The United States and the Denial of Prisoner of War (POW) Status at the End of the Second World War1
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Aufsatz Richard D. Wiggers The United States and the Denial of Prisoner of War (POW) Status at the End of the Second World War1 In his study entitled Nazi Prisoners of War in America, historian Arnold Krammer relates how the U. S. Government followed the 1929 Geneva Convention to the letter during World War Π in its treatment of nearly 400,000 captured German military personnel imprisoned in POW camps across the United States. According to Krammer the U. S. government »was almost obsessed with adherence to a liberal interpretation of the Geneva Convention, often far in excess of any agreed-upon requirements«.2 Even during the closing months of the war, the United States government gave every indication that it intended to continue to abide fully by the 1929 Geneva Convention in its treatment of captured enemy military personnel. As of January 1945,100 million leaflets to that effect had been dropped behind the shrinking German front lines, and by April 1945 large numbers of »safe conduct« passes making similar promises and signed by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) commander Dwight D. Eisenhower had also been dropped behind German lines by the US Army to induce surrenders of enemy military personnel.3 The same apparently unequivocal stance in support of compliance with the 1929 Geneva Convention was taken domestically by US government officials. During hearings which were held in Washington in April 1945 before a Special Committee of the US House of Representatives, officials from both the State and the War Departments testified that unless Congress decided otherwise, the 1929 Geneva Convention and strict adherence to its pro- visions remained the »law of the land« and would not be contravened by the United States.4 The following month the Theater Provost Marshal of the US Army, one of the officials most directly responsible for the custody and treatment of captured enemy military personnel, wrote an article in The American Mercury in which he assured the American public that »Today we of America are leading the world in our record of abiding by inter- national law. Certainly if we hope to make lawbreaking unpopular, we must ourselves appear in the court of world opinion with clean hands. If we aren't going to abide by 1 The author wishes to express his deep gratitude to his mentor and friend Professor Brian Villa. Without Brian's advice and assistance this article would never have been conceived or written. The author would also like to express his thanks to Professors Robert Keyserlingk and Günter Bischof for their guidance and encouragement in this project. — Portions of this article were original- ly presented on 20 June 1992 at the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations in Hyde Park, New York. 2 London: 1991, p. 153. 3 BG Robert A. McClure, Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF to the Chief of Staff, National Archives, Washington (NA), Record Group (RG) 59, General Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 1945-49, Box 3861, Document 740.00119 EW/2—1245, Colonel W.C. Chanler to Philip Jessup, 01 February 1945, FDR Library, Hyde Park, Fahy Papers, Box 65, File »Legal Consequences of Unconditional Surrender«, and Report of Proceedings and hearings held before the Special Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs, »Treatment of Prisoners of War«, 30 April 1945, NA, RG 59, Decimal File 1945-49, Box 3553, Document 740.00114 EW/4-3045, pp. 519-520. 4 Report of Proceedings, »Treatment of Prisoners of War« (see fn. 3), pp. 512—516 and 565—579. Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 52(1993), S. 91—104 © Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Freiburg i.Br. 92 MGM 52 (1993) Richard D. Wiggers international laws, why deceive ourselves by having them [...] We believe that abiding by the Geneva Convention is the best thing for us now, as well as in the future.«5 Challenged by Canadian author James Bacque's 1989 book Other Losses: An Investiga- tion Into the Mass Deaths of German Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans After World War II,6 as well as its later American and German editions, academics have now returned to the question of post-World War II Allied treatment of captured German military personnel. In Other Losses Bacque accused the Allies, and U. S. officials in par- ticular, of ruthlessly planning to violate the 1929 Geneva Convention in order to carry out a massive and illegal programme of long-term postwar employment of large numbers of German soldiers, and the death by starvation of a million of them. Originally designated POWs before the end of the war, Bacque claims that these and other enemy troops cap- tured after war's end were secretly switched to a new category not covered by the Geneva Convention, namely that of Disarmed Enemy Forces or Disarmed Enemy Force (DEF)s.7 In Bacque's view, it was SHAEF commander Dwight D. Eisenhower who personally devis- ed, drafted and signed the March 1945 order which »created the lethal DEF status« for captured German military personnel.8 This change of status supposedly allowed the Allies to ignore the stipulations of international law and to deal with the millions of German soldiers in their custody as they saw fit, including engineering their mistreatment and mass killing. The fact that several thousand captured enemy personnel, both POWs'and DEFs, died in Allied camps after the war from malnutrition and exposure has not been a secret, but certainly not one million died in the camps, and certainly not as the result of a concerted Allied or SHAEF plan. These points are discussed in more detail in a recently published collection of articles entitled Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood,9 This paper, meanwhile, will focus on an analysis of the denial of POW status, and the transfers from POW to DEF categories. It will attempt to show that indeed the Allies at the end of the war, like the Germans in some cases during the war, did withdraw cap- tured enemy personnel from the protection of the 1929 Geneva Convention, and will in- dicate reasons that this was done. It will also conclude that no satisfactory evidence exists at this time to link this change of status to any plan for a programme of mass killing as alleged by Bacque. The question of the status of captured German military personnel is indeed an impor- tant one. In order for a soldier to benefit from the protection of the rules of international humanitarian law, he must first be recognized as a »lawful belligerent« and be granted the status of a Prisoner of War upon capture. Only by gaining and maintaining POW status can an individual combatant claim Geneva Convention protection while in the custody of the enemy. In fact, it can be argued that the 1907 Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the 1929 Geneva Convention were a victory for international humanitarian law less because of the specific contents of the articles regarding the conditions to be provided 5 Major General Archer L. Lerch, »The Army Reports on Prisoners of War«, The American Mer- cury, May 1945, p. 3. 6 Toronto: 1989. 7 There are numerous other variations of this term which appear in war-time and post-war documents, but which have essentially the same meaning. Among the most common are »Surrendered Enemy Personnel«, »capitulated troops«, and »disarmed Germans«. 8 Bacque, Other Losses, (see fn. 6), pp. xii, 30, 164. 9 Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (eds), Baton Rouge and London: 1992. The United States and the Denial of Prisoner of War 93 for captive military personnel than for the recognition of the POW status at all. These laws acknowledged that once disarmed and taken into custody a soldier of an enemy state was at the mercy of the detaining state which captured him, and deserved henceforth the protection of an international regime of regulations and standards.10 The detainee had in effect now become a third party to the conflict, protected as a matter of international public interest by the terms of the Convention until the conclusion of a peace treaty, or his repatriation to and/or the annexation of his state of origin. Unfortunately, the denial of POW status and Geneva Convention standards of treat- ment to captured enemy military personnel was hardly a novel occurence during World War II. The Germans did not accord them to millions of Red Army personnel which it captured during the course of the conflict on the eastern front, leading to fatal results for the majority.11 After the German annexation of Poland that country's military personnel were transferred to civilian labour status, and only Polish military officers continued to be accorded POW status.12 Yugoslavian military personnel were also denied POW status and were treated as civilian labourers. German officials argued in both the Polish and Yugoslav cases that the state of origin of these troops had ceased to exist and that Germany was now exercising sovereignty.13 During 1943 the Germans also decided to designate more than 500,000 Italian soldiers disarmed after that state's capitulation to the Allies as »military internees« rather than as POWs, arguing that the latter were not enemy personnel but subjects of the neo-Fascist government to which the Germans remained allied.14 In all of these cases the German authorities unilaterally denied or removed POW status and Geneva Convention guarantees of treatment and protection from captured enemy military personnel by employing various legalistic rationales. The denial of POW status by the Germans in turn led to abuses; poor diet, labour and living conditions, and even deaths on a massive scale.