Kingship in Early Medieval China Sinica Leidensia

Edited by Barend J. ter Haar

In co-operation with P.K. Bol, D.R. Knechtges, E.S. Rawski, W.L. Idema, E. Zürcher, H.T. Zurndorfer

VOLUME 83 Kingship in Early Medieval China

By Andrew Eisenberg

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008 This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Eisenberg, Andrew. Kingship in early medieval China / by Andrew Eisenberg. p. cm. — (Sinica leidensia) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-16381-2 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Monarchy—China—History. 2. China—Politics and government—221 B.C.–960 A.D. I. Title. II. Series.

JQ1511.E38 2008 320.95109'02—dc22 2007050999

ISSN 0169-9563 ISBN 978 90 04 16381 2

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands This book is dedicated to the memory of Professor Jack L. Dull, University of Washington, Seattle

CONTENTS

Diagrams and Tables ...... ix Acknowledgements ...... xi

Chapter One Introduction: Interpretive Perspective ...... 1

Chapter Two Retired Emperorship: The Northern Wei Innovation ...... 23

Chapter Three The Northern Wei Case Concluded: The Regency of the Empress Dowager Wenming, 476–490 ...... 61

Chapter Four The Collapse of the Northern Qi ...... 93

Chapter Five The Northern Zhou Case ...... 127

Chapter Six The Xuanwu Men Incident of the Tang: Imperial Retirement Enters the Mainstream ...... 167

Chapter Seven The Xuanwu Men Legacy: Taizong’s Factionalization of the Position of Heir Apparent ...... 195

Chapter Eight The Pervasive Factionalization of Taizong’s Court ...... 213

Chapter Nine Taizong—An Emperor on the Run ...... 239

Chapter Ten Conclusion ...... 253

Bibliography ...... 261 Index ...... 271

DIAGRAMS AND TABLES

Diagram I: Sketch of the Northern Wei Succession ...... 30 Diagram II: Ego’s Politically Relevant Descent Group From the Chinese Perspective ...... 34 Table I: Agnates and Coup Efforts in the Northern Wei ...... 37 Table II: Relative Share of Coup Attempts by Agnatic Categories 386–516 ...... 38 Table III: Survival Rates of Selected Imperial Agnates .... 42 Table IV: Relative Share of Coup Attempts by Agnatic Categories in the Liu Song Regime ...... 48–49 Diagram III: Comparative Succession Patterns of Contemporary South Chinese Regimes ...... 56 Diagram IV: Sketch of the Northern Qi Succession ...... 108 Table V: Agnates and Coup Efforts in the Northern Qi ...... 111 Table VI: Agnates and Coup Efforts in the Northern Zhou ...... 164 Diagram V: Northern Zhou Imperial Succession ...... 165 Table VII: Tang Administrative Personnel, 623–629 ...... 183 Table VIII: Tang Administrative Personnel, 627–649 ...... 215

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Chapters II and VI are directly based on essays published in T’oung Pao as follows: “Retired Emperorship in Medieval China: The Northern Wei,” 77. 1–3 (1991): 49–87, and “Kingship, Power and the Hsüan-wu Men Incident of the T’ang,” 80. 4–5 (1994): 223–259, respectively. Permission to re-print the following material has been granted: Chapter VII originally appeared in Tang Yanjiu as “Installing an Heir: Factional Politics in the Court of Tang Taizong” 5 (1999): 247–268. Chapter IX originally appeared in T’ang Studies as “A Study in Court Factionalism: The Politics of Tang Taizong,” 20–21 (2002–03): 39–69. First, many thanks to Prof. Ronald G. Knapp, Professor Emeritus, SUNY New Paltz, for critiqueing the rough manuscript and providing advice and support throughout the publication process. I wish to thank the following individuals for their crucial assistance in computer editing: Ronnie S. Eisenberg and Samuel D. Eisenberg. Special thanks to Jeanette E. Eisenberg for the time and skill she put into the editing process. Prof. Cai Fangpei, University of Chicago, took time from his busy schedule to assist in installing the proper Chinese and Japanese language programming. My thanks to the senior scholars and colleagues in China who provided advice, constructive criticism, and valuable scholarly references: Prof. He Ziquan, Professor Emeritus, Beijing Normal University; Prof. Tian Yuqing, Professor Emeritus, Peking University; Prof. Wu Zong’guo, Professor Emeritus, Peking University; Prof. Li Ping; Prof. Zhang Qingjie, Director, Shanxi Institute of Archeology; Prof. Mou Fasong, Wuhan University; Dr. Roger Covey, Tang Studies Foundation; Prof. Rong Xinjiang, Peking University; Prof. Luo Xin, Peking University; Prof. Wang Xiaofu, Peking University. My appreciation to Prof. Paul Kroll, University of Colorado, Boulder, and Prof. Michael Drompp, Rhodes College and to my colleagues in the T’ang Studies Society for their gracious support. Congratulations to Prof. Al Dien, Professor Emeritus, Stanford University and to my colleagues in the Early Medieval China Group on the forthcoming fest- schrift in honor of Prof. Dien. I owe much to my colleagues at Northeastern Illinois University for fully supporting my sabbatical research requests which were crucial in xii acknowledgements bringing this book to completion. Also, this book could not have been undertaken without the support of the Center for East Asian Studies, University of Chicago. My thanks to Prof. Donald N. Levine, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, for permission to audit his gradu- ate seminar on Georg Simmel and Max Weber. Finally, to the Hon. You Shaozhong and the PRC Ministry of Education 1998 “Cultural Research Fellowship”, thank-you for your support. CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: INTERPRETIVE PERSPECTIVE

This monograph is an interpretive discussion of classical Chinese political history from the late 300’s AD through the 650’s AD, covering the Northern Dynasties (Northern Wei, 386–534; Eastern Wei/Northern Qi, 534–577, the Western Wei/Northern Zhou, 534–580), and the early Tang. The historical discussion will open with a consideration of the peculiar imperial institution of ‘retired emperorship’ wherein a senior and a junior emperor reigned simultaneously. The explanation for implementing such a structure will directly lead us into a discussion of the politics of imperial succession and kinship politics, and from there into an overarching analysis of patterns of political action in these pre- modern imperial regimes. Indeed, as far as the Northern Dynasties were concerned, the politics of succession and kinship politics were so tightly enmeshed with the conduct of more general court politics as to be indis- tinguishable from each other. By the Tang period the political arena and its participants had become more complex and diversified in the context of a unified continental empire. The institution of retired emperorship and its related phenomenon of intensive court factional politics focused on the imperial succession is not limited to the Chinese cases, but can be found in pre-modern empires from around the world. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter, but both the early Japanese empire of the pre-Nara through Heian Periods as well as medieval French dynasties manifested similar patterns of political activity regarding retired emperorship, in fact, in a much more consistent fashion than in the Chinese case. Before entering into the specific historical discussion, which com- prises the body of this book, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of the term ‘pre-modern imperial regimes’ from a broad sociological perspective. These regimes were certainly governments that had hierarchical administrative structures and that performed many functions quite similar to that of modern state governments—the making of war and peace and building internal infrastructure (roads, canals). On the other hand, there is also a general sense that these pre-modern imperial regimes were also significantly distinct from the modern understanding 2 chapter one of how a state structures its administration and the functions performed by this structure. In this regard, it is appropriate to elucidate the general applicability of the Weberian concept of patrimonialism and deriva- tive hypotheses as they apply to pre-modern Chinese imperial regimes in general (not limiting the presentation to the pre-1000 AD classical regimes). In general, the field of pre-modern Chinese imperial political history has been poorly served by either the unintentional misappropriation of Weberian historical sociological political constructs (usually involving the misapplication of the bureaucracy construct to pre-modern structures) or simply a complete lack of attention to their usefulness for the field. The only significant exception would be the interest in Weberian and neo-Weberian concepts of legitimation that became popular in the 1970’s and early 1980’s. The most well known results of this interest were Howard Wechsler’s monograph, Offerings of Jade and Silk, and Robert Guisso’s monograph on Wu Zetian’s efforts at political legitimation. Antonino Forte’s work on Wu Zetian and her manipulation of Buddhist and Confucian religious symbols for purposes of political legitimation also falls within this intellectual tradition, though, it is also very much a part of a long tradition of scholarship on Tang period Buddhism, as well.1 Scholars in the field failed to follow through on the general discussion of the Weberian concept of legitimation to a more specific analysis of patterns of political action in the context of historically specific modes of political legitimation, which would have led to a full scale discussion of patrimonialism and its fruitfulness in guiding the writing of the political history of pre-modern China, but most especially, classical Chinese history. Additionally, the 1970’s were the heyday of Western language works related to classical Chinese political history, written under the auspices of Denis Twitchett and his colleagues, but since then the field has become relatively moribund.2 Here, we wish to pick up the thread and carry the discussion forward.

1 Howard Wechsler, Offerings of Jade and Silk: Ritual and Symbolism in the Legitimation of the T’ang Dynasty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). RWL Guisso, Wu Tse- t’ien and the Politics of Legitimation in T’ang China (Bellingham: Western Washington University Press, 1978). Antonino Forte, Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Century (Naples: Instituto Universitario Orientale, 1976). 2 Three recent monographs in the field of political (and military) history are Pan Yihong, Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan: Sui-Tang China and its Neighbors (Bellingham: Western Washington University Press, 1997); David A. Graff,Medieval Chinese Warfare: 300–900 (London: Routledge Press, 2002); and Victor C. Xiong, introduction: interpretive perspective 3

The term patrimonialism broadly typologizes a polity wherein the political sphere is under the leadership of one royal house (organized as a court) that has attained a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis other sectors of society. This moderately autonomous political sphere is in many ways still beholden to traditional values as a source of legitimating ideology. Weber viewed the patrimonial form of domination as an extension and development from an earlier system of political-kinship control exercised by the extended patriarchal household (loosely characterized by common residence and commensality). Weber clearly defined patrimonialism as the extension of the political power of the extended household head (in this case the prince) over areas formerly outside his realm of control.3 Such activity would entail the truncation of formerly elaborate kinship social and political networks and the concentration of power in the hands of one elite extended household leader and the extension of this power over populations and territory formerly outside the control of this leader. The court, which was the locus of activity of the patrimonial ruler was a multifunctional rococco structure with somewhat blurred functional boundaries. It was first and foremost the lord’s residence, and by extension the social and cultural center of the realm, devoted to the glorification of the ruler and his dynasty. By social center I mean that the court was the epicenter for large scale organized drinking and feasting parties, sports events (a form of soccor, wrestling, polo, etc.), and related to this latter category, large scale hunting exhibitions conducted in the massive imperial parks. Tang period elite funerary murals provide graphic illustrations of the hunting activities. The court was also a massive patron of both the secular and religious arts. The court was also a policy making and administrative center, as well as a ritual/religious center containing within its precincts a variety of shrines and temples as well as offices devoted to religious affairs. The capital city and all major administrative centers were also ringed by important detached shrines, most

Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty: His Life, Times, and Legacy (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006). 3 Max Weber, Economy and Society, trans. and ed. by Guenter Roth & Claus Wittich. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1013–1014. In advocating the usefulness of Weberian concepts for the study of Chinese history I am directly disagreeing with the position of Gary Hamilton, a sinologically trained historical sociologist. For specifics see my essay, “Weberian Patrimonialism and Imperial Chinese History,” Theory and Society 27 (1998): 83–102. Significant portions of this Introduction are based on that essay. 4 chapter one famously, those identified with the worship of Heaven (usually outside the southern wall of the city), and shrines to the four directions. Ritual/ religious specialists as well as ‘secular’ courtiers were all participants in these religious ceremonies. The various offices of the court had a moderate degree of functional specification. The imperial codes, with their supplementary regulations and guidelines provided routine guidance to administrative conduct (along with punishments for infractions of routine) but did not provide legal jurisdictional autonomy to the various court officers and their functions. The tripartite court structure of Secretariat, Chancellory, and Department of State Affairs which was created under Sui Wendi was expressly designed to fragment power in the court administrative structure. Furthermore, even with an administrative structure of his own design in place Wendi refused to appoint a Director of the Department of State Affairs and informed the Left and Right Deputy Directors that they should not overly concern themselves with routine administrative issues. Sui Wendi was concerned that these high ranking courtiers would accumulate and centralize power in their own hands at the expense of the throne. Under Sui Yangdi, by 612 the top three positions in the Department of State Affairs and the Secretariat remained vacant, and the Chancellory was in only slightly better shape. Yangdi simply bypassed the formal elite level administrative structure and created his own ad hoc cabinet (this is a general tactic that Tang Taizong would also use). Note that as soon as these offices were created the throne was tampering with their structural integrity due to expedient political concerns. This lack of institutional jurisdictional integrity would also explain the rapidity and ease with which the Tang period Department of State Affairs (shang shu sheng 尚書省) was derogated from a leading institutional policy making actor in the context of the early Tang imperial ‘cabinet’ (the zheng shi tang 政事堂, from 618 through the 680’s) to a secondary actor after the 680’s. This demise in its status and functions has been attributed to the rapid increase in the ad hoc expedient role of imperial commissioners, who were appointed and functioned outside the standard administrative structure or were interpolated directly into pre-existing organizations and to the general expansion of the court administrative burden.4

4 Regarding Sui Wendi and Yangdi, respectively, see Victor Xiong, 109–110, 119. Regarding the Tang period zheng shi tang see Liu Houbin 劉後濱, “Tang dai zhongshumenxia tizhixia de san sheng jigou yu zhiquan 唐代中書門下體制下的三省機構與職權,” Lishi Yanjiu, 2 (2001): 15–28. introduction: interpretive perspective 5

For Weber, “The majority of all great continental empires had a fairly strong patrimonial character until and even after the beginning of modern times.”5 In a negative fashion, he explicitly excluded from the category of modern bureaucratic regimes “the large political structures such as those of the ancient Orient, the Germanic and Mongolian empires of conquest and of many feudal states.”6 I register the above quotes to emphasize that Weber did not conceive of patrimonial regimes as pre- literate tribal societies, or very early primitive empires, but in fact as the literate pre-modern imperial regimes of the world, which he felt dis- played common ideological and organizational characteristics. Relatively speaking, Weber perceived the Chinese empire to be a highly rationalized form of a patrimonial regime,7 though it shared with other patrimonial regimes “features of a conglomerate of satrapies.”8 Students of the Period of Disunion (220 AD–580’s) and the early and late Tang periods would be sympathetic to such a description. Students of the much later Qing period (1644–1912) often object to such a char- acterization as anachronistic. Nevertheless, the ability of the Yangzi region governor-generals to take a territorial ‘leave of absence’ during the height of the Sino-Western conflict that developed over the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 in North China without incurring the disintegration of the dynasty, indicates the continuing validity of the satrapy concept. The patrimonial regime was a loosely linked territorial entity administered by servants of the throne, whose concept of office tended to blur with their private family status responsibilities (often resulting in the merger of official and private duties and sources of income). In the Chinese case, the appropriated offices were formally temporary and rotated among status qualified personnel, though during different historical periods certain offices and imperial status rank were sold by the

The concept of the court as an extension of the imperial household’s executive functions is well known in the Chinese language scholarly literature, but this perspective is usually limited to a discussion of the late Warring States’ regimes and the Qin-Western Han administrative structures. See Yan Buke’s 閻步克 discussion and citation of a statement by Qian Mu in, “Diguo Kaiduan Shiqi de Guanliao Zhengzhi Zhidu—Qin Han 帝國開端時期的官僚政治制度-秦漢,” in Zhong’guo Gudai Guanliao Zhengzhi Zhidu Yanjiu 中國古代官僚政治制度研究, ed. Wu Zong’guo 吳宗國 (Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2004), 31. Subsequent powerful, enduring dynasties are often analyzed in terms of their ‘bureaucratic’ tendencies. 5 Weber, 1013. 6 Ibid., 956. 7 Ibid., 1047–1051. 8 Ibid., 1052. 6 chapter one throne for revenue. Complete, practically hereditary appropriation of nominally imperially controlled administrative positions did occur on occasion. The Period of Disunion in general, witnessed a surge in this type of phenomenon, especially at the sub-regional and county levels due to the partial breakdown of Chinese imperial rule at this time. It is not unusual for scholars to refer in passing to the various post- Qin unification dynasties of China asbureaucratic, rationally organized polities without pausing to specify their understanding of the terms ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘rational’. To an extent, Weber contributed to this confusion by juxtaposing such terms as ‘patrimonial bureaucracy’ or ‘pre- bendal bureaucratic’ to refer to highly structured patrimonial regimes. For many readers the term bureaucracy will usually trigger an association with contemporary governing structures. I prefer to use a more neutral, less suggestive term, such as ‘administration’ or ‘administrative structure’ when referring to patrimonial regimes. Despite some confusion over the use of the term ‘bureaucracy’, Weber specifically conceived of clear distinctions between what he termed ‘modern’ bureaucracy and ‘patrimonial’ bureaucracy. While patrimonial administrative structures were capable of developing functional divisions for the practical performance of routine administration, often of a somewhat stereotypical nature, they were ultimately subject to the dis- cretionary power of the throne and lacking in formal legal jurisdictional protections.9 Weber noted that “the position of the patrimonial official derives from his purely personal submission to the ruler” and that, “Even when the political official is not a personal household dependent the ruler demands unconditional administrative compliance.”10 Even into the Late Imperial Period the stereotyped land tax system, systemic underfunding of the imperial administration, and the blurred public– private functions of the ‘mu-fu’ chancellery system privately maintained by imperial officials speak to the accuracy of Weber’s perceptions. The modern bureaucracy, as we commonly understand the term, is typical “only in the modern state and in the private economy only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism.”11

9 Ibid., 1028–1029. 10 Ibid., 1030. 11 Ibid., 956. Brad Reed provides a clear discussion of the Qing period administration at the county level that directly reflects the above patrimonial characteristics. Reed’s discussion is on target but he mistakenly assumes that Weber’s concept of bureaucracy was meant to apply to these types of administrative structures. See his monograph, introduction: interpretive perspective 7

Given the overwhelmingly dynastic focus on the lineal power of the throne in patrimonial regimes (which places a peculiarly sharp focus on the politics of imperial succession), as well as due to their unavoid- ably manpower intensive mode of administration, emperors and their courtiers were not especially concerned with issues of administrative efficiency. Often, patrimonial regimes preferred to fragment court political and military power by creating duplicative and overlapping formal administrative posts and by encouraging leading political figures to compete for the attention and favor of the throne. The key goal was dynastic survival and continuity, not administrative efficiency. Factional competition directly fomented by the throne was a ‘Machiavellian’, if not Legalist, technique for ensuring the continued dominance of the emperor over his court. Indeed, as noted in Legalist discussions of political technique, the emperor did not rule his people, he ruled his court. In the Legalist texts of the Hanfeizi and the Shen Buhai frag- ments collected by Herlee G. Creel, the king is instructed on a number of tactics to use to keep his leading courtiers off balance and unable to unite among themselves or to gain insight in the mind of their lord. The intellectual perspectives used to guide and legitimate political action at the Chinese court were not limited to Confucianism (which, indeed, objected to factional competition), but were derived from a variety of Legalist and so-called Huang-Lao perspectives, as well, which argued for the necessity of the throne to manipulate the court. The essays of Chen Yinke and Howard Wechsler have both noted the tendency of the Tang court to organize political activities around factional groupings, though, Wechsler disagreed with Chen regarding the factors which held the factions together as cohesive court groupings.12 It is noteworthy that neither writer discussed the issue of court factionalism from the perspective of the throne being the instigator of some of these factional struggles. Norbert Elias has argued that courtiers are manipulated: . . . largely against each other, so that they cancel each other out in their effect on the king. In a broader sense this applies to the whole dominion. In a narrower sense it applies directly to the court . . . Here, not only does each individual compete with every other for prestige, but different groups

Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 12 Howard Wechsler’s essay, “Factionalism in Early Tang Government,” sums up the debate as it stood in 1973. See Arthur E. Wright & Denis Twitchett, eds., Perspectives on the Tang (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 87–120. 8 chapter one

struggle with each other . . . This sets the king . . . a very specific task . . .he must constantly ensure that the conflicting tendencies of court people act in his own favor . . . In this way the king divided and ruled.13 In another part of his discussion, Elias refers to the king as a “kind of umpire.”14 Strictly speaking, unauthorized factional competition undertaken by courtiers on their own behalf was viewed as disloyalty to their duty to serve the throne. In point of fact, at times when political consensus did not obtain at the court, the only way by which competing political positions could be organized was by sub-rosa modes of factional organization. Factions were not legally recognized entities in the Chinese court nor were they morally approved of, they were simply useful vehicles by which to implement short and medium term political goals. In this politically divisive context (be it created by the initiative of the throne or otherwise), formal court administrative positions became logistics bases for the competing factional groupings, further vitiating their capacity to carry out standard administrative functions. Scholars in the field of classical Chinese history have noted these characteristics with regard to various aspects of the imperial administrative structure. Zhang Guogang, discussing the system of Prime Ministers, zai xiang 宰相, called it a “fundamental rule” that emperors pitted their inner court personnel against outer court political leaders.15 In the arena of foreign affairs there was never a unified agency designed to specialize in the conduct of foreign affairs. Li Hu has stated that a two tiered system of imperial agencies with moderate degrees of functional specialization handled foreign affairs and was “. . . the basic pattern of administrative structuring for handling foreign affairs for all the classical dynasties.”16 In fact, as Li Hu notes in his book, multiple autonomous agencies were involved in a variety of subsidiary functions related to

13 Norbert Elias, The Court Society (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 119–120. 14 Ibid., 273. Elias’ discussion of the European court has been subject to revisionist criticism, particularly from Jeroen Duindam, in his, Myths of Power (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1994). The validity of this critique is mixed in that the evidence presented in his own text does not controvert Elias’ specific description and analysis of social/political action in the context of a court. Regarding other issues specific to European history and also to Elias’ broader research agenda, Duindam’s critique seems substantive and valid. 15 Zhang Guogang 張國剛, Tangdai Guanzhi 唐代官制 (Xi’an: Sanqin Chubanshe, 1987), 1. 16 Li Hu 黎虎, Han Tang Waijiao Zhidushi 漢唐外交制度史 (Lanzhou: Lanzhou Daxue Chubanshe, 1998), 51. introduction: interpretive perspective 9 foreign affairs.17 This situation is explained in terms of foreign affairs as a form of tributary relations between lord (the emperor) and clients (foreign emissaries).18 The traditional, routine central court administrative structure of the Six Boards, Nine Courts, and Three Inspectorates, which was consolidated by the Tang period exhibited a less dramatic, but structurally more pervasive dichotomy between staff offices (the Six Boards) and line offices (the Nine Courts and Three Inspectorates). For example, using Li Hu’s discussion of the conduct of foreign affairs, the Bureau of Guests and Dignitaries (Zhu kesi 主客司) under the auspices of the Board of Ritual issued orders and regulations to the Court of State Ceremonial (Honglu Si 鴻臚寺) which was the line organization). However, the Bureau of Guests had no administrative authority over the Court of State Ceremonial, the latter was a separate organization. Furthermore, the Bureau head (langzhong 郎中) was ranked at 5b1 (cong wupin shang).19 The Minister in charge of the Court of State Ceremonial (Honglu Qing 鴻臚卿) to whom the orders were issued was ranked at 3b (cong san pin),20 which placed him just below the Minister of the Board of Ritual, which was ranked at 3a (zheng sanpin).21 Thus, a subordinate administrative courtier was issuing orders to his court superior in rank. The Six Boards and Nine Courts were structurally separate and parallel to each other but functionally linked through their respective staff-line functions. One of the most startling examples of a completely factionalized imperial administrative system is the case of the Eastern Jin regime (317–420) discussed by Tian Yuqing. One of the main functions of the Guangling 廣陵 military command (located near present day Yangzhou) was to prevent armed units from the south bank of the Huai River, which were usually loyal to the southern court, from crossing the Yangzi River and upsetting the existing balance of power at the Eastern Jin capital at Jiankang (modern day Nanjing).22 Political and military tension between Jiankang and the Jingzhou military command controlling the Middle Yangzi Region was rife throughout the existence of the

17 Ibid., 576. 18 Ibid., 573. 19 Zhang Guogang, 63. 20 Ibid., 90. 21 Ibid., 62. 22 Tian Yuqing 田余慶, Dong Jin Menfa Zhengzhi 東晉門閥政治 (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1996), 50–51. 10 chapter one

Eastern Jin and became particularly fierce in the 390’s.23 In effect, the entire Eastern Jin realm became the logistics base from which the court based and regionally based political/military factions vied for political supremacy. In the patrimonial order, beyond certain ritual requirements, ruler and subjects related to each other by means of limited, stereotyped amounts of in-kind taxes and corvee. By the Qing period (1644–1912) taxes were usually paid in units of silver (the tael). However, the grain tribute from the Lower and Middle Yangzi Regions continued to be paid in kind. The orientation of the Chinese dynasties (and, indeed, many other patrimonial regimes) toward in-kind fiscal payments directly contributed to a lack of administrative efficiency, as we understand the term today. Using the Tang dynasty, which was deeply committed to an in- kind fiscal system, as an example, it was necessary to create two separate empire-wide depot systems run by two separate line organizations—a granary depot system and a cloth/Chinese string cash/miscellaneous items depot system, managed by the Sinong Court 司農 and the Taifu Court 太府, respectively. The corresponding staff bureau offices, under the Board of Revenue (Hubu 戶部), were the Cangbu 倉部 and Jinbu 金部, respectively.24 The record keeping for the various minor goods, and replacement goods paid as taxes with their different equivalency rates relative to the standard grain and cloth tax rates must have been potentially quite complicated. Under stable political conditions and a relatively fixed, stereotyped central imperial in-kind tax schedule, the Budget Bureau (Duzhi 度支), under the Board of Revenue became a shipping coordinator agency, ensuring that depot tax goods from the county level depots were transported to higher level depots or moved laterally to same level depots on schedule. In times of rapid change affecting imperial in-kind tax receipts, one would need extremely talented individuals to keep track of the different goods and the altering schedule of payments and equivalency conversion rates, somewhat reminiscent of a modern international currency conversion system.25 In the absence of a fully monetized economy book-keeping of in-kind payments can become a very prolix and frustrating endeavor. Weber has an interesting discussion of the difficulties an in-kind exchange system

23 Ibid., 277. 24 Li Jinxiu 李錦绣, Tangdai Caizhengshi Gao 唐代財政史稿 vol. I (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1995), 54, 174, 307. 25 Ibid., 47. introduction: interpretive perspective 11 would cause in calculating business profitability and future investment options on a strictly quantitative basis.26 Given the limited nature of administrative rationalization and imperial government penetration into society, taxation and local control responsibilities were often placed upon semi-coerced groupings of subjects (villages, guilds, lineages). Weber referred to this phenomenon as ‘liturgical’ duties, wherein private subjects of the throne were expected to assume public responsibilities at their own expense.27 Correlated with this mode of political domination was a market economy that, during the early imperial period was either buried in a natural peasant economy or, in the case of major urban markets, embedded in the patrimonial system of political control wherein urban markets were directly or indirectly manipulated by functionally specified imperial administrators. The commercialized peasant market economy of the late imperial period is a variation on this pattern of patrimonial political control of large urban markets. In this case, a large aggregated regional marketing system with moderate inter-regional linkages was accommodated into the patrimonial structure by means of expanded liturgical responsibilities placed upon the participants, usually the late imperial period guilds, to maintain an orderly market.28 On the other hand, in the late imperial period remnants of a more direct mode of patrimonial control over key commodities were manifested in the production and sale licensing monopoly of salt and in the extensive emergency granary system of the high Qing period. Indeed, during the course of the Qing

26 Weber, Economy and Society, 100–104. 27 Ibid., 1022–1025. Susan Mann has published a monograph which adroitly utilizes the Weberian concept of ‘liturgy’ in discussing commercial tax policy from the Qing period through the mid-twentieth century. See Mann, Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750–1950 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). Prasenjit Duara’s concept of ‘brokerage’ to describe aspects of imperial local relations in the Qing period and early twentieth century is very similar to Weber’s concept of liturgical services. See Duara, Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 28 G.W. Skinner’s works are the source for the remarks regarding the commercialized peasant economy and its hierarchical marketing network. William Rowe presents a clear discussion of Qing period guild liturgical management of the massive urban wholesale market of Hankou (part of modern Wuhan) and how the guilds related to the local political authorities. Ironically, Rowe’s book was designed to debunk the Weberian position. The author believes that he was unsuccessful in this latter endeavor, but the text is a vivid description and analysis of how a Qing period commercial center functioned. See Rowe, Hankow-Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796–1889, vol. I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984). 12 chapter one period granary responsibilities would also become increasingly ‘liturgi- calized’ over time.29 In terms of legal orientation, patrimonial regimes commonly attempted to establish and magnify the power of the prince by codifying penal and administrative laws and merging administrative and adju- dicative responsibilities. The legal and administrative structures were strongly oriented toward issues of social and economic equity that were congruent with the politically enforced status systems existing in these regimes. This orientation was closely tied to the legitimating concept that the throne was the enforcer and upholder of a just and traditional social order with strong ritual/cosmic overtones. This sort of orientation to status equity and justice, often codified into extensive codes, is what Weber referred to as the substantive rationality of the patrimonial regime.30 When we use the term ‘rational’ in the Weberian sense we must be sensitive to the clear typological distinctions that Weber constructed between different types of rationality. Weber tended to use the contrast- ing terms ‘substantive’ and ‘formal’ rationality most often in his discussions of modes of economic organization and action and also in regard to historical patterns of legal orientation. The different types of rationality are correlated, in Weber’s writings, with different modes of political domination, as well as with different modes of subjective historical social action. Donald N. Levine explains substantive rationality as “manifest to the extent that operative norms are subordinated to some overarching value; it reflects the desire to achieve motivational integrity.” On the other hand, “Formal rationality is manifest to the extent that the operative norms channel action according to clearly stipulated procedures; it reflects the wish to act within a calculable order of activities and relationships.”31 In a philosophical mode, a substantively rational order would emphasize the need to ascertain and mandate a morally absolute truth, while a formally rational order would emphasize the process of dis- covering a multitude of relative truths. I want to emphasize that Weber viewed his typologies of domination and their corresponding rational-

29 Pierre Etienne-Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 314–317. 30 Max Weber, From Max Weber, eds. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 298–299. Also see the comments regarding the relationship between status and the economy on pages 301, 331. 31 Donald N. Levine, The Flight From Ambiguity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 159. introduction: interpretive perspective 13 ization trends as intellectual constructs representing his interpretive understanding of complex, multi-dimensional historical developments. These ideal-typical constructs do not have a life of their own, nor are they conceived of as representing a unilineal unfolding of ‘Reason’ in historical time. Weber was not a Hegelian.32 Weber correlated strong tendencies toward substantive rationalization with patrimonial regimes. This issue of rationalization can become complex, however, in that different types of rationalization trends can be crosscutting in any given historical period and under a variety of different modes of political domination, resulting in historically contingent outcomes dependent upon existing constellations of socio-political and cultural structures and orientations. Regarding substantive rationality in the legal realm as it would apply to patrimonial regimes, Weber argued that, . . . their aim is not that of achieving the highest degree of formal juridical precision . . . The aim is to find a type of law which is most appropriate to the expediential and ethical goals of the authorities in question . . ., the self contained and specialized juridical treatment of legal questions is an alien idea and they are not at all interested in any separation of law from ethics.33 Formal rationality, in contrast, ideally eschews determination of the morally right or proper and enforces adherence to recognized procedure regardless of the status or personal identity of the parties involved. It is an irony of history that formally rational systems of law and the

32 Weber’s methodological stand, including the existentially crucial concept of value relevance in setting research agendas, is ably discussed by David Zaret, “From Weber to Parsons and Schutz: The Eclipse of History in Modern Social Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 85:5 (1980): 1180–1201. Weber’s complex understanding of the past and his efforts to express the multivocality of historical meaning and action is discussed by Levine, The Flight from Ambiguity, 152, 160–162; and by Stephen Kalberg, “Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History,” American Journal of Sociology 85:5 (1980): 1150–1151. Kalberg specifically denies that Weber’s concept of rationalization was related to a “unilinear evolutionary process”. Indeed, Weber’s neo-Kantian influenced epistemological perspective enjoins a “radical perspectivism” (Kalberg, 1155). These points need to be emphasized because of consistent ignorance and misinterpretation of Weber’s methodological grounding and historical understanding. This confusion is highlighted in a monograph by Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). Duara argues in a somewhat halting, intel- lectually strained fashion that Weber is an inheritor and follower of Hegelian evolutionary historical idealism (Duara, 24–25). 33 Weber, Economy and Society, 810. 14 chapter one

economy give much more play to economic and class inequities. However, speaking of a dichotomy between rational versus irrational action, or rational versus pre-rational action, reflects a misconstrual of the general Weberian position. In the context of patrimonial administrators as formal representatives of the throne rendering judicial decisions, Weber termed this ‘kadi justice’ insofar as the magistrate is basing his decision on the concrete situation, existing customary law, and recognized legal precedent. Under these circumstances, Weber’s concept of kadi justice and his concept of empirical justice (a common law tradition) are very closely related.34 In the English common law tradition, however, procedure and reasoning by precedent and analogy were ‘established’, that is, the practice of law became a recognized ‘technology’, and court and law personnel were monopolized by an autonomous guild, in juxtaposition to the institutions of the church and the throne. In the Chinese (patrimonial) case, the magistrate alone was formally responsible for establishing and implementing recognized procedure and reaching a decision, although magistrates had to be aware of the indirect implications for civil law implied in the dynastic penal and administrative codes. The imperial codes placed specific limits on the use of judicial torture and the imple- ments of torture which were to be used. Local yamens had various semi- customary procedures which a plaintiff had to accord with in order to file a legitimate legal complaint. ‘Pettifoggers’, which were semi-professional legal amanuenses, often found in late imperial period market towns, were resented and sometimes subject to prosecution by the magistrate. The autonomous practice of law as a vocation was never recognized in China. Where Weber’s concept of kadi justice veers off significantly from the practice of empirical justice is in its ability to “advance to a prophetic break with all tradition.” Weber expressed this in the form of the “prophetic dictum that follows the pattern: ‘It is written . . . but I say unto you.’”35 Such a prophetic tradition was not widely present in China (at least not in mainstream forms of political and religious practice, though, the Buddho-Daoist syncretic millenarian cults of the medieval

34 Ibid., 976–978. Also, Weber, The Religion of China (New York: The Free Press, 1951), 102–103, 148–149. The edited volume by Philip C.C. Huang and Kathryn Bernhardt, Civil Law in Qing and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994) provides a stimulating discussion of late imperial civil law. For a misconstrued attack by Huang on Weber’s understanding of civil adjudication in China see page 147 in this volume. 35 Weber, Economy and Society, 976, 978, respectively. introduction: interpretive perspective 15 period seem to fall into the realm of prophetic eschatology), and Weber was aware of this.36 Nonetheless, the Chinese magistrate was religiously charged. As part of his formal duties, the magistrate was authorized to communicate with and also discipline local deities within his bailiwick who were officially recognized by the imperial center (the City God of the county seat, the spirits of canonized local heroes, etc.). More startling, however, it appears that magistrates could become charismatic magi in their own right as a means of expediting their official responsibilities in coping with superstitious or recalcitrant local elites.37 Thus, Weber’s use of the term ‘kadi justice’, if sensibly applied, is rather appropriate to the imperial Chinese situation. As regards the rule governed nature of imperial law, it would be subsumed under the concept of substantive rationalization. That is, exogenous social concerns entwined themselves around juridical logic and were fully incorporated into both the dynastic codes and the judicial decisions of the local magistrate. Thus, all the extant dynastic codes, from the Tang on contained variant punishments depending upon the generational, kinship, or social status relationship between defendant and plaintiff. Civil cases in general were viewed as affairs of the household or the immediate community that should be mediated out of court, particularly inheritance disputes. In the case of the late imperial period, the general practice of what Philip C.C. Huang terms the ‘third realm’ of civil justice, representing a type of synergistic relationship between formal legal appeals to the county yamen and local community mediation as a means of reaching a viable settlement is simply a form of legal liturgicalism.38 The bulk of the mediatory responsibility is assumed by the local community leaders and affected household leaders. The expediential aspect of imperial legislation and law is illustrated in a 1743 edict by the Qianlong emperor. The emperor refused to implement a policy proposal that would restrict the amount of arable acre- age that any household could own. The emperor premised his refusal on strictly practical administrative grounds. The issues of contractual

36 Ibid., 818. 37 This tradition is discussed in the context of the late imperial period by Judith M. Boltz, “Not by the Seal of Office Alone: New Weapons in the Battle with the Supernatural,” in Patricia B. Ebrey & Peter N. Gregory, eds., Religion and Society in T’ang and Sung China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 241–305. 38 See Philip C.C. Huang’s discussion in, “Between Imperial Mediation and Formal Adjudication: The Third Realm of Qing Justice,” Modern China 19:2 (1993): 251–298. 16 chapter one rights to purchased property or the autonomy of market decision making were not even discussed.39 The substantive rationality of thepatrimonial regime was in part the direct reflection of the extension of the power of the prince. This is particularly noticeable in the penal codifications and the development of administrative regulations as noted earlier regarding the Sui and Tang period Department of State Affairs. Indeed, adjudication often took on the character of administration, since there was little differentiation of the officials involved in these activities, especially at the county level. Ultimately, the prince had the right and responsibility to ensure that social status equity was achieved, and of course, imperial interests realized, regardless of laws or regulations.40 The qualitatively unique characteristics of the patrimonial administration were a function of the tendency of these regimes to rationalize themselves in a substantive as opposed to a formally rational manner. The unique, overarching feature of authority in a patrimonial regime is that the king or emperor exercised their authority as suzerain lords, as opposed to the exercise of sovereign authority by the modern state. In the patrimonial context, the realm was a territorial entity of fluctu- ating size, and from the legal/political perspective, it had permeable political boundaries. In terms of foreign relations, this permeability was expressed as tributary suzerainty between two unequal signatories. The superior partner often had the recognized privilege of inserting itself into the domestic dynastic politics and succession to the throne of the inferior partner, a formal relationship that is unacceptable in modern interstate relations (on the formal level, that is). The inferior partner is legally obliged to seek confirmation of the succession to their throne from the superior partner. In the Chinese case, this act was also associated with the practice of providing the newly ascended monarch with a Chinese dynastic calendar. Lack of compliance would be a legal casus belli. The tributary relationship was quite flexible and positions of inferior and superior could easily be altered. Generally, differential military power was determinative in calibrating degrees of inequality between tributary partners. The Chinese throne occupied the inferior position on a number of occasions, such as during the early Western Han period

39 Hsiao Kung-ch’uan, Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), 387–388. 40 Weber, Economy and Society, 844–845. introduction: interpretive perspective 17 vis-à-vis the Xiongnu Confederacy, Tang Gaozu’s relationship with the Eastern Turks, and the Song dynasty relationships with the Liao and Jin regimes. Parity between empires was possible, though only reluctantly recognized. The key factor in inducing empires to recognize mutual parity was a balance of military power wherein each side was capable of inflict- ing border damage upon the other but incapable of significantly under- mining the military capabilities of its opponent. Pan Yihong argues that a series of specially constructed, religiously sanctioned covenants with Tibet from 706 through 821 implied or explicitly stated a relationship of parity.41 In the author’s view, however, suzerain authority is not limited to foreign affairs, it is also the means by which the emperor, as lord, relates to his subjects, as clients. This is expressed in the submission of ‘domestic tribute’ from prefectural and provincial administrators. As late as the Qing dynasty, provincial governors were expected to submit annual tribute gifts to the throne, which were stored in the emperor’s household depot (as opposed to annual taxation in-kind and in silver, most of which came under the auspices of the traditional Board of Revenue and its system of depots). This underlying concept of the ‘internal’ realm as zones of tribute giving to the throne is also relevant to Weber’s conceptualization of the patrimonial empire as a conglomerate of satrapies. This relationship is also illustrated by the mediated clientage relationship of the classical period ‘client kingdom’ (shuguo 屬國) to the Chinese throne, a relationship that is reiterated in the Qing period by the tribal reserves of Southwest China (tusi 土司). The ancient tradition, dating back to the Western Han period, of sending ‘flowering talent’ from the prefectures and provinces to the court to serve the throne was simply a form of human tribute from ‘within the realm’. The late imperial examination system was a substantively rationalized and objectified version of this type of human tribute, replete with legal status perquisites for those who passed even very low level qualifying examinations and affirmative action quotas for poorer, less educated provinces of the realm. Benjamin A. Elman noted that “. . . as a cultural form of political selection (voluntary human talent for the bureaucracy), the examination system paralleled the extraction of local

41 Pan Yihong, “The Sino-Tibetan Treaties in the Tang Dynasty,” T’oung Pao 78.1–3 (1992): 143–152. 18 chapter one taxes (involuntary material resources for the empire).” Elman’s parallel would be more satisfying in terms of a comparison to tribute.42 For Weber, the examination system was deeply integrated in the Chinese patrimonial system of rule. From the perspective of the throne it served to eliminate the possibility of the formation of an independent, hereditary office holding estate that could threaten the authority of the throne and simultaneously the examination system coopted multitudes of elite Chinese households with the formal status perquisites and informal network benefits accruing to the male participants in the examination system. In terms of content, Weber viewed the examinations as “a sort of cultural examination for the literati” and he also noted popular beliefs that attributed a degree of magical charisma to degree holders.43 For the average subject, their relationship as clients to their lord was ultimately mediated via the household head. From the Han period until the early 20th century, the individual was legally subsumed under the authority of the household head. Imperial taxation was levied on the household’s gross production (certain levies were based on the number of adult members present), not individual income streams. In imperial law household seniors always received preferential treatment over household juniors. This preferential legal treatment was only qualified in cases of alleged treason or sedition. The suzerain relationship was simply a magnified form of the patron client relationship, which tends to operate by a series of articulated mediatory relationships. Suzerain authority was the thread which knit together the patrimonial political/ social universe. In contrast to the above discussion, the sovereign authority of the modern state tends to demand a direct unmediated relationship with the individual citizen, who votes (even in obviously rigged elections) and who pays taxes to the state from the individual’s income stream. The territorial parameters of the state is well defined, or in the process of try-

42 Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), xxviii–xxix. 43 For Weber’s statements regarding the examination system see, The Religion of China, 116, 119, 128, 129; Economy and Society, 1109. The general perspective presented here regarding the imperial examination system is similar to the themes articulated by Elman in terms of a politically manipulated cooptation device as discussed in Elman, “Political, Social, and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examination in Late Imperial China,” Journal of Asian Studies 50.1 (1991): 7–28; and in terms of an institution designed to replicate desired cultural traits and frames of mind championed by both the court political center and participating Chinese elites, emphasized in his monographic work, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China, 123. introduction: interpretive perspective 19 ing to arrange such a definition, and the domestic territory is exhausted by the sovereign powers of the state. In essence, the sovereign state is like an atom formally closed off from the authority of the other nearby atomistic sovereignties (the emphasis here is on the formal legal status of the state, not the variant circumstances surrounding the exercise of realpolitik power politics). In modern times this has been expressed by the totalitarian ideals of Facism and Stalinism, especially regarding the authority of the leader. On the other hand, the Western federal republic expresses this idea in a more nuanced fashion whereby each level of the federal republic exhausts its legally autonomous jurisdiction of sovereign authority. Tributary gift-giving has been almost entirely eliminated from the realm of political intercourse. Where it does exist, it is usually a vestigial remnant of what was once the legal heart of suzerain tributary relations.

Practical Applications

In the Chinese case, dynasties were established by virtue of military conquest, the realm was literally an agglomeration of satrapies in terms of its origins. This is glaringly true for the early imperial and medieval empires, when what we refer to as China proper today, was inhabited by a variety of non-Chinese peoples. This is particularly true of South China, but chunks of Northwest China (including parts of the Wei River valley) and even the North China Plain were inhabited by a variety of semi-autonomous, armed ethnic groups. The Period of Disunion accelerated this sort of ethnic quiltwork society and also sharpened intra- Chinese regional distinctions. After a bruising civil war in the early 620’s, the Tang dynasty had to carefully stitch together Northwest China and the North China Plain, not to mention what was then practically the colonial zone of South China. These conquests would be legitimated by appeals to the Confucian concept of the Will of Heaven, or, as in the Tang case, by appeals to popular legends circulating at the time concerning the advent of a great unifying monarch descended from the line of Laozi, but it was military conquest that physically created the realm. The conquest was led by a small militarized ruling elite, the leader of which became the founding dynast. Many of the early imperial and medieval monarchs reveled in their militaristic heritage—Tang Taizong (r. 626–649) being one of the better known examples. The later imperial regimes sometimes tried to obscure their militarized base, but it lay just 20 chapter one beneath the surface. The Qing dynasty, in part because it was a minority ethnic conquest dynasty, put forward a face of peaceful Confucianized rule to its Chinese subjects, but simultaneously maintained an intensely funded and extremely expensive hereditary ethnic military garrison system, with all the legal perquisites its members were entitled to enjoy.44 The militarized core elite which founded a dynasty had one major goal—to ensure the survival and continuity of the dynasty. Territorial boundaries could fluctuate wildly, ‘domestic’ satraps could partially sever their practical political ties to the court, but the dynastic line must persist. The ultimate symbol and reality of this goal was imperial succession. Because we are dealing with bloodline succession with somewhat flexible parameters of who was eligible for the throne, the result was a form of court politics that was volatile and potentially very violent— succession disputes could destroy a dynasty. In the modern Western republic succession to high office has been routinized into an objective electoral process, but the terror and danger inherent in the politics of succession can be glimpsed in the changing of leadership in modern dictatorships and some existing monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia. In the Chinese case, custom and written ritual guidelines dating back to the late Warring States Period (300’s BC–200’s BC) called for the eldest son of the Empress to be titled heir apparent (taizi 太子). The Chinese usually pre-selected the heir at a very young age, and often immediately after the reigning monarch had ascended the throne, as a means of stabilizing the succession. Needless to say, cultural/ritual guidelines are not absolute law, and close blood relatives of the reigning monarch (brothers, uncles, sometimes cousins) in alliance with a variety of court factions sought to insert themselves into the process, despite the presence of a designated heir apparent. At other times, as will be discussed in this book, the throne itself pitted its own sons against each other for a variety of perceived political benefits. Beginning with the Period of Disunion (220 AD–580’s) non-Chinese conquest regimes occupied the North China Plain and Northwest China, introducing North Asian customs and cultural/ritual concerns into the issue of imperial succession. Indeed, the institution of retired emperorship will be invented by just such a regime, the Northern Wei (386 AD–534).

44 Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). introduction: interpretive perspective 21

The politics of succession was not solely focused on the reigning monarch at the time of his imminent demise, but was an issue that also focused on the position of the heir apparent. Factional court struggles focused on the succession often began long before the reigning monarch had passed away. In terms of the conduct of court factional politics, the struggle over the succession was a gut level issue touching upon the very survival of the dynasty. Consequently, monarchs and their courts paid very close attention to the structural institution of succession. The above mentioned Chinese custom of designating a heir apparent (taizi) was not simply limited to a formal title, but an entire section of the inner palace was devoted to the residence of the heir, along with palace support staff, palace guard units, and high level advisory personnel appointed by the throne. The North Asian conquest dynasties of the Period of Disunion would introduce their own distinct, very consciously formulated structures of succession. As part of this conscious effort at molding and structuring imperial succession, all dynasties, regardless of ethno-cultural origins, carefully watched, and often very consciously ‘culled’ entire agnatic and affinal kin categories that were viewed as possible threats to the desired future succession. Wars could be won or lost, tax revenues collected in full or not, but none of these issues approached the significance and viciousness of the politics of succession, when the leading members of the militarized ruling elite and their factional allies in the court faced off against each other. Meyer Fortes noted, Succession . . . is of key importance in corporate group structure as well as . . . in the continuity of corporation sole . . . With the kinship corporation and hereditary offices of statuses, the connection is patent . . . Office per- petuated by succession, hereditary or appointive, can serve as the focus for the corporate structure of a heterogenous or internally differentiated aggregation.45 The serious study of the politics of succession affords us access to new interpretive vistas of power relations within patrimonial regimes.

45 Meyer Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), 305–6.

CHAPTER TWO

RETIRED EMPERORSHIP: THE NORTHERN WEI INNOVATION

The broad issue to be addressed in this chapter is the politics of succession in medieval China, as reflected in the institution of the retired emperorship (taishang huangdi 太上皇帝) of the Northern Wei, 386– 534. This chapter will argue the hypothesis that the retired emperorship was first successfully utilized by the Northern Wei and then imitated by the immediately succeeding Northern Dynasties (Northern Qi, 550–577 and Northern Zhou, 557–580) and then the Tang as a means of stabilizing the imperial succession. The position presented here is, in part, inspired by the arguments laid out by G. Cameron Hurst, III regarding the Japanese institution,1 and in part, by the specific reasons offered for the later Northern Qi retirement of 565.2

Retired Emperorship

The appearance of the retired emperorship in the Northern Dynasties and its extension into the early Tang is strongly correlated with succession difficulties encountered by these regimes. This early use of imperial retirement as a tool to stabilize imperial successions is also strongly correlated with regimes attempting to institute a vertical male primogenital

1 The term retired emperor is borrowed from G. Cameron Hurst’s discussion of the later Japanese institution from the Nara and Heian Periods. Hurst argued for a strong correlation between the Japanese use of imperial retirement in the 600’s and 700’s with the existence of an imperial succession that vacillated between a horizontal and vertical primogenital mode, with the horizontal mode appearing much more frequently than the vertical mode. Retirement was designed to stabilize the succession in the direction of the vertical primogenital mode. See Hurst, Insei, Abdicated Sovereigns in the Politics of Late Heian Japan, 1086–1185 (New York: Colombia University Press, 1976). Perhaps a more accurate term would be ranked co-emperorship. In the Chinese Northern Wei and Northern Dynasties’ cases the junior emperors were all minors and did not exercise significant political power beyond serving as the living symbol of the stability and continuity of the primogenital imperial succession. 2 Zizhi Tongjian [ZzTj], (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1976), 169.5251. 24 chapter two form of succession over against an earlier tradition of horizontal succession. This is particularly true of the cases from the Northern Dynasties, however, the later Tang period cases seem to represent a developmental variation that was less concerned with the existence of competing forms of succession. In the case of the Northern Dynasties’ emperors, the utilization of retired emperorship represented a positive move by the mature imperial incumbent (at least sixteen years of age) to ensure that his young son would not encounter a legitimacy crisis upon the demise of the former. Quite simply, the reigning monarch announced his ‘retirement’ and (often) removal to a separate palace complex. The young heir designate was then formally installed as emperor. In the Northern Dynasties, all the boy emperors were under ten years of age at their ascension. Under such conditions, the young heir was formally and legitimately ensconsed upon the throne long before the death of his father, while the latter continued to manage all affairs of state until his death. Needless to say, the boy emperor would be under an intensive on the job training regimen. In the precedent setting Northern Wei retirement the boy emperor was required to pay a formal court visit to his father once a month.3 The later Tang cases are distinctive in that the retired emperors seemed to have actively shared power with their already mature son. The first Tang case of imperial retirement, occurring in 626, will be discussed in later chapters. In this introductory discussion of Chinese retired emperors, it is necessary to distinguish between nominal and active retired emperors, which is a distinction also implicitly made by the Qing scholar, Zhao Yi.4 To understand why such a distinction should be made we must quickly review the historical development of the Chinese institution.5 Prior to the establishment of the Western Jin dynasty (265–317), retired emperorship was a strictly honorific appellation. Qinshi Huangdi

3 Wei shu [Ws], (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984), 7.138. 4 Zhao Yi 趙翼 also made this distinction. Nianershi Zhaji 廿二史劄記 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1963), 14.255. 5 The following narrative is taken from Peter Boodberg, “Marginalia to the Histories of the Northern Dynasties,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 3.3–4 (1938): 235–7; Anthony B. Fairbank, “Kingdom and Province in the Western Jin: Regional Power and the Eight Kings Insurrection, 300–306,” unpub. MA thesis (Seattle: University of Washington, 1986) 140, 162; Wenxian Tongkao [WxTk] (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1936) juan 251–2. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 25 first bestowed this title upon his deceased father. During the early years if the Han dynasty, Gaozu, the dynastic founder, bestowed this title upon his living father as a means of expressing filial piety and preserving the custormary status hierarchy betweenhis father, who was a commoner, the son, who was a dynastic founder. In 301 as part of the complex political infighting accompanying the Insurrection of the Eight Kings, Sima Lun 司馬倫 staged a coup and forced the puppet emperor, Huidi 惠帝, to ‘retire’ with the title taishanghuang. Lun assumed imperial responsibilities and the retired emperor, Huidi, was sequestered in the Jinyong Fortress in Loyang. The use of retired emperor occurred again in 400 when Lü Guang 呂光, ruler of the Later Liang regime based in the Gansu Corridor retired in favor of his son, and then died immediately thereafter. Following this occurrence are the key Northern Dynasties cases of the Northern Wei in 471, Northern Qi in 565, 576, and 577, and the Northern Zhou case of 579. In 617 Li Yuan, founding dynast of the Tang dynasty (Tang Gaozu) bestowed the title upon Sui Yangdi in absentia. In 626, following the palace coup known as the Xuanwu Men Incident engineered by Tang Gaozu’s son, Li Shimin (Tang Taizong), Gaozu retired with the title of taishang huang, which he held until his death in 635. Following this is the Tang Ruizong retirement in favor of his son, Xuanzong, in 712. Finally, in 756 in the midst of the An Lushan Rebellion, Xuanzong, who was in Sichuan, retired in favor of his son, Suzong, who then directed the imperial counter-attack from his base in northeastern Gansu. The early Southern Song dynasty made continuous use of this institution. The last case of imperial retirement was that of the Qing Qianlong emperor. Based upon the above historical outline, we can establish a developmental pattern. Prior to the Western Jin coup of 301 the retired emperorship was an honorific title. In 301, however, this title was directly involved in the factional politics of the time. The point is not that Jin Huidi used his position of retired emperor to exercise political power—he did not—historical opinion considers Huidi to have been incompetent. However, the mere use of the originally honorific, otiose title of retired emperor as a tool in factional infighting was unique at the time. Thus, the Western Jin utilization of retired emperorship may be viewed as a crucial transitional usage, a harbinger of the active role the retired emperor would play in the later Northern Dynasties and the Tang. Indeed, in the major cases from the Northern Dynasties, the 26 chapter two retired emperors continued to “manage important affairs of state, especially matters of foreign policy.”6 The second developmental stage in the use of retired emperorship occurred in 399 when Lü Guang of the Later Liang regime in the Gansu Corridor retired in favor of one of his younger sons (this son was the eldest child borne by Guang’s main consort but was not the eldest male of all the sons propagated by Guang). Guang, who was 62 and mortally ill, died immediately after retiring but his goal was to ensure the position of his designated heir in the face of the clear threat posed by his eldest ‘bastard’ son.7 Guang’s stratagem ultimately failed to secure the position of his designated heir, but this effort marked the first time that imperial retirement and legitimate succession to the throne by a designated heir were directly (albeit unsuccessfully) linked together. Commencing with the crucial and influential Northern Wei retirement of 471, this linkage was successfully effectuated. In 471, two courtiers participating in the discussion regarding the retirement issue at the Northern Wei court were originally from the Gansu Corridor—the eunuch, Zhao Hei 趙黑 and the Xianbei general, Yuan He 源賀.8 They may very well have been aware of the Later Liang precedent. One of the reasons which the Northern Wei monarch offered for desiring to retire in 471 was that he was ill. The claim does not appear to have been true, but it may have been a direct imitation of the circumstances which Lü Guang (truth- fully) used to justify his retirement in 399. The statements issued by the Northern Wei court referred solely to the prestigious Han Dynasty precedent—the Later Liang regime was never mentioned. Beginning with the Northern Wei case imperial retirement became closely tied with efforts by non-Han Chinese regimes based in Northern China to shake loose from a tradition of horizontal succession, wherein a variety of uncles, father’s cousins, nephews, etc., could claim legitimate rights to the succession, and to establish a pattern of vertical, primogenital succession to the throne. The third developmental stage can be discerned in the Tang usage of imperial retirement to ensure that the desired son of the reigning emperor made it to the throne safely, but the issue of a competing, horizontal system of succession, associated with the political culture of the

6 Boodberg, 1938. 7 Jin shu [Js] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1974) 122.3063; Ws 95.2086; ZzTj 111.3487, 3504–06. 8 Ws 94.2016; 41.919. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 27 northern steppe peoples, was no longer a problem. This is not to deny the probable continuing influence of North Asian political culture on the early Tang, but that it was being sublimated and integrated into a rationalization of court politics and factional conflict more in keeping with standard Han Chinese ideals and practices, which were oriented to the more rigidly controlled form of vertical succession.9 Additionally, in contrast to the Northern Dynasties’ cases, all the Tang period ‘junior’ emperors were mature adults, so that the political dynamics between senior and junior emperors during the Tang was quite distinct, and more fraught with tension, when compared with the Northern Dynasties’ cases. An interesting aspect of the retired emperorship during the Period of Disunion is that it was unique to the Northern Dynasties. This strat- egem was never used by any of the Southern Dynasties, based in modern Nanjing, as a means of resolving their own manifest difficulties with imperial succession. The hypothesis of this chapter will be that the Northern Dynasties, particularly the Northern Wei, were so concerned with the possible impact of their inherited tradition of horizontal succession coming from the pre-imperial nomadic confederacy past, that they were impelled to innovate in order to stabilize the regime. Retired emperorship was a means of directly confronting and blocking the influence of this previous counter-tradition. The receptivity of the early Tang regime to this institutional innovation (in contrast to the earlier Southern dynasties) may very well be understood as reflecting a diffuse North Asian cultural heritage at the court. As Jennifer Holmgren has noted, the Tang royal family and many of the highest ranking courtiers were ethnically and culturally mestizo—and they were quite unself- consciously cognizant of this fact, as well. The Northern Wei case is of particular importance to this enterprise because, as mentioned above, it was the first regime to successfully link together imperial retirement with stabilization of the male primogenital pattern of succession. The argument that an enduring counter-tradition of horizontal succession continued a subterranean existence for the

9 Nevertheless, a probable continuing North Asian influence should not be ignored. Joseph Fletcher referred to the early Tang succession pattern as being characterized by ‘bloody tannistry’. He also referred to the early Tang as a ‘post-nomadic system’. From an unpublished conference paper, “Bloody Tannistry: Authority and Succession in the Ottoman, Indian Muslim and later Chinese Empires,” 1978, 66. Cited courtesy of Dr. Beatrice F. Manz. 28 chapter two entire first half of the Northern Wei regime will be discussed in more detail below. Evidence will be presented that this regime manifested peculiarities in the conduct of high level agnatic politics that can best be understood in the context of an incomplete transition to a vertical, primogenital mode of imperial succession. The argument will incline heavily toward correlations of political behavior and inferences based upon these behavior patterns.10

The Northern Wei case

Prior to 386, when the Northern Wei began its conquest of northern China, the ruling Tuoba house of the future Northern Wei was a nomad confederacy chieftaincy centered in northern Shanxi and Inner Mongolia. The Tuoba were one among a number of tribal groups associated with the semi-nomadic Xianbei peoples of Manchuria. The Tuoba had migrated

10 There are very few sources, ancient or modern, that treat the Chinese retired emperorship as a political institutional phenomenon, as opposed to its ritualistic significance, in a thorough manner. Notable among the pre-modern encyclopedic sources in this regard are the Wenxian Tongkao juan 251–252 and the Gujin tushu jicheng, (Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju, 1934), juan 11–14. The Qing period scholar, Zhao Yi, has an excellent overview in his Nianershi zhaji 14.254–260. In English there is a peculiarly perceptive vignette by Peter Boodberg in his HJAS 1938 essay on the retired emperorship in the Northern Dynasties. Curiously, I have not come across an extended treatment of the subject by modern Japanese scholars. This is odd because of the prominence of the institution in classical Japanese history. The position advanced here that a counter-tradition of horizontal succession in the Northern Wei was an inheritance from their nomad confederacy past has been previously advanced in a more limited and modified manner by Jennifer Holmgren, “The Harem in Northern Wei Politics 398–4308 . . .,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 26.1 (1983): 71–95; and Li Ping 李憑, Bei Wei Pingcheng Shidai 北魏平城時代 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000), 114–118. In other areas of social life, the continuance of steppe traditions throughout the entirety of the Northern Wei and the Northern Dynasties Period is a well known aspect of this time period. See Zhou Yiliang 周一良, Wei Jin Nanbeichaoshi lunji 魏晉南北朝史論集 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1963), 177–198; Koga Akimine 古賀昭岑, “Hoku Gi no buzoku kaisan ni tsuite 北魏の部族解散について,” Tōhōgaku 59 (1980): 62–76; Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 524–28; Jennifer Holmgren, “Empress Dowager Ling of the Northern Wei and the T’o-pa Sinicization Question,” Papers on Far Eastern History 18 (1978): 154–57; Holmgren, “Marriage and Political Power in 6th Century China: A Study of the Kao Family of Northern Ch’i,” Journal of Asian History 16.1 (1982): 37–38; Tamura Jitsuzō 田村実造, “Kindenpō no keifu 均田法の系譜,” Shirin 45.6 (1962): 45–65; Tamura, “Hoku Gi Kōbuntei no seiji 北魏孝文帝の政治,” Tōyōshi Kenkyū 41.3 (1982): 43; Uchida Ginpu 丙田吟風, Kita Ajiashi kenkyū キタアジア史研究 vol. 2 (Kyoto: Dobosya Press Co., Ltd., 1875), 142–147. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 29 out of Manchuria to Mongolia and thence to points south by the 100’s AD. Other Xianbei tribes, such as the Murong migrated to southern Manchuria, and thence to Inner Mongolia and eventually parts of the North China Plain north of the Yellow River. Among the Tuoba, the chieftainship tended to pass in a horizontal fashion from brother to brother, uncle to nephew, etc. Father to son successions occurred but did not predominate.11 The successions, as typical among many North Asian peoples, were determined by the charisma and maturity of the candidates and their access to convincing force. Tian Yuqing notes that in 386 when the sixteen year old Daowudi (founding dynast of the Northern Wei) was attempting to establish his position as King of Dai, which was the title of previous Tuoba chieftains, based upon his primogenital credentials as the eldest son of the eldest son of the most honored consort of the last Dai chieftain, Zhaochengdi, who had been killed ten years previously, he was militarily challenged by his sole surviving uncle. It is also clear that a number of his cousins viewed themselves as legitimate candidates for leadership.12 In the Tuoba case, an additional factor was that the Tuoba chieftains married exogamously, consequently, affinal tribal support was very important in determining the outcome of succession disputes amongst the Tuoba agnates. Daowudi’s ability to withstand the challenges of the mid-380’s was due in significant part to the support of his mother’s tribe, the Helan. This latter fact is, ironically, crucial in explaining the later Northern Wei ‘tradition’ that the natural mother of the designated heir had to die (usually by taking poison), which is discussed in depth by Tian Yuqing.13 This ‘tradition’ was created by Daowudi, who, indeed, never forgot the crucial role of his mother’s tribe in ensuring his survival. Clearly, a centralized monarchy could never tolerate such uncontrolled outside military power imping- ing upon the imperial succession. Parallel with the military consolida- tion of the regime through the 380’s into the late 390’s, the Northern Wei royal house (the Tuoba surname was later sinicized to Yuan 元) successfully and rapidly engineered a switch from a horizontal mode of political succession to a vertical, primogenital mode of succession. Generally speaking, the emperor’s eldest son was designated to inherit the throne, and quite often succeeded in doing so (see diagram I, below).

11 See the succession chart in Tian Yuqing 田余慶, Tuoba Shi Tan 拓跋史探 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2003), 19; Ws 1.1–18. 12 Tian 2003, 80–83. 13 Ibid., 15–68. 30 chapter two

1) Daowudi (386–409)

3) Mingyuandi (409–424) 2) Shao (紹, 409)

4) Taiwudi (424–452)

Huang (晃) Han (翰) 5) Yu (餘, 452) Heir Apparent suddenly executed in 451

6) Gaozong (452–465)

7) Xianzu (465–476)

8) Xiaowendi (471–499)

Xun (恂) 9) Shizong (500–516) Heir Apparent executed in 496

X 10) Suzong (516–528) Died early

Dynasty Destroyed (534) Diagram I: Sketch of the Northern Wei Succession

This pattern of primogenital political succession closely approximates the Chinese model, though, the latter model also specifies that the imperial heir should be the eldest son of the main consort, or empress (huanghou 皇后). The curious status of the formal positions of heir apparent (taizi) and empress in the early and middle periods of Northern Wei history is an issue that will be addressed later. Based on the preceding diagram we can see that the succession, while not primogenitally perfect, comes retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 31 quite close to perfection. In the author’s view, such orthodox symme- try raises the question of why and how such results were obtained so quickly. This chapter will argue that underlying the orthodox serenity of the Northern Wei succession was a maelstrom of unique forms of violent agnatic political competition for imperial power. The retirement of the Northern Wei emperor, Xianzu, occurred suddenly in 471. Xianzu, who was then approximately sixteen years old made his four year old heir apparent, the future Xiaowendi, the reigning emperor. There are some unique, almost theatrical aspects to the events surrounding the retirement. Initially, during the course of the court conference called to debate the issue, Xianzu offered the throne to his eldest paternal uncle, but then publicly retracted the offer in the face of strong court opposition. I do not believe that any of Xianzu’s uncles were actively seeking to seize the throne, that is, the retirement drama does not appear to have been enacted in order to place Xianzu’s uncle (or uncles) in an exposed and untenable political position and thus to blunt a previously covert effort at power seizure. Zitui子推 , the object of Xianzu’s initial abdication offer, may actually have been one of Xianzu’s closest political supporters. This statement is based upon a complicated series of high court purges that occurred after Xianzu’s death in 476. Zitui died suddenly while en route to a provincial posting in 477. The date and circumstances surrounding his death correlate suspiciously with a purge of the deceased Xianzu’s close personal associates. These issues will be discussed in the following chapter on the Empress Dowager Wenming. Assuming that these uncles were not truly the cause of the 471 retirement, the question arises as to what occurred in the previous course of Xianzu’s reign that would raise concerns over the future succession to the throne? Xianzu was approximately eleven years old when he ascended the throne in 465. The period 465 through 467 was marked by an acute power struggle at court which almost succeeded in unseating the young Xianzu. This political turbulence was capped by the unsuccessful revolt of Xianzu’s father’s first cousin, ortangshu 堂叔, Tuoba Daofu 道符 in Chang’an in 467. The hypothesis will be that Xianzu’s 471 retirement was correlated with the traumatic events of 465–467, and that the retirement was designed to ensure the legitimacy of his young son upon the throne. The theatricality and heated rhetoric asseverating the legitimacy of the father to eldest son succession which was so prominent in the 471 debate would serve to generate accumulated court support for the 32 chapter two throne sufficient to withstand future threats to the succession in the eventuality of the demise of the senior emperor, Xianzu.14 Before discussing the specifics of the 471 retirement, however, it is necessary to establish the existence of a counter-tradition of horizontal succession that existed both before and after the 471 retirement drama. Below, I will endeavor to demonstrate the existence of peculiar patterns of agnatic political activity highlighting the role of the reigning emperor’s father’s first cousins tangshu( ) in leading unsuccessful coup attempts and also as clearly pivotal figures, sometimes as imperialloy- alists in determining the course of on-going agnatic coup efforts.15 In the course of the discussion the emperor’s attitude towards his brothers and paternal uncles, as well as the posited relationship between paternal uncles and tangshu, will be explored. The perspective from which these matters will be discussed is the one implied by the Chinese concept of vertical, primogenital imperial succession. While ideally, the Chinese conceptualization emphasized a severely limited line of descent (father to eldest son and so on down the generations) in point of actual fact there was a somewhat wider grouping of agnates who were acknowledged to have legitimate interests in determining or participating in succession issues. This group would usually include paternal uncles, brothers, paternal first cousins, and nephews. From the perspective of the throne this grouping would be

14 The overall historical interpretation presented in this book regarding the events and key actors during the reign of Xianzu is at variance with the received historiographi- cal tradition. The correlation of the retirement of Xianzu with a succession crisis in the Northern Wei, relating to events which occurred in 465–466, is unusual in the literature. There are, however, others who do perceive such a linkage; see Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Du Tongjian lun 讀通鑑論 (Beijing: Zhonghua shujju, 1975 reprint), 15.521–22. Following a related revisionist line of thought, the Qing scholar, Wang Mingsheng 王鳴盛 denies that the Empress Dowager Wenming (commonly identified as another power player in the 471 retirement drama) ever had sufficient political clout at that time to force Xianzu into retirement. See his Shiqishi Shangque 十七史商榷 (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin chubanshe, 1957 reprint), 66.9b–11b. This author agrees that Wenming was of secondary political importance in 471 and that we need to look much more closely at the Tuoba Daofu rebellion and the roles of Xianzu’s uncles in supporting the throne. However, as will be discussed later in this book, Wenming was probably directly involved in the 476 assassination of Xianzu, and did indeed emerge as a significant power player after 476 until her death in 490. 15 In using the term ‘coup’ I am referring to both large scale military confrontations and smaller scale incidents growing out of violent court factional competition. Due to the personalistic orientation of politics during this period, with their ramifying kin and clientage linkages, small scale incidents had the potential to be just as politically significant as large scale confrontations on the battlefield. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 33 the politically relevant imperial ‘descent group’. Under both the Chinese and Xianbei systems males from the matriline and affines are not valid direct participants in the succession issue, though, they could certainly have a strong influence on the eventual outcome of a succession struggle. The dotted line on diagram II below illustrates the imperial ‘descent group’ from the Chinese perspective. Note that the tangshu category, who will be so prominent in the Northern Wei case, is not relevant to the standard Chinese position. Concepts of lineage and clan may have a ritual-legalistic bearing on a succession crisis, but would not necessarily indicate actual participants in a power struggle.16 An important aspect of the subsequent presentation is that rules and precedents regarding political succession in any culture will, in the long term, tend to channel political action. Over time, general patterns of action will appear that owe their existence to such cultural-political norms. This is especially true for patrimonial regimes that, by definition, base their legitimacy upon the selective upholding of ‘traditional’ norms. Specific exceptions and variations to such norms—not to mention deliberate efforts at altering these norms—do not invalidate this position. Indeed, in the case of deliberate efforts to alter norms of succession, account will have to be taken of the continued influence of prior norms for quite a while. In regard to this issue Jean La Fontaine notes: Competition between agnates may, and often does, cause fission of the group and the emergence of new autonomous groups, without thereby invalidating the succession rule. The rule legitimizing authority . . . is thus distinct from the action surrounding the appointment of a particular individual, although it remains an important component since factions must justify their candidate for office in terms of his descent status. Seniority is a claim with a variety of possible applications by interested parties.17 La Fontaine’s comments are important because in the discussion below we will be dealing with ranges of permissible political action and trying to identify specific differences in the ranges of action between the

16 This conceptualization is adapted from E.R. Leach, “The Structural Implications of Matrilateral Cross-Cousin Marriage,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society 80–84 (1952): 24; and from Patricia B. Ebrey & James L. Watson, eds., Kinship Organization in Late Imperial China, 1000–1940 (Berkeley: University of Californai Press, 1986), 5–6. 17 Jean La Fontaine, “Descent in New Guinea: an Africanist View, in The Character of Kinship ed., Jack Goody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 43. Great Grandfather

Gdfa’s Brother Grandfather Gdfa’s Brother

Tangshu Tangshu Tangshu Fa’s Brother Father Fa’s Brother Tangshu Tangshu Tangshu

Second Cousins Second Cousins Cousin Cousin Cousin Brother Ego Brother Cousin Cousin Cousin Second Cousins Second Cousins

Nephew

Diagram II: Ego’s Politically Relevant Descent Group from the Chinese Perspective retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 35

Northern Wei pattern and patterns of action typical of Han Chinese regimes.

