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Download PDF (46.9 JOBNAME: Chan PAGE: 1 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Wed Feb 21 09:47:12 2018 Index Abe, Shinzō 62, 80, 83, 88 balance of power 81–3, 88–9 Afghanistan 99, 188–9 Baltics 34 Africa 6–7, 11, 16, 24–9, 31, 36, 44, Bangkok 24–5, 32, 82, 87 49, 51, 53, 58, 61, 68–9, 71, 80, Bangladesh 32, 64, 81, 87–90 103, 120 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar African Barometer 51, 106 (BCIM) Economic Corridor 7, 9, African century 120–21 81, 88 African Union 27, 121 Bank of China 68 Alaska 31, 34, 78 Beijing 21, 29, 31, 35, 44–5, 61, Alstom 21, 44 65–6, 83 Arctic Ocean 7 Olympic Games 21, 44 Argentina 23–4, 29 Belarus 29–30 Asia 6, 11, 15, 21, 24, 30–32, 35–6, Belgium 20 44, 57–8, 61, 65, 68, 71, 79, Belt and Road Forum for International 87, 89–90, 100, 102–3, 116, Cooperation 14–15, 102, 112, 120 117 responses to OBOR 76–91 Belt and Road Initiative 7, 14–15, 51, Asia-Pacific 11, 33, 77, 79 68, 80, 83, 85, 90, 107 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Berlin 83 (APEC) 28, 102 Boao Forum 102, 107 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 14, Bombardier 21, 44 33, 57, 62–5, 67–8, 71, 77, 80, Bretton Woods system 51, 63, 107, 91, 100 114 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank BRICS 14, 59–61, 70, 89, 106 bank 70 (AIIB) ix, 11, 14–15, 57, 60, their GDPs 61 61–5, 66, 68–70, 76–7, 79, 83, see also Contingency Reserve 85–6, 89, 91, 100–101, 105, 107, Arrangement 70, 107; 114, 116 New Development Bank share holdings of 62 Brunei 90, 99 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 24–5, 36, 70, Cambodia 25, 57, 90 116 see also Kampuchea ASEAN Infrastructure Fund 57 Central Asia ix, 6–7, 12, 21, 25, 33, China-ASEAN Fund 69 35–6, 44, 78–80, 83–5, 99, 116 Master Plan on Connectivity 10 Chan Lai-Ha xii, 63, 64 Atlantic Ocean 26, 28–9 Chengdu 29–30, 67 Australia 23, 49, 70 Chiang Mai Initiative Austria 20 Multilateralisation 70, 105, 107 129 Gerald Chan - 9781788112079 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/24/2021 12:26:12PM via free access Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Chan-Understanding_Chinas_new_diplomacy / Division: Index /Pg. Position: 1 / Date: 5/2 JOBNAME: Chan PAGE: 2 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed Feb 21 09:47:12 2018 130 Understanding China’s new diplomacy Chile 29 Dreams 37, 89, 114 China, People’s Republic of Duisburg xii, 29 as a civilisation state 9 Duterte, Rodrigo 36, 82 demography 45, 52 development in western region 9–10 East Africa 26–7, 29 FDI 36, 72 East Asia 10, 53, 76–8, 88, 116 Five Year Plan 15 Egypt 61 as a global leader 120 Eurasia 9, 11, 16, 24, 29, 31, 34, 69, military base 27 71, 84, 103, 120 Ministry of Commerce 23 Eurasian Economic Union 10, 33, 35 Ministry of Finance 66 ‘Eurasian Initiative’ 83 research and development 47–50 Europe 6–7, 10–11, 20–22, 25, 29, science and technology 47–50 32, 35–6, 44–5, 47, 61, 68, 79, State Administration of Foreign 83–5, 87–9, 102–3, 109, 116, Exchange 66 119–20 state capitalism 46–7 European Bank for Reconstruction white paper 20 and Development 64, 100 China-African Cooperation Summit European Union (EU) 16, 58–9, 96 16 Juncker Plan 10 China Construction Bank 51 Export