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American countries, thus shaping their foreign PH ILl PAGEE policies, the patterns of their economic growth and their social structures.2 It falls into three sections. The first (1956-60) is INSIDE THE COMPANY an account of the recruitment and training of a CIA agent, which brings out the attractions of this career, especially for someone liable to be conscriptedforVietnam,anditsunderlying political philosophy. The reader is struck by how much the original and legal purpose, information gathering and analysis, has been supplemented by a new and illegal one, covert intervention in the politics of foreign countries, using advanced technology. The second, taking up the bulk of the book, is about the operations of CIA 'stations' in the years 1960-68 in , and . This is an important primary source on both US policy in and the internal politics of these three countries. Thelastsectionincludestheauthor'sown appraisal of the agency and describes his efforts from 1968-74, mostly in Paris and London, to writethisexposure,"helped"byvarious "friends", some of whom turned out to be CIA agents trying to stop the book being published and to silence the author. ÇI'his section would make an exciting film.) The emphasis on the work the author had to do before writing the book raises some questions about its value as a primary source. The diary formatis,astheintroduction acknowledges, simply an ex post artifice:"intensive research" The CIA and the social sciences: the contribution was needed to "reinforce my own recollections." of Mr Agee. This device (seemingly unnecessary) might be Inside the Company: CIA Diary.' taken to justify the lack of professional notice. Philip Agee, Penguin, 1975, £1.00. But although no doubt there are minor errors, Dudley Seers and perhaps the author's perceptions were less This book has not been getting adequate pro- naive at the time than he now remembers, there fessional notice, especially in the journals. Many isnot much reasontoquestion the general social scientists have read it with varying degrees picture that emerges. The known framework of of approval but as far as I know very few, if any, US Latin American policy in the l960s is as treat it as relevant to their models. Yet it is no depicted here. Subsequent Congressional hearings longer professionallydefensible to ignore the have provided evidence quite consistent with what CIA. What the book describes is outside inter- 2 An earlier exposure, The CIA and ehe Cuir ofIntel- ventionsufficiently powerfultoinfluencethe lsgence by and John D. Marks (UK editicn:Jonathan Cape, 1974) was marred by numerous balanceofpoliticalforcesinseveralLatin deletionsto meet the requirementsof US government censorship. In anycase,itdoes not contain nearly so much field materialMarchetti worked forthe CIA in I This was written before the recent deportation crder against Washington and Marks wasintheStateDepartment. theauthor.Ibenefited from the comments ofseveral However, its interesting data on general CIA policies and colleagues at IDS. practices are brcadly consistent with Agee's book.

53 Agee describes.3 Naming dozens of CIA officials, Social scientists are, one would like to think, not agents, cover organisations and operations add immune from moral revulsion either, despite the conviction. inroads of positivism, but we have another con- cern as well: how the material in this book affects For the general reader this is a repugnant story. our models, in the sense of broad theoretical Ministers are bribed, arrests arranged of radical and reformist leaders, enemy agents provided frameworks. with girl-friends and blackmailed, rumours manu- Scholars in many disciplines (and virtuallyall facturedandspread,journalistsandeditors international civil servants) treat governments, if bought, generals and admirals induced to commit only implicitly, as sovereign and genuine spokes- treason,terroristssubsidised,workers paid to men for their nation's interest. Others, especially form breakawayunions,studentassociations but not only Marxists, also see them as repre- destroyed and new ones established, police forces sentative, although only of a dominant class or equipped with the latest electrical gadgetry.4 at least social coalition. The assumption that