The Issue of Horizontal Succession

Strictly speaking, fraternal succession means a succession passing from brother to brother (wherein age seniority may or may not be prominent) followed by access to the succession devolving upon the sons of these brothers. By means of classificatory nomenclature cousins can also be absorbed within the category of brothers.Viewed more abstractly, such a succession system can be understood as ultimately passing from the qualified members of one descent group to the qualified members of a collateral descent group, especially when the genealogical distance from the founding dynast and his brothers has increased with the passage of time. Indeed, if a regime practicing this type of succession survives long enough, the succession could even be viewed as traveling from lineage to lineage. Viewed in the context of a circulating succession, where the emphasis is on collateral descent group to collateral descent group transfer of political power, the term horizontal succession in reference to this phenomenon may be more appropriate than the narrower term fraternal succession. The term horizontal succession can cover a number of variant types of non-primogenital successions. A potential problem associated with the horizontal mode of succession, as opposed to the primogenital mode, is that access to supreme political power is legitimately available to a greater number of descent groups, consequently, the possibility for competitive violence to occur in the course of establishing a new monarch upon the throne becomes much greater than in a primogenital system of succession.18 In the case of a succession crisis in a primogenital system, the violence will usually be limited to the smaller group contained within the confines of the imperial descent group indicated in Diagram II. In a horizontal succession system the violence could very well spread to all the qualified collateral descent groups and degenerate into a wild free-for-all. In the Chinese style system of primogenital succession, the formal early designation of an heir apparent, re-inforced with the position of Empress,

18 Jack Goody, “Succession to High Office”Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 161. 36 chapter two served as a legitimating safeguard to the inviolability of the succession. Sophisticated systems of horizontal succession, some with, and some without effective rules of precedence, appear among many African, Middle Eastern Islamic kingdoms, and the nomad regimes of North Asia. In order to support the argument regarding the unusual prominence of distant collateral agnates in high political affairs in the Northern Wei, which would imply the continued legitimacy of a counter-tradition of horizontal succession, the Wei shu imperial annals and biographies of imperial agnates were surveyed for the period 386–516.19 Occasionally, the Bei shi and the Zizhi Tongjian were consulted in order to supplement statements made in the Wei shu. The goal is to identify agnatic coup leaders, pivotal agnatic loyalists and also violent successions (like the 452 succession crisis). The two tables on the following pages identify key agnates and present the rough arithmetic results of the survey.20

19 Ws juan 15–22. 20 The cases in table I were compiled according to discrete incident regardless of the number of different relatives simultaneously involved. Consequently, in arithmetically tabulating the results for the categories of brothers, tangshu, and some miscellaneous figures in table II, they are occasionally valued as a fraction. This occurred in the coup attempts of 409, 444, 496, and 508. In 409 Lie and Shao shared the same event (though, Lie was a loyalist), thus each of them is valued at .5; in 444 Pi and Fan shared the same event, each valued at .5; in 496 Yi and the sons of Yuan Pi (the latter as a group) shared the same event, and finally, in 508 Yu and Quan shared the same event and are valued at .5 each. All other individuals are valued at 1, embedded in their own discrete events. The percentage results in table II are rounded off to the nearest tenth. This is simply a rough and ready method at trying to tease out a pattern from these events covering the course of the dynasty. The references used to compile table I are as follows: Sons—Ws 4.107–09; 22.588; TzTj 126.3970–71. Brothers—Ws 3.49; 4.97; 8.206; 15.370–72; 16.389–90; 17.414–15; 22.589–90; 28.688–89. First Cousins—Ws 2.32; 15.383. Uncles—Ws 2.21; 4. 106–07; 7.146; 8.193; 15.374, 385–86; 18.418,438; 20.525; 21.533–39; 94.2012–13. Tangshu— Ws 5.112; 6.127; 7.180; 8.206; 14.361–62; 16.390; 17.415; 18.418; 19.442; 20.526. Miscellaneous—Ws 3.50; 5.115; 14.361–65; 15.381–82. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 37

MISC. YUE 悅 (2ND COUSIN) 409 TI 元提 YUAN (UNKNOWN) 456 SONS PI’S YUAN 496

TANGSHU REN 仁 453 LI 麗 453 道符 DAOFU 467 YI 頤 496 詮 QUAN 508

UNCLES 禧 KUDU 窟咄 KUDU 386 LIE 烈 409 YU 餘 452 CHANGLE 長樂 479 501 FIRST FIRST COUSINS COUSINS 順 SHUN 397 YILIE 意烈 398 XI

BROTHERS Table I: Agnates and Coup Efforts in the Northern Wei Northern the in Efforts Coup and I: Agnates Table YI 儀 409 SHAO 紹 409 範丕 & FAN PI 444 YU 愉 508

SONS HUANG 晃 451 XUN 恂 497 DAOWUDI (386–409) MINGYUANDI (409–424) TAIWUDI (424–452) GAOZONG (452–465) XIANZU (465–476) XIAOWENDI 471–499 SHIZONG (500–516) EMPEROR’S NAME 38 chapter two

Table II: Relative Share of Coup Attempts byAgnatic Categories, 386–516

Total number of incidents: 18 Sons: 2/18 = 11%21 Brothers: 3/18 = 17% First Cousins: 2/18 = 11% Uncles: 4.5/18 = 25% Tangshu: 4/18 = 22% Second Cousin: 1/18 = 6% Sons of Yuan Pi: .5/18 = 3% Yuan Ti (unknown): 1/18 = 6%22

As one can see from the survey, incidents involving tangshu as active, leading participants in coup related activities was only slightly below the figure for uncles, at 22% of all incidents versus 25% for uncles. Together, uncles and tangshu comprise 47% of all coup participants. Additionally, uncles and tangshu are of the same generation and can easily be blurred together. If we take the generation of brothers, first cousins, and second cousins, we only have a total of 34% of the coup participants. In the Chinese case, however, with its ideal of lineal succession, tangshu were generally viewed as too distant to be consistent

21 Xiaowendi’s eldest son and heir apparent, Xun, was executed in circa 497 (Ws 7.180; 22.588–89). Xun was apparently tied, either directly or indirectly, to the unsuccessful Mu Tai rebellion of 496 by attempting to leave the palace in Loyang without permission and flee to Pingcheng, which is modern Datong. Since Xun was not a leader in the Mu Tai Affair and his relationship to the plotters is unclear, I did not include him as a participant in the affair. According to Xun’s biography Ws( 22.588–89), in 496 he was derogated to commoner status and placed under house arrest. Subsequently, (probably in 497) he was accused of continuing to plot against the throne and executed. The charges, however, were later shown to have been false. The text implies that Xiaowendi did not overly rue the execution of this son. I included Xun as a separate entry in the category of sons by virtue of the continuing legitimacy threat which he posed to his father. This approach also simplifies the arithmetic juggling and gives a deserved place in the ranks of notable ‘has-beens’ to such an important figure. The case of Shizong’s uncle, Xie (d. 508), is omitted from the table. Xie was clearly executed in a pre-emptive fashion (Ws 8.206; 21.571–583). The apparent reasoning behind his execution was that Xie was late in responding to an imperial summons. The text implies that Xie was the victim of a misunderstanding. Shizong apparently perceived his youngest uncle as acting in a disrespectful manner towards the throne, thus, challeng- ing imperial authority. At the time, Shizong’s brother, Yu, was in revolt in the provinces and the political situation was very tense. Xie was not formally charged with sedition or a similar crime. 22 The identity of Yuan Ti is unclear. By virtue of the Yuan surname and the fact that he served in the elite imperial bodyguard indicates he was a distant but honored member of a collateral line (see Ws 5.115). retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 39 legitimate contenders for imperial power, even though the Chinese, like the Tuoba, recognized generational classificatory nomenclature. Within the framework of a horizontal system of succession, the concept of the collateral descent group as a vessel of legitimacy would appear to be an appropriate means of explaining the consistent prominence of tangshu throughout the course of Northern Wei history surveyed by the tables. To reiterate, the consistent appearance of tangshu over the course of time makes the Northern Wei case unique. A Chinese regime ought not manifest consist ent agnatic participation in coup attempts outside the limited imperial descent group. From table I we can see that all coup attempts involving cousins were clustered during and immediately following the reign of the dynastic founder, Daowudi, from the mid-380’s to 409 when Daowudi was killed by his son, Shao. After the Former Qin dynasty collapsed in 383 all of Northern China entered a phase of civil war and warlord competition for turf areas—the Tuoba were simply one of the competitors in this violent time period. Daowudi’s cousins seemed to have functioned as both leaders of incipiently separate collateral lines and simultaneously as generational brothers, which is what they were in terms of classificatory nomenclature. After this founding period the other agnatic categories became much more active. Daowudi’s relationship with his cousins is complicated by what may very well be purposeful obfuscation by the compilers of both the Wei shu and the Bei shi. In both texts, three of these putative cousins, Gu 觚, Yi 儀, and Lie 烈 are listed as the offspring of Daowudi’s uncle, Han 翰.23 Zhou Yiliang, however, has made a powerful argument that Tuoba Han died too early to father Gu and implies that Yi was not his child, either.24 On the other hand, these three children are consistently associated with Daowudi’s mother from the Helan tribe during this turbulent period of incessant warfare. In fact, the Wei shu biography of the Helan mother, without offering any explanation, mentions that Gu was her youngest son.25 Most scholars agree that Daowudi himself was the offspring of the Helan mother and Tuoba Shi寔 ;26 but Shi

23 Ws 15.370, 374. 24 Zhou Yiliang, Wei Jin Nanbeichaoshi Zhaji 魏晉南北史劄記 (Beijing: Zhong- hua shuju: 1985), 347–49. Tian Yuqing also supports this position. See Tian, Tuoba Shi Tan, 48. 25 Ws 13.324. 26 This discussion follows the Wei Shu, Bei Shi, and Zizhi Tongjian in recognizing Daowudi as the grandson of the Tuoba chieftain Zhaochengdi (Shiyijian), who died in 376. Zhou Yiliang also takes this position. The various Southern dynastic annals refer in 40 chapter two also died too early to father the above three children. Li Ping, following Zhou Yiliang’s line of reasoning regarding Gu, has argued that by means of a levirate arrangement all three children were fathered by Daowudi’s grandfather, Zhaochengdi, who was killed in 376,27 by his own surviving eldest son, Shijun 寔君 (actually the text phrases this as the eldest son, but borne of a lower status wife, or shu zhangzi 庶長子.28 This has interesting implications for the strict patrilineal legitimacy of Daowudi and his deceased father as the ‘rightful heirs’ to the Toba chieftaincy, given the somewhat fluid conceptualization of what comprised ‘rightful’ among the Tuoba nomads of this earlier period. Shijun was clearly a viable candidate. This issue becomes a moot point, however, because shortly after 376 Shijun was captured and executed by the Former Qin emperor). What seems probable is that either by means of some type of levirate arrangement or perhaps by means of adoption, Daowudi had three half-brothers. Gu died in the early 400’s as a prisioner of the Murong Xianbei (Daowudi refused an earlier ransom request from Gu’s captors);29 Yi was executed by Daowudi in 409, probably as a means of avoiding a threat to his heir to the throne; and Lie survived into the reign of the second Northern Wei emperor, the eldest son of Daowudi, passing to Daowudi as the son of Shiyijian. This issue has bedeviled modern scholarship. The Southern dynastic annals give no rationale for this position. Furthermore, it would completely disrupt the generational relationship laid out in the Wei Shu, etc. Note that even though the Wei Shu may have been attempting to hide the identity of Daowudi’s generational peers (his relationship with three of his alleged first cousins) the text has never been accused of confusing generational lines. For a quick summary of what the different sources say on this issue but with a Southern bias see Lü Simian 呂思勉, Liang Jin Nanbeichaoshi 兩晉南北朝史 (Shanghai: Kaiming shudian, 1948), 222–24. Zhou Yiliang attempts a more balanced but friendly approach to the Southern sources in his Zhaji, 342–350. Also Uchida Ginpu, “Gi Sho Joki tokuni sono seikei kiji ni tsuite 魏書序紀特に其の世系記事について,” Shirin 22.3 (1937): 19–45, and Shida Fudomaro 志田不動磨, Dai ō seikei hihan 代王世系批判 pt. 2, Shigaku Zasshi 48 (1937): 323–354. Uchida hypothesizes that the Southern annals may have confused Daowudi’s captured uncle Kudu with the latter’s deceased father, Shiyijian (the Southern annals also state that Shiyijian was not killed in 376 but captured along with Kudu and the young Daowudi and they were all initially taken to Chang’an by the victorious Former Qin monarch, Fu Jian). The confusion just seems to proliferate. All sources agree that Daowudi’s uncle, Kudu, was indeed captured, but that is where agreement ends. Overall, this author feels that the Southern annals were too distant from events and they seem to have confused the data. 27 Li Ping, Bei Wei Pingcheng Shidai, 103–108 provides the most extensive argument for identifying all three children as Daowudi’s uterine half brothers by the levirate. 28 Ws 15.369. 29 Ws 15.274. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 41

Mingyuandi, unmolested and passing away from natural causes in 420. In fact, in 409 Lie was a crucial actor in securing Mingyuandi’s ascension to the throne in the midst of a palace coup effort, and so is entered in table I on “Agnates and Coup Efforts in the Northern Wei”. Due to the sensitivity of the Northern Wei throne to imperial claims from potentially rival collateral lines, the throne endeavored to co-opt its kin members into active military and political service to the throne. The throne appears to have insisted upon its primogenital prerogatives, but not to the extent of unalterably antagonizing its familial and former tribal supporters. In this context, Jack Goody notes: Elimination from the eligibles (to imperial pretensions) does not necessarily involve elimination from the dynasty itself . . . complete exclusion is unlikely to take place where the society is divided into a number of unilineal descent groups . . . since membership of these groups has many other implications apart from rights to kingship.30 The above statement is certainly relevant to understanding Northern Wei agnatic politics, however, the Northern Wei case demonstrates certain sinister patterns of imperial behavior towards agnates of which we should be cognizant. In table III below an effort is made to elucidate a pattern to the conduct of agnatic politics in the Northern Wei. The most immediately noticeable aspect of the table is that the reigns of Gaozong and Xianzu mark a watershed in the survival ability of the three agnatic categories listed in the table. Beginning with the reign of Gaozong, most of his brothers survive into the subsequent reign of Xianzu and beyond. This was the most permanent aspect of the alteration in the pattern of agnatic relations with the throne, because prior to the reign of Gaozong, imperial brothers tended not to survive into the reign of their nephew. In the case of the dynastic founder, Daowudi, as noted above, he was indirectly responsible for the death of Gu and he executed his second brother, Yi, in 409. The information regarding the agnates of Daowudi is very confusing and sparse, nevertheless, it is clear, especially in the later years of his reign, that he was executing siblings, cousins and anybody else perceived as a possible threat to the imperial

30 Jack Goody, Succession to High Office, 37. 42 chapter two

Table III: Survival Rates of Selected Imperial Agnates Emperor’s Name % of Brothers % of living uncles % of Tangshu surviving into the surviving beyond surviving into the subsequent reign first 5 years of subsequent reign nephew’s reign

Daowudi 1/3 = 33% 0/1 = 031 1/2 = 50% (386–409) Mingyuandi 2/7 = 26% 1/1 = 100% 0/0 = 0 Taiwudi 1/6 = 17%32 0/2 = 0 1/4 = 25% (424–452) Gaozong 9/12 = 75% 0/4 = 0 1/4 = 25% (452–465) Xianzu 5/5 = 100% 7/9 = 78%33 2/4 = 50% (465–476)

31 Out of a total of eight uncles, only one, Kudu, survived a coup effort by the eldest uncle, Shijun, in 376 just before the complete collapse of the Tuoba nomad confederacy led by Daowudi’s grandfather, Shiyijian (also known as Zhaochengdi) in the face of the military offensive by the Former Qin regime. Shiyijian was killed in this coup effort and the successful Shijun was shortly after captured and executed by the Former Qin monarch, Fu Jian. Kudu was captured and taken hostage to Chang’an, a fact highlighted by Ōta Minoru. The Former Qin thus viewed Kudu as, potentially, the most viable surviving leader of the Tuoba. Keeping him in captivity in Chang’an on a tight leash was a means of controlling the leading Tuoba lineages remaining in Inner Mongolia. The decision by the Former Qin to let the youthful Daowudi remain in the north reflected the latter’s relative lack of political stature at the time. After the Former Qin collapsed in the early 380’s Kudu re-appeared as an ultimately unsuccessful challenger to Daowudi’s leadership of the Tuoba in 386. Kudu was killed by his disgruntled tribal supporters in this same year. See Ōta Minoru 太田稔, “Takubatsu Kei no buzoku kaisan seisaku ni tsuite 拓跋珪の部族解散政策” Shūkan Tōyōgaku 89 (2003): 43. 32 Taiwudi was succeeded by his grandson, Gaozong, due to a bloody succession crisis in 452. The one brother that survived into Gaozong’s reign was Chong. Chong’s son, Li, was Gaozong’s tangshu. Both Li and Chong were executed in 453 for sedition (only Li is listed on table I). 33 The percentage of Xianzu’s uncles surviving through his reign into that of the successor reign of Xiaowendi (using 476 as the base year, when Xianzu was assassinated, and the Grand Empress Dowager Wenming assumed regency powers at the court) was 5/9 = 56%. This survival rate was extraordinary for paternal uncles and was not replicated during the period under consideration. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 43

Table III (cont.)

Emperor’s Name % of Brothers % of living uncles % of Tangshu surviving into the surviving beyond surviving into the subsequent reign first 5 years of subsequent reign nephew’s reign Xiaowendi (476 5/6 = 83% 2/5 = 40%34 18/20 = 90% as the base year) (471–499) Shizong 3/5 = 60% 3/5 = 60%35 2/4 = 50% (500–516) succession.36 With the reign of the second monarch Mingyuandi, a clear pattern of sib elimination appears. Out of seven known brothers, one was executed in 409 for attempting to seize the throne (in the process killing his father, Daowudi). Another two brothers died in 416, and another two in 421–422. The remaining two brothers survived three years into the reign of their nephew, Taiwudi, dying in 427 and 428.37 An excellent analysis of the correlations of the deaths of the brothers of Mingyuandi with the issue of a continuing counter-tradition of horizontal succession within the regime is rendered by Li Ping.38 Unlike Mingyuandi, the treatment the next monarch, Taiwudi, accorded his brothers is not as clearly patterned. Out of six brothers, one died in 424 of unstated causes;39 two died in 441 (one of whom was involved in a criminal proceeding);40 and

34 Only one of Xiaowendi’s uncles survived the death of the Grand Empress Dowager Wenming in 490. Using 476 as the base year for the separate reign of Xiaowendi, only two of the uncles survived beyond 481. With the exception of the eldest uncle, Changle, the sources do not explicitly or implicitly mention the existence of a policy of avuncular elimination, nevertheless, the pattern is suspicious. It is possible that Wenming quietly arranged for the paternal uncles to pre-decease her. Regarding Xiaowendi’s tangshu, 26 individuals were counted but six of them did not have clear death dates so they were left out of the arithmetic calculations for the table. 35 Only one uncle survived beyond the crisis of the 508 rebellion of Shizong’s next eldest brother, Yu. I suspect that the rebellion triggered efforts to eliminate the imperial uncles in a pre-emptive fashion. This was clearly the fate of the unfortunate Xie. 36 See Zhang Xiaohu 張小虎, “Lun Bei Wei Zhuanzhi Huangquan de Xingcheng 論北魏專制皇權的形成” Xibei Shidaxue Xuebao 3 (2002): 84–85. 37 Ws 3.49, 56, 61, 72, 73. 38 Li Ping, Bei Wei Pingcheng Shidai, 114–118. 39 Ws 4.69. 40 Ws 4.94; ZzTj 23.3891. 44 chapter two another two in 444 and 447, respectively, as a direct result of their participation in seditious activity against the throne.41 Only one brother, Chong 崇, survived into the reign of the next monarch, Gaozong, as the latter’s grandfather’s brother (Gaozong’s father, Huang, was executed in 451 by his own father, Taiwudi). Chong was himself executed in 453, along with his son, Li 麗, for sedition.42 The primary sources do not explicitly state that any of the Northern Wei emperors had a standing policy of sib elimination or avuncular murder, but the mortal dates of some of these individuals seem suspicious. Tables I and III indicate that beginning with the reign of Gaozong in 452 the category of brothers became much more stable. This may be the result of the lopsided danger to the imperial line posed by the tangshu in the early 450’s (imperial sibs rally round the wagon) and in subsequent reigns the consistent presence of both the senior agnatic categories of uncles and tangshu who served to check the untoward ambitions of imperial sibs, as well as checking each other. It is notable that the loyal brothers of Gaozong will become the stalwart uncles of the next monarch, Xianzu, during the 471 retirement debate. In addition to the improvement in the life span of imperial sibs beginning with the reign of Gaozong, the tangshu category seems to have reached a degree of stability. Clearly, with the reign of Xianzu all agnatic categories flourished remarkably. The period 465–476 (when Xianzu was assassinated) represents the heyday of agnatic peaceful co-existence within the royal family. After the reign of Xianzu, tangshu stabilize at a new higher survivability rate, though, uncles experience a deterioration in their status. The miserable agnatic survivability rates prior to the reign of Gaozong can be accounted for by a number of reasons. First, the data in table III is taken from the standard dynastic histories, so it is possible that lesser known agnates were simply not recorded. Under Daowudi, the early Northern Wei was in a constant state of both external and internal war thus resulting in the combat deaths and (as just discussed), selective execution of agnates viewed by the throne as a possible succession threat. It would appear that all of Daowudi’s first cousins died or were executed prior to the ascension of the second emperor, Mingyuandi, consequently, this latter monarch had no tangshu agnates. Only one uncle, Lie, survived

41 Ws 4.97; 17.415. 42 Ws 5.112. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 45 into the reign of this second monarch, consequently, Mingyuandi had a limited number of first cousins, though, the situation regarding these first cousins is very ambiguous.43 The standard dynastic annals record only two of these first cousins surviving into the reign of the third monarch, Taiwudi, as his tangshu, though, they apparently kept a low profile and caused no problems for the throne. Given Mingyuandi’s probable policy of sib eradication, the third emperor,Taiwudi, who ascended the throne in 424, had only two uncles surviving into his reign and they died relatively early in 427 and 428.44 As a result there was a scarcity of senior agnates during the reign of this third monarch, and this fact appears to be directly reflected in table I (“Agnates and Coup Efforts”) where there is an absolute dearth of senior agnatic troublemakers. The ascension of the fourth emperor, Gaozong, revealed the types of problems that senior agnates could cause if given the opportunity. Gaozong was approximately twelve years old when he ascended the throne in 452 following a severe and bloody succession crisis. By the time he made it to the throne, three of his five uncles (in addition to his father) had already died, two of the uncles and the father dying as a result of the succession crisis.45 The remaining two uncles died suddenly immediately after Gaozong ascended the throne—no cause of death was given.46 The one senior agnatic category that did survive the 452 succession crisis and the ascension of Gaozong—to the unprecedented number of four, were his tangshu. Never before had this large a number of tangshu walked the face of the earth and so monopolized the category of surviving close senior agnates. They seemed to have viewed the unsettled political conditions at the court after 452 and the presence of a boy emperor on the throne as a green light to seize power. These developments would mark the debut of the tangshu as an uniquely Northern Wei political phenomenon. Unfortunately for them, by 455 three of the tangshu had been executed, along with the father of one of

43 Mingyuandi’s uncle, Lie, had one known son, Qiu 裘, but the latter’s mortal dates are not listed, only his name (Ws 15.374). Mingyuandi’s other uncle, Yi, was executed by Daowudi just prior to the latter’s death in 409. However, Yi had fifteen children, three of whom are given biographies (Ws 15.372). All three survived into Mingyuandi’s reign as his first cousins and two of these three even survived into the subsequent reign of Taiwudi as his tangshu. The offspring of Yi and Lie, however, appear to have been loyal to the throne and caused no problems. 44 Ws 4.72, 73. 45 Ws 4.102, 106. 46 Ws 5.111. 46 chapter two them (the aforementioned Chong).47 Two of these tangshu are listed on table I for explicitly seditious activity against the throne. This situation needs to be taken into account when viewing table III, tangshu survivability rates, which superficially indicates a steady state with the previous reign. Perhaps it is remarkable that the sole surviving individual was left unmolested. In notes 34 and 35 to table III the allegation was advanced that in the post-Xianzu period, after his assassination in 476, a subtle form of avuncular elimination re-asserted itself into the political process. There seemed to be a strong correlation between the occurrence of political crises or political transitions and the disappearance of paternal uncles. This surmise is given a degree of support by the historical precedents discussed above. We should note the closely grouped deaths of Taiwudi’s two surviving uncles in 427 and 428 and the complete elimination of all of Gaozong’s uncles by the end of 452. Thetangshu cases are less clear. Certainly, during the reign of Gaozong they were a major de-stabilizing factor at the court and would remain a very sensitive agnatic category throughout the remainder of Northern Wei history. Individual trouble-makers and their associates were dealt with harshly. Nevertheless, there does not appear to be a clear pattern of persecution against tangshu, as there does against paternal uncles. This may be due to the fact that their position was a liminal one. From the perspective of the old horizontal tradition of succession they were viewed as legitimate contenders for imperial succession, within the purview of the politically relevant imperial descent group. From the perspective of the throne and its supporters who were trying to construct a more stable, narrow, and clearly defined system of succession, but simultaneously, acutely aware of this counter-tradition, tangshu were viewed as unwel- come participants in the succession issue, but also as senior members of politically influential collateral lines in their own right at the court. Jack Goody’s above quote is quite relevant to this delicate situation. The throne may have felt that persecution would send a disturbing message to collateral agnates distributed throughout the imperial military and administrative structure—and the Northern Wei was strongly committed to coopting agnates into active imperial service whenever possible. Paternal uncles, on the other hand, were much closer to the throne, more ‘his own people’, consequently, the emperor could move against

47 Ws 5.112, 114; 7.144; 17.415. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 47 them with more impunity, creating less social disruption at the court. The reader should also keep in mind that the Northern Wei, particularly during the early and middle periods of its history, was an ethnic minority conquest dynasty, ruling over its conquered lands in an explicitly ethnic apartheid fashion. Thus, the court elite were closely bonded to each other as warrior conquerors who viewed themselves, their armies and associated household dependents as distinct from the conquered populations. In this situation, the more court political violence could be limited and contained, the better to maintain elite ruling cohesion. In view of the above discussion, the relationship between tangshu and uncles also merits closer attention. Under the unique conditions which existed at the Northern Wei court, the members of these two agnatic categories would directly check each other. The paternal uncles, being the senior politically active members deeply ensconsed within the imperial descent group (by either Chinese or Xianbei conceptualizations) would be eager to keep supreme political power within this smaller, tighter group which was defining itself by the system of primogenital imperial succession. They would be a strong support to the throne in its deal- ings with more distant collateral lines. Conversely, left to themselves, paternal uncles could also pose a severe threat to the throne. In terms of generational position relative to the emperor, political experience, and potential leadership ability, uncles and tangshu would be senior peers. In terms of generational classificatory nomenclature these two categories are actually merged. Thus, the relationship between uncles and tangshu would be simultaneously close and potentially conflictual. As will be discussed later, it is probable that Xianzu was using his uncles in the 471 retirement debate in just such a manner against more distant collateral lines. Given the posited existence of a counter-tradition of horizontal succession among the Tuoba elite, once uncles were eliminated, the door was left open to the direct exercise oftangshu political influence upon the throne, as appeared to have occurred, in an extreme fashion, to the youthful Gaozong between 452 through 455. Another two incidents involving tangshu in 496 and 508, involving two separate monarchs, also occurred when the ranks of uncles were being severely pruned. The one exception to this pattern of the usefulness of countervailing senior agnatic categories is the revolt of Tuoba Daofu in 467 against the young monarch Xianzu. Daofu staged his revolt in the face of the full presence of the imperial uncles. The case of Tuoba Daofu is complex, because Daofu’s father (one of Emperor Gaozong’s uncles who was killed in the 48 chapter two

452 succession crisis) was appointed to the emperorship by a court conference in 452, but assassinated immediately afterwards. The details of the Daofu revolt and how it may be related to Xianzu’s 471 retirement will be discussed in the next chapter. Despite the dangers of engaging in a policy of what can be termed avuncular pruning (as opposed to complete genocide) the throne seems to have made a calculated gamble engaged in by successive emperors, that this policy was appropriate to maintaining a court balance of political power favorable to the throne. In a Chinese regime, it is of course possible to find tangshu and even more distant agnates threatening the throne. When such instances occur, however, it is under circumstances quite distinct from that of the Northern Wei. It should be emphasized that the diagnostic political phenomena characteristic of a vertical succession system versus that of a horizontal succession system need not be absolutely different. The difference between the two systems can very well be one of degree and emphasis that emerges in a pattern over time. The author made a survey of three Southern Chinese regimes which were contemporaries of the Northern Wei (i.e., the Eastern Jin, 317–420; Liu Song, 420–479; and the Southern Qi, 479–502). All three Southern dynasties manifested surprisingly different patterns of agnatic involvement in coup activity. Only the Liu Song regime adhered closely to the ideal-typical behavior posited as appropriate to a Chinese regime. For the moment the Liu Song case will be treated as paradigmatic. Throughout most of the history of the Liu Song regime agnatic coup related activity was limited to the more narrowly defined (Chinese style) politically relevant imperial descent group. Brothers and uncles were particularly prominent in this regard. Brothers claimed 33% of all coup related incidents and paternal uncles claimed 15% of all such incidents. 48

48 The Liu Song table (table IV) is as follow:

Total incidents : 27

Sons : 1/27 = 4% Brothers : 9/27 = 33% Nephews : 3/27 = 11% First Cousins : 2/27 = 7% Uncles : 4/27 = 15% Tangshu : 3/27 = 11% Grdfa’s bro. : 1/27 = 4% Second cous. : 3/27 = 11% Unknown : 1/27 = 4% retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 49

Toward the end of the political life of the regime, when power was already firmly in the hands of Xiao Daocheng, founder of the subsequent Southern Qi regime, tangshu and second cousins suddenly surged to the fore. It appears that following the deaths and general inability of close Liu agnates to act decisively in the face of an imminent usurpation of the throne, more distant agnates appeared as a last line of defense in an unsuccessful effort to pre-empt a power seizure by Xiao Daocheng. This agnatic ‘splintering’ effect, which the Liu Song manifested toward the end of the dynasty, when the regime was effectively controlled by a non-agnate, bears a distant resemblance to the pattern of agnatic activity for the entirety of the previous Eastern Jin regime. This latter regime was dominated by non-agnate satraps for most of its existence. The vast majority of coup related incidents in the Eastern Jin involved agnates who were quite distant from the reigning emperor. In the course of the intense competition between the Lower Yangzi satrapy of Yangzhou, which was usually controlled directly by the court, and the Middle Yangzi satrapy of Jingzhou, which was usually controlled by a non- agnatic military governor, it seems that close Sima royal agnates cooperated more closely out of the need for political and physical survival. The Southern Qi case was unique, exhibiting a very high level of intra-familial violence. Most of the violence was the handiwork of one individual, Xiao Luan, who ascended the throne from 494–498. The Southern Qi does not adhere to any of the author’s expectations. For the moment I will regard it as an aberration from the standard pattern. In the Northern Wei case, direct tangshu involvement in coup attempts covered the half-century from 452 through 508, spanning the reigns of four of the regime’s outstanding emperors—the period when the dynasty was reaching towards the height of its power and prestige. This would indicate a pattern of activity over time that cannot be dismissed as random occurrences. Opportunities for power aggrandizement are not absolute entities, but the result of culturally unique social structures. This perspective also applies to the manner in which power plays are made. The direct, undisguised presence oftangshu agnates throughout

The references for the above figures are as follows: Sons—Song shu [Ss] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 99.2423–2441. Brothers—Ss 6.109–113, 117, 123, 127; 7.145; 8.168 61.1638; 68.1796; 72.1874–75, 1880, 1884; 79.2036, 2039–2042, 2044; 80.2064, 2069; 99.2434. Nephews—Ss 8.155–160; 80.2059, 2060. First Cousins—Ss 72.1861–63. Uncles—Ss 6.114–15; 7.145; 8.152–53; 9.181; 68.1803–07; 72.1869; 79.2050. Tangshu—Ss 10.195, 196; 51.1466, 1468–69. Grdfa’s. bro.—Ss 61.1651. Second cous.—Ss 10.198, 199; 51.1467, 1480; 99.2428. Unknown—Ss 10.194. 50 chapter two the history of the Northern Wei implies a degree of authority granted to certain imperial collateral agnates that is not similarly present in the Chinese political/cultural context. That a former steppe regime, in its efforts to convert to a Sinic oriented continental empire, should encounter systemic problems in ordering the imperial succession ought not to cause us surprise. The Northern Wei throne not only had to face threats from close agnates, but also from relatively distant ones, too.

Affines and the Heir Apparent in the Northern Wei

The early and middle period of Northern Wei history is notable for certain idiosyncratic political practices. The formal position of heir apparent (taizi) and empress (huanghou) were treated in a very lackadaisical manner by the throne. Sometimes the identity of the empress would be formally declared, but not that of the heir apparent. At other times the situation would be reversed. This phenomenon has been extensively discussed by Jennifer Holmgren.49 Additionally, it was customary law in the Northern Wei dynasty that the natural mother of the child slated to succeed to the throne (usually the mother of the first born son) had to die, usually by taking poison. The orphaned child would then be assigned a step-mother, and if necessary, a wet nurse, from the harem. It was then possible for this woman, who may never have consummated a relationship with the emperor, to be proclaimed empress. Both Holmgren and Li Ping have also noted that many such imperial step-mothers and wet nurses tended to be females from conquered regimes.50 The Empress Dowager Wenming is the most well known example of this type of political actor. The use of such women seemed to have a dual purpose—on the one hand, an attempt to placate conquered elites, many of whom were non-Chinese or culturally Xianbeized by honoring their elite women with harem positions. On the other hand, these females had no significant agnatic political base within the regime which could be a viable threat to the Tuoba royal house. Whenever possible, non-Chinese conquered elites were coopted into Northern Wei court service, but not in the numbers and in positions that would de-stabilize the Tuoba and closely related Xianbei power elites.

49 Jennifer Holmgren, 1983. 50 Li Ping, 2000, 138–193, 225–232. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 51

The above practices served to mitigate against strong affinal influence upon the throne. The custom of executing the natural mother of the heir dates back to the dynastic founder, Daowudi’s fear of the continuing influence by his mother’s tribe upon high imperial politics, which seemed to have been quite common in the previous Tuoba steppe confederacy. This interesting policy was also backed up by the military destruction of his mother’s tribe, the Helan, as well as other traditionally influential affinal tribes from 386 through the late 390’s. Despite the fact that the confederacy/tribal mode of social organization faded over the course of the years after the founding of the dynasty, the practice of matricide continued and became a constant in the practice of the court politics of succession. Tian Yuqing and Li Ping argue that this custom was utilized by the ‘step-mothers’ as a means of augmenting their influence with the throne directly. This was a particularly potent tactic if the female was the reigning emperor’s wet nurse, a relationship that seems to have engendered very close emotional bonds.51 Again, the Empress Dowager Wenming emerged as the longest lasting and most consum- mate manipulator of this policy of matricide. The early Northern Wei also manifested a curious reluctance toward formally designating a heir apparent. The reigning monarchs often ‘tele- graphed’ their intent by putting their eldest son through a rigorous on- the-job training regimen (jianguo 監國) but would still refrain from publicly proclaiming the identity of the heir. This may have reflected a desire to ensure that only able sons succeeded to the throne. This stance gave the Northern Wei emperors the potential freedom to alter the identity of the individual without public embarrassment and unnecessary political wrangles at the court. On the other hand, it also created a degree of political ambiguity. This much said, perhaps we can push the issue further. In Chinese regimes, the formal positions of heir apparent and empress were usually inter-locking, both biologically and politically. It was tantamount to customary law that an emperor could not alter the occupant of one position, without doing the same to the other. Indeed, any arbitrary change in the occupant of either of these two positions risked provoking critical court discussion and the inevitable factionalism that would accompany such discussions. T.R. Trautman, a scholar of Indian history and society advanced the hypothesis that:

51 Tian Yuqing, Tuoba Shi Tan, 15–61. 52 chapter two

Exogamy and primogeniture turn collaterals and the marriage allies into mirror images of each other . . . set against one another, and then pushed from the cent6er of power by the next generation; and when the system is working well monarchy sits effortlessly, upheld by two opposed but equal forces.52 The link posited by Trautman between vertical primogenital succession (the heir apparent issue) and the position of the empress were crucial as one of the few existing political checks upon the imperial whim. In a culture already oriented toward primogenital imperial succession, these two positions were also formal safeguards upon the inviolability of the succession. The Northern Wei, in contrast, was a regime which actively cultivated intensive and extensive agnatic participation in high imperial affairs and, in fact, bent its will toward reducing the matrilateral and affinal presence in imperial politics. Additionally, we have posited that this is a court society where the counter-tradition of horizontal succession is strong and respected. In this type of political culture, the formal presence of an heir apparent and an empress would be symbolically important, but politically irrelevant. Large scale use of affines would be impossible without provoking severe dissension among powerful agnates. Thus, the ability of the Northern Wei emperor to keep his agnates in check depended upon the manipulation of agnatic groupings and agnatic lines one against the other. The Northern Wei constructed an elaborate schema of high ranking agnatic ‘ten surnames’, non-agnatic, but Xianbei with former tribal and affinal links to the Tuoba of ‘eight surnames’, more distant former tribal allies, etc.53 At the highest level, as discussed above, we see the manipulation of brothers, uncles, tangshu, and others. Compared to the Northern Wei situation, the Chinese emperor had a relatively flexible system of checks and balances to which he could have recourse, such as, affines, agnates, eunuchs, outer court courtiers (in the early and middle periods of Northern Wei history these two latter categories were not that extensively cultivated). Comparatively viewed, the Northern Wei polity was like a one armed man, highly muscled in its one usable arm, but as a consequence, relatively rigid and inflexible in its political outlook.

52 Thomas R. Trautman, “Consanguineous Marriage in Pali Literature,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 93 (1973): 178. 53 Ws 113.3005–06; Tamura Jitsuzo, 1954, 111–12. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 53

In this environment, Xianzu’s use of the retired emperorship was a brilliant exercise in the psychology of power. The retirement was the double safety, latched onto the formal position of heir apparent which Xianzu had proclaimed, that ensured the smooth ascension to the throne of the future Xiaowendi (true to idiosyncratic Northern Wei form, Xianzu never formally declared the identity of an empress. Xiaowendi’s natural mother was ordered to commit suicide, and the now Empress Dowager Wenming functioned as the boy’s legal maternal guardian). From the author’s perspective, the 471 retirement was a forceful statement to all agnates that the imperial succession was not to be tampered with. Imperial retirement (strongly supported by powerful imperial agnates) was the backbone to Xiaowendi’s formal position of heir apparent, and the shield against the claims of the horizontal succession tradition.

Analogous Cases of Horizontal Succession

Legitimate lines of horizontal succession are important in the context of a regime attempting to convert from a horizontal to a vertical primogenital mode of succession, as was the case with the post-386 Northern Wei. Unfortunately, the Chinese historical records regarding these tensions within the regime tend to be quite muted. However, kindred cases where these tensions are explicitly discussed are worth glancing at briefly. The surrender of the Southern Xiongnu to the Later Han in 48 AD was, in part, premised upon a succession dispute involving the conversion from a horizontal, fraternal succession to a vertical primogenital mode of succession. In circa 47 AD, the reigning Shanyu, Yu 輿, executed his younger brother, the King of the Left and replaced him with his own son.54 Bi 比 was the son of a preceding Shanyu and was the eldest member of the next junior generation, eligible for leadership after the assassinated younger brother of Yu.55 Yu’s placement of his son in the line of succession completely upset all precedent. Since 31 BC the Xiongnu Confederacy had carefully followed generational rules in circulating the succession. Bi was disgruntled and remarked, “In terms of fraternal succession, the [executed] King of the Left ought to have been

54 TheHou Han shu notes that the position of King of the Left was always held by the next in line for the succession. See HHs (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1965), 89.2941. 55 See Uchida Ginpu, 1975 vol. I, 210–18. 54 chapter two installed, in terms of primogenital succession, then I, as the eldest son of the previous Shanyu, should be the heir designate.”56 Frustrated, Bi finally revolted and surrendered to the Later Han as the leader of the Southern Xiongnu. An interesting aspect of the Xiongnu practice of horizontal succession is that this was a relatively recent and very conscious policy decision initiated in 31 BC. Prior to this time the succession tended to be father to son. At this time, the dying Shanyu had previously married two sisters from a powerful tribal consort family, it is possible that the decision made at that time to reorient to a horizontal mode of fraternal, circulating succession was done to satisfy the affines.57 In the Tuoba case, during their years as a steppe confederacy they consistently followed a variety of horizontal succession forms. After 386 Daowudi made a conscious decision to enforce a father to son succession pattern. This decision was made in conjunction with a policy of militarily destroying former affinal tribal allies and forcing the survivors to politically restructure themselves under Northern Wei imperial authority. As noted previously, the policy of customary matricide was closely linked to these imperial centralization policies. Under Daowudi, Tuoba/Northern Wei political capabilities became much more centralized and powerful than anything experienced by the earlier Xiongnu Confederacy. The conscious manipulation of the imperial succession pattern is not a phenomenon limited to the Northern Wei or the Xiongnu Confederacy. Other North Asian and Turkic regimes have also altered their succession patterns for either reasons of political expediency or as part of a deliberate effort to centralize and stabilize imperial rule. In tribal confederacies where manipulating the succession pattern is part of a drive to centralize power in the hands of the throne, then it is often part of a larger effort to destroy the political influence of chieftains and clan leaders throughout the polity. The ability of nomad conquest regimes to make some sort of headway in undercutting diffuse particularistic and familialistic political ties and replace these with a more centralized form of rule determined the ability of these conquest regimes to survive over time.58

56 HHs 89.2942. 57 Uchida, 1975 vol. I, 213. 58 Lawrence Krader, Formation of the State (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), 99–103. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 55

We have argued in this chapter that once the pattern of political succession to high office is deliberately altered, a regime, like the Northern Wei, still has to cope with the continued ‘subterranean’ influence of the earlier succession pattern upon court politics. A similar type of situation is discussed by Wittfogel and Feng as a major cause of political instability in the Liao court.59 The Turks of Asia Minor engaged in the genocide of close imperial agnates in the early 16th century as a means of ensuring the stability of a rigid form of vertical succession to the throne.60 Then, in the 17th century this regime switched to a tightly controlled form of fraternal succession.61 Martin Southwold discusses similar types of alterations in the succession pattern of the East African kingdom of Buganda.62

Comparative Chinese Successions

Below is diagram III illustrating the succession patterns of the three con- temporaneous Southern Chinese dynasties discussed earlier. Compared to the prim, primogenital orthodoxy of the Northern Wei pattern, the Southern Chinese dynasties demonstrated wild variations from the primogenital standard. The Southern Qi pattern begins to resemble a curlicue. Ironically, if one looks at the Southern Chinese patterns of succession without reference to specific historical causality, the pattern exhibited strongly resembles a modified form of horizontal succession. Thus, in the Eastern Jin case, the succession from Mudi to Aidi was cousin to cousin, and Aidi to Jianwendi was that of generational grandson to grandfather’s brother. The Liu Song case is less outré, with the succession from Qianfeidi to Mingdi being one of nephew to uncle. Finally, in the Southern Qi case there is a succession going from the Prince of Hailing to his grandfather’s cousin. Despite the primogenitally unorthodox nature of the Southern successions, none of these Chinese dynasties were troubled by uncontrolled

59 Karl A. Wittfogel & Feng Chia-seng, History of Chinese Society: Liao, 907–1125 (New York: MacMillan Co., 1949), 398–403. 60 Joseph Fletcher, “Turko-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire,” Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3/4 (1979–80): 248–49. 61 Jack Goody, 1966, 18–20, 49. 62 Goody, 1966, 99–122. 56 chapter two (Shundi) (Shundi)

Shao Yu 7 8 9 (Mingdi) (Mingdi)

Northern Wei (386−534) satraps Suzong (516–528) Suzong disorganized due to due disorganized 6 6 After Suzong, succession Suzong, After (Wendi) (Wendi) (Xiaowudi) interference from provincial from interference (Qianfeidi) (Houfeidi) (Houfeidi) (Qianfeidi) (Wudi) (Wudi) Liu Song (419−478) 1 2 3 4 5 海陵王劭 (Shao) (Hailing Wang) (Hailing (Shaodi) (Wenhui taizi) (Wenhui (Gaodi) (Gaodi) (Wudi) 1 1 2 11

3 4 4 3 (Yubin (Yubin 文惠太子 (Jianwendi) (Jianwendi) (Xiaowudi) Wang) 鬰彬王 10 Southern Qi (479−501) Eastern Jin (317−419)

(Hedi) 5 5 (Mudi) (Mudi) (Gongdi) (Kangdi) (Kangdi) (Yuandi) (Mingdi) (Mingdi) 3 4 9 1 2 8 5 6 7 7 6 始安貞王道生 Diagram III: Comparative Succession Patterns of Contemporary South Chinese Regimes Chinese South Contemporary of Patterns Succession III: Comparative Diagram (Feidi) (Shianzhen Wang Daosheng) Wang (Shianzhen (Mingdi) (Mingdi) 東昏侯 (Donghun Hou) (Donghun (Chengdi) (Chengdi) 6 7 7 6 (Aidi) (Aidi)

retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 57 feuding between collateral lines. Thus after Jianwendi ascended the throne in 371 the Eastern Jin survived another 48 years. In the Liu Song ascension of Mingdi, the regime survived another thirteen years, and in the case of the Southern Qi ascension of Mingdi the dynasty survived another seven years. While these succession patterns give the appearance of the presence of a horizontal tradition, a look at the causal factors involved indicate that such was not the case. The Eastern Jin successions from Kangdi through Jianwendi were determined by the balance of military power between the military governor of the Middle Yangzi region and the dominant court faction which usually controlled the Lower Yangzi and Huainan regions. More specifically, the succession from Feidi to Jianwendi was the direct result of the exercise of the hegemonic power of the former Middle Yangzi region governor general, Huan Wen.63 In the Liu Song case, following the assassination of Qianfeidi, the ensu- ing civil war was essentially limited to two contenders, the assassinated emperor’s younger brother and his uncle, the eventual victor and the future Mingdi.64 No other competing descent lines were involved. In the Southern Qi case the egregiously illegitimate ascension of Mingdi, who made an concerted effort to savage the politically relevant, legitimate imperial descent group, was not opposed by an array of jealous collateral lines.65 While theoretically rigid, the actual patterns of imperial successions in these Chinese regimes was remarkably flexible in the face of varying political contingencies without fully destroying the aura of legitimacy surrounding the occupant of the throne. This flexibility, in part, can be traced to a lack of strong collateral lineal identity as the basis for claims to imperial pretensions. In the Northern Wei case, we posit that the situation is very different. In 452 when the high ranking eunuch, Zong Ai 宗愛, merely broached the possibility of engineering a non-primogenital succession, he was forthwith assassinated.66 In view of the power and probable claims to imperial pretensions harbored by the surrounding Tuoba collateral lines, it would have been dynastic suicide to admit anyone outside the direct line of descent (father to one of his sons) to occupancy of the throne.

63 Jin shu [Js] 98.2577. 64 Song shu 8.155. 65 That is, illegitimate even by the standards of that time. See Nan Qi shu [NQs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974), 42.749; 45.793. 66 Ws 30.721. 58 chapter two

We argue here that the Northern Wei succession pattern was so formally correct because the survival of the dynasty was directly dependent upon maintaining the impermeability of the imperial succession. From this perspective, the ‘superstructure’ of the Northern Wei polity was extremely brittle when compared with its Southern Chinese dynastic competitors. There are probably a number of very good reasons why the Southern regimes were able to survive so long in the face of the overwhelming manpower and materiel possessed by the Northern regimes, besides the fact that they were located on the south bank of the Yangzi River. As one hypothesis, the political structure of the Southern regimes may have been more flexible and resilient than their Northern counterpart.

Conclusion

This discussion of the Northern Wei case has endeavored to establish a pattern of tangshu involvement in coup attempts over time within the Northern Wei polity. The lack of success of these coup efforts does not detract from the validity of the inference that such consistent involvement implies the continued existence of a counter-tradition of political legitimation premised upon horizontal claims to the throne. Of the familial categories explored in this discussion only the tangshu could make a vital claim to the throne by appealing to the rights of their descent line, given their distance from the immediate blood relatives of the throne. However, such collateral descent line pretensions did not extend beyond the tangshu category. For example, in the 496 Mu Tai Affair, which unsuccessfully attempted to rollback Xiaowendi’s transfer of the capital from modern Datong to Loyang, a number of core plotters were sons of Yuan Pi 元丕, a high ranking Tuoba agnate, but descended from a distant line of kings.67 Nevertheless, the plotters preferred working in tandem with Xiaowendi’s eldest tangshu, Tuoba Yi, in order to provide formal leadership and endow the undertaking with significant prestige—the Yuan surname alone was not sufficient.68 In Chinese dynasties, the tangshu category did not possess autonomous legitimating status. This is not to say that from the primogenital

67 Ws 14.361. 68 Ws 19.442. retired emperorship: the northern wei innovation 59 perspective, Chinese dynasties were not subject to very odd patterns of successions—the three Southern Dynasties presented in this discussion provide evidence of this fact. These odd Chinese succession patterns, however, were partially determined by political powers exogenous to the imperial family (Eastern Jin case). Even the Liu Song regime, which encouraged considerable agnatic participation in imperial politics, only generated a series of brother to brother and one nephew to uncle transfer of power. The Southern Qi case is a wild card resulting from the actions of a single individual. The Chinese succession pattern would appear to have been relatively open to innovation. On the other hand, the posited ‘brittleness’ of the Northern Wei power structure resulted in an obfuscation of political trends negatively affecting theorthodox primogenital succession pattern—they are skeletons in the closet. The Northern Wei power elite clung with grim tenacity to the formally strict father to son succession pattern. The reign of Northern Wei Gaozong, who was bereft of uncles, marked the first time that imperialtangshu were on the political stage in very significant numbers without the check of other senior imperial agnates. In 453 tangshu attempted two unsuccessful coup efforts. Gaozong appears to have compensated for his exposed position by making intensive use of his twelve surviving brothers beginning in 457—thus definitively altering the previous pattern of sib genocide. Many of the brothers were assigned military governor-generalships on the southern borders with the Chinese regimes. They were out of the court, but not out of the political action. By 467, when Xianzu was facing a crisis which would culminate in the Tuoba Daofu rebellion, many of these brothers returned to court as his staunch supporters. As can be seen from table III, these individuals, as Xianzu’s uncles, attained an unsurpassed rate of survivability. The political problems confronted by Gaozong and his son, Xianzu, appear similar, viz., how to keep the ambitions of their agnates in check and then sublimate these political energies into constructive areas of activity. Beginning in 452, the ultimately successful efforts by the throne and its supporters to address the issues surrounding agnatic power politics had a direct and powerful impact upon the monarchy right into the 490’s. Xiaowendi might not have made it to the throne were it not for Xianzu’s retirement stratagem of 471. The dramatic court reforms of Xiaowendi from 495 through 499 would have been difficult to implement without the power centralizing efforts undertaken by his two predecessors. 60 chapter two

Xianzu implemented the institution of retired emperorship encap- sulated within a protective wall of loyal uncles and Tuoba supporters of a strengthened monarchy. The drama of the court debate assumed the proportions of a legal test case. Participants in the debate denounced any form of horizontal succession as ‘unconstitutional’—only primogenital succession was legitimate for the Northern Wei throne. Gaozong and Xianzu’s definitive re-alignmentof agnatic power politics and the stabilization of the primogenital succession provided a solid base upon which to implement the formal court structural refoms of the 480’s and their acceleration and the move into culturalistic reforms under Xiaowendi in the mid 490’s. A similar perspective is found in M.G. Smith’s analysis of the dynastic politics of the pre-modern African kingdom of Fulani Zaria. Smith argued for the necessary priority of structural changes in the politics of succession as a pre-condition for subsequent personnel and administrative reforms.69 Similar to Smith’s argument, Northern Wei agnatic politics can be fruitfully analyzed as an autonomous arena of political action. Indeed, the senior court elite that supported Gaozong and Xianzu in their efforts in the arena of agnatic politics and succession, Yuan Pi and the Empress Dowager Wenming, also pioneered the salary and land tax systems of the mid-480’s.

69 Michael G. Smith, Government in Zazzau, 1800–1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), 196, 295, 304ff. CHAPTER THREE

THE NORTHERN WEI CASE CONCLUDED—THE REGENCY OF THE EMPRESS DOWAGER WENMING, 476–490

The chapter will endeavor to interpret the career of the Empress Dowager Wenming in a manner consistent with the discussion in the previous chapter. We will demonstrate that the sudden prominence of Wenming after 476 does not violate earlier statements regarding the strong agnatic orientation of Northern Wei politics. A crucial point that needs to be emphasized is that Wenming’s prominence did not compromise or negate the lasting political significance of the 471 retirement of Xianzu. The imperial succession was left undisturbed—the young Xiaowendi remained upon the throne. We will argue that the Wenming regency period of 476 through 490 was a collegial, moderately conservative Xianbei elite reaction to radical power aggrandizing activity by the deceased Xianzu (assassinated in 476) after the successful completion of the 471 retirement. It is important to present a detailed historical discussion of the Wenming regency period in order to buttress the discussion in the previous chapter regarding broad trends in Northern Wei politics and the specific significance of the 471 retirement. This chapter is conceived of as a defense of the the flanks of the central argument presented in the previous chapter. The post-476 prominence of Wenming, in her formal role as Grand Empress Dowager, raises a number of questions. Foremost among these questions is: how is it that Wenming, who was such a passive figure during the reign of Xianzu, was suddenly able to emerge as a major political actor following the latter’s death in 476? To answer this question we will discuss the trajectory of Wenming’s career. Wenming was one of a series of ‘placebo’ empresses and empress dowagers employed by the Northern Wei monarchy for subsidiary political and status reasons. She was the scion of the conquered ruling family of the small Northern Yan regime, which was destroyed in 436. She entered the harem as a young girl, and possibly when she was fourteen years old was proclaimed the placebo empress of Gaozong in 456. Wenming’s designation as empress occurred immediately after 62 chapter three the execution of Gaozong’s biological consort who had given birth to his eldest son and ultimate heir, the future Xianzu, in 454. The formal public decision to execute the biological consort and install Wenming was made by the ‘placebo’ Empress Dowager Chang 常, Gaozong’s former wet nurse, in accordance with Northern Wei ‘tradition’. The suspicion of this author is that in view of the massive political instability that attended the ascension of Gaozong to the throne in 452 through 455 (the tangshu issue, among others), Empress Dowager Chang’s ‘decision’ could only have been made with the concurrence of the dominant Tuoba and Xianbei elites who had elevated the young Gaozong to the throne in the first place. It is likely that Chang was given some freedom to choose an appropriately young and powerless candidate, thus she was the ultimate arbitor regarding internal harem politics and the conduit to political contacts with the Tuoba/Xianbei ruling elites. Li Ping has discussed the strong political ties which developed between the Chang and Feng families (Wenming’s surname) over the course of time after Wenming’s 456 appointment, which developed into what can be termed a secondary level of political clientage at the Northern Wei court.1 For the remainder of Gaozong’s reign Wenming, the nominal empress, was a cipher. The dominant female at the court, Empress Dowager Chang, died in 460, but this seems not to have affected Wenming’s degree of obscurity. This began to change somewhat with the onset of the political crisis which shook the court in 465 through 466 following the death of Gaozong, and the ascension of the eleven year old Xianzu to the throne.

The Reign of Xianzu

When Gaozong died and was succeeded by his eleven year old son a formal regency was established under the Empress Dowager Wenming. Wenming, the political cipher, was immediately confronted with a major power play by a leading courtier named Yi Hun 乙渾, who from mid 465 through early 466 fought and murdered his way to the formal position of Premier (chengxiang 丞相). This position gave him authority over the Department of State Affairs shangshu( sheng), which is to say, over the

1 See Li Ping, 2000, 177–186, 225–232 regarding Wenming’s background and her relationship with the Empress Dowager Chang. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 63 formal outer routine administrative apparatus, such as it was at that time in the Northern Wei court.2 Then suddenly, in the third lunar month

2 Kubozoe Yoshifumi 窪添慶文, “Hoku Gi zenki no shōsho shō ni tsuite 北魏前期の尚書省について,” Shigaku Zasshi 87.7 (1978): 26–54, provides an overview of the tentative existence of the Chinese style Department of State Affairs in the period before Xiaowendi’s first administrative reforms of 493. After the reign of Taiwudi (after the 450’s) it becomes a more substantive institution at the Northern Wei court, but does not dominate the administrative landscape until after the 493 reforms. Yan Gengwang’s 嚴耕望 discussion is now somewhat dated but contains significant detail, “Bei Wei Shangshu Zhidu kao 北魏尚書制度考,” Guoli Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiusuo Jikan 18 (1948): 255–57. For the early and middle period of Northern Wei history it is debatable as to the relevance and importance of the entire Chinese style system of court administration that was developing in the Southern Dynasties, adapted by Xiaowendi of the Northern Wei after 493 and would become standard in the Sui-Tang period as the Department of State Affairs (shangshu sheng), Secretariat (zhongshu sheng), and the Chancellory (menxia sheng). During this period of Northern Wei history the Secretariat had a strictly scribal role and the Chancellory may have been absorbed into the Tuoba/Xianbei conceptualization of companion/advisor to the king, so it was more significant. Prior to the 493 re-structurings of Xiaowendi, bureaus (cao 曹) and other units referred to as boards (shangshu), such as the Northern and Southern Boards, and the palace guard command known as the dianzhong shangshu, were probably not under the aegis of the Department of State Affairs but functioned as semi-independent units. An overarching coordinating officer for these inner court bureaus and boards could be designated by the throne, but it was not necessarily the Director of the Department of State Affairs shangshu( ling, Yan Yaozhong, 1990, 55–56). Until 493 the Northern Wei regime formally functioned as an apartheid conquest dynasty. Conquered Chinese areas were generally left to be governed by customary law and inherited Chinese administrative institutions, but these local and provincial structures were assigned as many as two levels of Xianbei surveillance officials placed at all levels (Yan Yaozhong, 1990, 77–83). Thus, a prefect’s office could very well comprise a member of a local elite Chinese family (the rule of avoidance was not strictly adhered to at this time), a Xianbei official, and, if the Xianbei official was not fluent in spoken or written Chinese, a Chinese courtier from the central court would be present as well. At the central court the Chinese style Department of State Affairs along with the Secretariat (less so regarding the Chancellory) were mostly manned by Chinese courtiers in what has been referred to as the Northern Wei ‘outer court’, though, the highest ranking members of the Department of State Affairs could very well be Xianbei. The Northern Wei ‘inner court’, which was where political and military power was centered, was a relatively separate and almost entirely Xianbei court universe. Small numbers of extraneous elements were granted access, some were Chinese and some were distant Altaic individuals, such as Yi Hun. In all matters of imperial policy making the inner court always had final decision making responsibility in consultation with the throne (Yan Yaozhong, 56; also Wei Pengju 1999, 33–4). The discovery of the “Nanxun Stele”, which was first reported inKaogu 3 (1987), has been intensively analyzed in a series of essays by Zhang Qingjie (see his extended discussion in Zhong’guo Shi Yanjiu 2 (1999): 57–69). The stele inscription revealed a series of ranked inner court positions and titles regarding which the standard histories had made only passing references or no references whatsoever. Some of these titles used Chinese ideograms to transliterate Xianbei language terms. The titles ranged from companions and advisors to the throne to a series of inner court palace guard generalships. 64 chapter three of 466, under formal orders from the Empress Dowager Wenming, Yi Hun was seized and executed, and his supporters were removed from high court positions. Suddenly, Wenming emerged as the dynastic savior, a truly curious development that needs to be explored in more depth. The identity of Yi Hun is obscure, he has no separate biography in the dynastic annals, apparently, his name was partially expunged from the record.3 There is some evidence to identify Yi Hun with Tuyuhun tribal groups (of distant Xianbei origin) which surrendered to Taiwudi in the 430’s and early 440’s in the course of the conquest of the Gansu Corridor.4 By the reign of Gaozong and early Xianzu there were a clus- ter of prominent Yi surnames serving at the court.5 This is probably one example of how the Northern Wei throne sought to coopt and absorb limited numbers of conquered elites into their political system. Under Gaozong, Yi Hun was appointed to a generalship, made Palace Attendant (shizhong, the highest ranking Chancellory position) and honored with the title of Prince.6 The Chinese style title of Palace Attendant is

While the Xianbei inner court and the Chinese manned outer court were structurally separate, it was possible for a courtier, usually of Xianbei or general Altaic origin, to function simultaneously in both arenas. Close inner court companion/advisors to the throne were often titled shizhong, the highest rank in the Chinese style Chancellory—Yi Hun was one such individual. Sometimes very high ranking Xianbei would carry the formal title of Director (ling) of the Department of State Affairs; all such individuals were ‘crossover’ courtiers exercising considerable authority at the court (see Wei Pengju, 1999, 21–22). Sato Masaru has placed particular emphasis on these high level crossover figures as a part of a larger argument for a much more tightly integrated relationship between inner and outer courts—including a significant blurring of personnel ethnic distinctions. I think Prof. Sato’s argument is too extreme and flies in the face of known early Northern Wei efforts at apartheid control of the realm. See Sato Masaru 佐藤賢 “Hoku Gi Zenki no Naichō-Gaichō to Kokan Mondai 北魏前期の内朝外朝と胡漢問題” Shūkan Tōyōgaku 88 (2002): 32. 3 Jennifer Holmgren, 1983, 83. 4 Yao Weiyuan 姚薇元, Beichao Huxing kao 北朝胡姓考 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962), 160–66. 5 Ws 44.991–2; Bei shi [Bs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 13.506–07. 6 Ws 5.120. Yi Hun is listed on Gaozong’s “Nanxun Stele” as one of the highest ranking courtiers accompanying the throne as they toured the southeastern sector of the Sang’gan River valley and passed through the area near modern Lingqiu, Shanxi. See the redaction and explanation of the stele by Zhang Qingjie 張慶捷, “Shanxi Lingqiu Bei Wei Wenchengdi ‘Nanxun bei’ 山西靈丘北魏文成帝‘南巡碑’, ” Wen wu 12 (1997): 72, 79; also, Yi Hun is discussed with reference to this stele inscription by Zhang Jinlong 張釒龍 , Wei Jin Nan Bei Chao Jinwei Wuguan Zhidu Yanjiu 魏晉南北朝禁衛武官制度研究 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), 734. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 65 probably of most significance since it gave Yi Hun direct access to the throne as an advisor and companion. This would also mark him as one of the inner circle of Xianbei courtiers, which probably provided him with the political base for his later efforts in 465 through 466. Yi Hun was able to function in both the inner Xianbei council chambers and in the outer Chinese manned court. Li Ping has strongly correlated Yi Hun’s rise in the court to the influence of the Empress Dowager Chang, Gaozong’s beloved former wet nurse. However, Li Ping seems to argue that Chang and her harem political network, which included the nominal empress, Wenming, and a limited number of close agnates (particularly her brother) somehow dominated the throne.7 The direct personal link with the emperor is a crucial conduit of influence, but clearly the throne had to pay much more attention to the needs of its agnates and Xianbei elites. While Yi Hun was probably an imperial favorite linked to the Empress Dowager (who died in 460), it is doubtful that such individuals could unilaterally overturn the entire agnatic ‘constitution’ of Northern Wei imperial politics. The historical argument below regarding Yi Hun’s ultimate fate will also support this position. During the bloody contentions of the 465–66 period Yi Hun seems to have endeavored to link up with prominent Xianbei at the court. Two of his identifiable supporters were Murong Baiyao 慕容白曜, of the defeated and conquered Murong Xianbei.8 In terms of status this individual would not be much different from Yi Hun himself, an honored semi-outsider to the Toba inner circles. A much more strategically crucial ally was Shusun Lin 叔孫隣, a member of one of the ten ‘inner surname’ groups traditionally directly related to the imperial line.9 Prior to cooperating with Yi Hun both men had careers in the Northern Board (beibu shangshu 北部尚書), which may not necessarily have been under the administrative supervision of the standard Chinese style Department of State Affairs. The functions of the Northern Board are not clear, but it may have dealt with tribes and clans of Altaic peoples

7 Li Ping, 2000, 186–191. 8 Ws 50.1117. Wan Sitong 萬斯同, “Wei Jiang Xiang Dachen Nianbiao 魏將相大臣年表,” Ershiwushi Bubian 二十五史補編 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 4501. 9 Ws 29.706. Wan Sitong, 4500. 66 chapter three settled in the northern sector of the Sang’gan River basin outside the immediate Pingcheng capital district.10

10 Yan Gengwang, quoting brief statements found in the Nan Qi shu, has described the beibu shangshu as the administrative center for all northern border affairs and thenanbu shangshu (Southern Board) as the administrative center for all southern border affairs, under the overarching auspices of a Chinese style Department of State Affairs (Yan, 1948, 256, 281–87). Given the population distribution patterns at the time this arrangement would imply a significant split in terms of representation of ethnic concerns from the provinces to the throne (Altaic northern interests versus Han Chinese). Yan Gengwang’s discussion is probably not fully accurate. Yan Yaozhong 嚴耀中 notes that the beibu and nanbu shangshu were very sensitive positions, and if not part of a Xianbei inner court, then not necessarily subject to the authority of the standard Board of Personnel. See his Bei Wei Qianqi Zhengzhi Zhidu 北魏前期政治制度 (Changchun: Jilin Jiaoyu chubanshe, 1990), 55, 56. On the other hand, Yan Yaozhong also cites the Nan Qi shu in describing the functions of these two offices as dealing with border affairs of the southern and northern prefectures and provinces (see page 55). But the Northern Wei did not have standard Chinese style administrative units on its northern borders until the reign of Xiaowendi and later—these areas tended to be governed by garrison commanders. Perhaps the Nan Qi shu is giving a distorted picture of an early Northern Wei form of administering its Capital District. In his discussion, Yan Yaozhong also offers a much more expansive interpretation where he sees Pingcheng as the dividing line between northern and southern portions of the entire empire administered by Tuoba/Xianbei viceroys (page 29). One would think that such an extraordinary structure would have received more coverage in the sources. Also, the use of the term bu in the names of the Boards, implying tribal, or ethnic, or pseudo-tribal, would point to a much more circumscribed area of interest. I would like to offer a hypothesis for consideration—perhaps these offices are related to the administration of the Capital District, which the early Northern Wei turned into the logistics support center for its central expeditionary cavalry armies. For that reason, relatively intensive administration of the Capital District was absolutely crucial to the regime. Li Ping (2000, 59) has noted that the Northern Wei, after establishing its capital at Pingcheng (modern Datong) in 398, divided the Sang’gan River basin of northern Shanxi into the Inner Capital District, which would include the capital city and the central basin area (jinei 畿內). This zone would be inhabited by the bulk of the settled farming population, Tuoba and related households and probably a large portion of the central army cavalry units, not to mention the palace guard units. The Outer Capital District, which would include the hills and mountains surrounding the basin area ( jiwai 畿外) would be settled by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribal and clan groups who were never completely de-tribalized. Together, these two zones would comprise the Capital District (dianfu 甸服). These two zones were administered by Eight Councillors babu( daifu 八部大夫) and Eight Chieftains (babu dashuai 八部大帥), respectively. The nanbu and beibu shangshu may have been concerned with administrative and legal issues involving these inhabitants of the Capital District as a whole, perhaps using the Sang’gan River, or Pingcheng itself, as a rough dividing line. There may be another aspect to this issue. Li Ping describes the area south of the Sang’gan River, centered on ancient Fanzhi, located in the northeastern part of modern Ying County, northern Shanxi, as the agricultural center of the basin region, not the immediate area surrounding ancient Pingcheng (see Li Ping, 55–7). It is possible that ethnic Chinese were forcibly re-settled in this southern area as an agricultural support population and this may account for the fact that many of the individuals who held the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 67

During Yi Hun’s brief period of dominance from 465–66 both men served under Yi Hun as the top administrators in the Department of State Affairs and after Yi Hun’s fall from power both men were relieved of their duties and assigned provincial postings. From 467 through 469 Murong Baiyao was appointed the lead general in reconquering the Liu Song zones south of the Yellow River and north of the Huai River. In 470 Baiyao was suddenly executed on charges of having formerly collaborated with Yi Hun and plotting treason.11 Shusun Lin was sent out to Gansu where he was later executed on charges of corruption.12 Whatever the validity of the charges against both men, they clearly lacked the ability to protect themselves. This also indirectly reflects upon Yi Hun’s own control of the court, which seems to have been tenuous, at best. Yi Hun never had the full support of the crucial palace guard commands, especially the dianzhong shangshu 殿中尚書 which was commanded by Tuoba agnates and allied families traditionally very close to the throne.13 Towards the end of his brief career, Yi Hun was even unable to get the Personnel Bureau (licao 吏曹), a division of the Department of State Affairs which he dominated, to grant his consort the title of Princess.14 In the course of his rapid rise to precarious dominance, Yi Hun also killed very high ranking Xianbei court elites, such as Lu Li 陸麗, who was crucial in bringing Gaozong to the throne in 452, and Mu Duohou

the position of Director of the Southern Board (nanbu shangshu) were Chinese. Sato Masaru has provided detailed listings of individuals holding various shangshu positions from the founding of the dynasty through circa 493 and the Chinese style institutional restructurings of Xiaowendi. Of the twelve individuals holding the Southern Board (nanbu) position, four were Chinese. Of the eight individuals identified as holding the Northern Board (beibu) position, none were Chinese, all were from very prominent Xianbei families (see Sato, 2002, 28–30). Matsushita Kennichi has pointed out the existence of the very early Northern Wei offices of Northern Chief and Southern Chief (beibu daren, nanbu daren 大人) appointed directly by the throne and charged with maintaining surveillance over re-located tribal peoples in the Sang’gan River basin and its environs. Matsuhita argues that this system remained in place from 386–398, and following the establishment of Pingcheng as the Northern Wei capital, was subsequently supplanted by the more elaborate arrangement of the Eight Councillors and Eight Chieftains. However, the administrative bailiwick remained the same, and was later directly absorbed by the Northern and Southern Boards. See Matsushita Kennichi 松下憲一, “Hoku Gi no ryōmin shūchōsei to buzoku kaisan 北魏の領民酋長制と部族解散,” Shūkan Tōyōgaku 84 (2000): 55, 62–3. 11 Ws 50.1119. 12 Ws 29.706. 13 Ws 14.347; 44.993. 14 Ws 33.793. 68 chapter three

穆多侯, a scion of a Xianbei family with close marriage ties to the throne.15 The Mu family affinal tie with the throne goes back to the days of Daowudi. Their young women were frequently taken in by the imperial family as spouses for the Tuoba princes and many Mu family males served in the elite imperial guard commands. The high profile executions of such courtiers only exacerbated an already tense situation. A major target of these violent purges were individuals associated with the Department of State Affairs or units loosely associated with it. Holmgren has noted the high percentage of imperial agnates who held positions in these units.16 In point of fact, of the seven high ranking courtiers executed by Yi Hun, three of these high profile victims were directly associated with the elite palace guard command (dianzhong shangshu). Two of these three were members of the elite Mu family and the third was associated with an independent palace guard command and supervisory unit, the siwei jian 司衛監.17

15 ZzTj 130.4073. 16 Jennifer Holmgren, “Political Organization of Non-Han States in China: The Role of Imperial Princes in Wei, Liao and Yuan,” Journal of Oriental Studies 25.1 (1987): 42 footnote 32. 17 Ws 6.125; 14.347; 27.673; and ZzTj 130.4073. The siwei jian was an independent palace military command. Zhang Jinlong argues that its main function was as a military inspectorate for the palace guard commands (Zhang Jinlong 2004, 705–09). The independent Xianbei palace guard command, known as thedianzhong shangshu, was quite powerful at the court and its members played a leading role in the Northern Wei palace coups discussed here. This command was part of the Northern Wei central army garrisoned around Pingcheng (see He Ziquan 何茲全, Du Shiji 讀史集 [Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin chubanshe, 1982], 324), but its duties were specialized in terms of guarding both inner palace precincts and patrolling the palace perimeter, as well. Frequently in many of these dynasties, the palace guard command was split among a few individuals or a few distinct commands. In the Northern Wei case often more than one individual would hold the rank of dianzhong shangshu, and this command did not monopolize authority over the palace guards, there appear to have been other separate palace guard commands (see Zhang Jinlong 2004, 698, 702). Matsushita Kennichi counts five separate palace guard commands based on an analysis of the ‘Nanxun Stele’. See Matsushita, “Hoku Gi Sekkoku Shiryō ni mieru naichōkan ‘Hoku Gi Bunseitei Nanjun Hi’ no bunseki o chūshin ni 北魏石刻史料に見える内朝官-‘北魏文成帝南巡碑’ の分析を中心に,” Hokudai Shigaku 40 (2000): 72–3. Palace guard officers and units accompanied the emperor on his excursions—as recorded in the “Nanxun Stele”—and they were also expected to participate in frontline combat (Zhang Jinlong 2004, 703; and Wei Pengju 魏鵬舉, “Bei Wei Qianqi Neichao Jigou kaolue 北魏前期內朝機構考略,” Beichao Yanjiu 1 (1999): 32. Given the structure of the early and middle period Northern Wei court, Yi Hun’s control of the outer court Department of State Affairs was not necessarily crucial—it is more of an indicator of his high status within the inner court, given his past relationship with the deceased Gaozong as shizong and his Altaic origins. His ties with Xianbei figures in the Northern Board, particularly Shusun Lin who was closely related to the Tuoba royal the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 69

It is clear that Yi Hun was not working alone, that he was struggling, somewhat clumsily and brutally, to gain Xianbei supporters from the highest levels of the Northern Wei ruling elite. All of this still does not explain why Yi Hun was a threat to the throne. After all, he was a relative new-comer to the court from a distant Xianbei group in Northwest China that had submitted quite late to Northern Wei suzerainty. In the face of the entrenched court power of the various Tuoba lines and allied families, Yi Hun would be a most unsuitable figure to make a direct claim for the throne. The conclusion is that Yi Hun functioned either as the strong-arm enforcer for a more prestigious client, or conversely, was using such a figure to legitimate his own rapid rise to court dominance. Regarding either option, the author hazards the hypothesis that this posited mysterious client was Tuoba Daofu 道符. Tuoba Daofu’s relationship with the throne was complex, but strong.18 Daofu was Xianzu’s tangshu, in fact, the eldest son of the senior tangshu line. This was already a potentially sensitive political position—but there is more. Daofu was the eldest son of the prince who was assassinated in 452 just prior to being recognized as emperor by a council of notables following the assassination of Taiwudi that same year. Thus, Daofu had reasonable primogenital claims to the throne, as well. Finally, Daofu was a mature adult and Xianzu was an eleven year old boy emperor under the formal authority of a nominal empress dowager in her mid-twenties. When the power struggle began in 465 Daofu held a high level central army generalship (zhongjun dajiangjun 中軍大將軍) and was stationed in the capital, Pingcheng. At some point in the midst of the power struggle, probably in the winter of 465, Daofu was transferred to be Garrison Commander of distant Chang’an (zhendu dajiang 鎮都大將). Chang’an at that time was a decrepit provincial center, located at the original Han dynasty site, not the later Sui-Tang location, containing the ruins of past dynastic palaces. At this point in history the Northern Wei throne was intensely focused on its Pingcheng based central army and its expedi- tions north into Inner Mongolia and Mongolia and south into the zone of the North China Plain south of the Yellow River. The Wei River valley was always of strategic importance, but with the Northern Wei focus on its near steppe capital at Pingcheng, and one of its military targets bloodline, were much more important. Yi Hun’s glaring weakness was his inability to control the palace guard commands, especially the dianzhong shangshu—and this would result in his rapid fall from power and subsequent execution. 18 Ws 6.127; 18.418. 70 chapter three being the southern portion of the North China Plain, the transfer to Chang’an should be interpreted as a form of polite domestic exile and a military demotion. Furthermore, Daofu’s transfer to Chang’an assumes particular interest in the light of a simultaneous counter-transfer of all of Xianzu’s administratively active paternal uncles (a total of five individuals) from their garrison commands at the southern marches, including one coming in from Chang’an, to the capital in the winter of 465.19 The en masse presence of these paternal uncles at the capital is here interpreted as significantly augmenting the forces loyal to the boy emperor in the face off with Yi Hun. Consequently, with Daofu isolated from the court, we can surmise that Yi Hun was stripped of his legitimating base, resulting in his arrest and execution in the third lunar month of 466. In 467 a new reign year was proclaimed, huangxing 皇興, loosely translated as imperial resurgence, apparently celebrating the hard won victory of securing the boy emperor upon the throne. Immediately thereafter, Tuoba Daofu revolted in Chang’an. The interpretation of this sequence of events is that Daofu was made aware that his imperial pretensions were in vain, and more speculatively, that his life was forfeit in view of his prior association with Yi Hun. The revolt was quickly aborted because Daofu’s deputy chief of staff (sima 司馬) beheaded him. Nevertheless, news of Daofu’s revolt was serious enough to cause the court to dispatch elite armored cavalry units from the palace guard command. This elite task force of 10,000 men was placed under the command of two trusted and experienced courtiers and generals, He Qinu 和其奴 and Yuan Pi 元丕.20 Daofu’s timely assassination prompted the recall of this force. Just as the pattern of Daofu’s actions assumed significance in the light of the arrival of Xianzu’s paternal uncles to the court, so too, did the activities of the Empress Dowager Wenming. Note that Wenming only assumed an active role after the arrival of the uncles. Wenming’s biography states that she secretly finalized the great plan to eliminate Yi Hun.21 The specific sequence of events actually appears to have been that Yuan Pi first memorialized the throne that Yi Hun was plotting sedition, thereupon, Wenming authorized Yuan Pi, and two other high ranking Tuoba and Xianbei courtiers to seize and execute him.22 We should view the role of the Empress Dowager as that of a facilitator of political

19 Ws 6.126; 18.418. 20 Ws 6.127; 44.993. 21 Ws 13.328. 22 Ws 14.357. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 71 action, based on her formal position as regent with access to various governmental seals and tallies and securely supported by the bulk of the Tuoba court elite. The imperial uncles, who seem to have played a quiet stabilizing role in this political drama remained at the court in key decision making roles well into the latter half of the reign of Xianzu. As noted earlier, they played a pivotal role in the 471 retirement drama which we will discuss in more detail shortly. Following the execution of Yi Hun, the Empress Dowager, with the close assistance of prominent Chinese members of the Imperial Secretariat (zhongshu sheng 中書省), actively managed routine court affairs from 466 to early 467.23 Note that within the context of the Northern Wei power structure, control of the central army based in Pingcheng, the inner Xianbei court and parts of the Department of State Affairs were the key to controlling the flow of court politics—not the Chinese manned Secretariat.24 This portion of Wenming’s period of political activity appears to have been in the nature of a legitimist caretaker regime until Xianzu would reach his majority, surrounded by Xianzu’s uncles and the Tuoba and Xianbei courtiers who had led the vanguard in toppling Yi Hun and suppressing Tuoba Daofu. In 467, following the birth of the fourteen year old Xianzu’s first son—the future Xiaowendi—Wenming peacefully retired from active court politics, allegedly focusing on raising the young infant, and sank once again, into total obscurity until she re-surfaced in 476 following the sudden death of Xianzu.25 Contrary to the received historiographi- cal tradition, this discussion places Wenming in a distinctly secondary position of political power for the entirety of her career until her 476 political resurrection. In 470, when Xianzu was approximately sixteen years old, he began to take an active part in state affairs, promulgat- ing administrative reform edicts and personally leading a military campaign against marauding Rouruan nomads.26 Then, in 471 the youthful,

23 Ws 13.328; 33.793; 48.1077; 54.1196. 24 The Chinese manned Secretariat was a strictly scribal agency charged with drafting formally correct edicts and proclamations in Chinese for the throne. Select members could be invited to advise the throne on policy or Chinese historical precedents. See Zheng Qinren 鄭欽仁, Bei Wei Zhongshu sheng kao 北魏中書省考 (Taibei: Guoli Taiwan Daxue Wenshi Congkan, 14 (1965); also Yan Yaozhong 1990, 56–8). Unlike the Secretariat in the Southern Dynasties, it had no supervisory political functions or consistent policy making functions as in the middle Tang period. 25 Ws 6.128; 13.328. 26 Ws 6.130; ZzTj 132.4153–54. 72 chapter three but mature monarch staged his retirement, which will be the focus of the subsequent discussion.

