DOCSLIB.ORG

Dynamics of Naval Ship Design : a Systems Approach

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Dynamics of Naval Ship Design : a Systems Approach Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1998 Dynamics of Naval Ship design : a systems approach. Laverghetta, Thomas A. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/8280 OUOIEY KNOX LIBRARY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCH MONTFREY CA 93943-5101 Dynamics of Naval Ship Design: A Systems Approach by Thomas A. Laverghetta I! BS Mathematics United States Naval Academy, 1990 SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN ENGINEERING IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREES OF NAVAL ENGINEER AND MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OCEAN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AT THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY JUNE 1998 © 1998 Thomas Laverghetta, All Rights Reserved The Author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part. DUDLEY I NAVAI Dynamics of Naval Ship Design: A Systems Approach by Thomas A. Laverghetta Submitted to the Department of Ocean Engineering on May 18. 1998 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of Naval Engineer and Master of Science in Ocean Systems Management ABSTRACT The 1990 Naval Sea Systems Command Ship Design, Acquisition and Construction (DAC) Study provides a stepping stone for the implementation of improvements towards optimizing ship performance, cutting acquisition costs, and reducing design cycle time. With respect to performance, significant advances in computing power coupled with customer oriented design (QFD, AHP. evolutionary optimization, etc) provide both improvements and direct means to measure effectiveness of improvements. As for cost, implementation of world class building and design techniques (concurrent engineering, group technology. CAD/CAM/CAE. etc) coupled with higher fidelity costing methods ( ACEIT. PODAC. etc) provide savings and direct measures of effectiveness. Cycle time improvements have also been implemented (IPTs. Open System Architecture, 3-D Product Models, etc). However, ship design managers have been unable to identify and quantify' design process effectiveness with respect to the impact of those proposed cycle time improvements. In order to understand the impact of cycle time improvements, it is necessary to examine the mechanisms which have lead to increased cycle time including external influences (such as increasmg technological complexity and budgetary pressures), internal process delays (information flow delays and approval delays) and feedback processes (design iteration, error propagation and design change.) Modeling of such mechanisms, using the methods of System Dynamics, provides a means to study past programs (in particular, the DDG-51 Destroyer program of the 1980s), and to study the anticipated savings that can be generated with the introduction of process improvements. Of particular interest in modeling the naval ship design process with System Dynamics is the flow of design information. Traditional process analysis methods based on the design spiral represent the progression of design tasks as a linear process. However, actual design data propagation (a fundamental property resulting from the physical and architectural relationships of total ship systems) shows the process to be highly non-linear. These non- linearities are captured by system dynamics, providing a simulation tool that more fully captures the impacts of process improvements as they relate to the naval ship design process. Thesis Supervisor: Alan J. Brown Title: Senior Lecturer. Department of Ocean Engineering This thesis is dedicated to my loved ones, who make my life complete... Kimberley, Francesca and Thomas " DYNAMICS OF NAVAL SHD? DESIGN: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 1 1 Problem Statement 6 1.1 "Affordability Crisis" 6 1.1.1 Cycle Time 6 1.1.2 Requirements and Design Performance 13 1.1.3 Cost 20 1 . 2 Dynamic Modeling ofthe Design Process 30 1.2.1 Need for Modeling 30 1.2.2 What is System Dynamics? 31 1.2.3 Modeling Approach and Structure 32 2 Design Process External Influences 34 2. 1 Reciprocity and Proliferation ...the Needfor Naval Capabilities Evolution 37 " 2. 2 "Order ofBattle Dynamics.. Maintaining Force Levels 39 2.3 Design & Acquisition Rate Influences 42 3 Design Process Dynamics 45 3.1 Systems Engineering and Na\>al Ship Design 45 3.2 A cquisition Process . Points of \ lew 46 3. 3 Operational Process View 57 3.3.1 Design Phases 51 3.3.2 Scope Change Implementation and Detailed Design 53 4 Design Spiral and Task Dynamics 54 4. 1 "The Design Spiral 54 4. 2 Design Disciplines 62 4.3 Design Task Matrix 64 4.4 Programmatics 68 4.4.1 Program Management Tasks 71 4.4.2 Requirements Setting and Assessment 72 4.4.3 Risk Mitigation and Coordination 74 4.5 Systems Engineering 75 4.5.1 Logistics and Reliability Engineering 76 4.5.2 Design Integration and Specifications 77 4.5.3 Producibility and Production Engineering 78 4.5.4 Performance Assessment and Requirements Comparison 80 4.5.5 Manning 81 4.6 Hull Engineering 81 4.6.1 Hull Geometry 83 4.6.2 Weight Engineering 84 4.6.3 Hydrodynamics-Resistance and Powering 85 4.6.4 Hydrodynamics-Seakeeping 85 4.6.5 Hydrodynamics-Maneuvering. Control and Appendages 86 4.6.6 Structural Engineering 87 4.6.7 Space and Arrangements 88 4. 