DOCSLIB.ORG

DOUBT in FAVOUR of the DEFENDANT, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT Comparative Study

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
DOUBT in FAVOUR of the DEFENDANT, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT Comparative Study DOUBT IN FAVOUR OF THE DEFENDANT, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT Comparative study Здружение за кривично право и криминологија на Македонија Copyrights 2016 OSCE Mission to Skopje This publication is available in pdf form on the web site of the OSCE Mission to Skopje ISBN Published by OSCE Mission to Skopje Boulevard 8 September, 1000 Skopje www.osce.org/skopje Authors: Zoran Dimitrievski, Radmila Dragicevic-Dicic, Gianfranco Gallo, Michael G.Karnavas, Ruzica Nikolovska, Gordan Kalajdziev, Denis Pajic. Edited by: Ljubica Mishevska, OSCE Mission to Skopje Printed by: Polyesterday The content of this publication does not necessarily represent the view or the position of the OSCE Mission to Skopje. The Mission adheres to PC.DEC/81. This study complements the efforts of the OSCE Mission to Skopje to support the transition in practicing the new adversarial model of criminal procedure in the country, largely based upon similar legislative transitions in countries across Europe. Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt 4 * Editor’s note The principle of in dubio pro reo was introduced in the national criminal procedure legislation in 1997. The new, party driven, Law on criminal procedure from 2010, (hereinafter: domestic LCP)1, continues to regulate this principle in Article 4, which reads that “The Court shall decide in favour of the defendant whenever there is doubt regarding the existence or non-existence of facts comprising the elements of crime, or facts which lead to the application of a certain provision of the Criminal Code”. The domestic LCP goes a step further by introducing the standard, in Article 403, that the prosecution shall prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without giving any further definition. In order to make a distinction between the suspicion whether a person has committed a crime (suspicion that is detrimental to the defendant and is always in favour of the indictment) and the suspicion whether that person is really the perpetrator of the crime, i.e. suspicion which is in favour of the defendant’s innocence (positive suspicion which is always in favour of the defendant and is reflected in the principle ofin dubio pro reo as well as in the standard that the prosecution has the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt), the countries in the Anglo-Saxon world, as well as Italy, have been using two different terminologies. Namely, the term suspicion (in Macedonian language: сомневање) is used in a detrimental sense for the defendant and is in favour of the indictment, while the term doubt (in Macedonian language: двојба, двоумење, несигурност) is used to favour the defendant and the definition of the principle of in dubio pro reo, as well as for the standard of the prosecution bearing the burden of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the domestic LCP does not offer different terminologies for these two types of suspicion. The Law uses the term “suspicion” (сомневање) when it refers to the required level of suspicion that a person has committed the crime so that certain investigative measures, restrictions or charges can be undertaken or pressed against him/her., it also refers to the application of the principle of in dubio pro reo and the standard that the guilt shall be proven beyond reasonable doubt. For the purposes of this research, however, efforts have been made to make terminological distinction between these two types of suspicion/doubt, despite the fact that such terminological distinction does not correspond with the current legal terminology. 1 Law on criminal procedure, Official gazette 150/10, 200/12, 142/16 and Constitutional Court Decision no. 2/2016 Official gazette no.193/16. Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt 6 FOREWORD “If you would be a real seeker after truth, it is necessary that at least once in your life you doubt, as far as possible, all things.” (Rene Descartes) What is doubt and what kind of feeling is doubt? Should a judge being an independent arbiter not be doubtful for the most time of the trial? Nonetheless, is the judge not required to decide at the end? How can a judge decide if in doubt, and can a judge remain in doubt despite all? The criminal procedure principle in dubio pro reo-when in doubt in favour of the defendant- and the standard that the guilt shall be proven beyond reasonable doubt deal with the doubt, so their essence and use could probably throw some light on the above questions. Whilst in dubio pro reo principle is common for most of the continental law countries, the standard of beyond reasonable doubt developed in the Anglo-Saxon world, but it has been ‘recently’ introduced on the continent as well. Nowadays, the two can have very similar, if not identical, effect and probably could have had it at different stages in the past as well. It does not mean the origin and the circumstances in which the two emerged and developed were the same. Yet, most scholars would probably agree that today both of them reflect the realistic tendency of any conscientious person or a good society to protect themselves from injustice because the purpose of the overall criminal justice to punish the guilty at the same time has the other side, acquitting the innocent. By comparing the two one can notice that unlike the standard of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, which is applied in the end of