The 471 Retirement of Xianzu

The factual details of Xianzu’s retirement are as follows: in the eigth lunar month of 471 Xianzu returned to the capital, Pingcheng, from an imperial progression which took him from the Gansu Corridor to the Yin Mountains in Inner Mongolia and thence back to Pingcheng in northern Shanxi. Immediately upon returning to the capital Xianzu announced his intention to abdicate the throne in favor of his eldest paternal uncle, Zitui. The explicit reason offered in the sources for this ostensibly unexpected action was that the seventeen year old emperor was ill, weary of worldly affairs, and desired to go into religious retreat (Xianzu was known to have an interest in both Buddhism and Daoism).27 The sources also aver that the emperor chose his most senior uncle in place of the duly established and publicly proclaimed heir apparent because the latter was too young to succeed to the throne (the future Xiaowendi was then approximately four years old).28 Xianzu’s actions would appear to be a complete yielding to the rationale and explicit form of a traditional pre-dynastic nomadic Tuoba style horizontal succession. This would appear to be a complete negation of the bloody, painful efforts undertaken by the throne since the founding of the dynasty under Daowudi to ensure a relatively rigid form of male primogenital imperial succession. Remember the policy of mandating that the natural mother of the designated heir must die, the clear efforts by previous monarchs to cull entire agnatic categories perceived as possible threats to the succession, and the disruptive bloody successions of 409, 452, and Xianzu’s own experience of 465–66. All of a sudden this seventeen year old monarch decides to throw all of this to the wind—curious indeed! This is the initial policy decision which provided the context for the court debate regarding its feasibility. At this time, of the five administratively active uncles who were recalled to the court in the winter of 465, three survived, from eldest to youngest they were, Zitui, Tianci 天賜 and Yun 雲. Zitui played an abso-

27 Ws 6.131; ZzTj 133.4164. 28 ZzTj 133.4165. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 73 lutely passive role throughout the entire proceedings even though his name was the one being offered by the throne as the new heir apparent. Tianci is not even mentioned—it is possible that due to an embarrassing military defeat against northern nomad groups earlier in the year his standing at the court was in low repute.29 Yun took the most active role in the debates. There were also four younger uncles in the capital but they did not participate in the court debate. In addition to the uncles high level Tuoba and Xianbei courtiers participated. The debate can be divided into two substantive sections: the resolution of the succession issue, and secondly, the decision for Xianzu to continue to rule as an active retired emperor. Xianzu convened a formal palace policy conference which did not commence until one of the high ranking Xianbei courtiers and general, Yuan He , returned to court from his posting at the Wuchuan Garrison (just north of the Yin Mountains in Inner Mongolia) where he functioned as commander of this entire frontier zone south of the Gobi Desert.30 He was also directly involved in seizing Yi Hun in 466. Once convened, all conference participants were unalterably opposed to both an outright abdication and to the proposed horizontal transmission of the succession to Zitui. In response to this opposition Xianzu executed a complete volte face, agreeing to reinstate his four year old son as heir apparent and then, by means of the precedent setting ‘retired emperorship’, to continue active rulership of the realm.31 Discussing the debate in more detail, the following high level courtiers voiced their objections to Xianzu’s initial plan for a horizontal succession in the following order: Yun, Yuan He, Lu Bo 陸馛 (brother of Lu Li who was executed by Yi Hun in 465, and co-director of the Board of Personnel), Zhao Hei (a eunuch and the other co-director of the Board of Personnel), and Gao Yun 高允, the only Chinese in this group, Director of the Secretariat and one who had worked closely with Wenming from 466 through 468 in managing the court. This group seems to be some- thing of a broad sampling of the court elite ranging from the highest level Tuoba and Xianbei inner courtiers, through practical administrators like Zhao Hei, and then trusted Chinese members of the court, who tended to be found in the outer court. Tuoba Yun was the first to speak,

29 Ws 6.131; 19.450. 30 Ws 41.921,925; ZzTj 133.4164. 31 Ws 6.129. 74 chapter three followed by Yuan He, and both of them seem to have set the tone for the others to follow. Yun and Yuan He directly questioned the legitimacy of any form of horizontal succession and many of the other speakers voiced their undying loyalty to the four year old heir apparent. Below are the direct quotes from Yun and Yuan He: Yun: Your Majesty has ushered in an empire-wide peace with a realm that extends to the four directions. How is it that you dare to offend the ancestors on high and disregard the welfare of the subjects below [by pro- posing the horizontal succession to Zitui]? It is traditional with us that the father should always transfer the throne to his son; it has been thus without interruption since the rise of the royal Wei house. The succession of the Emperor to his heir is true and proper, and it is thus that the holy virtue manifests itself. If Your Majesty must needs renounce both throne and worldly affairs…then the throne should pass to the heir apparent in proper fashion. If You desire to discard the heir and unconcernedly topple the very beams of the imperial household, I fear that this will not accord with the will of the ancestors and natural human feelings. Remember, the empire is the patrimony of the august ancestors, and by toying with the imperial patrimony You will undermine the spirits of the seven ancestral temples and encourage perverseness and treachery amongst the subjects. These matters are at the root of imperial destinies. I desire that You seriously consider this issue. Yuan He: The Emperor desires to go outside the royal line to choose a king from among the princes [referring to the uncle, Zitui] to whom he will abdicate the throne. Your servant fears that the ultimate result of this action will be the dishonor of confusing the familial lines at the seasonal sacrifices; so that after Your death there will be no one to worship your spirit. I truly desire that You ponder the words of the Prince of Rencheng [Yun].32 In discussing the motivations behind this curious retirement debate there is a scholarly consensus that the health and religious reasons offered by the throne were a subterfuge—Xianzu was a hale and hearty seventeen year old with a strong appetite for power, as manifested in his active governance after 471. Most scholars, with a few exceptions, have focused in on the truly retired Wenming as the behind the scenes leader of a powerful court faction that sought to limit Xianzu’s power. There is very little data to base this assumption on besides severely tendentious references in the “Astrology” section of the Wei Shu (Tianxiang 天象), which will be discussed later. Scholars also make a linkage with a

32 Ws 7.461–62. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 75 probable factional purge in 470 which eliminated some close associates of Wenming, which will also be discussed below. A more compelling reason for focusing on Wenming is the significant power that the Grand Empress Dowager did indeed exercise after Xianzu’s assassination in 476. This author does not dispute the veracity of the latter case, but it is risky, and in this instance, inaccurate, to grasp an historical effect and turn it into a prior cause. We will argue that Wenming was irrelevant to the retirement debate. Given the insistent emphasis on the proper mode of primogenital imperial succession in the above two extended quotes, then obviously the succession issue weighed heavily on the minds of the court elite. The next question would be—were there severe succession problems in the recent past? The equally obvious answer is to recall the 465–66 Yi Hun affair followed by the revolt of Tuoba Daofu in 467. Looking further back, the uncles of Xianzu and many senior courtiers were witnesses to the series of crises which occurred during the early part of the reign of Gaozong from 452 through 455. Finally, the indirectly acknowledged appeal of the horizontal succession mode was an issue that needed to be directly confronted. Xianzu’s dramatic and startling offer to his uncle followed by the equally dramatic statements by the highest level courtiers denouncing such a policy was a piece of pre-planned court political theater designed to muster a court consensus against any future efforts at destabilizing the imperial succession. All of the actors would have had to rehearse their roles prior to the conference—it is inconceivable that Zitui would have been offered the succession on the spur of the moment, or that the strong response was not properly prepared in advance. Furthermore, if the succession was in fact designed to go into a horizontal mode then Yun would have been a direct beneficiary of such a policy. It seems to this author that the uncles were highlighted in the court debate to forcefully demonstrate to the greater court population that the prime beneficiaries of such a succession pattern were themselves completely opposed to its implementation. Xianzu’s relationship with his uncles just prior to 471 remained close. In the fall and winter of 470, for the first time, Xianzu accompanied his troops on a northern campaign against the Rouruan nomads. The leading frontline commanders were Xianzu’s three senior uncles and the Xianbei commander, Yuan He in reserve support.33 Additionally, there is no prior evidence that Xianzu was dissatisfied with his heir apparent

33 ZzTj 132.4153. 76 chapter three

(Xiaowendi had been publicly proclaimed heir in 469). Finally, once the proper mode of succession was clearly established, Xianzu and his advisors conceived of the imperial retirement as a forceful way to ensure that the Tuoba and Xianbei elites understood how seriously the preservation of the primogenital succession was to the throne. What could be more direct, blunt, and to the point than two emperors reigning simultaneously? Consequently, the Han dynasty precedent was referred to and improvised upon so that Xianzu, as taishang huangdi, would remain in active control of state affairs. Immediately thereafter, Xianzu re-located to a separate palace complex (the Chong’guang Palace), and the four year old boy emperor, the future Xiaowendi, would visit the court of his father once a month.34 Because Xianzu remained the active reigning emperor, the Empress Dowager Wenming was not recalled and did not re-appear until 476.

Additional Remarks Regarding the Pre-471 Pattern of Events

In 470 the throne executed brothers from an elite Chinese courtier family, Li Fu 李敷, Li Yi 李弈 and another sibling. The two brothers had become closely associated with Wenming in the previous years, nevertheless, Wenming was unable to prevent their execution in 470, though she was clearly upset regarding their fate.35 Many scholars have viewed these executions as the trigger that launched Wenming into an effort to politically cripple Xianzu by forcing him to retire in 471. The Tianxiang“ ” (Astrology) section of the Wei Shu is often quoted in this regard where it bluntly states that Wenming forced Xianzu to retire. In the view of this author, the “Tianxiang” statement is a later tendentious interpola- tion and has no bearing on the substance of the retirement debate as we discussed it above.36 Furthermore, retirement did nothing to curb

34 Ws 7.138. 35 Ws 13.328. 36 Ws 105, part III.2412. By the time of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1126) the original Wei Shu had been fragmented and lost. Over the course of time prior to the Northern Song period various individuals had partially or wholly reconstructed portions of the text based on Tang period secondary source histories, and Song philologists made significant efforts at identifying and tracing these reconstructed portions of the text. The part of the “Astrology” section that concerns us (Ws 105, part III.2389–2424) was wholly reconstructed, probably from Tang sources—more specifically—a work by a Tang scholar, Zhang Taisu 張太素, who was active in the reigns of Gaozong and Wu Zetian (660’s– the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 77

Xianzu’s powers in any manner whatsoever, in fact, as will be discussed later, Xianzu actually engaged on a program of accelerated aggrandizement of political power after his retirement. Finally, from 467 through 476 Wenming is rarely mentioned in the dynastic annals, presumably because she was insufficiently prominent to merit extended attention. The execution of the Li brothers seems to have involved a secondary level of power at the court, partially the result of factional competition among Chinese courtiers, but a factional linkage with Wenming is probable, too. Glancing at the standard dynastic histories, it appears that Li Fu, the elder brother, was at the center of a court corruption scandal and factional infighting.37 Since 463 (the latter portion of the reign of Gaozong) until his death in 470 Li Fu held the post of Supervisor of the Imperial Secretariat (zhongshu jian 中書監)38 and participated in the formulation of major court policy decisions into Wenming’s first regency following the Yi Hun crisis. By 470 Li Fu had more than ten younger brothers serving at the court in various capacities.39 The Zizhi Tongjian broadly hints

700’s), is referred to as a probable source (see the Wei shu, “Editors Introduction”, page 4, and Ws 105.2418–19, endnote #1). The Jiu Tang shu (Beijing. Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 68.2507 has a very brief biography, and both Tang histories list Zhang Taisu’s historical writings in their respective bibliographic sections. The contents of this part of the “Astrology” section are startling in terms of the very specific political commentary and the blunt, sometimes shrilly vitriolic nature of the comments made regarding Wenming and female political authority in what should be a prosaic presentation of astralisms and their general significance. For the period 471–76, the heyday of Xianzu’s exercise of power, the comments read as if the court were collaps- ing into confusion and wallowing in the decadence of Wenming’s corrupting influence. The significance of the 471 retirement does not seem to be understood—it is simplisti- cally referred to as the result of Wenming forcing Xianzu into this allegedly passive political posture. There is also an historical inaccuracy—Lu Li, the Xianbei courtier executed by Yi Hun in 465 is confused with one of his surviving sons, Lu Ding’guo 陸定國, whom Xianzu demoted to infantryman in 475 (see the reference on Ws 105.2412). The discussion on Ws 105.2415 of the series of purges which occurred between 476–79 caus- tically places the blame for these events on Wenming’s domineering corruption of the court. The role of Yuan Pi is not even mentioned, possibly not understood. It is difficult to imagine any court historian writing in this fashion from the Northern Wei period through the reign of Wu Zetian. Clearly, this latter female ruler would have suppressed such comments given the obvious analogies to her own period of dominance at the Tang court (684–705). It is possible that the basic astrological data was taken from Zhang Taisu, or perhaps Southern dynasty sources, but the caustic anti-Wenming comments must have been added in the late Tang period or at some later date into the early Northern Song period. 37 Ws 6.130; ZzTj 132.4154. 38 Wan Sitong, 4500. 39 Ws 36.834. 78 chapter three that in the course of their careers the Li brothers had made significant enemies among high level courtiers. Li Xin 李訢, a Chinese courtier and friend of Li Fu (but not related by blood) was accused of corruption, but Li Fu saw to it that the charges were quashed. The throne later was made aware of the original charges against Li Xin, had him arrested, and the prosecuting official offered him a deal whereby he could spare his life in return for incriminating evidence against his friend, Li Fu. The throne may have been aware of Li Fu’s earlier role in quashing the original charges. Li Xin complied, dredged up court factional gossip involving other courtiers with grudges against Li Fu, and the information was used to execute all the Li brothers.40 We can surmise that the Li brothers were executed on charges of corruption and influence peddling. Since 467 the throne had been making a serious effort to increase court discipline by limiting gifts that court officials could accept41—a difficult undertaking—since the Northern Wei court had no standard court salary system in place at this time. Courtiers were expected to support themselves from their private household wealth, bestowals of rewards by the throne, and possibly limited access to tax revenue flows as a minimal sort of salary, especially for courtiers serving in the provinces. It appears, in part, that the Li brothers were made examples of the willingness of the throne to go to great lengths to discipline the court. There is also another aspect to this case, indicated by the eagerness of the prosecuting official to bring charges against Li Fu—in 467 Xianzu was only thirteen, and in 470 he was sixteen and just beginning to take an active role in governing the court. The moves against the Li brothers were probably carried out by Tuoba/Xianbei groups surrounding the throne who had displaced Wenming in 467—Xianzu’s uncles, etc. That is, they were engaging in a factional purge of known Wenming supporters just to make sure that no extraneous elements, like competent Chinese courtiers, would distract the throne and dilute their influence. Li Fu’s younger brother, Yi, was a member of the palace guard command (dianzhong shangshu) and also personally close to Wenming, thus he was strategically placed in the court structure to be able to cause problems, so he was executed, as well. There may be another element—the Murong Xianbei courtier and general, Murong Baiyao, was executed at

40 Ws 46.1040–41; ZzTj 132.4154. 41 ZzTj 41.4141. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 79 the same time as the Li brothers for what were perceived of as trumped up charges, though of a different nature than the Li’s—he was accused of sedition.42 Baiyao was the successful general who led the Northern Wei forces in the conquest of the North China Plain between the Yellow River and the Huai River between 467–470—and then he was suddenly executed. There may be a link between these events. In 467 Li Fu was an ardent supporter of the war cause and Murong Baiyao was its successful executor.43 Wenming, as noted earlier, was related to the Murong Xianbei by being a scion of the Northern Yan royal family. Li Ping has presented a strong argument that within the female quarters there was a Murong Xianbei related clique linking Gaozong’s Empress Dowager Chang (died 460) and her immediate relatives with the youthful Wenming and her family. It is possible that there were suspicions of factional linkages between the above three individuals such that it was felt necessary to eliminate them in 470 (Wenming was simply completely isolated but left unharmed). This type of purge does not seem to have been terribly disruptive to the Tuoba/Xianbei inner elite since it was focused primarily on outer courtiers, Chinese and Murong Xianbei. The decks were cleared and the truly important people could get on with their job of stabilizing the throne and the succession. As for Wenming, as upset as she was, in 470 she was helpless against the actions of political actors much more powerful than herself. Events after 476, however, will be quite a different story, because Wenming will emerge as a powerful player in her own right. In view of the above series of events, the retirement drama of 471 had nothing to do with a Wenming/Xianzu factional struggle because Wenming was powerless. Wenming’s powerlessness was not due to Xianzu, who was barely sixteen years old in 470, but to an entire phalanx of Tuoba/Xianbei elites who were determined to implement a pressing political agenda and would not brook the presence of distracting, extraneous courtiers or outer court factional groupings. Wenming had performed her limited legitimating role as Empress Dowager, and after 467 her services were no longer needed.

42 Ws 6.130. 43 Ws 36.833–34. 80 chapter three

Political trends after the 471 Retirement

The anti-Yi Hun clique which seized power in 466 (including Wenming as a member) was committed to the security of the legitimate primogenital succession to the throne and in blunting the appeal of the horizontal counter-tradition. This was a political sine qua non to the more effective centralization of power in the hands of the throne. The 467 revolt of Tuoba Daofu was a powerful affirmation of the horizontal counter- tradition and the 471 retirement was the eloquent and equally powerful refutation of this tradition. Based on developments which came to a head with the 476 assassination of Xianzu, however, it would appear that another common goal held by these Tuoba and Xianbei elites was the perceived necessity of having an emperor on the throne who was amenable to the political suasion of this self-same power elite. The tradition of conciliar decision making between the throne and a select circle of mostly Xianbei and Tuoba elites was a strong one in the Northern Wei going back to Daowudi’s Council of Eight that appeared with the founding of Pingcheng as the Northern Wei capital in 398, Mingyuandi’s continuation of this tradition with his own council of eight leading advisors in the early 400’s,44 and the effective conciliar regencies which guided the throne through the dangerous and violent minorities of both Gaozong and Xianzu. Indeed, even when Xiaowendi appeared upon the throne as the sole monarch beginning from 476 until the death of Wenming in 490, political decision making was also characterized by conciliar rule—as the subsequent discussion will reveal. Ironically, the Tuoba/Xianbei elites who sacrificed themselves to secure Xianzu upon the throne in 466 were upholding contradictory ideals of how a proper monarchy should function—a strong centralized throne yet characterized by a more diffuse form of conciliar decision making. This kind of tension in the political ideology could only cause further instability. From the perspective of this author, the sudden death of Xianzu in 476 and the equally sudden emergence of Wenming in that same year is explicable in terms of the above contradictory political stances of the Xianbei ruling elite. The discussion below will attempt to substantiate the following argument: that in 476 Wenming was called upon to eliminate Xianzu, who was attempting to destroy the conciliar mode of decision making that

44 Li Ping 2000, 54–55; Yan Yaozhong 1990, 30–31, 52–53. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 81 had secured him upon the throne in the first place, and in its stead implement a radically independent status for the throne. Earlier, in the 465–67 period Wenming was a relatively weak political actor and an outsider to the agnatically oriented politics of the Toba and closely allied Xianbei elites. Thus, once Xianzu’s first son was born in 467 Wenming was easily shoved aside, her close associates were killed in a probable factional purge, and she could do nothing to stop this process. This section will demonstrate that by 476 all the major anti-Yi Hun factional leaders had themselves been removed from the court—either dispatched to the provinces or simply no longer politically active. At the time, Wenming was the only centrally placed figure from the old factional grouping still residing at the palace in Pingcheng. She had the extensive court connections and political will to arrange for the murder of the emperor, which is what she is accused of doing in the standard dynastic annals.45 Once the assassination was completed it was then Wenming’s turn to call in political debts that were now owed to her. As far as Wenming was concerned, the prevailing political situation in 476 was the exact opposite of what occurred in 467. When we look at the identities of the anti-Yi Hun leaders of 466 with those who appeared after 476, they are almost identi- cal. This would imply that Wenming’s assassination had been approved in a conciliar fashion—she was not acting alone.

The Growing Independence of Xianzu after 471

By 471 Xianzu was already a young adult, approximately seventeen years old and presumably thoroughly trained in court politics and court society. An important point to be noticed regarding Xianzu’s post-471 activity is the rapid rise to power of individuals whose sole claim to high rank and office was their direct, personal relationship with Xianzu. In 472, Wan Anguo 萬安國, a personal friend of the emperor was appointed to very high court honorific rank and basically functioned as an imperial companion.46 At approximately the same time, Li Xin, who had earlier betrayed his friend, Li Fu in 470, was rapidly promoted to the key court fiscal and logistics position of Commissioner of the Granary, also to the post of Commissioner of the Southern Bureau, and he appears

45 Ws 13.328; Bei shi 2.77. 46 Ws 7.136; 34.804. 82 chapter three to have been involved in personnel issues, as well.47 Li Xin was probably an effective administrator, but his rapid rise to power in the central court was premised on a direct dependency upon the throne. Li Xin not only offended courtiers in the Chinese outer court associated with the Li brothers, as well as Wenming, but he seems to have offended the eunuch, Zhao Hei, who long associated in higher court circles, was a major actor in the 471 retirement drama, and was long associated with the Bureau of Personnel.48 Li Hui 李惠, Xianzu’s actual father-in-law, and an individual explicitly listed as a target of Wenming’s dislike, was kept in high level provincial positions, mostly in the Wei River valley. Hui’s cousin, Feng 鳳, was an administrative assistant to Xianzu’s favorite brother, Changle.49 All these individuals were direct dependents of Xianzu and all of them will die in the immediate aftermath of the 476 assassination and the return of Wenming. Xianzu not only accumulated clients but he also dispersed individuals he considered to be overly powerful courtiers. Beginning in 473 Xianzu began dispersing some of his uncles to provincial postings. Yun, the most politically prominent of the group of uncles who came to the succor of the throne in the winter of 465, appointed Supreme Commander of the Central Armies from 465 through 473, was transferred to the north bank of the Huai River in preparation for a military campaign in that zone, which never got off the ground. Later Yun was transferred to Jizhou located in the southeastern portion of modern Hebei Province.50 Of the two other surviving senior uncles, Zitui and Tianci, little is known, but indirect evidence to be discussed later would indicate that Zitui was very close to Xianzu. Both uncles appear to have remained at Pingcheng. There were also three younger uncles, one of whom is obscure and died in 475.51 The other two were sent out to the provinces as governor-generals (dudu 都督).52 Xianzu avoided killing

47 Ws 46.1041; 94.2016. Commissioner of the Granaries is probably a separate inner court fiscal position. See Yan Yaozhong 1990, 112. 48 Ws 46.1042; 94.2016–17. 49 Ws 83.1824–25. 50 Ws 19.462; 7.139. 51 Ws 19.509. 52 In 471 Zhen was appointed military governor (dudu 都督) of Liangzhou in the Northwest and Xiu was sent out as garrison commander of Helong (zhen jiang 鎮將), in modern Liaoning in Northeastern China. Ws 19.493, 517. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 83 his uncles, but he did remove them from the centers of power—the most significant case being that of Yun. Other high ranking old-time loyalists also were removed from the scene. Yuan He, the Xianbei courtier and general, the second speaker after Yun at the retirement debate, retired from court and died a natural death in 478.53 Another senior courtier and distant collateral member of the royal family, Yuan Pi, also the prime mover in the successful effort to seize Yi Hun in 466, was dispatched to southeastern Shaanxi in 474 to take charge of a military campaign in that area. Shortly after, Pi was appointed governor of Yongzhou, based in Chang’an.54 Since 466 until his transfer in 474 Pi had been Director of the Department of State Affairs (shangshu ling)—given his Tuoba blood and prominent political role at court, his leadership of this formal Chinese style administrative agency was significant—he was a cross-over figure functioning in both the inner Xianbei court and the outer court. It is probable that after Pi was transferred out, that Li Xin began to function as Xianzu’s agent in maintaining oversight of the Department of State Affairs. This may account for the hostility of Zhao Hei, the long time administrator to the presence of Li Xin. The left deputy director of the Department of State Affairs (generally the higher ranking of the two deputy director positions) was a Tuoba collateral, Yuan Muchen 元目辰, who was in this position from 465 until 477.55 He seems to have simply adapted to the changing political environment and switched allegiances from his old superior, Yuan Pi, to Li Xin as Xianzu’s representative. Yuan Muchen would rue this decision in 477. Finally, by 475, Xianzu’s relationship with the high ranking Xianbei Lu family was destroyed after one of its most prominent members, and a former friend of Xianzu, was stripped of his court ranks and demoted to a common infantryman (he was not

53 Ws 7.140; 41.922. 54 Dispatched to southwestern Shaanxi, Ws 7.141. Appointed Governor of Yongzhou, Ws 7.144. The Zizhi Tongjian 133.4184, discards the statement in Wei Shu 7.141 that Pi was dispatched to southwestern Shaanxi noting that Pi’s Wei Shu biography does not mention this nor do references in the Song shu annals. This author will accept the veracity of the Wei shu statement, because of the subsequent statement that Pi was promoted to a high honorary court rank (situ 司徒) and then recalled to the capital on Ws 7.144. In two different places the Wei shu text consistently notes Pi’s brief tenure in the Wei River valley. Note also that Pi’s transfer to Shaanxi (474) is very close in time to Yun’s transfer to the north bank of the Huai River (473), thus, fitting into a pattern of personnel transfer of senior Tuoba/Xianbei courtiers. The ZzTj judgement regarding the Wei shu material is too arbitrary. 55 Ws 14.348; 7.142, 147; Bs 3.92. 84 chapter three even made a cavalryman, which was the respected military function of a Xianbei trooper).56 Lu Li, the father of Xianzu’s unfortunate friend, had been executed by Yi Hun for opposing his plans. By 475 the major Tuoba/Xianbei notables who had guided Xianzu since 465 were absent from the political center. Xianzu had purposely splintered this cohesive faction by dispatching them to various provincial postings. Note in particular, that Yun and Yuan Pi were sent to different ends of the empire. As for Wenming, she was still quiescent. In 476, once the death of Xianzu was accomplished, allegedly under the guidance of Wenming, she emerges as a major political actor. At the same time, in 477, Yuan Pi was recalled to the court, and by 479 was once again in charge of the Department of State Affairs as Chancellor lu( shangshu shi 錄尚書事), a position of extraordinary authority and the holder of high honorific rank.57 The fact that Wenming recalled Yuan Pi indicates that the assassination was not a simple unilateral act but probably involved prior consultation with Xianbei elites. Once accomplished, Wenming was not the dominant court figure, but a primus inter pares with the other senior Xianbei elites. So begins a period of conciliar rule at the court between Wenming and Yuan Pi with Xiaowendi as the ten year old nominal emperor. All the previously mentioned individuals and others, as well, who were clients of Xianzu were executed. In some cases Wenming was clearly settling scores, but the extent of the executions indicates a purge at the court of those who supported the efforts of Xianzu to make the throne more independent of its Tuoba/Xianbei senior elites. Wan Anguo was executed in 476; Li Xin in 477; Li Hui, Xianzu’s father-in-law, all his children and his brothers were executed in 478; Yuan Muchen, who may have been viewed as a factional turncoat, was executed in 479; Changle, Xianzu’s favorite brother and his administrative assistant and Li Hui’s cousin, Li Feng, were both executed in 479. Zitui, Xianzu’s eldest uncle died in 477 en route to a provincial posting in modern Shandong.58 The timing of Zitui’s death is very suspicious, though nothing is hinted at in the sources—it could have been a natural death. The executions of the Chinese courtiers Li Xin and Li Hui are attributed to Wenming in the sources. In fact, shortly after 477 Wenming sought out the surviving members of the Li brothers’ house-

56 Ws 40.909. 57 Ws 7.147; 14.358. 58 Execution dates are in order of appearance in the text: Ws 7.142; 46.1042; 7.146; 7.147; 7.147; 83.1825; 7.144. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 85 holds and recompensed them for their tribulations.59 Regarding the execution of Tuoba elites, however, I suspect that such actions would have to have been approved by Yuan Pi. The case of Yuan Muchen, Pi’s prior immediate subordinate indicates a direct connection and a possible settling of scores on Pi’s part. As for Xianzu’s surviving four uncles, the most prominent, Tuoba Yun, was given higher honors but never permitted to return to the capital. He died in 481 in Chang’an as essentially the governor general of Northwest China. Tianci remained at the capital as a political non-entity, dying sometime in the 480’s, and the two most junior uncles shuttled between court and provincial service. As for Xianzu’s brothers (Xiaowendi’s uncles), the fact that only one uncle survived beyond the death of Wenming in 490 indicates that they may also have been quietly eliminated by Wenming and Yuan Pi

The Balance of Power at Court

Following the assassination of Xianzu in 476 court politics revolved around a dynamic balance of power between factions led by Wenming and Yuan Pi.60 Generally, the tension between the two factional leaders was ameliorated by efforts on Wenming’s part to appease Yuan Pi and to carefully calibrate the relations between the two factions. Of direct interest in this regard is the situation in the Department of State Affairs, the relatively powerful executive body in the Northern Wei court. Pi had been formally established as the equivalent of Chancellor of the Department of State Affairs in 479. In 480 Wang Rui王叡 , a person of relatively low status at the court who was rapidly promoted as a representative of Wenming’s political interests, was appointed Director of the Department of State Affairs尚書令 , making him the immediate

59 Ws 36.841. 60 Li Ping 2000, 218–19, views Yuan Pi as a follower, if not a factional subordinate of Wenming going back to the Yi Hun crisis of 465–66. Tamura Jitsuzō also portrays Wenming as the leader of a unified court after the assassination of Xianzu, including Yuan Pi as one of her supporters. Tamura also argues that Wenming introduced to the court an unprecedented degree of Han Chinese—Altaic courtier cooperation and balance. This author argues for a very different view of the Wenming—Yuan Pi relationship. Regarding Wenming’s alleged ethnic reconciliation policies mentioned by Tamura, I rather suspect that the demands of court ‘realpolitik’ simply forced Wenming to make more extensive use of ethnic Chinese courtiers. See Tamura Jitsuzō, Chūgoku Shijō no Minzoku Idō Ki 中国史上の民族移動期 (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1985), 253–54. 86 chapter three

subordinate of Yuan Pi, replacing Lu Jun 陸雋 in this position.61 Lu Jun has a very short biography, but he was a scion of the elite Lu Xianbei courtier family, the second cousin of Lu Li who had been executed by Yi Hun in 465, and thus a very senior courtier by this time. Jun was an active member of the anti-Yi Hun faction in 465–66 and remained in high court positions for much of the subsequent period, including the shizhong Chancellor position. He was the Director of the Department of State Affairs from 476 until the factional struggles at the court resulted in his displacement at this position by Wang Rui in 480. His relationship with either Wenming or Yuan Pi is not clear, possibly he was an acceptable figure to both factional leaders, but after 480 he was sent out to be governor of Dingzhou on the North China Plain, where he ended his career. Wenming would have seemed to have found him unsatisfac- tory to her needs. Thus, Wenming was trying to hedge the authority of Yuan Pi by appointing her direct servitors as high ranking subordinates under Pi. The left deputy Director of the Department of State Affairs was a high ranking eunuch close to Wenming, Zhang You 張祐, also appointed in 479.62 Two eunuchs close to Wenming, Fu Chengzu 苻承祖, and Wang Yu 王遇, were placed in high positions within the Board of Personnel under the Department of State Affairs.63 It seems, however, that Wenming’s problem was that these positions were part of the outer court, and thus of somewhat limited utility. Yuan Pi (and the dismissed Lu Jun) were crossover figures who functioned in both the outer and inner Xianbei courts. It is doubtful if Wenming’s emissaries had this crossover capability on a consistent basis. Most likely, the central army and the various palace guard commands were under Yuan Pi’s control or influence. Wenming had control over all the imperial props—tallies, seals, edict issuing authority, and the highly literate Chinese establishment at court—but the Xianbei military levers of power were probably beyond her grasp—Wenming had to work with

61 Ws 93.1988; Ws 40.917; Wan Sitong, 4504. 62 Ws 94.2021. 63 Ws 94.2025; 2024. The presence of eunuchs in high formal court positions was not unique to the Wenming regency. Unlike many Han Chinese regimes, the Northern Wei was relatively flexible in its utilization of eunuchs. Two notable cases mentioned previously in this discussion were Zong Ai, who assassinated Taiwudi and one of his sons in the 452 succession crisis, and Zhao Hei, who was a high level participant in the 471 retirement debate and was in charge of court personnel issues throughout the 470’s and 480’s. Zhao Yi, 14.277–78, discusses this issue with examples taken from the entirety of Northern Wei history. Wenming is perhaps unique in that her eunuchs are being used for overtly political factional purposes, to attempt to check the power of Yuan Pi. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 87 the court administration that she had, not the one that she would have wanted to have. Nevertheless, Yuan Pi set an example by going out of his way to treat Wenming’s representatives—her ‘creatures’—in a courteous fashion.64 Wenming had earned respect by assassinating Xianzu, and, it should be remembered, Wenming does appear to have been responsible for raising and training the boy emperor, Xiaowendi—who was probably her greatest asset in the court. It is debatable how long Wenming was able to maintain her beach head in the Department of State Affairs. In mid-481 Wang Rui, the Director died and was replaced in 482 by Wei Yuan 尉元, from a Xianbei family with a record of long service to the Tuoba throne.65 In 482 he was approximately 69 years old and publicly honored as one of the most senior active Xianbei courtiers. It seems unlikely that he would have been a pliant follower of Wenming, but on the other hand, he was nine years older than his superior, Yuan Pi, who was approximately 60 years old at the time.66 Insofar as this appointment may have represented a factional consensus, Wei Yuan’s age seniority and excellent reputation may have been viewed by Wenming as a moderate brake on the actions of Yuan Pi, who was a member of the royal family. In 486 Zhang You was replaced at Left Deputy Director by Mu Liang穆亮 , member of a high ranking Xianbei family that inter-married with the royal line over the course of the generations. Mu Liang was approximately 35 years old at that time and would appear to have the same general court political qualifications as Wei Yuan.67 It is interesting to note that both men were recalled to the court to fill the above positions immediately after concluding very successful border military pacification campaigns. Needless to say, these achievements would give both men and their political sponsors considerable prestige at the court. Even assuming that both appointments

64 Ws 14.358. Wenming did try to grasp control of the inner court but could not sustain her effort. In approximately 476, following the death of Xianzu, Zhang You, Wenming’s eunuch representative was appointed Supervisor of the inner court Executive Administrative Office (?) (jian ducao [shangshu] 監都曹尚書). This office seems to have been a very high ranking inner court administrative coordinating agency for the various other inner court executive boards and bureaus, separate from the outer court Department of State Affairs, and usually manned by Tuoba/Xianbei courtiers, often with strong military backgrounds (see Yan Yaozhong 1990, 55–6). Zhang You, however, only lasted a year before he was replaced in 477 by a senior Xianbei courtier, Gou Tui 苟頹. See Ws 94.2020; Wan Sitong, 4503; for Tui’s biography see Ws 44.993–94. 65 For Wang Rui—Ws 7.150. For Wei Yuan—Ws 50.1113. 66 Ws 14.362. 67 Ws 27.667–671. 88 chapter three were the result of a factional consensus, still, Wenming’s control is significantly diluted. Additionally, unlike her previously directly appointed agents, both Wei Yuan and Mu Liang would have direct access to the inner Xianbei chambers of policy making. This situation is made more complex in that by 486 Xiaowendi was already seventeen years old and beginning to take a more active role in court affairs—the Wei Shu notes that he began to personally compose his own edicts.68 Xiaowendi never directly challenged the oversight of his step-grandmother but the march of time went most heavily against her interests. Prior to 486 Wenming made very conscious efforts to use the awarding of honors and favors to balance the factions and maintain court harmony. She used imperial funds to build mansions simultaneously for Wang Rui and Yuan Pi and went out of her way to bestow honors on senior Tuoba and Xianbei courtiers including both Yuan Pi and Wei Yuan. She used the authority of the throne to award members of both factions equally with life time exemptions from capital punishment (ru bayi 入八議).69 Yuan Pi and Wenming strove to ensure consensus and stability at the court, but discrete incidents reveal the factional seams that lurked beneath the surface. Perhaps the most glaring example, and one that illustrates Wenming’s one strong suite at court is the allegation that she actively contemplated killing the young Xiaowendi and replacing him with his brother, Xi. Wenming was brought to a halt by the combined protests of Yuan Pi, Mu Tai, and Li Chong 李沖 (this latter individual is usually identified as a close advisor to Wenming).70 It is interesting, though, that Wenming was not deprived of her ‘turf zone’, the boy emperor Xiaowendi. The factional faultline appears again in an exchange recorded between Wenming and Yuan Pi, when the latter requested that an official residence be established for the heir apparent, Xiaowendi’s son, Xun. Wenming replied: The heir apparent is still young, there is no reason to hurry.

68 Ws 7.187. 69 Ws 14.358; 31.738; 93.1988; 94.2020, 2025. 70 Ws 7.186. The “Astrology” section of theWei shu mentions in general terms threats by Wenming against Xiaowendi’s life datable to circa 480, but this text is problematic. See Ws 105, part III.2414. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 89

Pi: Your servant is in his autumnal years and wishes to witness the full flourishing of the imperial rites; for Your Servant it is indeed a matter of urgency.71 Pi’s request was denied but there is a sharpness to the exchange that indicates a distrust on Pi’s part regarding Wenming’s reliability in guaranteeing a proper primogenital successor to Xiaowendi. The sharpness of the exchange also indicates Pi’s position as an equal with the Grand Empress Dowager. An example that has often been cited to support the contention that Wenming was an overwhelming political force at the court is derived from the biography of one of her affinal relatives, Yang Chun楊椿 . During the early years of the regency Chun served as one of Wenmings personal attendants. Chun’s biography states: At this time an oral command was issued [by Wenming] charging all inner court officials that every ten days every courtier must report at least one event of political significance [basically, court gossip and goings-on]. If this requirement were not met, then the courtier responsible would be severely reprimanded. There were many who conformed to the requirements of this command, and there were also those who purveyed gossip damaging to the relationship between the grand Empress Dowager and Gaozu.72 From the perspective of this author, the above quote is a two edged sword. It rather demonstrates Wenming’s weakness—that her position within the court was sensitive and that she had to be constantly on guard. Over the course of time, Yuan Pi, Wenming, Xianzu’s uncles and various other prominent court families were united in their common desire to ensure that the imperial succession remained inviolate and the power of the throne stable and strong (Wenming allegedly faltered once, but she was quickly brought back into line). Overlaid upon this basic premise was the contradictory belief upon the part of many of the key Tuoba/ Xianbei actors that the throne ought to be amenable to their counsel. This kind of tension is common in any patrimonial regime, but was exacerbated by the very high level of royal agnatic participation in court politics. If anything, after 470 imperial agnates tended to increase their

71 Ws 14.358. Xun, the eldest son, was born in 483 (Ws 7.152) when Xiaowendi was approximately sixteen years old. He was only formally proclaimed heir apparent in 493 (Ws 7.172), three years after Wenming died. The above exchange thus occurred between 483–490. 72 Ws 58.1290. 90 chapter three share of high court positions.73 Xianzu attempted to free himself from these encumbrances to his imperial prerogatives after he retired in 471, unfortunately, he was assassinated for so trying. In the place of Xianzu, the Xianbei ruling elite retained his nine year old son (as of 476), thus hoping to simultaneously preserve the succession and retain the conciliar mode of court governance as it had existed before 471. There is great historical irony to these efforts by the Xianbei elite, because Xiaowendi developed into a greater and more successful threat to the conciliar court power arrangement than did his father, Xianzu. During the period 476 through 490, however, the factional coalition power structure was stable and dynamic. Conflict between Wenming and Yuan Pi was contained within their commonly shared parameters of political action. There seems to have been a general recognition that if the dynasty wished to stabilize and further develop administrative reforms were necessary. For example, the sanzhang local administrative structure and the tax reform package proposed by Li Chong in 484 and 485 were fully supported by Wenming and Yuan Pi, though, the latter wanted to delay its implementation by a few months.74 Presumably, the salary system and the juntian equal fields proposals received the same general support. The significant achievement of the Tuoba/Xianbei ruling elite, dating the efforts back to the reign of Gaozong (452–465), was to stabilize the practice of agnatic politics and the related issue of the imperial succession. On this base the above institutional reforms were first implemented. This brings to mind the position of M.G. Smith discussed at the end of the previous chapter. Following the death of Wenming in 490, Xiaowendi fully came into his own—he continued to implement the previous structural reforms, but simultaneously worked to successfully destroy the old power structure that had created these reforms. Following the failed Mu Tai Affair of 496, which sought to return the capital to Pingcheng from Loyang, Xiaowendi split the old ruling elite such as Yuan Pi, and leading members of the affinal Mu family, discredited many of its members, and surrounded himself with new advisors. Under Xiaowendi’s post-490 activist rule there was a resurgence of the influence of imperialtangshu , the descendents of the lines of Xianzu’s uncles. By 496, in the face of

73 Jennifer Holmgren, “Northern Wei as a Conquest Dynasty: Current Perceptions; Past Scholarship,” Papers on Far Eastern History 40 (1989): 15. 74 Ws 53.1180. the regency of the empress dowager wenming, 476–490 91

Xiaowendi’s radical court reform measures circumstances had maneu- vered the old ruling elite into the position of conservative, almost reac- tionary politicians seeking to preserve the ways of old. Individuals who had risked their lives in 466 to secure the throne for Xianzu, and who had helped to raise the boy emperor, Xiaowendi, after 496 were dis- carded as obstacles to Xiaowendi’s efforts to construct his own version of a Sinic style world empire. The foundations of this new empire rested upon the broken backs of the failed political elites who gave their last hurrah in the aborted coup attempt of 496.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE COLLAPSE OF THE NORTHERN QI

The Northern Wei retired emperorship established an important precedent which the subsequent Northern Qi regime would utilize for its own purposes in the retirement of its monarch, Wuchengdi in 565. We will discuss the Northern Qi retirement in the context of the military and political developments leading to the complete military collapse of the regime in 577. It is ironic that the successful retirement of 565 may have been indirectly responsible for the political gaffes committed by the overconfident young monarch, Houzhu, following the death of his father in 569. In the end, of course, the successful and significant political maneuvers of 565 were overshadowed by the collapse of 577. The Northern Zhou victory is surprising because this was a regime that was materially so much poorer than its Northern Qi competitor. In classical China, as in much of the ancient world, manpower and agricultural resources (or, in the case of nomads, their flocks of animals) were the material bases for creating a powerful political/military structure. Tang Changru roughly estimates that the Northern Qi had close to a three to one advantage in population. This same author also notes that during the later Sui dynasty, population figures from the 605–607 time period for the North China Plain (north of the Huai River) indicate that slightly more than 53% of the entire imperial population lived in this part of the empire.1 Before the development of South China, the North China Plain was the population and agrarian heart of the China based classical empires. This same region was solidly controlled by the Northern Qi during its political existence. The Western Wei/Northern Zhou conquest of the Chengdu basin in 553 could not alter these unfavorable resource disadvantages due to the extreme difficulties in overland transport across the Qinling Mountains to the Wei River valley. The Chengdu Basin could serve as a defensive redoubt of last resort, as in the case of Tang Xuanzong during the An Lushan Rebellion, but it

1 Tang Changru 唐長孺, Wei Jin Nan Beichao Sui Tang Shi San Lun 魏晉南北朝隋唐史三論 (Wuhan: Wuhan Daxue chubanshe, 1993), 104, 242. 94 chapter four

contributed little to altering the material balance of power between the Wei River valley and the North China Plain. The population and agrarian core of the Northern Zhou regime was a relatively narrow band on both banks of the Wei River. Huang Yongnian provides a general description of the material and cultural backwardness of the Northern Zhou regime and argues that one consequence of this poverty of resources was a fiscal dependence on acquiring and distributing war plunder, both wealth and human captives, in large quantities to maintain its armies and its court establishment.2 The defeat of the Northern Qi was premised on poor political leadership over an extended period of time which crippled the throne and the court as effective leadership institutions. This long term political morass was exacerbated by equally poor tactical military leadership by the throne in the 476–477 military face off with the Northern Zhou. The Northern Qi collapsed with extraordinary rapidity (within the space of a month) and suffered large scale defections on the part of court and military personnel. In exploring the political factors behind the collapse, this chapter will argue that the first five monarchs of this dynasty (covering the years 534–571) made conscious use of its Chinese and sometimes Central Asian courtiers as a means of keeping its own Altaic military elite and royal agnates, most of whom came from a Northern Garrisons background, off-balance and thus creating a space for the throne to dominate both groups as a divide and rule tactic. The term Altaic elites does not refer to surviving members of the Northern Wei Tuoba royal family or non-Chinese households descended from long serving families in the previous Northern Wei court. The Qi elite seemed to view these individuals as almost Chinese, or at any rate as members of an overly refined urban elite.3 Generally, these rulers carefully cultivated a stable clique

2 Huang Yongnian 黃永年, Liu zhi Jiu Shiji Zhong’guo Zhengzhishi 六至九世紀中國政治史 (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian chubanshe, 2004), 41–47. 3 See the remark of Gao Anahong to Yuan Shi 源師, “You damned Chinese really know your astrology,” Bei Qi shu [BQs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 50.690. Yuan Shi was a descendent of a high ranking Tuyuhun Xianbei family that began serving the Northern Wei in the 430’s. See Bei shi [Bs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 28.1023 for Yuan Shi’s family biographies. Huang Yongnian argues that the epithet haner 漢兒 can refer to all literate elites regardless of ethnicity. See Huang Yongnian, Wenshi Tanwei 文史探微 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000), 64–5. In 569 He Shikai, a confidante of both Wuchengdi and Houzhu said to Yuan Wenyao 元文遙, a descendent of the Tuoba royal family, “. . . let a damn Yuan family member hold high executive court posts and he dis- graces the court,” BQs 38.504. the collapse of the northern qi 95 of Chinese advisers and administrators and at the same time coopted the Altaic elite into high court and military service, particularly the latter. Beginning in 571, however, this stability was shattered by the political ineptitude of the last functioning Northern Qi monarch, Houzhu (r. 565–577). This last monarch sought to dramatically augment the power of the throne and in so doing triggered a series of factional purges that turned violent in late 573. The result of these actions was to significantly compromise the independent maneuvering room of the throne and destabilize the ethnic political equilibrium the throne had previously used to help preserve this maneuvering room. In a more meta- physical sense, Tanigawa Michio argued that this crisis sprang from the inability of the Northern Qi rulers to weld together imperial legitimacy with hegemonic political/military power into a fully centralized monarchy.4 What seems to have triggered the cascade of events after 573 was the unexpected assassination of the imperial confidante and political tactician, He Shikai 和士開, in 571. Without his presence and guidance, the throne over-reached resulting in the unraveling of court discipline and factional etiquette. Ultimately, the consequence of these previous actions in the face of a direct frontal assault by the Northern Zhou in 576–577 was to undermine the viability of the court to withstand this degree of military pressure. The crucial issues of imperial succession, imperial retirement, and the pattern of court political action relevant to these issues will be discussed in the context of the above over-arching perspective.

The Han Chinese-Altaic cultural conflict (perhaps a bit over-worked by modern his- torians) certainly had some subtleties to its manifestations. In a suggestive and interesting essay, Luo Xin has demonstrated that one of the most virulently anti-Chinese elite Altaic families, the Han 韓, in fact laid claim to being members of a well known elite Chinese line from the Northeast with the same surname—apparently along the same lines that Gao Huan laid claim to being related to the Chinese Gao family of the North China Plain while simultaneously maintaining an ardent and very public Xianbei/ Northern Garrisons cultural persona. See Luo Xin 羅新, “Bei Qi Han Changluan zhi Jiashi 北齊韓長鸞之家世,” Beijing Daxue Xuebao 43.1 (2006): 149–53. 4 Tanigawa Michio 谷川道雄, Sui Tang Diguo Xingchengshi Lun 隋唐帝國形成史論, translated to Chinese by Li Jicang 李濟滄 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe, 2004), 215–16. 96 chapter four

The Historical Background

The dynastic founder, Gao Huan, established the tradition of the throne (or strictly speaking, from the 530’s through 550 the Gao family ‘bakufu’) using Chinese courtiers as a foil against members of his Altaic elite and high ranking founding members of his regime in general (some of whom were of Chinese descent). In many ways the regime was similar to a military junta and Gao Huan could not afford to offend his key generals or even leading Chinese courtiers, fearing they would defect either to the Northern Zhou or the Liang regime in the south. Gao Huan explicitly states this in conversations dated to circa 537 with his Chinese courtier, Du Bi 杜弼.5 Earlier. in 532, when Gao Huan was beginning his rise to power, just after the seizure of Ye and the defeat of the combined Erzhu family armies outside of Ye, Heba Yue 賀拔岳, the Erzhu appointed warlord of the Wei River valley, was contemplat- ing whether to heed a summons from Gao Huan to leave his Wei River base area and serve under Huan on the North China Plain. Yue’s adviser opposed obeying the transfer order and argued that at the time there were still generals superior to Gao Huan, and others with whom he was considered an equal.6 The term used is deng yi 等夷, a term which was also commonly used to express the relationship of Yuwen Tai of the Western Wei/Northern Zhou regime to his fellow generals, who in fact elected him as their nominal leader. Over the course of time after 532 Gao Huan coopted or eliminated all competition from his part of China, but the coalition nature of his regime was never fully supplanted. This fact is illustrated by the relationship of Hou Jing 侯景 to Gao Huan. Hou Jing, an old acquaintance from the Huaishuo Garrison days, served on the North China Plain under the Erzhu family until their defeat by Gao Huan in 532, when he defected to Gao Huan. In late 542 Hou Jing was granted plenipotentiary powers over the war zones south of the Yellow River (Henan dao daxingtai), wherein Jing could conduct military affairs as he saw fit. Hou Jing was essentially the satrap of Henan—his loyalty was to Gao Huan personally, not to the dynasty (or bakufu). When Gao Huan died in 547 and passed the reins of authority to his eldest son Cheng, Hou Jing revolted—he refused to serve under anyone except

5 Wang Zhongluo 王仲犖, Wei Jin Nanbeichao Shi 魏晉南北朝史 (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin chubanshe, 1980), 600; Zizhi Tongjian [ZzTj] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 157.4881. 6 ZzTj 155.4824–5. the collapse of the northern qi 97

Gao Huan. Thus, while Gao Huan was highly respected and an astute manipulator of his supporters, he was still a primus inter pares and he had to tread carefully, as he previously indicated to Du Bi.7 In order for Gao Huan to rein in his regime elites without unduly antagonizing them and disrupting the direct personal relationships that held the regime together, Huan used Chinese courtiers as point guards, and if necessary, scapegoats to be sacrificed for political expediency. Whenever necessary, the throne would oscillate between supporting Chinese courtier groups and the Altaic/founding elite courtier groups.8 In a peculiar way this ethnically oriented divide and rule tactic was much easier under the conditions of the ‘dual polity’ of the 530’s–550, particularly after the 534 enforced translation of a completely cowed Northern Wei court from Loyang to Ye. Under the dual polity, Gao Huan tended to reside at Jinyang, the functional military heart of the regime with its overwhelmingly Altaic (and Altaicized) military forces and officer corps. In 536 he sent his eldest son Cheng 澄, then about fourteen years old, to represent his interests at the official court capital of Ye9 (as well as to get hands on experience in imperial politics), which tended to have a much

7 ZzTj 155.4911–12. Also see Scott Pearce, “Who, and What was Hou Jing?” Early Medieval China 6 (2000): 52–3. Chen Qun 陳群 has taken careful note of the coalition nature of Gao Huan’s regime, specifically referring to Hou Jing as an illustrative example. Chen also relates this structural situation to Gao Huan’s complicity in encouraging and permitting the semi-puppet Eastern Wei monarch, Xiaowudi, to order Gao Huan’s loyal supporter, Gao Qian 高乾 to commit suicide for perceived offenses against the throne in 533. Gao Qian was the politically sophisticated leader of powerful Han Chinese warlord forces based in Jizhou on the North China Plain. Qian and his warlord army were absolutely crucial in helping to support and stabilize Gao Huan’s ‘Six Garrisons’ refugee army when they emerged on the North China Plain in 530 fleeing from the Erzhu forces based in Shanxi. Regardless of whether or not these two men were distantly related agnates, Chen convincingly argues that their relationship was based on geo-political grounds—they needed each other to survive. Acquiescing to the “noble” death of his associate was one way for Gao Huan to rid himself of a powerful warlord counterpart. See Chen Qun “Bohai Gaoshi yu Dong Wei Zhengzhi 渤海高氏與東魏政治,” Zhong’guo Shi Yanjiu 2 (1997): 70–80. Private militaries commanded by Northern Qi administrators and courtiers with government approval or tolerance, and actively utilized in bandit suppression and border patrols, appeared throughout the life of the dynasty, though, not on such a large scale as during Gao Huan’s times. See Zhu Lei 朱雷, “Bei Qi shu Hulü Xian Zhuanzhong suojian Bei Qi Sibingzhi 北齊書斛律羨傳中所見北齊私兵制,” Wuhan Daxue Xuebao 5 (1995): 37–40. Also, Gao Min 高敏, Wei Jin Nan Bei Chao Bingzhi Yanjiu 魏晉南北朝兵制研究成 (Zhengzhou: Daxiang chubanshe, 1998), 333–36. This issue is frequently discussed in the context of the development of the Northern Zhou fubing 府兵 system, but often glossed over when discussing the Northern Qi. 8 Wang Zhongluo, 601. 9 ZzTj 157.4871. 98 chapter four stronger Chinese courtier presence as well as the urbanized Northern Wei Xianbei from Loyang. Beginning in 543, when Cheng was approximately 22 years old, he began to play the role of court enforcer, directly disciplining some of his father’s original followers who also resided at Ye,10 and making extensive and very public use of lower ranking Chinese courtiers to impeach high ranking founding members of Gao Huan’s regime.11 Under the dual polity, Gao Huan’s son and the Chinese courtiers took all the political heat while Gao Huan reaped the benefits of a more disciplined court but still kept a distance from the animosities aroused by these efforts. Additionally, the Northern Wei monarch was still the nominal lord of Ye, and so Gao Huan was able to hide behind him, as well. In fact, after Cheng began his crackdown, Gao Huan visited with one of his old com- rade in arms, Sima Ziru 司馬子如, who had been one of Cheng’s targets, and Huan comforted Ziru by placing his head upon his knees and pick- ing the lice from it.12 The Zizhi Tongjian specifically refers to this father- son tag team as a technique for riding herd over powerful courtiers.

10 ZzTj 158.4921. 11 ZzTj 158.4922–3. Chen Qun 1997, 78–9 agrees with this perspective. Huang Yongnian notes, “The Gao dynasts used literati figures as a means of waging political campaigns against close elite members of the regime; this cannot be said to be a case of Han Chinese versus Xianbei ethnic conflict.” Wenshi Tanwei, 34. Huang’s essay in Wenshi Tanwei, “Lun Bei Qi de Zhengzhi Naozheng 論北齊的政治鬧爭,” 21–68, is an incisive, clearly argued essay that rebuts reified culturalistic interpretations of political conflict in the Northern Qi as simply Han Chinese versus Xianbei. He points out the specific political rationales motivating both Han Chinese and Xianbei courtiers in their efforts to form factional groupings that often crossed ethnic boundaries as well as efforts by the throne to directly encourage some of this factional activity for its own self-serving political purposes. Huang’s analysis of the bloody succession coup of 560— briefly mentioned in this chapter—is worth close attention in this regard. Huang does attempt to overly muffle the ethnic factor, and while giving significant prominence to specific causal factors in engendering political strife, he views the ultimate ground of the divisions at the court as a conflict between a functionalist literati (both practical scribal groups and Confucianist groups) versus the military (a wen 文 versus wu 武 dichotomy) wherein most of the literati happen to be Chinese and most of the military tend to be Xianbei. This is actually part of a larger argument Huang presents where he sees this dichotomy as a manifestation of a specialization of labor typical of more developed patrimonial courts—a development which he does not see occurring in the Northern Zhou court. This is also a strong argument against a linear view of history as the triumph of the more advanced over the less advanced—for Huang the Northern Zhou regime was primitive. However, as regards the specifics of Northern Qi factional struggle, replacing one reification with another is not too helpful—the ethnic factor should be acknowledged. Ethnicity was a contributing factor—often used by the Northern Qi elites in a demagogic fashion to resolve their own intra-elite political disputes. 12 ZzTj 158.4923. the collapse of the northern qi 99

After Gao Yang 洋 (Wenxuandi) ascended the throne as the first Northern Qi emperor in 550, this tag team approach was no longer fully feasible, but the ethnically oriented divide and rule approach to the court by the throne continued to be utilized. Gao Yang inherited and actively utilized the Chinese courtiers who had served under both Gao Huan and Gao Cheng (the deceased eldest brother of Gao Yang). Since Gao Yang was only able to ascend the throne by means of complex negotiations with senior members of the court (including his mother, the Empress Dowager Lou 婁) who felt that his imperial ambitions were politically destabilizing, he initially appeased these groups by, among other things, whipping and exiling to the northern frontier the Chinese courtiers who were previously so active at Ye impeaching founding members of the dynasty of breach of court discipline. Then, in 551 Wenxuan simply recalled these men to court for continued active service—a tactic of appeasement followed by a bait and switch at the expense of the Altaic courtiers.13 Most of the Northern Qi emperors surrounded themselves with advisers who were outsiders to the royal line and to the founding court elite of the dynasty. Chinese courtiers were the most readily available, but individuals of Central Asian descent were used, as well, particularly by the last two major monarchs, Wuchengdi and his son, Houzhu. As Jennifer Holmgren has noted, despite the lurid reputation of the Northern Qi rulers, in point of fact, there were few violent outbreaks of purely ethnic hatred.14 The purpose of outsider courtiers grouped around the throne seemed to be understood as an acceptable form of divide and rule politics at the court. Generally, with the exception of the violent imperial succession of 560 and the violent court purge of 573, most courtiers experienced relatively long term, stable service at the Northern Qi court. Specific rulers had their own kitchen cabinets, but the former members of these advisory councils would remain in active service under succeeding emperors. The outré murders by Wenxuan (r. 550–559) in his later years were usually the result of alcoholism and possibly insanity, not planned political purges.15

13 Wang Zhongluo, 601; Bs 32.1185, 1190. 14 Jennifer Holmgren, “Politics of the Inner Court under the Houzhu (Last Lord) of the Northern Ch’i (ca 565–73),” in State and Society in Early Medieval China, ed., Albert E. Dien, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 326–27. 15 Jennifer Holmgren, “Seeds of Madness: A Portrait of Kao Yang, First Emperor of Northern Ch’i, 530–560 AD,” Papers on Far Eastern History 23–24 (1981): 132–4. 100 chapter four

In exchange, Altaic and founding member elites were recognized as the military elites commanding the central army forces stationed around Jinyang, the key northern garrisons, and around Loyang and Ye. The throne seems to have taken care to consult with this group regarding any major policy decisions—as the above discussion of Wenxuan’s ascension illustrated. The successful and vigorous defensive response to the 564 Northern Zhou—Turkish assault against Jinyang brought the Altaic military elite and key imperial agnates to the forefront, to the extent that the emperor at the time, Wuchengdi, seems to have faded into the background as a secondary player. The central military forces themselves were comprised of Altaic and Altaicized cavalry and troopers. Another means used by the throne to co-opt its Altaic military elite and to keep open lines of communication was to cultivate the image of the warrior king. While on the throne, all the Northern Qi rulers functioned as at least nominal frontline commanders at some time or another. This practice was particularly true of the leaders from Gao Huan through Xiaozhao (r. 560–561). As the founding dynast Gao Huan was sometimes compelled to be with his army in the course of the vicious struggles to establish his realm, but the subsequent rulers, Gao Cheng, Wenxuan, and Xiaozhao accompanied their armies out of choice. Gao Cheng dominated the Eastern Wei regime from 547 until his assassination in 549. In 549, just prior to his assassination, Gao Cheng explicitly accompanied an army of allegedly 100,000 men to complete the re- taking of the North China Plain city of Yingchuan from a Western Wei force for the sole purpose of acquiring a martial reputation.16 Wenxuandi became famous not only as a frontline commander but as a direct combatant, as well. From 552 through 555 he participated in annual fast moving cavalry campaigns against the tribal peoples of southern Manchuria, against the Rouruan to the north resulting in the accelerating fragmentation of their tribal armies and political coher- ence, and against the Shanhu peoples of western Shanxi (probably of Central Asian descent), crippling their military capabilities in 554.17 In 553, Wenxuan personally led a campaign against Turkish probes into northwestern Shanxi.18 The Turks would not return in a significant fashion until 564). On the one hand, Wenxuan’s frenetic military activity

16 ZzTj 162.5017. 17 ZzTj 165.5107–8. 18 ZzTj 165.5107. the collapse of the northern qi 101 was probably designed to overcome his weak political position vis-à-vis the court Altaic elite following the tortured negotiations that resulted in his 550 ascension to the throne. On the other hand, the overall impact of these campaigns (and others going on simultaneously) was to consolidate the geo-strategic position of the fledgling dynasty. The northern cavalry campaigns were the most dramatic and emotionally satisfying for the throne and its military elite, but equally important, though less dramatic, was the beginning of a definitive military resolution of the Hedong boundaries with the Northern Zhou. Commencing in early 559, while Wenxuan was still alive, the general Hulü Guang 斛律光 commanded cavalry units that pushed Northern Zhou forces south of the Fen River and he also constructed and occupied forts along the north bank of the Fen to consolidate these military gains.19 Hulü Guang could safely accomplish this task because his rear, comprising areas occupied by Shanhu peoples, had been neutralized earlier in 554. Simultaneously, Northern Qi forces were engaged in the seizure of most of the area south of the Huai River from the wreakage of the collapsed Liang regime. Wenxuan become the embodiment of the conquering warrior monarch. In 577 when the Northern Qi collapsed, Wenxuan’s surviving son Shaoyi 紹義 fled to the Turks for sanctuary leading a force of some 1500 men. The sympathetic Turkish kaghan referred to Wenxuan as a hero monarch.20 This remark probably reflects Wenxuan’s reputation among the Altaic peoples of the period. It also probably accounts for the respect and obedience given to him by the Altaic elite of his own court even after his dysfunctional alcoholism became severe. Xiaozhao, in late 560 also personally led a cavalry campaign against southern Manchurian tribal peoples.21 When his literati Chinese adviser, Wang Xi 王晞, queried him regarding his plans, Xiaozhao responded, “I had never personally experienced combat, so I want to use this occasion to practice the martial arts.”22 Xi criticized this sort of imperial personal warfare as risking the loss of respect from the inhabitants of the realm. Xiaozhao replied that these were the concerns of a weakling.

