Sudan's Southern Kordofan Problem: the Next Darfur?
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SUDAN’S SOUTHERN KORDOFAN PROBLEM: THE NEXT DARFUR? Africa Report N°145 – 21 October 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. NUBA FRUSTRATIONS ................................................................................................. 2 A. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CPA AND THE SPLM ......................................................................2 1. CPA uncertainties...................................................................................................................3 2. Discontent with SPLM leadership..........................................................................................4 B. NCP MANIPULATION...................................................................................................................5 1. Keeping control over state finances........................................................................................5 2. Census concerns .....................................................................................................................7 3. Real progress? ........................................................................................................................8 C. LAND GRIEVANCES......................................................................................................................9 D. STALLED DDR AND RISK OF NEW INSURGENCY ........................................................................11 III. MISSERIYA GRIEVANCES......................................................................................... 13 A. NCP DIVIDE-AND-RULE TACTICS ..............................................................................................13 B. THE EMERGENCE OF GRASSROOTS OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS....................................................15 IV. PREVENTING RESUMED CONFLICT ..................................................................... 18 A. PREPARING THE POPULAR CONSULTATION ................................................................................18 B. A PEACEBUILDING ACTION PLAN ..............................................................................................19 V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................ 20 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SUDAN................................................................................................................................21 B. MAP OF SOUTHERN KORDOFAN .......................................................................................................22 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ....................................................................................23 D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA .............................................24 E. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES .....................................................................26 Africa Report N°145 21 October 2008 SUDAN’S SOUTHERN KORDOFAN PROBLEM: THE NEXT DARFUR? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended by the NCP and SPLM to co-opt Arab and African tribes, Sudan’s generation-long North-South civil war in 2005 respectively, prior to elections by politicising develop- is at risk in Southern Kordofan state, where many of ment policies are aggravating tensions. the same ingredients exist that produced the vicious Darfur conflict. Both parties to that agreement, the Tribal and communal reconciliation to foster peaceful National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s coexistence is a daunting but essential task. More is at Liberation Movement (SPLM), who together form the stake than the prevention of a local conflict. The fate Government of National Unity in Khartoum, have been of peacebuilding in this front-line state will say much guilty of mistakes and misjudgements there as they about the viability of Sudan’s entire peace process manoeuvre for partisan advantage in advance of national and in particular whether the CPA genuinely offers an elections scheduled for 2009. Any strategy for address- effective framework for resolving the Darfur conflict ing the problems must recognise that time is short. and satisfying all those in the country who do not belong Concrete progress on integration and reform is essen- to core SPLM and NCP constituencies. tial to address the prospect of what could be a devastat- ing new conflict. Rapid interventions are needed, well Moreover, if peacebuilding fails in the transitional before the national elections. areas of the 1956 North-South border, where the major- ity of the two armies’ troops are still concentrated, it Southern Kordofan is a new state, created by the CPA, is highly unlikely the secession option the CPA gives in the critical border area between North and South, a the South can be implemented peacefully. Though more zone of ethnic interaction between Arab (mainly Mis- than half the six-year transition period has already seriya and Hawazma) and indigenous African (mainly been lost, there is still time to implement key steps to Nuba) tribes. Inadequate implementation of the CPA’s calm the situation prior to national elections, which special protocol relating to the region has led to inse- may have to be postponed to 2010. In addition to pro- curity and growing dissatisfaction. Tribal reconciliation ducing an integrated state administration, the NCP and based on negotiation of a common agenda, establish- the SPLM need to accelerate the integration of com- ment of an efficient state government administration and batants within the Joint Integrated Units provided for adherence to the CPA’s principles of power and wealth by the CPA and otherwise pursue disarmament, demo- sharing have to be fostered from Khartoum and pushed bilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs, includ- forward by the international guarantors. There has been ing for the many militias. They must also immediately some limited recent progress, but much more is urgently release the accumulated 2 per cent share of oil revenue needed. for Southern Kordofan so major development projects can be carried out, based on an inclusive consultative The state’s inhabitants were mobilised by the opposing process involving tribal authorities. sides during the North/South war and despite the CPA remain deeply scarred by that conflict, polarised and The Nuba are bitter at their SPLM allies, believing they fragmented along political and tribal lines. They are did not negotiate a better deal for them in the CPA armed and organised and feel increasingly abandoned because they prioritised getting Abyei territory and its by their former patrons, who have not fulfilled their oil and an independence referendum commitment for promises to provide peace dividends. Return of inter- the South. But the special protocol provides for a pub- nally displaced persons (IDPs), development projects lic consultation to be held after the elections to consider and creation of an integrated state government admini- revision of the peace agreement’s terms for the new stration have all stalled. Hundreds of people have died state and address unresolved issues (for example, land in disputes over land and grazing rights, with no compre- ownership and use). Financial aid is needed for the hensive or sustainable local or national response. Efforts organisation of inter-tribal dialogue aimed at fostering reconciliation and producing a common agenda for that Sudan’s Southern Kordofan Problem: The Next Darfur? Crisis Group Africa Report N°145, 21 October 2008 Page ii consultation. Discussions should be held in particular 7. Establish proper anti-corruption mechanisms to on creation of a formal state mechanism dedicated to ensure an accountable disbursement of development resolving tribal disputes over land use and livestock funds in the state and otherwise discourage fraud. migration (transhumance) routes, such as the Southern Sudan Peace Commission created for the Southern states, To the Government of Southern Kordofan: and on identifying principles for the commission that is supposed to address the deep land grievances accumu- 8. Provide financial support to facilitate inter-tribal dia- lated by the Nuba, in particular since the early 1970s. logues and to establish an institutional mechanism for achieving and sustaining tribal reconciliation The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and other members between the Nuba and Misseriya tribes. of the international community have vital roles to play 9. Encourage a Southern Kordofan dialogue process in the stabilisation of the new state. UNMIS should between the representatives of all tribes to produce not just observe and register violent incidents, but also a common agenda, endorsed by the legislative coun- follow the example of the Joint Military Commission cil, that: (JMC) established in the Nuba Mountains after the 2002 ceasefire agreement and become an active part- a) sets out the primary objectives of the post- ner in local conflict prevention, in cooperation with elections public consultation process and iden- the tribal authorities. If its local leadership is incapa- tifies the principles to guide it; ble of this, it should be replaced. Simultaneously, the b) identifies the shortcomings of the CPA protocol, CPA’s international guarantors and Sudan’s bilateral as stipulated in its Article 3.6; partners