they speak for any national interest, however narrowly In the early years of his CIA career, Mr Agee defined, has already been partially undermined believed that these means were justified by the by the growing work of 'dependence' theorists ends, a combination of democracy and social on how economic, political and military pressures reform, asoutlinedin the documents of the constrain a government's room to manoeuvre, Alliance for Progress. Thwarting Communism, and even more by recent work on cultural de- especially Cuban and Soviet foreign policy, was pendence, the moulding of the minds of decision- apre-conditionforachieving them.But he makers by imported theories and attitudes. The noticed that it was this condition which was in sovereignty of a government becomes scarcely fact treated as the real objective. Much effort, for credibleatall when we learn that numerous example, was spent buying support throughout cabinet ministers and senior civil and military the hemisphere for the CIA-organised Bay of officialsaresalaried employees of an agency Pigs invasion in 1961, and financing parties and of another government (notallof them,of politicians who favoured breaking off diplomatic course, conscious of the true source of funds).6 relations with . On the other hand, the What exactly is 'the State' in such a case? An agency devoted no resources at all to arranging electrode has been implanted in the cortex and for the exile or imprisonment of powerful land- thisasalways throws doubt on the subject's owners:itdid not even bother to invent any identity. rumours or pay any journalists to discredit them. Another fundamental question is raised about the Indeed, it was so keen to prevent hostile or even very substance of international relations. Accord- non-aligned governments from taking power that ing to material presented in this book, US foreign it backed those who were most corrupt and reac- policy in many key fields is decided and imple- tionary. especially in the armed forces, and used mented by the CIA, leaving ambassadors in the any means, however sordid, to support them. The countries concerned largely ritual functions. (One author wasintheendsickened.Itwasa ambassador preferred not to know about the traumatic experience to hear the groans of a man activitiesoftheagency.)7 To studytreaties, being tortured by the Uruguayan secret police speeches and otherofficial documents may be and realise it was someone he had himself de- dangerously misleading, when the most important nounced. Another was the massacre of students elementsininternationalbehaviour are clan- in (just before the 1968 Olympic destineactivitiesinthis'informalsector'of games)bya governmentwhosePresident, diplomacy. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, was a "close collaborator of the Mexico City station."5 Questions are also raised about analyses on a nationalplane.Itisclearthatastudyof 3 CIA operations in Chile are described in detail in Hearings Ecuadorian politics would hardly be scientifically before the Select Committee to study Government Opera- defensible unless it took acount of the CIA as a tions with RespecttoIntelligenceActivities of the US Senate, Vol. 7 Covert Action especially Appendix Covert causal factor, whatever the model used. This Action in Chile 1963-1973: Staff Report, US Government Printing Office, 1976. applies to micro-level research too. If a political 4 Of course, as became revealed in the closing months of the Nixon regime, CIA techniques began to seep back into 6 A President must often look around the Cabinet room and the USA itself,ashas happened elsewhere(cf. OAS wonder which of his colleagues is also on the payroll. To operationsinFrance).Indeedtheagencybecamean paraphraseStanley Baldwin, who once claimed that he accomplice in some of President Nixon's illegalactivities, had formed a Cabinet of which Harrow could be proud, b-eh directly and through former agents such as Howard Ecuador at this time had a Cabinet which was a credit to Hunt. the CIA. 5 The author contrasts the agency's activities pointedly with 7 On the other hand, Ambassador Korry knew of and sup- the public pleaofitsformer director, : ported most of thecovert CIA actionsagainstAllende. "You've got to trust us. We are honourable men." Select Committee Hearings op cit.