19 ZzTj 167.5183. 20 ZzTj 173.5375. 21 ZzTj 168.5210. 22 Qs 31.421. 102 chapter four

The Reigns of Wucheng and Houzhu (561–577)

The first four rulers of the Northern Qi were personally and profession- ally committed to a warrior ethos even if it meant paying less attention to the demands of routine empire maintenance. The dynastic annals, which make much of Wenxuan’s bloody rages, still accounted him a serious and conscientious monarch, particularly for the first five or six years of his reign.23 Despite his annual absences from the court on military campaigns in his early years, and distracted by illness and alcoholism in his later years, nevertheless, routine affairs of state were carried forward by his Chinese advisers, centered around the courtier, Yang Yin 楊愔. The Zizhi Tongjian specifically referred to this situation when it quotes courtiers of the time as saying, “A besotted lord above—an unblemished administration below.”24 Nevertheless, Wenxuan’s multiple military activities seem to have put stress on the administrative infrastructure. TheSui Shu blames incessant campaigning in Huainan for costly losses in troops and horses.25 Because of pressure on taxpaying households, many seem to have slipped out of the imperial registers. Interestingly, with the partial exception of Gao Cheng in 549, none of the warrior emperors ever participated in any of the southern campaigns in Huainan, which could be difficult and complicated, involving siege warfare and riverine warfare. They preferred more traditional, high prestige forms of nomad cavalry warfare against fragmented or tentative opponents. Overall, with active geo-strategic and military issues dominating the agenda, imperial institution building was placed on a back burner, with Chinese courtiers maintaining and manning minimal formal institutions, and the throne maintaining its ethnically oriented factional equilibrium as a means of manipulating the court and managing policy issues. The advent of the reigns of Wuchengdi and Houzhu marked a significant new stage in institutionalizing the formal imperial structure and directly asserting the interests of the throne and factions associated with it, over against the interests of the court Altaic elite, including royal agnates. In this regard Wuchengdi was a crucial innovator. First of all, neither Wucheng nor Houzhu evinced any interest in personally leading military campaigns. Only extraordinary military emergen-

23 Bs 7.259. 24 ZzTj 166.5150. 25 Sui shu [Ss] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 24.676. the collapse of the northern qi 103 cies forced them to be present at active battlefields. Wucheng provided a symbolic presence in 564 on the walls of Jinyang in the face of the Northern Zhou-Turk assault, and in late 564 (following the unsuccessful assault against Jinyang earlier in the year) Yuwen Hu of the Northern Zhou mounted a massive offensive against Loyang, which was also decisively defeated by the Qi. Wuchengdi did not arrive at the battlefields in the Loyang area until immediately after combat had been concluded.26 As for Houzhu, his sole direct experience with combat was his inept and ultimately destructive presence in the rear lines in 576 during the battle for Jinzhou (Pingyang). Oddly, despite the fact that Wuchengdi was initiating new trends in political directions at the court, traditional and semi-traditional historical opinion regarding this monarch ranges from the mildly critical to harshly dismissive. The Bei shi evaluates Wuchengdi as a competent monarch, but one who also laid the seeds for future decadence and decline by being a luxury loving monarch who favored an inner circle of sycophantic courtiers.27 Wucheng’s more dramatic policies, such as the execution of agnates and the 565 imperial ‘retirement’ are judged as unwarranted, unorthodox, and inappropriate. Lü Simian, the early 20th century neo-traditional historian, agrees with this interpretation.28 Even the venerable Wang Zhongluo is dismissive of Wucheng, devoting one sentence to this monarch and charging him with giving the Xianbei elite too much authority—a charge with which this author cannot agree.29 These types of criticisms are understandable in view of the near term collapse of the dynasty in 577, however, the dynastic collapse was due to a partial reversal of previous policy trends which occurred after 571—after Wuchengdi’s death—in a rapid series of factional conflicts that the throne was not able to fully control. When Wuchengdi ascended the throne in 561 he abandoned the aggressive military campaigns initiated by his predecessors. In early 560, Qi forces, operating in conjunction with a southern warlord, had attempted to seize the Chen capital of Jiankang, and were decisively defeated. The result was that the Chen regime consolidated its control of the south bank of the Yangzi River and the Huainan war zone remained unchanged, with the Northern Qi having the upper hand

26 ZzTj 169.5249. 27 Bs 8.302–3. 28 Lü Simian 呂思勉, Wei Jin Nanbeichao shi 魏晉南北朝史 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe, 1983), 720–1. 29 Wang Zhongluo, 602. 104 chapter four there.30 Wuchengdi broke this military stalemate by opening diplomatic relations with the Chen regime in 562.31 As a result, the Huainan frontier, which seems to have been the most fiscally draining (based on the Sui shu comments), remained peaceful until 573 (during the reign of Houzhu) when the Chen commenced the reconquest of the region.32 Wuchengdi and his successor were relatively uninterested in personal participation in military campaigns and the type of political capital that accrues from such activities. Wuchengdi, in particular, seems to have been committed to establishing structured diplomatic relations with the surrounding regimes as opposed to relying on the vagaries and expenses of extended military campaigns. This policy was also a pragmatic recognition of a new geo-strategic reality—the rise of a coherent Turkish confederacy far more powerful than the previous Rouruan nomads and diplomatically much more sophisticated than the Rouruan, as well, witnessed by their early 564 alliance with the Northern Zhou. Indeed, by 565, after the Northern Qi had successively demonstrated its military defensive capabilities, Wuchengdi was able to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Turks, only a year after their massive assault against Jinyang.33 In late 568, approximately three months before his death, Wuchengdi established diplomatic relations with the Northern Zhou.34 In fact, efforts had been made in mid-564, between the first Northern Zhou—Turk assault against Jinyang and the later Northern Zhou assault against Loyang, to open diplomatic relations with the Northern Zhou. This effort failed due to complications involving military relations between the Northern Zhou and the Turks.35 This setback was a severe embarrassment to Wuchengdi, who had engaged in this earlier reap- prochement effort against the advice of his senior military commander, Duan Shao. Nevertheless, the overall policy was never changed and bore fruit in 568. Perhaps one of the most significant events in the history of the dynasty, and certainly the defining event of the reign of Wuchengdi, was the early 564 assault by the Northern Zhou and the Turks against Jinyang. Turkish groups first impinged upon the consciousness of the Western Wei in

30 ZzTj 168.5194–5. 31 ZzTj 168.5223. 32 ZzTj 171.5316–17. 33 ZzTj 169.5252. 34 ZzTj 170.5275. 35 ZzTj 169.5243–5. the collapse of the northern qi 105 the early 540’s.36 In 552 and 553 the newly risen independent Turkish confederacy under Tumen and his younger brother militarily shattered the Rouruan confederacy. Leading elements of this latter defeated group flocked to the Northern Qi borders seeking sanctuary and were temporarily accommodated, many being re-settled by Wenxuandi in Shanxi north of the Wutai Mountains (Yanbei). Northern Qi Wenxuandi’s 553 campaign aginst Turkish probes was designed to protect the Rouruan refugees.37 In the end, however, Northern Qi efforts to work with the Rouruan collapsed. In 554, following looting by Rouruan groups south of the Wutai Mountains, Wenxuandi began a concerted campaign of elimination and enslavement of the Rouruan refugees.38 The result was that the Rouruan as a political entity were utterly destroyed—hammered on all sides by expanding Turkish hegemony, Northern Qi attacks and Northern Zhou attacks (the latter had already established a working military relationship with the Turkish confederacy). Regarding Turk—Northern Qi contacts, there is no further news until the massive Turk—Northern Zhou coordinated assault against Jinyang in early 564. Xue Zongzheng argues that the concerted effort by Wenxuandi to build a system of defensive walls in the north between 554–558 was focused on warding off future Turkish incursions.39 For their part the Turks expanded both east and west to dominate most of Northern and Inner Asia, straddling both sides of the Altai Mountains. The culminating highpoint came under the Muhan kaghan (r. 553–572) who, in partial cooperation with Persia, extended Turkish dominance to the east bank of the Amu Darya River by 563.40 This was a relatively unitary realm controlled by the Muhan kaghan, in fact, Istami (or Shidianmi) the famous kaghan of the West, was not designated by the Muhan kaghan until 562. This kaghan of the West was initially camped in the valleys of the Tianshan Mountains to the north of Kucha, relatively close to the main encampment of the universal kaghan in north central Mongolia.41 This foregoing information is important because the early

36 Xue Zongzheng 薛宗正, Tujue shi 突厥史 (Beijing: Zhong’guo Shehui Kexue chubanshe, 1992), 74. 37 Xue, 91. 38 Xue, 93. 39 Xue, 102–3. 40 Xue, 98–100. 41 Matsuda Hisao 松田寿男, Gudai Tianshan Lishi Dilixue yanjiu 古代天山歷史地理研究, translated to Chinese by Chen Junmou 陳俊謀 (Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan chubanshe, 1987), 319–347. 106 chapter four

564 coordinated assault against Jinyang by the Turks and the Northern Zhou was personally led by the Muhan kaghan and was conducted by a unified Turkish cavalry army drawing upon resources from both wings of its trans-Altai realm.42 The degree of military force brought to bear against Jinyang was extraordinary. The comfortable geo-strategic world of the past was destroyed and a new system of power relations was forming and, as noted above, Wuchengdi was acutely aware of this emerging situation. In the 564 combat the system of walled defenses constructed by Wenxuandi in the 550’s were breached and armies allegedly totaling over 100,000 men and horses advanced directly toward Jinyang.43 In the south, a smaller Northern Zhou force attacked Jinzhou (Pingyang), which defended the southern route up the Fen River to Jinyang. Wuchengdi almost cracked under the pressure.44 This political/military crisis occurred in the midst of an on-going resource crisis that seems to have lasted from 563 through 570, when the population suffered from year after year of droughts, floods, and heavy snows.45 In 564 the Altaic officer corps and armies stood firm and saved the dynasty, but these multiple crises seemed to have resulted in the slow acceleration of efforts by the throne to strengthen formal court institutions and functions and upgrade military infrastructure in such a way that would slowly erode and seek to minimalize the favored political privileges of the Altaic court elites. This trend would, in turn, disrupt the existing ethnically oriented balance of power at the court that the throne had manipulated to its partial benefit in the past. If one surveys the relevant chapters of the Sui shu and related material in other encyclopedic sources, one sees that Wuchengdi’s activities in constructing formal court institutions were very prominent, perhaps

42 Xue, 103–4, 114–15. 43 Hamaguchi Shigekuni 浜口重国 notes that the Northern Qi was not the first Northern Dynasty to build defensive walls in the north. The Northern Wei constructed crude walls but they were not as crucial to the Northern Wei defensive system as the later more systematically constructed walls were to the Northern Qi. See his Shin Kan Zui Tō Shi no kenkyū 秦漢隋唐史の研究 vol. I (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1966), 115, 117–18. 44 ZzTj 169.5237–8. 45 For a general discussion of the Period of Disunion as coinciding with long term climatological changes see, Qin Dongmei 秦冬梅, “Shi Lun Wei Jin Nan Beichao Shiqi de Qihou Yichang yu Nongye Shengchan 試論魏晉南北朝時期的氣候異常與農業生產,” Zhong’guo Nongye 1 (2003): 60–68. The essay, however, does not specifically discuss Northern China in the 560’s. the collapse of the northern qi 107 dominating. A dynastic legal code was formally promulgated in 564, immediately following the failed assault against Jinyang. This project was begun under Wenxuandi, but apparently subsequently neglected, until Wuchengdi accelerated the project and brought it to completion.46 As part of this same program under Wuchengdi dynastic equal field distribution and tax laws were also promulgated.47 Also in 564 in the immediate aftermath of the Northern Zhou—Turk assault, the northern defenses were upgraded by ordering the creation of locally controlled military farming lands at all garrisons and forts (cheng shou. 城守).48 Finally, Wuchengdi systematized court ritual procedures for the suburban sacrifices and the dynastic ancestral sacrifices.49 Wuchengdi was consciously engaged in the construction of a standard Sino/East Asian imperial court structure. That is, Wuchengdi was not trying to become culturally Chinese, but rather that the Chinese style imperial structure had become an ethnically ‘ecumenical’ imperial model. It was relatively durable, it functioned on a routine basis (even under war kings like Wenxuandi), and it looked very impressive (voluminous written codes and other documents existing in a sea of illiterate and semi-literate subjects also ‘looked’ impressive). While some ethnic Chinese courtiers, such as Yan Zhitui, may have had essentialistic/culturalistic Sinicizing goals for their Altaic lords, the Altaic ruling strata seemed to have had nominalistic/formal structural goals. Regardless of goals, however, the very expansion of formal institutional structures in conjunction with the power interests of the throne, inevitably meant the ineluctable dimi- nution of the range and strength of influence of the personalized, par- ticularized power interests of the court Altaic elite, imperial agnates, and other members of the founding dynastic elite. In the context of the Northern Qi court, conflict between the throne and its Altaic elites may simply have been inevitable. In another significant institutional development that pointed toward Wuchengdi’s interest in constructing Sinic style imperial institutions at

46 ZzTj 169.5239; Ss 25.705. 47 Sui shu 24.677–8. 48 Tong Dian [TD] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 2.19. 49 Sui shu 14.314. Yan Buke 閻步克 has convincingly argued that sometime between 562–565 Wuchengdi definitively revamped and systematized the court ranking system and its associated military honorific titles. Functional responsibilities may also have been affected. This significantly modified the inherited late Northern Wei court status structure established by Xiaowendi in 493 and 499. See Yan Buke, “Zhou Qi Junjie Sanguan Zhidu Yitong Lun 周齊軍階散官制度異同論,” Lishi Yanjiu 2 (1998): 25–38. 108 chapter four

Gao Huan (D. 547)

1) Gao Cheng 2) Wenxuandi 4) Xiaozhao 5) Wuchengdi (547–549) (550–559) (560–561) (561–569) ret. 565

3) Feidi 6) Houzhu (559–560) (565–577) ret. 576

7) Youzhu (576–577) Diagram IV: Sketch of the Northern Qi Succession the expense of previously acceptable alternatives that were potentially unstable, he ‘retired’ in mid-565. His eldest son, nine year old Wei 緯 (known later as Houzhu) born of the Empress Hu 胡, ascended the throne as emperor. The text makes it clear that until his death in early 569 Wuchengdi continued to control imperial policymaking as ‘retired emperor’ (taishang huangdi). This imperial ‘retirement’ dramatically disrupted a previous pattern of occasionally bloody fraternal successions, which had proceeded in a relatively orderly fashion from eldest brother to younger brother, amongst the offspring of Empress Dowager Lou, the main consort of the dynastic founder, Gao Huan (see diagram IV, above). The retirement also clarified the relationship between Wei and his next youngest brother, Yan 儼, also born of Empress Hu, as to whom was the heir to the throne. Incipient factional groupings had developed around the two boys due in part due to encouragement from Empress Hu (she favored Yan) and the previous indecisiveness of Wuchengdi on this issue. The retirement partially settled these issues and also ensured that the courtiers currently loyally serving Wuchengdi would seamlessly transfer their services to the new emperor, as well.50 Imperial retirement

50 See Holmgren, 1990, 285–7. the collapse of the northern qi 109 was being used as a means of stabilizing the Sinic style mode of father to eldest son imperial succession. The institution of imperial retirement was a structural innovation of the Northern Wei (the 471 retirement of Xianzu), as the Chinese courtier Zu Ting clearly stated in his formal presentation of the idea to the throne.51 The issue of a stable vertical succession for the Northern Qi was most pressing because of the impact of the Northern Zhou-Turk assault of early 564. The Northern Qi was being pressed from the north and the west in an unprecedented fashion. Under these conditions, any weak- nesses revealed by a bloody or drawn out succession crisis would be immediately exploited by hostile neighbors. Also, in this general context, related internal dynastic family issues required a resolution of the imperial succession issue, as well. All previous Northern Qi fraternal successions from the 549 death of Gao Cheng through the 561 ascension of Wuchengdi were accomplished under the auspices of the Empress Dowager Lou, who was able to maintain a degree of control over the ambitions and actions of her sons—but she died of natural causes in 562.52 Empress Dowager Lou had given birth to six sons, one of whom died young in 551.53 After Wuchengdi ascended the throne in 561 the only uterine brother left was Ji濟 . In circa 562 Ji was sent out to the North China Plain as governor of Dingzhou (Dingzhou cishi) where he remained until his execution in 569, following the death of Wuchengdi, for alleged remarks that he deserved to ascend the throne, not Wucheng’s son, Wei.54 Imperial agnates circulated throughout the imperial administration. While Dingzhou was a crucial province and the site of an elaborate palace complex, provincial service seems to have been viewed at the time as a form of polite political exile. Nevertheless, many of Wuchengdi’s nephews and powerful cousins did serve at the court in either Ye or Jinyang. Based on past precedent, if a horizontal succession were to have occurred after the death of Wuchengdi, then Ji would have become emperor and Wucheng’s son, Wei, would have been killed (though his other brothers would probably not have been molested). Possibly more troubling, though, in the absence of a dominant figure like the Empress Dowager Lou, if Ji himself were to have

51 ZzTj 169.5251. 52 ZzTj 168.5223. 53 Bs 51.1859, 1865. 54 Bs 51.1867. 110 chapter four

suffered a mortal mishap, then the realm of possible legitimate suc- cessors to the throne would have been open to any of Wucheng’s sons, nephews, and cousins. The dynasty could have easily fragmented into civil war. Thus, the imperial retirement dealt very directly and decisively with these underlying faults within the imperial family. The institutionalization of the imperial succession in the direction of a Sinic style vertical imperial succession also seems to have resulted in a startling rise in the execution of imperial agnates under Wuchengdi and under the Empress Dowager Hu following the death of Wucheng in 569 until 571, when she lost control of a de facto regency that was guiding her son, Wei (Houzhu). There were different specific reasons why individual imperial agnates were executed, but the spurt in agnatic murders under Wuchengdi is undeniable (see table V, below). These agnatic murders are a direct testimony to the consequences of court institution building in conjunction with the power interests of the throne on entrenched Altaic elites. One of the most sensitive areas in this regard would be the institution of the imperial succession—and agnates, many of them with direct ties to the military and troop commands— were too dangerous to be ignored under these changing circumstances. Ironically, in the aftermath of the 471 Northern Wei retirement agnatic murders (or at any rate, disappearances) which were quite common prior to 471 abated considerably. In the Northern Qi case, contingent circumstances seemed to have dictated the opposite result. The relatively short duration of the dynasty and the consistent pattern of horizontal succession strictly limited to the offspring of the Empress Dowager Lou facing off against and usually trumping a possible vertical succession opportunity resulted in the prominence of the agnatic categories of nephews and brothers as perceived sources of danger to the throne. Tangshu and tangshu-like individuals emerge as distinctly secondary or tertiary centers of agnatic threats to the throne. Before his death in early 569, Wuchengdi’s institution building agenda had been quite successful both in terms of foreign diplomatic relations and with regard to domestic court structures. Additionally, Wuchengdi had put together a solid factional advisory group around the throne (most of whom held formal court positions) that was competent and committed to his program of expanding the political prerogatives of the throne and stabilizing the imperial succession around his son, Wei. The key figure in constructing and managing this imperial faction was He Shikai, of Central Asian descent on his father’s side and educated as a youth in the late Northern Wei Imperial Academy for Courtiers the collapse of the northern qi 111

MISC.

GAO GUIYAN GUIYAN GAO 高歸彥 562 (distant Gao of cousin Huan) GAO SIHAO SIHAO GAO 高思好 of (adopted; 574 Wucheng’s generation)

TANGSHU

YUE 岳 555

RUI 叡 RUI 569

UNCLES

JI 濟 569 FIRST COUSINS

CHANG’GONG 長恭 CHANG’GONG 573

BROTHERS

JUN 浚 559 渙 HUAN 559

YAN (?) 淹 YAN 564 YAN 儼 YAN 571 CHUO 綽 575 Table V: Agnates and Coup Efforts in the Northern Qi Northern the in Efforts Coup and Agnates V: Table

NEPHEWS

YIN 殷 560 SHAODE 紹德 SHAODE 562 孝瑜 XIAOYU 563 百年 BAINIAN 564 孝琬 SHAOYUAN 567

SONS

GAO HUAN GAO 547 d. GAO CHENG GAO (547–549) EMPEROR’S NAME WENXUAN (550–559) XIAOZHAO (559–560) WUCHENGDI (561–569) 565 Retired HOUZHU (565–576) Emprs. Hu Dowager regency, 569–571 112 chapter four

(Guozi xuesheng 國子學生).55 He was also a talented conversationalist and musician. He Shikai was a close personal companion of Wuchengdi when he was still a princeling, and by 563, after Wucheng had ascended the throne, He Shikai emerged as his key adviser, a position which he maintained under Houzhu, as well, until He’s sudden assassination in 571. He Shikai was unique in his ability to bring together diverse personalities with diverse agendas and channel them into loyal service to the throne under his management. In this regard he was extremely successful. Based on how the political crisis of 569 developed, immediately following Wuchengdi’s death, He Shikai was viewed by the princes of the blood, particularly Wuchengdi’s cousins, as an obstacle to their political interests and to their ability to influence the throne. This certainly was not accidental—Wuchengdi arranged this personnel around the throne in order to keep his Altaic elites at a distance. This perception by the Altaic elites of their distance from the throne may have been exacerbated by the fact that Wuchengdi, unlike his predecessors did not cultivate comradely soldier ties with his Altaic elite that were forged on the campaign trails by previous Qi monarchs. As Holmgren noted: . . . There was a serious contradiction at court in Kao Chan’s [Wuchengdi] time between authority and power: those . . . most favored by Kao Chan and his son [Houzhu] and who thus had the most influence on the throne, found their legal authority prescribed by their relatively low ranking position in the outer bureaucracy while the Kao princes who believed themselves entitled to act as confidential advisers to the ruler, and who held posts at the top of the official hierarchy, found their actions checked by the influence of these favored men . . 56. As noted earlier, this type of court personnel arrangement can be traced back to the dynastic founder, Gao Huan, but in the context of Wucheng’s efforts at institutionalizing court structures it tended to work against the interests of the Altaic elite. One wonders if the impact of the 564 Northern Zhou—Turkish assault was not being felt here, as well. In 564 the Altaic military elite and imperial agnates stood solidly behind the throne and faced down the invasion threat. Wuchengdi demonstrated a degree of inexperience and fear during this time and seems to have played a distinctly secondary role in managing the crisis. The fact that as

55 Bs 92.3042–3. 56 Holmgren, 1990, 291. the collapse of the northern qi 113 soon as the crisis passed this same Altaic elite would be confronted by an increasingly distant throne must have been galling. He Shikai’s advice in assisting Wuchengdi to stabilize his rule in the early years was crucial. In 563, following He’s advice, Wuchengdi appointed a stable coterie of experienced administrators to oversee routine imperial administrative functions at Ye and to oversee the militarily crucial administrative functions of the Board of Cavalry and the Central Army (nei jibing 內騎兵) and the Board of Infantry and Garrisons (wai bubing 外步兵), both offices located at Jinyang.57 In fact, the two men who controlled the latter two military boards had held these positions (or ones similar to them) since the days of Gao Huan and were considered highly competent and experienced. They both appear to be Chinese.58 He Shikai also advised Wuchengdi to relax and enjoy himself and let his appointed courtiers worry about administrative affairs. Additionally, Wuchengdi only met in formal audience with his court every three to four days, and during the audience wrote brief remarks on submitted documents, said little, and then quickly dismissed the court.59 TheZizhi Tongjian presents these actions in a negative light as the advice of a sybarite to a minimally competent king. Holmgren contributes to this negative impression by noting that “. . . by 563, Kao Chan [Wuchengdi] was drunk more often than not, and most political and administrative matters which required close cooperation between the bureaucracy and the imperial person were in the hands of Kao Yuan-hai.”60 Kao Yuanhai was replaced by He Shikai as the imperial confidante when the above courses of action were suggested to the throne. These negative comments misrepresent the historical context. The individuals He Shikai tapped as strategic administrative managers were eminently competent, comprising a mix of Chinese and Northern Wei court Xianbei individuals. Some of these Chinese individuals were viewed as distinct from the Chinese literary-cultural court elite. For example, in his early years Zhao Yanshen 趙彥深, who Wuchengdi placed in charge of the Department

57 Mao Hanguang 毛漢光, Zhong’guo Zhong’gu Zhengzhi shi 中國中古政治史 (Taibei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1989), 92–93. Also, Yang Yaokun 楊曜坤, “Dong Wei Bei Qi Bingzhi Gailun 東魏北齊兵制概論,” in Wei Jin Nanbeichao Lunwenji 魏晉南北朝論文集 (Jinan: Qilu shushe, 1991), 119–121. 58 Bs 50.2001, 2004. 59 ZzTj 169.5234. 60 Holmgren, 1990, 283. Miyakawa Hisayuki 宮川尚志 expresses a view similar to the Zizhi Tongjian regarding the personal qualities and policies of He Shikai. See his Rokuchō shi kenkyū 六朝史研究 (Tokyo: Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkokai, 1956), 428. 114 chapter four of State Affairs was considered of low elite status (han 寒) and not suitable to associate with Chinese courtiers of breeding and refinement.61 He Shikai himself had little interest in Confucianism and related ritual and culturalistic concerns—he favored practical, experienced administrators. Wuchengdi’s delegation of administrative authority to strategic managers and his moderate court schedule were probably a reaction to the management style of the previous monarch, Xiaozhao (r. 560–561), who was criticized by his own close advisers for micro-managing court administrative affairs.62 He Shikai introduced Zu Ting 祖珽, a brilliant but opportunistic Chinese courtier, into the inner advisory circle which resulted in his excellent strategy of imperial retirement in 565. Zu Ting would have a bumpy career—in 567 he was sent out to the provinces, but He Shikai had him recalled to the court in 569. In 573 (two years after the assassination of He Shikai) Zu Ting was again sent out to the provinces where he died a natural death at his provincial posting. Another outstanding characteristic of He was his parsimonious use of violence in the course of factional struggles.63 In the political crisis of 569 following the death of Wuchengdi, He Shikai guided Empress Dowager Hu’s de facto regency regime as he dealt with the deceased emperor’s powerful cousin, Rui 叡, who was demanding that the Empress Dowager remove He Shikai from the court, which would presumably put Rui in charge of guiding the regency regime. Gao Rui was not alone, he was supported by Run 潤, a concubine son of Gao Huan, and Yanzong 延宗, a concubine son of Gao Cheng, as well as some high ranking courtiers.64 He Shikai, with the cooperation of the Empress Dowager Hu, stopped the political offensive of the princes of the blood and in the end only Rui was executed, the other members of the factions were sent out to high provincial postings. He Shikai’s reluctance to use violence probably reflects the intri- cate personal relationships that held the Northern Qi court together. For example, in the aftermath of the later failed coup effort by Houzhu’s younger brother, Yan, in 571 (wherein He Shikai was killed) the general Hulü Guang councilled against extensive use of violence for fear it would upset too many powerful families.

61 BQs 38.506. 62 Bs 7.271–2. 63 See Holmgren’s comments in 1990, 324. 64 BQs 13.172. the collapse of the northern qi 115

The outcome of the 569 crisis under He Shikai’s management was that the court was able to resume its daily routine rather rapidly and the circle of imperial advisers and administrative managers emerged relatively unscathed (though there were some defections). Imperial agnates had been tamed without excessive bloodshed. After the crisis, the Qi court continued to stabilize and also advanced its geo-strategic position on the Hedong border with the Northern Zhou. From 570 to the middle of 571 Qi forces under the generals Hulü Guang and Duan Shao 段韶 continued to fortify the Qi positions north of the Fen River, in the passes to the east of this zone that gave passage from Shanxi to the Loyang area, and actually ejected Northern Zhou forces from the area north of the Fen and east of the Yellow River.65 This progress came to a crashing halt with the fluke murder of He Shikai in the seventh lunar month of 571. At this time Houzhu was 15 years old and functioning under the guidance of his mother and He Shikai, for whom he had considerable respect. His uterine brother, Yan, then approximately thirteen years old attempted a palace coup guided and encouraged by senior courtiers (including Empress Hu’s brother-in-law) whose immediate goal was to kill He Shikai. Yan himself resented He, possibly because of He’s efforts on behalf of his elder brother’s ascension to the throne in 565, or possibly due to ongoing efforts to remove Yan from powerful military posts that gave him access to the palace guard at Ye. 66 Whatever the causes, the results were that He Shikai was killed, but Yan’s coup attempt failed to topple Houzhu, and Yan himself would be executed by the end of 571 along with a number of his co-conspirators. With He Shikai gone, however, the court would blunder from one political crisis to another. The second level leadership that was cultivated under He Shikai’s guidance, such as Zu Ting, lacked a sense of political finesse and timing, which was what caused Zu Ting to be removed from the court in 573. Others, like Gao Anahong 高阿那肱 and Han Changluan 韓長鸞, Altaic companions of the young Houzhu when he was still heir apparent prior to 565, seemed to lack vision and a sense of political direction. If anything, they may have been wedded to the old fashioned vision of a collegial relationship between the throne and the court Altaic elites. Houzhu himself slowly emerges as an independent policy maker after the death of He Shikai, but he seems clumsy in his

65 Mao Hanguang, 131–166. 66 Yang Yaokun, 126. 116 chapter four efforts to push forward his father’s program of institutionalization of the court and promoting the power interests of the throne. Houzhu authorized experiments in political brinkmanship that ultimately destabilized the court and hobbled the throne. Yan’s unsuccessful coup occurred in the seventh lunar month of 571, by the ninth lunar month Yan was executed, and by the tenth lunar month Houzhu had placed his mother, the Empress Dowager Hu under temporary house arrest. This latter action occurred, in part, because Yan’s execution had been accomplished without her permission, so Houzhu was concerned regarding possible acts of revenge, and in part it was Houzhu’s means of bringing the de facto regency to an end—he now ruled in his own right at the age of approximately sixteen. The arrest of his mother, however, marks the beginning of the slow unraveling of the factional coalition He Shikai had constructed to protect and guide the throne. He’s murder catapaulted Zu Ting to leadership in the outer court from 571 throught 573. During most of this time period Zu Ting seems to have worked closely with an inner court group of companion/advisers to Houzhu comprising the offspring of Central Asian merchants, eunuchs, and Houzhu’s wet nurse, Lu Lingxuan 陸令萱, and her son, Mu Tipo 穆提婆.67 Another relatively distinct group advising Houzhu were Altaic leaders like Gao Anahong and Han Changluan, who were active in the military and outer court affairs, though, they seem to have kept their distance from the former two groups. From the remarks in the Bei shi, Houzhu made unprecedented use of such informal inner court companions, though, the politically active ones like the Central Asian, He Hongzhen 何洪珍, and the eunuch, Deng Changyong 鄧長顒, seemed to be knowledgeable and serious politicians. Huang Yongnian notes that important eunuchs like Deng Changyong often supported Zu Ting’s Chinese style literati projects at the court. Huang also argues that lurid reports from the Bei shi regarding eunuch interference in court administration are grossly exaggerated.68 Generally, the members of the Altaic clique around the throne tended to oppose the Central Asian,

67 Bs 92.3054–5. Holmgren, “Politics of the Inner Court . . .” 1990, 278–281, has noted that although Lu Lingxuan was classified as a menial in the household of the Gao family, she was actually a scion of the elite Xianbei Lu family, the grand-daughter of Lu Rui 陸叡, who was very prominent in the Northern Wei. Her servitude was due to the political missteps of her husband, otherwise she probably had extensive social/political contacts throughout the court. The Lu family, including her father and brothers, continued to be active in the Northern Qi court. 68 Huang Yongnian, Wenshi Tanwei, 73–77. the collapse of the northern qi 117

He Hongzhen.69 For example, the Altaic clique was opposed to Zu Ting’s proposal to execute Hulü Guang in 572, a move supported by He Hongzhen,70 and they vehemently opposed the effort by Zu Ting to be promoted to an active military commander of the Ye palace guard in late 572.71 Between late 571 through 573 Zu Ting, with the full support of the throne and its inner circle attempted an unprecedented effort to concentrate court power in his hands. It is important to emphasize that Zu Ting was acting as an agent of the throne. This was an effort by Houzhu to radically accelerate his father Wuchengdi’s institutionalizing and throne centralizing policies which would directly target the prerogatives of the Altaic court elite. Ironically, the political reverberations from this effort would further shred the broad based imperial faction constructed by He Shikai. In late 571 Zu Ting gained control of the Department of State Affairs by removing Zhao Yanshen, an old He Shikai associate, from the court and sending him to a provincial posting.72 This move had a direct impact on the Altaic military elite, which apparently took Zu Ting by surprise. Hulü Guang, the senior general at the court since the death of Duan Shao in 571 and Houzhu’s father-in-law, publicly complained that military leaders were not being consulted by the court on military related administrative policy, for which he blamed Zu Ting.73 But Hulü Guang did not stop at this, he also publicly criticized gifts the throne itself made to the imperial favorite, Mu Tipo, which in part were taken from military land holdings around Jinyang.74 Finally, Hulü Guang publicly criticized mass bestowals that the throne had made to the female inner court and to eunuchs. The Bei shi quotes Guang as saying, “The troops lack pants and leggings. The throne bestowed tens of thousands of pairs of pants and leggings [to the inner court] and the storehouses are empty. Does this make any sense?”75 It is possible, though I cannot offer definitive confirmation, that this mass bestowal (apparently unprecedented in size judging from Guang’s reaction) was a sign that the throne was engaged in an effort to solidify inner court loyalty, though, the texts do not explain

69 The dynastic annals offer very little information regarding these inner companions of the throne. See ZzTj 17.5327; BQs 44.594. 70 ZzTj 171.5308. Huang Yongnian, Wenshi Tanwei, 80. 71 Bs 47.1742. 72 Bs 55.2008. 73 ZzTj 171.5307. 74 ZzTj 171.5307; Bs 54.1969. 75 Bs 54.1970. 118 chapter four the specific rationale for this massive gift giving. Both Wuchengdi, but particularly Houzhu, were committed to significantly expanding their inner court, which they used as a political advisory resource as well as a separate recreational arena. A previous example of mass bestowal of goods by the throne was by Wenxuandi in 550 just after ascending the throne as the first Northern Qi emperor. As noted earlier, the ascension of Wenxuandi was realized in the face of opposition from the court Altaic elites including Wenxuan’s mother, the Empress Dowager Lou.76 After this, Wenxuan rejected the advice of his own Chinese councillors who were eager to conciliate the court Altaic elite, and appointed his main consort, a Chinese woman, to be Empress instead of one of his secondary consorts who was the daughter of a high ranking court Altaic family.77 Immediately after this series of strong willed decisions, Wenxuan proclaimed that the former Northern Wei emperor’s privy storehouse would be opened and its contents completely distributed to all court members. The bestowals and feasting lasted a week.78 This was clearly an effort to curry court political support and heal recent political

76 ZzTj 5042–3. Unlike all the subsequent Northern Qi monarchs, only Wenxuan staged his formal ascension ceremonies at Ye instead of Jinyang. In part, this was because the puppet Eastern Wei emperor resided at Ye so it would be formally correct to stage the abdication ceremonies at this venue. Another part of the rationale may also have been due to a desire on the part of Wenxuan to avoid friction with the entrenched Altaic elite at Jinyang which opposed the creation of a new dynasty at that point in time. This latter group, including his mother, the Empress Dowager Lou, was fearful that this move would create political instability. This fear was not baseless. Hamaguchi Shigekuni has noted that the Western Wei regime under Yuwen Tai immediately began preparations for a massive eastern campaign following GaoYang’s ascension in the fifth lunar month of 550. The Western Wei assumption was that ‘public opinion’ would be taken aback by Gao Yang’s (Wenxuandi) bold move and would cooperate with Western Wei invading forces. ‘Public opinion’ refers to various warlords on the North China Plain and maybe even diehard Wei loyalists within the Eastern Wei court. Earlier, this type of development had made it possible for the Western Wei to invade and then retain the strategically crucial Hongnong salient after the disastrous defeat of the Eastern Wei forces under Gao Huan at Shayuan. Many powerful Hongnong warlords saw it as advantageous to their interests to support the Western Wei. To the chagrin of the Western Wei leaders, no such ‘public’ dissatisfaction materialized. The planned invasion of 550 was aborted by the end of the year amidst inclement weather and general disappointment. See Hamaguchi Shigekuni 1966, 191–92. After Gao Yang ascended the throne he went out of his way to appease his court. Tanigawa Michio notes that GaoYang not only made sacrifices to the spirits of the Gao family ancestors, he also notified non-agnatic co-founders of the earlier Gao ‘bakufu’ of his ascension to the throne. See Tanigawa 2004, 303. Tanigawa also renders a vivid narration of the Altaic opposition to Gao Yang’s dynastic plans on page 205. 77 ZzTj 163.5046–7; BQs 4.52. 78 BQs 4.53. the collapse of the northern qi 119 rifts. Houzhu seems to be engaging in similar activities with regard to his inner court, presumably as a means of gaining support for his centralizing policies being implemented by Zu Ting. The decision to execute Hulü Guang for his obstructionism (which will also result in a series of changes in the person of the Empress) was realized by Zu Ting in close consultation with the throne and its close inner court companions, particularly He Hongzhen.79 The execution was accomplished in the sixth lunar month of 572. Hulü Guang was a renowned, highly competent general, feared and respected by both his own troops and his opponents. He was also the imperial father-in-law with multiple affinal ties to the imperial family, and the son of one of the founding Altaic Huaishuo Garrison members of Gao Huan’s early regime. One would assume that his murder would have devastated the elite officer corps and disrupted the court, but contrary to expectations, the murder does not seem to have had any significant discernible effect. This political maneuver was certainly daring. As noted regarding the view of Han Changluan above, Altaic members of the imperial clique do not seem to have approved this move. There was no absolutely compelling reason to utilize violence to deal with Guang—some form of polite provincial exile probably would have served the purpose of removing his direct influence from the court scene. This certainly breaks with the tradition, so admirably upheld by He Shikai, of using violence as an extreme last resort, and thus setting a dangerous precedent. The fact that the Altaic elite seem to have been outside the decision- making loop regarding the final approval of the murder also is disturbing. Nevertheless, the immediate political impact of the murder was negligible, and may have gained the throne some near term prestige by demonstrating that no courtier, regardless how exalted in status, could publicly undermine imperial political goals. Zu Ting and the throne seemed to have first ensured that Guang was politically isolated at the court before proceeding with the murder. The Zizhi Tongjian indicates that by nature Guang was a taciturn individual who was not active in court social life, and was isolated from the political cronyism and various forms of factionalism that had its roots in court social functions.80 Earlier, when Hulü Guang criticized the throne’s massive bestowal of pants and leggings to court members he offended the

79 ZzTj 171.5308–9. 80 ZzTj 171.5308. 120 chapter four recipients of these items who responded that Hulü Guang should mind his own business.81 Guang seemed to have a knack for alienating his fellow courtiers and Altaic generals. In 564, in the immediate aftermath of the Northern Zhou-Turk assault against Jinyang, Hulü Guang criticized Duan Shao, who was his senior in rank, for permitting the Turkish cavalry to withdraw at their ease, pillaging as they went. Addressing himself directly to Duan, in front of their peers, Guang said, “So Madam Duan is good at sending off our female guests.”82 This type of comment could not have earned Guang many friends. Surprisingly, after Guang’s death the officer corps seemed stable and maintained communication with the throne. Bei shi contains a vignette of Houzhu calmly discussing with leading officers a suitable candidate to succeed to the deceased Guang’s position of ranking military officer at the court.83 The Bei Qi shu biography of Moduolou Jingxian 莫多婁敬顯 also reveals a stable officer corps.84 Jingxian was also the son of one of the Altaic founding members of the regime and was one of Hulü Guang’s most trusted and favored military subordinates. Nevertheless, after Guang’s death Jingxian showed no signs of faltering in his loyalty to the throne. Houzhu entrusted him with the supervision of military patrols in Ye when the court was residing at Jinyang. Jingxian was executed by Zhou Wudi after the conquest of Ye for refusing to surrender at an earlier time. The success of the murder of Hulü Guang was rapidly followed by efforts on the part of Zu Ting to concentrate more power in his hands. In one of the more spectacular developments Zu Ting requested and received initial permission to assume the military rank of ling jun 領軍, which gave him command over the elite palace guard at Ye and possibly even at Jinyang. This was unprecedented because Zu Ting was a court Chinese (and also blind) and he was granted access to a position normally reserved for Altaic members of the court.85 This issue aroused

81 Bs 54.1970. 82 Bs 51.1846. 83 Bs 8.300. 84 BQs 19.253. 85 See Yang Yaokun, 126. The tradition regarding this command position goes back to the late Northern Wei court. See Hamaguchi Shigekuni 1966, 84. A more recent and detailed discussion is in Zhang Jinlong 2004, 760–67, where he emphasizes the appearance of this institution in the early 490’s as part of Northern Wei Xiaowendi’s administrative re-structuring acts. By the time of Houzhu it was common to have a few individuals holding the rank of lingjun simultaneously. Zu Ting would not have been the collapse of the northern qi 121 significant opposition among Altaic members of the imperial faction, including Mu Tipo, with whom Zu Ting had an otherwise smooth working relationship.86 The outcome is not clear, one receives the impression that imperial permission was rescinded. Assuming this to be the case, Zu Ting’s consolation was that some of the lesser figures that opposed his appointment were sent out to the provinces and he was given administrative oversight of the Jinyang based Central Board of Cavalry and the Board of Infantry and Garrisons.87 Before discussing this latter appointment, keep in mind that Zu Ting was acting on behalf of the throne. If, in fact, Zu Ting did not receive his desired military commission, that means the throne failed to place its direct representative into the formerly sacrosanct preserve of the Altaic elite. The fact that Houzhu even attempted to engage in such a maneuver indicates the extraordinary lengths to which the throne was ready to go to centralize its authority, and indeed, felt somewhat confident in its ability to do so. The consolation appointment mentioned above, would in fact be an effort to appease the throne, assuming its initial political gamble had failed. The two Boards mentioned above were critical in providing logistics support and administrative support to the Qi military. The two men in charge of the two Boards, Bai Jian 白建 and Tang Yong 唐邕, respectively, (Tang Yong was probably ethnically Chinese; the ethnic status of Bai Jian is not clear) had occupied these postings since the days of Gao Huan. He Shikai ratified their positions after Wuchengdi ascended the throne due to their competence and their ability to guarantee administrative continuity. Houzhu disrupted this pattern by placing Zu Ting in overall charge of the two Boards and removing at least one of these men from the court. There is no specific information regarding Bai Jian during this time period, but Tang Yong was suddenly impeached by censorial officials in the early 570’s and had his name removed from the register of courtiers. Later, at an unspecified date, he was re-appointed to high the only individual with this high rank (assuming he was, in fact, actually granted this rank). See Zhang Jinlong 2004, 849–851; 918. 86 See Bs 47.1742 for a more complete discussion of the depth of the Altaic opposition that is not presented in the ZzTj 171.5310–11 discussion. 87 TheZzTj 171.5310–11 explanation of these Boards is probably incorrect. It discusses the Ye based corvee coordination boards, not the Jinyang based military administrative boards. See Yang Yaokun’s discussion, 121. Yan Yaozhong affirms the Jinyang location of these two boards. See his essay, “Bei Qi Zhengzhi yu Shangshu Bingsheng 北齊政治與尚書並省,” Shanghai Shifan Daxue Xuebao 4 (1990): 37. Also, Cui Yanhua 崔彥華, “Jinyang zai Dong Wei Bei Qi Shi de Bafu he Bie Du Diwei 晉陽在東魏北齊時的霸府和別都地位,” Jinyang Xuekan 3 (2004): 22. 122 chapter four court positions.88 The pattern is very similar to that of Zhao Yanshen whom Zu Ting had removed from his central court posting in 571. Zhao returned to the court in 573 at the same time that Zu Ting himself was being exiled to a provincial posting on the North China Plain,89 and Tang Yong probably returned to the court at about the same time. Houzhu was engaged in a significant and potentially radical shake-up of the court, and the Hulü Guang murder was only the opening shot. Another aspect of Zu Ting’s agenda, which received at least partial support from the throne was the effort to create a more ‘aristocratic’ Chinese style court environment where criteria of family breeding and literary refinement would determine the hiring of court personnel. This seems to be the implication of the statement that Zu Ting wanted to purge the court of eunuchs and other low status groups like merchants and entertainers who circulated widely at the Northern Qi court and “. . . promote the sincere and engage the shi.” 90 This program bears resem- blances to the earlier agenda of Gao Cheng (Gao Huan’s eldest son), who in 543 revamped the Ye court and purged hanmen courtiers like the youthful Zhao Yanshen from their postings. Related to Zu Ting’s efforts in this regard was an initiative to create a Chinese style literary college, the Wenlin Academy in early 573.91 Houzhu himself strongly supported this project as did He Hongzhen and the powerful eunuch, Deng Changyong.92 Altaic members of the imperial faction seemed to have had little interest in these issues. In this surging political environment, Zu Ting over-reached by trying to purge members of the emperor’s inner court clique, his nursemaid Lu Lingxuan and her son, Mu Tipo, whom he felt were becoming obstacles to his political agenda. I cannot state with any certainty, but attempting to remove these individuals may have been an opening effort at purging powerful Altaic members of the inner imperial clique. In the previous fight over Zu Ting’s military commission, Mu Tipo worked closely with other Altaic figures in opposing this appointment. At any rate, Zu Ting failed in this factional maneuver and was himself permanently exiled to a provincial posting in Huaibei in the fourth lunar month of 573.93

88 Bs 55.2002. 89 Bs 55.2008. 90 Bs 47.1743. 91 ZzTj 171.5316. 92 BQs 44.591; 45.603. 93 ZzTj 171.5322. the collapse of the northern qi 123

After Zu Ting was removed from the court, the pace of change seems to have slackened and Altaic members of the imperial faction became more prominent, such as Duan Xiaoyan 段孝言, the younger brother of the deceased senior general, Duan Shao. As far as Yan Zhitui, an ardent Zu Ting supporter was concerned, the removal of Ting from the court resulted in a collapse of court discipline and morale, which ultimately contributed to the dynastic collapse of 577.94 Yan Zhitui was somewhat alarmist, what appears to have occurred was a return to the pre-571 status quo that He Shikai had constructed. The practical, competent administrators, Zhao Yanshen and Tang Yong were recalled to high central court functions, the Chinese style ‘aristocraticization’ program of personnel hiring was halted, due, in particular, to the efforts of Duan Xiaoyan.95 History, however, never repeats itself, political equilibriums are always dynamic and subject to pressures from unforeseen, contingent developments. In the third lunar month of 573, approximately one month prior to the ejection of Zu Ting from the court, the Chen regime began the reconquest of the region between the Huai River and the Yangzi from the Qi. By the eigth lunar month Qi forces had been pushed out of this region and Chen forces were probing into areas north of the Huai River. The Chen offensive triggered a political crisis at the Northern Qi court resulting in the sudden execution of six leading Chinese courtiers. These courtiers had submitted a jointly signed public petition to the throne giving strong advice as to how the emperor should comport himself in the face of the Chen military advance. With the exception of the 560 succession crisis this was the bloodiest purge in Northern Qi history.96 Three of the six men executed were Wenlin Academy members and five of the men can be directly or indirectly associated with Zu Ting personally or with his power centralization policies and Chinese style court aristocraticization policies. One victim, Liu Ti 劉逖 had severed his personal ties to Zu Ting in 567, but he was clearly a literary shi participant at the Qi court.97 Another victim, Zhang Diaohu 張雕虎, was closely linked to the patronage of He Hongzhen, who tended to work in tandem with Zu Ting.98 However, as Albert E. Dien noted, simply having

94 BQs 45.624. 95 BQs 16.215. 96 ZzTj171.5327–8. 97 BQs 45.616. 98 BQs 44.594–5. 124 chapter four been an associate of Zu Ting does not seem to have been the rationale behind the execution of these men—many other former Zu Ting parti- sans and Academy members were not molested.99 Dien hypothesizes a generalized Xianbei versus Chinese ethnic friction exacerbated by the tense political climate triggered the violence. Holmgren modifies this understanding by positing an extreme sensitivity on the part of Altaic members of the court to efforts by Chinese courtiers of dubious loyalty to participate in national security debates during a time of crisis.100 Holmgren may be on the right track, but the historical context needs to be made more specific. Between 571 through 573 Zu Ting had spear- headed an unprecedented effort by the throne to expand its power at the expense of the Altaic elite, to the extent of attempting to grant to a blind Chinese courtier a strategic military commission as well as giving him control over crucial military administrative offices. With the throne’s encouragement Zu Ting had accumulated extraordinary power into his hands. This effort had been significantly slowed by the expulsion of Zu Ting from the court and the re-establishment of a more moderate political dispensation favorable to the court Altaic elite. After all this turbulent infighting, however, having Chinese courtiers formerly associated with Zu Ting’s policies publicly demand a voice in deciding a significant national security issue may have been viewed as an attempt to overturn this newly established court political equilibrium. It may also have been viewed as a covert effort by the throne to wriggle out from under the new balance of power at the court. Han Changluan, one of the Altaic members of the imperial faction, made the outlandish allegation that these Chinese courtiers may very well have been planning to rebel,101 and then, as Dien noted, “With little further investigation, those who had signed the petition were summoned, and six of the principals were decapitated . . .”102 From the perspective of this analysis, the reason for the sudden violence was that the throne was forced to bow to Altaic courtier pressure and make examples of these specific Chinese courtiers for the above- stated reasons. Indeed, the throne itself was being cowed and humili-

99 Albert E. Dien, “Yen Chih-t’ui: A Buddho-Confucian,” in Confucian Personalities, ed. Denis Twitchett & Arthur F. Wright, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 60–1. 100 Holmgren, 1990, 321. 101 ZzTj 171.5328. 102 Albert Dien, 60. the collapse of the northern qi 125 ated, and a demonstration of its bona fides to the Altaic elite was the scapegoating of the six Chinese courtiers. Thus, Houzhu, under pressure, was implicitly stating to his court that he foreswore the radical centralizing policies of the 571 through 573 period. For the subsequent period after 573 Holmgren notes, “There is very little information about factional squabbles at court between the time of Zu Ting’s second expulsion [573] and the fall of the dynasty in February 577.”103 This is an interesting way of putting the issue, because there is indeed information about factional squabbling, but nothing overtly dramatic or of transcending significance. In the Zizhi Tongjian discussion for early 575, after listing the names of leading courtiers, states that each one had their own personal factions and used their court positions as a source of profit and pleasure.104 A 575 memorial to the Northern Zhou emperor Wudi, by his general Wei Xiaokuan 韋孝寬, lists as one of the reasons the Qi could be militarily defeated that “. . . the Qi court is besotted, its government is factionally splintered and they are immersed in hedonis- tic pleasures . . .”105 But one has to ask, in view of the late 573 humiliation of the throne with the execution of loyal Chinese courtiers, what kind of active role could the throne play—it was committed to maintaining the status quo at the court. Additionally, in the presence of a politically inept and politically crippled emperor, lacking the guidance of a dominant coordinating figure like He Shikai, the only thing left for various court factions to do was to dicker with each other and to drift listlessly without a clear policy direction. What was more disheartening was that this policy drift was occurring in the face of a Chen offensive that had reached the center of the region north of the Huai River by early 575.106 It is doubtful if the Chen forces could have withstood a concerted counter- attack by the Northern Qi central armies. For example, in late 575 the Qi stopped the Northern Zhou offensive at Loyang and in late 576 pushed the first Northern Zhou drive up the Fen River back down again. The Qi military capabilities were still intact, they simply lacked proper political guidance. This situation may explain why in early 577, when Houzhu was facing the Northern Zhou armies in front of Jinzhou (Pingyang), he rejected the carefully considered conservative tactical advice of his senior general and Altaic confidante, Gao Anahong, to adopt a defensive

103 Holmgren, 1990, 319. 104 ZzTj 172.5339–40. 105 ZzTj 172.5342. 106 ZzTj 172.5339. 126 chapter four posture in the Jinzhou area and let the Northern Zhou troops make the first offensive move. Instead, Houzhu accepted the blustery advice of non-specialists in his entourage not to show weakness, and so risked an offensive open field engagement which he ultimately lost.107 If the analysis here is accurate, then Houzhu’s political weakness and passivity since late 573 was a political albatross that he felt he could be rid of by a successful and dramatic performance on the field of combat, reverting to a tactic used by earlier Qi emperors to bolster their political standing. As we know, his gambit failed.

107 ZzTj 172.5358. CHAPTER FIVE

THE NORTHERN ZHOU CASE

The reign of the Northern Zhou monarch, Xuandi (r. 578–580; he retired in early 579), is accorded little attention in the secondary sources. When noticed, there is a tendency to label this individual as a bloodthirsty, sybaritic ruler who brought his dynasty to ruination.1 The fact that Xuandi did succeed in alienating important segments of his court is attested to by his early and sudden demise. Nevertheless, it is possible to make Xuandi’s political actions understandable within their proper historical context. The task of this chapter will be to delineate the political legacy which informed the decisions made by Xuandi. The political actions of this monarch suggest he was striving to make the throne into a direct and functioning extension of his political will as opposed to a consensus creating institution. Xuandi sought to create a tight inner cabinet, eschewing the kind of elite inclusivity, or at the very least the impression thereof, that his father, Wudi (r. 561–578), the 577 conqueror of the Northern Qi went to great lengths to create. Much of the stability of Wudi’s relatively long reign rested on his ability to make enduring political compromises without jeapordizing the authority of the throne. Xuandi, by contrast, was rigid and uncompromising in his efforts to secure independence of action for the throne—a goal which he attempted to accomplish in an impatient and overly rapid fashion. Xuandi’s major concerns were related to diminishing—or sometimes eliminating—the political roles of his close senior agnates, particularly his uncles, and the high advisors of his deceased father. Xuandi’s attitude toward the foregoing individuals was also closely related to his concerns regarding the stabilization of the imperial succession, especially given the recent past history of the Northern Zhou monarchy, which we will discuss below. The tactics used by the throne to accomplish its goals were murder, heavy-handed, even outré, use of imperial prestige symbolism, and transparent divide and rule tactics designed to keep his senior courtiers off balance. Imperial retirement was part of this of

1 Tanigawa Michio, Sui Tang Diguo Xingcheng Shi Lun, 2004, 313. 128 chapter five this overall course of action designed to secure maximum freedom of movement for the throne. Indeed, in the Northern Zhou case imperial retirement as a means of manipulating imperial prestige symbolism was an extraordinarily prominent component of the process. Of all the the retirement cases discussed in this book the Northern Zhou case is the most sparsely documented, though the concerns motivating the actions of this monarch can be readily deduced from the history of the regime. This chapter will present a survey of Northern Zhou political history, with the goal of constructing a historical perspective from which vantage point Xuandi’s motivations will become apparent to the reader. In the detailed discussion below, the text will point to a political style of compromise and cooptation that was initiated by Yuwen Tai—one of the key founders of this regime—and continued into the reign of Wudi. This political approach was initiated by Yuwen Tai as a means of exercising control over the complex political situation that prevailed during the early years of the regime, when it was still called the Western Wei. Xuandi is notable for making an abrupt and clear break with this political approach. After Yuwen Tai died in 556, his nephew, Yuwen Hu became the formal regent and de facto ruler of the newly founded Northern Zhou, while the children of Yuwen Tai who ascended the throne functioned as monarchical figureheads. This ongoing regency over late adolescent emperors capable of ruling in their own right added a new level of tension to the political situation, and put a strain on the willingness of the throne and its close associates to act in a flexible, compromising fashion. This tension was reflected in the efforts by the first three Yuwen monarchs, operating under the watchful eye of their cousin, a generational equal, to form tight conspiratorial cliques around themselves in a series of unsuccessful efforts to throw off the Yuwen Hu tutelage. Hu was finally murdered by Wudi, the third Northern Zhou emperor, in 572. This tendency to form tight cliques around the throne was not fully abandoned by Wudi and was significantly accentuated by Xuandi in his more radical approach to court politics. This chapter will also demonstrate that the tensions created by Yuwen Hu’s long and uncomfortable period of political tutelage made the imperial succession a very sensitive issue. Before he was killed in 572, Hu had, somewhat reluctantly, executed two of his emperor-cousins for ‘disobedience’ and ended up dictating a series of fraternal successions from among the children of his deceased uncle, Yuwen Tai. When Wudi freed himself from his elder cousin’s domination, he dealt with the succession issue by keeping his proclaimed heir apparent under a very the northern zhou case 129 rigorous observation and training regimen by close trusted associates, without, at the same time, overly alienating courtiers who had been former political associates of Yuwen Hu. Wudi attempted to build a big ‘political tent’ at his court. Xuandi, however, would eliminate the ‘big tent’ approach and attempt to create a very narrow, intense factional base at court to support imperial initiatives. The effort failed and Xuandi would lose his life and ultimately, the dynasty in the process.

The Early History of the Northern Zhou

The Northern Zhou, unlike many dynasties which were usually founded by one principal individual, was distinctive in that it originated as a collegial military junta. Yuwen Tai, the individual who eventually emerged as the founding dynast—but who never proclaimed himself emperor—was initially elected to the position of junta chief executive by his fellow generals. The military clique which elected Tai was composed primarily of individuals from the late Northern Wei Six Garrisons region of Inner Mongolia, especially from the Wuchuan garrison. Many of these generals also came from families which had served as officials and officers in these garrison communities. In the turmoil and disasters attendant upon the suppression of the Revolt of the Six Garrisons in the 520’s, the above militarists, many by a most circuitous route, found their way into the service of the army of Erzhu Rong, the late Northern Wei hegemon based near modern Taiyuan in Shanxi. During the period 529 through 530, in a successful effort to crush dissident satraps in the Wei River valley (the Guanzhong region), Rong dispatched his younger brother, Erzhu Tianguang, to the area with a small army. The generals from this detached army were to form the ruling elite of the subsequent Guanzhong junta. Tianguang’s immediate subordinates were Houmochen Yue 侯莫陳悅 and Heba Yue 賀拔嶽. In 532, following the assassination of Erzhu Rong in 529, Tianguang returned east in order to assist in the ultimately unsuccessful effort of checking the growing power of Gao Huan, who would go on to become the founding dynast of the Northern Qi regime. Tianguang would die in the course of combat in the east and Erzhu power would collapse completely. Meanwhile, Guanzhong was left in the hands of the two previously mentioned generals, who briefly managed to co-exist, due mostly to their desire to consolidate their control over sub-regions associated with the Wei River valley. When Xiaowudi, the semi-puppet 130 chapter five

Northern Wei emperor in Loyang, subject to the hegemonic power of Gao Huan, ascended the throne in 532 he formally recognized Heba Yue as Field Viceroy of Guanzhong (Guanzhong daxingtai 關中大行台) and Houmochen Yue had the nominally lower rank of Longxi Governor- General and Governor of Qinzhou (dudu Longyou zhujunshi and Qinzhou cishi 都督隴右諸軍事; 秦州刺史).2 This was simply granting formal recognition to a pre-existing geo-political situation wherein the Long Mountains served as a boundary between the two satrapies. At this time, Heba Yue’s viceregal left assistant deputy executive administrator and his field command deputy chief of staff was Yuwen Tai (zuo cheng 左丞 and fu sima 府司馬). In late 532 Tai was sent out as Governor of Xiazhou in an effort by Heba Yue to establish firm control over the eastern Ordos region. With this same goal in mind regarding the western portion of the Ordos, Yue attempted to effect an alliance of convenience with his rival, Houmochen Yue. In 534, in the course of discussing military tactics with the latter at his forward base near modern Lingwu on the Yellow River, Heba Yue was assassinated. Heba Yue’s principal generals hastily reassembled some 300 hundred miles south of the tragedy in the safety of their base at Pingliang, on the eastern side of the Long Mountains, in order to discuss policy and choose a new leader. Yuwen Tai was not present at these meetings and probably did not immediately know of the events which had transpired.

The Early Rise of Yuwen Tai

In the efforts of the generals to select a leader, Yuwen Tai was not the candidate of their immediate choice. The senior general, Kou Luo 寇洛, was first nominated, but he voluntarily stepped aside.3 Another option considered was to invite Heba Sheng 賀拔勝, Yue’s elder brother serving the Northern Wei emperor, Xiaowudi, then stationed in the Middle Yangzi region by the city of Xiangfan, to come to the Wei River valley. A third possibility debated was to seek a suitable candidate from the Northern Wei court at Loyang.4 Under insistent pressure from the general, Zhao Gui 趙貴 and others who argued that Yuwen Tai was

2 Zhou shu [Zs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 14.225; and 14.226, respectively. 3 Zs 15.237–38. 4 Zs 27.439. the northern zhou case 131 capable and conveniently close at hand, Tai was ultimately elected to be the Guanzhong junta chief executive. Tai was a well known clique member, formerly close to the deceased leader, and equal in status, or possibly even junior to many of the generals he was elected to lead. As the Zhou shu notes, “Initially, Zhao Gui . . . and the other [generals] were all equals of Taizu [Yuwen Tai].”5 During this very early period, clearly Zhao Gui was a major figure in guiding the junta. Gui was also the leader of the fifty picked men who entered the camp of Houmochen Yue and spirited away the remains of Heba Yue in a courageous act of loyalty and respect to the deceased hegemon. Perhaps to avoid undue friction and jealosy from his military associates, Gui did not actively pursue the chief executive role, but it is telling that after Yuwen Tai was elected, he appointed Gui to be his deputy chief of staff ( fu sima). Subsequently, Gui held a number of sensitive regional posting west of the Long Mountains and in circa 538 was appointed Tai’s left chief of staff ( fu zuozhangshi 府左長史).6 After Tai’s election, the junta went on to defeat Houmochen Yue, and following this victory, the Northern Wei court at Loyang bestowed upon Tai the expansive title of Field Viceroy of the West (more specifically, west of the Hangu pass—Guanxi daxingtai). Then, in the latter half of the year, the Northern Wei court, under Xiaowudi, having provoked open warfare with Gao Huan, fled west to the Wei River valley with a few thousand members of the palace guard and high ranking courtiers, where they re-established themselves at Chang’an under the protection of the Yuwen Tai led junta.7 In coping with the defeated forces of Houmochen Yue and then with the members of the expatriate Northern Wei court, the Guanzhong junta demonstrated a pronounced tendency to absorb newly arrived military political elites and give them access to a degree of power. This was not an open ended commitment—by the end of 534 Tai had the Northern Wei monarch poisoned due to his unfortunate efforts to forge an independent imperial policy. The arrival of this refugee court initiated the beginning of the east—west civil war, since Gao Huan immediately established a new puppet Northern Wei emperor on the throne and then moved the capital from Loyang to Ye,

5 Tanigawa, 2004, 281. Zs 16.263. The succession options considered by this headless junta in 534 are also summed up in Zhou Shuanglin 周雙林, “Bei Zhou Zhao Gui, Dugu Xin Shijian Kaolun 北周趙貴獨孤信事件考論,” Wenshi 40 (1994): 57–58. 6 Zs 16.262. 7 ZzTj 156.4851. 132 chapter five on the North China Plain near the southeastern foothills of the Taihang Mountains. The location at Ye cut off the ability of the puppet emperor to secretly communicate with the Wei River valley, as the previous Xiaowudi had done, much to Gao Huan’s annoyance. A point worth considering regarding Tai’s policy of cooptation in these early years is his effort to provide himself with a cadre of loyal subordinates, drawn from former generals under Houmochen Yue, members of the rump Northern Wei court, and from local warlords and other sources, capable of counter-balancing the influence of the Wuchuan clique of generals who had elected him to leadership. Many of these individuals were strategically placed in the Western Wei court at Chang’an as palace guard commanders to keep an eye on the puppet emperor, others served in Tai’s autonomous administrative and military establishment, which had been duly authorized by the puppet Wei emperor. In 534, after the rump Northern Wei court under Xiaowudi had arrived in Chang’an, the Northern Wei monarch authorized Yuwen Tai to establish an autonomous Chancellory, thus changing his title from Field Viceroy to Chancellor (chengxiang 丞相). The puppet court had its own standard late Northern Wei administrative structure of shangshu sheng, zhongshu sheng, etc., presumably under the immediate authority of the Chancellor, who in addition had his own staff reporting directly to him—this was Tai’s chengxiang fu 丞相府. The dates are in dispute, but as early as 535 or no later than 553 (scholarly opinion favors the latter date) Tai was authorized by the second (or perhaps third) puppet Northern Wei emperor to establish a Supreme Military Command with full staff- ing—this was Tai’s dudu zhongwai zhujunshi 都督中外諸軍事. It seems probable that in 553 Tai’s Chancellory establishment was abolished and the Supreme Command staff was left standing, with personnel distinct from the former Chancellory staff.8 The Supreme Command gave Tai

8 Wang Zhongluo, in his Bei Zhou Liu Dian 北周六典 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979) states on page 15 that Tai’s Chancellory (chengxiang fu) was established in 534 and on page 519 that his Supreme Command headquarters (dudu zhongwaizhujunshi fu) was established in 553. Hamaguchi Shigekuni supports this position in his Shin Kan Zui To shi no Kenkyu, 1966, 195, 243, endnote 40. However, Huang Yongnian, in his Wenshi Tanwei, 90 footnote 1, has pointed out an inconsistency in the data. TheZhou shu biography of Yuwen Gui, 19.313, specifically notes that he was appointed Supreme Command headquarters chief of staff (zhangshi) in 550, three years before the office was supposed to have been established. Wang Zhongluo’s Bei Zhou Liu Dian entry for this position simply notes that Yuwen Gui was promoted to this post but does not mention the date listed in the Zhou shu biography. Huang argues that this office was established in 535, buttressing his argument with data from other parts of the Zhou shu. It does the northern zhou case 133 formal recognition for power he already wielded, which was command over the central armies, including the court palace guard units, and command over all regional and local forces that Tai could get his hands on. The earlyfubing units of the Western Wei came under the authority of Tai’s Supreme Command headquarters. The Supreme Command would exist until Tai’s death in 557, but Yuwen Hu, Tai’s hand-picked successor, would revive the structure from 561 until his assassination by his cousin, Wudi, in 572. The separateness and autonomy of Tai’s administrative and military staffs was made more prominent after 537, following the strategic defeat of Gao Huan and his Eastern Wei armies at the battle of Shayuan. Western Wei forces and their local warlord allies were able to seize the Hongnong salient, which is the ‘bubble’ of territory between the Yellow River north of Loyang and the south bank of the Fen River on the North China Plain. With this forward defense in place and solid, Huazhou (near modern Huayin on the west bank of the Yellow River before it makes the hairpin turn to the east, approximately 100 miles east of Chang’an) became the seat of Yuwen Tai’s staffs and also residences, as well as the residence of many of the members of the Guanzhong junta. This physical separation between the court and the hegemon was maintained until Yuwen Hu’s assassination in 572.9 The Eastern Wei/Northern Qi was similar in structure and even more consistent in this regard than the Western Wei/Northern Zhou, with dual capitals in Jinyang and Ye until the regime was destroyed in 577. If we look at the ranking staff members of Tai’s Chancellory and Supreme Command headquarters—specifically, chiefs of staff and deputy chiefs of staff—we can tease out information regarding how Tai used these structures to create and award a cadre of factional supporters. In Tai’s Chancellory (chengxiang fu, abolished in 553) the position of chief of staff (zhangshi 長史) was sometimes held by one person, at other times by two individuals designated left and right chiefs of staff.10 Of the seven individuals recorded, only Zhao Gui, who served at both the deputy chief of staff and left chief of staff positions, can be considered an independent, and not fully trusted, political actor. All the others were either personally loyal to Tai and politically significant actors, or,

seem odd that if the Supreme Command headquarters staff had been in existence since 535 only one individual can be identified as zhangshi and fu sima, respectively, for this entire time period. 9 See Hamaguchi Shigekuni, 1966, 220–21; and Tanigawa Michio, 2004, 304. 10 Wang Zhongluo, Bei Zhou Liu Dian, 1979, 1.16–17. 134 chapter five they were experienced, competent administrators whose loyalty was not questioned. Yu Jin 于謹, who emerged as a very powerful figure, one of the original six Generals of the Pillars of State, along with Zhao Gui (zhuguo dajiangjun 柱國大將軍) by 550 and the key, indispensable supporter of Yuwen Hu after Tai’s death, was Tai’s policy advisor in 532 when he was appointed Governor of Xiazhou. Another, but politically less exalted Xiazhou period confidante was Zhangsun Jian長孫儉 , who was initially appointed deputy chief of staff and in circa 550 promoted to Left Chief of Staff. Two others, Cui Teng 崔騰 and Xing Qingzhi 幸慶之 were administrators in Heba Yue’s Field Viceregal staff and were probably personally known to Yuwen Tai. Yuwen Ce 宇文測 was appropriated from the rump Nortern Wei court as was Zheng Xiaomu 鄭孝穆. This latter individual was not appointed Right Chief of Staff until 550, serving with Zhangsun Jian mentioned above. Zheng earned a reputation within the Western Wei regime as a talented administrator, having served at both the court and in a variety of provincial positions. Yuwen Tai treated the position of chief of staff very seriously, looking for both loyalty and very high levels of competence. The position of deputy chief of staff fu sima seems to have had a more explicitly factional political coloration.11 Of the five identified deputy chiefs of staff Zhao Gui was probably the first, presumably appointed for political reasons12—he was promoted to Left Chief of Staff in circa 538 and probably directly replaced by Li Yuan 李遠. This latter individual is a good example of cooptation—he was from a local warlord household based in Gaoping, now modern Guyuan in Ningxia, who had initially served under the defeated general Houmochen Yue and defected to Tai. By 550 he was appointed one of the twelve original army generals in the early fubing command system. Another individual, Yang Kuan 楊寬, was appropriated from the rump Northern Wei court, as was Yuan Jian 元儉, who was probably related to the Tuoba royal family. Yang Kuan is similar to Zheng Xiaomu mentioned above in that he was known for both his administrative and military capabilities. He also happened to be from the elite Chinese Yang family of Hongnong and thus also provided a means by which Yuwen Tai could appease and also communicate with locally powerful households located in sensitive strategic

11 Ibid. 12 Zs 16.262. the northern zhou case 135 zones.13 Finally, Han Bao 韓褒 and the previously mentioned Zhangsun Jian were both advisors going back to Tai’s service in Xiazhou. As part of his effort to neutralize the influence of powerful junta generals, Tai also used subordinate staff positions to place lower ranking associates of these generals in order to encourage a shifting of their loyalty to Tai. Dugu Xin 獨孤信, an important general in the Wuchuan clique, was a particular target of such efforts focused on his subordinates with ties to the Hongnong and Loyang areas.14 Regarding the Supreme Command chief of staff and deputy chief of staff positions, only one individual for each post is listed by Wang Zhonglo, and both men arrived in Chang’an with the rump Northern Wei court in 534.15 Both men, Yuwen Gui 宇文貴, whom Tai viewed as a distant agnate, and Da Xishi 達奚寔, respectively, became close associates of Yuwen Tai, and Gui was also one of the original twelve army generals in the 550 command system associated with the early fubing structure. By 550 when the early fubing command system of six Pillar of State Generals and twelve subordinate Army Generals clearly emerged, there is a scholarly consensus that Tai tended to appoint Army Generals personally loyal to him and use them as a check on the powers of some of the more independent and politically influential Pillar of State Generals. Both Li Yuan and Yuwen Gui, from Tai’s personal staff are two examples. Zhao Gui and Dugu Xin, two Pillar of State Generals of particular concern to Tai, tended to be associated with post-550 military commands and provincial governing assignments outside of the Wei River valley population and resource heartland, usually west of the Long Mountains.16 In contrast to his future adversaries on the North China Plain, Yuwen Tai had an exiguous military and resource base, and so he and his junta colleagues eagerly incorporated troops and personnel from a number of factional/military sources. From the defeated armies of Houmochen Yue Tai obtained Li Bi 李弼 who was one of the six Pillars of State by 550 and Bi’s subordinate, Dou Luning 豆盧寧, who was one of the twelve Army Generals. Both men became strong supporters of

13 Mao Hanguang, Zhong’guo Zhong’gu Zhengzhi shi Lun (1989), 197–98, emphasizes the Yang family’s deep-seated opposition to Gao Huan’s political presence in their area of influence. 14 See Zhou Shuanglin, (1994): 60. 15 Wang Zhongluo, 1979, 8.519–520. 16 Mao Hanguang, 1989, 223–245. Yang Cuiwei 楊翠微, “Lun Yuwen Tai Jianli Fubing Zhi 論宇文泰建立府兵制,” Wei Jin Nan Bei Chao Sui Tang Shi 3 (1998): 48. 136 chapter five

Tai and also Yuwen Hu after Tai’s death in 557.17 A related case, is that of the Li brothers of Gaoping, also referred to as Yuanzhou (modern Guyuan), of whom Li Yuan, the middle brother was mentioned above. The Li brothers were local satraps who first served under Houmochen Yue and then defected to Tai and the junta. Their local satrap status in the strategically located city of Gaoping seems to have been more significant than their relationship with Houmouchen Yue. The eldest brother, Li Xian 李賢, generally remained in the Gaoping area until after the death of Tai. The two younger brothers, Yuan and Li Mu李穆 became close political clients of Tai and served in various military and administrative positions in the Western Wei regime.18 The clearest examples of the regime cultivating loyalty ties with local satraps is the manner in which the Hongnong salient was protected against Northern Qi efforts to re-take the area. In addition to fortified border positions on the Fen River manned by Western Wei junta appointed generals and central army troops, satrap armies were expected to be active in the field harassing and blocking Northern Qi troop maneuvers. Yang Piao 楊摽 and Xue Shan 薛善 were two such individuals from elite and powerful families in the region who operated in this fashion.19 A stunning example of such troops and commanders is the case of Linghu Zheng 令狐整 who marched from Dunhuang to Chang’an with a private army of two thousand troops which he appears to have commanded as a separate unit in the service of Yuwen Tai.20

17 Regarding Li Bi, Zs 15.239; regarding Dou Luning, Zs 19.308. 18 Xian, Zs 25.413; Yuan, Zs 25.418; Mu, Zs 30.527. 19 Yang Piao, Zs 34.590; Xue Shan, Zs 35.623. 20 Zs 36.643. Both the Western Wei/Northern Zhou and Eastern Wei/Northern Qi regimes made extensive use of militarized satraps and semi-private militias as supple- ments to their central army forces, though, most scholarship has focused on the phenomenon in the Western Wei/ Northern Zhou side of the equation. In part, this may reflect the reality on the ground, where the more impoverished regime simply had to use the manpower and materiel it had at hand. See Gu Jiguang 谷霽光, Shixue Wenji 史學文集 vol. I (Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin chubanshe & Jiangxi Jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 230; Tang Changru, Wei Jin Nan Bei Chaoshi Luncong 魏晉南北朝史論叢 (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002, reprint of the 1955 volume), 263–67; Mao Hanguang, 1989, 205; Albert E. Dien, “The Role of the Military in the Western Wei/Northern Zhou State,” State and Society in Early Medieval China, ed. Albert E. Dien (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 357–58, notes the presence of satrap troops but emphasizes the integrity of the central army and its command. On page 362 Dien provides short biographies of the three Gaoping Li brothers as both satraps and loyal servitors of the Yuwen regime. For discussions on the Northern Zhou policy of militia cooptation see Zhu Weizheng 朱維錚, “Fubing Zhiduhua Shiqi Xi Wei Bei Zhou Shehui de Teshu Maodun ji qi Jiejue 府兵制度化時期西魏北周社會的特殊矛盾及其解決,” Lishi Yanjiu 6 (1963): the northern zhou case 137

As noted earlier, the entire expatrtiate Northern Wei court was absorbed into the junta regime after their arrival in 534. Some members of the Toba royal family were given high honors but often very limited functional responsibilities. However, competent and loyal courtiers from the Wei court, like Yang Kuan and Zheng Xiaomu, were taken into the highest levels of junta administrative authority. Another key political/military faction which caused Tai the most problems and sorely tested his political flexibility was actually a sub-set of the Wuchuan clique—Heba Sheng and his followers. Sheng was the elder brother of Heba Yue, and Sheng stayed in the east when his brother, Yue, was dispatched to Guanzhong by Erzhu Rong in 529.21 When Yue was assassinated in 534 Sheng was in the Middle Yangzi region opereating under the authority of the Loyang based Northern Wei monarch, Xiaowudi. Serving under Sheng was Dugu Xin, and subordinate to Xin were Yang Zhong 楊忠22 (the father of Yang Jian, founder of the Sui dynasty) and another general, Shi Ning 史寧.23 This group is worth discussing in some detail because of their importance to subsequent political developments in the early years of the Northern Zhou regime. Heba Sheng, upon hearing of his brother’s assassination sent Dugu Xin and Yang Zhong to Guanzhong with instructions to take control of the deceased Yue’s presumed leaderless troops.24 By the time Xin

157–161; Gu Jiguang, 1996, 24–30, 58–9. Gu Jiguang, in an essay published in 1983 and included in the volume of his collected writings argued that the Northern Zhou fubing structure was crucial in absorbing, modifying and ultimately weakening the viability of the cooperating private militias (see the discussion on pages 479–485). Along the lines of this latter mode of reasoning, but permeated with concepts of aristocratic society and kyodotai pre-suppositions, Tanigawa Michio has a detailed essay arguing that the ability of the Northern Zhou to absorb these locally based satraps and militias helped destroy the previous aristocratic Chinese lock on court influence and invigorate the Northern Zhou leadership, bring the throne into greater unity with its localist elites, ultimately enabling it to triumph over a Northern Qi regime still locked in an suffocating embrace with such Chinese high aristocratic social elements. This socially invigorated, militarized Northern Zhou court society would then form the foundation for the unitary Sui and Tang empires. This author feels that such a discussion is highly speculative, bordering on a volkgeist type of argument, however, Tanigawa’s specific analysis of such satrap military structures reveals a ramifying series of patron-client relationships burrowing deep into local society see Tanigawa, 2004, 163–195). Needless to say, similar relationships governed political action at the high court level, as well. 21 Zs 14.215. 22 Zs 19.314. 23 Zs 28.465. 24 See Dugu Xin’s biography, Zs 16.264. 138 chapter five arrived in Guanzhong Yuwen Tai had already been elected the junta chief executive, consequently, Xin and Zhong were politely but firmly told to go to Loyang and render their services there. Both men then proceeded to Loyang where they ended up following the Wei emperor back to Chang’an. Thereupon, both men were sent back to the Middle Yangzi region. However, this region quickly fell under the rule of the Northern Qi and so Heba Sheng and his entire command fled south to the Liang regime based in Jiankang (modern Nanjing). It was not until early 537 that Heba Sheng and his men were given permission by the Liang throne to return to the Wei River valley, and the Tai junta regime was willing to take them in. Under the auspices of the junta, Sheng was made a general in the central army and participated in the military campaigns of the time, but relations between himself and Yuwen Tai were tense.25 Sheng initially refused to greet Tai as his leader because he was senior to Tai in years— though, a compromise arrangement was eventually worked out. Sheng was never permitted to operate in the provinces, but was kept within the confines of the court and the central army. Sheng died in 544, and his will is a significant pro-Yuwen Tai propaganda document which encouraged Yuwen Tai to achieve internal unity and then go on to conquer eastward.26 Sheng’s subordinates were alive and active in the regime, so this document is significant in expressing a desire (either by Sheng or Tai) for factional reconciliation. The outstanding figure after Sheng in this factional grouping was Dugu Xin. After returning to Chang’an in 537 Dugu Xin was initially stationed in the capital, but after 537 a pattern emerged of sending Xin to areas outside the Wei River valley. In 538 he was sent on an unsuccessful campaign to seize Loyang; in 540 he was sent out on another unsuccessful campaign to retake the Middle Yangzi region from Northern Qi forces. From approximately 541 through 550 Xin was sent out as Governor-General of the region west of the Long Mountains and Governor of Qinzhou.27 Despite the submission of earlier requests to be permitted to return to Chang’an, he was not recalled until 550 as one of the original six Pillars of State Generals and granted high court rank.28 Xin, however, would be

25 Zs 14.220. 26 Zs 14.220. 27 Zs 16.265. 28 Zs 16.266. the northern zhou case 139 executed in 557 following the death of Tai, for his passive participation in a coup effort by Zhao Gui, who would also be executed. Yang Zhong, Xin’s subordinate, was accorded different treatment. In 537 he was summoned to serve on Tai’s personal bodyguard staff ( ju zhangxia 居帳下) which was distinct from the Supreme Command staff, which may not have existed at this time.29 In 549 he was sent back to the Middle Yangzi region, clearly a trusted confidante of Yuwen Tai, where he was a leading general in re-asserting Western Wei control over the area. Zhong would return to Chang’an in 557 at the establishment of the Northern Zhou dynasty. Shi Ning will not figure prominently in this discussion, but he held a number of provincial governorships in the western part of the realm where he finished off his career. Tai treated Heba Sheng and Dugu Xin as hostile entities while successfully wooing their subordinates Yang Zhong and Shi Ning with trusted administrative and military positions. Yang Zhong, in particular, was utilized in a very flexible fashion, making him a close client of Tai, but also adroitly using his expertise in the Middle Yangzi region to the benefit of the junta and Tai’s own reputation as a successful military strategist. After Sheng’s death in 544 Dugu Xin’s daughter was married to Tai’s eldest son, clearly an effort to reach a modus vivendi between the two men, though, this affinal relationship will prove to be a double- edged sword.30 From 537 until 547 the Western Wei regime had to fight for its survival in the face of significant threats from the Northern Qi. Instead of cracking under the pressure, the junta succeeded in melding its various factions into an effective military/political organization. This success was, in part, manifested by the post 550 emergence of the aforementioned early fubing command structure, which governed the use of the regime’s central army troops. The affinal tie established between Tai and Dugu Xin was also a manifestation of this necessity of the factions

29 Zs 19.315. 30 Zs 25.421. Mao Hanguang, 1989, 169–194, has a thorough discussion of the various factional groupings at the Northern Zhou court. Mao notes regarding Yuwen Tai’s success in wooing Yang Zhong away from Dugu Xin that Zhong was given the high honor of being appointed Commandante (dudu zhujunshi 都督諸軍事) of four of the six ‘embedded’ expatriate Altaic garrisons located between the Lo and Ni Rivers, north of the Wei River valley, sometime in the late 540’s (see page 255). These garrisons were a major source of Altaic cavalry manpower for the regime and seem to have functioned in a fashion similar to the larger, more well known Altaic garrison communities which were placed strategically around the Northern Qi capital of Jinyang. 140 chapter five to cooperate in order to survive. There is no doubt that Tai’s relative success as the junta’s supreme commanding general contributed to his lengthy tenure as junta chief executive. Tai was able to establish and consolidate Western Wei control over the strategically crucial Hongnong salient which controlled access to and egress from the Wei River valley relative to the North China Plain. Tai also managed to keep his northern and western borders intact by bribing the Turks with tribute and campaigning against the weaker Tuyuhun nomads who were based in modern Qinghai. Tai’s efforts to seize Loyang and the agriculturally rich Henan region were definite failures. The planned massive eastern campaign of 550, which was to feature the debut of the new military command system was aborted for political reasons, but the troops had to endure inclement weather and disease before they could return to their bases or homes. However, between 551 through 555 Tai was able to take advantage of the collapse of the Liang regime in the south and the dissension among the remnant Liang princes to roll through Hanzhong, Sichuan, and the Middle Yangzi region, where he established the client kingdom of the Later Liang near modern Jiangling. Tai was thus able to balance the strategic failures of his eastern campaigns with the spectacular military successes in the south. One result of these southern successes was that Tai’s generals had an opportunity to accumulate plunder and circulate within an expanding military political elite. Relative military success and careful implementation of a policy of factional cooptation assured Tai of his political paramountcy within the Guanzhong junta until his death in 556. This stability, in turn, enabled Tai to plan successfully for the future establishment of a Yuwen imperial dynasty.