7 Machinery Systems Engineering 88 4.7.1 Machinery Systems Design and Integration 89 4.7.2 Propulsion Systems 90 4.7.3 Electrical Systems 91 4.7.4 Auxiliary and Support Systems 92 4.7.5 Deck. Handling and Aviation Support Systems 92 4. 8 Mission Systems Engineering 93 4.8.1 Mission Systems Selection, Design and Integration 93 4.8 2 Topside Design and Integration 95 4. 9 Cost Engineering 96 4.9.1 Cost Estimates and Analysis 96 5 Process Model Sectors 98 5. 1 Process Sector 98 5.1.1 Primary Work Flow 101 4 65432 5.1.2 Review and Approval Factors 101 5.1.3 Error Generation and Detection 102 5.1.4 Design Feedback 103 5. Scheduling Sector 1 03 5.2.1 Desired Schedule 103 5.2.2 Phase, Review and Approval Initiation 106 5. Productivity Sector 107 5. Manpower Availability and Assignment Sectors 109 5.4.1 Naval Ship Design Organization and Resource Structure 109 5.4.2 Manpower and Adjustments 117 5.5 Financial Sector 119 Hypothesis Testing, Modeling Resitts .and Conclusions 122 6.1 Baseline Model Results 122 6.2 WhatifCAE/CAD/CAMAre Used? 125 6. What ifConcurrent Engineering and IPTs Are Applied 127 Conclusions and Future Work 130 7. 1 Conclusions 130 7. Future Uses and Work 131 Appendices 133 8.1 Bibliography 133 8.2 Thank you..'. 137 8. Glossary and Abbreviations 138 8. Design Task. Discipline and Duration Resources 147 8. Baseline DDG-5 1 Task and Productivity Levels 149 8. Programmatic Task Development and Processing 152 8. 7 Na\>al Ship Design Process Model 158 1 Problem Statement In June 1990. under the direction of Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Chief Engineer. RADM Roger Home, the United States Navy undertook a program to assess the effectiveness of the naval ship design, acquisition and construction (DAC) process. The focus of this project was "to identify the critical actions necessary to improve the quality of future ship designs (i.e. meeting customer's performance requirements), to reduce ship costs (from research and development through disposal), and to reduce the cycle time required from establishment of requirements to delivery of the lead ship ."' It was immediately recognized that naval ship acquisition is itself unique within the constrained framework of the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of the Navy (DON) organization. In particular. Navy ships are bought in small quantities, have very long development cycles, and are 2 extremely costly. precluding the "fly before you buy" approaches required for purchase of other weapon systems. Additionally, the technical complexity of warship design has passed the point that any "one" individual can be an 3 "expert" in all aspects of the design. The resulting process is neither well documented nor well understood. Although the purpose for the DAC program was very wide-ranging, the specific reasons prompting the DAC effort were clear: increasing naval performance requirements are resulting in increasing ship costs and increasing 4 cycle times for delivery. The resulting "Affordability Crisis" put strong pressure on the DOD to reform the acquisition process. This "Crisis" is analyzed by examining three key symptoms: mcreasing design cycle time, constraints leading to sub-optimal system performance, and increasing cost trends. 1.1 "Affordability Crisis" 1.1.1 Cycle Time The time required to conceptualize, design and produce new ship designs has been increasing steadily over the years. Consider the trends for naval combatant programs shown in Figure 1 . Conceptual Design time (concept design and preliminary design) is increasing at a rate of 1 .5 months per year Contract Award time (from program start through completion of contract design) is increasing at a rate of 3 months per year. Time to deliver completed ships is increasing at a rate of 5 months per year. These trends are coupled with exponentially increasing man-day efforts required to deliver ship designs (Figure 1). These trends are disturbing as they represent a barrier to providing warfighters with timely systems necessary to meet threats. The causes of these trends are numerous and will be discussed in depth in Chapter 2. 1 RADM Roger B. Home, "Concept to Commissioning: Ship Design, Acquisition and Construction Process Improvement Workshop II", Richmond, VA, May 6-7, 1991. 2 Ryan and Jons, "Improving the Ship Design, Acquisition and Construction Process", Association of Scientists and lh Engineers, 28 Annual Technical Symposium, April 11. 1991 3 Tibbitts and Keane. "Making Design Everybody's Job". Naval Engineers Journal. May 1995, page 286. 4 Timothy P McCue, "The Dynamics of Naval Shipbuilding-a Systems Approach". Department of Ocean Engineering Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles
    The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles The Chinese Navy Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Saunders, EDITED BY Yung, Swaine, PhILLIP C. SAUNderS, ChrISToPher YUNG, and Yang MIChAeL Swaine, ANd ANdreW NIeN-dzU YANG CeNTer For The STUdY oF ChINeSe MilitarY AffairS INSTITUTe For NATIoNAL STrATeGIC STUdIeS NatioNAL deFeNSe UNIverSITY COVER 4 SPINE 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY COVER.indd 3 COVER 1 11/29/11 12:35 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 1 11/29/11 12:37 PM 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 2 11/29/11 12:37 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington, D.C. 2011 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 3 11/29/11 12:37 PM Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Chapter 5 was originally published as an article of the same title in Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), 144–169. Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Used by permission. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Chinese Navy : expanding capabilities, evolving roles / edited by Phillip C. Saunders ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations
    China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations The modular transfer system between a Type 054A frigate and a COSCO container ship during China’s first military-civil UNREP. Source: “重大突破！民船为海军水面舰艇实施干货补给 [Breakthrough! Civil Ships Implement Dry Cargo Supply for Naval Surface Ships],” Guancha, November 15, 2019 Primary author: Chad Peltier Supporting analysts: Tate Nurkin and Sean O’Connor Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in this commissioned research report. 1 Contents Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 4 Methodology, Scope, and Study Limitations ........................................................................................................ 6 1. China’s Expeditionary Operations
    [Show full text]
  • American Naval Policy, Strategy, Plans and Operations in the Second Decade of the Twenty- First Century Peter M
    American Naval Policy, Strategy, Plans and Operations in the Second Decade of the Twenty- first Century Peter M. Swartz January 2017 Select a caveat DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. CNA’s Occasional Paper series is published by CNA, but the opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CNA or the Department of the Navy. Distribution DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. PUBLIC RELEASE. 1/31/2017 Other requests for this document shall be referred to CNA Document Center at [email protected]. Photography Credit: A SM-6 Dual I fired from USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) during a Dec. 14, 2016 MDA BMD test. MDA Photo. Approved by: January 2017 Eric V. Thompson, Director Center for Strategic Studies This work was performed under Federal Government Contract No. N00014-16-D-5003. Copyright © 2017 CNA Abstract This paper provides a brief overview of U.S. Navy policy, strategy, plans and operations. It discusses some basic fundamentals and the Navy’s three major operational activities: peacetime engagement, crisis response, and wartime combat. It concludes with a general discussion of U.S. naval forces. It was originally written as a contribution to an international conference on maritime strategy and security, and originally published as a chapter in a Routledge handbook in 2015. The author is a longtime contributor to, advisor on, and observer of US Navy strategy and policy, and the paper represents his personal but well-informed views. The paper was written while the Navy (and Marine Corps and Coast Guard) were revising their tri- service strategy document A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, finally signed and published in March 2015, and includes suggestions made by the author to the drafters during that time.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cost of the Navy's New Frigate
    OCTOBER 2020 The Cost of the Navy’s New Frigate On April 30, 2020, the Navy awarded Fincantieri Several factors support the Navy’s estimate: Marinette Marine a contract to build the Navy’s new sur- face combatant, a guided missile frigate long designated • The FFG(X) is based on a design that has been in as FFG(X).1 The contract guarantees that Fincantieri will production for many years. build the lead ship (the first ship designed for a class) and gives the Navy options to build as many as nine addi- • Little if any new technology is being developed for it. tional ships. In this report, the Congressional Budget Office examines the potential costs if the Navy exercises • The contractor is an experienced builder of small all of those options. surface combatants. • CBO estimates the cost of the 10 FFG(X) ships • An independent estimate within the Department of would be $12.3 billion in 2020 (inflation-adjusted) Defense (DoD) was lower than the Navy’s estimate. dollars, about $1.2 billion per ship, on the basis of its own weight-based cost model. That amount is Other factors suggest the Navy’s estimate is too low: 40 percent more than the Navy’s estimate. • The costs of all surface combatants since 1970, as • The Navy estimates that the 10 ships would measured per thousand tons, were higher. cost $8.7 billion in 2020 dollars, an average of $870 million per ship. • Historically the Navy has almost always underestimated the cost of the lead ship, and a more • If the Navy’s estimate turns out to be accurate, expensive lead ship generally results in higher costs the FFG(X) would be the least expensive surface for the follow-on ships.