54 historian wanted toexplain why (say) bombs Once in power, the new military governments were placed in churches in Cuenca (9/i/62) or havetorelyheavilyonimportedcapital, Guayaquil (20/1/62), research should start by especiallyprivatecapital,althoughsubstantial an interview with the then chief of the CTA aid also suddenly becomes available. This is also station on his objectives, how he expected bomb- true of governments which have corne to power ing to help achieve them, how he evaluated the with less evident CIA support, but which use its results,etc. Since even identifying him will not helpsubsequentlyinruthlesssuppressionof normally be possible, much research inevitably egalitarian political forcesas in most of Latin misses the main factorsand CIA officials must America now. The reader of this book would oftenbe amusedatthenaivetyofsocial look askance at sociological projects designed to scientists. explain the extent to which poverty is caused by It appears from this book that the agency's in- the attitudes and customs of the poor. The poor fluence is usually decisive. A clearly definable are poor, he would conclude, because the CIA pattern can be seen in its procedures for destroy- believes that this suits US interests. The situation ing governments itconsiders unhelpful to US intheregion,especially the'southerncone', interests. The process by which Arosemena was seems stabilised in the long-term interests of US overthrown by the Ecuadorian military shows a foreign policy (at least on the CIA's interpreta- strong formal similarity with the pattern of later tion of this). Indeed there appears to be a sort of coups d'etat which demolished the governments transnationalisationofcounter-insurgency. A of Jaganin Guyana, Goulart inBrazil and group of governments are determined to elimin- (especially) Allende in Chile.8 Trade unions are ate, expel or demoralise a whole generation of created or stimulated to organise strikes which reformist and revolutionaryintellectuals,with disrupt economic life;9 press articles and leaflets their own security forces aided by CIA training, are circulated to whip up hysteria and undermine equipment and facilities for exchanging informa- law and order; provocateurs are hired to set off tion. This is the counter-part to what is seen as explosions and start riots; officers in the armed a transnational threat of communism. forces are supplied with up-to-date hardware and In such circumstances the economists in planning bribes; plans for a Communist revolution are offices could only affect the pattern of growth forged, planted and brought to light at a con- marginally,howeversophisticatedtheirtech- venientmoment.1°Theverycounter-moves niques, even if they were allowed a more than provoked(importsofarms from communist ritualisticrole.12(Sophistication would merely countries, censorship, etc.) fit the propaganda line mask irrelevance.) Purely economic analysis is and help stimulate and justify a military take- in facttrivial:a function in which the only over. A high priority in research should, in fact, exogenous variables are economic is technically be toexplorethis patternof CIA-engineered mis-specified. For this reason, lectures on (say) changes of government: it would be of help to economic development which left out the CIA governments to whom the same treatment might would be biased. be applied in the future'1including, possibly, So would any text on official statistics which did some in Europe. the same. It would be interesting to know where CIA transactions (a) should (b) do appear in the 8 An earlier example, perhaps the model, was the overthrow of the Arbenz administration in Guatemala in the l950s, balance of payments or estimates of personal except that this involved military invasion (with the com- plicity of the government of ). income, and similarly for CIA agents in statistics 9 One major contribution of the book is te show the strength of employment. Presumably a statistician who of CIA influenceinunions,inco-operation withthe AFL/CIO, especially through itscontrl of ORIT. the had the data would construct a separate table for LatinAmericanregionalorganisationofthe WCFTU. This evidencetendsto support world models, such as its activities in a system of national accounts. It thoseof Sunkel, which treat the industrial proletariat in would make an interesting example for a UN modern sectorsasbasically'transnational'andtherefore non-revolutionary, in contrast to Marxist models. However, statistical manual (eg on the System of National one could argue that CIA intervention is so powerful that thebehaviouroforganisedlabour(viz,thestrikeof Accounts), of an 'informal' sector the dimen- Chilean copper workers against the Allende government) sions of which have to be guessed.'3 But for pur- isevidence more of the agency's influence than of new class alliances. poses of aggregative measures of welfare what 10 Meanwhile USAID and the Export-Imprt Bank cut off finan- cial support and US representatives endeavour to get inter- isits 'output'and in principle should this be national agencies, such as IBRD and the Inter-American considered a 'final' product? Development Bank, tdo the same. il Internationalagencies wouldbe rendering aservice by providing technicalassistance to improve security against 12 Actually the Ministerof Economics inEcuador wasa clandestineoperationsorganised byforeign governments, CIA agent,andtheMinisterofPlanninganunpaid although of course the governments most in need of such collaborator. help may be too heavily infiltrated to request it. Agencies 13 Are there, one wonders, any proxies one could useeg are in any case hardly autonomous enough to provide such 'deaths due to unidentifiablecauses', numbers ofauto- assistance. mobiles owned by cabinet ministers?