The Founding of the Yuwen Dynasty

The first steps in the founding of the Yuwen dynasty occurred in the years 554 through 556 when a number of formal changes in court titles and administrative nomenclature were introduced based on archaic Zhou ritual texts. In effect, these changes denied the legitimacy of the rump Western Wei Tuoba court and its inherited court traditions going back to the reforms of the Northern Wei emperor, Xiaowendi in the 490’s. The most significant and controversial issue within the junta was the determination in 556 of who would be Yuwen Tai’s legal successor. The controversy caused by the succession issue affords the reader a the northern zhou case 141 glimpse into the faultlines within the regime.31 Tai desired to establish the eldest son of his main consort as heir. However, it is not clear when, if ever, Tai had formally announced the identity of this main consort, who was a Tuoba princess. The son proposed by Tai was his third eldest son, out of thirteen known sons, who was approximately fourteen years old in 556.32 The second eldest died earlier, but the eldest son, who will end up becoming the second reigning Northern Zhou monarch, was not chosen by Tai as his immediate successor. The major obstacle to this latter individual being named heir was the fact that his father-in-law was Dugu Xin. In contrast, the Tuoba royal family was powerless and carefully watched by Tai appointed palace guard commanders stationed in the Chang’an palace complex. In Tai’s relationship with Xin one can sense the exquisite and dangerous political balancing act Tai was engaged in. Tai was willing to grant Xin high level honors at the court but he would not tolerate a direct influence by this individual over his nascent dynasty.33 In a successful effort to settle the succession issue tohis satisfaction, Tai appears to have rigged a carefully planned, but nonetheless dangerous piece of political theater. In the course of a high level junta meeting Tai stated, “I desire to establish my eldest son of my main consort as heir, but I fear that the dasima [Dugu Xin’s honorific court title] will object.” In the midst of a worried silence following this blunt, embarrassing statement, Li Yuan interjected: “The ritual classics clearly state that the heir should always be the eldest son of the main consort, and not simply the eldest of all the sons as determined by age alone. What objections could be entertained toward establishing the Duke of Lueyang [the future Xiaomindi] as the rightful heir? If Xin is perceived as objecting, then I propose that Xin be immediately beheaded.” Li Yuan thereupon rose and drew his sword. Taizu [Yuwen Tai] also stood and said, “How have affairs come to this extreme?” Then Xin clarified his position and Li Yuan ceased his demands. Thereupon, the conference participants all accorded with Yuan’s proposal [regarding the proper heir].34 Once the conference was adjourned Dugu Xin and Li Yuan made an uncomfortable reconciliation. Unlike the court debate preceding the

31 Zs 25.421. 32 Zs 13.201. 33 Zhou Shuanglin (1994): 61–2, has a similar analysis. 34 Zs 25.421. 142 chapter five

Northern Wei retirement of 471, the Northern Zhou debate regarding Yuwen Tai’s heir involved direct confrontation. One does not receive the impression that Dugu Xin was a cooperative participant in this event. In late 556, following the settling of the succession issue and the installation of the court titles based on the Zhouli, Yuwen Tai died in Chang’an. Before expiring Tai entrusted the stability of the succeeding political order to his nephew, Yuwen Hu, who was approximately 43 years old at the time. Subsequently in 557, Hu initiated the abdication proceedings for the puppet Western Wei emperor and arranged for the installation of the first Northern Zhou monarch, his fifteen year old cousin, Xiaomindi.

The Yuwen Hu Period of Tutelage

Yuwen Hu maintained himself in power from 557 until his assassination in 572, covering the reigns of two and a half Northern Zhou monarchs. During this period of time Hu was forced to kill the first two monarchs and then met his own death at the hands of the third ruler (and cousin), Wudi, who personally clubbed Hu with the imperial scepter. Prior to his death Hu became the premier political figure of the Northern Zhou regime, adequately fulfilling the expectations of his deceased uncle, Yuwen Tai. In late 556, however, Hu was not one of the dominant political figures of his time. He stood in the shadows of the older men of his uncle’s generation who were leading commanding officers and courtiers. Hu first traveled west in early 530, shortly after the armies of Erzhu Tianguang entered Guanzhong. Once in the west Hu served in the private household of his uncle, and in 534, following the election of Yuwen Tai as junta chief executive, Hu received a military officer’s command.35 In 554 he served under Tai’s close associate, Yu Jin, in the conquest of the Later Liang regime on the Middle Yangzi.36 Hu was a minor luminary, and a relatively middle-aged one at that, in the Guanzhong political constel- lation, nevertheless, Hu was Tai’s sole surviving mature, close agnate and so was qualified to function as a regent for his young son.

35 Zs 11.165–66. 36 Zs 2.35. the northern zhou case 143

There is also another probable reason Hu was chosen as regent in addition to his agnatic qualifications—his relative youth and lack of dominant political stature. Tai had gone to great lengths to secure general recognition of his third eldest son as heir, and insofar as it was necessary to install a regency regime—really an extension of the collegial junta quality of the regime—Tai would not want an individual who was independently powerful to act as regent and guide to his son. This would be an open invitation to attempt a usurpation of the throne. What Tai seems to have anticipated was a complex and somewhat unstable balance of power at the court wherein it was initially impossible for Yuwen Hu to make unilateral political decisions. Hu would have to consult with loyal, senior court figures and thus ensure a significant degree of consensus before any political actions were undertaken. The tangled nature of factional relations in the early Northern Zhou regime was further complicated by Hu’s relationship with the emperors over whom he was regent and political tutor. The first Northern Zhou monarch was fifteen years old in 557 and very near maturity as a politically active emperor. This unfavorable age relationship became less favorable under the two successive monarchs. In late 557 Hu had Xiaomindi killed and permitted Yuwen Tai’s eldest son, Mingdi, to ascend the throne at age 23, with Hu still acting as regent. In 561 Hu had to eliminate this monarch and designated Tai’s fourth eldest son, Wudi, as the new ruler at age seventeen. The conflicts engendered by the continued existence of a tutelage regime over mature emperors was explicitly commented upon by Wudi after he killed Hu. Wudi observed, “How can a thirty year old emperor submit to the control of another . . .?”37 Furthermore, Hu was the eldest first cousin to the emperors he dominated and in terms of classificatory nomenclature that simply made him the equivalent of an elder brother to these monarchs.38 This was a position of respect, but did not carry the weightier status of an uncle or other member of the senior generation.

37 Zs 12.190. 38 See Hu’s biography where Wudi addresses him as elder brother, xiong 兄 just moments before clubbing Hu (Zs 11.176). 144 chapter five

The Early Northern Zhou Power Structure

In this early period, power was often directly reflected in the identities of the holders of the formal ancient Zhou style Six Offices (formally distinct from the Six Pillar of State Generals, but the occupants often wore two hats) and subordinate positions,and less directly reflected in more obscure relations of political clientage. In 557 Yuwen Hu assumed the position of dasima 大司馬 which was no longer an honorific position but implied control over all central armies. Yuwen Tai’s Supreme Command headquarters was temporarily abolished, but Hu would revive it in 561, making himself Supreme Commander of all military forces in the realm. Dugu Xin was shunted off to the position ofdazongbo 大宗伯, which was supposed to deal with court ritual, etiquette and the reception of foreign dignitaries. Xin was thus removed from contact with the military apparatus. Zhao Gui was appointed the highly prestigious post of dazhongzai 大冢宰 which made him a type of Premier, with responsibility for the management of general affairs of state. However, since this regime was simply a military junta, real power resided with the control of the military, which was Hu’s dasima post, insofar as the formal postings were functionally significant. In point of fact, it is difficult to say what specific functional significance any of these archaically titled positions had besides serving as status markers for individuals who were already autonomously powerful politicians and generals with patronage ties ramifying throughout the court and military structures. Earlier in 556 before he died, Yuwen Tai had established the Zhou style Six Offices and appointed to these positions his junta colleagues, attempting to accommodate powerful individuals like Zhao Gui and Dugu Xin. At the same time, in accordance with a long standing policy of factional check and balance, Tai arranged for his loyal clients to be able to act via Hu’s formal regency positions, since Yuwen Hu alone was weak. The biography of Yu Jin notes, “. . . although Hu received [Tai’s] political last will and testament, his reputation and position was distinctly inferior. The various high officials each entertained plans to seize the realm. There was none who willingly submitted.”39 In order to cope with this situation Hu relied on the support of Tai’s old advisors and supporters Yu Jin and Li Bi, both of them original Pillar of State Generals.40 Yu Jin exerted direct pressure on the senior junta

39 Zs 15.248. 40 Zs 15.241. the northern zhou case 145 members to support Hu, and it was probably this support that enabled Hu to foil an attempted coup by Zhao Gui in 557, which also implicated Dugu Xin. Individuals like Yu Jin, Li Bi and also Li Yuan stood by Hu because of their close clientage ties to the deceased Yuwen Tai. Yuwen Tai, while he was still living was able to undermine his junta colleagues by siphoning off their subordinates to become his loyal supporters. This policy bore fruit after his death in 556. A good example would be Yang Zhong, originally a subordinate general under Dugu Xin. As noted earlier, Zhong was first absorbed into Tai’s personal bodyguard staff and later sent out as a leading general to the Middle Yangzi region. In 557 he was recalled to court and served under his former military superior, Dugu Xin as the equivalent of a Deputy Foreign Minister and Deputy Minister of Rites (xiaozongbo 小宗伯).41 This would appear to indicate a re-assertion of former clientage relations, yet Yang Zhong’s biography makes no mention of any role he might have had in the ill fated 557 coup attempt of Zhao Gui and Dugu Xin. Zhong went on to be one of the leading courtiers in Yuwen Hu’s court until his death in 568. Zhong’s appointment may have been meant as a gesture of respect to Xin, but it it does not appear to have given Xin any practical benefits. A case similar to that of Yang Zhong is the career of the general, Da Xiwu 達奚武.42 Originally, Da Xiwu served under Zhao Gui and was one of the ‘magnificent fifty’ who followed Zhao Gui into the camp of Houmouchen Yue in 534 and carried off the remains of their assassinated leader, Heba Yue. In 535 Da Xiwu was appointed to Yuwen Tai’s Chancellory as a military adviser (at this time Zhao Gui was Tai’s deputy chief of staff). By 550 Da Xiwu was one of the original twelve Army Generals and one scholar has tied him to a close relationship with Yu Jin as his commanding Pillar of State General.43 Like Zhong, there is no reference to any connection with the 557 coup attempt. Immediately afterwards, however, Da Xiwu was appointed Minister of Punishments (dasikou 大司寇) replacing Yu Jin in that post.44 Yu Jin, in turn, replaced the disgraced Dugu Xin at the Minister of Ritual position (dazongbo).45 Tai had successfully weaned Da Xiwu away from Zhao Gui and the

41 Wang Zhongluo, 1979, 4.156, 157. 42 Zs 19.303. 43 See Mao Hanguang, 1989, 227–28, 274. 44 Wang Zhongluo, 1979, 6.398. 45 Wang Zhongluo, 4.156. 146 chapter five benefits of this approach were manifested in the ability of Yuwen Hu to maintain his position in these early years of the dynasty. A glance at some of the leading individuals on Yuwen Hu’s personal staff, and later managing his Supreme Command staff from 561 through 572, reveals interesting patterns of clientage relationships. Chi Luoxie 叱羅協 and Feng Qian 馮遷 would become Hu’s chief of staff ( fu zhangshi) and staff office manger ( fu silu 府司録), respectively, after 561, but they had already been closely working with Hu since approximately 557.46 Both men had long, varied careers and both men came from relatively low local level official backgrounds. The point of commonality between both men was their tie to the late Northern Wei governor of Hengzhou, Yang Jun 楊鈞 (not related to Yang Zhong). Jun had appointed Chi Luoxie as his aide (congshi 從事). Feng Qian had served as Jun’s military aide (zhongbing canjunshi 中兵參軍).47 For both men these positions were crucial steps up in staus and social advancement. Jun died during the revolt of the Six Garrisons, but his son, Yang Kuan, survived and became a high level courtier and general in the Western Wei/Northern Zhou regime. Kuan served as Yuwen Tai’s Chancellory deputy chief of staff. Kuan had accompanied his father to Hengzhou so he was probably personally familiar with Chi Loxie and Feng Qian.48 Kuan became a close associate of Yuwen Hu and in late 557 was appointed Deputy Premier (xiao zhongzai 小冢宰) serving as Yuwen Hu’s direct, trusted subordinate, the latter being the dazhongzai, a position Hu occupied in early 557 after the fall of Zhao Gui.49 It is also possible to tie Yang Kuan to the senior courtier and Yuwen Tai confidante, Yu Jin. Kuan’s biography notes that after his father died in the course of the revolt of the Six Garrisons, Kuan developed a strong clientage tie with the Tuoba prince and general, Yuan Shen 元深.50 When Yuan Shen fell out of grace with the throne in 525, Kuan was almost arrested. In 522 Yu Jin was appointed to serve as a policy adviser to Yuan Shen and also became very closely attached to this prince. When Shen was calumniated at court in 525, Yu Jin’s decisive defense of his patron convinced the court

46 Regarding Chi Loxie see Zs 11.179. For Feng Qian see Zs 11.181. Regarding the fu silu position see Wang Zhongluo, 1.16. 47 Zs 11.177; and Zs 11.180, respectively. 48 Zs 22.364. 49 Zs 22.367. For Kuan’s influence at the court see the incident recorded in the biography of Liu Qing 柳慶, Zs 22.372. 50 Zs 22.365. the northern zhou case 147 to lift the ban on Yuan Shen and all of his associates.51 Following the death of Yuwen Tai, Yu Jin emerges not only as a strong and influential supporter of Yuwen Hu among the senior generation of junta leaders, but as a patron with clientage ties reaching deep into the court/regency power structure. By 558, the second year of the new Northern Zhou dynasty, the situation at court had stabilized somewhat, particularly with the full support lent to Hu by the loyal factions so ably created by his deceased uncle and guided in this new political era by Yu Jin. However, a new focus of tension developed in the relations between Hu and the monarchs he was supposed to tutor. Each imperial incumbent endeavored to make the throne independent of Hu’s domination, and the legacy and fears generated by this struggle may account for the virulence of Xuandi’s later efforts to make the throne into an ‘autocracy’, beyond the influence of powerful courtiers. The key to the friction that developed between the throne and Yuwen Hu was the succession issue. A curious aspect of Hu’s regency was his insistence on installing emperors from among the sons of Yuwen Tai in strict accordance with their age seniority. This resulted in the consistent appearance on the throne of mature or near mature emperors who were consistently difficult to control forcing Hu to kill them—which was the fate of the first two Northern Zhou monarchs. Hu never attempted to arbitrarily elevate to the throne one of Tai’s youngest sons or even the young son of the second monarch whom he had poisoned. On the other hand, he refused to relinquish significant power into the hands of his imperial charges. It is ironic that the regime which gloried in the archaic court titles of the ancient Zhou refused to follow the ancient Zhou tradition of promogenital succession to the throne and insisted on a series of fraternal successions. It is not clear why Hu insisted on this pattern, but it may have been tangled in the need to legitimate himself in front of his junta colleagues, especially in the early years of the dynasty. Certainly, Hu and his junta associates could be said to have had a cultural openness to such succession patterns, since these men came from the general Altaic cultural zone of the Six Garrisons, just as did their Northern Qi competitors. But this diffuse cultural background does not appear to have been the specific causal factor prompting Hu to engineer this series of fraternal successions.

51 Zs 15.244–45. 148 chapter five

The first manifestation of a sharp conflict between Hu and the throne emerged quickly in late 557 (unrelated to the earlier Zhao Gui affair). The imperially inspired anti-Hu plot was a miserable failure. Hu was informed in detail by one of the palace guard commanders whom he had appointed to guard the emperor.52 The young emperor had attempted to include these officers in his plot. Nevertheless, the organizational pattern exhibited by the imperial faction became a standard form of inner court political organization throughout the history of the regime. The emperor attempted to gather a tight clique around himself, usually consisting of personal companions and sometimes younger, ambitious members of the court.53 These factions tended to express themselves in the form of a sudden violent putsch, without significant organizational connections to the greater court population. One does not see the kind of broad organizational efforts visible in Tang period palace coups, which could involve all the palace guard commands and sizable chunks of the courtier elite in violent military affrays involving as many as a thousand or more participants. In the course of imperial Chinese history such inner cliques were not unusual; however, in the case of the Northern Zhou, they appeared with peculiar consistency. This was due to the in-built structural conflict between the vigilant Hu regency and the mature but frustratingly powerless emperors. The second Northern Zhou emperor presented complications because he was a mature adult when he ascended the throne in late 557. Hu formally returned all

52 This is a reference to the left and right duty guard commanderszuo, ( you gongbo 左右宮伯 who rotated on and off guard duty and were under the authority of theda zhongzai, the equivalent of a Northern Zhou Chancellory, or menxia sheng. Given their bodyguard functions they were apparently closely aligned with the da sima command, though, strictly speaking, they belonged to a separate chain of command from other palace guard units operating directly under the authority of the da sima. See Zhang Jinlong, Wei Jin Nan Bei Chao Jinwei Wuguan Zhidu Yanjiu, 2004, 941. For the narration of the Xiaomindi failed coup effort see Zs 3.49–50. 53 Tanigawa Michio provides an excellent discussion of the tight inner cliques developed by the Northern Zhou emperors as a defense against the power of Yuwen Hu. Tanigawa also notes that under Xuandi this inner clique was granted considerable power which its members eventually turned against the interests of their deceased overlord in 580 and cooperated in the seizure of power by Yang Jian, founder of the Sui dynasty. See Tanigawa, “Shu Zui kakumei no Keii ni tsuite 周隋革命の経緯について,” Kodai Bunka 18.5 (1967): 22. In the case of the Xiaomindi affair, Li Zhi李植 , a son of the senior courtier, Li Yuan serving in a high budgetary office position and Sun Heng 孫恆, serving under the da sima were motivated by fears that Hu’s continued political domination of the throne would deprive them of opportunities for higher court positions directly advising the throne. See Zs 3.49. the northern zhou case 149 powers of state to the throne but retained direct control of the military. This resulted in the throne having the freedom to appoint courtiers to important positions, which this second emperor may have attempted to use as a means of creating factional obstacles to Hu within the imperial administration. This activity apparently prompted Hu to have him poisoned in 560. Throughout all the visscitudes of Hu’s struggles at the court, he consistently retained control of the military.54 At the beginning of 557 Hu was da sima which gave him command over all military forces—this was not simply an office for military personnel and logistics support. Slightly later, in the aftermath of the Zhao Gui affair, Hu transferred himself to the more prestigious position of da zhongzai, or Premier, replacing Zhao Gui in this post. The sensitive post of da sima was given to Helan Xiang 賀蘭祥, who remained in this post until his death in 562, and Xiang’s successor from 562 through 568 was Yuchi Jiong 尉遲迥.55 The post of Deputy Minister of War (xiao sima 小司馬) was held by Yuchi Gang 尉遲綱, the younger brother of Jiong. This latter position was important because it was directly concerned with command of the palace guard units, which were a separate group of commands within the overall central army and its fubing system.56 Helan Xiang and Yuchi Gang were directly involved in suppressing the putsch effort of the first Northern Zhou emperor, Xiaomindi, based on information provided by one the palace duty guard commanders. The mothers of all three of the above individuals were sisters of Yuwen Tai, and all three men were raised in Tai’s household. They were junior affinal cousins of Yuwen Hu, and treated with great consideration by Yuwen Tai when he was alive, and similarly honored by Yuwen Hu. Thus, Hu controlled the military through his kin connections and Yu Jin, with his deep patronage ties at court, kept watch over the senior junta leaders and general court affairs.

54 Gu Jiguang argues that by grossly inflating the number of high ranking generalships Hu distributed at the court he succeeded in de-centralizing the six high Pillar of State Generals’ and twelve Army Generals’ command and control capabilities and had the commander of each of the subordinate twenty-four army divisions reporting directly to him. Another goal was to reward cooperative courtiers with honorific titles. See Gu Jiguang, 1996, 55–58. 55 For the Helan Xiang reference see Zs 20.335. For Yuchi Jiong see Zs 21.349. 56 Zs 20.339. Also see Zhang Jinlong’s discussion of Yuchi Gang in his 2004 book, page 954. 150 chapter five

The Reign of Wudi and the Downfall of Yuwen Hu

Once Yuwen Hu was able to establish a firm footing at the court he proved himself to be a benevolent despot, after all, he only held on top power due to the support of key factions created by his deceased uncle. Hu saw to it that successful generals made their way up the court hierarchy and that imperial agnates were coopted into service under his leadership. A glance at the Xiaomindi plot of 557—which was designed to kill Hu and give the throne sole authority—illustrates Yuwen Hu’s political approach to the court. Li Zhi 李植, the son of the senior courtier, Li Yuan from Gaoping, was deeply involved in the plot, an example of a younger generation of courtiers anxious to flex their political muscle but seemingly blocked by the Hu regency. In the end, Li Zhi and his brothers were executed, but Hu was going to spare the father out of respect for his service to Yuwen Tai, until further complications emerged and the father was ordered to take poison. The other family members were temporarily disgraced, but had fully re-entered politics by the 560’s. In 565 Li Mu, the youngest of the three brothers from the founding generation of the dynasty was awarded high court office. Hu seemed to consistently value cooptation and consensus over acts of political violence which might boomerang on him and prove politically destructive. The second Zhou emperor, Mingdi, was poisoned in early 560 and was replaced by his next eldest brother, Wudi. In early 561, immediately following the proclamation of a new reign title, Yuwen Hu resurrected the Supreme Command headquarters which was last held by Yuwen Tai until his death in 556. The Supreme Command staff was based in Huazhou, not in Chang’an. Hu also retained his Chang’an court position as Premier (da zhongzai), giving him general authority over all affairs of state. This was a clear, explicit signal that Hu was in charge, and a significant contrast to his public posture under the previous two monarchs when he had tactfully (but unsuccessfully) attempted to understate his powers. The 561 posture of Hu is also reminiscent of the dual government of Yuwen Tai during the Western Wei period, and may have been purposely designed in this fashion to emphasize Hu’s authority to the court. Hu’s eventual downfall in 572 was due to a combination of foreign policy setbacks and to growing dissatisfaction at the court with the continued stressful co-existence of a mature monarch under a Hu dominated political protectorate. In early 560 when the third Zhou monarch, Wudi, ascended the throne the international situation had the northern zhou case 151 become more competitive. Beginning in 561 the Chen regime in the south was more assertive and had forced Northern Zhou forces to withdraw from the southern bank of the Middle Yangzi. While the Chen regime was never perceived as a direct threat to the security of the Northern Zhou, it was a constant challenge to Northern Zhou authority in the Middle Yangzi and to its control over the puppet kingdom of the Later Liang, based in Jiangling. Hu never appreciated the degree of stability achieved by the Chen and consequently lost considerable political capital waging unsuccessful border wars in the south. To the north, the Northern Zhou was particularly vulnerable to pressure from the Turk steppe empire which was emerging as a North Asian super-power at this time, due to well established transport routes that cavalry forces could take to penetrate south into the Wei River valley. The overall pattern of Turkish policy to the China based regimes to their south was to play them off against each other. Often, the Turkish kaghan would ally with the Northern Zhou, the weaker of the two kingdoms, and make war against the Northern Qi.57 From the Northern Zhou perspective the Turks were seen as an immediate threat to their regime. Since the latter years of Yuwen Tai’s period of dominance, when the Turks were first emerging on the scene following the destruction of the Rouruan confederacy, negotiations were initiated for a matrimonial alliance, with an agreement in principle being reached in 563.58 At that time the Turkish kaghan stipulated that a Turkish princess would be sent to the Northern Zhou only after the Northern Qi had been destroyed. By acquiescing to these terms, the Northern Zhou bound itself to an unconditional military alliance with the Turks.59 This matrimonial alliance was not consummated until 568 following a superstitious occurrence which providentially frightened the Turkish kaghan into immediate compliance, even though the Northern Qi was still alive and kicking. Insofar as the Turks did not desire to immediately conquer China, but rather sought to ensure the indefinite continuance of a weakened and divided North China, the 563 agreement in principle was a clever device that made the Northern Zhou into a military client state of the Turks. When the Turks beckoned, the Northern Zhou would have to

57 The Turks temporarily abandoned this policy after the Northern Qi was destroyed in 577 by unsuccessfully backing a Qi court in exile. In 580, however, the Turks and the Northern Zhou renewed diplomatic relations. See ZzTj 174.5404. 58 Zs 50.911. 59 ZzTj 169.5236. 152 chapter five heed the call. It was precisely this arrangement that dragged Hu into an expensive and relatively unsuccessful series of eastern campaigns. Left to themselves, large scale east-west campaigns had died down due to the difficulties and expenses incurred in trying to uproot consolidated military positions—a strategic equilibrium had settled into place. The 563 alliance with the Turks would temporarily fracture this equilibrium. In the winter of 563 the Turks and the Northern Zhou staged the massive cavalry and infantry invasion of the Northern Qi which was discussed in chapter four. The campaign was a tactical defeat, but it shook up the geo-strategic horizon of North China and shattered the confidence of the Northern Qi in its sense of military and materiel superiority. Its defensive walls in the north had been breached and Turkish cavalry plundered the Jinyang suburbs and northern Shanxi at will. In the south, Northern Zhou infantry had the effrontery to attempt to push up the Fen River in an unsuccessful effort to seize Jinyang from the rear while the Qi military was focused on the Turkish invasion from the north. As a result of the 563 scare, the Northern Qi released Yuwen Hu’s mother and aunt (both of whom had never left the east) in the Fall of 564 in an effort to establish friendly relations with the Northern Zhou. Just after Hu’s mother had been released the Turks called on the Zhou to commence another pre-planned winter campaign against the Qi. Under the circumstances, Hu was reluctant to comply, but in fear of incurring Turkish wrath and the consequent devastation of his own northern borders, he nevertheless undertook the campaign.60 This latter campaign was structured in a much more traditional way, focused on seizing Loyang. Like Yuwen Tai’s armies before him, Hu suffered an embarrassing and costly defeat outside Loyang. Geo-strategically, it was relatively easy for the Northern Qi to move reinforcements to the high ground overlooking Loyang in a timely fashion and thus checkmate any Zhou offensive. The Zizhi Tongjian noted that, “Hu lacked military ability, and furthermore the campaign was undertaken against his own wishes—consequently—it was without success.”61 Also, Turkish attacks on Qi northern border positions were unable to destabilize its defensive posture. In the summer of 565, coming on top of these Zhou military setbacks, the Turks opened diplomatic relations with the Northern Qi.

60 ZzTj 169.5245. 61 ZzTj 169.5349. the northern zhou case 153

This undoubtedly expressed their disgust with Hu’s failures and could only erode Hu’s political reputation within the Northern Zhou court. In contrast to the situation under Yuwen Tai, who was able to balance his defeats in the east (Tai failed to seize Loyang three times) with spectacular successes in Sichuan and the Middle Yangzi region, Hu could only accept defeat and embarrassment and continue consolidating territory already gained. In 567 Hu sought to regain prestige by capital- izing on the proferred defection of a Chen provincial governor, but this effort also proved to be an embarrassing failure. At the time there were many courtiers who were opposed to further military adventures and concerned about the lingering ill effects of the eastern campaign of 564. This is fully revealed in a memorial submitted by Cui You 崔猷, then a high budget official. Cui opined: In the previous years’ eastern campaigns more than half of the army either died or was wounded. Although we were unable to conserve our forces we have not yet fully recovered from our losses. The Chen regime stays within its borders, treats its subjects leniently and maintains neighborly relations [with the Zhou]. How can we then attempt to seize their territory, give sanctuary to a turncoat Chen official, violate the sureties of treaties and levy countless armies?62 That Hu’s hobbled military policy was slowly alienating upper and middle level generals and administrator can be inferred from the biography of Wei Xiaokuan 韋孝寬. Xiaokuan was the famous general who defended the fortress of Yubi on the south bank of the Fen River from repeated Qi attacks in the 540’s, thus helping to secure the Hongnong salient. In 564 Xiaokuan futilely warned Hu against attempting a Loyang campaign.63 Prior to 569 and 570 when the Northern Qi was making significant gains in clearing the Zhou presence from the north bank of the Fen River, Xiaokuan had again futilely warned Hu to establish more forts in this area in preparation for such an offensive from the Qi. Xiaokuan’s biography explicitly notes how, following the assassination of Hu in 572, Wudi followed his advice to the profit of the dynasty. Thus, Hu’s assassination does not appear to have troubled Wei Xiaokuan. The grinding factional conflict that inevitably developed between Hu and the mature emperor on the throne also took its toll. Another

62 ZzTj 170.5267. Scott A. Pearce also remarks that Hu’s military defeats injured his political standing. See Pearce, “The Yuwen Regime in 6th Century China,” Unpub Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1987, 699. 63 Zs 31.539. 154 chapter five revealing case is that of Yu Yi 于翼, the second eldest son of Yu Jin (Jin will die in 568), illustrating the drift of the court away from Hu and also probably illustrating the desire of a younger generation of courtiers to hold power, an issue that was presaged in the Xiaomindi coup affair of 557. Yu Yi worked closely with Hu, following in the footsteps of his father, and when Mingdi was poisoned in 560 Yi received the dying monarch’s verbal last will along with Hu, and cooperated with Hu in enthroning Wudi that same year.64 Throughout the 560’s Yi held important military and budgetary positions under the Hu regency. In approximately 569 or 570 Yi was appointed to command all Palace Guard units (zong zhongwai suweibing 縂中外宿衛兵). In fact, it is not clear who appointed Yi to this post, since it appears that Wudi may have been exercising appointative authority on his own, independent of Hu. Hu seems to have granted Wudi some political leeway to appoint courtiers, though he held ultimate veto authority over any decisions made by the throne. This situation reiterates the problems that occurred between Hu and the second monarch, Mingdi, who attempted to use his appointative powers as a factional weapon. At this point in time, Hu became concerned regarding Yi’s increasingly close relationship with the throne and so had him transferred to a more innocuous court posting, Vice Minister of Revenue (xiao situ 小司徒). When Hu was assassinated in 572 Yi was deeply involved in the affair on the side of Wudi and subsequently served as a close adviser to the throne. Even a senior courtier like Yang Zhong, one of the original twelve Army Generals of 550, was alienated from Hu. Under Yuwen Hu, Yang Zhong became an important commander in the east and led the Northern Zhou forces in the north during the 563 winter campaign against Jinyang in conjunction with Turkish cavalry. When Zhong returned from this last campaign Wudi paid special attention to him, thus prompting suspicions on Hu’s part resulting in the denial of certain court honors to Zhong which Wudi had proposed bestowing upon him.65 Prior to his death in 568 Zhong warned his son, Jian 堅 (the future Sui Wendi), against accepting an offer to serve as Hu’s close assistant with the comment that “Between two paternal aunts it is difficult to be a

64 Zs 30.524. 65 Zs 19.318. the northern zhou case 155 wife.”66 Finally, in circa 564 Hu’s eldest nephew, Yuwen Guang 宇文廣 advised Hu to surrender the reins of power.67

The 572 Coup of Wudi

Prior to the 572 coup Wudi is a somewhat shadowy personality dominated by the presence of Hu, though clearly by 563 one can sense the competitive tension developing between the two men, as discussed above. The 572 coup occurred suddenly with no warning and bore organizational similarities to the earlier unsuccessful effort of Xiaomindi in 557. A small, tight clique around the throne plotted the murder of Hu, after which Hu’s mature male children and close associates were also executed. During the course of a private interview with the empress dowager, Wudi hit Hu over the head with the imperial scepter, and then his younger brother, Zhi 直, and a eunuch beheaded the man. The subsequent extent of the violence seems to have been relatively limited to those closely attached to Hu. In 572 Wudi was 27 years old. The inner clique that accomplished this task included Wudi’s secretaries, his companion/bodyguards (functioning similar to a militarized version of the menxia, or Chancellory, personnel of the Tang), and at least one duty commander of the imperial bodyguard.68 All these individuals were either appointed by Hu, or appointed by Wudi and then sanctioned by Hu. A new element added by Wudi to his clique was the inclusion of two of his brothers as co-plotters. Neither of the previous two emperors appear to have involved their sibs in such affairs.Unlike Xiaomindi’s unsuccessful putsch of 557, Wudi’s palace guard personnel did not leak information to Hu, and Wudi was also able to benefit from the widespread dissatisfaction at court with the way Hu handled policy matters and relations with the throne. These close associates of Wudi always had direct access to his person and often held key palace guard commands. When Wudi died in 578 and passed the throne to his eldest son, Xuandi, these close associates commanded the palace guard units and ensured a safe passage for Xuandi during the early months of his reign.

66 ZzTj 170.5274. 67 Zs 10.156. 68 These individuals were: Wang Gui,Zs 40.711; Yuwen Shenju Zs 40.713; Yuwen Xiaobo, Zs 40.716; Zhangsun Lan, Sui shu 51.1327. Yuchi Yun, Zs 32.709, son of Hu’s strong supporter, Yuchi Gang, became prominent in Wudi’s inner clique after 572. 156 chapter five

The pattern of appointments of inner imperial clique members to strategic court positions, which was repeated by Xuandi, contrasts with appointment patterns in the early years of the Hu regency. Because Hu was dealing with the founding generation of generals and courtiers, many of them with semi-autonomous factional power bases, the formal court and military positions these men held actually reflected the power centers at the court. As discussed earlier, however, the checks and balances achieved within the formal court structure were premised upon factional loyalties and not upon a formal institutional system of checks and balances. Hu, too, had his own kitchen cabinet, but it was never as clearly marked off as it became under Wudi and his successor. After Hu was killed, Wudi, as an activist emperor, unified in his person the functional duties of Premier (he determined state policies, though the formal position of da zhongzai was retained in the outer court structure) and Supreme Commander of all troops in the realm, abolishing Hu’s Huazhou based Supreme Command headquarters and staff. Wudi’s close associates were always his most trusted source for advice and protection, regardless of the court positions which they held. However, Wudi made a show of appointing deserving members of the court to the various formal court positions. Some of his brothers had worked closely with the deceased Hu, but Wudi coopted them with high level court positions and titles; even Hu’s nephew, Liang 亮, brother of the previously mentioned courtier Yuwen Guang, was integrated into the new political dispensation.69 The subsequent discussion of the post-572 period of the reign of Wudi can be divided into the following three topics:

1) Wudi’s cooptation of his brothers and also many Hu supporters who were not related in any fashion to the throne. 2) Wudi’s success in establishing his heir as his successor, which is directly related to the role played by his clique of inner associates. 3) The conquest of the Northern Qi, which involved the cooperation of individuals from across the entire court political spectrum and positively reinforced Wudi’s political stature. Wudi, in planning and implementing the conquest drew upon the advice of a wide variety of sources. Mistaken policies were rapidly abandoned and alternative approaches were utilized. As a result, Wudi’s reign was known for the

69 Zs 10.156–57. the northern zhou case 157

ostensible openness of the throne to advice from his court, giving the impression that policy making was a semi-public, consensual affair.

Wudi’s Brothers

By the time of the 572 coup, Wudi’s paternal uncles and first cousins were no longer alive. The agnates of most concern to him were his eight surviving brothers who were active in court politics with a variety of political interests that needed to be satisfied. The two most powerful were Zhi, an aggressive opportunist, who had directly killed Hu and Xian 憲, who had become closely associated with Hu before 572. From 568 through 572 Xian served under Hu in the very sensitive da sima position (Minister of War, with overall authority over the imperial palace guard. If Wudi’s assassination plan had been leaked, Xian would most likely have been entrusted with crushing the plot, as happened to the coup plotters in 557). Immediately after Wudi seized power, Xian was moved to the position of da zhongzai, or Premier, though he had little power since the throne was actively making policy and super- vising the court administration. The biography of Xian also notes that “. . . although he was raised to the position of da zhongzai, this [actually] stripped him of his powers.”70 Xian was ultimately replaced by Wudi’s more reliable, less powerful brother Zhao 招 in the position of da sima until approximately 574.71 Zhi was awarded the highly honored but somewhat toothless position of da situ, or Minister of Revenue, which he found unsatisfying.72 In 574 Zhi would be executed for attempting to seize the throne while Wudi was absent from the capital. Despite Zhi’s treachery, Wudi continued to make extensive use of his brothers and other imperial agnates as governors and high level generals. The large unsuccessful eastern campaign of 575 (another unsuccessful attempt to take Loyang) and the successful campaigns of 576 through 577 when the Zhou forces marched up the Fen River and seized Jinyang were superb vehicles for drawing everyone into the war effort. Immediately following the conquest of the Northern Qi, Wudi’s other brothers, Chun 純 and Sheng 盛, were briefly appointed Governor-Generals (zong’guan縂管 )

70 Zs 12.189. 71 Zs 13.202. 72 Zs 13.202. 158 chapter five of Bingzhou (Jinyang) and Xiangzhou (Ye), respectively.73 Another brother, You 逌, was appointed Governor-General of Heyang, which controlled the major north-south access routes to Loyang across the Yellow River.74 Illustrative of Wudi’s cautious approach to granting his brothers positions of authority is the fact that Chun’s subordinate Governor of Bingzhou (Bingzhou cishi) was Yuwen Shenju 宇文神舉, a member of Wudi’s inner clique.75 Sheng’s subordinate Governor of Xiangzhou was Wang Yi 王誼, who attained prominence in Wudi’s eastern campaigns.76 Wang Yi also appeared in a subsequent military campign against recalcitrant tribal groups in Shaanxi which was nominally commanded by Wudi’s two brothers, Sheng and Jian 儉. Wang Yi, however, decided all issues of tactics and logistics.77 Thus, in many ways, Wudi continued the ostensibly ‘open’ personnel policies of Yuwen Tai and Hu, and like them, used close factional loyalists to maintain surveillance on the individuals appointed to high positions. The legacy of Yuwen Hu’s prolonged period of political tutelage left an unfortunate precedent with regard to the imperial succession. For reasons of his own, Hu arranged that the Yuwen emperors succeed each other in a fraternal fashion. By the time Wudi eliminated Hu in 572, a precedent had already been established that made politically active sibs a distinct danger to Wudi’s desire to institute a primogenital sucession. Wudi never specifically indicated that he feared that one of his brothers would attempt to seize the throne, but given the past pattern of imperial succession, it was a possibility that he could not afford to ignore. The 574 coup effort by Zhi demonstrated the danger the brothers posed. The political ambitions of Zhi and the quiet potency of Xian were phenomena that Wudi consciously endeavored to control. Wudi’s extraordinary stringency regarding the training of his chosen heir, the future Xuandi, also indicates a strong concern in this area. Xuandi, on the other hand, when he ascended the throne did indicate a very specific fear of his uncles.

73 Zs 13.204. 74 Zs 13.206. 75 Zs 40.715. 76 Sui shu 40.1168. 77 Ibid. the northern zhou case 159

Wudi and the Imperial Succession

In the fourth lunar month of 572, one month after the assassination of Hu, Wudi formally announced the installation of his eldest son, the fourteen year old Yong 邕, as his heir apparent. This was the first such independent decision by a Northern Zhou monarch since Yuwen Tai installed his own heir in the dramatic 556 junta conference. To ensure the permanency of his succession arrangement Wudi entrusted the control of the palace guard troops surrounding the heir and the instruction and surveillance of the heir to the members of his innermost clique.78 In approximately 573 Yuwen Xiaobo 宇文孝伯 and Yuchi Yun 尉遲運 were appointed tutor/companions to the heir as occupants of the newly created posts of left and right tutor zuo,( you gongzheng 左右宮正).79 Wudi subjected his son to an intensive training in practical government affairs. All the members of the innermost clique were extremely critical of the heir’s personal qualifications, the texts imply sexual misconduct and drunkeness.80 In 576 in the course of a western campaign against the nomadic Tuyuhun, just prior to the great eastern campaign against the Northern Qi, Yuwen Xiaobo and Wang Gui 王軌 reported to Wudi on the misconduct of the heir while in the field. Wudi had his son flogged and his entire personal staff dismissed.81 The result of this incessant surveillance and criticism was to make the heir anxious and defensive regarding his future. Wang Gui, the most insistently critical member of Wudi’s inner circle, urged that the heir be replaced by his younger brother, Zhi 贄, the Prince of Qin.82 In a comment to one of his close associates, Xuandi is reported to have said, “The Prince of Qin is the emperor’s favorite and Wang Gui the emperor’s trusted courtier; given my current situation, can I avoid the fate of Fu Su [the eldest son of Qinshi Huangdi, who was ordered to commit suicide]?”83 Wudi acknowledged the validity of the criticisms against his

78 After Yuwen Hu was assassinated in 572 his Supreme Command headquarters in Huazhou was abolished and Wudi personally assumed supreme command functions. After 572 Wudi increased the types and number of palace guard commands and personnel. Under Wudi there were at least three separate palace guard chains of command, ultimately all reporting to the throne. See Zhang Jinlong, 2004, 974, 978, 984. 79 Zs 40.717. Wang Zhongluo, 1979, 8.532. 80 Bei shi 35.1312; Zs 7.124. 81 ZzTj 172.5350. 82 Bei shi 35.1312. 83 Ibid. 160 chapter five son but was reluctant to remove him from his status as heir, though, he was not above threatening the young man, “Since antiquity there have been a number of heir apparents who were removed from their position; would not any of my other sons be capable of replacing you?”84 The pressures to which the future Xuandi was subjected as heir and the 576 flogging and dismissal of his staff served to solidify the lines of personal vindictiveness that were to find full expressionm in the court purges of 578 through 579. When Xuandi ascended the throne in the sixth lunar month of 578, the same personal staff that was dismissed in 576 was re-appointed and became Xuandi’s inner cabinet. The previous pressures of the Yuwen Hu period of tutelage on the incumbent emperors at the time led to the formation of tight, secretive imperial cliques. The stringent disciplining of Wudi’s heir and the sense of urgency manifested by Wudi toward his son can be seen as a legacy of the Yuwen Hu years of dominance over the throne. Xuandi’s extreme reaction to this political legacy will ironically result in the destruction of the dynasty.

The Ascension of Xuandi

In the fifth lunar month of 578 Wudi died suddenly and his duly designated heir ascended the throne the following month. The short-lived reign of this monarch is notable for its complete rejection of the style of rule of his father. Where Wudi made a show of Confucian influenced parsimony and beliefs, even demonstrating a degree of intolerance toward Buddhism, and an interest in administrative streamlining as a traditionally recognized means of cutting expenses, Xuandi acted in the opposite fashion. He indulged in rich court décor, revived imperial protection of Buddhism and Daoism, and engaged in the profuse use of imperial symbolism. In 579 Xuandi created the Four Consultative Offices (si fuguan 四輔官), which existed parallel with the standard “Six Offices” of the archaic Zhou inspired formal court administrative structure. The creation of this structure seems to have been an exercise in prestige symbolism, providing Xuandi with a new, distinctive manner with which to honor and reward courtiers of his choice. The image of consensual rule so assiduously cultivated by Wudi was also rejected for

84 Zs 7.124. the northern zhou case 161 a more centralized mode of decision making dominated by the emperor and his few close advisers.85 Wudi’s policy of cooptation of potential rivals was abandoned for one of confrontational politics. Xuandi’s influential uncle, Xian, whom Wudi had taken such pains to envelop within his post-572 political dispensation, was executed in the month following Xuandi’s ascension to the throne. Approximately a year later, in 579, Xuandi’s five surviving uncles were all sent out to nominal appanages scattered throughout the empire. The Zizhi Tongjian quotes Yang Jian (the future Sui Wendi) as stating regarding this avuncular diaspora, “The emperor lack virtue, his physi- ognomy shows him to be endowed with a short life. The protectors of the throne [Xuandi’s uncles] are enfeebled and separately sent to their appanages, which is a policy without any sound foundation. Once the feathers are plucked one cannot fly very far.”86 Beginning in the second lunar month of 579 Xuandi executed most of the members of his father’s inner cabinet, with the exception of Zhangsun Lan 長孫覽. The biography of Wang Gui states, “When Xuandi ascended the throne he recalled Zheng Yi 鄭譯 and others to his personal service. Gui thereupon knew that disaster would eventually befall him.”87 Zheng Yi was a member of Xuandi’s personal staff who had been dismissed in 576. Other courtiers who had been close to Wudi were removed to the provinces. Wang Yi was sent out to be Governor- General of the Xiangfan area on the Middle Yangzi. In addition to selective judicial execution and exile from the court, Xuandi used some novel approaches to dividing and ruling his court. He is one of the few emperors of a China based dynasty to name multiple, simultaneous empresses (huanghou). Most China based emperors named one empress but would have a number of ranked secondary consorts, or concubines.88 By 580 five women had been titled

85 For a very specific memorial to the throne discussing these points see the biography of Le Yun 樂運, Zs 40.722–24. 86 ZzTj 173.5398. 87 Zs 40.713. 88 Zhao Yi, Nian Ershi Zhaji, 1963, 15.302, records three cases of emperors having multiple living empresses. He omits, however, the brief Northern Qi case. The four cases are as follows: Sun Hao of the Three Kingdoms Wu regime; the fourth century Xiongnu monarch, Liu Cong; the Northern Qi case of Houzhu; and the Northern Zhou case of Xuandi. It is a possibility that Xuandi’s multiple empress policy may have been inspired by a similar but shorter and much more restricted situation under Northern Qi Houzhu. Taken in conjunction with Xuandi’s retirement policy there may be a pattern indicating the influence of Northern Qi political culture upon the Northern Zhou. 162 chapter five empress, ranked in order of seniority. The dynastic annals of Sui Wendi note that, “The emperor [Xuandi] had four consorts, all were appointed empresses. Their families vied for imperial attention and frequently slandered each other.”89 One of the families most severely discomfited by this policy of multiple empresses was the Yang family. Yang Jian’s daughter was the senior empress, assigned to the young Xuandi when he was first installed as heir apparent in 573. Xuandi’s policy of maintaining multiple empresses was truly unique. Of the five empresses, the middle three were from families of moderate or little influence in high court circles, consequently, their families can be said to have been completely dependent upon the imperial favor. These three middle empresses were flanked by the senior Yang family empress and the most junior empress, who was the daughter of the high level courtier, Yuchi Jiong, who had served in sensitive military positions under Yuwen Tai and Yuwen Hu. Jiong had been mentioned previously as Yuwen Tai’s sister’s son who was raised in Tai’s household. During Yuwen Hu’s period of dominance at the court Jiong was da sima from 562 through 568 when he was replaced in this position by Wudi’s brother, Xian, from 568 until the assassination in 572. For the remainder of Wudi’s reign very little is said regarding Jiong’s position at court; his career probably suffered a relative setback, though, Wudi did accord him a number of courtly honorifics and Jiong did not experience overt persecution.90 In early 579, when Xuandi was emperor, Jiong was sent out from the court as Governor-General of Xiangzhou, based in the former Qi secondary capital of Ye.91 This was a geo- strategically sensitive posting, but Xuandi may have felt it to be politically convenient for Jiong to be out of the court. In early 580 Jiong’s daughter was basically confiscated by Xuandi and made his most junior empress. Xuandi is alleged to have made the woman drunk and then seduced her.92 At the time she was already married to Xuandi’s second cousins’s son. Following the appropriation of his daughter-in-law the second cousin, Liang, staged an unsuccessful revolt which was rapidly crushed. Jiong never seemed to have objected to this arrangement, the incident is not mentioned in his biography. In point of fact, there is

89 Sui shu 1.3. 90 Bs 62.2211. 91 Zs 21.351. 92 Zs 7.125. the northern zhou case 163 no reason why Jiong should object to this affair since he was now the imperial father-in-law. The dynastic histories give no explanation for Xuandi’s actions regarding the Yuchi empress beyond noting that Xuandi was a base libertine by nature.93 While this evaluation may be accurate, Xuandi was not a mindless libertine—but a calculating politician. It seems to this writer that linking the Yuchi house directly to the throne would precisely counter-balance the position and influence of the Yang house. The perspicacity of this maneuver is borne out by the events which occurred immediately after Xuandi died suddenly in mid-580. Yang Jian, with the cooperation of high level courtiers forged documents appointing him regent to Xuandi’s young son and nominal successor, Jingdi. Yuchi Jiong remained loyal to the Yuwen throne and rose up in rebellion at Ye. The rebellion was rapidly suppressed, but the effectiveness of Xuandi’s divide and rule approach was made manifest.

The 579 Retirement of Xuandi and Concluding Remarks

From the beginning of 579 until the third lunar month of that year Xuandi conducted an eastern tour that took him to Loyang and Ye in full imperial splendor. Just after departing for the east, Xuandi annmounced the installation of his young son, then approximately six years old, as his heir apparent. In the second month, while touring Ye, Xuandi announced his retirement and the ascension of his young son as emperor. The fact that the retirement was announced from Ye is suggestive given the extensive use the Northern Qi made of this institution in its latter years primarily as a means of stabilizing the father to son succession to the throne. In view of Xuandi’s fears regarding his uncles and the novelty of a Northern Zhou emperor determining his own successor, Xuandi’s retirement would seem to fall into a pattern of activity aimed a strength- ening the imperial succession.94 Unlike the Northern Wei, which manifested a significant concentration of agnatic coup related activities in the categories of uncles and tangshu; and unlike the Northern Qi case, with a concentration of such

93 Zs 7.125. 94 Scott Pearce, 1987, 727–28, remarks on the the probable mixture of power politics and power symbolism as a motivation behind the 579 retirement. 164 chapter five

Table VI: Agnates and Coup Efforts in the Northern Zhou EMPEROR’S NEPHEWS BROTHERS COUSINS UNCLES MISC. NAME

XIAOMINDI HU 557 宇文胡 MINGDI HU (557–560) WUDI KANG 康 ZHI 直 HU (560–578) 576 574 Killed, 572 XUANDI XIAN 憲 LIANG 亮 (578–580) 578 580 (2nd cousin) activities in the categories of nephews and brothers (with tangshu as a possible runner-up to brothers)—the Northern Zhou case does not manifest any particular concentration of activity in any of the agnatic categories (see table VI). For the Northern Zhou, the main focus of dispute between imperial agnates was the long term antinomic relationship between the Yuwen Hu political protectorate and the incumbent Zhou emperors. Violent, endemic conflict within the Yuwen royal family was relatively muted, in part due to the presence of Hu on the court scene and in part due to the fact that the Northern Zhou regime was a collegial junta regime that had to abide by a politics of consensus and cooptation. The fraternal succession patterns of the first three Northern Zhou emperors were dictated by Hu for reasons not made explicit in the sources (see diagram V, below). Perhaps Hu was signaling to the court and the key factions created by Yuwen Tai and fully backing Hu, that he had no intention of seizing the throne for himself and that when the time was right he would voluntarily relinquish power. A tragic difficulty for Hu may have been that after dominating the court for as long as he did, that it had become too dangerous for him to relinquish power to a suspicious emperor—but maintaining the staus quo practically demanded that a forceful emperor violently appropriate power from Hu. Perhaps Yuwen Hu understood his fate and was patiently waiting for the violent outcome to manifest itself. the northern zhou case 165

Yuwen Tai

2) Mingdi 1) Xiaomindi 3) Wudi (557–560) (557) (560–578

4) Xuandi (578–580) ret. 579

5) Jingdi (580–581)

Sui Dynasty Diagram V: Northern Zhou Imperial Succession

CHAPTER SIX

THE XUANWU MEN INCIDENT OF THE TANG: IMPERIAL RETIREMENT ENTERS THE MAINSTREAM

The institution of retired emperorship was developed by the Northern Wei and utilized by the subsequent Northern Dynasties as a means of securing the primogenital succession to the throne. The next step is to investigate the relevance of this understanding of imperial retirement to the Tang context. Many members of the Tang ruling elite could trace their ancestry back to non-Han Chinese courtiers serving in the courts of the Northern Dynasties. Tang elite culture looked back to the Period of Disunion for cultural and political precedents. One scholar has referred to Taizong’s reign—the Zhenguan period—as the culmination in the development of the Xianbei inspired monarchies of the Northern Dynasties period.1 This is, perhaps, a somewhat controversial way of stating the issue, but it underlines the importance of the Period of Disunion’s cultural and political heritage. This chapter will discuss the retirement of Tang Gaozu in late 626 in the context of a succession crisis. Gaozu was personally familiar with the concept of the retired emperor. In 617, after seizing Chang’an, which held members of the Sui royal family (Yangdi was in Yangzhou), and prior to proclaiming himself emperor of the Tang dynasty, Gaozu followed the advice of Pei Ji 裴寂 and recognized Yangdi as retired emperor (taishang huang, without the final term, di). A grandson of Yangdi residing in Chang’an, You 侑, was recognized as emperor. To an extent, designating Sui Yangdi as retired emperor ‘in absentia’ was an exercise in the awarding of a passive honorific. You was a puppet emperor under the influence of Gaozu. In this instance Gaozu was simply using multiple emperors as a legitimating figleaf to cover his seizure of power. Gaozu’s use of the term may also have been designed to keep his options open with the Turks, who were interested in having Gaozu establish a tributary relationship with their kaghan. Gaozu could put the Turks off by hiding

1 Nunome Chōfū 布目潮渢, Zui Tō shi kenkyū 隋唐史研究 (Kyoto: Nakamura Press Co., Ltd., 1968), 312. 168 chapter six behind these multiple Sui emperors. Finally, at this time Sui Yangdi was still alive and in control of key garrison areas of China, including nearby Loyang. The use of the titletaishang huang was also tacit recognition on the part of Gaozu of these respective spheres of influence. Gaozu and his advisers were familiar with the general idea of retired emperorship, and most probably with the specific historical precedents. The approach of this chapter to the relative roles of Gaozu and Taizong in establishing and consolidating the Tang regime is in general accord with what can be termed the revisionist perspective.2 From the revisionist perspective, Gaozu is portrayed as the key decision-maker from the time of the Taiyuan uprising until the 626 retirement, when he ostensibly yielded power to Taizong. Gaozu consistently emerges as the key policy-maker while Li Shimin (the future Taizong), his brothers, and key associates may aggressively put forth policy suggestions, no significant action was ever initiated without Gaozu’s explicit approval. Gaozu, like the future Taizong, exhibited two notable qualities as a leader: first, the ability to wait and time his actions in accordance with favorable circumstances. Second, the ability to delegate authority and be open to policy advice from a wide variety of sources. The leadership qualities which traditional scholars have attributed to the Zhenguan reign period were, in fact, a direct continuation of Gaozu’s leadership style.3 Where the current revisionist perspective falters, however, is in its efforts to explain Gaozu’s apparent passivity with regard to the factional fighting carried on by his three eldest sons, the uterine brothers born of his deceased main consort, Empress Dou. Even more startling was Gaozu’s placid acceptance of the fratricide that occurred at Xuanwu Men, where Li Shimin killed his two uterine brothers and then successfully demanded recognition from Gaozu as his heir apparent. Had Gaozu become too old and too soft to deal competently with the harsh realities of court politics? Here we will argue that Gaozu encouraged his sons to compete with each other, that he, in fact, set the parameters of the competition and probably expected and desired an outcome similar

2 See Niu Zhigong 牛致功, Li Yuan Jian Tang Shilue 李淵建唐史略 (Xi’an: Shaanxi Renmin chubanshe, 1983); Li Shutong 李樹桐, Tang Shi Kaobian 唐史考辨 (Taibei: Taiwan Zhonghua shuju, 1965); Wang Fuzhi, Du Tongjian Lun (Beijing: Chonghua shuju, 1975 reprt). The entireDa Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu 大唐創業起居注 (Xuejin Taoyuan edition) is a major source for the revisionist perspective. 3 Li Shutong, in his, Tang Shi Xinlun 唐史新論 (Taibei: Taiwan Zhonghua shuju, 1972), 119–138, strongly emphasizes the continuity in leadership style between the two men. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 169 to what actually occurred at Xuanwu Men in 626. Gaozu’s approach was very risky, but under conditions where there were a limited number of relatively legitimate contenders for the throne, the encouragement of a controlled free-for-all ensured that the survivior would be the most competent and ruthless political manipulater and thus eminently qualified to become emperor. In regimes that practice forms of horizontal succession it is not unusual for such free-for-all’s to occur, which could temporarily plunge such regimes into complete civil war. Such violence is often necessary as a means of deciding upon a competent successor from among a number of mature brothers and uncles of the deceased monarch, who view themselves as eligible for the kingship. Many Turkish confederacies and the early Mongols engaged in competitive, sometimes highly institu- tionalized violence to determine the succession. By contrast, in native Chinese regimes and in most North Asian conquest regimes established in China overt encouragement of competitive violence to determine the succession was rare. The usual tendency, following the Chinese model, was to control the succession by definitively pre-selecting the heir, with the (often frustrated) expectation that all interested parties would abide by the decision. The Chinese style approach did not completely eliminate competitive violence for the throne, but it did channel legitimate violence in a manner distinct from regimes practicing horizontal succession patterns, usually limiting the legitimate competitors to a much narrower range of agnates. Tang Gaozu’s approach was unique—the only other example of a non-determinist approach to imperial succession in the Chinese context that comes to mind is that of the Qing dynasty. In the case of Tang Gaozu, it seems that he was not interested in establishing an institutional precendent; rather, he was responding in an imaginative fashion to the unique circumstances which he confronted following the establishment of the dynasty in late 618. Li Yuan (Gaozu) began his climb to imperial power late in life—he was 51 in 618. At that time his eldest son, Jiancheng 建成 was 29 years old, Shimin 世民 (the future victor at Xuanwu Men) was 20, and Yuanji 元吉 was 15 years old. Immediately after Gaozu ascended the throne he formally designated Jiancheng as his heir apparent. From the perspective of imperial/ Confucianized ritual this was the correct thing to do. However, with three adult sons present, all of whom could claim to have made significant contributions to the establishment of the Tang; all of whom were intensely jealous of each other; and all of whom had their own staffs and entourage, ritual legitimacy was insufficient. Gaozu was confronted with a very delicate situation, indeed. 170 chapter six

Under the rough and tumble conditions of establishing a new dynasty, having three adult sons (Yuanji, due to his relative youth, was usually aligned with Jiancheng) vying with each other was analogous to the fraternal and avuncular strife typical in many North Asian regimes of that time period and later. Gaozu’s solution was also analogous to that of a North Asian regime, viz., let the mature sons fight it out. There was an interesting twist to this approach, however, the competition would be overseen by Gaozu to ensure that it did not get out of hand and damage the viability of the dynasty. Thomas Barfield has remarked regarding the fratricide which occurred at Xuanwu Men, “Such actions were more in keeping with traditional Turkish power struggles . . .,” which he includes as one among a number of “nomadic features” characterizing the early Tang.4 Barfield is here echoing the position of his mentor, Joseph Fletcher, who characterized the early Tang as a “post- nomadic system.”5 In accordance with Gaozu’s arrangements, the succession issue would have to be resolved while he was still alive and in control of the political environment. The loser(s) in this struggle would have to die regardless of whether Gaozu was present or not since the Chinese style imperial structure was not constructed to accommodate institutional- ized competition for high office. With Gaozu present the probability that the violence could be minimized and contained was much greater. Under Gaozu’s ‘benign’ aegis, the losing factions at court would not be able to complain that the emperor unduly favored one side over the other. In point of fact, until the Xuanwu Men incident, Gaozu was constantly balancing one son off against the other son. Only at the very end did he make a definitive tilt toward Li Shimin, though even then, Gaozu offered no material support. The winner would emerge by virtue of raw talent and ruthlessness. Gaozu would then see to it that the surviving son would be duly legitimized and receive the full support of

4 Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1989), 141. 5 Joseph Fletcher, “Bloody Tannistry: Authority and Succession in the Ottoman, Indian Muslim and later Chinese Dynasties,” conference paper to Conference on the Theory of Democracy and Popular Participation, Bellagio, Italy, (1978), 66. In a historically nuanced essay, Xu Leshuai 徐樂帥 argues that ambiguities in the Northern Dynasties’ systems of succession, specifically, a willingness to consider other sons besides the eldest son of the main consort and an openness to uterine fraternal succession as in the Northern Qi, bequeathed to the Tang a flexibility in settling the imperial succession. See Xu, “Tangdai Huangwei Jicheng bu Wending de Yuanyin ji qi Yingxiang 唐代皇位繼承不穩定的原因及其影響,” in Zhong’guo Zhong’gu shi Lunji 中國中古史論集 ed. by Zhang Guogang (Tianjin: Tianjin Guji chubanshe, 2003), 304–09. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 171 all key courtiers. Another aspect of this competitive situation was that political power would be fragmented among the three sons and Gaozu would see to it that this dynamic equilibrium remained in place until he was prepared to alter the situation.6 By ostensibly keeping himself above the factional struggle consuming his sons, Gaozu would also be able to provide a focus of loyalty for all courtiers that would transcend the grimy factional strife and maintain dynastic unity. Additionally, after an extended and bruising fight, the surviving son would still need the full cooperation and support of Gaozu in order to effect a reconciliation of the various factions. Thus, Gaozu would be able to avoid the grim fate of Sui Wendi, who was allegedly killed by his son, Yangdi—the latter feeling confident enough about his political base to eliminate his father. Gaozu never permitted one son to attain sustained factional dominance. From 618 through 622 Li Shimin was granted the spotlight. From 622 through 626 Jiancheng re-couped his position and slowly whittled away at Shimin’s staff and close advisers, always working with the permission and active knowledge of Gaozu, nevertheless, in the end Gaozu threw his support behind the weakened Shimin, allegedly relaying a favorable astrologer’s report to this son.7 Nunome Chōfū attributes a four to one force advantage in favor of Jiancheng just before the violence occurred. The success of the Xuanwu Men coup was based on the element of surprise by numerically inferior forces. The core violence was committed by approximately nine to twelve individuals, all close associates of Li Shimin.8 From Gaozu’s perspective, if Shimin was capable of

6 The argument presented here tallies with that of Niu Zhigong. Niu emphasized that Gaozu allowed his sons to compete as a means of preserving the full power of the throne (a divide and rule technique) while indirectly guiding the struggle among his sons for the position of heir apparent. Niu explicitly makes reference to the alleged fate of Sui Wendi (who may have been killed on his sickbed by his son, the future Sui Yangdi) as a possible danger of which Gaozu was aware. Niu’s insight is lucid and bold, but his argumentation is uncritically dependent on the standard sources, which he utilizes in his own unique fashion. See Niu, “Xuanwu Men zhi Bian yu Tang Gaozu Rangweixi 玄武門之變與唐高祖讓位析, Renwen Zazhi 6 (1980): 54, 55. In his 1983 monograph and in his 1998 revised and expanded biography of Gaozu, Niu emphasizes a perceived affection Gaozu had for Li Shimin. This author much prefers the cynical perspective of the 1980 essay. The 1998 expanded biography provides much more detail regarding the events leading up to the Xuanwu Men incident. Even when reading the 1998 monograph, Gaozu’s calculating manipulation of his sons is still striking. See Niu, Tang Gaozu Zhuan 唐高祖傳 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1998). 7 See note 29. 8 Nunome Chofu, 293. Sun Ying’gang 孫英剛 credits Li Shimin with a total of 800 men spread out at various points both outside the inner palace grounds, at key access 172 chapter six eliminating his two brothers, then he would be willing to grant him the throne. Under such conditions, of course, Shimin would have to continue working with his father. Gaozu’s strategy bears similarities to approaches used at the time in dealing with foreign powers. The successful Sui dynasty policy of the early 580’s of destroying Northern Turk power was premised on the idea of “seeking allies from afar and attacking the enemy who is near, under- mining the strong and consolidating the weak.”9 Later Tang approaches to the then divided Korean peninsula appear to have been similar—support for the weakest party, Silla, against the two stronger contenders, as a means of assuring maximum Tang leverage in the region. Therefore, applying this sort of approach to domestic political competition should not surprise us. A key component in Gaozu’s efforts at legitimizing the surviving heir was imperial retirement. As retired emperor, Gaozu would be able to maintain policy and personnel continuity and assist in major state policy decisions. His role as an active retired emperor probably ended in 629 or 630 when he removed himself to a suburban palace complex. Nevertheless, he maintained a visible presence in Tang politics until his death in 635. A remarkable aspect of the state of affairs prior to the Xuanwu Men incident was Gaozu’s apparent ability to dictate to his sons the extent to which their competition could go. All three sons had their own staffs, advisers, and palace guard units. All the sons had extensive contacts throughout the central court and provincial level military and political structures. Nevertheless, any affort to bring in outside assistance to their Chang’an centered factional struggles was immediately quashed by Gaozu. In the end, the 626 violence at Xuanwu Men involved only a limited number of personnel, and all the participants were palace insiders. The overall military and administrative structure of the Tang was not immediately affected by the violence. The isolation of the factional contenders to Chang’an was not hermitic, however. High military personnel from Qingzhou in Shaanxi (Yang Wengan 楊文幹) and personnel

gates to the grounds, and inside the inner palace grounds at and near the Xuanwu Gate. When fighting began outside the Xuanwu Gate, pro-Jiancheng and Yuanji forces may have amounted to 2,000 men or more. See Sun, “Tangdai Qianqi Gongting Geming Yanjiu 唐代前期宮廷革命研究 Tang Yanjiu 7 (2001): 269, 270. 9 Lin Gan 林幹, Tujue shi 突厥史 (Huhehot: Nei Meng’gu Renmin chubanshe, 1988), 65. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 173 originally based in the modern Beijing area (Prince of Lujiang, Li Yuan 盧江王李瑗, and Luo Yi 羅兿) were deeply implicated with Jiancheng and subsequently executed for rebellious activity.10 The military staff at Loyang was strongly oriented toward Li Shimin, though he never acti- vated these contacts to provide him with direct assistance in his factional struggles in Chang’an. Gaozu certainly had to be very careful with regard to the outside contacts allowed to his sons. If he permitted any of them to bring to the capital outside forces, then the factional competition which he was engineering could blow up in his face, and he could very well become a casualty of the struggle. Furthermore, if the violence became uncontrolled, then the possibility of a full blown civil war loomed that could spell the collapse of the dynasty.