the trial once the court has heard and seen all the evidence and is to decide on the guilt (or innocence) of the defendant, the in dubio pro reo principle literally does not restrict the moment of its application. Therefore, some may argue that in dubio pro reo has wider application and can be used in all stages of the criminal procedure, such as the stage when the court decides on imposing detention or when it accepts or rejects the Indictment, etc. However, given the fact that a judge can be doubtful during the trial, moreover, even prior to the trial, a question arises whether a judge should always apply the principle of in dubio pro reo and decide in favour of the defendant by halting the criminal procedure? Certainly not. Instead, the judge shall decide whether the prosecution has met the other necessary standards for undertaking certain investigative measures, restrictions and charges, such as the standard of reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed the crime. Moreover, the domestic LCP requires that the court applies the principle of in dubio pro reo only when decides whether facts exist or not, which the court decides Doubt in Favour of the Defendant, Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt on in the end of the trial. This basically means that the application of in dubio pro reo, more or less, focuses also on the ultimate question about the defendant’s guilt. So, if the judge, having considered the evidence, has doubts about the existence of facts that define the crime, the judge basically doubts the defendant’s guilt and, by applying the principle of in dubio pro reo, shall decide that those facts are not existent (were not proven beyond doubt) and shall adopt an acquitting decision. Another obvious difference between the two principles is the level of doubt. While beyond reasonable doubt standard requires taking into consideration only ‘reasonable’ doubt, the principle of in dubio pro reo does not require it explicitly. The principle of in dubio pro reo does not give gradation of the doubt, so it is up to the judge to do the same (to determine whether he/she is in doubt or not). Although the doubt is an inner state of mind and it is connected with the process of thinking as well as the consciousness of the person, it cannot be detached from the society in general and the overall level of awareness of the society at a particular point in time. In other words, an individual cannot derogate much from what could be considered doubtful in a society in a particular period of time. For example, a judge cannot doubt whether the defendant has committed the crime only because they may have twin brother or sister nobody knows about, including the judge, and who may have committed the crime instead. Even if the judge has such doubts, these doubts will not be reasonable for most of the people around him/her. But, what if such evidence corroborating this theory exists? What if, for instance, the defence presents evidence showing that a twin brother really exists, that he is not in good relations with the defendant, and he actually wants to set the defendant up? In such a case, the judge may have solid grounds to reasonably doubt the prosecutor’s case and the defendant’s guilt. So, although not specifically stated, the principle of in dubio pro reo refers also to the reasonable doubt, because any unreasonable doubt is just an assumption that may lead to a cul-de-sac with remerging doubts, doubts in everything and anything, with only limit being one’s imagination. The next question would be whether doubt always exists? Probably yes. Doubting is inevitable part of the thinking process and the judge should be doubtful throughout the trial. Having a doubt is equally important, as it is healthy. But whether the reasonable doubt always exists? Probably not. If the case is clear (that is, the prosecutor manages to refute the allegations of the defence about the twin brother beyond reasonable doubt), there will be no reasonable doubt. When a person doubts reasonably, it is improbable that he/she will remain in a stage of doubt for too long.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Identity, Authority and Myth-Making: Politically-Motivated Prisoners and the Use of Music During the Northern Irish Conflict, 1962 - 2000
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Queen Mary Research Online Identity, authority and myth-making: Politically-motivated prisoners and the use of music during the Northern Irish conflict, 1962 - 2000 Claire Alexandra Green Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 1 I, Claire Alexandra Green, confirm that the research included within this thesis is my own work or that where it has been carried out in collaboration with, or supported by others, that this is duly acknowledged below and my contribution indicated. Previously published material is also acknowledged below. I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third party’s copyright or other Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential material. I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection software to check the electronic version of the thesis. I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree by this or any other university. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author. Signature: Date: 29/04/19 Details of collaboration and publications: ‘It’s All Over: Romantic Relationships, Endurance and Loyalty in the Songs of Northern Irish Politically-Motivated Prisoners’, Estudios Irlandeses, 14, 70-82. 2 Abstract. In this study I examine the use of music by and in relation to politically-motivated prisoners in Northern Ireland, from the mid-1960s until 2000.
