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Middle East Briefing, Nr. 16: After Arafat? Challenges and Prospects

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Middle East Briefing, Nr. 16: After Arafat? Challenges and Prospects MIDDLE EAST Briefing Amman/Brussels, 23 December 2004 AFTER ARAFAT? CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS I. OVERVIEW statement notwithstanding, the "heart of the matter" is not nor has it ever been Palestinian reform. Defects in Palestinian democracy (by almost every measure less In the weeks since Yasir Arafat's death on 11 significant than in every other Arab country) did not November 2004, the Palestinian leadership has cause the Israeli-Palestinian conflict any more than undergone a surprisingly smooth and orderly addressing them will resolve it. While international transition. Israeli-Palestinian as well as Palestinian- support for Palestinian reform is welcome, it ought not Arab and Arab-Israeli relations are witnessing levels come at the detriment of simultaneous moves on the of cooperation and coordination not seen in years.1 political front, lest the new Palestinian leadership International efforts to jumpstart the peace process are rapidly lose whatever legitimacy elections will bring. visible once again, with those previously debating whether attempts should be made to defuse the There is, in other words, a danger of excessive ongoing crisis now discussing how best to do so. Still, complacency generated by the current harmony. That the extent to which these dynamics present an the relative calm and goodwill is vulnerable already is opportunity for peace remain uncertain and will evident in the mounting toll of Palestinian and Israeli depend on whether visible efforts to rejuvenate casualties, which could yet imperil the electoral Palestinian institutions are accompanied by renewed process.3 It will prove transient if efforts to embed commitment to repairing Israeli-Palestinian relations it within a clear and defined political horizon and moving toward a viable, comprehensive peace. accompanied by concrete changes on the ground are not actively pursued. Timing and sequencing will be key. All relevant parties -- Palestinian, Israeli, American, Arab and The challenges posed by the Palestinian transition European -- are in agreement that the transition can be grouped into several categories: process and the reconstruction of Palestinian institutions is a priority; the immediate focus, The new Palestinian leadership will have to therefore, naturally is on the 9 January presidential earn its legitimacy from the Palestinian election. The Palestinian decision to conduct this poll people. Given the weak and discredited nature within the 60 days prescribed by Palestinian Authority of Palestinian Authority (PA) institutions, the (PA) legislation and associated commitments and presidential poll is necessary but insufficient. Israel's assurance that it will facilitate the event represent hopeful starts.2 But, President Bush's restrictions on his movement and his inability to obtain a permit to campaign in the Gaza Strip. 3 Arafat's final weeks and the period immediately following 1 In December 2004 PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu his death were among the least violent since September Mazen) paid official visits to Syria, Lebanon, and Kuwait, 2000. Late November 2004, however, witnessed a gradual repairing ties that had been strained to the point of non- escalation, particularly in the Gaza Strip, initially limited to existence for over a decade. A prisoner exchange, economic Israeli assassination of Palestinian militants and Palestinian protocol, and other measures that same month also pointed to attacks on Israeli military installations and settlements. By a noticeable thaw in Egyptian-Israeli relations. Susan mid-December, with each side blaming the other for the Severeid, "Egypt charts new course for Mideast peace", deterioration, matters in the Gaza Strip had reverted to form. Associated Press, 15 December 2004. Palestinians conducted a series of sophisticated attacks 2 Even on the electoral front, there is cause for concern. As against Israeli positions within Gaza and once again shelled of 10 December 2004, Israeli soldiers had roughed up PA Gaza settlements and the Israeli town of Sderot; Israel presidential candidate Mustafa Barghouti at a roadblock and launched several armoured incursions into Palestinian detained a second, Bassam Salhi, on the outskirts of population centres. The death toll from 1 November through Jerusalem. A third, Hassan Khreisheh announced his 20 December stands at approximately 45 Palestinians and withdrawal from the contest, citing unacceptable Israeli ten Israelis dead. After Arafat? Challenges and Prospects Crisis Group Middle East Briefing, 23 December 2004 Page 2 Local elections, scheduled to begin on 23 The international community's approach should December 2004 in several West