Disciplining One’s Children

Until late 621 the dynasty was primarily concerned with survival and consolidating basic political authority on the North China Plain and in South China. The sibling rivalry intensified only after the basic conquest had been completed. In the period 617 through 618 both Jiancheng and Shimin actively led military forces. Jiancheng was assigned command of the Left Flank troops and Shimin the Right Flank troops, and Yuanji was left behind in nominal command of Taiyuan.11 In this early period Jiancheng and Shimin did not have serious policy disagreements between themselves. For example, in the 617 attack on the city of Huoyi, which was undertaken at the same time that Liu Wuzhou 劉武周 was rumored to be planning an attack on Taiyuan at their rear, both sons urged Gaozu to push aggressively forward and not be concerned with the doings of Liu Wuzhou.12 Prior to the onset of the uprising Shimin had the closest sustained contact with his father. When Sui Yangdi assigned Li Yuan (the future Gaozu) to Taiyuan in 617, both Jiancheng and Yuanji were in Hedong

10 Luo Yi, who had been granted the imperial surname of Li, was actually transferred to Jingzhou in Shaanxi before rebelling. His ties to Jiancheng go back to the time when he was the dominant satrap of Youzhou, which is the modern Beijing area. 11 Jiu Tang shu [JTs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 1.3. 12 ZzTj 184.5744, 5748. 174 chapter six

(southwest Shanxi). Shimin resided with his father in Taiyuan. During this period Shimin often acted as an interested intermediary between his father and parties desiring that Gaozu make a definitive political move in view of the rapid deterioration of the Sui regime, while Gaozu carefully weighed and balanced the flow of information provided by his son.13 Because of his active political role in Taiyuan, Shimin was inti- mately familiar with his father’s close advisers, which would prove to be of some benefit in his future struggles with his brothers and subsequently when he ascended the throne in 626. After Chang’an was seized in 617, however, the majority of subsequent crucial military campaigns were manged by Shimin. That is, Gaozu made the managerial decisions to assign Shimin to frontline commands and not his other sons. The campaigns against Liu Wuzhou in Shanxi, Wang Shichong 王世充 at Loyang, and Dou Jiande 竇建徳 on the North China Plain were all commanded by Shimin. Jiancheng either remained at the capital with his father or served in military support positions or on secondary fronts. During Shimin’s successful campaign against Loyang in 620–21, Jiancheng was assigned to garrison Puzhou 蒲州, a strategic crossing on the Yellow River just before it bends east.14 He was also assigned to campaign against tribal groups on the Shaanxi-Shanxi border, a distinctly low prestige theater of operations.15 The advantage of being the frontline commander in a major theater of operations was that one had the opportunity to directly contact and possibly employ talented surrendered personnel.16 The commander in charge of a major campaign also had a voice in the distribution of booty to his men, and this, in turn, increased the reputation and number of

13 See JTs 57.2285–86, 2289–2292. Li Shimin is presented here in a very aggressive role. 14 See Li Shutong (1965), 276–309. 15 JTs 1.11; 64.2414. Jiancheng may have been assigned these low key commands out of Gaozu’s concern to protect the heir apparent from unnecessary danger. Perhaps, from a more cynical perspective, this was done to avoid granting the heir apparent immediate access to power and prestige that could threaten the reigning father. For the argument that this was a traditional way of protecting the heir apparent see, Cen Zhongmian 岑仲勉, Sui Tang Shi 隋唐史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982), 96. Also, Huang Yongnian, Wenshi Tanwei (2000), 192; and his Liu zhi Jiu Shiji Zhong’guo Zhengzhi shi (2004), 129– 130. 16 This assumes that high level courtiers in the imperial administration at Chang’an had no objections. See the biography of Du Yan 杜淹 in JTs 66.2471. Yan was captured by Li Shimin’s forces at Loyang, and he personally desired to serve on the staff of Jiancheng. However, the high ranking courtier in charge of personnel assignments, Feng Deyi, intervened and had Du Yan assigned to the staff of Li Shimin. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 175 followers such an individual could muster. In this regard, Jiancheng’s unfavorable position was explicitly recognized by his close advisers, Wei Zheng 魏徵 and Wang Gui 王珪 in late 621, following Li Shimin’s simultaneous conquest of Loyang and capture of Dou Jiande. At this time the Liu Heita 劉黑闥 rebellion broke out on the North China Plain (Heita was one of the surviving generals from the army of Dou Jiande). Jiancheng was advised to apply for permission to lead the campaign against Heita as a means of bolstering his reputation in the face of the growing prestige of Shimin.17 This is, in fact, one of the earliest references made regarding an active rivalry between the two brothers. At approximately the same time (621), we also receive the first hint that Gaozu is interested in manipulating his two eldest sons. After the conquest of Loyang, Shimin offended some of Gaozu’s consort families by refusing to award their relatives with desired parcels of land. Members of these families then criticized Shimin to his father, alleging that Shimin had even disregarded edicts from Gaozu empowering members of these families to take possessions of said parcels of land. The text then notes that an enraged Gaozu withdrew his favor from Shimin, giving prefer- ence to the other two brothers, and that he was no longer interested in altering heir apparents.18 The Zizhi Tongjian notes a similar sort of action by Kaozu for the year 622.19 The text alleges that when Gaozu began his uprising in Taiyuan in 617 he had promised that if the ven- ture were successful he would name Shimin as heir apparent. The text then goes on to note that beginning from this time (622), Jiancheng and Yuanji began to cooperate in forming anti-Shimin factions at the court. Key allies of Jiancheng proved to be consort families of Gaozu who felt threatened. The point in mentioning these allegations is not to vouch for their internal consistency, which has been strongly questioned, but to emphasize their temporal clustering and also the active, conscious role played by Gaozu in these alleged incidents. By 624 the factional tensions had increased—the events that occurred highlighting the manner in which Gaozu played his sons off against each other. Jiancheng and Yuanji were becoming impatient and at one point Jiancheng allegedly had to restrain Yuanji from assassinating Shimin in the presence of their father.20 In this same period Jiancheng attempted

17 JTs 64.2415. 18 Jiancheng had been designated heir apparent in 618. See JTs 64.2416. 19 ZzTj 190.5957. 20 ZzTj 191.5985. 176 chapter six to call in unauthorized heavy cavalry units to serve in his entourage. Gaozu immediately intervened, cancelled the request, and rebuked his son. The culmination of these tensions was the Yang Wengan affair. The scenario that developed illustrates the complicated political relations which existed at the time. In the summer of 624 Gaozu, accompanied by Shimin and Yuanji went to his summer resort in Fangzhou 坊州, approximately 100 kilometers north of Chang’an. Jiancheng was left in Chang’an to handle routine affairs of state. At this time, Yang Wengan was Governor–General of Qingzhou, the neighboring province to the northwest of Fangzhou. Yang Wengan was a former palace guard on the staff of the heir apparent’s quarters and the two men were close friends.21 In 624 for unknown reasons, Wengan revolted. The revolt was quickly suppressed, but it served as the backdrop for an explicit accusation in the texts that Jiancheng had instigated it. The texts also allege that Gaozu promised Li Shimin the throne if he would help crush the revolt.22 The accuracy of these allegations has been strongly challenged and given the tendentious nature of the data it is impossible to know the specific course of events and motivations of the individuals involved.23 What is clear is that the factional strife between Shimin and Jiancheng was deeply implicated in this affair. After the revolt was suppressed Gaozu punished high staff members from the camps of both sons with

21 Ibid., 191. 5986. 22 Ibid., 191. 5987. 23 See Li Shutong (1965), 99–117. The essays of textual and historical criticism by Li provide crucial insights regarding the discussions presented in the dynastic annals and the Zizhi Tongjian relevant to the reigns of Gaozu and Taizong. Li Shutong has assailed the data presented by these sources as tainted and tendentious, therefore, it is still important to note the timing of many of the alleged incidents and statements recorded in these traditional sources. Whereas specific incidents may be partially or wholly manufactured, a temporal clustering of incidents is probably an accurate indication of tensions or concerns related in a general way to the specific incidents in question. The work of Li Shutong has had a significant impact on Western and Japanese scholars. See Howard Wechsler’s discussion in, Mirror to the Son of Heaven (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 8–9, and his essay in the Cambridge History of China, vol. 3, part 1, Sui and Tang China, 589–906 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 184 footnote #88. Also, Michael Rogers, The Chronicle of Fu Jian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 43, 99 footnote #247, where he writes admiringly of Li Shutong’s work. Denis Twitchett, in his monograph, The Writing of Official History Under the Tang (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), does not explicitly discuss Li Shutong, though he broadly hints at some of Li’s positions regarding textual sources. Twitchett’s stance on the relevant portions of the extant texts is certainly compatible with that of Li Shutong. See Twitchett’s discussion of Taizong’s draft history (shilu) on pages 127–128 and footnote #34. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 177 banishment and the brothers were simply scolded.24 Having eliminated the Yang Wengan disturbance, Gaozu permitted the dangerous competition to continue.25 In early 626 Jiancheng unsuccessfully attempted to poison Shimin. Gaozu arrived in the scene and admonished the brothers to be nice to each other, or he would have to separate them!26 On

Nunome Chōfū’s monograph, Zui Tō shi Kenkyū, is sprinkled with remarks sometimes agreeing with Li Shutong, sometimes disagreeing with his perspective. On page 281, Nunome disagrees with Li’s analysis of the Yang Wengan affair of 624 (Nunome’s position, however, did not satisfy Howard Wechsler, see The Cambridge History of China, loc. cit.). On page 255, footnote #5, Nunome cites with approval Li Shutong’s critique of Li Shimin’s alleged prominent role in the 617 uprising led by his father, the future Gaozu. 24 Li Shutong (1965), 109, 112. Also, see Niu Zhigong’s narration of the incident in his Tang Gaozu Zhuan (1998), 301–04. 25 Gaozu was acutely aware of the increasingly violent competition between his two eldest sons, as indicated by the fact that he placed a greater distance between himself and his three sons. Fu Lecheng 傅樂成 surmises, regarding the specific date, that at some point after the Yang Wengan affair Jiancheng and Yuanji could no longer have direct, unhindered access to the inner palace grounds—they would have to go by a round-about way and enter through the northern Xuanwu Gate. Li Shimin was moved from his residence on the west side of the Taiji Palace complex, the Chengqian Palace 承乾殿 (also referred to as the Chengqing Palace 承慶殿), to the suburban Hongyi Palace 宏義宮, located beyond the inner palace walls, north and west of the Xuanwu Gate. In 629 the name of this latter palace was changed to the Tai’an Palace 太安, which was where Gaozu resided from 629 until his death in 635 (Taizong may have derived a sardonic satisfaction from this situation). Yuanji originally lived on the eastern side of the Taiji Palace in the Wude Palace 武德殿, though it is not clear where he was re-located to. Jiancheng, as heir apparent, lived in the walled off eastern sector of the inner palace grounds reserved for the heir apparent. Apparently Gaozu ordered gates communicating directly from the heir apparent’s quarters to the inner palace grounds to be sealed. See Fu Lecheng, “Xuanwu Men Shibian zhi Yun’niang,” 玄武門事變之醞釀 Taiwan Daxue Wenshi Zhexue Bao 8 (1958), 176–77. For the specifics on the residences of the three sons see Huang Yongnian (2000), 195. Huang adds that the reason Li Shimin planned to ambush his brothers within the inner palace grounds is because once they had passed through the Xuanwu Gate and were well within the grounds of the inner palace, they had no means of retreat to the safety of their residences and guard units, but would be trapped against the walls of the inner palace. See Huang (2000), 196. Fu Lecheng acknowledges that Gaozu was aware of the ill feelings between the two brothers, but denies that he foresaw the impending tragedy at Xuanwu Men. This chapter argues that the Yang Wengan affair was simply another incident among many that indicated the almost inexorable logic of the situation. Gaozu’s post-624 security mea- sure mentioned above were simply an effort at drawing out the competition for a longer period of time, and avoiding unduly exposing himself to danger. For maps of the palace grounds see, Xu Song 徐松, Tang Liang Jingcheng Fangkao 唐兩京城坊考, reprint edition (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985); and the map in Nancy S. Steinhardt, Chinese Imperial City Planning (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 103. 26 The poisoning episode may be indirectly corroborated by a brief statement in the biography of Ren Xiang 任瓖 ( JTs 59.2324). The text notes some blemishes in the career of Jen and then, almost as a non-sequitur, states, “When Jiancheng was killed, Xiang’s younger brother, Can 璨 [a known partisan of Jiancheng], was Inspector of the Imperial 178 chapter six another occasion Gaozu was almost persuaded to arrest Shimin but refrained from doing so at the last minute, following objections from high courtiers.27 One should note the pattern: as long as the contestants stayed within the bounds of the palace and its personnel, Gaozu is seen playing a very passive, reactive role. However, when there is even the hint of outside intervention, like the attempted call-up of heavy cavalry by Jiancheng , or the Yang Wengan affair, then the passive Gaozu suddenly transforms himself into a decisive leader, and these ‘extramural’ activities are stopped. 626 proved to be the decisive year when all the issues hanging fire were to be resolved.28 The major determinant for Gaozu may have been symbolic—he turned 61 in this year using the traditional Chinese counting style. It was not unusual for Chinese politicians to resolve long-standing issues following the end of a sexagenary cycle and Gaozu had already waited a year beyond that time. There seems to have been a general expectation, perhaps impatience, among all the contenders that the time for a definitive resolution had arrived. In manipulating multiple factions (including the old guard directly loyal to him) it would have been dangerous for Gaozu to ignore the aspirations of his clients. While the situation had not reached the point of what the Japanese term gekokujō, or covert insubordination, the danger was certainly present. The urgency in Shimin’s camp was palpable and the only question that remained was that of exact timing and circumstances. Gaozu hastened events by notifying Shimin that he would be the appropriate person to inherit the throne: he relayed to Shimin the astrologer’s report that the King of Qin (Shimin’s noble rank) was favored to rule the empire.29

Kitchens (dian shanjian 典膳監). Xiang was administratively penalized by being sent out as Governor–General of Tongzhou [in Sichuan].” This reference would be relevant if Can was cognizant of the attempted poisoning. This detail is mentioned because it may indicate that some of the more outré incidents recorded in the annals may actually be factual, not later concoctions of Taizong who tampered with the historical record. 27 ZzTj 191.6004–05. 28 For the following discussion see ZzTj 191.6006–6012. 29 The astrologer’s report is mentioned in the biography of Fu Yi傅弈 ( JTs 79.2716; and the “Tianwen” section of the JTs, 36.2321). There is a slight discrepancy regarding the date when the astrologer’s report was issued. Assuming that the Jiu Tang shu “Tianwen” section and a brief statement in the Zizhi Tongjian 191.6003, are accurate, Gaozu handed the report to Li Shimin on the sixth lunar month, third day, i.e., one day prior to the Xuanwu Men incident (though, according to Fu Yi’s biography it was handed to Gaozu a month earlier). Such a report probably did exist. Fu Yi’s biography records a conversation between Taizong and Fu Yi after the former had ascended the throne. Taizong’s attitude toward the report is negative—he states that the document almost the xuanwu men incident of the tang 179

Shimin notified his father that the brothers were plotting to kill him and so Gaozu responded by arranging to have a private conference with Shimin the following morning to discuss these charges. The news of this conference was leaked to Jiancheng and Yuanji, who decided to attend uninvited. Shimin ambushed his brothers near the Xuanwu Gate, and Shimin’s close associates personally killed the two brothers. Gaozu, who was boating in a palace lake nearby was notified of Shimin’s victory by the same man who had killed Yuanji.30 Gaozu indicated his immediate destroyed him. If such were the case, and if Gaozu did, in fact, leak the report to Shimin, then it may have forced latter to act more quickly than he had originally planned. In other words, Gaozu was giving him notice that the time had arrived—either he would act immediately, or he would relinquish his claims to the succession and sign, in effect, his own death warrant. Li Shutong also considers the astrologer’s report a valid piece of data, but he interprets it in a completely opposite fashion from the one suggested here. See Li (1965), 158–9, 188–9. Despite his revisionist textual research, Li Shutong never went as far as Niu Zhigong, who essentially asserted that Tang Gaozu was a complete cynic and was manipulating his sons for fundamental reasons of power politics with the goal of assuring the survival of the dynasty after he died—a position which this chapter supports. Li Shutong views Gaozu as a brilliant politician and a concerned father seeking to protect is eldest son and heir apparent (Jiancheng) from the threat posed by Shimin. He interprets the leaking of the astrologer’s report to Shimin as a warning that he (Gaozu) knew that Shimin was planning to usurp the position of heir apparent and that he should abandon his illegitimate desires for power. This interpretation does not match up with the pattern of past events and the trajectory they established for the subsequent course of action to be taken. 30 The messenger was Yuchi Jingde 尉遲敬德, who was Li Shimin’s leading bodyguard and military retainer, and a close personal friend. In approximately 625 Yuanji had slandered Jingde before Gaozu, who then initially sentenced Jingde to death. Li Shimin successfully pleaded with his father to pardon Jingde (see JTs 68.2497; and the Cambridge History, 186). When Yuchi Jingde came to report on the Xuanwu Men killings, Jingde approached Gaozu fully armed, which was a violation of protocol meriting death. To quote Howard Wechsler’s description, “It was Li Shimin’s dramatic way of announcing to his father that the tide of events at court had turned and that he was now in full command,” (Cambridge History, 186). This statement is partially true in that the announcement was indeed dramatic, and probably did carry the implicit threat that Gaozu was expected to follow through and legitimate Li Shimin’s hard won and tenuous victory, or face violence against his person. It is not possible, however, to state that Li Shimin was in full control. He needed his father as much as his father needed him. A major point argued in this chapter is that the political reality at the Tang court at the time did not correspond to such a cut and dried scenario of complete victory for Li Shimin. Liu Pengchun 劉蓬春, in the essay, “Xuanwu Men zhi Bian, Fubing Kaobian玄武門之變伏兵考辯,” Wei Jin Nan Bei Chao Sui Tang Shi 2 (1999) points out that the initial ambuscade occurred within the inner palace grounds southwest of the Xuanwu Gate and probably quite near to where Gaozu was boating on one of the artificial lakes on the palace grounds. Liu goes on to ask how Gaozu could not have been aware of the fighting and hubbub going on nearby. How could he just sit there with arms folded and do nothing (see page 66)? Liu speculates that Li Shimin had already placed a sizable force within the inner palace grounds and had overwhelmed Gaozu’s own bodyguard 180 chapter six and complete acceptance of Shimin’s actions and issued a written order terminating all subsidiary fighting which was occurring in and around the inner palace grounds. The fighting ceased immediately. Problems of textual accuracy notwithstanding, the general pattern of action is clearly delineated by the texts.31 The consistent pattern is one of increasingly overt hostility between the brothers, with Gaozu appearing in the role of referee. Clearly, given past precedent in imperial political history, two of the three brothers would have to die since the political structure was not built to accommodate the losing side in overt competition for the throne.

The Post-Xuanwu Men Dispensation

Immediately after the violence was concluded Shimin was made heir apparent with authority over all imperial affairs, with the specific proviso that all decisions would be subsequently reported to Gaozu. This is essentially a form of rule by the heir apparent (taizi jianguo 太子監國) a type of on-the-job training, which was made famous in the early Northern Wei but has existed in varied forms throughout classical Chinese imperial history.32 Gaozu retained broad oversight authority over his new

contingent and held the emperor under de facto house arrest (see pages 68, 71). This latter hypothesis is dramatic, but reasonable, however, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis regarding the taking of Gaozu as a hostage. Furthermore, it is doubtful if Gaozu, who was already wary of his sons’ activities would permit himself to be taken unawares at a pre-determined meeting spot which he had designated, by one of these sons.The position of this chapter is simply that Gaozu knowingly permitted the bloodshed to run its course. 31 This is also a position supported by Li Shutong (1965), 90–1. 32 Li Ping (2000), 75–137, has a detailed discussion of the Northern Wei institution of the heir apparent governing the realm (taizi jianguo) under Mingyuandi (r. 409– 424) and Taiwudi (r. 424–452). The latter case is particularly important to events in Northern Wei history. Li Ping also points out native Chinese precedents for this institution. Kubozoe Yoshifumi has written an essay that explores in some depth the somewhat limited decision making authority of the Northern Wei heir apparent in this position of responsibility since their fathers, especially Taiwudi, were quite active and engaged in court political affairs. See Kubozoe, translated into Chinese, “Guanyu Bei Wei de Taizi Jianguo Zhidu 關於北魏的太子監國制度,” Wen Shi Zhe 1 (2002): 124–29. The Northern Wei institution was clearly geared toward stabilizing the succession and giving the heir apparent significant on the job training. The political environment which Gaozu arranged between the sixth lunar month through the eigth lunar month of 626 by placing Li Shimin in a similar position, though, with much more independent decision making powers than any of his Northern Wei predecessors, had significant precedents in the immediate past. Certainly, Li Shimin’s the xuanwu men incident of the tang 181 heir apparent.33 As the victor, Shimin issued a general amnesty to the losing sides that was given substance by a policy of personnel cooptation. High policy advisers to the dead brothers were directly incorporated in to Shimin’s staff (Wei Zheng, Wang Gui, Wei Ting韋挺 ). Lower level loyalist troops who fought on behalf of Jiancheng and Yuanji to the bitter end were pardoned. Some officers were awarded high provincial postings on the frontiers.34 Since Gaozu retained oversight authority during this period, the cooptation policy would directly reflect his own policy orientation. Indeed, the cooptation policy is a direct continuation of Gaozu’s pre-Xuanwu Men incident approach of isolating the competitive factional violence at the capital and ensuring the continuation of a smoothly running imperial administrative structure. Once Shimin decided the issue of imperial succession at Xuanwu Men he was expected to fall in line and see to it that all the remaining ‘creases’ were smoothed out. The only exceptions to the general amnesty were the approximately ten male children of the deceased brothers—they were all executed. The coup was notable for its vicious precision.35 Li Shimin not only absorbed the staff members of his former rivals, but he also initially retained Gaozu’s close associates in their high court positions and these individuals worked closely with Shimin’s appoin- tees (note the continued presence of Feng Deyi 封德彝, Pei Ji, Xiao Yu 蕭瑀, and Chen Shuda 陳叔達). Until 628 the Department of State Affairs (shangshu sheng) was manned at its highest levels by Xiao Yu and Feng Deyi (Feng died in the sixth lunar month of 627). Pei Ji remained at court as a highly honored courtier, though, with no specific functional title. In early 629 he was accused of being an accessory to the discovered plotting of a heterodox religious figure and ordered to return to his home county. A closer examination of the higher levels of the Tang court structure will bear out the above statements. The fluent exercise of power demands coordination and control over both policy formulation and policy implementation aspects of the organizational structure.36 In the case of the early Tang court the Chancellory (menxia sheng) and the successful coup as a backdrop places him on a very different political plane from the Northern Wei prototypes. 33 See ZzTj 191.6012. 34 See the biographies of Feng Li 馮立 and Xie Shufang 謝叔方 in JTs 187A.4872, 4873, respectively. 35 JTs 64.2419, 2423. 36 Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press, 1968 enlarged edition), 223–25, 548–49, 551. 182 chapter six

Secretariat (zhongshu sheng) were responsible for policy formulation while the Department of State Affairs was responsible for policy execution (however, the leadership of this organ in the early Tang was also deeply involved in policy formulation discussions). A situation in which a functioning organization has its policy formulating and policy implementing functions dominated by different power blocs would imply the existence of a coalitional political structure. This is precisely what occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Xuanwu Men incident from 626 through 629. The data to be discussed below will be used to buttress the argument that Gaozu continued to exercise oversight authority over imperial affairs until 629 at the earliest. Table VII below illustrates select positions within the three organs of theTang court discussed above. Individuals to the right of the thick line in the middle of the table were closely associated with Taizong. Individuals to the left of the thick line were associates of Gaozu. It should be noted that the court was not necessarily clearly dichotomized between the various factions. Gaozu always portrayed himself as being above the sordid factional strife, so one could be a partisan of Taizong and still owe final loyalty to Gaozu. Nevertheless, after the success of the Xuanwu Men incident partisanship for Taizong (Li Shimin) versus loyalty to Gaozu would tend to become more clearly articulated. Based on the pattern of activity indicated by the table, it appears that Taizong moved cautiously, immediately placing key supporters in sensitive lower level functional ministries, particularly Personnel and Military affairs. Within the next two years Taizong slowly displaced personnel associated with the higher managerial levels within the Department of State Affairs which were held by old associates of Gaozu. The pattern indicated by the table supports the hypothesis that Gaozu retained considerable power after the Xuanwu Men incident and engaged in a carefully managed transfer of power to his son. By retaining considerable influence within the Department of State Affairs Gaozu would have a hand in both policy formulation and implementation and still leave room for his son to fill the other major organs of the court with his supporters. As far as Taizong was concerned regarding the Department of State Affairs, he seems to have been operating on the premise of “gaining operational control at the second echelon as a way of gaining policy control at the first echelon.”37

37 Ibid., 551. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 183 李靖 Li Jing 杜正倫 Du Zhenglun 629 房玄齡杜如晦 Dai Zhou Dai Du Ruhui Du Ruhui Wang Gui Wang Du Ruhui & Du Ruhui Fang Xuanling Fang Ruhui Zheng 628 Wang Gui Wang Dai Zhou Dai Du Ruhui Du RuhuiDu Du Wei ZhengWei Wei Du Ruhui & Du Ruhui Wuji Fang XuanlingFang Xuanling Fang 王珪 Yu Xiao Zhang sun Zhang 杜淹 Wei 魏徵 Du Yan Zheng 長孫無忌 Zhangsun Wuji 627 戴胄 Xiao Yu Dai Zhou Dai Gao Shilian Yuwen Shiji Yuwen Fang Xuanling & Xuanling Fang Dai Zhou Feng Feng Deyi Zhangsun Wuji 蕭瑀封德彝 Xiao Yu Feng Deyi Feng Du Ruhui Du Du Ruhui 高士廉 Gao Shilian Zhangsun Zhangsun Wuji Fang Xuanling & Yuwen Shiji 626 Ren Xiang Chen & Shuda Yuwen Shiji Gongren Yang Gongren & Feng Deyi

宇文士及 625 李堿任瓖 Pei JiPei Ji Pei Li Xian Li Xiao Yu Xiao Yu Ren Xiang Yuwen Shiji Shiji Yuwen Yang GongrenYang Yang Yang Gongren & Feng & Feng Gongren Yang Deyi . Table VII: Tang Administrative Personnel, 623–629 Personnel, Administrative VII: Tang Table China 624 Pei Ji (see note#41). Xiao Yu 獨孤義順 Dugu Yishun Chen Shuda & Pei Ji & Pei Chen Shuda & Ji, Pei Chen Shuda, 楊恭仁 Gongren Yang Yang Gongren & Feng & Feng Gongren Yang Deyi Yu Xiao 623 裴寂 Pei Ji 陳叔達 Ji Chen Shuda Pei Deyi Feng Xiao Yu & Yang & Yang Xiao Yu Gongren . 左仆 zuo pu Director, Left Deputy of State of Dept. Affairs 右仆 you pu Director, Deputy Right Affairs of State of Dept. 左丞 Asst.- Left cheng zuo Dept. Director, Deputy Affairs of State of 右丞 you pu Asst.-Deputy Right of Dept. Director, Affairs of State 吏尚 li shang of Minister Personnel 兵尚 bing shang Minister of War 侍中 Chancellors shizhong 中書令 zhongshu ling Director Secretariat Ershiwushi Bubian Note: The vertical dotted lines indicate the approximate time of the year when an individual entered or left office. or left entered an individual year when of the time approximate the lines indicate vertical The dotted Note: Biao Chenglang Pushang Gengwang, Tang Yan Sources: A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial in Titles Official of A Dictionary Hucker, O. Charles 184 chapter six

There is evidence that Taizong may have supported an effort to purge middle level courtiers. From late 626 through the middle of 627 Wen Yanbo 溫彥博 was the Vice Minister of the Board of Personnel (libu shilang 吏部侍郎), a post that in the early Tang was charged with the appointment and oversight of court personnel ranks six down to nine.38 Yanpo was a partisan of Taizong before he ascended the throne and the younger brother of Wen Daya 溫大雅, Gaozu’s close associate from the days of the Taiyuan uprising. Wen Yanbo attempted to purge the court (shatai 沙汰),39 but apparently due to a lack of political acuity on his part, the effort became bogged down in political infighting and finally abandoned. Yanbo himself became the object of court ridicule40 and in mid-627 he was transferred to the Secretariat and replaced by Liu Linfu 劉林甫, an administrative and legal expert of long standing in the early Tang court who succeeded in rapidly quieting the situation.41 In short, even within these lower court levels Taizong’s room for maneuver was constrained and he had to proceed with caution. Taizong’s actions toward the Chancellory and the Secretariat (menxia sheng and zhongshu sheng, respectively) were much more direct, rapidly installing his own men in these top positions. Curiously, even in this case it took Taizong four months to remove Chen Shuda, an old Gaozu associate, albeit, coldly sympathetic to Taizong in the pre-626 period, from the top Chancellory position. Taizong’s rapid personnel installa- tions in these two organs probably reflects the more intimate relationship between them and the throne regarding policy discussions and the formal drafting of imperial policy positions. Here Gaozu was willing to give his son a free hand, and indeed, may have been expected to have done so. It will be of interest to discuss a series of personnel transfers that occurred just prior to and immediately following the Xuanwu Men incident in the sixth lunar month of 626. Before Li Shimin began adminis- trating the court, all personnel transfers had to be approved by the proper authorities in Chang’an, sometimes by Gaozu himself. Neither Li Shimin nor his brothers could exercise independent personnel appointment or transfer authority. For example, Li Shimin’s vice-regal staff based

38 Tang Huiyao (Taibei: Shijie shuju, 1989), 74.1333. 39 See JTs 61.2361; and Tang Huiyao, 74.1344. 40 Xin Tang shu [XTs] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 91.2782. 41 See the personnel chart in Yan Gengwang, Tang Pushang Chenglang Biao 唐仆尚丞郎表 (Taibei: Academia Sinica, 1956); also see the biography of Liu Linfu in JTs 81.2750. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 185 in Loyang lacked a Personnel Bureau in an administrative structure that generally mimicked the Chang’an court structure.42 This would imply that all significant personnel appointments and transfers to and from the Loyang organization would have to be made, or at least, confirmed in Chang’an. A probable exception would be low level members of the personal staffs of the brothers, such as extra bodyguards and the like. Thus, Jiancheng’s unauthorized effort to transfer heavy cavalry units to the capital (an imperial tactical resource) was quashed by Gaozu. In the factional in-fighting prior to the Xuanwu Men incident, successful efforts by Jiancheng to transfer out Li Shimin’s valued advisers had to be processed through Gaozu. The careers of Du Yan杜淹 and Du Ruhui 杜如晦 on Li Shimin’s staff had to be confirmed through the authorities at Chang’an.43 In line with the above discussion, the transfer of the five individuals below, would have to have been approved by Chang’an or possibly Gaozu directly, in view of the political tensions at the time:

1) Pei Ji—transferred in very early 626 from left Deputy Director of the Department of State Affairs (zuo puye) to the honorific position of Minister of Works (sikong 司空) 2) Wen Daya—transferred in the sixth lunar month of 626, just prior to the outbreak of the violence, from vice-minister of the Minstry of Works (gongshilang 工侍郎) to Director of the Loyang vice-regal command Board of Works (Shaandong dao xingtai gongshang 陝東道行台工尚) 3) Han Zhongliang 韓仲良—transferred in early 626 (?) from vice-minister of the Ministry of Personnel to Director of the Loyang vice-regal command Board of Revenue (Shaandong dao xingtai hushang 戶尚). 4) Qu Tutong屈突通—transferred in the immediate aftermath of the Xuanwu Men incident from Minister of Works (gongshang) to Deputy Director of the Loyang vice-regal command (Shaandong dao xingtai puye 仆射) 5) Yang Gongren 楊恭仁—transferred in either the seventh lunar month of 626, or the early Zhenguan period (which could imply as early as the eigth lunar month of 626) from Minister of Personnel to Yongzhou Shepherd (Yongzhou mu 雍州牧, which is responsible for governing the three prefectures surrounding the capital city).

42 Nunome Chōfū, 228. 43 JTs 66.2468, 2471. 186 chapter six

With the exception of Pei Ji, all of the above individuals were transferred from central court positions to posts previously held by Li Shimin. With the same exception, all of the above individuals continued to work in high court positions under Taizong (Li Shimin) well after 626. All of these individuals were elite senior courtiers with a long record of service to Gaozu. Wen Daya is the clearest example, having served on Gaozu’s staff in 617 when the Tang uprising was in its infancy and he continued to hold positions of high trust under Gaozu thereafter. Nevertheless, following Wen Daya’s transfer to Loyang, his biography informs us that Daya was a close confidante of Taizong and that the latter relied on Daya to keep an eye on affairs in Loyang for him.44 Qu Tutong has a similar sort of biography. These individuals illustrate the point that sympathy or partisanship for one of the three brothers did not conflict with loyalty to the Tang emperor, Gaozu. This is precisely the sort of reasoning that Wang Fuzhi used to explain the willingness of Confucian oriented men like Wei Zheng and Wang Gui to serve under Taizong after their lord, Jiancheng, was killed. Their ultimate overlord was Gaozu, and they served whomever Gaozu so designated.45 This raises the issue that Gaozu may have been privy to all the plotting and counter-plotting engaged in by his sons because he had loyal servitors distributed in the staffs of all these sons. As a hypothesis, the transfer of the above individuals may have represented a successful effort by Gaozu to clear the decks for the upcom- ing struggle at court. He was planning for the violence well ahead of time. Gaozu was personally very close to Pei Ji and may have sought to remove him from the portending political turmoil, placing him in a high, non-functional honorary court position. Wen Daya, Qu Tutong, and Han Zhongliang were deeply loyal to Gaozu but also capable of working smoothly with Li Shimin. And so they were sent to secure Li Shimin’s external power base at Loyang. Gaozu’s goal in authorizing these transfers was probably to prevent the violence from spreading to Loyang and to keep Li Shimin from calling in troops from Loyang to serve in Chang’an. Yang Gongren’s assignment to Yongzhou mu may have been to secure the Chang’an suburbs in a similar fashion. The violence at Xuanwu Men and Li Shimin’s elevation to heir apparent in charge of governmental affairs occured in the sixth lunar month of

44 JTs 61.2360. 45 Wang Fuzhi, Du Tongjian Lun, 20.680. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 187

626. In the eigth lunar month, Shimin ascended the throne as emperor and Gaozu announced that he was henceforth the retired emperor (taishang huang—without the di). There is no indication that the political environment changed in any manner between the sixth and the eigth lunar months—the court situation was relatively stable. Additionally, after announcing his retirement, Gaozu remained at the palace center, the Taiji complex, until the fourth lunar month of 629, at which point he moved to the suburban Tai’an Palace 太安, which was Li Shimin’s former residence from 624 through 626. This residential data is very important being a symbolic representation of Taizong’s delicate political situation and the continuing authority of Gaozu in the immediate aftermath of the Xuanwu Men violence. Taizong’s ascension ceremony took place in the Heir Apparent’s palace complex, not at the Taiji Hall where his father continued to reside. Until 629 Taizong continued to reside and conduct routine state affairs from the Heir Apparent’s quarters. This was a very awkward and telling arrangement which clearly implied Gaozu’s continued oversight authority, as was explicitly stated in the pronouncement of the sixth lunar month when Taizong was appointed heir apparent in charge of governmental affairs and which appears to have remained in place until 629, when Gaozu relinquished all imperial powers.46 In point of fact, Gaozu’s proclamation announcing his decision to leave the Taiji Palace in 629 specifically states that he remained in the palace complex for three years in order to observe Taizong at work and to ensure stable governance.47 That a significant alteration in the court balance of power had been realized in 629 is indicated by the extraordinary, unprecedented statement made by Taizong to the hapless Pei Ji on the occasion of his expulsion from the court, approximately three months before Gaozu moved to the Tai’an Palace. Taizong publicly denounced Pei Ji for permitting the open, shameless display of bribery and lax mor- als at court throughout the entire reign of his father.48 Taizong waited three and a half years before demonstrating such an independent stance toward his father (albeit, indirectly through criticism of his father’s closest associate). Significantly, this type of public criticism of his father does not re-appear in the subsequent historical record.

46 JTs 2.36. Niu Zhigong (1998), 324–5, discusses this issue, though, the interpretation in this chapter differs from his interpretation of the data. 47 Cefu Yuangui (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1994), 10.111b–112a; and Quan Tangwen (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), 3.41a. 48 ZzTj 193.6062. 188 chapter six

After 629, though Gaozu was not politically active, he was still a social presence at the court, hosting dinner parties.49 In 634, one year before his death at the age of 69, Gaozu, together with his son, Taizong, twice entertained Turkish emissaries. The second occasion included the presence of the captured Eastern Turk Xieli kaghan. In his toast to his father, Taizong recognized the latter as the planner and himself as a mere executor.50 This toast statement was not a mere courtesy, but an accurate reflection of historical reality. It is possible that Gaozu had begun planning his retirement as early as 623. According to the Jiu Tang shu biography of Pei Ji, in 623 the latter requested Gaozu’s permission to retire from active court service.51 Pei Ji noted that he was old (he was in his mid-fifties) and that the work of consolidating Tang imperial control had been accomplished. Gaozu allegedly cried and said, “Not yet. We will mutually support each other in our old age. You will be one of the highest honorific courtiers taisi( 台司) and I will be taishang; we will spend our days happy and carefree.” The carefree part is hyperbole, nevertheless, Gaozu was already enter- taining the idea of imperial retirement and he wanted his close associates with him when he did so. Typical of the circumstances surrounding imperial retirements that occurred in the Northern Dynasties, the change of administration from Gaozu to Taizong was relatively smooth, and saw strong continuity in terms of state policy and personnel. There were few outright purges, as discussed above, though by 630 close associates of Gaozu, such as Pei Ji and Xiao Yu, were being nudged out of power, coinciding with Gaozu’s relocation to he Tai’an suburban palace. Tang foreign policy toward the Turks remained an unchanged carrot and stick approach. Theheqin policy of inter-marriage with the Turkish kaghans was balanced with an effort to construct a strong defensive military posture.52 This policy orientation was only momentarily disrupted by the massive Turkish raid on the Wei River valley immediately after Taizong’s ascension to the throne in the eigth lunar month of 626.53 The policy changed only after the Turkish confederacy began to implode in 629, at which time the Tang took advantage of the weakness of the Turks and shifted into

49 JTs 61.2361. 50 JTs 1.17–18. 51 JTs 57.2288. 52 Niu Zhigong (1983), 88–95. 53 Li Shutong (1965), 247–275. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 189 an offensive military posture. Domestically, Taizong continued forward the administrative and military structures developed under his father’s reign, there were no sharp alterations in this arena, either. The one startling development occurred with regard to Taizong’s relationship with his distant agnates. Immediately after he ascended the throne in the eigth lunar month Taizong announced that all distant agnates who had been previously enfeoffed as princes (specifically, junwang 郡王) would be demoted to dukes (xiangong 縣公).54 Beginning with the reign of Taizong it came customary in the Tang to only enfeoff the sons and brothers of reigning emperors as princes.55 In the course of his rise to power Gaozu had enfeoffed a number of his relatives as princes as a means of awarding and encouraging agnatic unity.56 According to the Jiu Tang shu, many of these individuals were Gaozu’s first cousins or the children of first cousins.57 When Gaozu took up arms in 617 he had no surviving brothers or uncles, though, he did have two surviving nephews for whom he had little respect or use.58 It is suggestive that Gaozu should keep his surviving agnates from the closest collateral lines at a distance, since a sybaritic life-style and a vicious temper did not necessarily disqualify individuals from rendering effective service to the throne; perhaps fear was a more compelling motivation. Gaozu’s other agnates, by contrast, were fully utilized and some became important generals during the early conquest period and others were deeply involved in the pre-Xuanwu Men factional struggles. To be sure, there do not appear to be more than ten individuals involved, consequently, agnates cannot be said to have dominated the early Tang court, but they did make significant contributions to the establishment of the dynasty. When Taizong ascended the throne in late 626 these distant agnates tended to fall into the categories of tangshu and second cousins, and they clearly expected to receive the same honored treatment and prefer- ence under Taizong that they had received under his father. Taizong not only disappointed these expectations, but did so in an almost confrontational manner. Immediately after demoting the status of his distant agnates Taizong very publicly began awarding his close advisers with court honors superior to those granted to his agnates—and then invited

54 JTs 2.31. 55 Wenxian Tongkao [WxTk] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 275.2183. 56 JTs 60.2342. 57 WxTk 259.2055. 58 JTs 60.2356–57. 190 chapter six court comment on his actions. The issue was engaged by Shentong 神通, Taizong’s tangshu, who was a leading field general under Gaozu since the Taiyuan uprising in 617. Shentong was also a long time supporter of Taizong during the pre-Xuanwu Men period. Shentong questioned Taizong’s approach claiming that it was unfair—there was no mincing of words.59 Taizong responded by emphasizing two points:

1) In terms of efficacy, the high ranking non-agnatic advisers had been more consistently successful than Shentong, who had committed a series of military blunders on the North China Plain prior to 621. 2) Taizong stated that he was the emperor of an entire realm, not simply a representative of the particular interest of his agnates.

Feng Deyi, a high ranking courtier who was a close adviser to Gaozu and also worked closely with Taizong’s staff opined that the extensive enfeoffments of princely titles practiced by Gaozu was unprecedented and would prove to be a fiscal burden upon the realm.60 Taizong agreed with this view and the policy was carried forward without further public complaints from Taizong’s agnates. It may be useful to discuss the above situation in more detail. The comments made by Feng Deyi were hyperbolic. The Northern Dynasties, particularly the Northern Wei, were noted for the widespread enfeoffment of both agnates and non-agnates as princes.61 We can assume that Feng was simply disseminating disinformation for the benefit of Taizong. At this point in time the Tang royal family was still relatively small in numbers, though, Gaozu’s 22 offspring would rapidly alter the situation. The derogation legislation seems to be intended as an effort at disciplining royal agnates to the post-conquest and post-Gaozu political order. The one man with sufficient prestige to successfully enforce such a policy without incurring unnecessary opposition would have been Gaozu himself. Gaozu, as retired emperor still residing at the imperial center in the Taiji Palace, would have had the status to obtain the voluntary compliance of men of his own generation, like Shentong. This approach is reminiscent of the manner in which the founding hegemon of the Northern Qi, Gao Huan, used his eldest son, Cheng, to discipline his close associates at the court in Ye. It is very possible that Gaozu, as a

59 JTs 60.2341–42. 60 JTs 60.2342. 61 Zhao Yi, Nianershi Zhaji, 14.300–301. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 191 still influential retired emperor, initiated the derogation legislation and Taizong was the front man who executed it. This hypothesis is strengthened when we consider the political context at the time. Following our previous argument, Taizong, as the leader of the weakest faction on the eve of the Xuanwu Men incident, emerged from the violence by the skin of his teeth. Taizong then proceeded to work in tandem with the retired Gaozu under a coalitional factional arrangement at the court. In the eigth lunar month of 626, only days after Taizong formally ascended the throne that same month, the Turks staged their spectacular incursion into the heart of the Wei River valley that took them to the north bank of the Wei River across from Chang’an. Taizong engaged in some bravura diplomacy but in the end appears to have paid the Turks a ransom to withdraw, which they did at their lei- sure.62 By any interpretation, this was an insult and a threat to the new emperor. This kind of extraordinary external pressure would have been enough to undermine the domestic balance of factional power at the court. Taizong, however, not only did not falter, but immediately thereafter, in the ninth lunar month of 626 began his political assault against his agnates.63 From the perspective of this author, only the firm support of the old guard, Gaozu and his associates, could have ensured Taizong’s survival and success at this juncture. An issue that still needs to be clarified is the significance of the term taishang huang used in the early Tang. In the Northern Dynasties cases of imperial retirement the senior emperors always titled themselves as taishang huangdi. By contrast, in the early Tang cases, the retired emperors did not append the title di. There is broad agreement in the field that the presence of the title di denotes continued, unitary exercise of power by the senior emperor. In the Qin and Han periods the lack of a di clearly indicated the use of the title as an honorific appellation granted to the fathers of the emperors concerned.64 In the Northern Dynasties

62 ZzTj 191.6020. 63 ZzTj 192.6022. Niu Zhigong (1998), 322–23, also takes note of Taizong’s policy toward his senior agnates, but interprets it to signify Gaozu’s loss of authority since becoming retired emperor. 64 See Wei shu 7.462. Honiden Kikushi 本位田菊士, “Kodai Nihon no Kunshugō to Chūgoku no Kunshugō 古代日本の君主号と中国の君主号,” Shigaku Zasshi 90.12 (1981): 12–15, gives a concise summary of the legal/ritual meanings associated with the terms huang and di in Chinese imperial titles. Also see Gao Mingshi 高明士, “Zhitong Miaozhi yu Daotong Miaozhi de Xiaozhang 治統廟與道統廟制的消長, Paper given at the Conference on Imperial Rulership and Cultural Change, Taizhong, Taiwan (1992), 2–4. Howard Wechsler, Offerings of Jade and Silk (1985), 258–59 note #105, states with regard to Tang Gaozu that the lack of the di in his title indicated that he had, in fact, relinquished power to Taizong. 192 chapter six cases all the junior emperors were minors under the age of ten at their ascensions, so there was no doubt that the senior retired emperors continued to exercise full authority, as duly noted by the presence of the di in their titles. The Tang cases, however, were distinctive in that all the junior emperors were mature adults. The Tang cases rerpresented efforts at significant power sharing between the senior and junior emperors. The use of the monistic title di would appear to be inappropriate to the Tang cases. The concept of retired emperorship developed as a function of what can be termed customary ritual/legal practice since it was never formally codified. None of the ritual/legal texts from the period contain a category of retired emperorship. The only major pre-Ming encyclopedic source to have a separate category devoted to retired emperorship is the Wenxian Tongkao. Thus, the Tang emperors had a degree of latitude with which to improvise, which is what they did. This perspective coin- cides with the position of Ogata Isamu, that the Tang period marked a successful effort at stabilizing the procedures and concepts used to legitimate succession practices.65 The Tang emperors had the freedom to mold the fluid ritual/legal inheritance from the past into shapes that they found useful and congenial. Despite the continuance of the title taishang huang(di) from the Qin through the Qing dynasties, the political reality covered by the title changed over time. The formal presence of a title does not necessarily indicate a static reality beneath.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that Tang Gaozu purposely arranged for his three eldest sons to compete with each other, and ultimately endeavor to kill each other, in a bid to decide who will occupy the position of heir apparent. Li Shimin (Taizong) emerged the victor, and in order to ensure political stability and continuity in imperial policy, Gaozu retired in 626, but remained at the palace center for another three years before re-locating to the suburban Tai’an Palace. Because of the specific contingent circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Tang and the contributions of his three eldest sons to this effort, Gaozu had little

65 Ogata Isamu 尾形勇, “Chūgoku kodai ni okeru Teii no Keishō 中國古代における帝位の繼承,” Shigaku Zasshi 85.3 (1976): 60–61, 67. the xuanwu men incident of the tang 193 maneuvering room. His imaginative decision to permit a controlled form of violent competition for the succession may have been both humane and the least damaging to the viability of the newly established dynasty. In the end, two of the three brothers would have to die since the imperial structure had little room for the defeated parties in a succession struggle. Perhaps one of the few exceptions to this generalization may be Wu Zetian, who manged to keep most of her sons alive and able to succeed to the throne, even after she died in 705. Gaozu’s political strategy was implemented in an indirect manner, which perhaps best accords with the Japanese concept of haragei 肚兿, which has been defined as follows: The difficulty in dealing with haragei is that, to assert that it was practiced at any given time one must contradict the record of events. But this is inevitable; it is the very nature of haragei. It enables a man to encourage sur- reptitiously a course of action which he desires but which is contrary to a ‘correct’ and ‘acceptable’ position that he is expected to maintain. Haragei not only spares embarrassment for its practitioners in their relationship with their contemporaries, but can serve as a painless way of manipulating the judgement of history in favor of the practitioners.66 The author of this quote was referring to factional maneuvers engaged in by the Meiji oligarchs of Japan in the early 20th century. This case is relevant to our understanding of Tang period factional politics because, like the Tang courtiers, the early Meiji politicians operated in a highly elitist, closed political arena, and on the level of tactics their approach may help us to elucidate the oblique references and suggestive data contained in the Tang records. The agnatic political history of the early Tang was a never-ending source of drama and crisis. Wang Fuzhi stated, “The Tang were extraordinarily turbulent. Thirty years could not go by without a major crisis. Unlike the Han dynasty or the later Song dynasty, the Tang were not able to achieve an extended period of peace.”67 The major crises were

66 George Akita, Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868– 1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 140. 67 Wang Fuzhi, 20.701. Sun Ying’gang (2001), drawing in part on earlier observations by Li Shutong has characterized Tang imperial succession patterns prior to the ascension of Xuanzong (r. 713–755) as a violent struggle between one reigning monarch, two competing heirs, and thus, three court power centers. Aspects of the Xuanwu Men incident are discussed in some detail, with very interesting remarks regarding the members of different imperial palace guard chains of command who were present at the Xuanwu Gate during the fighting, as well as estimates regarding the total number of 194 chapter six usually caused by either succession difficulties or problems with their Northern border defenses. Regarding the succession crises, they were often resolved in a manner that recalled the approach of the earlier Northern Dynasties to similar issues. Because of the power and glory that the Tang period represents in Chinese history, it served as a crucial conduit for the integration of innovative, North Asian derived cultural and political institutions into the subsequent mainstream of Chinese cultural and political practice and history.

court personnel involved in the conflict. The competition between Taizong’s two sons, Chengqian and Tai, from 636 through 643 is also briefly discussed along with more in depth attention to succession struggles which occurred between the death of Wu Zetian in 705 through the ascension of Xuanzong in 713. The descriptive observation regarding the creation of a triangular power struggle is vivid and accurate, but the continued use of retired empeorship in some of these cases needs to be accounted for. Also, the interest of the throne in actively fomenting such triangular power struggles, as in the case of the Chengqian—Tai competition, needs in depth causal analysis, as well. Indeed, the next step in our discussion is to attempt such a causal analysis of this latter triangular power competition. CHAPTER SEVEN

THE XUANWU MEN LEGACY: TAIZONG’S FACTIONALIZATION OF THE POSITION OF HEIR APPARENT

Tang Taizong (r. 626–649) is reknowned in East Asian history as the great consolidator of the dynasty. Taizong and the title of his long reign period, the Zhen’guan period, became a potent symbol of imperial legitimacy and power throughout East Asia until the 20th century. To put this into context, one must remember that from the mid-220’s AD until the founding of the Tang no previous political regime had been able to unify China for more than two generations; the latter two cases being the Western Jin (265–317), and the Sui dynasty (581–618). Under Taizong’s leadership not only was Tang power consolidated, but it was enormously expanded. First, in 630 the first Eastern Turk confederacy was destroyed and its kaghan was captured resulting in hegemonic Tang power extending into North Asia. In 640 Gaochang was conquered putting the Tang in a position capable of dominating the Silk Road routes of Eastern Central Asia. Beginning in 645 Taizong renewed Chinese efforts to conquer the kingdom of Korguryo, which controlled southern Manchuria and northern Korea. This effort did not bear fruit, however, until the late 660’s, long after Taizong’s death in 649. In the midst of these accolades, however, we need to take note of one of Taizong’s significant failures—his inability to fully construct and control rabid factionalism at his court. To modern sensibilities, this may seem a rather peculiar fault, or indeed, no fault at all, but in the context of pre-modern imperial politics this was a serious failing. There is also a strong possibility that the onset of the 645 Korean campaign (focused on the east bank of the Liao River) may have taken on new significance at the time in the context of these political errors committed by Taizong at his court. This chapter will open with a discussion of Taizong’s famousfengjian 封建, or hereditary enfeoffment proposal, which served to lay the foundations for the later wider factionalization of his court. This enfeoffment policy began shortly after Taizong derogated the status of his agnates in 626 as discussed in the previous chapter. In late 627, following a proposal from a senior courtier, Xiao Yu, Taizong publicly supported the 196 chapter seven idea of taking all the imperial agnates, most particularly his brothers, mature sons, and briefly even senior non-agnatic courtiers, and granting them hereditary rule over prefectures in various parts of the empire. This was proclaimed as an effort to strengthen the dynasty by literally following the archaic Western Zhou enfeoffment model of antiquity and sending the designated individuals out to their fiefdoms. One of the curious aspects of the fengjian proposal was that it was never decisively implemented. The issue was bruited about from 627 through 639, and in the process the hereditary element was dropped, senior non-agnatic courtiers were never sent out to the provinces, but brothers and most mature sons were dispatched to the provinces as non-hereditary prefec- tual administrators with the noble rank of prince (wang 王). The result of this policy was to strip the court of mature agnates who might possibly mount a threat to the throne. In fact, by 636 when this anti-agnate policy was implemented on an accelerated basis, Taizong immediately began moving to create the competitive factional structure at court mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. With regard to this latter activity, Taizong’s target seems to have been his brother- in-law, Zhangsun Wuji 長孫無忌, and a group of loyal, time tested courtiers grouped around Wuji. Taizong’s means at hand was to take one of his mature sons, Li Tai 李泰, allegedly born of the main consort, the Zhangsun Empress, and permit him to compete at court with Chengqian 承乾, Taizong’s duly designated heir apparent whose status was publicly proclaimed in 627.1 Chengqian long had the full support of the senior courtiers who became the target of Taizong’s factionalization activities, as indeed it was their duty to support the duly proclaimed heir to the throne. The strategic goal of these inter-locking policies, that is the fengjian policy and the subsequent court factionalization policy was to accentuate the independent, creative power of the throne. Ironically, such a policy could only be detrimental in some manner to institution- alized court administrative and political stability—which is one of the very qualities for which Taizong’s reign is commonly lauded.

1 There are strong grounds for suspecting that Tai may have been as old or slightly older than Chengqian. See the discussion in the Cambridge History of China, 236. The fact that Tai never received any support from his putative maternal uncle, Zhangsun Wuji, also supports the contention that the Zhangsun Empress was not his biological mother. the xuanwu men legacy 197

The Fengjian Program

Taizong’s assault against his agnates dates to the ninth lunar month of 626 in the immediate aftermath of the massive Turkish raid which reached down to the north bank of the Wei River. At this time senior agnates were all derogated one noble rank and made to understand that they did not have special privileges at the court. By 627 all agnates of Taizong’s father’s generation were retired from active service (one, Youliang 幼良, was executed on suspicion of treason).2 Due to the uncertain political environment at the time, it was previously argued that this early anti- agnate policy was aided and abetted by the retired emperor, Gaozu. Distant agnates of Taizong’s generation (second cousins and others) who were already politically active were frequently retained as administrators in the provinces. Among this category, however, those who were considered overly popular were retained at court where they appear to have been kept under a loose surveillance and given nominal court duties, as in the cases of Xiaogong 孝恭 and his brothers, who were second cousins of Taizong.3 The fengjian enfeoffment debate began in this environment of ongoing strikes against senior and more distant agnatic members of the royal family. The main targets of the fengjian proposal were Taizong’s brothers and sons, thus providing a clean sweep of all remaining agnatic categories. From 627 through 639, when the program was finally ended, Taizong’s course of action had consistently generated almost universal opposition from among his senior courtiers and advisers. Nevertheless, the enfeoffment campaign was accelerated in early 636 when, following the conclusion of his mourning responsibilities for his recently deceased father, Gaozu, who died in the summer of 635, Taizong dispatched his brothers and sons en masse to their enfeoffed gubanatorial assignments.4 By 639, when the hereditary element in the program was formally dis- carded, the provincial assignments continued to remain in force. The publicly stated goal of the enfeoffment policy was to engage the active loyalty and service of all imperial agnates in the preservation and improvement of the realm. Explicit reference was made to the archaic Western Zhou precedent, thus, endowing the project with a sheen of

2 JTs 60.2346. 3 JTs 60.2349; XTs 78.3524 ff. 4 ZzTj 194.6119; JTs 64.2424–25. 198 chapter seven ritual/religious purity. The publicly stated objections to this program which were expressed in memorials to the throne from his most senior advisers, were that the policy was impractical, anachronistic, and an invitation to rampant nepotism and even warlordism.5 To a modern reader these objections are substantive, incisive, and notably lacking in excessive appeals to Confucian ritualistic concepts and symbols, perhaps in part, because Taizong had cleverly pre-empted this latter ground. From the perspective of this discussion, the policy and the strong court reaction that Taizong permitted to express itself, was a display of political theater; the clear goal of the policy was to remove agnates from the court to ensure that the actions of the throne and the imperial succession would not be subject to agnatic interference. Despite Taizong’s references to the archaic Western Zhou tradition and the glorious role that the dispersed agnates would play in safeguarding the dynasty, all the participants at the time fully understood that this was propagandis- tic bombast. The true nature of the tactic, as well as its goal were obvious—those agnates who were dispersed to the provinces would exercise little real power.6 They were, in fact, placed under tight surveillance.

5 Convenient collections of these memorials are found in the Tang Huiyao, 46.963–68; Wenxian Tongkao, 175.2181–83; and shorter collections in Zhen’guan Zhengyao yizhu 貞觀政要譯注 (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin chubanshe, 1987), 8.187–212; and Tong Dian (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), 31.181. From the perspective of Confucian oriented ritual concerns and speculative scholastic thought the archaic Western Zhou mode of hereditary political enfeoffment had been a subject of long standing interest and debate that pre-dated the Tang period (see the brief introductory statement in, Liu Zongyuan Ji 柳宗元集 [Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979], 3.69). Due to the impetus given to this issue by Taizong’s use of fengjian as a political tactic and the sophisticated intellectual response which it provoked from his close advisers it is, perhaps, no surprise that the defining and most controversial essay in this field should come out of the Tang period. Liu Zongyuan’s discourse, “On Feudalism”, written in the 800’s during the latter portion of the Tang period, is generally acknowledged to be one of the outstanding writings on the subject. One of Liu’s arguments is that the archaic Western Zhou practice of enfeoffments was a historically contingent social and political development and was not the product of the wisdom of the Confucian sages of high antiquity. As such, hereditary enfeoffment was no longer relevant to the different historical circumstances characterizing the Tang imperial system (see Jo-shui Chen, Liu Tsung-yuan and Intellectual Change in T’ang China, 773–819 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], 96). Liu Zongyuan’s essay was composed in the context of a rich scholastic tradition, including a similarly nominalistic, but much more compressed discussion of the issue by Du You 杜佑 in Tong Dian, 31.177. A more traditional, perhaps conformist orientation is found in the discussion in the Tang Huiyao, 47.830, where Taizong’s court advisers are excoriated for their lack of vision and moral stature in opposing the initial fengjian proposal. Edwin Pulleyblank’s essay provides important leads to the intellectual relationships among these three thinkers in his, “Neo-Confucianism and Neo-Legalism in T’ang Intellectual Life,” in The Confucian Persuasion, ed. by Arthur F. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), 77–114. the xuanwu men legacy 199

The Zizhi Tongjian notes regarding the senior staff officers who were assigned to these enfeoffed agnates that, “The Emperor selected stern, upright retainers as advisers to all the princes [the noble rank granted to all these close agnates prior to leaving the capital], they served as leading staff officers, if the princes committed transgressions they were to be reported [to the throne].”7 Based on specific cases, these staff officers were also expected to directly remonstrate with an offending agnate in an effort to have the person alter his behavior. The biography of Taizong’s son, Li You 李祐, who later rose in rebellion against his father, reveals the extensive powers available to these leading staff officers (zhangshi, or chief of staff and the sima, or deputy chief of staff ).8 Li You’s chief of staff was authorized to control access to You’s person, to set restrictions on his movements, and to arbitrarily remove what the officer considered to be excessive personal belongings, in You’s case hunting falcons and dogs. One of You’s chiefs of staff, Quan Wanji 權萬紀 also traveled to the court to directly report to the throne on his charge. In 643 You became so concerned about his position that he had Quan killed and allegedly dismembered.9 The action of assault- ing his father’s personally appointed staff officer forced You into a revolt against his father which was rapidly crushed and You was executed. A similar but less deadly situation occurred with regard to the chief of staff of Taizong’s second cousin, Li Gui 李瓌, who was the younger

This interest in the hereditary enfeoffment issue continued into the Qing dynasty. Wang Fuzhi was generally supportive of Liu Zongyuan’s position (see Du Tongjian Lun, 20.702–03). The term was even adopted by the late Qing thinker, Feng Guifen to indicate a highly elitist system of representative local self-government under the auspices of the Qing throne. Lü Simian provides a concise summary of the field from the pre- Tang period through the debates of Taizong’s reign and ending with a discussion of the late Tang thinker mentioned above. See his Sui Tang Wudai Shi 隋唐五代史 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe, 1984), 1062–67. 6 Taizong’s statements in his Difan 帝範 (Shanghai: Congshu Jicheng, 1937), 2.6–7, allegedly composed in circa 648, one year before his death, he manifests a much more pragmatic, almost Machivellian understanding not revealed in his earlier public edicts. In this work Taizong states in very explicit terms that the purpose of enfeoffment is to disperse agnates across the empire in administrative units of various sizes and to limit their actual power. This advice bears a close resemblance to statements in a 628 memorial by Yan Shigu 顏師古 which recommended a measured, controlled approach to agnatic enfeoffment along the lines just mentioned. See Tang Huiyao, 46.826. Yan Shigu’s attitude seems to have been that if Taizong was going to insist upon this policy of hereditary provincial enfeoffment, then there was a sensible way of implementing such a policy. 7 ZzTj 196.6186. 8 See JTs 76.2657. 9 XTs 80.3573. 200 chapter seven brother of the well known general, Li Xiaogong. While Gui was serving as a Governor-General (dudu) in the Middle Yangzi region, he flogged his chief of staff without authorization. Gui charged that this officer was arrogant and unilaterally managed his administrative affairs, Gui was removed from office and presumably recalled to the capital.10 There appears to have been a strong tendency to appoint chiefs of staff officers to the princes from among the former personnel of the imperial censorate or from among close associates of the throne. All the officers mentioned above as well as the chief of staff of another of Gui’s brothers had all served in the censorate.11 Perhaps the actions of Taizong’s non-uterine brother, Yuangui 元軌, were most expressive of the character of these enfeoffments. In his biography Yuangui is lauded as being a man of multiple talents. As a governor on the North China Plain (Xuzhou cishi) he was praised as a cautious, unsullied individual. According to the text, Yuangui secluded himself in his quarters, read books, and let his staff officers handle routine affairs. This seems to be a polite way of stating that Yuangui did nothing that would incur political entanglements and so he was able to keep out of trouble.12 Regardless of the high principles enunciated in the course of the court debate, these provincial enfeoffments were designed to disperse the tar- geted agnates, keep them under strict surveillance and grant them as little power as possible. This was a well known technique for controlling agnates and does not seem very different from the means used by the Three Kingdoms period Cao Wei regime to deal with its close agnates. Taizong’s efforts were simply endowed with a glossy ritual/religious fin- ish. Between 631 through 637 approximately thirteen agnates, mostly brothers and sons, were sent out to the provinces. There may also have been a punitive aspect to some of these provincial assignments. Taizong’s eigth youngest non-uterine brother, Yuanheng 元亨, was born to the Yinde concubine 尹德妃. In 628 this brother was the first individual to be sent out under the enfeoffment program as the governor of Jinzhou, on the Han River, which was a relatively isolated posting, where the young boy would die in 632.13 All the other brothers

10 JTs 60.2350–51. 11 See XTs 100.3939; JTs 60.2350; 72.2583–84; 88.2882. 12 See JTs 64.2430. 13 JTs 64.2426. the xuanwu men legacy 201 would be sent out between 631 through 636. In the biography of the doomed Li Jiancheng, whom Li Shimin (Taizong) killed in 626, the Yinde concubine and her family are specifically mentioned as political opponents of Li Shimin prior to the 626 Xuanwu Men incident.14 Enforcement of this program of de facto provincial exile may have been somewhat flexible. According to the Xin Tang shu, Taizong’s son, You, who would later rebel, left for his Shandong based province of Qizhou in 637.15 He returned to court on legitimate business in 638, and then remained in Chang’an due to illness until 641, at which time he returned to his provincial posting where he rebelled in 643. Thus, it is possible that at any given time provincially assigned agnates could be found in the capital for a variety of different reasons.

The Competition for Heir Apparent

The ‘scandalous’ competition for the position of heir apparent that occurred in the middle of Taizong’s reign and culminated in the purge of both contenders in 643, took place in a court cleansed of most qualified agnates who might want to enter the fray. The evidence is strong enough to indicate that Taizong encouraged the construction of a political faction which he pitted against the duly designated heir apparent, Chengqian. The rival was a slightly younger brother named Tai, who remained at the court in 636 when most of his other siblings were being sent out to the provinces. The goal of encouraging such a competition appears to have been the fracturing of a bloc of senior courtiers grouped around Zhangsun Wuji without at the same time having to forego their valuable advice and experience. Just as the death of Taizong’s father, Gaozu, in 635 served as a symbolic watershed in terms of the acceleration of the anti-agnate provincial enfeoffment policy, likewise, the death of Taizong’s main consort, the Zhangsun Empress, in the sixth lunar month of 636, triggered the full scale onset of Taizong’s factionalization tactic.16 The timing and the

14 JTs 64.2416. 15 XTs 80.3572. 16 The relationship between the death of the Zhangsun Empress to the onset of the factional competition at court had been noted earlier by Sun Guodong 孫國棟, “Tang Zhenguan Yonghui jian Dangzheng shishi 唐貞觀永徽間黨爭試釋,” Xinya Shuyuan Xueshu Niankan 7(1965): 39–40. Sun’s discussion tends to focus on the role of Zhangsun Wuji, with little discussion of Taizong’s role in provoking the situation or why Taizong 202 chapter seven

target (Zhangsun Wuji) were eminently sensible, in that Wuji’s loss of his sister as a personal conduit to the emperor already weakened his position. Despite the enfeoffment program, Tai never left the court, and

would desire to construct such a scenario. Huang Yongnian (2004), 158–164, provides a succinct narrative of the factional struggle, but his analysis of this issue is uncharac- teristically weak. The year 636 was certainly crucial in terms of setting policy directions for the future. In addition to the agnatic policy and the court factionalization policy initiative, Taizong also re-named and altered the structure of the fubing defensive military system in approximately late 636 (see ZzTj 194.6124). Gu Jiguang has argued that the changes in the military titles of the regiment military commanders and their immediate subordinates implied a lowering of their stature. As of 636 each regiment commander would be seconded by two deputy commanders as opposed to the previous one deputy commander, who in the past was often granted extensive local responsibilities. See Gu Jiguang, Fubing Zhidu Kaoshi 府兵制度釋 (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin chubanshe, 1978), 137. Gu goes on to note the complicated horizontal relationship between the regiment commander and the governor (zhou cishi, see Gu, 164–65). The cumulative result of this post 636 situation was to create a more intensely fragmented peacetime military command structure—a result that fits in comfortably with Taizong’s other political initiatives at the court. The perception that Taizong was purposely crippling the efficacy of the peacetime military command structure in order to accentuate the power of the throne was also noted by the Qing thinker, Wang Fuzhi. Wang referred to the fubing system as ‘play-acting’ designed to strengthen the throne at the cost of weakening the military capability of the empire. See his Du Tongjian Lun, 20.14, 701–02. Gu Jiguang never commented on Wang Fuzhi’s remarks, though, there certainly was considerable congruence between their respective views on how the fubing system functioned. The Japanese scholar, Hamaguchi Shigekuni, did specifically remark upon Wang Fuzhi’s observations. Hamaguchi criticized Wang for being excessiviely critical and by implication, inaccurate. It is true that Wang Fuzhi expressed himself in an exaggerated and sometimes speculative fashion. Wang Fuzhi cannot be considered an institutional historian in the modern sense of the term, but rather as a writer of moral, and often critical essays expressing his personal feelings on historical events. Wang’s value to the modern historian does not lie in the rigor of his causal analysis, which is barely discernible in his essays in Du Tongjian Lun, but in his oft-times searing insights, sometimes bordering on the brutally cynical, and indeed, sometimes completely irrelevant to the concerns of modern history writing. In point of fact, Hamaguchi acknowledges that the early Tang fubing system was less efficacious, more passive in nature, than either previous military systems or later ones. Nevertheless, he does not seek to explain why this is so, but merely records the institutional data (see Hamaguchi [1966], vol. I, 31–2). The lack of rigor and interpretive insight lies with Hamaguchi Shigekuni, not Wang Fuzhi. In the view of this author, Tang Taizong, operating in the context of a pre-modern patrimonial regime, was not interested in building efficient political and military institutional structures, as we now understand the concept and importance of efficiency, but in neutralizing and fragmenting existing structurers, particularly given the lack of any immediate ‘national security’ threat in the mid-630’s. If necessary, these structures could also be expanded, but in a fragmented manner. In contrast to this type of political approach, the experiments of Tang Xuanzong (r. 713–755) in institutionally centralizing power and personnel are interesting, but were tragic failures. 17 See ZzTj 194.6122–23. the xuanwu men legacy 203 the first time that Tai surfaces as the center of court political focus is in the twelth lunar month, or very early 637, one month after the interment of the Zhangsun Empress.17 Taizong confronted his most senior courtiers with allegations that they had not accorded Tai proper courtesy when encountering him on the palace grounds. This apparently manufactured incident (or series of incidents) marks the onset of a concerted effort by Taizong to raise the profile and status of Tai at the court. In early 638 a similar controversy re-surfaced. Taizong argued that his highest courtiers should all pay obeisance when encountering any of the imperial princes on the palace grounds.18 Taizong’s rationale was that if the duly designated heir apparent, Chengqian, were to die, then one of his brothers would be appointed in his stead. This argument was manifestedly contrived. As Wei Zheng, the famous Confucian oriented courtier noted, the proper succession would go from the heir apparent to the son of the heir apparent (Taizong’s grandson). Strictly speaking, none of Taizong’s other sons were in the legitimate line of succession (though as a politically relevant descent group they would certainly be important players if there was any hint of ambiguity to the succession). Taizong, of course, was aware of this, the point of the entire exercise was to signify to all senior courtiers that another horse was in the race for the emperor’s ostensible affections and possibly for the position of heir apparent. The role of Tai’s deputy chief of staff (sima), Su Xu 蘇勗, is an important clue pointing to pre-meditated planning on the part of Taizong. Ever since 636 Tai had been authorized by the throne to establish a college of scribes and literati, an honor which none of the other princes, including the heir apparent had been granted.19 In 638 Su Xu urged Tai to apply for permission from the throne (which was granted) to autho- rize his college of literati, which had apparently been dormant until this point in time, to compose a comprehensive geography and, of course, Tai would reap the honors of his patronage of such a project. The existence of this college of literati and then its activation in 638 was not an innocent sequence of developments, but rather redolent in political symbolism. This was exactly the same tactic that Li Shimin was permitted to adopt by his father, Gaozu, in 621 as a means of giving a cultural burnish to his then considerable martial reputation, and thus boost- ing Li Shimin’s position in the developing factional competition with

18 ZzTj 195.6135. 19 For the establishment of Tai’s literati college in 636 see JTs 76.2653; ZzTj 194.6119. 204 chapter seven his eldest brother and heir apparent, Jiancheng.20 Su Xu was one of the intial members of Li Shimin’s college of literati in 621. Subsequently, sometime during Taizong’s reign, Su was married to one of Taizong’s sisters, and he seems to have maintained a close personal relationship with Taizong, as well.21 But Su Xu’s relationships with main actors was complex. His niece, the daughter of his younger brother, Dan 亶, was the main consort (fei 妃) of Chengqian.22 Chengqian married Ms. Su in 635 when he was approximately fifteen years old.23 This affinal tie to Chengqian does not seem to have affected Su Xu’s loyalty to the throne nor does it appear to have disrupted the careers of Dan or his son, Gui 瓌.24 This series of relationships certainly illustrates the ambiguous role of affinal ties in the context of court factional politics, oftentimes, affinal ties can be spread around a number of factions simply as a type of insur- ance policy offering the participants networks of communication if they desire to activate these lines. It is difficult to judge whether Su Xu was able to use his niece as a source of information regarding Chengqian’s plans and activities, there is no data relevant to this issue. Given Su Xu’s personal relationship with the throne and what we already know about the duties of leading staff officers serving the princes of the blood, it is fairly certain that Su’s recommendation to Tai to

20 See XTs 201.5725. The political symbolism of texts with universalistic claims composed under the patronage of politically ambitious members of the royal family was potent. The composition of such a text marks the patron as one who symbolically unifies the realm under his auspices. See Mark E. Lewis, Writing and Authority in Early China (Albany: SUNY University of New York Press, 1999), 9. One of the most famous examples of this mode of cultural/political behavior was the composition of the Huainanzi text, completed in 139 BC under the patronage of Liu An, Prince of Huainan, a blood relative of the reigning emperor, Han Wudi. Lewis (page 346) states regarding the text that it was “. . . a work of cosmic pretensions composed under the auspices of an older relative of [Han Wudi] with possible imperial claims [which] was doubtless disquiet- ing to a young ruler of ambition and literary aspirations.” In 122 BC Liu An was forced to commit suicide over allegations of plotting against the throne. Mark Lewis sees the Huainanzi text as one cause of Han Wudi’s suspicion and distrust. Li Tai’s universal geography was probably not on a level with the Huainanzi, but it was composed with Taizong’s express approval, and thus was an obvious and powerful statement of political intent directed at Chengqian and those who supported him. 21 JTs 88.2882; XTs 83.3644. Nunome Chōfū also provides background biographical information on Su Xu. See Nunome (1968), 240, 331–32. 22 Quan Tangwen (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), 9.106 shang; 9.111 xia. Quan Tangwen Buyi 全唐文補遺 vol. I (Xi’an: Sanqin chubanshe, 1994), 470, contains a fragment of the Li Chengqian stele inscription. This stele was probably erected by Chengqian’s grandson, see XTs 80.3565. Also see XTs 74 shang, 3148–49. 23 Cefu Yuangui, 80.924. 24 JTs 88.2878. the xuanwu men legacy 205

activate his literati college directly reflected the emperor’s policy desires. One year later, in 639, the Chongxian Guan 崇賢館 was established under the auspices of Chengqian’s heir apparent’s palace administration (in 675 the name of the college was changed to the Chongwen Guan 崇文館).25 In the context of the ongoing factional competition and the 638 activation of Tai’s literati college,this latter effort would be Taizong’s way of re-establishing the factional balance of prestige and thus maintaining the momentum in his perpetual motion scheme of competitive court factions. This situation is a very specific example of how court institutions can become political capital in factional competition, while their institutional mission is of epiphenomenal significance. The senior courtiers grouped around Zhangsun Wuji were all strong supporters of Chengqian and strongly objected to Tai’s access to a literati college as denigrating to the prestige of the heir apparent.26 By 641 Li Tai himself was actively engaged in constructing a personal factional following. Tai’s biography notes that two of his subsequent chiefs of staff, Wei Ting 韋挺, and Du Chuke 杜楚客 actively recruited on Tai’s behalf.27 Taizong was aware of these activities but did nothing to stop them until the situation threatened to get out of control in 643.28 By 642 both the bloc of senior courtiers and Taizong himself realized that the stability of the imperial succession was faltering in the face of this increasingly acerbic factional struggle,29 yet Taizong took no immediate action. Taizong’s ostensible vacillation regarding this issue is reminiscent of the attitude of his father, Gaozu, from 621 until the Xuanwu Men incident of 626 when Li Shimin killed his brothers anad clarified the identity of the heir apparent. Based on what we know of Taizong’s probable knowledge and involvement in the construction of Tai’s clique, and based on the crucial function of leading staff officers in guiding their charges in accordance with the desires of the throne, it is reasonable to infer that Taizong was modeling his court policies on those pioneered by his father from 621 through 626.30

25 XTs 44.1163; 49.1294. 26 ZzTj 196.6174. 27 JTs 76.2655. 28 See the biography of Du Chuke, JTs 66.2470. 29 ZzTj 196.6176–77. 30 Matsui Shūichi 松井秀一 has interpreted the competition between Li Tai and Chengqian, backed by the senior courtiers in the Zhangsun Wuji faction as a reflection of intra-court elite generational conflict, with members of the Li Tai faction tending to be the younger brothers or sons of established courtiers. See his, “Sokuten Bukō no 206 chapter seven