    [Show full text]
  • S444-CAJ-Submission-To-ICCPR
    CAJ’s Submission no. S444 CAJ’s Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the UK’s 7th Periodic Report under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) June 2015 2nd Floor, Sturgen Building Tel – 028 9031 6000 9-15 Queen Street Email – [email protected] Belfast BT1 6EA Web – www.caj.org.uk About CAJ The Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) was established in 1981 and is an independent non-governmental organisation affiliated to the International Federation of Human Rights. CAJ takes no position on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and is firmly opposed to the use of violence for political ends. Its membership is drawn from across the community. The Committee seeks to ensure the highest standards in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland by ensuring that the government complies with its responsibilities in international human rights law. The CAJ works closely with other domestic and international human rights groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights) and Human Rights Watch and makes regular submissions to a number of United Nations and European bodies established to protect human rights. CAJ’s activities include - publishing reports, conducting research, holding conferences, campaigning locally and internationally, individual casework and providing legal advice. Its areas of work are extensive and include policing, emergency laws and the criminal justice system, equality and advocacy for a Bill of Rights. CAJ however would not be in a position to do any of this work, without the financial help of its funders, individual donors and charitable trusts (since CAJ does not take government funding).
    [Show full text]
  • Catching Terrorists: the British System Versus the U.S
    S. HRG. 109–701 CATCHING TERRORISTS: THE BRITISH SYSTEM VERSUS THE U.S. SYSTEM HEARING BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION SPECIAL HEARING SEPTEMBER 14, 2006—WASHINGTON, DC Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 30–707 PDF WASHINGTON : 2006 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman TED STEVENS, Alaska ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri TOM HARKIN, Iowa MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland CONRAD BURNS, Montana HARRY REID, Nevada RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HERB KOHL, Wisconsin JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire PATTY MURRAY, Washington ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois MIKE DEWINE, Ohio TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado BRUCE EVANS, Staff Director TERRENCE E. SAUVAIN, Minority Staff Director SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire, Chairman THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico BARBARA A.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume I Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons Dated 15 June 2010 for The
    Report of the Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 15 June 2010 for the Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman) Bloody Sunday Inquiry – Volume I Bloody Sunday Inquiry – Volume The Hon William Hoyt OC The Hon John Toohey AC Volume I Outline Table of Contents General Introduction Glossary Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment Published by TSO (The Stationery Office) and available from: Online The Background to Bloody www.tsoshop.co.uk Mail, Telephone, Fax & E-mail Sunday TSO PO Box 29, Norwich NR3 1GN Telephone orders/General enquiries: 0870 600 5522 Order through the Parliamentary Hotline Lo-Call: 0845 7 023474 Fax orders: 0870 600 5533 E-mail: [email protected] Textphone: 0870 240 3701 The Parliamentary Bookshop 12 Bridge Street, Parliament Square, London SW1A 2JX This volume is accompanied by a DVD containing the full Telephone orders/General enquiries: 020 7219 3890 Fax orders: 020 7219 3866 text of the report Email: [email protected] Internet: www.bookshop.parliament.uk TSO@Blackwell and other Accredited Agents Customers can also order publications from £572.00 TSO Ireland 10 volumes 16 Arthur Street, Belfast BT1 4GD not sold Telephone: 028 9023 8451 Fax: 028 9023 5401 HC29-I separately Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 15 June 2010 for the Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman) The Hon William Hoyt OC The Hon John Toohey AC Ordered by the House of Commons
    [Show full text]
  • THE APPARATUS of IMPUNITY? Human Rights Violations and the Northern Ireland Conflict: a Narrative of Official Limitations on Post-Agreement Investigative Mechanisms
    THE APPARATUS OF IMPUNITY? Human rights violations and the Northern Ireland conflict: a narrative of official limitations on post-Agreement investigative mechanisms Committee on the Administration of Justice January 2015 The Apparatus of Impunity? Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) © Committee on the Administration of Justice January 2015 The material may be reproduced, free of charge, in any format or medium without specific permission, provided the reproduction is not for financial or material gain.The material must be reproduced accurately and not used in a misleading context. If the material is to be republished or issued to others, acknowledgement must be given to its source, copyright status, and date of publication. This publication is available on our website. CAJ Committee on the Administration of Justice 2nd Floor, Sturgen Building 9-15 Queen Street Belfast BT1 6EA Tel: 028 9031 6000 Fax: 028 9031 4583 [email protected] www.caj.org.uk ISBN 978 1 873285 94 7 The Apparatus of Impunity? Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) THE APPARATUS OF IMPUNITY? Human rights violations and the Northern Ireland conflict: a narrative of official limitations on post-Agreement investigative mechanisms Committee on the Administration of Justice January 2015 The Apparatus of Impunity? Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) Recent comments from key Council of Europe and UN human rights bodies in relation to existing mechanisms investigating the conflict in Northern Ireland: The absence of any plausible explanation for the failure to collect key evidence at the time when this was possible, and for attempts to even obstruct this process, should be treated with particular vigilance.