    [Show full text]
  • Old Ships and Ship-Building Days of Medford 1630-1873
    OLD SHIPS AND SHIP-BUILDING DAYS OF MEDFORD 1630-1873 By HALL GLEASON WEST MEDFORD, MASS. 1936 -oV Q. co U © O0 •old o 3 § =a « § S5 O T3». Sks? r '■ " ¥ 5 s<3 H " as< -,-S.s« «.,; H u « CxJ S Qm § -°^ fc. u§i G rt I Uh This book was reproduced by the Medford Co-operative Bank. January 1998 Officers Robert H. Surabian, President & CEO Ralph W. Dunham, Executive Vice President Henry T. Sampson, Jr., Senior Vice President Thomas Burke, Senior Vice President Deborah McNeill, Senior Vice President John O’Donnell, Vice President John Line, Vice President Annette Hunt, Vice President Sherry Ambrose, Assistant Vice President Pauline L. Sampson, Marketing & Compliance Officer Patricia lozza, Mortgage Servicing Officer Directors John J. McGlynn, Chairman of the Board Julie Bemardin John A. Hackett Richard M. Kazanjian Dennis Raimo Lorraine P. Silva Robert H. Surabian CONTENTS. Chapter Pagf. I. Early Ships 7 II. 1800-1812 . 10 III. War of 1812 19 IV. 1815-1850 25 V. The Pepper Trade 30 VI. The California Clipper Ship Era . 33 VII. Storms and Shipwrecks . 37 VIII. Development of the American Merchant Vessel 48 IX. Later Clipper Ships 52 X. Medford-Built Vessels . 55 Index 81 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Page Clipper Ship Thatcher Magoun Frontispiece Medford Ship-Builders 7 Yankee Privateer 12 Mary Pollock Subtitle from Kipling’s “Derelict *’ 13 Heave to 20 The Squall . 20 A Whaler 21 Little White Brig 21 Little Convoy 28 Head Seas 28 Ship Lucilla 28 Brig Magoun 29 Clipper Ship Ocean Express 32 Ship Paul Jones” 32 Clipper Ship “Phantom” 32 Bark Rebecca Goddard” 33 Clipper Ship Ringleader” 36 Ship Rubicon 36 Ship Bazaar 36 Ship Cashmere 37 Clipper Ship Herald of the Morning” 44 Bark Jones 44 Clipper Ship Sancho Panza 44 Clipper Ship “Shooting Star 45 Ship “Sunbeam” .
    [Show full text]
  • Sw570-F0-Mmo-A70
    SW570-F0-MMO-A70 0640-LP-102-7699 Rev 00 TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR SURFACE MINE COUNTERMEASURES, AN/SLQ-37(V)3 AND AN/SLQ-38; MINESWEEPING SYSTEMS, MCM CLASS SHIPS; SYSTEM MANUAL; ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL (COAXIAL CABLE SET) DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT C: Distribution limited to U. S. Government Agencies and their contractors; administrative/operational use; 01 July 2004. Other requests for this document must be referred to Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 043). WARNING: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C. Sec 2751, et seq) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (Title 50, U.S.C. App 2401 et seq). Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DOD Directive 5230.25. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document. PUBLISHED BY DIRECTION OF COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND SW570-F0-MMO-A70 0640-LP-102-7699 Rev 00 TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR SURFACE MINE COUNTERMEASURES, AN/SLQ-37(V)3 AND AN/SLQ-38; MINESWEEPING SYSTEMS, MCM CLASS SHIPS; SYSTEM MANUAL; ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL (COAXIAL CABLE SET) DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT C: Distribution limited to U. S. Government Agencies and their contractors; administrative/operational use; 01 July 2004. Other requests for this document must be referred to Naval Sea Systems Command (SEA 043). WARNING: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C. Sec 2751, et seq) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (Title 50, U.S.C.
