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Cuba in the Middle East : a Brief Chronology Please do not remove this page Cuba in the Middle East : A Brief Chronology Amuchástegui, Domingo https://scholarship.miami.edu/discovery/delivery/01UOML_INST:ResearchRepository/12355453350002976?l#13355492280002976 Amuchástegui, D. (1999). Cuba in the Middle East: A Brief Chronology. https://scholarship.miami.edu/discovery/fulldisplay/alma991031447699502976/01UOML_INST:ResearchR epository Downloaded On 2021/10/01 03:10:24 -0400 Please do not remove this page I I I CUBA IN THE MIDDLE EAST A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY - DOMINGO AMUCHASTEGUI Foreword By I Haim Shaked, Director Middle East Studies Institute I July, 1999 I I I - Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Paper Series July 1999 OPS Editor Juan Carlos Espinosa, Assistant Director Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies OPS Advisory Board Luis Aguilar Leon, Cuba in the Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Middle East: Graciella Cruz-Taura, Florida Atlantic University A Brief - Jose Manuel Hernandez, Georgetown University Chronology (Emeritus) Irving Louis Horowitz, Rutgers University Antonio Jorge, Domingo Amuchastegui Florida International University Armando Logo, with a foreword Association for the Study by Haim Shaked of the Cuban Economy Lesbia Orta Varona, University of Miami Jaime Suchlicfd, Director Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies C 1999 ICCAS - FOREWORD "Cuba in the Middle East" is an important publication for several reasons. First it chronicles Fidel Castro's intimate and long standing involvement with revolutionary and terrorist groups and "rogue" states in the Middle East. It is the first time, to my knowledge, that a high-ranking, former Cuban official publicly discusses in writing and in such detail Castro's ongoing connection with and support for anti-American and anti-Israel groups in this important, albeit volatile, region of the world. The author, Mr. Domingo Amuchastegui, is highly qualified to document and explain these events, having been a key participant in the making of Castro's Middle East policies and activities. Secondly, this chronology shows Cuba's actions both as an arm of the Soviet Union's strategy in the Middle East and as Castro's own independent policies and initiatives, many times to the chagrin of the Soviets. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Castro has maintained close working relations with these groups in the region, continuing to train high- ranking PLO military leaders and sharing intelligence and information with PLO officials. Cuba's connections with terrorist groups and states have major implications for the security of Israel, as well as the United States. Castro is an ally of the most extremist anti-Israeli states in the region. Syria, Libya, Iran and Iraq are Castro's closest friends and supporters. Would some of these countries attempt to use Cuba as a springboard for anti-U. S. terrorist actions? The proximity of the island to the U. S., coupled with Castro's documented involvement in the Middle East should be of serious concern to U. S. policymakers and security officials. I _ Page 2. While Cuba, since the collapse of the Soviet Umon represents less of a conventional military threat to the U. S., Castro's continuous connections with terrorist groups and rogue states creates a new dynamic that requires vigilance and alertness. Amencan and Israeli policymakers alike should pay careful attention to the intricate web of relationships which emerges so clearly from this chronology and should not overtook a potential threat which is not well studied or fully understood. Haim Shaked, Ph.D. Director ■ Middle East Studies Institute School of International Studies University of Miami June 1999 I . I I I I I I - INDEX INTRODUCTION pp. 3-5 CHRONOLOGY pp. 6-16 | GLOSSARY pp. 17-21 BIBLIOGRAPHY pp. 22-23 I - I I I I . I I I CUBA AND THE MIDDLE EAST A Brief Chronology By Domingo Amuchastegui m Introduction I After a close relationship with Middle Eastern groups and countries for forty years, Cuba enjoys today an exceptional position in the region with embassies in almost all countries, and with a wide variety of political connections within the ruling elites. Castro is engaged in a growing process of enlarging bilateral trade, financial 1 Mr. Amuchastegui is a research associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies and a Doctoral candidate at the School of International Studies, University of Miami He was a professor at the Higher Institute of International Relations in Havana; Guest Professor at the Cuban National Defense College; Senior Researcher at Cuba's Center for Studies of Africa and the Middle East; and Intelligence Analyst and Head of the Organization Department at the Tricontinental Organization in the 1960s and 1970s. He traveled extensively through North Africa and the Middle East. He edited Palestine: Crisis and Revolution (Havana, 1970); Palestine: Dimensions of a Conflict (Havana, 1988); Sociology and Politics in Israel (Havana, 1990); and is the author of Contemporary History ofAsia and Africa (Four Volumes, Havana, 1984-1988), together with several