    [Show full text]
  • The Perilous Dialogue
    Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2009 The Perilous Dialogue Laura K. Donohue Georgetown University Law Center, [email protected] Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-028 This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/787 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2020353 97 Cal. L. Rev. 357-392 (2009) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons DONOHUE FINAL.DOC 4/30/2009 11:11:35 PM The Perilous Dialogue Laura K. Donohue† Five months before his retirement, Justice William Brennan wrote in a dissent: “the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to ‘create’ rights. Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing.”1 Professor Stephen Holmes reminds us in his lecture that such rights and liberties do not impede progress: they embody it.2 The rules preserving rights and liberties can help to focus action by bringing clarity to the present, while still preserving a long- term political perspective. Yet, time and again, both these rights and the rules designed to protect them are sacrificed in the name of national security. The master metaphor in each sacrifice is, indeed, “security or freedom,” and it is on this metaphor that I would like to focus.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Conceptual and Evidentiary Dimensions of Psychological Torture1
    15 REVIEW Debility, dependency and dread: On the conceptual and evidentiary dimensions of psychological torture1 Ergun Cakal, LLM* its perpetrators. A review of the current Key points of interest: literature to map conceptual and evidentiary •• Psychological torture is prohibited shortcomings from an inter-disciplinary by international law, but is ill- perspective is therefore warranted. Method: defined and regularly interpreted as The relevant texts were identified through not amounting to torture. Mental a systematic full-text search of databases, suffering needs to be clarified namely HeinOnline, HUDOC, UNODS and and expanded upon as part of the DIGNITY´s Documentation Centre, with definition of torture. the keywords `psychological torture´, `mental •• Psychological torture is complex and pain and suffering´, `severity´, `humiliation´, lacks appropriate acknowledgement `interrogation techniques´, and `torture in evidence-based fora. methods´. The identified texts, limited to English-language journal articles, NGO Abstract: reports, court-cases and UN documents Background: Psychological torture is from 1950 to date, were then selected deployed to break and obliterate human for relevance pertaining to conceptual, resistance, spirit and personality, but it evidentiary, technological and ethical critique is rarely afforded sufficient attention. provided therein. Results/Discussion: Deficiencies in conceptualising, documenting Evidential invisibility, subjectivity of the and adjudicating non-physical torture suffering, and perceived technological mean that it is frequently left undetected control are the primary ways in which and uncontested by the public, media psychological torture methods are designed, and the courts, bolstering impunity for and how they manage to evade prosecution 28, Number 2, 2018 Volume TORTURE and consequently be perpetuated. Cognisant of the need for further research, pertinent questions highlighting the need *) Legal Advisor, DIGNITY - Danish Institute to develop approaches, sharpen standards Against Torture.
    [Show full text]
  • Reconsidering the Troubles: an Examination of Paramilitary and State Violence in Northern Ireland
    Reconsidering the Troubles: An examination of paramilitary and state violence in Northern Ireland Erica Donaghy 2017 A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of International and Global Studies (Honours) in History, University of Sydney. 1 Abstract In the bitter sectarian conflict of the Northern Ireland Troubles, which spanned the years 1966- 1998, culpability has usually been firmly placed in the actions of the Irish Republican Army, a group seeking reunification with the Republic of Ireland. This thesis argues that the roles of Protestant loyalist paramilitaries and state forces such as the British Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary were equally as important. That this importance is not demonstrated in dominant literature remains to be to the detriment of efforts towards reconciliation and the acceptance of shared responsibility, and perpetuates the sectarian divide between Protestant and Catholic communities. 2 Contents Introduction 4 Chapter One: Republicanism and the IRA 11 Chapter Two: Unionism, loyalism and pro-state violence 31 Chapter Three: State Security Forces: the RUC and the British Army 54 Conclusion 71 Bibliography 75 3 Introduction Throughout the Northern Ireland Troubles, and especially in recent historical scholarship on the events of the conflict, primary culpability and the majority of focus has been given to the actions of republican groups and in particular the Irish Republican Army (in Gaelic Óglaigh na hÉireann). In popular memory and collective understanding outside of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland this group exists as a singular entity, responsible for some of Western Europe’s most bloody, destructive and expensive acts of sectarian terrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • State Violence in the Origins of Nationalism: the British Reinvention of Irish Nationalism 1969-1972
    State Violence in the Origins of Nationalism: The British Reinvention of Irish Nationalism 1969-1972 James Hughes London School of Economics Paper for the Nationalism and War Workshop McGill University, Montreal, March 24-26, 2011 Why does nationalism become a more persuasive frame of reference and why do nationalist movements develop at particular junctures. What makes for a nationalist ‘moment’? The episodic face of nationalism, when the ideology is popularised and movements mobilize, is usually placed within a historical continuum that is punctuated by precedents and precursors. In this paper I elaborate a hypothesis which is concerned with the violent contingent origins and reactive quality of nationalism. I believe that contingency can give us quite a good purchase on an explanation for why nationalism becomes a powerful political force when it does. In my previous work on post-communist nationalist movements, I have argued that the question why some nationalisms turned violent and others did not can be addressed at the macro-level by examining whether states responded to nationalist challenges by violence or accommodation. State violence is also a driver in the mutation of nationalism into extremist forms, and even driving resistance into movements that are antithetical to nationalism, such as Islamist jihadism (Hughes and Sasse, 2002; Hughes, 2007). Here, I examine the micro foundations for a nationalist mobilization and demonstrate its inherently reactive quality to a catalytical process of state violence. I take the case of the resurgence of Irish nationalism during the Northern Ireland “Troubles”, which was one of the most violent, costly and protracted nationalist conflicts in post-World War Two Europe.
