILITY AND PROGRESS OF GLOBAL CIVILIZATION DEPEND ON THE EFFICIENT WORKING OF THIS STRUCTURE . - 2 - MARITIME SAFETY IS A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE CONTINUANCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONTACTS AND COMMERCE AMONG THE NATION S OF THE WORLD . You ARE HELPING TO MAINTAIN THE HEALTH OF A MAIN ARTERY OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE. CONTINUAL ADVANCES IN TE CHNOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE GENERATE NEW CONCERNS IN ALL SPHERES OF HUMAN ACTIVITY , AS THEY HAVE IN YOURS. Yo u HAVE RESPONDED TO THEM BY , AMON G OTHER THINGS, YOUR SIGNIFICANT INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRESERVATION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT , THE UNDERTAKING OF MAJOR PROGRAMMES FOR TRAINING SEAFARERS PARTICULARLY FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE PROMOTION OF TH E WORLD MARITIME UN IVERSITY IN SWEDEN. AL L THESE ARE IMPRESSIVE ACHIEVEMENTS. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT NONE OF THEM WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE DEDICATION AND THE ABILITY WHICH YOU HAVE BROUGHT TO THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR TAS KS. I CONSIDER IT A MATTER OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THE STAFF OF TH E ENTIRE UNITED NATIONS SYSTE M SHOULD CONFORM TO THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF INTEGRITY AND COMPETENCE . IN RETURN, THEY ARE ENTITLED TO SATISFACTORY CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AND I DEEM IT A PERSONAL OBLIGATION , WITHIN MY POWE RS AND TH E FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO US, TO ALLAY THEIR ANXIETIES ON THIS SCO RE . You HAVE A COMMON CAUSE ALONG WITH YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT AND OTHER SPECIALIZED AGEN CIES IN MATTERS AFFECTING YOUR SALARIES, PENS IONS AND POST ADJUSTMENT . - 3 - PLEASE FEEL ASSURED THAT I RECOGNIZE THE GREAT IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY THE STAFF OF TH E WHOLE SYSTEM TO THE SECURITY OF PENSION AFTER YEARS OF DEVOTED SERVICE . I FOLLOW THIS AND RELATED QUESTIONS VERY CLOSELY AND YOUR CONCERNS ARE CONSTANTLY IN MY MIND. I WISH YOU ALL SUCCESS IN YOUR CAREERS. TH E BEST REWARD FOR EACH OF US IS THE FEELING THAT, WH ATEVER BE OUR INDIVIDUAL FUNCTIONS , WE ARE CONTR IBUTING TO THE FULFILMENT OF THE PURPOSES ENTR USTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM BY THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD. I THANK YOU • ••••• SECRETARY -GENERAL 'S ADDRESS TO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM LONDON - 17 APRIL 1984 MR. CHAIRM AN, LADIES AND GE NTLEMEN: I THANK YOU FOR YOUR WELCOME . IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO MEET THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CONVEY TO YOU MY DEEP APPRECIATION OF YOUR EFFORTS. I AM ALSO VERY GLAD TO NOTE THE PRESENCE HERE TODAY OF DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT. EVEN IN THE PRESENT TIME OF RAPID CHANGE , THE PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM CONTINUES TO PROVIDE A MODEL AND INSPIRING EXAMPLE FOR NUMEROUS SOCIETIES AROUND THE GLOBE . I WOULD NOT LET THIS OPPORTUNITY PASS WITHOUT TELLING YOU WHAT GREAT IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO THE WORK OF UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATIONS IN ALL COUNTRIES. I CANNOT REITERATE TOO OFTEN THAT , WHILE THE UNITED NATIONS IS PRIMARILY AN ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENTS, ITS SUCCESS OR FAILURE DEPENDS TO A GREAT DEGREE ON THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF PUBLIC OPINION. • - 2 - INDEED, THE VERY OPENING WORDS OF OUR CHARTER, •wE, THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS" IMPLY THAT THE WORLD ORGANIZATION WAS FASHIONED TO MEET THE ASPIRATIONS OF All THE PEOPLES OF OUR· MEM BER STATES FOR A LIFE OF PEACE , HUMAN DIGNITY AND JUSTICE . THOSE GREAT OBJECTIVES ELABORATED IN THE CHARTER - "TO SAVE SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR ••• TO REAFFIRM FAITH IN FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, IN THE DIGNITY AND WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON" ARE CLEARLY THE CONCERN OF EVERYONE OF US, OF All THE MEN AND WOMEN OF OUR MEMBER STATES. THE STRUGGLE AT THE UNITED NATIONS IS THEIR STRUGGLE. THE UNITED NATIONS IS THEIR ORGANIZATION , ITS DEFEATS ARE THEIR DEFE ATS AND ITS ACHIEVEMENTS ARE THEIRS TO SHARE. IF THEY UNDERSTAND THIS, THE DIFFICULTIES WE FACE IN CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGING TASKS ASSIGNED TO US Will BE EASED AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR SUCCESS CONSIDERABLY ADVANCED. IN SAYING THIS, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I DO NOT WISH PUBLIC OPINION TO BE OBL IVIOUS OF THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ORGANIZATION AS IT FUNCTIONS AT PRESENT. �IJCH HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT THE APPARENT FUTILITY OF SOME OF THE DEBATES AT THE UNITED NAT IONS, THE FAILURE TO SETTLE REGIONAL DISPUTES AND THE LACK OF COHERENCE AND DIRECTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSE ON SUBJECTS AS URGENT AS THAT OF ARRESTING THE ARMS RACE . • . � - 3 - I WOULD BE THE LAST TO DENY THE LARGE MEASURE OF TRUTH IN MANY OF THESE COMPLAINTS. INDEED , I HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED MY CONCERN AT THE EROSION OF CONFIDENCE IN THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS DESIGNED TO AFFORD. I HAVE USED EVERY AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO IMPRESS ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER STATES THAT THE UNITED NATIONS IS NOT PLAYING THE EFFECTIVE AND DECISIVE ROL E THAT ITS CHARTER ENVISAGED FOR IT. RUT THE POINT THAT DESERVES TO BE STRESSED IS THAT IF THESE WEAKNESSES SHOULD LEAD TO PUBLIC APATHY TOWARDS THE UNITED NATIONS, THEY WILL BE AGGRAVATED AND NOT LESSENED. AF TER ALL, THESE WEAKNESSES ARISE NOT FROM ANY STRUCTURAL DEFECT IN THE ORGANIZATION OR AN INEFFICIENT MAC HINERY BUT FROM THE DIVERGENCES IN THE POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENTS WHEN THEY ARE GEARED TO NARROW SHORT-TERM ENDS. GOVE RNMENTS ARE UNFORTUNATELY MORE WILLING TO VOICE THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER THAN TO ASSIGN ANY SIGNIFICANT ROL E TO THE ORGANIZATION WHERE THEIR OWN INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED. INEVITABLY, OUR OWN CREDIBILITY SUFFERS AS A RESULT. IN A VICIOUS CIRC LE, THIS IN TURN MAKES IT STILL MORE UNLIKELY THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL TURN TO THE ORGANIZATION TO RESOLVE DISPUTES OR RELY ON ITS SECURITY FRAMEWORK. - 4 - HE RE AGAIN. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION ASSUMES THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE . GOVERNMENTS - AS A GENERAL RULE ! - RESPOND TO THEIR DOMESTIC OPINION. IF THE LARGE CONSTITUENCY OF PEACE WHICH EXISTS IN All SOCIETIES ARTICULATES ITSELF CONSTRUCTIVE LY, THEN GOVERNMENTS Will BE ENCOURAGED TO ANSWER ITS DEMANDS AND THUS TO HARMONIZE THEIR ACTIONS FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF HUMANITY 'S COMMON ENDS. IF YOU ACCUSE ONE OF APPEALING TO PEOPLE OVER THE HEADS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS, YOU ARE ENTIRELY RIGHT . SOMETIMES THE WORK OF PEACE IS TOO IMPORTANT TO LEAVE TO GOVERNMENTS ALONE. OBVIOUSLY . THE NUCLEAR AGE - WHERE A FEW MINUTES' FLIGHT BY NUCLEAR MISSILES CAN BRING All HUMAN ENDEAVOUR TO AN END - HAS LENT A NEW URGENCY TO THE IMPERATIVE OF PEACE . THE NUCLEAR THREAT HAS ALSO LENT A NEW URGENCY TO THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SECURITY MACHINERY , ALTHOUGH THIS DIMENSION IS STRANGELY ABSENT FROM MUCH OF THE DEBATE ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE . UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATIONS CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE IN STRESSING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT, AND IN PROMOTING AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT ARE THE OBSTACLES TO THE FULFILMENT OF THE GOALS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND HOW THEY CAN BE OVERCOME . - 5 - AN UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH THE CREDIT AND THE DEBIT SIDE OF THE BALANCE SHEET OF THE UNITED NATIONS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN A COUNTRY LIKE BRITAIN WHICH IS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN FRAMING THE CHARTER AND WHICH ENJOYS A SPECIAL POSITION AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY CO UNCIL. HISTORY AND CULTURE HAVE MADE ITS CAPITAL A HUB OF WORLD COMMUNICATIONS AND A LEADING CENTRE FOR THE EXPRESSION AND INTERCHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION. THE INTELLECTUAL WEALTH OF THIS COUNTRY AND THE VITALITY OF ITS MEDIA, AFFORD THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION HERE AN ENVIABLE OPPORTUNITY TO KEEP ALIVE POPULAR INTEREST IN THE WORK AND PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE SINCERITY AND CALIBRE OF THE LEADERS OF THOUGHT IN BRITAIN, WHO ARE EMINENTLY QUALIFIED TO APPRAISE THE WORLD SITUATIO� IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMANITY 'S LONG-RANGE AIMS. FORTIFIES MY CONFIDENCE