When the throne, in a pre-meditated fashion, encourages (if not orders) the construction of competing factions, there seems to have been the expectation that the nominal factional leaders would abide by certain implicit rules of conduct. To wit, one could not ignore, pun- ish, or assault one’s leading staff officers, since they were appointed by thethrone, to raise one’s hand against them would comprise lese majeste. A nominal factional leader could attempt to coopt or convert such staff officers into truly personal agents, though, such activity could backfire disastrously, as in the case of the Northern Zhou monarchs under the Yuwen Hu period of tutelage. Nominal factional leaders could not attack or kill one another without the (tacit) authorization of the throne— which brings us into the realm of politics in the form of haragei. In this regard, Tai generally played by the rules. He actively fostered Taizong’s long term goal of breaking the grip on court policy making exercised by the senior courtiers without giving full rein to his own personal ambitions which were being manipulated by his father. The one player who did not closely abide by these implicit expectations, and the one with the most to lose, was Chengqian. By 640 Chengqian was approximately 20 years old (Li Tai was about the same age). The various traditional historical sources describe his adult behavior as arbitrary, deceitful, that he was a Turcophile, and (from a Confucianized perspective) a sexual pervert. For the position of emperor these are all excellent qualities that could be put to good use. Certainly, Taizong, the murderer of his two brothers and all their male children was not one to be squeamish about moral issues in politics. What seems to have been troubling to Taizong was Chengqian’s willingness to act unilaterally. As the pressure of the factional struggle increased by 640 through 641, Chengqian appears to have lost his equanimity. In his fear, he lashed out at staff members and imperially appointed tutors who had been assigned to watch and guide him. In 640 or 641 an assassina-

Yōritsu o megutte 則天武后の擁立をめぐって,” Hokudai Shigaku 11 (1966): 11. There is truth to this observation (whom else could Taizong recuit for Tai’s faction?), but the causal analysis needs to emphasize the primary role of the throne in provoking and manipulating this conflict. The Chinese historian, Lü Simian, found the sequence of events between 636 through 643 to be troubling, particularly Taizong’s apparent role in both abetting the conflict, and then bringing it to a sudden end. He blamed the dynastic histories for being tendentious, and thus obscuring the true course of events (see Lü (1984), 131. Pages 126–132 contain a detailed narrative of this factional struggle). Lü is probably correct regarding the traditional sources, but enough information is provided to enable one to infer the general pattern of events. the xuanwu men legacy 207 tion attempt was allegedly made against one of his tutors, Yu Zhining 于志寧;31 and Chengqian had another tutor, Zhang Xuansu 張玄素, flogged for astringently and insistently criticizing his behavior.32 In 643 Chengqian was discovered plotting to kill his rival, Tai and possibly his father. Consequently, Taizong’s plans for a perpetual motion system of court factional competition came crashing down. Chengquan was not suitable to be heir anymore, and Tai may have become too independent and certainly enjoyed no support among the senior clique of courtiers, who were not interested in supporting the very tool that was being used to undermine their authority at the court. A ritually legitimate compromise candidate was needed around whom the throne and its leading courtiers could temporarily rally. This candidate turned out to be the youngest of the sons born of the deceased Zhangsun Empress, the fifteen year old Li Zhi 李治, who would ascend the throne in 649 as Gaozong.33 Thus, the throne had a new malleable object to manipulate and the Zhangsun affinal connection to the throne was maintained which was satisfying to the Zhangsun Wuji clique of senior courtiers. Indeed, the emergence of a clearly defined clique grouped around Zhangsun Wuji (and ably discussed in an early essay by Sun Guodong) seems to have been a defensive reaction to Taizong’s failed aggressive political manipulations. Between 645 through 653 (the third year in the reign of the subsequent emperor, Gaozong) Zhangsun Wuji and his associates purged or had executed courtiers who were known supporters of Tai and other perceived rivals to a Zhangsun approved candidate for the position of heir apparent. As a result of the entrenchment of the Zhangsun clique, the generational changing of the guard which should have occurred upon the death of Taizong in 649 and the ascension of Gaozong was postponed, but the benefit of this situation was that there was considerable continuity in experienced personnel and imperial policy. The negative aspect of this situation was that a greater conflict had simply been postponed—a politically active mature emperor would not permit himself to be a ‘kept man’ for long, as Yuwen Hu discovered in

31 JTs 78.2697; ZzTj 196.6168. 32 JTs 75.2642. 33 Chengqian was derogated to commoner status and exiled to what is now Guizhou, at that time a distant frontier region, where he died in 644 (see the Cambridge History, 238). Tai was permitted to retain the rank of prince but was sent out to what is now northwestern Hubei, on the Han River, which was also a relatively isolated area. He died in 652, during the reign of his younger brother, Gaozong, at the age of 34. No cause of death was given (see JTs 76.2656). 208 chapter seven his tragic relationship with the third Northern Zhou monarch, Wudi. By 659 Gaozong had engineered the execution of his maternal uncle, Zhangsun Wuji, and the entire clique of senior courtiers around him were either purged or executed. The elevation of Wu Zetian, who was not supported by the Zhangsun clique, to the position of empress in 655 was simply part of Gaozong’s goal, fully realized in 659, of establishing his independence as emperor. The appearance of Wu Zetian raises the issue of the role of her mother’s family, the Yang family related to the Sui royal family, whose male and female members were quite active in the early Tang court. In 637 when Taizong accepted the thirteen year old Wu Zetian into his female quarters as a member of its elite support staff, he may have done this as a favor to the Yang family. Wu Zetian’s father, Wu Shihuo, a member of the founding generation under Gaozu had died in 635 shortly after the death of Gaozu. Relations between Wu Zetian’s mother, who was Wu Shihuo’s second wife (following the death of his first wife who gave birth to all of his sons), and the Wu family do not appear to have been close. Indeed, there is some evidence that Wu Shihuo was viewed by Taizong as a political opponent when the latter ascended the throne in late 626, and the two men remained distant from each other. Nevertheless, the Yang mother and her daughter were orphaned. In mid-636 Yang Shidao 楊師道 (Wu Zetian’s maternal tangshu, if the term can be used in this extended sense) replaced his elder brother, Yang Gongren 楊恭仁, at the position of Chancellor (shizhong, a policy adviser/high level companion to the throne; the leading position in the menxia sheng, often held by more than one person at any given time). The multiple marriage ties of this family with the Tang royal family during this early period have been noted by the standard histories.34 Taizong’s favorite concubine was a niece of Yang Gongren and she would be Wu Zetian’s second cousin. Taizong acquired her from his younger brother, Yuanji, after he had the latter killed during the Xuanwu Men incident in 626. Taizong seems to have retained a consistent interest in using members of the elite Yang family as foils and obstacles to Zhangsun affinal political influence, particularly following the death and interment of the Zhangsun Empress in late 636. TheXin Tang shu alleges that Taizong openly considered making Yang Gongren’s niece his new Empress but was dissuaded from such action by Wei Zheng, the Confucian courtier. 35

34 See JTs 62.2382. 35 XTs 80.3579. the xuanwu men legacy 209

No date is given for this incident, but it probably occurred between 637 to early 642, when Wei Zheng became seriously ill. Another incident occurred in in 643, when Taizong directly proposed to Zhangsun Wuji that Li Zhi, the new heir apparent, be replaced with another of his sons, Li Ke 李恪, whose mother was a daughter of Sui Yangdi, thus, from the Yang family.36 Zhangsun Wuji objected and the idea was shelved. Taizong’s interest in the Sui royal Yang family may be due to their high social status, political/administrative expertise, and as descendents of a defeated dynasty, their complete lack of an independent base of power outside of the favor granted them by the Tang throne. This is reminiscent of the way in which Yuwen Tai utilized his royal Tuoba consort in arguing that his third eldest son, born from this Tuoba woman, be accepted by the junta as his heir. The Tuoba royal family was powerless and under the domination of Yuwen Tai. Before concluding the discussion in this chapter, it is necessary to discuss the linkage between Taizong’s manipulation of the heir apparent and the 645 Korean War adventure. The first clear evidence that Taizong was actively planning a campaign to the east bank of the Liao River surfaces in the year 641.37 The exact reasons as to why Taizong was planning such a campaign are not clear. A lounging for the glories of conquest is certainly one possible reason, particularly given Taizong’s personal interest in warfare.38 In 639 through 640 the Tang had re-confirmed its dominance of North Asia by conquering Gaochang, near modern Turfan in Xinjiang, and in the process pushed Western Turk military influence out of this immediate strategic area. At this time the Korean peninsula, including southern Manchuria up to the east bank of the Liao River was divided among three contending regional empires. The northernmost one, Korguryo, which dominated southern Manchuria to the Liao River, was behaving in an increasingly aggressive fashion against one of its southern rivals, Silla, which was also a Tang tributary kingdom. The Korguryo leadership also took a tough defensive stance on its Liao River frontier with the Tang. Tang China maintained a strong interest in encouraging a divided, fragmented

36 See XTs 80.3566. In 653 during the reign of Gaozong, while Zhangsun Wuji still dominated the court, he had Li Ke executed for alleged involvement in an obscure court scandal. Li Tai died in 652 (see note 33)—one wonders if Zhangsun Wuji was ‘cleaning house’. 37 ZzTj 196.6169–70. 38 ZzTj 196.6170. 210 chapter seven political situation on the Korean Peninsula as a means of maximizing its influence in the region in lieu of a direct occupation. Thus, it was certainly in Tang interests to find some means of checking the increasingly expansive powers of the Korguryo regime. An interesting factor in these considerations was that between 640 through 641 the factional competition between Taizong’s two sons was reaching a mature stage of development. This chapter has argued that Taizong was fully cognizant of this fact and continued to encourage the rivalry. Therefore, one must assume that the Korean campaign, which would be a large overland expedition, was being planned in such a fashion so as to be able to mesh with the competitive factional situation at the court. Was Taizong trying to recreate the situation which he experienced as a young man, when his father, Gaozu, could use military campaigns and the assigning of preferred theaters of operation as a means of effectively playing one son off against the other? A definitive answer to this question is not possible given the limited and tendentious nature of the sources, however, the embarrassing failure of Taizong’s efforts at factional manipulation in 643 also raises another question. In 644, in the face of almost complete opposition from all his senior courtiers, Taizong announced that he would personally attend to the campaign on the Liao River front, which he did for all of 645. Such a decision was dangerous, dramatic, and from a strategic perspective, very unnecessary. The Liao River frontier had always been of secondary concern to Tang military strategists. The Northern frontier of Inner Mongolia and points north, the Gansu Corridor and the Gaochang access route to the Silk Road oases of Xinjiang had always claimed the primary attention of the court. The survival or even simple well being of the Tang realm did not depend upon aggressive campaigns against Korguryo on the Liao River. Was Taizong attempting to regain lost political prestige by personally presid- ing over a hoped for (and ultimately disappointing) victorious campaign against Korguryo? This latter question is an issue which we will take up in a subsequent chapter. The legacy of Tang Taizong may be more ambivalent than has been noticed previously. By unsuccessfully attempting to imitate the tactics of his father regarding the manipulation of competitive factions, Taizong carried forward a legacy of violent struggle over the succession to the throne focused on the position of the heir apparent.39 Indeeed, lurking

39 Xu Leshuai (2003), 309, also specifically commented on the disruptive impact of Taizong’s action on Tang political culture. the xuanwu men legacy 211 behind the complaints of Confucian oriented courtiers like Wei Zheng that the second half of the Zhen’guan Period lacked the harmony and cooperative political spirit of the earlier years, was the incessant factional conflict provoked by Taizong in his effort to augment the political influence of the throne.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PERVASIVE FACTIONALIZATION OF TAIZONG’S COURT

In this chapter we will expand the discussion commenced in the previous chapter that beginning in 636, following the interment of the Zhangsun Empress, Taizong engaged in an aggressive effort at creating factional tensions at the court by employing one of his sons, Tai, as an ostensible competitor with Chengqian for the position of heir apparent. The goal was to destabilize the court, particularly the senior courtiers grouped around Zhangsun Wuji, by using the competing factions to fragment their authority at the court, and so augment the power of the throne. This factional competition was not limited to cliques forming around Taizong’s two sons but also had an impact on the court administrative structure. The Chengqian-Tai competition was the tip of the iceberg, there was a court purge in progress from 638 through 645. Taizong may have been engaged in a variety of pre-emptive moves to head off, or at least neutralize the influence of Zhangsun Wuji in the court administrative apparatus. Direct evidence is not readily available, but there is indirect evidence for the emergence of this type of situation. Zhangsun Wuji did not hold functional court positions from 628 through 645, rather he held a series of high honorific titles and functioned as a high level adviser to the throne (with the exception of 643 when he was appointed one of the councillors to the new heir apparent, Li Zhi, the future Gaozong). However, the tomb biography of Zhangsun Xiang 長孫祥, Wuji’s nephew traces a series of seventeen court positions beginning with posts on the staff of an imperial prince and ascending in a continuous arc of substantive central court appointments including, towards the pinnacle of his career arc, deputy positions in the Boards of Revenue and Personnel, left assistant deputy to the Department of State Affairs, culminating in the position of Minister of Punishments from 655–657 during the reign of Gaozong.1 Most of these positions

1 Zhou Shaoliang 周紹良, Tangdai Muzhi Huibian 唐代墓誌匯編 (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe, 1992), 598.008. Also, JTs 65.2456, contains a very abbreviated biography of Xiang. Most of the positions held by Xiang are not listed in Yan Gengwang’s Tang Pushang Chenglangbiao compilation, except for his Board of Punishment position. 214 chapter eight were second tier positions with direct control over the implementation of imperial policy decisions. Xiang was executed, or forced to commit suicide in 659 along with his uncle. Xiang represents the type of individual that Taizong would be eager to remove from the court administration, even at the expense of damaging administrative efficiency. Insofar as the expansion of the direct power of the throne is a key goal of emperors in a patrimonial system, denigration of the efficacy of administrative institutions and instability and tension at the court were of secondary concern to the monarch. As the previous chapter argued, Taizong seemed to be imitating his father’s tactics in pitting Chengqian and Tai against each other—he was following a well trod path. In Taizong’s efforts at deepening the factional struggle and embroiling the court administrative structure in this strife, the years 638 and 641 are of importance. From 638 through 645 Taizong attempted to purge the Department of State Affairs (shangshu sheng). Also, in 638 Taizong created a new, elite palace guard unit, the Feiji 飛騎, which seems to be linked to his administrative purges. The year 641 is crucial because in that year the famous Tang general, Li Ji 李勣, was called to court from his regional command posting at Bingzhou, which is south of modern Taiyuan. After arriving at court, Li Ji became a crucial supporter of Taizong in his court factional fights and an absolutely crucial figure in stabilizing the subsequent reign of Gaozong and in assuring the rise of Wu Zetian to power. Li Ji, who died in 669 after the conquest of Pyongyang, which he directed, will truly become the ‘emi- nence grise’ of the early Tang political scene.

Taizong’s Purge of the Department of State Affairs

Below is table VIII listing personnel in the ranking positions of the Department of State Affairs and also the Chancellory. Generally, from the years 627 through 638 personnel in these various positions were experienced administrators and senior courtiers serving relatively stable tenures in office. Beginning in 638 significant personnel realignments occurred, most notably in the positions of left and right assistant deputies to the Department of State Affairs (shangshu zuo, you cheng 尚書左右丞) and the position of Minister of the Board of Personnel (libu 吏部). The left assistant deputy position was the key, senior assistant deputy for exercising direct oversight of the implementation of imperial policy decisions via the Department of State Affairs, as well the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 215

Wei Ting Wei ViceChan. ViceChan. huangmen shilang Wang Gui Wang Wang Wei Gui; Zheng Du Ruhui; Du Ruhui; Shilian 高士廉 Gui Wang Zheng Wei Chancellor Chancellor shizhong Gao

Guo Fushan 郭福善 Vice-Min. of War bing s hilang Li Jing Du Ruhui 李靖 Junji Hou Minister of of Minister War bing shang li 溫彥博劉林甫 Ting Wei 楊纂 Wen Yanbo Wen Vice-Min. of Personnel shilang 侯君集 Dai Zhou Dai Junji Hou Du Ruhui Gao Shilian Zuan Yang Wuji Minister of of Minister Personnel li shang Wei Ting Wei Wei ZhengWei Du Yan Linfu Liu Du Zheng- lun Right Asst. Asst. Right Dir. Dpty cheng you 賀若孝義 Left Asst Left Dir. Dpty zuo cheng Heruo Heruo Xiaoyi Li Jing Zhangsun Zhangsun Wuji Du Ruhui Right Dpty Dpty Right Director you pu Xuanling Left Dpty Left Dpty Director zuo pu 630 628 632 629 Fang 633 631 627 Xiao Yu Deyi Feng Zhou Dai Zhou Dai Zhangsun Office Office Year 216 chapter eight

Liu Ji ViceChan. ViceChan. huangmen shilang Wei Zheng; Wei Yang Gongren Zheng Wei 楊師道 Wei Zheng Wei Yang Shidao Zheng Wei Chancellor Chancellor shizhong

Vice-Min. War of bing s hilang Zhangsun Wuxian 長孫無憲 Minister of of Minister War bing shang li 唐皎 Tang Jiao Tang Yang Zuan Yang Yang ZuanYang Junji Hou Vice-Min. of Personnel shilang Gao Shilian Junji Hou Gao Shilian Minister of of Minister Personnel li shang 劉洎 Right Asst. Asst. Right Dir. Dpty cheng you

Yang Zuan Yang Quan Quan Tang JiaoTang Ji Liu 權萬紀馮長命韋琮 Feng Feng Chang ming Wei Zong Wei Wanji Left Asst Left Dir. Dpty zuo cheng Wen Wen Yanbo Gao Shilian Right Dpty Dpty Right Director you pu Xuanling Left Dpty Left Dpty Director zuo pu ) Office Office Year 635 636 Fang 639 640 634 637 638 Table ( cont. Table the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 217 Tang Lin Tang Chu Chu Suiliang 禇遂良 ; Zhang Zhang Xingcheng Liu Ji Zhangsun Wuji Zhining Yu 于志寧 Liu Ji; Liu Zhangsun Wuji Yang Hongli Cui Dunli Cui 崔敦禮楊弘禮 Lu Chengqing Shi Liu 柳奭李勣

Cui Dunli Cui Li Ji Gao Jifu Gao Jifu Tang Lin Tang Su Xu 蘇勗高季輔唐臨 Yang Shi- Yang dao Yang Shidao Lu Cheng- Lu qing Gao Jifu Hou Junji Hou Liu Ji Zhou Ma 馬周廬承慶 . 宇文節 ? ? ? ? Pei Xidai Pei Li Xinglian 裴熙戴 Di Xiaoxu 狄孝緒李行廉張行成 Zhang Zhang Xingcheng Yang ZuanYang Jie Yuwen Gao Shilian . Wuji Li Ji 647 648 Zhangsun 649 646 641 642 643 644 645 Tang Pushang Chenglang Biao Chenglang Pushang Gengwang, Tang Yan Sources: Ershiwushi Bubian 218 chapter eight as ensuring that administrative discipline was maintained and proper protocol followed in the various Department boards and bureaus.2 This responsibility was shared with a slightly junior right assistant deputy— often, the six boards of the Department of State Affairs were evenly split between these two administrators. Nevertheless, it was not always the case that both positions were filled all the time or at the same time- this latter sort of inconsistency applied to many other posts in the imperial administration, as well, for a variety of different reasons. According to Yan Gengwang’s tables, beginning in 638 the left assistant deputy position was filled by Quan Wanji 權萬紀, who was briefly mentioned in the previous chapter. The bulk of Quan’s court career was spent in the censorial service which provided the throne with surveillance information regarding all members of the court in terms of both their professional and personal behavior. Quan was a well known and widely resented figure at court because of his willingness to indict the highest level courtiers for misconduct and misdemeanors. In 643 Quan was Taizong’s son You’s chief of staff, and Quan so frightened You that the latter had him killed. In 638 Quan was transferred directly from the post of Assistant Court Censor (yushi zhongcheng 御史中丞) to the left assistant deputy position in the department of State Affairs where he served for one year before being sent out to the provinces, possibly due to political problems that Quan created during his one year tenure.3 Quan was immediately replaced by Feng Changming 馮長命 who had a reputation similar to that of Quan, and who would later be appointed Chief Censor (yushi daifu 御史大夫).4 It is not clear how long Feng remained in this position, but there were a number of lesser known figures occupying this post in succession until the situation suddenly stabilized in 645, when Taizong began his large scale military campaign against Korguryo on the Liao River. Beginning in 645 the post was held for approximately a year by the experienced administrator, Yang Zuan 楊纂, and the personnel situation stabilized therafter. The sudden appearance in 638 and 639 of feared and resented censorial agents of the throne as administrative heads of the Department of State Affairs, in addition to the personnel instability at this post, leads to the conclusion that in the context

Xiang’s tomb biography does not provide dates for the offices held, many of which may have been held in the reign of Gaozong. 2 Zhang Guogang, Tangdai Guanzhi (1987), 60–61. 3 On the yushi zhongcheng position see Zhang Guogang (1987), 78. For the biography of Quan Wanji see, XTs 100.3939. 4 JTs 60.2350; XTs 78.3525. the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 219 of the divisive and overarching factional competition between Tai and Chengqian, that Taizong was purging second tier court administrative personnel, as well. The hypothesis that Taizong was purging the court executive agencies is strengthened by a discussion of the career of a young courtier at the time, Liu Ji 劉洎. In 636 when he was a newly appointed junior censorial officerzhishu ( shiyushi 治書侍御史) he memorialized the throne expaining that ever since the early 630’s the Department of State Affairs had not been able to effectively exercise its executive administrative functions due to a lack of administrative discipline, nepotism and a willingness to tolerate the presence of super-annuated affines and honored courtiers who should have been retired.5 By tolerating this situation in the Department of State Affairs the route to advancement for the capable and the willing was blocked. Liu was immediately appointed to the position of right assistant deputy to the Department of State Affairs where he remained until 639.6 In the context of an increasingly factionalized, politically charged court, Liu Ji’s proposal was inflammatory, whether or not he originally intended it to have that effect. By 638, the juxtaposition of Liu Ji with Quan and then Feng in the left deputy assistant position implies that Liu came up with the ideas regarding who was qualified personnel and how best to run affairs and the latter two men saw that these ideas were implemented in the Department of State Affairs. Matsui Shuichi’s contention that the court factionalism fed off of a generational conflict is also supported by the Liu Ji memorial, where Liu is clearly calling for a generational change in leadership positions. Liu Ji also became a supporter of the Li Tai faction. In 639, Liu was promoted to assistant chancellor (huangmen shilang 黃門侍郎), and then granted the unprecedented privilege by the throne of permission to participate in policy making discussion between the throne and its highest ranking courtiers. Liu’s positions in the Department of State Affairs and then the promotion to assistant chancellor were all graded at different sub- levels of grade four. Generally, one had to be promoted to a grade three

5 JTs 74. 2607–08. 6 TheJiu Tang shu jumbles up the dates for Liu Ji’s submission of the memorial in 636 that brought him to the attention of the throne; the text gives a 641 date which is much too late. See JTs 74.2607. The JTs also confuses the dates for the various court positions he held. Yan Gengwang’s Tang Pushang compilation also makes note of this confusion on page 452. For an accurate date regarding the submission of the memorial see, Tang Huiyao 58.999. The XTs and the ZzTj are no help in this regard. 220 chapter eight courtier before one could sit in on what can be termed imperial cabinet discussions. Wu Zong’guo has noted that when the throne brings relatively junior courtiers into the cabinet level discussions then it is part of an effort to augment the position of the throne vis-à-vis the most senior, experienced courtiers.7 Clearly, Liu Ji had become a factional supporter of Taizong in his struggles with the Zhangsun Wuji faction and his long term earlier presence in the Department of State Affairs implies that he and the men he associated with actively implemented factional policies in that capacity. In 645, following the disappointing conclusion of Taizong’s Liao River campaign, Liu Ji was slandered by Chu Suiliang 禇遂良, the famous calligrapher and close associate of Zhangsun Wuji, and then ordered to commit suicide by the throne—a scapegoat to the constantly shifting balance of factional power at the court. The interesting career of Hou Junji侯君集 , one of the early Tang dynasty’s most famous and star crossed generals, also indicates Taizong’s interest in tightening his direct control over the court’s executive administrative apparatus. Hou Junji’s life was oriented to martial affairs and to achieving military distinction. Before 626 he was a member of Li Shimin’s entourage and was one of the honored few who directly participated in the Xuanwu Men incident as a core plotter. He became a leading general and in 640 commanded the Tang armies that conquered Gaochang. From 631 through 638 he served as Minister of the Board of War (bingbu shangshu 兵部尚書), which had responsibility for military logistics and personnel issues. Hou’s military field experience and his functional literacy served him well in this position. However, he was certainly not versed in the classical literary tradition of prosody and poesy, yet, from the latter half of 638 through the middle of 640, and again from 641 through the middle of 643, when he was executed for becoming involved with Chengqian’s plot to seize the throne, Hou was Minister of the Board of Personnel (libu shangshu). He was in charge of lower and middle level court personnel appointments and aspects of an early form of the imperial examination system that would demand a high degree of literacy, which Hou did not possess, though, his biography assures the reader that he worked hard and assiduously at his new posting.8 The question remains why would such a man be assigned to

7 Regarding Liu Ji’s support for Tai see ZzTj 197.6195. Regarding permission granted to Liu Ji in 639 to attend cabinet level discussions see XTs 2.39. The JTs does not mention this fact. Regarding Wu Zong’guo’s 吳宗國 comments see his monograph, Sui Tang Wudai Jianshi 隋唐五代簡史, (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin chubanshe, 1998), 92–3. 8 JTs 69.2510. the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 221 this type of posting? First, we must note that Hou was replacing Gao Shilian 高士廉, Zhangsun Wuji’s maternal uncle, who had held this post since 631. Gao was appointed to the high level post of right deputy to the Department of State Affairs (you puye 右仆射). In the early Tang system, in accordance with instructions issued by Taizong in 628, the left and right deputies to the Department of State Affairs were not to concern themselves with practical administrative issues, but were to function as high level policy advisers to the throne.9 Thus, a key connection which Zhangsun Wuji had to the court administrative apparatus was neutralized in a direct but courteous fashion. In what seems to have been a factional tit-for-tat maneuver, immediately after Hou Junji vacated the Board of War, he was replaced by Zhangsun Wuji’s next eldest brother, Zhangsun Wuxian 長孫無憲, who was in this post from 639 to the end of 640.10 Wuxian was in office throughout the Gaochang campaign which was commanded by Hou Junji, on loan from his position in the Board of Personnel. The Wuxian case is a good example of the ability of Zhangsun Wuji to place supporters in key functional administrative positions for some period of time. The Zhangsun Xiang case cited earlier is a much more detailed example of what can be termed Wuji’s capability of ‘boring from within’. A quality of Hou Junji that may have appealed to Taizong was the man’s social ineptness, and in the context of elite court society this also meant political ineptness. Hou had no identifiable friends or close factional supporters,11 which may explain why he miscalculated and became overly close to Chengqian in the early 640’s, ultimately resulting in his execution in 643. Prior to these missteps there was only one person at court who valued Hou Junji, and that was Taizong. Hou was the perfect political tool, completely dependent upon the favor of the throne—a rough and tough military man, veteran of the Xuanwu Men incident— placed in the unfamiliar cultural and social environment of the Board of

9 Cefu Yuangui 157.1895. Wu Zong’guo states that Taizong did this to purposely fragment authority within the Department of State Affairs. This early maneuver comes on top of Taizong’s refusal to appoint a unitary Director (ling 令) for the Department of State Affairs, which was conveniently legitmated as a Tang ‘tradition’ to pay homage to the fact that Li Shimin had held this position prior to the Xuanwu Men incident. See Wu (1998), 95–96. 10 Little is known regarding Zhangsun Wuxian. TheXTs 72 shang.2412 simply lists him in the genealogical table. Yan Gengwang admits to a degree of uncertainty regarding the exact dates for Wuxian’s tenure as Minister of the Board of War. See Yan, 898–99. 11 ZzTj 197.6194–95.; JTs 60.2355. 222 chapter eight

Personnel and all of its records. Hou would do whatever Taizong desired of him without raising annoying questions of traditional precedents or issues of moral rectitude. Taizong seems to have had even greater plans for Hou, but these plans were disrupted by the scandal which developed in the aftermath of Hou’s 640 conquest of Gaochang, which will be discussed shortly below. A degree of underlying competence and stability at the Board of Personnel seems to have been provided by the continuous presence of Yang Zuan, an experienced administrator, as deputy minister from 631 through 641. This same individual will take over the left assistant deputy position in the Department of State Affairs in 645 that was discussed above. Yang Zuan seems to have functioned as an administrative trouble-shooter for the throne. To sum up the discussion, the Department of State Affairs became the focal point of a court purge engineered by Taizong to remove older courtiers and affines, bring in a new generation of men with less accumulated seniority and status as a means of checking and destabilizing the influence of the highest level senior courtiers without having to dis- pense completely with their services and accumulated experience. In this context, keeping in mind the accelerating Chengqian-Tai factional competition, Liu Ji’s administrative reform memorial of 636 was akin to a declaration of war.

The Creation of the Feiji Palace Guard Units

The following discussion of these special palace guard units only applies to the reign of Taizong, because the organization and mission of these special units will alter subsequently. In 638 Taizong ordered the creation of this elite guard unit and placed it directly under the authority of the throne. The Feiji guards were autonomous from the Board of War and partially autonomous from the fubing command system.12 They were the emperor’s own men and his household staff and privy treasury saw to it that they were properly maintained. These units were stationed at the strategic Xuanwu Gate along with other pre-existing elite units attached to various standard palace commands.13 The Feiji guards were also des-

12 Meng Man 蒙曼, unpub. Ph.D. diss. “Tang Qianqi Beiya Jinjun Zhidu Yanjiu 唐前期北衙禁軍制度研究,” (Beijing University, 2002), 87, 103, 118. 13 Meng Man, 103, 108–109. Also see, Zhao Yule 趙雨樂, “Tang Qianqi Beiya de Jishe Budui 唐前期北衙的騎射部隊,” Shaanxi Shifan Daxue Xuebao 32 (2002): 75–77. the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 223 ignated to serve as imperial escorts and to stand guard at imperial court conferences. The other units stationed alongside the Feiji guards belonged to special palace commands and are generally referred to as inner fubing guard units distinct from the outer fubing units that patrolled the capital’s streets and maintained watch over outer palace walls and city walls.14 These latter units were drawn from the commoner population, though it members may have been of some status in their local communities, mostly from areas near the capital and they rotated in and out of capital duty service through the year. During the early Tang period, the inner fubing guardsmen were chosen from the children of elite court families. Zhang Guogang notes that “. . . the outer fubing guardsmen were chosen from households of rank six court status and lower, including commoner households; the inner fubing guardsmen were chosen from rank five court households and higher . . .”15 TheYu Hai notes very explicitly that during the reigns of Tang Gaozu and Taizong, the inner guardsmen positions were reserved for the children of the highest level court elites.16 The innerfubing units tended to be commanded by three distinct inner palace commands (the sanwei 三衛) though other commands could also be involved. The throne could move its officers around at will between inner and outer commands, but the distinction between inner and outer units and their respective command structures remained intact. The elitist nature of the inner fubing guard units was heightened by the fact that foreign emissaries, diplomatic ‘hostages’, and their children at the Tang court (whose numbers could range into the hundreds) also served on these elite guard units, though, not necessarily at the Xuanwu Gate. One of the most important tasks of the Tang period Honglu Si, or Court of Dignataries and Guests was to bestow court ranks on emissaries and guests as the basis for assigning to them Tang court positions and titles.17 Many of these individuals were commonly assigned to duty on the various elite palace guard units, called suwei 宿衛. In the 700’s the term suwei, which was simply a generic term to indicate service

14 Zhang Guogang, Tangdai Zhengzhi Zhidu Yanjiu Lunji 唐代政治制度研究論集 (Taibei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1994), 1–4. Zhang Qun 章群, Tangdai Fanjiang Yanjiu 唐代蕃將研究 vol. I (Taibei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi, 1985), 97. 15 Zhang Guogang, Tangdai Zhengzhi Zhidu, 4. 16 Yu Hai (Shanghai: Jiangsu Guji chubanshe & Shanghai Shudian, 1987), 138.2563 shang. 17 Li Hu, Han-Tang Waijiao Zhidu shi (1998), 319–322. 224 chapter eight on the elite imperial guard units, became identified with foreign guests and emissaries.18 Serving on these palace guard units was part of a program of training for foreign emissaries and guests in imperial culture, which also included accepting many such individuals into the imperial universities.19 In the context of this elite environment, the Feiji units were distinctive—they originally drew their members from well-off commoner households (rank six tax asset level and above) and most probably resi- dent in the immediate vicinity of the capital. Height requirements and pre-existing military skills were also prerequisites for admission to these Feiji units.20 Taizong was reaching outside of court society to incorpo- rate these young men into this new elite court unit and into general court society. Evidence indicates that Taizong expected these men to be able to function in the court beyond their strictly military duties, which is in contrast to the expectations and career paths of later elite palace guard units at the court. Feiji personnel were given special instruction in the Confucian texts and tradition by a qualified Imperial University professor.21 By 645, when Taizong personally attended to the frontlines of the campaign against Korguryo, one scholar estimates that there were a total of 5,000 Feiji guardsmen on duty.22 In addition to this, in 639 Taizong also created a super-elite imperial bodyguard unit called the Baiji 百騎, which drew part of it manpower from outstanding members of the newly created Feiji.23 The exact status of the Baiji is ambiguous because this unit may have also included mar- tially qualified government slaves and bond servants.24 Its peculiar status derived from its direct contact with the person of the emperor. These men were clothed in colorful uniforms and they seemed to have served as a status enhancing symbol for the throne as opposed to a functioning elite military unit. From the above discussion it is clear that the inner fubing units functioned not only as elite guard units for the throne, but they also functioned as court social institutions providing its members, particularly

18 Zhang Qun, Tangdai Fanjiang Yanjiu Xubian 唐代蕃將研究續編 (Taibei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi, 1989), 100. 19 Zhang Chun (1989), 101. 20 Yu Hai 138.2572. Meng Man (2002), 24. 21 Meng Man, 25, 94. Wenxian Tongkao 41.392. 22 Meng Man, 39. 23 Zhang Guogang, Tangdai Zhengzhi Zhidu, 145. Yu Hai 138.2573 shang. 24 Meng Man, 24, 51. the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 225 younger courtiers, with high court status. During the reign of Taizong, the Feiji units were very important in this regard, taking in young men who were outsiders to court society, giving them status as members of the emperor’s entourage (remember their autonomous status vis-à-vis the other inner fubing units) and then striving to integrate them into the greater court society. From the perspective of this chapter, the establishment of the Feiji units was directly related to Taizong’s efforts to purge the court. Taizong was seeking to draw in younger courtiers as loyal supporters by opening up existing court institutional positions (following Liu Ji’s memorial regarding the Department of State Affairs) and multiplying new positions available to a younger generation, as in the Feiji project.25 Taizong’s intense factional activity stimulated a need and interest in cultivating ‘new men’, which became very visible beginning in 638, which itself seems to be a dramatic expression of a longer term interest in opening the court up to loyal, competent courtiers who would owe their rise in status and power solely to the throne. The late Professor Wang Jian discussed this issue with regard to Taizong’s early penchant (well before 638) for choosing some of his most well known high courtiers from men of little background from the North China Plain (like Li Ji).26 In the end, the goal was to realize the maximal independent pow- erof the throne, uninhibited by court precedent, interest politics, and court social mores.27

The Arrival of Li Ji at the Court of Tang Taizong

In early 642 Li Ji, the famous Tang general, arrived in Chang’an at the behest of Taizong, where he was expected to become (and in fact did become) the backbone member of the imperial faction. The latter half of this discussion will argue that after the disappointment of Taizong’s

25 This is probably a common political gambit used by patrimonial rulers. For example, the Ashikaga shoguns of Japan made an effort to draw the personnel for their palace guard units (hokoshu) from “. . . junior branches of shugo houses [semi-hereditary provincial governors] and kokujin class proprietars [politically connected provincial landed elite houses] . . .” Kawai Masaharu, “Shogun and Shugo: The Provincial Aspects of Muromachi Politics,” in John W. Hall & Toyoda Takeshi, eds., Japan in the Muromachi Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 73. Also see page 40. 26 Wang Jian 汪篯, Wang Jian Sui Tang Shi Lungao 汪篯隋唐史論稿 (Beijing: Zhong’guo Shehui Kexue chubanshe, 1984), 132–37, 145–46. 27 Meng Man, 26, 99. 226 chapter eight

645 Liao River campaign, he would become dependent upon Li Ji’s political support. After the death of Taizong in 649, Li Ji would go on to become the crucial supporter of Gaozong (Li Zhi) in his ultimately violent struggle against his maternal uncle, Zhangsun Wuji. Li Ji’s political sophistication and solid military connections made him extremely valuable to both Taizong and Gaozong. The roots of this situation can be traced back to Taizong’s decision to bring Li Ji into the vortex of court factional politics in 641. Ever since the early years of his reign Taizong was interested in having successful generals serving directly under him at the court, adding luster and authority to the throne. Prior to the advent of Li Ji in 641, the two outstanding examples of Taizong’s interest in martial heroes were the famous Tang generals Li Jing 李靖, and Hou Junji. Unfortunately for Taizong, both men were to prove themselves to be political disap- pointments, unwilling or unable to bear up under the pressure of court factional politics and their designated role as the emperor’s own man. Li Jing is considered to be one of the most outstanding of the early Tang generals; being a man of considerable field experience as well as being highly literate in the classical military tradition stretching back to the Warring States Period. From 620 through 625 he was responsible for the pacification of the Middle Yangzi region, working under the command of Li Xiaogong, Taizong’s second cousin and sometime rival in court popularity and martial reputation. From 625 through 626 Li Jing was re-assigned to Shanxi to secure the region from Turkish incursions, and from 627 through 629 he was called to Chang’an where he served as Minister of the Board of Punishments and then the Board of War. He reached the pinnacle of his fame in 630 when he personally commanded the expeditionary army which captured the Xieli kaghan and destroyed the First Eastern Turk confederacy (Li Ji was his second in command). Li Jing was then promoted to the high policy advisory position of right deputy to the Department of State Affairs (you puye). At this point Li Jing manifested his political limitations and appeared unwilling to become overly involved in court politics.28 Following his successful command of a campaign against the Tuyuhun nomads of Qinghai in 634 to 635 he slowly faded from public view and actively avoided court society.29 As Li

28 JTs 67.2480. 29 JTs 67.2481. Nevertheless, according to the Song period collation of the Tang Taizong Li Weigong Wendui text, Taizong consulted with Li Jing until the latter’s death in 648. See Pian Yuqian 駢宇騫, Tang Taizong Li Weigong Wendui Yizhu 唐太宗李衛公問對譯注 (Shijiazhuang: Hebei Renmin chubanshe, 1992), 38, 46. the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 227

Jing proved increasingly unsuitable for actively engaging in court political affairs, Taizong sought to cultivate another military figure, his long- time follower, Hou Junji. From 630 through 638 Hou was Minister of the Board of War, directly replacing Li Jing in this position in 630 when Jing was sent out to fight the eastern Turks in Shanxi and Inner Mongolia. During this time Hou was apparently being primed by Taizong to step into Li Jing’s shoes. Hou served under Li Jing in the 634–635 Tuyuhun campaign, and Li Jing was ordered to personally instruct Hou in military strategy and tactics.30 In 638, Hou was assigned to be Minister of the Board of Personnel, far outside his arena of expertise, functioning, as was argued previously, as a political hatchet man for Taizong in bringing the Tang administrative apparatus under the more direct control of the throne. In 640 Hou received the opportunity to catapault himself to enduring fame and glory, as Li Jing did in 630, by being assigned the command of the field army designated to conquer Gaochang, which was successfully completed by the end of the year. The conquest of Gaochang put the Tang dynasty in a forward offensive posture from which to dominate the northern Xinjiang trade routes and associated strategic military sites, making the Tang a trans-Asian imperial power. However, despite the significance of this achievement, Hou’s political career at court and his usefulness to Taizong was severely compromised by validated charges of gross violation of military discipline regarding the accumulation of personal plunder from the campaign. Hou Junji, previously Taizong’s hatchet man at the court, had the misfortune to commit this blunder in the context of a now viciously factionalized court where there were individuals eager to weaken Taizong’s factional offensive.31 Hou was briefly imprisioned, pardoned, and then sent back to his former position as Minister of the Board of Personnel, a position with which he was profoundly dissatisfied until his execution in 643. Once again, Taizong’s closest, most successful military commander had proven himself to be politically inept. Immediately after the political wounding of Hou Junji,

30 ZzTj 197.6194–95. The XTs 94.3828 dates this tutorial relationship to the period 630 through 634. 31 The standard sources do not identify the individuals who indicted and prosecuted Hou Junji, but the Tang Taizong Li Weigong Wendui text asserts that Hou Junji’s downfall was due to the machinations of Zhangsun Wuji. See page 98.The fact that Wuji’s brother, Wuxian, was Minister of the Board of War during the Gaochang campaign would have placed Wuxian in a position to obtain incriminating evidence and then relay this data to his brother. TheTaizong Li Weigong text allegations are certainly creditable. 228 chapter eight

641 Taizong reached out to another military man, one who had worked closely with the famous Li Jing and had shared in the glory of the 630 conquest of the Eastern Turks—Li Ji. In the early years when the dynasty was first being established, Li Ji was originally an autonomous warlord on the North China Plain, with close ties to an earlier warlord, Li Mi 李密 (they were not blood related). In 620, unable to maintain an independent posture on the North China Plain, Li Ji defected to the Tang and rapidly gained the trust of both Gaozu and Taizong. Beginning in 624 Li Ji served under Li Jing (no blood relationship here, either) in the Middle Yangzi region and in 625 both men served together in Shanxi defending against the Turks. In 626 the two men parted, Li Jing was called to the capital and Li Ji was appointed Governor-General of Bingzhou (Bingzhou dudu, essentially encompassing most of modern Shanxi Province). The appointment was made in 626 just after Taizong killed his two brothers, so it is difficult to state which of the two monarchs was behind the appointment. In his capacity as a regional viceroy, Li Ji again served under the expeditionary army command of Li Jing from 629 to 630 when they destroyed the Turkish confederacy. The two men maintained a smooth working relationship. The Taizong Li Weigong Wendui text has Li Jing, in his capacity as a high military adviser to thre throne, consistently approving of Li Ji’s military ideas.32 The main difference noted in this text between the two men is that Li Ji is portrayed as lacking Li Jing’s knowledge of the classical literary tradition. Indeed, Li Jing came from an elite family with political connections going back to the Western Wei regime of the Period of Disunion. Li Ji came from a commoner family of some local influence, but apparently completely isolated from high cultural or political elites.33 In this text, the ultimate approval of Li Ji is established when Li Jing bestows upon him his library of military classics, thus establishing a direct line of legitimate transmission of knowledge and authority from one man to the other in the service of their lord, Taizong.34 After the famous 630 campaign Li Jing returned to the capital and Li Ji to his Bingzhou Governor-Generalship. Sometime between 630 to 633 Li Ji’s formal title was changed to Chief of Staff to the [Absentee]

32 Taizong Li Weigong, 56, 71. 33 Wang Jian (1984), 138. Li Ji’s biographical data is on pages 134–35. 34 Taizong Li Weigong, 115–16. the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 229

Governor-Generalissimo of Bingzhou 遙領並州大都督府長史, Li Zhi.35 Li Zhi, the future Gaozong, was the youngest of the sons born by the Zhangsun Empress. In 633 Li Zhi was approximately five years old and living in Chang’an, so Li Ji continued to govern all strategic affairs in Bingzhou, but the relationship with Li Zhi would remain unbroken until his death in 669. The length of Li Ji’s tenure at Bingzhou is startling, from 626 through 641, fifteen years. Outside of de facto satrapies in Southwestern and Southeastern China, which were essentially colonial frontier zones, this author is not aware of any other governor general who was able to maintain such a lengthy tenure in office, particularly given the strategic importance of Bingzhou. During the early Tang period Bingzhou was the strategic heart of the empire in terms of coping with threats emanating from the Northern frontier. The Wei River valley was the territorial base upon which the Tang built and expanded their empire, however, this base was insufficient to ensure dynastic military security. From the perspective of the basic security needs of the Wei River valley, or the Guanzhong base, to paraphrase Chen Yinke, it was crucial that Chang’an have direct control over the the Dong Pass on the south bank of the intersection of the Wei and Yellow Rivers, and the Hangu Pass which was directly east of the Dong Pass giving access to Loyang and the North China Plain. It was also necessary to directly control the densely populated, agriculturally fertile Fen River valley of Shanxi. The Fen River flows into the Yellow River some seventy miles north of the great east bend, and approximately fifty miles south of this riverine juncture one can ford the Yellow River and approach the north bank of the Wei River. When Loyang was conquered in 621, the Tang was able to secure the two above passes, however, the Fen River valley was not fully secured against Turk raids until 626. The key to controlling the Fen River was the secure occupation of the city of Bingzhou, located south of modern Taiyuan.

35 TheJTs 4.65 and XTs 3.51 agree that Li Zhi was titled absentee governor-generalissimo of Bingzhou in 633. Li Ji’s biographies note his own change in title to Chief of Staff but do not give a specific date, implying that it occurred in the early 630’s. See JTs 67.2486 and XTs 93.3818. Also see Li Ji’s tomb biography (muzhi) in Quan Tangwen Buyi, vol. I, 56. Li Ji’s stele inscription placed above ground by his tomb (beiwen) has long been in circulation but is severely damaged and does not contain the relevant data. See Yinghua Cuibian 59.5–9. TheZzTj 194.6125 has a peculiar reference that seems to imply that Li Zhi was appointed Bingzhou governor–general in 637. Actually, the entry is focused on the issue of preparing the princes of the blood to be sent out to their provincial gubanatorial postings, not to indicate the date of their appointment to their title. It does not appear that Li Zhi was ever sent out to Bingzhou. 230 chapter eight

Once Bingzhou was held the Tang was able to insulate the entire region south of the Wutai Mountains from Turkish harassment. Bingzhou thus became the forward command center for the Tang in its efforts to cope with threats to its northern frontier, forming the apex of a defensive triangle, with Chang’an and Loyang as its base. Turk raids from the north via Lingwu in modern Ningxia and then down through the river valleys leading south remained a problem, but did not have the destructive impact of raids into the Fen River. Usually the Turks did not penetrate directly south to the north bank of the Wei River, which would be a significant disruption. From 692 through 705 Bingzhou was renamed the Northern Capital (beidu 北都) due to both its historical association with the founding of the dynasty and its geo-strategic importance.36 Once the Tang position was consolidated in 626, Bingzhou functioned as the base area from which large expeditionary armies were dispatched northwards. The expeditionary armies from Bingzhou were the hammer which hit the Turkish forces against the defensive anvils of the neighboring northern and northwestern frontier garrison forces. In the successful 630 campaign against the Eastern Turks, Li Jing, as the expeditionary force commander proceeded from Bingzhou across the Wutai Mountains into northern Shanxi. Li Jing’s rear was protected by Li Ji, who followed the main force through the Yanmen Pass and into the modern Datong area. The expeditionary army allegedly totaled 100,000 men. They then turned northwestward toward Inner Mongolia heading for the encampment of the Xieli kaghan. At the same time that the expeditionary army was moving directly against the Xieli kaghan Tang frontier commands on the Turkish flanks attacked and harassed their Turkish counterparts at Lingzhou (south of modern Yingchuan, Ningxia) and from a base in the Yellow River loop area, probably Shengzhou, near the eastern section of the loop. The expeditionary campaign lasted for more than three months.37 After the successful conclusion of the campaign the expeditionary army was disbanded, and Li Ji and his troops returned to their bases in Bingzhou. The conquered Turkish tribal peoples and their allies, including Central Asian Sogdians, were settled north and south of the loop of the Yellow River and eastward stretching toward the modern Beijing

36 Yuanhe Jun Xian Zhi 元和郡縣誌 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995), 13.361, 385 note 10. 37 ZzTj 193.6066–6073. Liu Tong 劉統, Tangdai Jimi Fuzhou Yanjiu 唐代羈縻府州研究 (Xi’an: Xibei Daxue chubanshe, 1998), 12–13. the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 231 area in a variety of small client kingdoms and reservation-like entities. This re-settled population was overseen by Tang military frontier commanders in the areas involved, who in turn reported to major frontier vice-regal command centers (dudu fu). The most important of these major command centers at the time were the Dingxiang dudufu 定襄都督府 and the Yunzhong dudu fu 雲中都督府).38 These vice-regal command centers, in turn, reported to Chang’an. Bingzhou did not coordi- nate these re-settlement and client state efforts, but simply resumed its surveillance and geo-strategic military duties. Few surrendered tribal peoples were settled south of the Wutai Mountains.39 In sum, Bingzhou does not seem to have been directly concerned with the administrative details of establishing the post-630 client kingdoms nor were many re-settled tribal peoples permitted south of the Wutai Mountains. In late 641 when the Xueyantuo Turk confederacy threatened to destabilize the northern frontier, once again Bingzhou emerged as a source of Tang military muscle. Once again, all the major frontier military commands mustered their forces to harass and hem in the invading Xueyantuo cavalry. This time Li Ji was the commander of the expeditionary army that marched out from Bingzhou with some 60,000 troops and 1200 cavalry, making this army group the largest single unit in the campaign. Li Ji’s line of march was similar to that of the 630 campaign— over the Wutai Mountains to northern Shanxi, and from there northwestward towards Inner Mongolia. The expeditionary army directly assaulted the Xueyantuo contingents and forced them to retreat north across the Gobi, thus achieving a total victory.40 Bingzhou was of transcendent importance to early Tang imperial security. In essence, Li Ji was Bingzhou, and Bingzhou was Li Ji. His length of tenure at Bingzhou testifies to the extraordinary degree of trust which Taizong placed in him.41 Li Ji’s identification with the Bingzhou

38 Liu Tong, 11–14. 39 Liu Tong, 16, provides an example of a small group of Turkish people settled in what is today Xin County 忻縣, Shanxi. 40 ZzTj 196.6170–72.; JTs 3.53–4. 41 Niu Zhigong argues that Taizong retained a residue of distrust toward Li Ji because the latter remained neutral just preceding the Xuanwu Men violence despite an oblique invitation from Li Shimin seeking his support. With the possible exception of a temporary residence in the capital, Li Ji spent most of this time period in Shanxi. If Li Shimin did ask for Li Ji’s support it may have been to commit regular troops to his factional cause. As we noted in the case of Jiancheng’s unsuccessful effort to call in heavy cavalry units to the capital, this type of support was forbidden by Gaozu, who also dispatched his trusted personnel to Loyang in late 625 and early 626 to ensure that Li Shimin did 232 chapter eight command makes him distinct from both Li Jing and Hou Junji, both of whom spent much of their career at the capital and lacked any identification with a territorial base. Li Ji brought with him to Chang’an the potential power of a regional satrap, backed by lieutenants on the ground loyal to him, in fact, a position similar to that of Tang Gaozu in the waning years of the Sui dynasty before the 617 Tang uprising. Li Ji, however, was loyal to the throne and his arrival in Chang’an provided the throne with implicit military support that went far beyond the elite palace guard units. Bingzhou would become a place where the throne could go to retrench from political and military setbacks, as Taizong did in the immediate aftermath of the disappointing Liao River campaign of 645, or to prepare for bold, new policies as Gaozong did in 660 immediately following the elimination of the Zhangsun Wuji clique and his preparations for a new Korean campaign. Li Ji was called to the court in the eleventh lunar month of 641 to fill the post of Minister of the Board of War, like his illustrious predecessors. Before he could leave for Chang’an, however, he was charged with turning back the Xueyantuo invasion of Inner Mongolia, which was accomplished by the twelth lunar month of 641–42. As far as Taizong was concerned, the Xueyantuo incursion was serendipitous, offering Taizong’s new military man of the moment a chance to burnish his martial reputation, much as Li Jing had done in 630 and Hou Junji in 640 in the Gaochang campaign. The Xueyantuo threat did not reach the level of difficulty and importance that were attached to the previous campaigns, but Li Ji was able to discharge his military duties in a timely, well planned fashion that fully met the expectations of the throne, giving Taizong what he wanted, a quick military victory.42 The importance which Taizong seems to have invested in Li Ji’s success and future reputation is underlined by an odd occurrence—the

not embroil regular military forces and court personnel from that area into the factional struggle. At this time, both Li Ji and Li Jing are portrayed as professional military men, not court politicians. Li Jing would retain this stance and so eventually retired from the court scene; Li Ji would be more flexible and become an avid political player at the court beginning in the 640’s. Niu also notes the dramatic treatment Li Ji received just before Taizong’s impending death in 649, which was designed to test Li Ji’s loyalty to the throne. See Niu Zhigong, Tangdai Beishi yu Wenhua Yanjiu 唐代碑石與文化研究 (Xi’an: Sanqin chubanshe, 2002), 32–35. On a personal level it is doubtful if Taizong trusted anyone, including his father or his sons. On a professional level Taizong and Li Ji seemed to have a profound respect for each other. 42 ZzTj 196.6170–71. the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 233 dispatch of elite Feiji palace guard units (probably as cavalry) to the front and placing them under the command of Li Ji. The late Tang Changru stated that outside of extraordinary circumstances the elite palace guard units did not engage in frontline combat. This statement also concurs with Tang regulations which prohibited the dispatch of elite palace guard units for ordinary fubing duties, presumably including combat duty.43 This situation would be particularly true of the guardsmen during Taizong’s reign. If the emperor were personally attending to affairs on a military front, as Taizong did on the Liao River in 645, then the palace guard units would accompany the throne to the front. For reasons not stated in the standard histories, Taizong decided that the Xueyantuo campaign was exceptional. The Cefu Yuangui notes that the Right Guard Commander, Jiang Xingben 姜行本, led more than 1,000 men drawn from the Feiji and other guard units normally stationed at the Xuanwu Gate to serve at the front under the command of Li Ji.44 Li Ji commanded tens of thousands of men, the addition of 1,000 elite guardsmen probably did not have a significant tactical military impact upon the campaign. The impact may have been on the political side, that Taizong was making a direct statement to all attentive courtiers that Li Ji had the special favor of the throne, and as noted earlier, Li Ji fully lived up to the expectations of Taizong. After the Xueyantuo campaign was concluded by early 642 another military hero had arrived at the court, but in contrast to the previous ones, Li Ji would demonstrate political acumen and staying power. Li Ji has been characterized as an individual who knew how to deal with people.45 During the civil war years when the Tang dynasty was first establishing itself, Li Ji had already become acquainted with such future influential courtiers as Wei Zheng, Gao Jifu 高季輔 and others.

43 Tang Changru, Wei Jin Nan Beichao Sui Tang Shi Sanlun (1996), 446–47, 449. Da Tang Liu Dian, (Kyoto: Chubun shuppansha, 1980), 24.431 shang. Meng Man, 25–6, generally concurs with this position. 44 Cefu Yuangui [CfYg] 125.1501 xia-1502. Also repeated at 985.11,569 xia. This action is not discussed in the biographies of Jiang Xingben, JTs 59.2333–34; XTs 91.3792, nor in the Zizhi Tongjian. An extraordinarily strong relationship may have developed betweem Li Ji and the Feiji guard units, which, in turn, would be a manifestation of the close relationship between Li Ji and the throne. In the course of the 643 rebellion of Taizong’s son, You, in what is today Shandong Province, it was inaccurately rumored among the rebels that the throne was dispatching Li Ji to attack them with the Feiji guards. In point of fact Li Ji was ordered to muster provincial levies to attack You. See ZzTj 196.6187–88. 45 CfYg 843.10,011. 234 chapter eight

It is probable that as a result of his military service in the Middle Yangzi region from 624 through 625, as well as due to his close relationship with his then commanding officer, Li Jing, that Li Ji had open chan- nels of communication with young courtiers from this region who were being promoted by Taizong in the late 630’s and early 640’s. Liu Ji and Cen Wenben 岑文本 were two such courtiers who backed the throne and became identified as supporters of Tai.46 In fact, Cen Wenben’s career was directly assisted by the recommendations of Li Jing.47 All of these men were factional opponents of Zhangsun Wuji and the senior courtiers associated with him. Certainly, the Taizong Li Weigong Wendui text exhibits a marked hostility toward Zhangsun Wuji.48 Thus, from the very beginning Li Ji was, by virtue of his political and social connections, already identified as an opponent of the Zhangsun oriented faction. There also seems to have been a movement of experienced military men who had associated with Li Ji in one fashion or another in the rough and tumble conditions of the civil war period, who came together at court for varying periods of time coincident with the arrival of Li Ji. Zhang Shigui 張士貴, prior to the 620’s was an independent warlord in the strategic zone between Loyang and the Hangu Pass who was unsuccessfully courted by Li Mi, Li Ji’s former commander who was killed prior to Li Ji’s defection to the Tang in 620. Zhang Shigui had been cooperating with the Tang before Li Ji’s defection and subsequently both men fought under Li Shimin in the big North China Plain campaigns against Loyang and against Liu Heida. In mid-624 Zhang Shigui was assigned to fight under Li Ji in the pacification of Xu Yuanlang 徐圓郎 in modern Shandong, just south of the Yellow River. Zhang worked in concert with Li Ji in the 641 Xueyantuo campaign as a garrison commander (zhen- shou 鎮守) in Qingzhou, the northern portion of which borders on the Ordos region, and then as governor-general (dudu) of Xiazhou in the Ordos. Zhang then followed Li Ji to court where he held a Xuanwu Gate unit commander’s position.49 Cheng Zhijie 程知節, like Li Ji was a loyal officer to the doomed warlord, Li Mi, during the civil war years. He was called to court as a palace guard commander in 643.50 Finally, Zhang

46 ZzTj 197.6195. 47 JTs 70.2536; CfYg 324.3829 xia. 48 See endnote 31 in this chapter. 49 Quan Tangwen Buyi, vol. I, 40–42; JTs 83.2786; JTs 1.15. Also see Niu Zhigong (2002), 15–26. 50 JTs 68.2504–05. Quan Tangwen Buyi, vol. I, 22–3. the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 235

Liang 張亮, an old associate and direct subordinate of Li Ji from the civil war years, was recalled to court and appointed Minister of the Board of Punishment (xingbu shangshu 刑部尚書) in 643.51 This may have been an effort on the part of the throne to provide Li Ji with the presence of former associates whom he could trust and with whom he could readily communicate. On the other hand, as individuals who were almost equals with Li Ji in terms of experience and holding high court positions and titles, they were certainly not his subservient clients. The reluctance of the throne to permit Li Ji to establish a subservient client base is illustrated by the fact that is is doubtful if Li Ji brought with him to Chang’an an entourage drawn from his junior associates at Bingzhou. The only case known to this author is that of Zhang Wenguan 張文瓘, who was Li Ji’s staff aide (canjun 參軍) at Bingzhou and on whose behalf Li Ji actively lobbied the throne to have him transferred to Chang’an.52 Given the effort that Li Ji had to put into this one case, it is doubtful if he was permitted to bring a significant personal entourage with him from Bingzhou. Ultimately, the determining factor in Li Ji’s success at the capital would be his relationship with Taizong, which became extraordinarily close.53 When Li Ji arrived at the court he already had pre-existing ties with prominent courtiers, he was not as isolated from others as Hou Junji had been. Li Ji’s personal connections going back to the civil war years provided him with a wealth of court contacts whom he would have to actively manipulate in order to hold his own at court and perform the political and military duties demanded of him by Taizong. In the fourth lunar month of 643 Taizong’s efforts at creating a perpetual motion machine of factional competition around the position of heir apparent collapsed. This was a severe political embarrassment for the throne, but it did not end the factionalization of the court—it simply changed some of the participants and parameters. Li Zhi, the future Gaozong, was the agreed upon candidate for the vacated position of heir apparent. To say that Li Zhi was a compromise candidate meant that the councillors appointed to advise the fifteen year old adolescent heir apparent were drawn from all the leading factions, including Li Ji representing the interests of the throne.54 In 645 Taizong would attempt to

51 JTs 69.2514–15. 52 CfYg 413.4907 xia; JTs 85.2814; XTs 113.4186. 53 ZzTj 197.6197–98. 54 ZzTj 197.6197. 236 chapter eight use the Liao River campaign to regain lost political ground, and Li Ji was the commanding general for that campaign. In the unsatisfying aftermath of that campaign Taizong did not return to Loyang and thence to Chang’an, which would be the reverse of the route which he took to begin the campaign, but rather retreated to Bingzhou to recuperate and plan anew. One of the undesired results of the unsuccessful Liao River campaign was that Zhangsun Wuji emerged from the shadows of his honorific court titles and took up the position of Chancellor (shizhong, see the personnel table in this chapter) in 645, after almost sixteen years without a functional court position. Taizong had much for which to plan.

Conclusion

This chapter opened with a discussion illustrating the pervasiveness of factional politics in the conduct of court affairs. The intensity of factionalization could vary significantly at different periods of time—as Wei Zheng obliquely noted in his positive evaluation of the early Zhenguan period and his negative evaluation of the latter half of the period. One of the main instigators of court factional competition was the throne, which used the resultant competitive environment to enhance its own prestige and authority. Ideally, Chinese courtiers were not supposed to engage in such activity on their own behalf as detracting from their loyal service to the throne. In practical terms, courtier sponsored cliques were sometimes a necessary vehicle for extending their family political influence, guiding imperial policy, or as in the case of the courtiers supporting Zhangsun Wuji, as a means of political self-defense from a suddenly aggressive and threatening throne. Indeed, Taizong seems to have expected such a reaction and spent much thought and care in con- ducting a controlled factional duel with his brother-in-law. Factional competition need not be expressed in purely political terms, it could also take the form of prestige competition in the presence of the throne. The case of Yuchi Jingde, Taizong’s former personal bodyguard and friend is illustrative of prestige competition. In 634 Jingde attended an imperial banquet and became incensed that a younger prince of the blood, Daozong 道宗 had placed his mat (chairs were not widely used at this time) ahead of himself at the banquet table. Jingde started an argument and then punched Daozong in the eye. This latter action crossed the pervasive factionalization of taizong’s court 237 the line of propriety and Taizong personally rebuked Jingde.55 Other forms of social competition, such as staging large hunting parties or all night soirees are legion in the dynastic annals. Chengqian was known for his noisy, lengthy parties. The competition for prestige, status, and conspicuous consumption were part of the social activities that went into constructing court factions. From the discussion in these chapters one can readily glimpse the political brilliance of Tang Gaozu in his ability to manipulate the competition between his sons from the early 620’s through the Xuanwu Men incident in 626 all the while maintaining a moderately functional court. The Xuanwu Men violence has here been interpreted as Gaozu giving Taizong haragei style authorization to strike a blow against his uterine brothers, and face the consequences of whatever outcome ensued. On the other hand, one can also understand how clumsy Taizong was in attempting to engineer a similar scenario at his court and then having to stoically witness the collapse of the entire enterprise in 643 when Chengqian broke the reins of factional etiquette and discipline. Gaozu truly maintained the distant ‘umpire’ image; Taizong after 643 was forced to become a direct factional player making himself a mere primus inter pares with his other senior courtiers. Note the melodramatic ‘knife incident’ in 643 when Taizong threatened to stab himself in order to firm up a consensus around the new heir apparent, Li Zhi.56 Also note the much more dangerous expedient of personally attending the frontlines in the 645 Liao River campaign as a means of recouping lost political capital. In 576, Houzhu of the Northern Qi regime tried this tactic and found himself bereft of an empire—directly wagering imperial prestige on military enterprises is a risky gamble. Judged from the ‘aesthetics’ of factional manipulation, Taizong was a second rate performer. Taizong, in pursuit of his factional goals also set institutional precedents for the politically charged court of Wu Zetian in the 690 through 705 period. The tactic of expanding the number of court personnel and opening up positions to younger, less privileged members of the court elite, and even commoner elites, was already practiced by Taizong as discussed by the late Wang Jian and also discussed in this chapter with regard to political developments concerning the Department of State

55 JTs 68.2499–2500. 56 ZzTj 197.6196. 238 chapter eight

Affairs and the Feiji palace guard units. The extensive use Taizong made of censorial personnel to implement his court purges and factional maneuvers was given more formal institutional expression in 648, one year prior to his death, when Taizong authorized impeaching censors to imprision and interrogate political suspects parallel with similar authority (regarding criminal offenses) which had traditionally been reserved for the Imperial High Court (dali si 大理寺).57 In the end, regardless of the manipulative expertise of any particular emperor “. . . the competition of elite groups for power without a developed institutional framework, and therefore with a strong personal coloring, is a phenomenon always found in monarchic monopoly regimes in pre-industrial dynastic states.”58

57 Tang Huiyao 60.1042; XTs 130.4497; JTs 185 xia.4821; Tangdai Muzhi Huibian 493.020, Li Qianyou 李乾祐 entry. 58 Norbert Elias, The Court Society (1983), 283. CHAPTER NINE

TAIZONG—AN EMPEROR ON THE RUN

From 645–646, in particular, Taizong engaged in an extraordinary number of mobile personal appearances at the frontlines of the Liao River campaign of 645, the early 646 month-long sojourn at Bingzhou (south of modern Taiyuan), and then finally his triumphant personal summit in the ninth lunar month of 646 at Lingzhou (south of modern Yingchuan, Ningxia) with the defeated, tribute bearing leaders of the the Turkish nomad tribes of Inner and Outer Mongolia. The goal of all this personal movement was to recoup the political capital lost in the 643 court political fiasco. The Liao River campaign and the Tang subjuga- tion of the Turkish tribes of Mongolia had their respective geo-strategic logics but could have been executed without Taizong’s personal presence. Taizong’s goal was to attempt to hitch the political fortunes of the throne, in terms of court politics, to these military and foreign affairs activities; which will be of particular concern to this discussion. The key point in the following discussion is the surge in Taizong’s personal presence at these distant places; a degree of mobility unusual for most established emperors, indeed, unusual compared to Taizong’s previous activity after ascending the throne in late 626.1 The 645 Liaodong campaign turned into a strategic failure, and Taizong’s month-long sojourn in Bingzhou was in fact a full scale political retreat, an effort to avoid the court political arenas of Loyang and Chang’an. By the time he died in 649, Taizong had, in fact, been able to chalk up some high profile military achievements—the destruction of the Xueyantuo confederacy of late 646 and the conquest of Kucha in 648. However, in the immediate post-643 environment Taizong’s efforts at enhancing the prestige of the throne came to rely heavily on the Tang military. In this latter regard, the role of the early Tang general, Li Ji, whom I discussed in detail in the preceding chapter, in executing Taizong’s politically motivated military

1 David A. Graff makes a similar evaluation, attributing Taizong’s activity to “. . . the lingering influence of North Asian ideas of rulership among mixed-blood elites in North China.” There is truth to this statement in terms of providing an enabling militaristic ethos. See Graff,Medieval Chinese Warfare: 300–900 (London: Routledge, 2002), 256. 240 chapter nine campaigns and associated personal appearances became central to the throne. Li Ji was Taizong’s man at the court—he backed his lord without question.What distinguished Li Ji from other outstanding generals whom Taizong had attempted to use in a similar fashion in the past (Li Jing and Hou Junji) was that Li Ji was politically astute and had the ability to make wide-ranging connections that gave him political protection. His real task was to use his military luster to lend political support and prestige backing to Taizong’s political endeavors. In 643, when Li Zhi was appointed the new heir apparent, Li Ji was appointed as one of his close advisors. As Taizong’s man, Li Ji was generally opposed to the Zhangsun Wuji factional grouping, and this factional struggle would play itself out into Gaozong’s reign with the 655 appointment of Wu Zetian as Gaozong’s new Empress (over the objections of Zhangsun Wuji); and reach its denouement in 659 when Gaozong would sentence Zhangsun Wuji to death. Li Ji was the crucial behind the scenes supporter of all these efforts. In 645 Li Ji was one of the few courtiers who both supported the idea of a Liaodong campaign and Taizong’s desire to personally attend to the frontlines.2 The campaign was a disappointment for Taizong. Li Ji was the overall commander, and he conducted a conservative, highly organized series of sieges against a line of fortified cities on the east bank of the Liao River. The siege campaign was only partially successful, and Li Ji was unwilling to expose his supply lines by attempting to execute a sudden breakthrough offensive against Pyongyang. The result was that the Korguryo regime did not buckle under the pressure of the Tang campaign in the Liaodong region, and in the latter half of the ninth lunar month, with the onset of the winter season, Taizong called for a general withdrawal. In fact, by the fourth lunar month of 646, it appears

2 See the Cambridge History of China, vol. 3, 233. Lü Simian notes Li Ji’s isolated support for Taizong’s Liaodong campaign and labels Li Ji a sycophant. See Lü Simian (1984 ed.), 104. The ZzTj 196.6169–70, provides the earliest evidence that Taizong was planning a Liaodong campaign. This was at the height of the factional competition which Taizong was fomenting between his two sons. This in turn makes one wonder if Taizong was planning to use military operations as another means to sharpen the competition by assigning his sons different field commands at different times—much as Gaozu did to Jiancheng and Li Shimin in the early 620’s. At any rate, this issue becomes moot in the aftermath of the 643 fiasco. Taizong first announced that he would personally attend to the frontlines in the second lunar month of 644 (ZzTj 197.6207), approximately one half year after the 643 collapse of the Chengqian-Tai competition. taizong—an emperor on the run 241 that the fortified cities initially conquered by the Tang were abandoned and reverted to Korguryo control.3 Taizong, by virtue of his own ineptitude and lack of forethought, had suffered through the court political debacle of 643, and now had to cope with the strategic failure of his 645 Liaodong campaign. Taizong had over exposed the throne, and he was hemorroeging prestige and political capital. As David A. Graff noted with regard to a similar gamble by Sui Yangdi: Chinese emperors rarely led their armies in person. When the monarch organized a military undertaking on such a massive scale and took the field himself at the head of his army, he could not afford to fail; his defeat would be a signal to all the ambitious men of the empire that he was vulnerable, . . . and was destined to fall.4 It is in this context that Taizong’s journey to Bingzhou takes on extraordinary political significance. Following the conclusion of the Liaodong campaign Taizong and his entire entourage had returned to Dingzhou on the North China Plain, which is where the heir apparent, Li Zhi, had established the court while his father was at the front lines. Instead of proceeding from Dingzhou southwestward to Loyang, which was the route taken in going to the Liao River in 645,5 Taizong veered west to Bingzhou, through the Taihang Mountains, in what appears to have been an unannounced change in the itinerary. Taizong would spend a little over a month in Bingzhou before returning directly to Chang’an. This extended presence in Bingzhou and its possible significance needs to be discussed in more depth.

