1 the Legacies of Transition Governments: Practical Changes and Theoretical Optimism 1
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Notes 1 The Legacies of Transition Governments: Practical Changes and Theoretical Optimism 1. Villalón and VonDoepp (2005) also note this undue pessimism in the study of African democratization. 2. The role of civil society is also discussed with respect to Mali’s National Conference transition in Smith (1998); as well as more generally in African transitions in Monga (1996) and Nwokedi (1995). 3. I have addressed the role of the French in these transitions in greater depth in Seely (2001b). 4. These are: Benin, Burkina Faso, CAR, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mail, Namibia, Niger, Sao Tomé, South Africa, and Togo. 5. See, for example, Bendahmane and McDonald (1986), Peter Gastrow (1995), and Marks (2000). For the aftereffects of transition see Pierre du Toit (2003). 6. Iraq 2005 constitution, Chapter 1, Art. 65. 2 Political History and Practice Prior to Transition 1. This section draws upon the works of Cornevin (1962), Decalo (1995), and Ronen (1975), which should be consulted for additional information. 2. For more on this ethno-regional pattern of alliances see LeVine (2004, 168–170). 3. See Decalo (1995, 234–235) for individual members of the Ligue and the roles they played in government. 4. From President Kérékou’s speech at the opening of the Conference des Cadres (Ehuzu October 8, 1979, no. 1010). 5. From Gbenou’s closing address to the president (Ehuzu October 19, 1979, no. 1020). 6. From Kérékou’s closing address (Ehuzu October 19, 1979, no. 1020). 7. “Special Sondage: Résultats, Chiffres et Estimations en Pourcentages,” Gazette du Golfe September 1, 1989, no. 037. One hundred one people in Cotonou and 75 people in Porto-Novo were polled. The editors 184 NOTES admit (p. 3) that their methods are not the most sophisticated; they were forced to calculate percentages by hand because their Atari com- puter did not have the software for such a task. 8. “Recontre du ministre des Enseignements moyens et superieur avec la Cooperative universitaire des Etudiants,” Ehuzu (Cotonou) January 23, 1989, no. 3374. 9. “Fini, les bras de fer entre les enseignants et le gouvernement?” Gazette du Golfe (Edition Internationale) September 16, 1989, no. 38. 10. For example, “Exclusif: Affaire BCB, les protagonistes parlent,” La Gazette du Golfe (Cotonou) November 1988, no. Speciale. 11. “Communique Final de la Session Conjointe Speciale,” December 7, 1989. In Fondation Friedrich Naumann (1994), 112–116. 12. Ehuzu December 12, 1989, no. 3598. 13. From “Discours du president Kérékou a l’Ouverture de la Conference des Forces Vives de la Nation,” reprinted in Les Actes de la Conference Nationale (1994). 14. The Versailles meeting was organized by Severin Adjovi under the guise of his party “Club Perspectives ’99,” and the meeting and his role are recounted in detail in Adjovi (n.d.). Interview subject Aguessy also notes the importance of this gathering. 15. This section draws upon the works of Cornevin (1969), Decalo (1987), and Brown (1983), which should be consulted for additional information. 16. For more on the CUT and its role in the struggle of French colonies for independence, see LeVine (2004, 129–130). 17. Figures for Benin are from Africa Contemporary Record 1989–1990. Figures for Togo are from Apedo-Amah (1991). Benin’s population at this time was roughly 4.5 million, and Togo’s 3.4 million. 18. “Brazilian” is used to refer to Togolese of “mixed Euro-African par- entage, formerly exiled or deported Africans, and slaves taken to Brazil who went back to the coastal areas in the nineteenth century,” according to Decalo (1987, 50). 19. Africa Research Bulletin November 1987, 8677B. 20. Dossouvi Logo and Agbelenko Doglo were the two men on trial when the October 5 incidents took place. 21. “Togo: Le vendredi noir,” FORUM Hebdo October 17, 1990, no. 12. 22. “Une commission constitutionelle est créé,” La Nouvelle Marche October 17, 1990, no. 3330. 23. “Voici la constitution des 109” Atopani Express February 1–8, 1991, no. 24. 24. “Soulevement Populaire: Eyadéma cède sous la pression de la rue,” FORUM hebdo March 22, 1991, no. 31. 25. La Nouvelle Marche April 12, 1991, no. 33468. NOTES 185 3 Benin’s Civilian Coup d’Etat 1. “Tableau synoptique des suggestions faites dans le cadre de la Conférence Nationale,” République Populaire du Benin, January 1990. 2. The importance of this document in laying down the basis for the Conference decisions was mentioned by Glélé and Ibrahima, among others. 3. In the “Tableau Synoptique des suggestions faites dans le cadre de la Conference nationale,” (Ministry of the Interior document, January 1990) there are summaries of almost 500 letters sent to the National Conference preparatory committee. Here I am analyzing content of letters sent by organized groups (not individuals). Of these, there are 226 from political parties, regional development associations, unions and professional organizations, religious groups, and groups repre- senting the diaspora. These letters were voluntary and content was varied. Though they do not represent a random survey of preferences, they are a very revealing way to examine preferences as the transition was beginning. 