55 Questions are alsoraised by statistics of law roots too deep for any foreign agency to be as enforcement. Some arrests, convictions, imprison- effective as in many countries of Latin America. ments, executions, are for universally recognised And itwould beextremely hardtocontrol crimes, such as robbery or murder for personal really large countries, especially India.'5 There gain. But in many countries (eg Chile), they cover have been plenty of well-known CIA 'failures'- those who merely have the wrong political views. notably Cuba, (where they could not manage to Indeed, in the 'southern cone' of Latin America, assassinatethe Prime Minister, even with the many of the murders are done by agents of the helpof many marvelsof modernscience), state themselves (often in plain clothes), or by Eastern Europe and South East Asia and China. vigilantesthe informal gendarmerieandre- These have to be set against the 'successes'. main unrecorded. Moreover, the CIA is only one of the US de- Another example: aid is usually treated as suffi- partments operating inLatin America. Apart ciently homogeneous to be summed. Yet what is from State, Defense,'6 Agriculture and Labor are the meaning of statistics, such as those published especially active. Unless one believes in simplistic by OECD, adding Swedish (or British) assistance conspiracy theses it would be a mistake to assume for Kenyan rural development to US 'public that these always toe the CIA line. (However, safety' aid to improve police interrogation tech- under CIA-State liaison became niques in Latin Americaoften applied against close in Washington, eg over Chile.) There is peasant leaders? What welfare implications do also the private sector.In this book the US we draw from the increase in such a total?'4 multinationals appear as convenient covers for Identifying the 'recipient' also becomes difficult CIA agents on occasion: they actually, however, if aid is requested by a minister who is in fact influence the pattern of development in many an agent of the donor. The problems of the social other ways, eg by paying out their own bribes scientist are even greater. In the first place, much andexertingdirectpressurethemselves,not of the data in current use, especially about Com- necessarily always in alliance with the agency, munistcountries,consistof'disinformation' and also by influencing consumption patterns, circulated by the agency. Moreover, many major choice of techniques, etc. research projects have been initiated, financed and steered by the agency (often without the In any case, while the book may correctly des- knowledge of the researchers). cribe how CIA officials have perceived their role, we must not confuse this with actuality. The over- Yet we must not exaggerate the agency's influ- seas branch of any agency is bound to exagger- ence. While it is indefensible for social scientists ate its effectiveness in reports to its headquarters, to ignore the CIA, it would also be a mistake to since these are the basis of decisions on personnel go to the other extreme. In the first place, the promotion and resource allocation, and eventu- materialpresentedherecoversonlyLatin ally comes tobelieve much of the hyperbole America. Itis reasonable to presume that the itself. Even the CIA's opponents have reason to influence of the agency (or 'company') has been overstate its power: this gives them an excuse much weaker in other continents, except South- when they are defeated, as in Chile, or when they EastAsia(andIranandZaire).Informal remaininactiveandhelpstheirpropaganda diplomacy à la CIA is certainly practised by when they succeed, eg in Cuba. (Analogously the agencies of other governments: their invisibility CIA is bound to exaggerate the power of Com- reflects the fact that exposure is more difficult munism in order to justify its claims on resources than in the United States. No doubt French and its secrecy.) intelligence services are highly active in West Africa, and are not only 'gathering data'. But In fact, the impact of the CIA may be much less inmany countriesseveral agenciesmust be 15 One would expect (and the book's material is not incnsistent operating and this very diversity provides the with this expectation) a'small country effect' as in aid- ie that CIA expenditure per capita of the 'host' population 'host' with a degree of protection (just a diversity would tend to be smaller the larger the population. in aid or trade reduces economic dependence): 16 In a lecture at Oxford last June, Orlando Letelisr, former Defence Minister of Allende, stated that there was mount- casual observation suggests that cooperation even ing evidence that the Defense Intelligence Agency of the United States (the DIA) participated directly in the planning among 'We tern' intelligence agencies is cautious. and implementation of the coup in Chile. However, a deal Moreover, local nationalism often has historical was seemingly struck betwern Kissinger and Senator Frank Church, head of the SenateSelect Committee thatin- vestigated CIA actions in Chile, whereby the Ford govern- 14 The liberal and humanitarian oblectives of aid may in fact ment would cooperate in providing information about the be ovrrwhelmed, in the case of donors with malor overseas activities of the CIA on condition that the investigation interests, by action to support these interests. Thus while steered dear of the activities of the DIA. Sr. Letelier was parttif USAID may provide technical assistance to land subsequentlyassassinated inWashingtontheevidence reform agencies, another part may be strengthenmg the suggeststhatthis was done byagentsof DINA, the politicti forces which oppose any genuine land reform. Chilean intelligence agency.

