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It was our best chance to knock North Vietnam out of the war, but it was doomed to failure. Rolling Thunder OLLING Thunder, the air war By John T. Correll against North Vietnam, be- gan on March 2, 1965. The first mission was an indica- tion of things to come. RThe targets, timing of the attack, and other details of the operation were all decided in Washington, D.C. There were only two targets. Both were relatively minor, located just north of the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Viet- nam. The enemy’s real strength around Hanoi and Haiphong was there,” said Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, not touched, not even threatened. It commander in chief of US Pacific was a strange way to begin a war. Command. Air Force F-105s, F-100s, and B- Rolling Thunder would last for more 57s struck an ammunition depot at than three years, making it the longest Xom Bang, 10 miles north of the DMZ. air campaign in US history to that Meanwhile, Navy and South Vietnam- point. More bombs would be dropped ese aircraft bombed a naval base at on Vietnam than were dropped on all Quang Khe, 65 miles from the DMZ. of Europe in World War II. It would be almost two weeks be- The campaign ended in 1968 with- fore the next Rolling Thunder mis- out achieving any strategic results. It sions took place, again against minor did not persuade the North Vietnam- targets not far above the DMZ. ese to quit the war, nor did it stop Maxwell D. Taylor, the ambassa- dor to South Vietnam (and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), doubted that the enemy was impressed. “I fear that to date Rolling Thunder in their eyes has merely been a few iso- lated thunderclaps,” Taylor said. “The North Vietnamese probably didn’t even know the planes were 58 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2005 Thud and Thunder. The F-105— Thunderchief, Lead Sled, Thud—flew 75 percent of Rolling Thunder strikes and took more losses over North Vietnam than any other kind of aircraft. Here, an F-105D gasses up at a KC-135 tanker. USAF photo AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2005 59 were not sufficient. A Presidential directive on Feb. 13 called for “a program of measured and limited air action” against “selected military targets” in North Vietnam. It stipu- lated that “until further notice” the strikes would remain south of the 19th parallel, confining the action to the North Vietnamese panhandle. In his memoir, The Vantage Point, Lyndon B. Johnson said the decision for sustained strikes was made “be- cause it had become clear, gradually but unmistakably, that Hanoi was moving in for the kill.” The Vietnam Advisory Campaign (Nov. 15, 1961, to March 1, 1965) was over. The Vietnam Defensive Campaign was about to begin. The first Rolling Thunder mission was readied. Tight Leash. Gen. William Momyer, 7th Air Force commander, meets Presi- dent Johnson. LBJ was heard to boast, “I won’t let those Air Force generals Doubts and Redirection bomb the smallest outhouse without checking with me.” The conventional wisdom, often repeated at the time, was that the Hanoi’s infiltration of troops and equip- 1962, they were flying combat mis- United States must not get bogged ment into South Vietnam. sions in response to emergency re- down in a land war in Asia. Never- From beginning to end, Rolling quests. However, Gen. William W. theless, that was exactly what was Thunder was hampered by a policy of Momyer said in Airpower in Three about to happen. gradual escalation, which robbed air Wars, they were “not authorized to On March 8, 1965, marines de- strikes of their impact and gave North conduct combat missions without a ployed to Da Nang to defend the air Vietnam time to recover and adjust. Vietnamese crew member. Even base there. They were the first US For various reasons—including fear then, the missions were training ground combat forces in Vietnam. of provoking a confrontation with missions although combat weapons “President Johnson’s authorization North Vietnam’s Russian and Chi- were delivered.” of Operation Rolling Thunder not nese allies—all sorts of restrictions The conflict became overt in Au- only started the air war but unex- and constraints were imposed. gust 1964 when communist patrol pectedly triggered the introduction US airmen could not attack a sur- boats attacked US Navy vessels in of US troops into ground combat as face-to-air missile site unless it fired the Gulf of Tonkin. In response, Con- well,” McNamara said. a missile at them. For the first two gress passed a resolution authorizing By the middle of March, Rolling years, airmen were forbidden to strike the President “to take all necessary Thunder consisted of one mission a the