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SWP Research Paper 2006/RP 13, December 2006, 29 Pages SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Guido Steinberg The Iraqi Insurgency Actors, Strategies, and Structures RP 13 December 2006 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2006 SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Darren Hall (English version of SWP-Studie 27/06) The translation and publication of this research paper was made possible through the generous sup- port of E.ON AG, Düsseldorf, and the collaboration of the Forum Ebenhausen Table of Contents 5 Problems and Findings 7 Phases of the Insurgency in Iraq 8 The Insurgent Organizations 8 National Islamists 8 The Islamic Army in Iraq 10 The 1920 Revolution Brigades 10 Jihadists 10 Ansar al-Sunna (Ansar al-Islam) 11 al-Qaida in Iraq 14 Goals and Strategies 14 Goals and Visions of Political Order 15 Strategies and Their Implementation 17 Conflicts between National Islamists and Jihadists 19 Characteristics and Structures 19 Decentralization 20 Areas of Operation 22 Financial Sources 23 The Number of Fighters 24 Motives and Origins of the Insurgents 24 Who Are the Indigenous Fighters? 25 Who Are the Foreign Fighters? 28 Dividing the Insurgency? 29 Conclusion: From Insurgency to Civil War? Problems and Findings The Iraqi Insurgency: Actors, Strategies, and Structures Four years after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Sunni groups continue to fight an insurgency against the occupation forces, and the violence that erupted in summer 2003 has yet to let up. Some insurgents specifically target members of the Shiite majority in an effort to provoke a civil war in Iraq. al-Qaida in Iraq, which was headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death in June 2006, is especially guilty of this. Since summer 2005, there have been increasing signs that they might succeed in this strategy. Sectarian violence is claiming more and more civilian victims. Mean- while, the number of foreign and Iraqi soldiers and security forces killed is declining. The example of Afghanistan before 2001 shows just how dangerous these sorts of conflicts can be for the international community if they are not brought under control. Under the protection of the Taliban, al-Qaida succeeded in establishing a trans-national terrorist organization with an international agenda. In Afghanistan, they could plan and organize the September 11th attacks. Similarly, al-Qaida in Iraq also has international ambitions, in addition to their fight against the occupation forces and the new Iraqi state. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of intra- state conflicts has risen markedly compared to inter- state conflicts. Usually these involve conflicts between the state and one or more nonstate actors, and it is more important than ever that we study these actors in order to better understand them. The insurgency in Iraq presents such a case, and up to now our knowledge about the players involved has remained superficial. In order to understand the insurgency’s role in the development of Iraq and the region, we need to know about its structure, organization, ideology, goals, strategies and tactics. How should Germany and Europe respond to the insurgents’ activities? There are four characteristics of the insurgency in Iraq that are especially relevant to German and European policy: Iraq is a failed state. For years to come it will remain unstable and the insurgents will bear con- siderable responsibility for the instability. Through their attacks against the Iraqi military, police, and members of the emerging civil service, they have SWP-Berlin The Iraqi Insurgency December 2006 5 Problems and Findings thus far made it difficult, if not impossible, to tralized and diffuse insurgency scenarios in its cur- establish functioning state institutions. Since the rent and future missions. insurgents cannot defeat their enemy militarily, European policy in Iraq should differentiate they focus their efforts on simply not losing the between those insurgents and groups who are not fight. The stakes for the military, on the other engaged in a “holy war” (Jihad) against the West and hand, are much higher. In the eyes of world public anti-Western Jihadists. Neither the national Islamists opinion, they must at least appear to contain in- in Iraq nor their supporters abroad have posed a direct surgent activity. Anything less would spell defeat. threat to Europe so far. Efforts to involve them in The insurgency in Iraq is likely the best example of the political process should definitely be supported. an increasingly decentralized form of warfare, in The Jihadists, on the other hand, are another case which insurgent groups with flat hierarchies con- altogether. Although their role in Iraq is less promi- front their enemies with new threat scenarios. The nent than the national Islamists’, they pose a threat insurgency in