    [Show full text]
  • Landing Together: Pacific Amphibious Development and Implications for the U.S. Fleet
    June 2016 Landing Together Pacific Amphibious Development and Implications for the U.S. Fleet PROJECT DIRECTOR Kathleen H. Hicks AUTHORS Kathleen H. Hicks Mark F. Cancian Andrew Metrick John Schaus A Report of the CSIS International Security Program About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in November 2015. Former U.S. deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre has served as the Center’s president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2016 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
    [Show full text]
  • NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS Cost-Effectiveness of Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered Carriers
    United States General Accounting Office GAO Report to Congressional Requesters August 1998 NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS Cost-Effectiveness of Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered Carriers GAO/NSIAD-98-1 United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-259298 August 27, 1998 The Honorable Ted Stevens Chairman The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United States Senate The Honorable C.W. Bill Young Chairman The Honorable John P. Murtha Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on National Security Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives The aircraft carrier forms the building block of the Navy’s forward deployed peacetime presence, crisis response, and war-fighting forces. The nuclear-powered carrier is the most expensive weapon system in the Nation’s arsenal and represents a significant portion of the Navy’s shipbuilding and conversion future years defense program. As requested, this report discusses the cost-effectiveness to the Navy of using conventionally and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. As the Defense Department and the Navy assess design concepts for a new class of carriers, they will evaluate a number of factors, including different propulsion types. This report contains information and analysis that you may find useful in the process of allocating future defense resources. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, Navy, Energy, and State and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. Please contact me on (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Global Navy—Today's Challenge for the United States And
    Naval War College Review Volume 73 Number 4 Autumn 2020 Article 4 2020 China’s Global Navy—Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy James E. Fanell U.S. Navy (Ret.) Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Fanell, James E. (2020) "China’s Global Navy—Today’s Challenge for the United States and the U.S. Navy," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 4 , Article 4. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Fanell: China’s Global Navy—Today’s Challenge for the United States and t Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.), concluded a career of nearly thirty years as a naval intelligence officer specializing in Indo-Pacific security affairs, with an emphasis on China’s navy and operations. He most recently served as the director of intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He is a Government Fellow with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the creator and manager of the Indo-Pacific security forum Red Star Rising. Naval War College Review, Autumn 2020, Vol. 73, No. 4 Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020 1 Naval War College Review, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
    Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs July 22, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33741 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Summary The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a relatively inexpensive Navy surface combatant equipped with modular “plug-and-fight” mission packages for countering mines, small boats, and diesel- electric submarines, particularly in littoral (i.e., near-shore) waters. Navy plans call for fielding a total force of 52 LCSs. Twelve LCSs were funded from FY2005 through FY2012. Another four (LCSs 13 through 16) were funded in FY2013, although funding for those four ships has been reduced by the March 1, 2013, sequester on FY2013 funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2014 budget requests $1,793.0 million for four more LCSs (LCSs 17 through 20), or an average of about $448 million per ship. Two very different LCS designs are being built. One was developed by an industry team led by Lockheed; the other was developed by an industry team that was led by General Dynamics. The Lockheed design is built at the Marinette Marine shipyard at Marinette, WI; the General Dynamics design is built at the Austal USA shipyard at Mobile, AL. LCSs 1, 3, 5, and so on are Marinette Marine-built ships; LCSs 2, 4, 6, and so on are Austal-built ships. The 20 LCSs procured or scheduled for procurement in FY2010-FY2015 (LCSs 5 through 24) are being procured under a pair of 10-ship, fixed-price incentive (FPI) block buy contracts that the Navy awarded to Lockheed and Austal USA on December 29, 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • Refueling and Complex Overhaul of the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) : Lessons for the Future / John F
    Refueling and Complex Overhaul of the (CVN 68) Lessons for the Future John F. Schank, Mark V. Arena, Denis Rushworth, John Birkler, James Chiesa R National Defense Research Institute The research described in this report was conducted for the U.S. Navy within the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Planning and executing the refueling and complex overhaul of the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) : lessons for the future / John F. Schank ... [et al.]. p. cm. “MR-1632.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-3288-7 1. Nimitz (Ship : CVN-68) 2. Nuclear aircraft carriers—United States— Maintenance and repair. 3. Marine nuclear reactor plants—United States— Maintenance and repair. I. Schank, John F. (John Frederic), 1946– VA65.N625 P53 2002 359.9'4835—dc21 2002035781 Cover photo: USS Nimitz (CVN68), courtesy of Northrop Grumman Newport News, Mike Dillard, photographer. RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Cover design by Maritta Tapanainen © Copyright 2002 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress
    Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress Updated October 29, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RS22478 Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress Summary Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy’s ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. Section 1749 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 of December 20, 2019) prohibits the Secretary of Defense, in naming a new ship (or other asset) or renaming an existing ship (or other asset), from giving the asset a name that refers to, or includes a term referring to, the Confederate States of America, including any name referring to a person who served or held leadership within the Confederacy, or a Confederate battlefield victory. The provision also states that “nothing in this section may be construed as requiring a Secretary concerned to initiate a review of previously named assets.” Section 1749 of the House-reported FY2021 NDAA (H.R. 6395) would prohibit the public display of the Confederate battle flag on Department of Defense (DOD) property, including naval vessels.
    [Show full text]