MiG bases from which enemy steps, including the use of armed week in the southern part of North fighters were flying. Every so often, force” to repel any attack, prevent Vietnam. Apparently, the White Washington would stop the bomb- further aggression, and assist allies. House expected this to produce fast ing to see if Hanoi’s leaders were The Navy promptly launched re- results and was disappointed when it ready to make peace. prisal strikes, dubbed Pierce Arrow, did not. “In Rolling Thunder, the Johnson against North Vietnamese PT boat “After a month of bombing with Administration devised an air cam- bases, and the Air Force moved into no response from the North Viet- paign that did a lot of bombing in a Southeast Asia in force. B-57s, F-100s, namese, optimism began to wane,” way calculated not to threaten the en- and F-105s deployed to bases in South said the Pentagon Papers, a secret emy regime’s survival,” Air Force his- Vietnam and Thailand. The presence history of the war written in the torian Wayne Thompson said in To of the newly arrived aircrews was soon Office of the Secretary of Defense Hanoi and Back. “President Johnson challenged. and leaked to the New York Times in repeatedly assured the communist rul- In November, a Viet Cong mortar 1971. ers of North Vietnam that his forces attack at Bien Hoa killed four Ameri- Although President Johnson had would not hurt them, and he clearly cans, wounded 72, and destroyed five decided to use ground troops in Viet- meant it. Government buildings in B-57s. In February 1965, eight nam, there was no public announce- downtown Hanoi were never targeted.” Americans were killed and more than ment. The decision was embodied in 100 wounded in a sapper attack on an April 6 National Security Action Drift to War Pleiku. Navy and Air Force aircraft Memorandum. The President ordered Rolling Thunder was not the first flew reprisal strikes, called Opera- that “premature publicity be avoided combat for USAF airmen in Viet- tion Flaming Dart, against North by all possible precautions.” nam. Air Force crews deployed there Vietnam Feb. 7-11. The fighting forces were told of the in 1961 to train and support the The Johnson Administration de- change in strategy at an April 20 Ho- South Vietnamese Air Force. By cided that these reprisal missions nolulu conference, when McNamara 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2005 announced that US emphasis from then F-105s and F-4s flew mostly from to the Army-dominated Military As- on would be the ground war in the bases in Thailand and worked the sistance Command Vietnam. south. Targets in the south would take northern and western “route packs” When the aircraft and pilots were precedence over those in the north, in North Vietnam. Navy pilots from on the ground, they were in 13th Air and sorties would be diverted from the carriers at Yankee Station in the Force, with headquarters in the Phil- north to fill the requirement. Tonkin Gulf flew mainly against tar- ippines. When they were in the air, “This fateful decision contributed gets nearer the coastline. they were controlled by 7th Air Force to our ultimate loss of South Viet- Notable among the Navy aircraft in Saigon—which, for these missions, nam as much as any other single was the A-6 Intruder, an excellent reported to Pacific Air Forces and action we took during our involve- all-weather medium bomber. The Air US Pacific Command, not to MACV. ment,” Sharp later charged in his Force did not have an all-weather book, Strategy for Defeat. capability in the theater except on its MiGs, SAMs, and AAA The President on May 12 called a B-52 bombers, which were not per- When Rolling Thunder began, weeklong halt to the bombing—the mitted to operate more than a few North Vietnam’s air defense system first of many such halts—to see if miles north of the DMZ. did not amount to much and could North Vietnam was ready to negoti- Among those flying north or sup- have been destroyed easily. US policy, ate. It wasn’t. porting the operation were tankers, however, gave the North Vietnam- Micromanagement of the air war escort jammers, defense suppression ese the time, free from attack, to continued. “I was never allowed in airplanes, rescue aircraft, and recon- build a formidable air defense. the early days to send a single air- naissance systems, as well as com- The system consisted of anti-air- plane north [without being] told how mand and control airplanes. craft artillery, SA-2 surface-to-air mis- many bombs I would have on it, how One of the big operational changes siles, MiG fighters, and radars, all of many airplanes were in the flight, and in the Vietnam War was the every- Soviet design, some supplied by the what time it would be over the tar- day refueling of combat aircraft.