3 ZzTj 198.6236. 4 Graff, 155. Yuchi Jingde, in a brief, bluntly worded memorial opposing Taizong’s personal presence on the frontlines wrote “It is not worth personally mustering a large army for such a small kingdom. If you were to conquer, it would not rate much military glory. If you were to fail, you would become the object of ridicule.” Quan Tangwen [QTw] 153.1566. Yuchi Jingde’s memorial was immortalized in the Zhenguan Zhengyao, juan 9. Zhenguan Zhengyao Yizhu (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1987), 475. In the aftermath of the campaign in early 646, following the return to Chang’an from Bingzhou, Taizong was acutely aware of his uncomfortable and embarrassing position as noted by his rueful query to Li Jing as to how such a small kingdom could frustrate the Tang emperor’s armies. See ZzTj 198.6234–35. This account is repeated in expanded form, in the process describing a very close relationship between an aging Li Jing and Taizong in the Tang Yulin. See Tang Yulin Jiaozheng 唐語林校證. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1987), 5.428–29. 5 ZzTj 197.6217. 242 chapter nine

The Li Ji—Bingzhou Nexus

Engaging in counterfactual speculation, one would imagine that if Korguryo had been conquered in 645, that Taizong would have paraded himself, his army, and his elite captives throughout the North China Plain, Loyang, and Chang’an. As far as the Liao River and North China Plain affairs were concerned, Bingzhou was off the beaten track, and far from the politically taut imperial arenas of Loyang and Chang’an. Bingzhou was a functioning regional strategic military center, and more importantly, Bingzhou was Li Ji’s home base. It seems that after two con- secutive massive political failures (643 and 645) Taizong was reduced to relying on regionally affiliated military officers to maintain the viability of the throne. The standard historical sources reveal almost nothing regarding the motives for journeying to Bingzhou or what happened there, but the Li Ji/Bingzhou nexus is relatively clear, as is the complete bankruptcy of Taizong’s political strategy at that point in time. Bingzhou, as Li Ji’s base area, presumably stocked with officers and administrative personnel long acquainted with him, would be hostile to, or at best indif- ferent to the factional goals of Zhangsun Wuji and his supporters, who were part of the arriving entourage.6 The heir apparent Zhi (the future Gaozong), also appears to have accompanied his father from Dingzhou to Bingzhou, apparently the first time that he ever set foot in his former nominal command. The iron triangle of Li Ji and the Bingzhou command, Taizong, and the heir apparent, Li Zhi, may have been consolidated in the Bingzhou crucible at this time when the fortunes of the throne were very low. Li Ji never wavered in his support of his lord, Taizong, or in his support of his subsequent lord, Gaozong. For a month the entire faction ridden entourage was embalmed and partially stifled in Bingzhou.7

6 It is impossible to state who was in charge of Bingzhou between 642 through 652. TheTang Cishi Kao 唐刺史考 lists two relatively unknown and apparently lower ranking personnel with uncertain dates. See Yu Xianhao 鬱賢皓 (Hong Kong: Zhonghua Shuju & Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1987), 1120–21. 7 After the Liaodong campaign was terminated, Taizong fell seriously ill with boils and was probably suffering from exhaustion, too (ZzTj 198.6232). He partially recuper- ated in Bingzhou. taizong—an emperor on the run 243

Bingzhou and Tang Dynastic Legitimation

After Li Yuan, the Tang founder established his dynasty in Chang’an in 618, Bingzhou retained its importance in a subsidiary role as a legitimating center for the dynasty. It was the geographical origin of Li Yuan’s ‘Great Enterprise’ undertaken in 617, and Bingzhou men provided the original manpower for Li Yuan’s armies. In 723 Xuanzong referred to Bingzhou as the location from which the dynasty made its ‘dragon leap’.8 In a 641 message to a delegation of Bingzhou elders who had an audience with Taizong in Loyang, Taizong himself recognized the legitimating importance of the locale and the role of its inhabitants in the early fortunes of the dynasty.9 In the Quan Tang Wen document footnoted above, Taizong analogizes his lounging for Bingzhou to that of the Han Dynasty founder Liu Bang’s lounging for his birthplace of Pei. As will be discussed below, the analogy may be a bit forced, but one could not deny the legitimating significance of Bingzhou. Li Yuan never returned to Bingzhou, and after Taizong ascended the throne in late 626 he never returned until the 646 sojourn. Sometime prior to 645 Taizong had proposed establishing a detached temple to his father at Bingzhou but this project was dropped due to ritual objections.10 Actually, the Li royal family had very tenuous ties to Bingzhou. During the early Northern Zhou period, Taizong’s great-grandfather, Li Hu 李虎, was posthumously ennobled with the honorific title of Duke of Tang. Tang was an ancient Western Zhou dukedom held by Shuyu 叔虞, the younger brother of King Cheng, located near the site of Tang dynasty time Bingzhou. No member of the Li family actually set foot in Bingzhou until Li Yuan was stationed there in 617 by Sui Yangdi as Taiyuan Governor-General (Li Yuan had been sent to Shanxi in 615 at a lower ranking position to help maintain law and order).11 At the most, Gaozu and Taizong spent three years in Shanxi before starting their rebellion and setting out for Chang’an in 617. In 641, while Taizong was

8 Yu Hai 16.314 xia. 9 ZzTj 196.6168; QTw 10.117; JTS 3.52–53. 10 See Yan Shigu’s memorial opposing this project in QTw 147.1493–94. 11 JTs 1.–2. The Cambridge History, quoting the Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu, emphasizes the fortuitous linkage between Li Yuan’s inherited honorific title, his assignment to Taiyuan, and the legendary ruler Yao (Tang Yao) who allegedly resided in this area in the distant past (Cambridge History, 156). Li Yuan’s honorific title was related to the Western Zhou enfeoffment, not to the legendary ruler Yao. SeeZzTj 185.5771 for a clear discussion of the issue. 244 chapter nine in Loyang preparing for a fengshan ceremony planned for 642, a delegation of Bingzhou elders had an audience with him and requested that after the fengshan ceremony was completed that he visit Bingzhou. Taizong agreed to this request (this was the context for the 641 missive to the Bingzhou elders cited above).12 However, the fengshan ceremony for 642 was cancelled due to astrological reasons, as was the Bingzhou visit. The issue was never raised again, so Taizong’s arrival in 646 appears improvised, there was no prior announcement regarding this itinerary. Taizong’s appearance in Bingzhou under these circumstances is startling and demands closer attention for its possible political significance. The court, while at Bingzhou, was relatively active in attending to imperial issues. The first large-scale defensive operations against a threatened Xueyantuo offensive were undertaken with courtiers temporarily detached from Bingzhou and sent to border commands.13 Twenty-two courtiers were sent out from Bingzhou to investigate local conditions and the administration of justice within the empire.14 The dynastic histories duly record these events, but the fact that the court was at Bingzhou almost fades into the background, and no effort was made to explain why the court stayed there for an entire month. The only major source that gives any hint as to Taizong’s political state of mind is the Jin Ci Bei 晉祠碑 (the Jin Chapel stele inscription), composed and written by Taizong during his sojourn at Bingzhou, describing the beauty and significance of the Jin Chapel. The Chapel complex is located in the hills on the west bank of the Jin River, just to the southwest of Bingzhou.15 The Chapel was dedicated to Shuyu, the original Duke of Tang, younger brother of Western Zhou King Cheng.16 By Tang times the site was also a location for offering prayers for rain and probably served other local deities as well.17 The site developed into

12 ZzTj 196.6168; JTs 3.53–53. 13 ZzTj 198.6232. 14 ZzTj 198.6234. 15 For the discussion of the stele inscription I use a direct redaction of the inscription from the stele, with punctuation and explanatory glosses provided by Liu Shuxia 劉舒俠, Tang Taizong Jinci zhi Ming bing Xu 唐太宗晉祠之銘並序 (Taiyuan: Shanxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1995). The text is also entered into the QTw 10.125–26. The texts are very similar with some variations in characters. The stele inscription has recently been translated into English by Tracy Miller in her monograph, The Divine Nature of Power: Chinese Ritual Architecture at the Sacred Site of Jinci (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 16 Yuanhe Junxian Zhi [YhJxZ] (1995), 13.366. 17 JTs 1.2. taizong—an emperor on the run 245 an elaborate temple complex, with important additions being made by the Northern Qi royal family, which had established their military and administrative headquarters at the nearby Bingzhou site (then called Jinyang). After the Tang period, the temple complex was also expanded during the Northern Song period and a female figure (subsequently identified as Shuyu’s mother) was added to the site.18 One can say that the Jin Chapel complex (which still stands today) preserved the political/historical soul, or spirit, of Bingzhou. For Li Yuan, the Jin Chapel had a particular appeal because of his inherited, honorific title of Duke of Tang. The Chapel complex provided a direct legitimating link with the Western Zhou, and both Gaozu and Taizong would avail themselves of this extraordinary vehicle of legitimation.19 Prior to setting out from Bingzhou, Li Yuan may have pledged his army at or near the temple complex, though this is not clear.20 As for the completed stele inscription, it was originally placed within the city walls of Bingzhou,21 today it is enclosed in a gazeebo on the Jin Chapel grounds.

The Jin Chapel Inscription—Taizong Reaffirms his Own Political Legitimacy

The inscription is divided into three thematic sections: an opening section praising the Western Zhou system of kinship enfeoffment of the able and virtuous, whose effects, the stele inscription claims, were still lingering in present times. This is probably a less than oblique reference

18 Liu Shuxia, 10. 19 Interestingly, the Li royal family never attempted to genealogically link itself with Shuyu. No such claim is advanced in Cen Zhongmian’s edited version of the Yuanhe Xingzuan 元和姓纂 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1994), 1.1–2. 20 The stele inscription simply states that Li Yuan first pledged his army and then set out upon his holy mission of establishing the realm. The CfYg 7.76 shang, states that Li Yuan raised a white banner in the open country outside Taiyuan city where he pledged his 30,000 troops. XTs 1.4 and ZzTj 184.5741 provide similar but more abbreviated statements. The JTs and the Da Tang Chuangye Qijuzhu offer no specifics regarding the location of the pledge. Liu Shuxia notes that when Li Yuan, with the assistance of Li Shimin, started their rebellion they offered prayers at the Jin Chapel (Liu, 10). Liu provides no source for this claim, though he may be referring to the statement preceding the one referring to the pledging of the troops in the stele inscription, that Li Yuan “. . . with the utmost sincerity of heart, prayed for success and good fortune.” However, the stele inscription does not specify where Li Yuan prayed. 21 YhJxZ 13.367. 246 chapter nine to Taizong’s own efforts at kin, and even non-kin, enfeoffment which lasted from 627 to 639.22 At the time the policy was in effect, it was explicitly justified in terms of the Western Zhou precedent. This seems to be a legitimating linkage that Taizong could not forego mentioning. The second section of the inscription describes and praises the numi- nous beauty of the Jin temple complex, with its gardens, streams, and bridges set in a highland environment. Taizong uses Daoist oriented terminology, with references to realms of the immortals; as well as praise for the naturalistic, self-regulating functions of the garden and stream ecology, with overtones of Laozi style natural philosophy. In this latter regard, the inscription contains direct statements regarding how the garden and stream ecology manifest the naturalistic principles of knowing one’s natural limits and not exceeding the given circumstances, though remaining flexible in one’s ability to adjust to changes in these given circumstances. The text explicitly refers to the garden and stream ecology as manifesting the sage wisdom of knowing when to recoil upon oneself and when to expand outwards. Given Taizong’s circumstances at the time, this could be a relatively direct reference to the dramatic fluc- tuations in his own political/military fortunes. Taizong seems to imply here that he is not politically defeated, but simply engaged in a tactical retreat. Insofar as Taizong is identifying the dynasty and the throne (namely himself) with the Jin Chapel complex, the effort to understand Taizong’s historical and Daoistic nature references regarding the chapel complex as oblique comments on his contemporary political situation is reasonable. The third section of the inscription is a stirring rendition of the establishment of the dynasty by Tang Gaozu, who is portrayed as inheriting and seeking to restore the Western Zhou legacy. Gaozu, in harmony with the spirits of the earth and mountains, and by virtue of his own extraordinary exertion of will and legitimate force, restores order to a confused realm, and spreads righteousness and harmony throughout the realm in the aftermath of this imperial restoration. In his panegyric to the establishment of the dynasty, Taizong made a particular point of emphasizing that the goal of the Tang was not brute accumulation of wealth and power (implying that such was the goal of the confused Sui regime), but that the Tang viewed wealth and power as simply a means by which to rule wisely and virtuously, in harmony with the spirits of

22 ZzTj 195.6146. taizong—an emperor on the run 247 nature. It is irresistible, at this time when Taizong’s political fortunes were in a deep trough in the aftermath of the Liaodong campaign, to view these altruistic assertions as an effort by Taizong to distance himself from the experience of Sui Yangdi, who lost his throne in the aftermath of his Korguryo defeats. Taizong is not one who lusts for personal power like Sui Yangdi, but rather seeks to accumulate power for the greater good of the dynasty and the empire. The stele inscription concludes with a four character per line poem that sums up the prose content discussed above. Following established practice, the back of the stele inscription contains the signatures of seven ‘sponsors’ of the stele project, that is, Taizong’s leading courtiers present at Bingzhou, including the signatures of Li Ji and Zhangsun Wuji.23 The entire text of the inscription is suffused with the theme of dynastic legitimation, and this textual theme is reinforced by the political context in which it was produced. The type of legitimating themes emphasized, however, are fundamental, almost nativistic Chinese themes. Dynastic legitimacy is anchored in the specifics of Chinese history (the Western Zhou references) and the autochthonous deities of the Chinese earth, mountains, and Daoist empyrean. Just as Taizong’s Liaodong set-back clipped his political wings and forced him into political (and medi- cal) retreat to Bingzhou, where he found temporary sanctuary; so also, Taizong’s concepts of legitimation are subdued and specific. His discussion harkens to past glories and implies that when circumstances alter, he will renew that glory. The stele inscription makes no references to Taizong’s valid and important martial achievements of the recent past. His consistent political failures since 643 seem to have overwhelmed and negated the positive significance of the earlier military successes. The legitimating themes of theJin Ci Bei stand in stark contrast to legitimating themes enunciated in the 640 declaration of war against Gaochang, the declaration issued against Korguryo in 645, and imperial edicts issued prior to the Lingzhou summit of late 646. In these statements dynastic legitimacy is discussed in aggressive, universal terms. The Gaochang declaration notes that though Taizong is the ruler of the Chinese realm, it is still his duty to spread righteousness and the true way throughout the world. He also notes that in receiving the mandate to rule, his duty is to crush arbitrary violence without regard for boundaries of inner or outer.24

23 Liu Shuxia, 34–35. 24 QTw 6.75–76. 248 chapter nine

In the Korguryo declaration of war the emphasis is on the responsibility of the tributary lord to succour his client (the Korguryo throne) from usurpation and vile actions by the usurper against the people of that kingdom. It is interesting (and embarrassing) to note Taizong’s martial bombasity, “In the north we destroyed the Xiongnu descendents (the Eastern Turk confederacy) like breaking a dried branch. In the west we destroyed the Tuyuhun and Gaochang as easily as plucking greens from the ground,” and so Korguryo’s usurping warlord would also be destroyed.25 The Liaodong failure dramatically altered Taizong’s rhetoric of legitimation.

Taizong Resurgent

Taizong’s dilemma of how to regain political momentum was unwit- tingly solved for him by the actions of the Xueyantuo Turk confederacy—a weaker successor to the Eastern Turk confederacy destroyed by Taizong in 630. Unlike their predecessors, the Xueyantuo were based north of the Gobi and were attempting to extend their influence into the Tang dominated grasslands of Inner Mongolia. In late 641–early 642 Li Ji led a campaign that routed the first such Xueyantuo effort. In 645, while Taizong was at the Liaodong front, the Xueyantuo mounted a large expedition south of the Gobi, but were deterred by Tang defences. In early 646, while Taizong was at Bingzhou, the Xueyantuo again mounted a large expedition south of the Gobi and this time they were routed and forced to retreat north.26 After this defeat the confederacy dissolved into civil war. Unlike their experience with the earlier Eastern Turk confederacy, the Tang never had difficulty thwarting and defeating the Xueyantuo. It is possible that given the distance they had to travel to arrive at their target areas south of the Gobi, and the lack of secure supply lines made it difficult for the Xueyantuo to successfully engage the Tang. In the sixth lunar month of 646, after watching the growing dis- array of the Xueyantuo confederacy, Taizong unleashed an offensive that struck north of the Gobi, destroyed what was left of the confederacy, and induced the surrender of associate tribal groupings. In the latter stages of this campaign, Li Ji was ordered to go to southwest Mongolia to sta-

25 QTw 7.86. 26 ZzTj 196.6170–72; 198.6232–33, 6234. taizong—an emperor on the run 249 bilize the situation with associated tribes and complete the surrender of remaining Xueyantuo groups, which he successfully accomplished.27 Taizong, for his part, took maximum political advantage of the situation and dramatically injected himself into the surrender process. Taizong announced that he would personally meet with all surrendered tribal chieftains at Lingzhou in the ninth lunar month of 646.28 Lingzhou, a major Tang garrison, was an important transit point from the Ordos region southward to modern Guyuan in Ningxia, and then via the Jing River to Chang’an. In his first edict announcing the summit Taizong stated that it was necessary for him to personally attend the summit in order to ensure an enduring peace on the northern borders. By having tribal leaders personally swear fealty to him, Taizong would comfort them.29 This goal is repeated in a second edict issued in the eigth lunar month after Taizong had departed Chang’an en route to Lingzhou.30 Both edicts also explicitly acknowlege that Taizong viewed the victories over both the Eastern Turks and the Xueyantuo as an eve- ning up of the score and an erasing of past humiliations received from the Turks. In the second edict, in particular, Taizong’s sense of political self-confidence re-appears, where he notes that never before had history witnessed such an achievement—the surrender of all of North Asia to a Chinese dynasty. Taizong’s personal presence at Lingzhou was unnecessary, this was simply a maneuver designed to use a military/foreign policy success to inflate the status of the throne at the Tang court; it was the elixir of gran- deur that was so terribly lacking in the aftermath of the Liaodong campaign. Prior to arriving at Lingzhou, tribal emissaries were quite content to meet the Chinese emperor in the Wei River valley at Jingyang.31 At the Lingzhou summit Taizong promised the assembled tribal leaders (more than one thousand are alleged to have attended) that he would maintain stability in North Asia and assign turf zones to all the assembled dignitaries. In return, Taizong was acclaimed ‘Heavenly Kaghan’, a title retained by the Tang emperors until the reign of Xuanzong.32 At Lingzhou, Taizong inscribed a stele with poetry describing his view of

27 ZzTj 198.6236–37. 28 ZzTj 198.6237–38. 29 QTw 8.95. 30 QTw 8.96; Cen Zhongmian, Tujue Jishi 突厥集史 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1958), 245–46. 31 Cen Zhongmian, 244. 32 Cen, 247. 250 chapter nine events, but only two lines survive. The surviving lines refer to Tang success at erasing previous humiliations and at succouring the subjects of his realm from a great evil [Turk depredations].33 Shortly afterwards, in the first lunar month of 647, tribal emissaries paid another large scale tributary visit to Taizong at the court in Chang’an, where they were feted.34 At the 647 audiences, the chieftains were confirmed in their various zones of influence and given formal client titles as participants in the Tang tributary system.35 Taizong’s summit at Lingzhou was political theater of the highest sort. Pomp, pageantry, and the quest for political status successfully coming together at one place and one event. The Lingzhou summit, and the political theater which both preceded and followed the summit brought to a successful conclusion a series of sometimes desperate efforts to re-establish the prestige of the throne after the 643 political debacle. The Cambridge History notes that, “T’ai- tsung’s last years were a sad ending to a great reign . . .” and refers to the “. . . Liaotung campaign of 645 which cast the shadow of defeat and failure over his last years . . .”36 From political, as well as geo-strategic perspectives this judgement is overdrawn. The success of the Lingzhou summit and the early 648 conquest of Kucha, as well as the development of a long term strategy to weaken Korguryo, provided strong compen- satory effects to the Liaodong failure. Taizong was able to recoup significant political cachet before his death in 649, but the factional havoc which he created at the court would plague the early years of the reign of his successor, Gaozong. Throughout all this political turmoil, Li Ji and the Bingzhou military base would provide what can be called the militarized political support for the throne in its struggle with entrenched, factionalized, senior courtiers. This discussion has endeavored to provide an interpretive framework that would give meaning and cohesion to the political activities of the Tang emperor. The fact that Taizong’s court was factionalized during the latter half of his reign is well known to students of Tang history, but the argument presented regarding Taizong’s role in this process of factionalization is a fresh viewpoint. From this perspective, a number of formerly disparate actions take on a pattern of meaning that would otherwise have been obscured. Taizong’s sojourn in Bingzhou is a case

33 Cen, 247. Quan Tang Shi. 全唐詩 (Taibei: Hongye Shuju, 1976), 1:20. 34 Cen, 248. 35 Cen, 249–250. 36 Cambridge History of China, vol. 3, 239. taizong—an emperor on the run 251 in point, as this was previously a rarely discussed, almost irrelevant datum.37 From the interpretive perspective of this chapter, the Bingzhou journey assumes great significance, particularly when it is related to the role of Li Ji at the court. An issue worth considering in a speculative mode due to the dearth of data, is whether Taizong went to Bingzhou to forestall a coup effort against him by the Zhangsun faction. That is, an effort by Zhangsun Wuji to force Taizong to step down (or possibly kill him), and place the heir apparent, Zhi, on the throne immediately (regardless of how Li Zhi felt about the issue). Taizong’s complete reli- ance on Li Ji and the Bingzhou military apparatus hints at the possibility of just such a situation.

37 A recently published narrative biography of Li Ji does not discuss the Bingzhou visit. See Ning Zhixin 寧志新, Li Ji Pingzhuan 李勣評傳 (Xi’an: Sanqin Chubanshe, 2000).

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

The institution of retired emperorship, which links together the discussion in this book, was a portal which led us to a discussion of the politics of imperial succession and from thence to a consideration of broader patterns of political action in the pre-modern patrimonial courts of early medieval China. The Northern Wei invented this institution in 471 to cope with succession problems peculiar to a former North Asian nomad confederacy with a prior tendency toward horizontal modes of succession amongst the ruling elite rapidly transitioning into a full scale imperial-court patrimonial structure of rule with a definitive orientation toward a vertical (preferably primogenital) mode of imperial succession. The two subsequent Northern dynasties after the Northern Wei (the Northern Qi and the Northern Zhou) experienced somewhat similar succession problems (particularly the Northern Qi) and used retired emperorship as part of their attempted solutions. The Northern Dynasties’ monarchs who directly benefited from imperial retirement seemed to have viewed their success in implementing the institution as a signal that the power of the throne could surge forward unhindered at the court. This was a severe miscalculation. The Northern Wei monarch, Xianzu, was assassinated five years after retiring; the Northern Qi monarch, Houzhu, was reduced to political ineffectualness after overplaying his hand in the factional struggles which he precipitated at the court; the Northern Zhou monarch, Xuandi, was assassinated one year after retiring. With historical hindsight, we can state that when the early Tang emperors utilized retired emperorship (pioneered by Tang Gaozu in 626) they took an institution strictly associated with North China based regional non-Chinese North Asian conquest dynasties and made it part of the political repertoire of a unified, massive continental empire. Tang Taizong was able to consolidate the empire and unlike his Northern Dynasties’ predecessors, both Gaozu and Taizong moved very carefully and deliberately, initially employing a policy of court factional reconciliation. Taizong, perhaps feeling more confident in 636, perhaps fearful of permitting senior courtiers to develop overly entrenched interests, reversed this previous approach and employed a much more aggressive 254 chapter ten and abrasive court factionalization policy for the remainder of his reign until his death in 649. Prior to the An Lushan Rebellion of 755–763 the Tang regime would succeed in expanding the empire to unprecedented size, extending its influence far into Central Asia, despite a series of violent succession struggles at the court. Court institutions had developed to such an extent that they were able to muffle and restrict the disruptive impacts of these violent struggles to the central court precincts. The pre-755 Tang court elite is interesting because their political experiments did not stop with the utilization of retired emperorship, they also provided the only example in Chinese history of a female emperor, Wu Zetian, who dominated the Tang court as Empress Dowager following the natural death of her husband, Tang Gaozong, in 684 until 690, when she decided to ascend the throne in her own right as Emperor of the Zhou dynasty, reigning from 690 until 705. At that latter date she was forced to abdicate to her eldest son fathered by her deceased husband, Gaozong, and the Tang dynasty was officially ‘restored’. It would seem that this extraordinary development was the result of a consensus among the court elite that Wu Zetian, with her broad political experience at the court, was crucial in the effort to stabilize an ongoing foreign policy crisis. Beginning in the 670’s for the first and only time in world history, a Tibetan empire, based in Lhasa emerged that made a concerted effort to attack Tang imperial and client state holdings in modern Xinjiang, the Gansu Corridor, and the Sichuan borderlands, as well. This was coupled with a resurgence of Turk nomad military activity against the Tang in Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, and Zungaria. Wu Zetian was able to steer the empire through this crisis. Her presence on the throne after 690 clarified the chain of command and also avoided overly debilitating factionally driven personnel and administrative changes at the court which her eldest son, later known as Zhongzong, seemed interested in pursu- ing when he briefly ascended the throne in 684, following the death of his father. Wu Zetian had him immediately removed from the throne, placed under house arrest, but he was not killed and survived to ascend the throne again in 705. The very fact that he and his younger brother, Ruizong, who would succeed him in 710, survived, indicates that Wu Zetian saw herself as a stop-gap figure whose presence on the throne after 690 was tolerated but never fully legitimate or accepted. Insofar as there may have been a precedent that encouraged Wu Zetian and cooperating court policy makers to go forward with her imperial ascension in 690, then the experience of the Silla kingdom on the Korean Peninsula is very suggestive. From 632 through 654 Silla had conclusion 255 two female kings in a row. The Silla kingdom was the closest Tang ally on the peninsula at that time, and the Sillan court elite was intensely interested in Tang imperial culture and they appear to have been the most numerous foreign contingent at the Tang court. By comparison, the Japanese were too distant and too primitive, and the Eastern Turks did not have a political tradition of female rulers. The experiences of smaller kingdoms from the far west were probably too alien to serve as a precedent to be seriously considered by the Tang court. Additionally, the reigns of the Sillan female kings coincided with Wu Zetian’s adolescence and young adulthood at the Tang court. She officially became Empress to Tang Gaozong in 655, consequently Wu Zetian would have been personally familiar with the Sillan precedent. Nonetheless, the Wu Zetian experiment was a dead-end that was never replicated. It certainly never received sympathetic understanding from traditional Chinese historical sources. It does illustrate, however, the extraordinary political flexibility of the Chinese court ruling elite at that time. Political flexibility as expressed in the use of the institution of retired emperorship, however, was not unique to China, but was utilized by a variety of pre-modern dynasties. Below are some examples of this situation. In Japan, prior to the emergence of an imperial center in the 600’s A.D., various forms of horizontal succession were practiced by a variety of tribal and tribal confederacy leaders. Beginning in the 400’s and 500’s A.D. political leaders, particularly on the Yamato Plain (the Kansai region), began to construct more centralized kingdoms based on Sino- Korean models. As part of this effort, the implementation of primogenital imperial succession became a long term goal of the emerging imperial line which claimed descent from the Sun Goddess. The result of what became a Japanese effort at a forced pace program of imperial centralization of power resulted in the competitive existence of two ideals of imperial succession (much like the Northern Wei situation, of which the Japanese political elite may have been aware) where collateral agnatic lines continued to vie for the imperial succession. The Japanese situation was complicated by the extraordinary power influence of affinal houses to the throne. This latter case was partially due to classical Japanese customs (shared with the classical Koreans and possibly other Tungusic oriented cultures) of a tendency to uxorilocal marriage and of raising children in the wife’s household. The pre-dynastic Tuoba confederacies also faced a similar problem, in part because the Tuoba elites married exogamously with affines from neighboring powerful tribes, and perhaps in part, for the same reason as the Japanese, since 256 chapter ten the Tuoba were originally from Manchuria, a Tungusic cultural zone. This is radically different from Chinese and Turkic-Mongol customs of the nomadic people’s of North Asia. At this time the Yamato imperial line was inter-marrying with the daughters of surrounding chieftains as a means of securing political alliances, thus the wife’s family was politically potent. To cope with this immensely complicated situation, over time the Japanese throne utilized correspondingly immensely complicated forms of retired emperorship to simultaneously ward off competing collateral agnates and also to satisfy the expectations of politically potent affinal houses, in this latter case, by guaranteeing that one of the offspring of the politically sensitive female child bearer would be designated either a heir apparent, a junior- junior emperor, or a junior emperor. The Japanese constructed multiple level retired emperorships whenever necessary. At other times the Japanese royal family became so concerned with devising means of avoiding affinal interference in the imperial succession that they engaged in endogamous marriage (but this simply accentuated the role and interests of collateral agnatic imperial lines in the succession). For example, Emperor Bidatsu married his sister Suiko (both reigned from 572–628). Empress Kogyoku married her half—brother, Jomei (r. 629–661), and Empress Jito married her uncle, Temmu.1 Jito later assumed the position of retired emperor, which she pioneered in Japan. Also, Japan was accustomed to the practice of female Emperors, again due to succession problems regarding the proper male to put in that position (a practice alien to the Chinese, with the sole exception of Wu Zetian, in the middle of the early Tang period when she ascended the throne as the emperor of the Zhou dynasty from 690–705, when she was forced to abdicate to one of her sons, the offspring of a Tang [Li family] emperor). In the Japanese case, a female emperor (Jito) pioneered imperial retirement and also brought an end to endogamous marriage within the imperial family, thus bringing into play again outside affinal houses. By the Heian period (790’s–1180’s) the practice of primogenital imperial succession was more widely accepted, but competition among collateral agnates was sufficient to warrant continued use of complicated forms of retired emperorship. Also, with the onset of the Heian period the use of female emperors fell in abeyance, and was rarely utilized thereafter.

1 Joan R. Piggott, The Emergence of Japanese Kingship (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 68, 163–164. conclusion 257

G. Cameron Hurst has argued that “Abdication [retired emperorship in Japan] was another means of ensuring a successful transfer of the throne without conflict between different claimants.”2 Regarding the extraordinary prominence of both female emperors and retired female emperors (especially between the years 645–770) Hurst argues that these women were placed on the throne “. . . to avoid succession troubles and ensure transmission of the succession to the proper person.”3

The French Case

Outside of East Asia retired emperorship was also used to stabilize the imperial succession. The Capetian dynasty of medieval France (c. 987–1326) used this institution consistently for approximately six generations of kings. In the tenth century, when the dynasty was first established, France was so feudalized that the hereditary authority of kings, while theoretically acknowledged, was given little opportunity to flourish. In 987 at an assembly of great feudal nobles and Church leaders, Hugh Capet was elected King of France. If Hugh did not produce a male heir (the French, like the Chinese, did not favor female kings), or if he made political missteps, the same feudal lords who elected Hugh as king could revoke his powers and cancel the line of kings.4 In its early years the Capetian dynasty was quite weak and imperial succession was an extraordinarily sensitive issue, initially subject to the possibility of outside interference. The early Capetian kings had the good fortune to have individually long reigns (averaging 29 years) and every king had male offspring so that “. . . there were few chances for the nobles to discuss the question of the succession [so] that the elective principle . . . was rapidly forgotten.”5 However, biological good fortune and adroit political maneuvering were institutionally reinforced by the practice of all the Capetian kings from 987–1180 to function as active retired emperors and place their eldest son (often a minor) on the throne as soon as possible. Philip II Augustus (d. 1223) stopped this practice, probably

2 G. Cameron Hurst, III, Insei: Abdicated Sovereigns in the Politics of Late Heian Japan, 1086–1185 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 49–50. 3 Ibid., 49. 4 Joseph R. Strayer & Dana C. Munro, The Middle Ages: 395–1500 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1942), 166–167. 5 Ibid., 168. 258 chapter ten reflecting the degree to which the dynasty had consolidated its power over the lords of France.6 The use of retired emperorship was not unique to the Capetian monarchs, the Normans engaged in similar practices.7 Generally, these European monarchs used imperial retirement (which Andrew W. Lewis awkwardly terms “anticipatory association of the heir”) as a means of promoting familial order and stabilizing the future relations between the eldest son and his politically potent younger brothers.8 Hugh Capet’s precarious political position in the late 900’s gave a peculiar urgency to the institution of retired emperorship. In the French case, the pre- emptive legal transference of politically and militarily important landed property to the eldest son was also facilitated by imperial retirement. “This balance [stabilizing sibling prestige and establishing appropriate property endowments to all the sons] could be effected most smoothly if the father himself prepared his successor, of which anticipatory association of the heir was a guarantee . . . The sum of this ordering was provi- sion for, yet subordination of, junior members of the family . . . arranged beneath and around its senior member and his office.”9 The concerns expressed in the above quote were common throughout Europe. John W. Baldwin noted that the Carolingian dynasty (which preceded the Capetian dynasty in France) as well as the Byzantine emperors utilized retired emperorship.10 The institution of retired emperorship existed throughout the world in very different cultures and time periods. I will tentatively propose that actively functioning retired emperorship was used by incipient dynastic regimes attempting to establish a male primogenital mode of imperial succession. Both the Northern Wei and classical Japanese regimes had to cope with broadly diffused ‘patriline collegiality’ and power legitimacy. In the Japanese case, affinal political pressures severely complicated the situation, an issue that the early Northern Wei dynasty resolved by the practice of killing the birth mother of the heir. In the case of the Capetian kings, they initially had to fend off the electoral privileges

6 John W. Baldwin, The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundations of French Royal Power in the Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 369. 7 Andrew W. Lewis, Royal Succession in Capetian France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 37–38. 8 Ibid., 41. 9 Ibid. 10 Baldwin, 369. conclusion 259 of the assembly of nobles, and additionally there was the concern to maintain discipline and a prestige hierarchy among the king’s younger sons. Retired emperorship was invented or borrowed by widely varying cultures operating under very different contingent historical circumstances. In China the institution developed out of the needs of a North Asian nomad leadership to restructure their polity in the direction of a more stable, enduring political imperial order. The institution in China was used sparingly by both the Northern Wei and all other subsequent dynasties. In Japan, due to their own peculiar historical circumstances, a multi-layered form of retired emperorship became a standard feature of the classical imperial institutional structure. The early Tokugawa shoguns of the 1600’s also utilized this institution. If I may be so bold as to suggest, the role the Meiji oligarchs played in very early twentieth century Japanese policy-making, particularly Yamagata Aritomo and Ito Hirobumi, closely resembles retired emperorship. In the Capetian case, the institution was used consistently for more than one hundred years until it was abruptly stopped by Philip II. Pre-modern patrimonial dynasties, regardless of culture or specific time period were characterized by institutions which, while quite elaborate with regard to ranking systems and multi-functionality, lacked rigorous functional specialization and legal jurisdictional autonomy. Imperial institutions tended to be the result of the systematization and objectification of traditional procedures, common-sense ways of doing things, combined with ad hoc innovations, often based on the contingent, expedient political needs of the court. Indeed, the blurring of the personal and official needs and functions of the imperial family was the very basis for the creation of the entire elaborate court institutional structure.11 Nevertheless, there were a few institutions which had some- thing approximating a protected legal existence in the major empires of the pre-modern world, and the household was pre-eminent in this regard. At the court of the emperor, this meant that the imperial household was not only the sole ruling institution of the court and the realm, it was also the sole legally valid ‘political party’ and administrative body

11 Norbert Elias, The Court Society (1983), 1. Elias’ discussion is basically an abbreviated version of Max Weber’s concept of patrimonial rule. 260 chapter ten

(abstractly conceived) of the realm (the court being simply the extended household of the ruling family). As such, the members of the imperial family, including the emperor, viewed each other not simply as blood kin, but as political competitors and/or allies. Thus, entire categories of imperial kin and affines were purposely manipulated. The throne could very well pit uncles against tangshu, brothers against cousins, or even sons against each other, not to mention all agnates against all affines and variations thereof. As part of this consciously manipulated, politi- cized household/court environment, the issue of stabilizing, controlling, and manipulating the imperial succession was absolutely crucial to all imperial dynastic structures. The retired emperorship was one institution designed to guard against interference in the imperial succession by other patrilineal kin or other powerful political actors. Thus, given the broadly similar institutional structures of pre-modern patrimonial regimes, it is not surprising that a peculiar institution like the retired emperorship should appear in very different cultures but performing similar institutional functions. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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INDEX

Ashikaga shoguns, 225 n. 25 Chengqian Palace (also known as “Astrology” section (Tianxiang section) Chengqing Palace), 177 n. 25 of the Wei shu, 74, 76, 88 n. 70 Chi, Luoxie 叱羅協, 146 Chinese empire, 5 Baiji 百騎, 224 patrimonial origins and characteristics, Bai Jian白建,121 2–4, 6 n. 11, 18–19 Baldwin, John W., 258 conglomerate of satrapies, 5, 17 Barfield, Thomas, 170 appropriation of office, 5 Bi 比, prince of the Southern Xiongnu, patrimonial bureaucracy and 53–54 factionalism, 6–10, 202 n. 16 Bingzhou, 158, 214, 228–229, 229 n. 35, stereotypification of revenue and depot 230–232, 235–236, 239, 241, 241 n. 4, system, 10 242, 242 nn. 6–7, 243–245, 247–248, legal orientation, 12–16 250–251, 251 n. 37 examination system, 17–18, 18 n. 43, Board of Cavalry and the Central Army 220 (nei jibing), Northern Qi, 113 politics of imperial succession, 1, Board of Infantry and Garrisons (wai 20–21, 23–27 bubing), Northern Qi, 113, 121 Chong 崇 (brother of the Northern Wei Bureau of Guests and Dignitaries (zhu Emperor Taiwudi), 42 n. 32, 44, 46 ke si), 9 Chongxian Guan (later re-named Byzantine emperors, 258 Chongwen Guan), 205 Chu, Suiliang 禇遂良, 217, 220 Cambridge History of China, 176 n. 23, classificatory nomenclature (in kinship 177 n. 23, 196 n. 1, 240 n. 2, 250 terminology), 35, 39, 47, 143 n. 36 Court, 1, 3–4, 5 n. 4, 7–8, 8 n. 14, 9–10, cangbu (Bureau of Granaries), 10 14–15, 17, 18 n. 43, 20–21, 24, 26–27, Capet, Hugh, 257–258 31, 32 n. 15, 42 n. 33, 45, 46–52, 55, Capetian dynasty, 257–258 57, 59–60, 62–63, 63 n. 2, 64, 64 n. 2, Carolingian dynasty, 258 65, 66 n. 10, 67, 68 n. 17, 69–77, 77 Cen, Wenben 岑文本, 234 n. 36, 78–79, 81–82, 82 n. 47, 83, 83 Chancellory (menxia) 63 n. 2, 148 n. 52, n. 54, 84–85, 85 n. 60, 86, 86 n. 63, 87, 181, 184 87 n. 64, 88–91, 94, 94 n. 3, 95, 97–98, Chang 常, Empress Dowager during the 98 n. 11, 99, 101–103, 106–107, 107 Northern Wei, 62, 62 n. 1, 65, 79 n. 49, 109–110, 112–116, 116 n. 67, Chang’an, 31, 40 n. 26, 42 n. 31, 69, 70, 117–118, 118 n. 76, 119–120, 120 83, 85, 131–133, 135–136, 138–139, n. 85, 121–125, 127–135, 137, 137 141–142, 150, 167, 172–174, 174 n. 16, n. 20, 138, 140–146, 146 n. 49, 176, 184–186, 191, 201, 225–226, 147–148, 148 n. 53, 149, 149 n. 54, 229–232, 235–236, 241, 241 n. 4, 150, 151 n. 57, 153–157, 160–162, 242–243, 249–250 164, 168, 170, 172, 175, 179 n. 30, Changle 長樂 (Northern Wei Xianzu’s 180 n. 32, 181–182, 184–193, 193 brother), 37, 43 n. 34, 82, 84 n. 67, 195–198, 198 n. 5, 199–201, Chen dynasty, 103–104, 123, 151, 153 201 n. 16, 202, 202 n. 16, 203–205, Chen, Shuda 陳叔達, 181, 183–184 205 n. 30, 206–208, 209 n. 36, 210, Chen, Qun 陳群, 97 n. 7 213–214, 218–219, 219 n. 6, 220–227, Chen, Yinke 陳寅恪, 7, 229 232, 232 n. 41, 233–241, 244, 249–251, Cheng, Zhijie 程知節, 234 253–255, 259–260 272 index

general characteristics of, 3–4 Duan, Xiaoyan 段孝言, 123 inner court versus outer court Duara, Prasenjit, 11 n. 27, 13 n. 32 (generalized dichotomy) 8 six boards, nine courts, and three Eastern Jin, 9–10, 48–49, 55–57, 59 inspectorates (Sui-Tang structure), Elias, Norbert, 7–8, 8 n. 14 9 Elman, Benjamin A., 17–18, 18 n. 43 Northern Wei peculiarities of inner court Empress (huang hou), 30, 50, 161 versus outer court, 63 n. 2, 68 n. 17, 82 Northern Wei attitude to, 50–52, n. 47, 87 n. 64 61–62 Northern Wei court—conciliar mandatory suicide of the heir decision-making, 80–81, 89–91 apparent’s birth mother in the early Northern Qi court as a dual Northern Wei, 29, 50 polity, or bakufu, 96–98, 118 n. 76 Erzhu Rong 尒朱榮, 129, 137 Northern Zhou court—origins as a Erzhu Tianguang 尒朱天光, 129, 142 collegial junta, 129–147 early Northern Zhou court—dual Fangzhou (Tang period), 176 polity pattern, 97–98, 133, 150 Feiji 飛騎, 214, 222–225, 233, 233 n. 44, Northern Zhou court—tight imperial 238 factions, 148 n. 52, 149, 155 Fen River, 101, 106, 115, 125, 133, 136, Tang court—staff versus line structural 152–153, 157, 229–230 dichotomy, 9 Feng, Changming 馮長命, 218 Court of State Ceremonial (honglu si), 9 Feng, Deyi (also known as Feng Lun) Cui, Teng 崔騰, 134 封德彝, 174 n. 16, 181, 183, 190, 215 Cui, You 崔猷, 153 Feng, Lun (see Feng Deyi). Feng, Qian 馮遷, 146 Daowudi, Northern Wei Emperor, 29–30, Fletcher, Joseph, 27 n. 9, 170 37, 39, 39 n. 26, 40, 40 nn. 26–27, 41, Former Qin, 39–40, 40 n. 26, 42 n. 31 42 n. 31, 43–44, 45 n. 43, 51, 54, 68, Forte, Antonino, 2 72, 80 Fortes, Meyer, 21 Da, Xishi 達奚寔, 135 Fu, Chengzu 苻承祖, 86 Da, Xiwu 達奚武, 145 Fu, Lecheng 傅樂成, 177 n. 25 Deng, Changyong 鄧長顒, 116, 122 Fu, Yi 傅弈, 178 n. 29 Department of State Affairs shangshu( fubing, 133–135, 139, 149, 202 n. 16, sheng) 4, 62, 63 n. 2, 181, 214 222–225, 233 dianzhong shangshu (Northern Wei Tang period inner versus outer fubing palace guard command), 63 n. 2, units, 223–224 67–68, 68 n. 17, 69 n. 17, 78 Dien, Albert E., 123, 136 n. 20 Gao, Anahong 高阿那肱, 115–116, 125 Dingxiang dudufu (Tang vice-regal (Gao), Cheng 高澄 (Northern Qi, son command headquarters), 231 of Gao Huan), 96–100, 102, 108–109, Dingzhou (Tang period) 86, 109, 241–242 111, 114, 122, 190 Dong Pass, 229 Gao, Huan 高歡, 95 n. 3, 96, 97 n. 7, Dou 竇, Tang Gaozu’s Empress, 168 98–100, 108, 111–114, 118 n. 76, 121, Dou, Jiande 竇建德, 174–175 129–131, 133, 190 Dou, Luning 豆盧寧, 135, 136 n. 17 (Gao), Ji 高濟, (Northern Qi, son of Gao Du, Bi 杜弼, 96–97 Huan), 000 Du, Chuke 杜楚客, 205 Gao, Jifu 高季輔, 217, 233 Du, Ruhui 杜如晦, 183, 185, 215 Gao, Qian 高乾, 97 n. 7 Du, Yan 杜淹, 174 n. 16, 183, 185, 215 Gao, Rui 高叡, 114 Dugu, Xin 獨孤信, 135, 137–139, 139 n. (Gao), Run 高潤 (Northern Qi royal 30, 141–142, 144–145 family), 114 Duke of Tang, 243–245 (Gao), Shaoyi 高紹義 (Northern Qi, son duzhi (Budget Bureau), 10 of Wenxuandi), 101 Duan, Shao 段韶, 104, 115, 117, 120, 123 Gao, Shilian 高士廉, 183, 221, 215–217 index 273

(Gao), Yan 高儼 (Northern Qi, younger Helan tribe, 39 brother of Houzhu), 高紹義, 000 Helan, Xiang 賀蘭祥, 149, 149 n. 55 Gao, Yang 高洋 (see Wenxuandi). Holmgren, Jennifer, 27, 50, 68, 99, (Gao), Yanzong 高延宗 (Northern Qi 112–113, 124–125 royal family), 114 Hongnong salient, 118 n. 76, 133, 136, Gao, Yun 高允, 73 140, 153 Gao, Zhan 高湛 (see Wuchengdi). Hongyi Palace (see Tai’an Palace). Gaochang, 195, 209–210, 220–222, 227, Hou, Jing 侯景, 96, 97 n. 7 227 n. 31, 232, 247–248 Hou, Junji 侯君集, 215–217, 220–221, Gaozong, Northern Wei Emperor, 30, 37, 226–227, 227 n. 31, 232, 235, 240 41–42, 42 n. 32, 44–47, 59–62, 64, 67, Houmochen, Yue 侯莫陳悅, 129–132, 68 n. 17, 75, 76 n. 36, 77, 80, 90, 207, 134–136, 145 207 n. 33, 208, 209 n. 36, 213–214, 218 Houzhu (personal name, Wei 緯), n. 1, 226, 229, 232, 235, 240, 242, 250, Northern Qi Emperor, 108 254 Hu 胡, Empress and Empress Dowager Goody, Jack, 41, 46 during the Northern Qi, 108, 110, 111, Graff, David A., 239 n. 1, 241 114, 116 Gu 觚 (probable half-brother of the Huainanzi, 204 n. 20 Northern Wei Emperor Daowudi), Huan, Wen 桓溫, 57 39–41 Huang, Philip, C.C., 14 n. 34, 15 Gu, Jiguang 谷霽光, 136 n. 20, 137 n. 20, Huang, Yongnian 黃永年, 94, 94 nn. 2–3, 149 n. 54, 202 n. 16 98 n. 11, 116, 132 n. 8, 174 n. 15, 177 Guisso, R.W.L., 2 n. 1 n. 25, 202 n. 16 Guyuan (modern city), 134, 136, 249 Huazhou (Northern Zhou period), 133, 150, 156, 159 n. 78 Hamaguchi, Shigekuni, 106 n. 43, 118 Huidi, Emperor of the Western Jjin, 25 n. 76, 120 n. 85, 132 n. 8, 133 n. 9, 202 Hulü, Guang 斛律光, 101, 114–115, 117, n. 16 119–120, 122 Hamilton, Gary, 3 n. 3 Huoyi (late Sui city), 173 Han 翰 (uncle of the Northern Wei Hurst, G. Cameron, 23, 23 n. 1, 257 Emperor Daowudi), 30, 39 Han, Bao 韓褒, 135 imperial descent group, 35, 39, 46–48, Han, Changluan 韓長鸞, 115–116, 119, 57 124 imperial succession, 1, 7, 20–21, 23, 23 Han, Feizi, 7 n. 1, 27–29, 32, 46–47, 50, 52–54, 58, Han Gaozu, 25 61, 72, 75, 89–90, 95, 99, 109–110, Han, Zhongliang 韓仲良, 185–186 127–128, 158–159, 163, 165, 169, 170 Hangu Pass, 131, 229, 234 n. 5, 181, 193 n. 67, 198, 205, 253, haragei (Japanese term), 193, 206, 237 255–258, 260 He, Hongzhen 何洪珍, 116–117, 119, vertical succession, 27, 48, 55, 109–110 122–123 horizontal succession, 24, 26–27, 28 n. He, Qinu 和其奴, 70 10, 32, 35–36, 43, 47–48, 52–55, 60, He, Shikai 和士開, 94 n. 3, 95, 110, 72–75, 109–110, 169, 255 112–113, 113 n. 60, 114–117, 119, 121, fraternal succession, 35, 53, 55, 164, 123, 125 170 n. 5 Heavenly Kaghan, 249 Istami (also known as Shidianmi), 105 Heba, Sheng 賀拔勝, 130, 137–139 Heba, Yue 賀拔岳, 96, 129–131, 137, Jiang, Xingben 姜行本, 233, 233 n. 44 145 Jin Chapel, 244–245, 245 n. 20, 246 Hedong, 101, 115, 173 Jin Ci Bei 晉祠碑, 244, 247 Heian Period (Japan), 1, 23 n. 1, 256 jinbu (Bureau of Metals and Storehouses), heir apparent (taizi), 20–21, 30, 50 10 Northern Wei attitude to, 50–52, 180 Jing River, 249 n. 32 Jingyang, 249 274 index

Jinyang, 97, 100, 103–107, 109, 113, 117, Li, Mi 李密, 228, 234 118 n. 76, 120–121, 121 n. 87, 133, 139 Li, Mu 李穆, 136, 150 n. 30, 152, 154, 157–158, 245 Li, Ping 李憑, 28 n. 10, 40, 43, 50–51, 62, Jinzhou, 103, 106, 125–126, 200 65, 66 n. 10, 79, 180 n. 32 Jingzhou, 9, 49, 173 n. 10 Li, Shentong 李神通, 190 Li, Shimin 李世民 (see Tang Taizong) kadi justice, 14–15 Li, Shutong 李樹桐, 168 nn. 2–3, 174 Korguryo, 195, 209–210, 218, 224, n. 14, 176 n. 23, 177 n. 23, 177 n. 24, 240–242, 247–248, 250 179 n. 29, 180 n. 31, 193 n. 67 Kou, Luo 寇洛, 130 (Li), Tai 李泰 (son of Tang Taizong), 196, Kucha, 105, 239, 250 196 n. 1, 201–205, 205 n. 30, 206–207, Kudu 窟咄 (uncle of the Northern Wei 207 n. 33, 209 n. 36, 219 Emperor Daowudi), 37, 40 n. 26, 42 Li, Xian 李賢, 136, 183 n. 31 (Li), Xiaogong 李孝恭 (Tang royal family), 197, 200, 226 La Fontaine, Jean, 33 Li, Xin 李訢, 78, 81–84 Later Liang, 25–26, 140, 142, 151 Li, Yi 李弈, 76 Legalism, 198 n. 5 (Li), You 李祐 (son of Tang Taizong), Levine, Donald N., 12, 13 n. 32 199, 201, 218, 233 n. 44 levirate, 40, 40 n. 27 (Li), Youliang 李幼良(Tang royal family), Lewis, Andrew W., 258 197 Lewis, Mark E., 204 n. 20 Li, Yuan 李遠, 134 Lhasa, 254 Li, Yuan 李瑗, Prince of Lujiang, 173 Li 麗 (nephew of Northern Wei Taiwudi), Li, Yuan 李淵 (see Tang Gaozu). 42–43 (Li), Yuangui 李元軌 (Tang royal family) Li, Bi 李弼, 135, 136 n. 17, 144–145 200 (Li), Chengqian 李承乾, 194 n. 67, 196, (Li), Yuanheng 李元亨 (Tang royal 196 n. 1, 201, 203–204, 204 nn. 20, family), 200 22, 205, 205 n. 30, 206–207, 207 n. 33, Li, Yuanji 李元吉 (Tang royal family), 213–214, 219, 221, 237 169–170, 172 n. 8, 173, 175–176, 177 Li, Chong 李沖, 42 n. 32, 44, 46, 88, 90 n. 25, 179, 179 n. 30, 181, 208 (Li), Daozong 李道宗 (Tang royal Li, Zhi 李植, 148 n. 53, 150 family), 236 Li, Zhi 李治 (see Tang Gaozong). Li, Feng 李鳳, 82, 84 Liao River, 195, 209–210, 218, 220, 226, Li, Fu 李敷, 76–79, 81 232–233, 236–237, 239–242 Li, Gui 李瓌, 199–200 Liaodong, 239–240, 240 n. 2, 241, 242 Li, Hu 黎虎, 8 n. 7, 247–250 Li, Hu 李虎 (Tang royal family), 243 Lie 烈 (probable half-brother of the Li, Hui 李惠, 82, 84 Northern Wei Emperor Daowudi), 36 Li, Ji 李勣, 214, 217, 225–226, 228–231, n. 20, 37, 39–41, 44, 45 n. 43 231 n. 41, 232, 232 n. 41, 233, 233 Linghu, Zheng, 令狐整, 136 n. 44, 234–236, 239–240, 240 n. 2, 242, lingjun 領軍, 120 n. 85 247–248, 250–251, 251 n. 37 Lingwu (see Lingzhou). Li, Jiancheng 李建成, 169–171, 173, 173 Lingzhou (modern Lingwu), 230, 239, n. 10, 174, 174 nn. 15–16, 175, 175 247, 249–250 n. 18, 176–177, 177 n. 25, 178–179, liturgical duties, 11 179 n. 29, 181, 185–186, 201, 204, 240 Liu, An, Prince of Huainan, 204 n. 20 n. 2 Liu, Heita 劉黒闥, 175 Li, Jing 李靖, 183, 215, 226, 226 n. 29, Liu, Ji 劉洎, 216–217, 219–220, 234 227–228, 230, 232, 232 n. 41, 234, 240, Liu, Linfu 劉林甫, 184, 215 241 n. 4 Liu, Pengchun 劉蓬春, 179 n. 30 Li, Ke 李恪 (Tang royal family), 209, 209 Liu, Shuxia 劉舒俠, 245 n. 18, 247 n. 23 n. 36 Liu Song regime, 48, 59 index 275

Liu, Ti 劉逖, 123 n. 20, 138–139, 139 n. 30, 147, 151, Liu, Wuzhou 劉武周, 173–174 151 n. 57, 152–153, 156–157, 159, 161 Liu, Zongyuan 柳宗元, 198 n. 88, 163, 170 n. 5, 190, 237, 245, 253 Lou 婁, Empress Dowager during the Northern Wei, 1, 20, 23, 23 n. 1, 24–28, Northern Qi, 99, 108–110, 118, 118 28 n. 10, 29–31, 32 n. 14, 33, 35–37, n. 76 39–41, 44–63, 63 n. 2, 64, 65, 66 Loyang, 25, 38 n. 21, 58, 90, 97–98, 100, n. 10, 67 n. 10, 68 n. 17, 69, 71, 77 n. 103–104, 115, 125, 130–131, 133, 135, 36, 78–80, 85, 86 n. 63, 93–94, 94 n. 3, 137–138, 140, 152–153, 157–158, 163, 97–98, 106 n. 43, 107 n. 49, 109–110, 168, 173–175, 185–186, 229–230, 234, 113, 116 n. 67, 118, 120 n. 85, 129–132, 236, 239, 241–244 134–135, 137, 140, 142, 146, 163, 167, Lu, Bo 陸馛, 73 180, 180 n. 32, 181 n. 32, 190, 253, 255, Lu, Ding’guo 陸定國, 77 n. 36 258–259 Lu, Jun 陸雋, 86 Northern Zhou, 1, 23, 25, 93–96, 97 n. 7, Lu, Li 陸麗, 67, 73, 77 n. 36, 84, 86 98 n. 11, 100–101, 103–107, 109, 112, Lu, Lingxuan 陸令萱, 116, 116 n. 67, 122 115, 120, 125–129, 133, 136 n. 20, 137, Lü, Guang 呂光, 25–26 137 n. 20, 139, 139 n. 30, 141–144, Lü, Simian 呂思勉, 40 n. 26, 103 n. 28, 146–148, 148 nn. 52–53, 149, 151, 199 n. 5, 206 n. 30, 240 n. 2 151 n. 57, 152–154, 159, 161 n. 88, Luo, Xin 羅新, 95 n. 3 163–165, 206, 208, 243, 253 Luo, Yi 羅兿, 173, 173 n. 10 Nunome, Chōfū, 167 n. 1, 171, 171 n. 8, 177 n. 23, 185 n. 42, 204 n. 21 Mann, Susan, 11 n. 27 Matsui, Shūichi, 205 n. 30, 219 Ordos region, 130, 234, 249 Matsushita, Kennichi, 67 n. 10, 68 n. 17 Ōta, Minoru, 42 n. 31 Meiji oligarchs, 193, 259 Mingdi, Northern Zhou Emperor, 55–57, Pan, Yihong, 2 n. 2, 17, 17 n. 41 143, 150, 154, 164–165 patrimonialism, 2–3 Mingyuandi, Northern Wei Emperor, 30, definition, 2–3 37, 41–45, 45 n. 43, 80, 180 n. 32 and markets, 86–87 Moduolou, Jingxian 莫多婁敬顯, 120 affinity with substantive rationality, Mu, Duohou 穆多侯, 67–68 12–16 Mu, Liang 穆亮, 87–88 Pei, Ji 裴寂, 167, 181, 183, 185–188 Mu Tai Affair 穆泰, 38 n. 21, 58, 90 Philip II Augustus, 257 Mu, Tipo 穆提婆, 116–117, 121–122 Pingcheng, 38 n. 21, 66, 66–67 n. 10, 68 Muhan Kaghan, 105–106 n. 17, 69, 71–72, 80–82, 90 Murong, Baiyao 慕容白要, 65, 67, Capital District (dianfu) 78–79 administrative structure, 66–67 n. Murong Xianbei, 29, 40, 65, 67, 78–79 10 Puzhou, 174 Nanxun Stele, 63 n. 2, 64 n. 6, 68 n. 17 Pyongyang, 214, 240 Nara Period (Japan), 1, 23 n. 1 Niu, Zhigong 牛致功, 168 n. 2, 171 n. 6, Qinshi Huangdi, 24, 159 177 n. 24, 179 n. 29, 187 n. 46, 188 n. Qing Qianlong Emperor, 25 52, 191 n. 63, 231 n. 41, 232 n. 41, 234 Qingzhou, 172, 176, 234 n. 49 Qiu 裘 (cousin of Northern Wei Emperor Normans, 258 Mingyuandi), 45 n. 43 Northern Board (beibu shangshu of the Qu, Tutong 屈突通, 185–186 Northern Wei), 65, 67 n. 10, 68 n. 17 Quan, Wanji 權萬紀, 199, 216, 218, 218 Northern Qi, 1, 23 25, 93–95, 97 n. 7, 98 n. 3, 219 n. 11, 99–105, 106 n. 43, 107–108–111, 114, 116 n. 67, 118, 118 n. 76, 122–123, Reed, Brad, 6 n. 11 125, 127, 129, 133, 136, 136 n. 20, 137 Ren, Can 任璨, 177–178 n. 26 276 index

Ren, Xiang 任瓖, 177–178 n. 26, 183 Sun, Ying’gang 孫英剛, 171 n. 8, 193 retired emperorship, 1, 20, 23–27, 28 n. 67 n. 10, 53, 60, 73, 93, 167–168, 192, suzerain authority, 16–19 253–260 Rouruan, 71, 75, 100, 104–105, 151 Tai’an Palace (formerly named Hongyi Rowe, William, 11 n. 28 Palace), 177 n. 25, 187, 192 taifu court (Court of Metals and Sato, Masaru, 64 n. 2, 67 n. 10 Storehouses), 10 Secretariat (zhongshu sheng), 63 n. 2, 71, Taiji complex, 187 132, 182, 184 Taiwudi, Northern Wei Emperor, 30, 37, Northern Wei treatment of, 70–71, 63 42, 42 n. 32, 43, 45, 45 n. 43, 63 n. 2, n. 2, 71 n. 24 64, 69, 86 n. 63, 180 n. 32 Shanhu (ethinic group during the taizi jianguo 太子監國 (also, jianguo), Northern Qi), 100–101 180, 180 n. 32 Shao 紹 (son of Northern Wei Emperor Taizong Li Weigong Wendui text, 226 Daowudi), 30, 36 n. 20, 37, 39, 56 n. 29, 227 n. 31, 228, 234 Shayuan, battle of, 118, 133 Tamura, Jitsuzō, 28 n. 10, 52 n. 53, 85 Shen, Buhai, 7 n. 60 Shengzhou, 230 Tang dynasty, 10, 19, 25, 167, 227, 233, Shi 寔 (son of Dai king Zhaochengdi), 243, 254 39 Tang, Changru 唐長孺, 93, 93 n. 1, 136 Shi, Ning 史寧, 137, 139 n. 20, 233, 233 n. 43 Shijun 寔君 (son of Dai king Tang Gaozong (Li Zhi), 148 n. 53, 150, Zhaochengdi), 40, 42 n. 31 207, 209, 213, 226, 229, 229 n. 35, 235, Shiyijian 什翼犍 (see Zhaochengdi). 237, 240–242, 251, 254–255 Shizong, Northern Wei Emperor, 30, 37, Tang Gaozu (Li Yuan), 17, 25, 134–136, 38 n. 21, 43 141, 145, 148 n. 53, 150, 167, 169, 171 Shusun, Lin叔孫隣, 65, 67, 68 n. 17 n. 6, 173, 179 n. 29, 191 n. 64, 192, 223, Shuyu 叔虞 (of Western Zhou antiquity), 232, 237, 243, 243 n. 11, 245, 245 n. 20, 243–244, 245 n. 19 246, 253 Silla, 172, 209, 254–255 Tang Ruizong, 25, 254 Sima, Lun 司馬倫, 25 Tang Suzong, 25, 30, 56 Sima, Ziru 司馬子如, 98 Tang Taizong (Li Shimin), 4, 19 , 25, 168, sinong court (Court of Agriculture), 170–171, 171 nn. 6, 8, 173, 174 nn. 13, 10 16, 175–176, 177 nn. 23, 25, 178 n. 29, siwei jian (Northern Wei palace guard 179 n. 30, 180 n. 32, 181–182, 184–187, command), 68, 68 n. 17 192, 195, 201, 202 n. 16, 203–205, 221 Smith, M.G., 60, 60 n. 69, 90 n. 9, 231 n. 41, 234, 240 n. 2, 245 n. Southern Board (nanbu shangshu of the 20, 253 Northern Wei), 63 n. 2, 66–67 n. 10 Tang Xuanzong, 93, 202 n. 16 Southern Qi, 48–49, 55–57, 59 Tang, Yong 唐邕, 121–123 Southern Xiongnu, 53–54 Tang Zhongzong, 254 Southwold, Martin, 55 tangshu (father’s paternal first cousins), sovereign authority, 16, 18–19 31–34, 36 n. 20, 37–39, 42, 42 n. 32, 43, Su, Dan 蘇亶, 204 43 n. 34, 44–45, 45 n. 43, 46–49, 49 Su, Gui 蘇瓌, 204 nn. 48–49, 52, 58–59, 62, 69, 90, Su, Xu 蘇勗, 203–204, 204 n. 21, 217 110–111, 163–164, 189–190, 208, 260 Sui dynasty, 93, 137, 148 n. 53, 165, 172, Tanigawa, Michio, 95, 95 n. 4, 118 n. 76, 195, 232 127 n. 1, 131 n. 5, 133 n. 9, 137 n. 20, Sui Wendi, 4, 4 n. 4, 154, 161–162, 171, 148 n. 53 171 n. 6 Tian, Yuqing 田余慶, 9, 9 n. 22, 29, 29 Sui Yangdi, 4, 25, 167–168, 171 n. 6, 173, nn. 11–12, 39 n. 24, 39 n. 24, 51, 51 209, 241, 243, 247 n. 51 Sun, Guodong 孫國棟, 201 n. 16, 207 Tianci 天賜 (uncle of the Northern Wei Sun, Heng 孫恆, 148 n. 53 Emperor Xianzu), 72–73, 82, 85 index 277

Trautman, T.R., 51–52, 52 n. 52 Western Zhou (of antiquity), 196–198, Tuoba, Daofu 拓跋道符, 31, 32 n. 14, 47, 198 n. 5, 243, 243 n. 11, 245–247 59, 69–71, 75, 80 Wittfogel, Karl, 55, 55 n. 59 Tuoba Shi (see Shi, son of the Dai king Wu, Shihuo 武士彠, 208 Zhaochengdi), 39 Wu, Zetian 武則天, 2, 76 n. 36, 77 Tuoba Xianbei, 62, 63 n. 2, 66 n. 10, n. 36, 193, 194 n. 67, 208, 214, 237, 78–80, 83 n. 54, 84, 87 n. 64, 89–90 240, 254–256 Turks, 17, 55, 100–101, 104–106, 140, Wu, Zong’guo 吳宗國, 5 n. 4, 220 151, 151 n. 57, 152, 167, 188, 191, Wuchengdi (Gao Zhan), Northern Qi 227–228, 230, 249, 255 Emperor, 93, 94 n. 3, 99, 102–104, Tuyuhun, 64, 94 n. 3, 140, 159, 226–227, 106–107, 107 n. 49, 108–114, 118, 121 248 Wuchuan clique, 132, 135, 137 Twitchett, Denis, 2, 176 n. 23 Wude Palace, 177 n. 25 Wudi, (Yuwen Yong 邕), Northern Zhou Wan, Anguo 萬安國, 81, 84 Emperor, 56, 125, 127–129, 133, Wang, Fuzhi 王夫之, 32 n. 14, 168 n. 2, 142–143, 143 n. 38, 150, 153–159, 186, 193, 193 n. 67, 199 n. 5, 202 n. 16 159 n. 78, 160–162, 164–165, 204 Wang, Gui 王軌 (Northern Zhou n. 20, 208 courtier), 159 Wutai Mountains, 105, 230–231 Wang, Gui 王珪 (Tang courtier), 175, 183 Wang, Jian王篯, 225, 225 n. 26, 228 n. Xianzu, Northern Wei Emperor, 30–31, 33, 237 32, 32 n. 14, 37, 41–42, 42 n. 33, 44, Wang, Mingsheng 王鳴盛, 32 n. 14 46–47, 53, 59–62, 64, 69, 71–77, 77 n. Wang, Rui 王叡, 85–87, 87 n. 65, 88 36, 78–85, 85 n. 60, 87, 87 n. 64, 90–91, Wang, Shichong王世充, 174 109, 253 Wang, Xi 王晞, 101 Xiao, Daocheng 蕭道成, 49 Wang, Yi 王誼, 158, 161 Xiao, Luan 蕭鸞, 49 Wang, Yu 王遇, 86 Xiao, Yu 蕭瑀, 181, 183, 188, 195 Wang, Zhongluo 王仲犖, 96 n. 5, 97 n. 8, Xiaomindi, Northern Zhou Emperor, 99 n. 13, 103, 103 n. 29, 132 n. 8, 133 142–143, 148 nn. 52–53, 149–150, 154, n. 10, 135 n. 15, 145 nn. 41, 44–45, 146 164–165 n. 46, 159 n. 79 Xiaowendi, Northern Wei Emperor, Weber, Max, 3, 3 n. 3, 5, 5 n. 5, 6, 6 n. 11, 30–31, 37, 38 n. 21, 42 n. 33, 43, 43 n. 10–11, 11 nn. 26–27, 12–13, 13 n. 32, 34, 53, 59–61, 63 n. 2, 66 n. 10, 67 n. 14, 14 n. 34, 15, 17–18, 18 n. 43, 259 10, 71–72, 76, 80, 84, 87–89, 89 n. 71, n. 11 90–91, 107 n. 49, 140 Wechsler, Howard, 2, 2 n. 1, 7, 7 n. 12, Xiaowudi, Northern Wei Emperor, 56, 97 176–177 n. 23, 179 n. 30, 191 n. 64 n. 7, 129–132, 137 Wei, Ting 韋挺, 181, 205, 215 Xiaozhao, Northern Qi Emperor, Wei, Xiaokuan 韋孝寬, 125, 153 100–101, 108, 111, 114 Wei, Yuan 尉元, 87, 87 n. 65, 88 Xie 勰 (uncle of the Northern Wei Wei, Zheng 魏徵, 175, 181, 183, 186, 203, Emperor Shizong), 38 n. 21, 43 n. 35 208–209, 211, 215–216, 233, 236 Xieli Kaghan, 188, 226, 230 Wen, Daya 溫大雅, 184–186 Xing, Qingzhi 幸慶之, 134 Wen, Yanbo 溫彥博, 184, 215–216 Xiu 休 (uncle of the Northern Wei Wenlin Academy, 122–123 Emperor Xianzu), 82 Wenming 文明, Empress and Empress Xu, Leshuai 徐樂帥, 170 n. 5, 210 n. 39 Dowager during the Northern Wei, 31, Xu, Yuanlang 徐圓郎, 234 32 n. 14, 42 n. 33, 43 n. 34, 50–51, 53, Xuandi (Yuwen Yong), Northern Zhou 60–62, 64–65, 70–71, 73–77, 77 n. 36, Emperor, 127–129, 148 n. 53, 155–156, 78–82, 84–85, 85 n. 60, 86, 86 n. 63, 87, 158–161, 161 n. 88, 162–165, 253 87 n. 64, 88, 88 n. 70, 89, 89 n. 71, 90 Xuanwu Men Incident, 25, 170, 171 n. 6, Wenxuandi (Gao Yang), Northern Qi 172, 178 n. 29, 181–182, 184–185, 191, Emperor, 99–100, 105–108, 118, 118 193 n. 67, 201, 205, 208, 220–221, 221 n. 76 n. 9, 237 278 index

Xue, Shan 薛善, 136, 136 n. 19 Yuchi, Jiong 尉遲迥, 149, 149 n. 55, Xue, Zongzheng 薛宗正, 105, 105 n. 36 162–163 Xueyantuo, 231–234, 239, 244, 248–249 Yuchi, Yun 尉遲運, 155 n. 68, 159 Xun 恂 (son of the Northern Wei Yun 雲(uncle of the Northern Wei Emperor Xiaowendi), 30, 37, 38 n. 21, Emperor Xianzu), 72–74, 82–85 88, 89 n. 71 Yunzhong dudufu, 231 Yuwen, Ce 宇文測, 134 Yamato imperial line, 256 (Yuwen) Chun 宇文純(brother of the Yamato Plain, 255 Northern Zhou Emperor Wudi), 157 Yan, Buke 閻步克, 107 n. 49 Yuwen, Guang 宇文廣, 155–156 Yan, Shigu 顏師古, 199 n. 6 Yuwen, Gui 宇文貴, 132 n. 8, 135 Yan, Zhitui 顏之推, 107, 123 Yuwen, Hu 宇文護, 103, 128–129, Yang, Chun 楊椿, 89 133–134, 136, 142–144, 146–147, 148 Yang, Gongren 楊恭仁, 183, 185, 208, n. 53, 149–150, 154, 159 n. 78, 160, 216 162, 164, 206–207 Yang, Jian 楊堅 (see Sui Wendi) Yuwen, Jian 宇文儉 Yang, Jun 楊鈞, 146 (Yuwen), Liang 宇文亮(member of the Yang, Kuan 楊寬, 134, 137, 146 Northern Zhou royal family), 25–26, Yang, Piao 楊摽, 136, 136 n. 19 101, 138, 140 Yang, Shidao 楊師道, 208, 216–217 Yuwen, Shenju宇文神舉, 155 n. 68, 158 Yang, Yin 楊愔, 102 (Yuwen), Sheng 宇文盛(brother of the (Yang) You 楊佑 (son of Sui Yangdi), 167 Northern Zhou Emperor Wudi), 137 Yang, Zhong 楊忠, 137–139, 139 n. 30, Yuwen, Tai宇文泰, 96, 118 n. 76, 145–146, 154 128–136, 138–139, 142, 144–147, Yang, Zuan 楊纂, 215–218, 222 149–153, 158–159, 162, 164–165, 209 Yangzhou, 9, 49, 167 (Yuwen), Xian 宇文憲(brother of the Ye, 96–100, 109, 113, 115, 117, 118 n. Northern Zhou Emperor Wudi), 76, 120, 121 n. 87, 122, 131–133, 158, 157–158, 161–162 162–163, 190 Yuwen, Xiaobo 宇文孝伯, 155 n. 68, 159 Yi 儀 (probable half-brother of the (Yuwen), You 宇文逌(brother of the Northern Wei Emperor Daowudi), 37, Northern Zhou Emperor Wudi), 158, 39–41, 45 n. 43, 64, 78, 154, 158 167 Yi, Hun 乙渾, 62, 63 n. 7, 64, 64 nn. 2, 6, (Yuwen), Zhao 宇文招(brother of the 65, 67–68, 68 n. 17, 69, 69 n. 17, 70–71, Northern Zhou Emperor Wudi), 157 73, 75, 77, 77 n. 36, 80–81, 83–84, 85 (Yuwen), Zhi 宇文直(brother of the n. 60, 86 Northern Zhou Emperor Wudi), 125 Yinde concubine 尹德妃, 200–201 (Yuwen), Zhi 宇文贄(brother of the Yu 愉(brother of the Northern Wei Northern Zhou Emperor Xuandi), 163 Emperor Shizong), 38 n. 21, 43 n. 35, 53 Zhang, Diaohu 張雕虎, 123 Yu, Jin 于謹, 134, 142, 144–147, 149, 154 Zhang, Guo’gang 張國剛, 8, 8 n. 15, 9 Yu, Yi 于翼, 154 n. 19, 223 Yu, Zhining 于志寧, 207, 217 Zhang, Liang 張亮, 235 Yuan, He 源賀, 26, 73–75, 83 Zhang, Shigui 張士貴, 234 Yuan, Jian 元儉, 134 Zhang, Taisu 張太素, 76 n. 36, 77 n. 36 Yuan, Muchen 元目辰, 83–85 Zhang, Wenguan 張文瓘, 235 Yuan, Pi元丕, 36 n. 20, 38, 58, 60, 70, 77 Zhang, Xuansu 張玄素, 207 n. 36, 83– 85, 85 n. 60, 86, 86 n. 63, Zhang, You 張祐, 86–87, 87 n. 64 87–90 Zhangsun Empress (consort of Tang Yuan, Shen 元深, 146–147 Taizong), 196, 201, 203, 213 Yuchi, Gang 尉遲綱, 149, 149 n. 56, 155 Zhangsun, Jian 長孫儉, 134–135 n. 68 Zhangsun, Lan 長孫覽, 155 n. 68, 161 Yuchi, Jingde 尉遲敬德, 179 n. 30, 236, Zhangsun, Wuji 長孫無忌, 183, 196, 196 241 n. 4 n. 1, 201, 201 n. 16, 202, 205, 205 index 279

n. 30, 207–209, 209 n. 36, 213, 215, Zhen 楨 (uncle of the Northern Wei 217, 220–221, 226, 227 n. 31, 232, 234, Emperor Xianzu), 82 n. 52 236, 240, 242, 247, 251 zheng shi tang (early Tang royal Zhangsun, Wuxian 長孫無憲, 216, 221, ‘cabinet’), 4, 4 n. 4 221 n. 10 Zheng, Yi 鄭譯, 161 Zhangsun, Xiang 長孫祥, 213, 221 Zheng, Xiaomu 鄭孝穆, 134, 137 Zhao, Gui 趙貴, 130–131, 133–135, 139, Zhou, Yiliang 周一良, 39, 39 n. 26, 40 144–146, 148–149, n. 26 Zhao, Hei 趙黑, 26, 73, 82–83, 86 n. 63 Zitui 子推 (uncle of the Northern Wei Zhao, Yanshen 趙彥深, 113, 117, Emperor Xianzu), 31, 72–75, 82, 84 122–123 Zong, Ai 宗愛, 57, 86 n. 63 Zhao, Yi 趙翼, 24, 24 n. 4, 28 n. 10, 86 Zu, Ting 祖挺, 109, 114–117, 119–120, n. 63, 161 n. 88, 190 n. 61 120 n. 85, 121–125 Zhaochengdi (Shiyijian), 39 n. 26, 42 n. 31