Import Bank of China (EXIM) China Investment Corporation 66 26, 28, 32, 51, 66, 68, 112 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 7, 66–7, 117 Five Basic Principles of Peaceful China Railway Group 31–2, 45, 47 Co-Existence 101 China Railway Rolling Stock France 15–16, 20–21, 26–7, 30, 34–5, Corporation (CRRC) 24, 44, 50 43–4, 77, 82, 85 Chinese Communist Party 9, 12, 49 functionalism 94–5, 102–4 Politburo 12–13 Chinese foreign aid 24–5, 66 G20 61, 70, 102 Chinese foreign policy 6, 8, 76, Gao Bai xii, 5, 46 101–2, 112–18 geo-developmentalism 51–2, 94–109, ‘go out’ policy 9, 21, 44, 50–51, 113 117–19 definition 97 ‘go west’ policy 36 testing 104, 106 ten conundrums of 114–18 theoretical challenges 106–8 Chongqing 29–30, 67 see also geo-neo-functionalism; Cold War 26, 103 neo-functionalism with Chinese Colonialism 26 characteristics Conference on Interactions and geo-economics 36, 51, 68, 71, 99–100 Confidence-Building Measures in see also geopolitics Asia 102, 107 geo-neo-functionalism 37, 71 connectivity 6–8, 98–9, 103, 113, 119 see also geo-developmentalism; cooperation 53, 71, 94–5, 97–8, neo-functionalism with Chinese 100–101, 104, 108, 117 characteristics geopolitics 13, 20, 36, 51, 68, 71, 88, developmentalism 94–5 89, 99–100, 113, 120 Djibouti 26–8, 118 see also geo-economics Gerald Chan - 9781788112079 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/24/2021 12:26:12PM via free access Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Chan-Understanding_Chinas_new_diplomacy / Division: Index /Pg. Position: 2 / Date: 5/2 JOBNAME: Chan PAGE: 3 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed Feb 21 09:47:12 2018 Index 131 Germany 15, 20–21, 26–7, 29–30, 33, infrastructure development 13–14, 35, 43–4, 77, 82–3 21–2, 29, 33, 35, 46, 58, 62, 65, global financial order 57, 69–70 71, 79, 86, 88, 90, 98, 101, 102, global governance 91, 107–8, 104, 106, 112, 114, 118–19 115–18 financing of 57–72 global power change 113 infrastructure diplomacy 6, 8, 58–9, global public goods 71, 96, 103, 112, 62, 72, 79, 80 113–14 innovation 49, 52, 117 global responsibility 71, 96 integration 96, 120, 108 Global South 34–5, 51, 53, 72, 95, intellectual properties 48, 50, 105 105, 107, 109, 113 intergovernmental organisations 62, globalisation ix, 37, 99, 113, 120 107 good governance 95, 105, 106 international development 106–7 Greater Mekong Subregion 57 international finance 106–7 Gulf of Aden 26 international land order 36 international maritime order 36 Hamburg 29, 44 International Monetary Fund (IMF) high-speed rail 5–6, 9, 20–56, 77, 80, 33, 63, 70–71, 95, 105, 106 83–6, 97–8, 112 international organisations 16, 102, market of 22 104, 106–7, 112 origins and development 43–5 international political economy 20, 94, ten reasons for China’s rise in 112 45–52 international relations 35, 53, 77, 91, Holland 20 94, 99, 101, 103–4, 106, 108–9, hub-and-spokes structure 95 112–13, 115–16 Hungary 32 International Union of Railways 20, 44 imperialism 26–95 Iran 22, 88, 89, 119 India 7, 12, 16, 20, 26, 29, 32–3, 45, Italy 15, 20, 27, 34, 35, 43 52, 59, 64, 77, 80, 85, 87–90, Jakarta 23, 32, 50, 81, 86 99, 109, 119 Japan 11, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, Act East policy 10 33, 35, 43, 44, 45, 49, 52, 53, Go West policy 