other books and articles. He was a direct or indirect participant in most of - assistance, involvement in joint ventures, and cooperation projects, as well as in diplomatic cooperation in the international system. The context has changed over the years. While the priorities are not to channel weapons to groups within the region, there are still some specialized military assistance, training and cooperation, especially with the PLO. Yet Cuba's priorities now are to obtain investments, economic cooperation, and trade opportunities from Iran, Algeria, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, and others. For U.S. interests the closeness of the relationship with Iraq and some of the more militant terrorist groups in the Middle East is troublesome. Can Cuba be used to carry out terrorist acts against U.S. targets? Is there any cooperation between Sadam Hussein and Castro in the development of chemical and bacteriological weapons? What remains from the close cooperation between Castro and the more militant terrorist groups in the region? These and other questions are of critical importance to the security of the United States. Cuba's proximity to the U.S., the continuous flow of m immigrants from the island and the increased travel from and to Cuba should make I the developments described herein until 1993. I I I I "" Castro's relationships a troublesome and worrysome issue to U.S. policymakers. The Middle East and North Africa have been extremely important to Castro's foreign policy since 1959. It remains today as a region of special priority in Castro's redesign of his foreign policy after the collapse of Cuba's alliance with the former Soviet Union. Actually, there is not one single aspect of Castro's foreign policy in which the Middle East does not become important as: 1) A region connected to Cuba's non-aligned interests and policies. 2) An area were Cuba laid the foundations for the deployment of regular military forces and the establishment of military cooperation for the last 40 years. - 3) A region to gain knowledge/connections/influence with "liberation m movements" throughout Africa and the Middle East. 4) A base for triangular operations in connection with Intelligence/subversive activities in Latin America. 5) A source of influence with Arab communities in Latin America and the Caribbean. _ 6) A region in which trade, loans, cooperation, and diplomatic support has become very important, especially in the 1990's. 7) After Vietnam, a virtual laboratory, in the military field, in particular since _ the Six Day War (1967), for updating and upgrading Cuba's military capabilities, including technological and operational capacities. 8) A region where the Arab-Islamic states are extremely important due to their voting power within the UN system for Cuba's multilateral diplomacy. It is within such a context that the relevance of the Middle East for Cuba's foreign policy should be understood. The following chronology is only meant to be illustrative of the depth and closesness of Cuba's long-standing relationships with States, leaders, and groups in this troubled region. 1959-1963 * Relations developed with Gamal Abdel Nasser; Cuba joined the Non-Aligned Movement, sponsored by India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt Efforts to buy weapons from Egypt foiled. The Cuban government sent Captain Jose Ramon Fernandez (currently m vicepresident of the Cuban government) to Israel in the summer of 1959 to negotiate the purchase of light weaponry and artillery, but no agreement was reached. Instead, signficant civilian assistance was granted by Israel to Cuba for more than 10 years in the field of citrus cultivation and diplomatic relations 6 were normal until 1973. * Raul Castro and Che Guevara visited Cairo and established contacts with m African liberation movements stationed in, and supported by, Cairo. Both m Cuban leaders visited Gaza and expressed support for the Palestinian cause. * Initial relations established with Baghdad under Karim Kassem. The Cuban government sent Commander William Galvez to purchase light weaponry, tanks, and artillery. No agreement was reached. * Castro established relations with the Algerian FLN through Paris and Rabat; m official and public support extended, shipping large quantities of weapons to the FLN through Morocco (1960-1961); provided shelter, medical and educational services in Cuba for wounded Algerians; political and military cooperation in the fields of Counter-intelligence and Intelligence were initiated. First Cuban deployment of regular military forces in support of the Algerian government against the Moroccan aggression of 1963. These forces will then fa train the Algerian army for more than a year. to 1964-1967 * With considerable hesitation and reluctance, Nasser cooperated with Che I Guevara during his guerrilla operation in Congo-Kinshasa (former Zaire) in 1965. Cuba welcomed the founding of the PLO. First contacts with Palestinian FATEH between 1965 (Algiers) and 1966-67 (Damascus). * The Tricontinental Conference was held in Havana in January, 1966 to I adopt a common political strategy against colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.
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