Bank proceed from the premise that a successful locations, and legislative elections, expected to transition, end of the violent confrontation, be announced for mid-2005, are no less changes on the ground and revival of the peace important. These will need to conducted with process are organically linked rather than issues the participation of the opposition and be free that can be sequentially and separately addressed. of violence and obstruction.4 If progress is held up on any of these fronts, the likelihood is that none will be satisfactorily The new leadership will not be able to operate achieved. without the support of the Palestinian political system and will, therefore, need to revitalise it in As preparations for the January 2005 election order to lead. In addition to the above elections, demonstrate, the current environment is one in which this means conducting internal primaries within Palestinians must lead if the transition is to succeed. the dominant Palestinian National Liberation But they cannot do so unless enabled by Israel and the Movement (Fatah) to choose delegates to its sixth international community. After four years of conflict General Congress scheduled for 4 August 2005, there are too many factors beyond the PA's control for and the latter's election of a new and more it to be otherwise. The onus is upon all the parties, representative leadership. In addition, it entails and particularly upon those who have proclaimed the intensified efforts to incorporate the Islamic new reality in the Middle East a fresh opportunity. Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) into the Palestinian political system -- ideally through the institutions of the II. MULTIPLE VOIDS Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) -- on the basis of a strategic consensus that is consistent with a negotiated two-state settlement and a The void created at the heart of the Palestinian mutual cessation of attacks against civilians, and political system by Yasir Arafat's demise is best to which its adherents are held accountable. explained by his unique popular stature, undisputed monopoly over decision-making, and methods of rule Democratic and organisational legitimacy will during nearly four decades at the helm of the national not absolve the new leadership of the requirement movement.6 to deliver results; as a Palestinian observer explained: "in our system, elections confirm legitimacy, they don't create it. Abu Mazen was A. ARAFAT'S UNIQUE POSITION selected because of his institutional status, and, if elected, he will last because of his achievements. For the vast majority of Palestinians, Arafat's leading Elections are just one part of this equation".5 role in the rebirth of the Palestinians as a people after Rapid and tangible progress will be expected in the nakba (catastrophe) of 1948 and the emergence of terms of law and order as well as economic well- the contemporary national movement after 1967 being, as will concrete evidence of a halt to endowed him with personal political credit that on the further settlement expansion, Israel's release of whole outweighed their criticisms of his policies and prisoners, loosening of Israeli restrictions on methods. This attitude is best summed up in the movement and a credible diplomatic process. expression used by Fatah activists, "We disagree with How the Gaza disengagement initiative is him but not about him".7 implemented in 2005, and what follows it, will be a critical test in this regard. Of course, none To Palestinians, Arafat remains above all the leader of this will be sustainable without a mutual and who took a scattered and broken people, held them visible reduction in violence. 6 For a comprehensive analysis of the development of the contemporary Palestinian national movement and Arafat's role, see Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The 4 Crisis Group telephone interview, Yezid Sayigh, Palestinian Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1963 (Oxford, 1997). analyst, 8 December 2004. See further, Yezid Sayigh, For an account of more recent developments, see Graham "Palestinians must go to the polls", Financial Times, 22 Usher, "Facing defeat: The Intifada two years on", Journal of November 2004. Palestine Studies XXXII: 2 (Winter 2003), pp. 21-40. 5 Crisis Group telephone interview, Ramallah, December 2004. 7 Crisis Group interviews, Fatah activists, West Bank, 2004. After Arafat? Challenges and Prospects Crisis Group Middle East Briefing, 23 December 2004 Page 3 together despite overwhelming odds and in the face of these weakened and marginalised structures in order repeated Israeli and Arab attempts to subdue them, to legitimise their own strategic steps. and successfully placed their struggle for self- determination at the centre of the international agenda, A dedicated micromanager throughout his life, and transforming refugee communities
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