56 than the reader might assume. Its information functions are constrained by overall policy guide- gathering isextensive, but not necessarily effi- lines which it has limited power to influence. (it cient. For a station to select and analyse what is may in fact be allowed less autonomy under the relevant from the thousands of tape-hours of Carteradministration,atleasttemporarily, monitoredconversationsmustbeimmensely especially in initiating covert action.) difficult. We can also infer from the rather crude views quotedthough in this respect the author's Moreover, the Latin American regimes now being reconstructions are somewhat suspectthat CIA supported may well prove incapable of contain- staffsare not nearly sufficiently knowledgeable ing the social pressures which are being generated. about local situations to play politics with great Ifso, the future influence of the agency (and success. Its personnel are no doubt usually far thus the US government) will be weakened by less sophisticated than their field agents. Indeed association with political elements, and by the the latter must often be able to get away with a employment of methods which must appear des- mere pretence of activity. They have every reason picable to many of the next generation of Latin not to become too dependent on the agency: over American political leaders (as is already the case the years it must have dawned on agents that in Greece). This raises the question whether the CIA policies and thus choice of agents fluctuates national interests of the USA which the agency with changes in Washington and replacements of is supposed to serve, such as military security, local agency personnel. Although severance pay might not be better promoted, especially in the is apparently generous, only a very simple rural longer term,by,forexample,switching the policeman could look on the CIA as the source bulk of the more than $1 billion spent on the of a secure career for a foreigner. agency" to support commodity prices. (It is un- Even more to the point, those on CIA payrolls likely,however, thatsuchcrucialcost-benefit must receive money for doing many things they analyses are ever carried out.) An even bigger would do anyway. After all, there were military question is how serious the long-term effects will coups before the CIA was bornand the police be of undermining the patriotism of many young force of Machado (say) was not exactly com- Americans. posed of gentlemen. The agency can hardly We cannot really judge precisely how the different achieve much unless strong local forces share social sciences should handle the informal sector the same objectives.17 Only in a complex and of diplomacy until we receive more information. indeterminate situation (such as, perhaps, Chile We need more defectors from the CIA and other in 1973) can its essentially marginal influence be agencies in various countries (including Britain), decisive. Nothing inthis book should leada if only to help us make social science more reader to infer that national political forces are relevant! I might perhaps conclude, however, that analytically irrelevant. two general propositions (for which other support Theagency'slong-terminfluenceonLatin is not lacking) are confirmed by reading this American governments isstill more doubtful. In book. The first is that purely economic analysis is thefirstplace,this would require consistent virtually useless, especially at the macro level; secrecy of a sort incompatible with US democratic the second that in the social sciences quantitative institutions.Inaddition,CIApolicy-making research is often largely irrelevant.

17 Thereisan interestinganalogy here with othertrans- 18 Machetti and Marks op.cit. Chaprr 3. Includes money nationaloperations. Fcreign companies, military missions, which the authors say is spent on the agency's behalf by technical assistance programmes, etc. cannot operate either Defense, AID, etc. They put the total cost of intelligence without compliant local ccunterparts. at $6 billion.

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