Iraq differs from most conventional to neighboring states, and they will most likely insurgencies in that it lacks a center of gravity and become active in these states, particularly in Syria a hierarchical command structure. and Lebanon. The insurgency is increasingly taking on an Islamist character. This is consistent with the trend toward the Islamization of Iraqi society which began in the nineties. As a result, national Islamists, which represent groups whose military and political agenda is focused on Iraq, are also gaining ground within the insurgency. Due to their more limited political objectives, they hold open prospects of reaching a negotiated settlement. The Jihadists, defined as members of militant Islamist groups who are ideologically aligned with Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida, are not the dominant force in the insurgency, and they are losing ground vis-à-vis the national Islamist groups. Nevertheless, they continue to play an important role. In particu- lar, it appears that they are succeeding in provok- ing a civil war between Shiites and Sunnis. Regard- less of whether a civil war erupts or not, they will attempt to shift their activities to neighboring countries and possibly even further afar. Germany should be prepared for Iraq to be unstable for the foreseeable future. Given that German and European influence on events in Iraq is negligible, they ought to pay special attention to what is going on in neighboring states. Representatives of neighboring states and Egypt have met on several occasions to dis- cuss the impact of the Iraq War. The European Union and Germany should try to promote such initiatives, with the long-term objective of establishing a new regional security architecture. In the future, German and European policy needs to be prepared to meet the challenges of threat sce- narios emerging from decentralized forms of warfare. Current counterterrorism measures already address this to some extent, but it also affects the German military. The Bundeswehr increasingly faces decen- SWP-Berlin The Iraqi Insurgency December 2006 6 Phases of the Insurgency in Iraq Phases of the Insurgency in Iraq The insurgency in Iraq can be divided into four phases. the fourth phase had begun. In this phase, which While events in each phase were primarily influenced coincides with the national Islamist phase, the con- by different insurgent groups, there was activity flict has increasingly taken on characteristics of a civil across the spectrum of the insurgency during all war. The sectarian violence reached an initial high- four phases. In the “Baathist phase” from early water mark in spring 2006 following the bombing of summer 2003 until the winter of 2003/2004, the one of the most important holy places for Shiites in dominant group was the so-called Army of Muhammad Iraq, the Askariya shrine in Samarra, which houses the (Jaish Muhammad). They allegedly maintained close ties tombs of the Shiite Imams Ali al-Hadi and al-Hasan to Saddam Hussein, who was still a fugitive at the al-Askari, and it has persisted unabated ever since. time, and consisted primarily of former members of the Baath Party.1 The organization fought a more or less classic guerrilla war, in which they would attack military targets with mortars and hand grenades, explode roadside bombs and try to shoot down coalition forces’ aircraft. Spectacular suicide attacks were conducted as early as August 2003, but they were rare in comparison to the years that fol- lowed. By the end of 2003, the influence of the Army of Muhammad and the Baathists was on the decline.2 This was followed by the “Zarqawi” or “Jihadist” phase, which, from the beginning of 2004 until the summer of 2005, was dominated by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In early 2004, he released his first audio message announcing the goals of his organiza- tion Jama’at al-Tauhid wa-l-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War).3 Zarqawi was able to catapult his organization to the forefront of the insurgency through spectacular acts of terrorism, kidnappings and an effective public relations. This was a particularly heated phase of the insurgency, as Shiite Islamists under the leadership of the populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr had also started to actively resist the occupation forces. It was not until the third, “national Islamist phase,” beginning in spring 2005, that groups more narrowly focused on Iraq, such as the Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaish al-Islami fi l-Iraq) and the 1920 Revolution Brigades (Kata’ib Thaurat al-’Ashrin), were able to gain more public attention and emerge as competitors to Zarqawi’s organization. During this period, the conflict between national Islamists and Jihadists intensified. By February 2006, 1 al-Hayat, February 25, 2006. 2 Los Angeles Times, November 16, 2004.
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