10 61, 62–5, 70, 76–8, 86–90, 99 Mausam Project 10 responses to OBOR 80–83 Indian Ocean 6–7, 116 ‘Silk Road Diplomacy’ 10 Indochina 7, 24–5, 29, 44, 82 Jin Liqun 62, 65 Indonesia 6, 23, 32, 50, 57, 61, 64, 69, 77, 81, 86, 90, 99, 119 Kampuchea 83 Global Maritime Fulcrum 10, see also Cambodia 86 Kawasaki 21, 44 Industrial and Commercial Bank Kazakhstan 6, 29–30, 69, 80, 90, 99, of China 51, 68 119 industrial overcapacity 9, 100, 112, ‘Bright Road’ initiative 10 116 Kenya 6, 26, 27, 28, 53 industrial policy 52 Kim, Jim Yong 62, 65 Industrial Revolution ix, 120 Korean War 84 Gerald Chan - 9781788112079 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/24/2021 12:26:12PM via free access Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Chan-Understanding_Chinas_new_diplomacy / Division: Index /Pg. Position: 3 / Date: 5/2 JOBNAME: Chan PAGE: 4 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Wed Feb 21 09:47:12 2018 132 Understanding China’s new diplomacy Kuala Lumpur 25, 32, 82, 87 New Development Bank (NDB) 14, Kunming 25, 67, 81, 82, 87, 88 57, 59–61, 66, 68, 69, 70,79, Kuwait 119 101, 107, 116 Kyrgyzstan 80, 99 see also BRICS bank New Silk Road initiative 2, 5–17, 76, Laos 7, 24, 25, 29, 32, 57, 69, 82, 90, 86 99 new world order 91, 108–9, 114 Latin America 22, 23, 24, 28–9, 31, New York 30, 44, 78, 97 69, 76 New Zealand xii, 20, 49, 70 see also South America Nigeria 25–8, 53 Li Keqiang 12, 16, 27, 28–9, 31, 33, non-interference 101, 108 36, 117, 120 North America 36, 47 Libya 34 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Lin Yifu 12 (NATO) 89 Liu Yazhou 10 North Korea 77, 83, 84, 85, 90, 99 Liu Zhijun 46, 48 Obama, Barak 96 Malaysia 7, 20, 23, 25, 32, 58, 67, 90, Oceania 7 99 see also South Pacific Marshall Plan 102 Oman 64 Mediterranean 6–7, 27, 67, 116 ‘one belt, one road’ (OBOR) initiative mercantilism 94, 100 1, 5–17, 34–8, 61, 67–9, 71, 83, Middle East 6, 10, 12, 21, 44, 61, 67, 84, 86, 89, 90, 91, 112 87, 88 Asian responses to 76–91 Mohamad Mahathir 21, 25 brief introduction of 6–8 Mongolia 7, 30, 62, 80, 96, 99 definition 1, 6 ‘Prairie Road’ 10 economic corridors 6–7 Morocco 20 Japan’s responses to 80–83 Moscow 30, 31, 32, 35 origins of 1 Mozambique 51 South Korea’s responses to 83–5 multilateral development banks 34, 63 Taiwan’s responses to 85–6 multilateral financial institutions 57, ten myths of 8–16 63, 68, 69–72, 102, 114 theorising of 94–109 Myanmar 7, 34, 64, 67, 87, 88, 89, see also Belt and Road Initiative 90, 99, 117 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development National Development and Reform (OCED) 95, 107 Commission (NDRC) 5, 7, 12–13 Pacific Ocean 28–9 national interest 72, 107, 116, 120 Pakistan 64, 66, 87, 88, 89, 90, 99, neo-functionalism with Chinese 118 characteristics 36–7, 71, 102–4, Pan-Asia 21, 25, 87 108 Panama Canal 29 see also geo-developmentalism; Park Geun-hye 83–4 geo-neo-functionalism peace and governance 106–8 neoliberalism 104–5, 109, 113 peace-building 36, 71 Nepal 34, 99 People’s Bank of China 66 Gerald Chan - 9781788112079 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/24/2021 12:26:12PM via free access Columns Design XML Ltd / Job: Chan-Understanding_Chinas_new_diplomacy / Division: Index /Pg.
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