4. From “Discours du président Kérékou a l’Ouverture de la Conférence des Forces Vives de la Nation,” reprinted in Fondation Friedrich Naumann (1994). 5. Kérékou visited the Conference on the third day, February 21, and expressed regret for the excesses committed under his regime but rejected the possibility of Conference sovereignty. On February 26, he returned to contribute the discussion of the economic commission report, and he returned later the same day in the context of the sov- ereignty debate to declare that he would not resign (Foundation Freidrich Naumann 1994, 6–10). 6. Transcript of the National Conference of Active Forces of the Nation, Ministry of the Interior document, 241. 7. In my interview, Alidou also suggested that getting the ex-presidents “out of the way” facilitated Soglo’s election. 8. Kouandété was invited to the Conference as a “personality,” but later was designated an “ex-president.” Kouandété held the presidency for a short period after one of the coups, and when he reminded the Preparatory Committee of this fact, his status was changed. The other ex-presidents were: Hubert Maga, Justin Ahomadegbé- Tometin, Emile-Derlin Zinsou, Paul-Emile de Souza, and Tairou Congacou. 9. Title III, Art. 44 of the final draft of the constitution; candidates must be between the ages of 40 and 70 on the date they officially declare their candidacy. 10. “Réunion du Conseil des Ministres,” La Nation June 21, 1990, no. 36, p. 3. 11. “Projet de loi sur l’amnistie” reprinted in Forum de la Semaine October 3–9, 1990, no. 25, p. 19. 186 NOTES 12. Title II, Art. 13 of the December 11, 1990 constitution. 13. Title III, Art. 71, Arts. 76–78. 14. “Haute Conseil de l’Audio-Visuel,” Title VIII. 15. The preferences of different administrative regions were taken by giv- ing each village one vote on each question and then reporting the majority opinion of all the villages in a given region. See, for example, Quénum (1990). 16. More recently, this party has changed its name to Parti du Renouveau Démocratique. 17. For more on regionalism of the 1991 legislative elections, see Degboe (1995), Bako-Arifari (1995), and Battle and Seely (2007). 18. Respectively: Idelphonse Lemon, Albert Tévoédjrè, Joseph Kéké, Bertin Borna, and Robert Dossou. 19. This point was also made by Kéké in our interview on July 12, 1999. 20. Loi no. 90–13 portant immunité personnelle du président Mathieu Kérékou. 4 “We Are Not Sheep”: Finding a Togolese Path 1. Joseph (1999) draws a distinction between transitions that happened before 1992, which were more likely to lead to democracy, and tran- sitions after 1992, when leaders were better able to manage the tran- sitions and establish “virtual” democracy, instead of real electoral democracy. 2. Groups and individuals at Togo’s National Conference, including the RPT, made more than 130 prepared speeches, or “communications.” Here I have analyzed printed records of 118 speeches by group rep- resentatives or prominent individuals. 3. Party tracts from the CDPA of Leopold Gnininvi (“Special Conference Nationale Communiqué no. 2,” no date) and CAR of Yaovi Agboyibo (CAR Communiqué no. 1, July 17, 1991) affirmed the parties’ sup- port for Act 1 of the Conference that declared sovereignty. 4. National Conference Report no. 6: séance de lundi 15 juillet 1991. 5. Declaration du gouvernement. Cabinet du President, Lomé: 16 juil- let 1991. 6. In an appearance on TV by Defense Minister Gen. Yao Ameyi, he said the military had “reservations about this concept of democracy,” and was concerned about the possibility of civil war, and reaffirmed their allegiance with Eyadéma (Africa Research Bulletin August 1991, 10232C–10233A). 7. Three interview subjects explicitly described the voting as ethnic, with Koffigoh winning the support of those from his own region, Kloto, as well as of the Kabiye delegates, many of whom live in or near that region (Batchati). Gnininvi, on the other hand, is Mina (or “Brazilian”), which is a very small percentage of the population NOTES 187 (Andjo). The Ewe, also southerners, were not able to unite behind the Mina candidate because of ethnic rivalry (Apati-Bassah). 8. “Largely, yes, the independent unions [were for Gnininvi]. The unions were approached to vote for Koffigoh . by the trade union- ists of Koffigoh’s region. The workers came to put pressure on their comrades” (Gbikpi-Benissan). 9. According to the official Conference report (no. 37), there were 765 votes cast and 757 usable ballots. Whichever of these figures is used, Koffigoh’s total of 385 is greater than 50 percent of the vote, so there did not appear to be any reason for a run-off.