IN THE MISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS SOCIATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. I WISH YOU ALL SUCCESS IN YOUR EFFORTS • •••••• . . TOAST BY SECRETARY-GENERAL AT LUNCHEON TO BE GIVEN BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, LONDON - APRIL t98� MR . SECRETARY-GENERAL, EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GE NTLEMEN: I THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND WORDS, MR . SECRETARY-GENERAL . THE BONDS OF CO-OPERATION WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COMMONWEALTH ARE INDEED GRATIFYING AND I DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE VALUABLE EFFORTS YOU HAVE PERSONALLY HADE TO STRENGHTEN THE�. - 2 - THE COMMONWEALTH IS UNIQUE AMONGST INTER-GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS OUTSIDE THE UN ITED NATIONS FOR THE HETEROGENOUS CHARACTER OF ITS �EHBERSHIP. YOUR ME�BER COUNTRIES - OF WHOM ALMOST ALL ARE ME�BERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS WE LL - SPAN .FIVE CONTINENTS, WIDELY DIFFERING STAGES OF ECONOMIC DEVE LOPMENT AND VARYING RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL BELIEFS. YOUR PRIN CIPAL AIMS , THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY , THE ADVANCEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT , AND THE PRESERVATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS , FOL LOW THE INSPIRING OBJECTIVES SPELT OUT IN THE CHARTE R OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATION. - 3 - INDEED� THE COMMONWEALTH EXEMPLIFIES THAT SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL FELLOWSHIP WHICH UNDERLIES THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER� THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF NATIONS LARGE AND SHALL IS AT THE HEART OF OUR ENDEAVOURS, DESIGNED AS THEY ARE TO PROMOTE THE COMMON GOOD . IN COMIN G TOGETHER AND RISING ABOVE DISTINCTIONS OF RACE, CULTURE, OR POLITICAL SYSTEM, OUR MEMBER COUNTRIES HAVE RECOGNIZED THE EXIGENCIES OF INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE NEED TO CHOOSE HARMONY OVER ISOLATION, CONSENSUS OVER CONFLICT. - 4 - THAT CHOICE WAS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE FOR THIS ERA. BUT IN ITSELF IT IS NOT ENOUGH. . WE HAVE TO HOVE FROM A MERE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS TOWARDS A TRUE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. WE HAVE BEEN COMPELLED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE REALITY OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND THE UNIVERSAL MENACE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT WE HAVE NOT SUFFICIENTLY FACED THE IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMANITY . THE UNITED NATIONS HAS BEEN CREATED, ITS MEMBERSHIP EXPANDS EACH YEAR, BUT ITS FULL POTENTIAL HAS NOT BEEN REALIZED . _·__ .J .. • - 5 - SOMETIMES IT ALMOST SEEMS AS IF THE HERE ACT OF JOINING THE ORGANIZATION IS THE CONCLUSION OF A STATE 'S RESPONSIBILITY TO INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY � RATHER THAN THE FIRST STEP IN TRUE CO-OPERATION. OR AGAIN, THAT VOTING FOR A DECISION BY A UN ITED NATIONS BODY ABSOLVES THE MEMBER STATE OF ANY FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION'S IMPLEMENTATION . WITHOUT THE COMMITMENT AND RESOLVE OF OUR MEMB ER STATES, IN DEED AS WELL AS IN WORD , THE MACHINERY OF PEACE AND SECURITY OFFERED BY THE WORLD ORGANIZATION CANNOT POSSIBLY FUNCTION AS IT WAS INTENDED . - 6 - IN OUR EFFORTS IN THE CAUSE OF AN EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE COMMONWEALTH WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE AND LEND ITS FIRM SUPPORT TO THE UNITED NA T !O�S. I KNOW THAT THIS SUPPORT IS ONE OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES O F TM£ · COMMONWEALTH, AS YOUR MEMBERS DECLARED IN THE L97L SINGAPORE �£ E TING , AND YOU HAVE INDEED BEEN TRUE TO THIS AFFIRMATION IN THE YEARS SINCE THEN. NO SHALL PART IN OUR CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN PLAYED BY YOUR DEDICATED AND FAR-SIGHTED SECREETARY-GENERAL, SHRIDATH RAHPHAL , TO WHOM I WOULD LIKE TO PAY A SPECIAL TRIBUTE TODAY. - 7 - I AM CONFIDENT THAT , AS IN THE PAST, THE UNITED NATIONS WILL RECEIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE FROM THE COMMONWEALTH IN OUR EFFORTS TO CONSTRUCT A NEW ORDER OF PEACE , JUSTICE AND STABILITY FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS. EXCELLENCIES, I WO ULD INVITE YOU TO JOIN ME IN A TOAST TO THE HEALTH OF HIS EXCELLENCY SHRIDATH RAMPHAL. SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH. • ••
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