The Unresolved Crisis in

On 7 February Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir announced that South had overwhelmingly voted for secession from the North. A committee is now negotiating post-referendum arrangements, including the contentious issues of oil revenue, border demarcation, and the future status of Abyei. Ongoing clashes in Abyei have the potential to destabilize these negotiations—the Abyei Area Administration insists that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are supporting Missiriya militias, while the Missiriya claim that Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) troops disguised as policemen are attacking their herders as the latter proceed on their annual migration. Increased clashes could push relations between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to breaking point. As the single most volatile post-referendum issue between the two Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) parties, the Abyei dispute could block or altogether derail the negotiations set to conclude before the South's declaration of independence on 9 July 2011. The 2005 CPA promised residents of Abyei a referendum to decide whether the territory will join North or , to be held simultaneously with the vote on South Sudan's independence. The vote did not occur, however, due to a heated dispute between and Juba over who should be eligible to vote. The CPA stipulates that voting rights should be given to the Ngok Dinka and 'other Sudanese residing in the area'. The NCP maintained that the Missiriya—semi-nomadic cattle herders who spend up to six months of the year in Abyei— should be considered residents. The SPLM held that the Missiriya are only in Abyei for a short period each year and thus should not be granted this status. Without the referendum, the status of the territory and its peoples remains uncertain, causing deep tensions at the local level. Following clashes in January between Missiriya militia forces and a Joint Integrated Police Unit (JIPU) that left over 30 dead, two meetings were organized to improve the situation. The first was held on 13 January 2011 between Missiriya and Ngok Dinka elders to discuss migration routes through the area. The elders agreed in principle that the Missiriya would be allowed to pass through Abyei in search of pastures, as long as blood compensation was paid for Ngok Dinka deaths that occurred during the last migration season and migration routes were agreed on. As of the beginning of March 2011, the Misseriya have offered to pay the compensation, but there is no agreement on the grazing routes. Despite this, Missiriya have now entered Abyei and are currently grazing their cattle around the Ragaba es Zarga, a river running through the territory, approximately 30 km from Abyei town. As they press further south, the absence of a grazing agreement will become increasingly problematic. A second agreement was signed by the northern and southern ministers of the interior and representatives of the SPLA and SAF on 17 January. This agreement focused on ensuring safe passage for returnees to Abyei, removing the road blocks in the north of the territory, and putting in place new security arrangements. As part of this agreement, the JIPU involved in the clashes was subsequently withdrawn to Abyei town, where it is currently garrisoned, and two new battalions of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) composed of northern and southern forces were stationed in Abyei to augment the existing battalion there. Although these new units were intended to improve the security situation, in some ways they have worsened it. Some of the JIU members were taken from the 31st battalion based in South , which was involved in heavy fighting between the SPLA and SAF in Abyei town in May 2008. In the two months following the attack, SAF steadfastly blocked access to affected areas, and the total death toll is still unknown. The Ngok Dinka are now worried that events might repeat themselves. The situation came to boiling point on 12 February when an armed northern soldier from one of the JIU battalions was prevented from entering Abyei market by the police. As he walked away, he fired his weapon, leading to hundreds of people fleeing and three northern merchants being killed. Even with the new JIU battalions now in place, headquartered at Noong and Tajalei (north of Abyei town), it is uncertain how much protection they will actually offer to local residents. On 27-28 February renewed clashes occurred between JIPU members and Missiriya in Todac that left over 20 dead and the new security arrangements looking distinctly shaky. Against a backdrop of the ongoing political stalemate and clashes on the ground, prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Abyei crisis look grim. Updated March 2011 Click here for more information on the crisis in Abyei.

Click below for information on the following: • Recent militarization in Abyei • Selected armed entities operating around Abyei • Abyei and nearby oil fields (map) • Arms flows to North and • Armed entities in South Kordofan • The buildup of forces and arms in Blue Note on sourcing: This site makes use of military documents whose authenticity has been confirmed by a source close to the Joint Defence Board (JDB). The JDB is under the Presidency and composed of the chiefs of staff of the Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan People's Liberation Army, their deputies, and a number of senior officers.

Relevant Tables, Maps, and Summaries

• Potential Flashpoints, Southern Sudan and Three Areas, April 2009 (UNMIS) Map highlighting critical areas of potential inter-communal conflict • Abyei and nearby oil fields (map) • Armed Elements in the Area, August 2008 (from HSBA Issue Brief 12) Table listing armed groups of concern in the Nuba Mountains region • Nuba Mountains Map (from HSBA Issue Brief 12) Map showing the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and environs • Selected Armed Groups of Concern in South Sudan and Border Areas, March 2008 (fromHSBA Issue Brief 11) Map showing armed group locations and alignments, including in South Kordofan and Abyei • Selected Armed Groups Operating in South Sudan/South Kordofan, May 2008 (from HSBA Issue Brief 11) Table showing armed groups in South Sudan and South Kordofan as of May 2008 • Misseriya Militia Strengths and Redeployment from Abyei, May 2008 (from HSBA Issue Brief 11) Table showing redeployment of Debab and Abu Matrig Forces from Abyei

Relevant HSBA Publications

• The Drift Back to War: Insecurity and Militarization in the Nuba Mountains, HSBA Issue Brief 12, August 2008 (in ) • Allies and Defectors: An Update on Armed Group Integration and Proxy Force Activity, HSBA Issue Brief 11, May 2008 (in Arabic)