    [Show full text]
  • Ucin1070571375.Pdf (2.43
    UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI DATE: November 10, 2003 I, Craig T. Cobane II , hereby submit this as part of the requirements for the degree of: Doctorate of Philosophy in: Political Science It is entitled: Terrorism and Democracy The Balance Between Freedom and Order: The British Experience Approved by: Richard Harknett James Stever Thomas Moore Terrorism and Democracy The Balance Between Freedom and Order: The British Experience A dissertation submitted to the Division of Research and Advanced Studies of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D.) in the Department of Political Science of the College of Arts and Sciences 2003 by Craig T. Cobane II B.S., University of Wisconsin-Green Bay 1990 M.A., University of Cincinnati 1992 Committee Chair: Richard J. Harknett, Ph.D. Abstract The British Government has been engaged for more than thirty years in a struggle with terrorism related to Northern Ireland. During what is euphemistically called the Troubles, the British government has implemented a series of special emergency laws to address the violence. Drawing upon the political context and debate surrounding the implementation and development of the emergency legislation this research examines the overall effect of British anti-terrorism legislation on both respect for civil liberties and the government’s ability to fight campaigns of violence. Drawing heavily upon primary sources, high profile cases of miscarriages of justice and accusation of an official ‘shoot to kill’ policy this project explores three distinct areas related to a government’s balancing of the exigencies of individual liberty and societal order.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights in Northern Ireland: Ireland V. the United Kingdom Deirdre E
    Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 4 8-1-1980 Human Rights in Northern Ireland: Ireland v. the United Kingdom Deirdre E. Donahue Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons Recommended Citation Deirdre E. Donahue, Human Rights in Northern Ireland: Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 3 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 377 (1980), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol3/iss2/4 This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Human Rights in Northern Ireland: Ireland v. the United Kingdom I. INTRODUCTION On January 18, 1978, ten years into the present conflict in Northern Ire­ land! and amidst a developing worldwide interest in the treatment of political 1. (Editor's note: Spelling in all quotations from British sources has been changed to reflect American usage. Where this has been done, brackets have been placed around the changed letter or word). The current conflict in Nor~hern Ireland has been an explosive topic of debate and the subject of numerous writings over the past ten years. Unfortunately, space does not permit a comprehensive discussion of this complc;x and still developing situation. Ho";'ever, a brief outline follows.
    [Show full text]
  • BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY in CYPRUS, ADEN, and NORTHERN IRELAND Brian Drohan a Dissertation Submitted to the Facu
    RIGHTS AT WAR: BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY IN CYPRUS, ADEN, AND NORTHERN IRELAND Brian Drohan A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School. Chapel Hill 2016 Approved by: Susan D. Pennybacker Wayne E. Lee Klaus Larres Cemil Aydin Michael C. Morgan © 2016 Brian Drohan ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Brian Drohan: Rights at War: British Counterinsurgency in Cyprus, Aden, and Northern Ireland (Under the direction of Susan D. Pennybacker) This study analyzes the role of human rights activism during three post-1945 British counterinsurgency campaigns in Cyprus (1955-1959), Aden (1963-1967), and the Northern Ireland “Troubles” (emphasizing 1969-1976). Based on material gathered from 15 archives in four countries as well as oral history records and personal papers, this study demonstrates that human rights activism shaped British operational decisions during each of these conflicts. Activists mobilized ideas of human rights to restrain counterinsurgency violence by defining certain British actions as illegal or morally unjustifiable. Although British forces often prevented activists from restraining state violence, activists forced government officials and military commanders to develop new ways of covering up human rights abuses. Focusing the analytical lens on activists and the officials with whom they interacted places rights activists on the counterinsurgency “battlefield”
    [Show full text]