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A Summary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

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Accord 18_43 13/12/06 13:32 Page 32 A summary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Machakos Protocol (2002) Power Sharing (2004) Wealth Sharing (2004) A six-year interim period [dated from Sudan will have both a national A National Land Commission, 9 July 2005] is established during government with representation from Southern Sudan Land Commission which the southern Sudanese will both sides of the north-south conflict, and state land commissions are to be have the right to govern affairs in their and a separate Government of established. A National Petroleum region and participate equitably in Southern Sudan (GoSS). The Southern Commission is to be established to the national government. Sudan Constitution and state manage petroleum resources. constitution must comply with the Peace implementation is to be 2% of oil revenue will go to oil- Interim National Constitution. conducted in ways that make the producing states in southern Sudan unity of Sudan attractive. A Government of National Unity is in proportion to their output. The to be formed. There shall be a remaining net revenue will be divided After the interim period, southern decentralized system of government, evenly with 50% allocated to the GoSS Sudan will have the right to vote in an granting more power to individual and 50% allocated to the national internationally monitored referendum states. government. The GoSS has no power either to confirm Sudan’s unity or vote to negotiate any of the oil leases for secession. Positions in the state governments are granted by the national government to be split 70:30 in favour of the NCP Shari’a law is to remain applicable in prior to the CPA. in northern states (20% for other the north and parts of the constitution northern parties and 10% for the The National Government is able to are to be re-written so that shari’a SPLM) and 70:30 in favour of the SPLM collect revenue from personal income, does not apply to any non-Muslims in southern states (15% for other corporate and customs taxes; the GoSS throughout Sudan. The status of southern parties and 15% for the NCP). can collect revenue from personal shari’a in Khartoum is to be decided In Abyei, the Blue Nile State and Nuba income taxes, luxury taxes and by an elected assembly. Mountains the division will be 55% for business taxes in southern Sudan. the NCP and 45% for the SPLM. Taxes that can be collected by states are also outlined. A commission to The executive will consist of the ensure the transparency of collection Presidency and the Council of and use of revenues will be formed. Ministers. Two Vice-Presidents will be appointed by the President. The First Two banking systems will be formed Vice President is the Chair of the SPLM. in the two areas, with the Bank of Southern Sudan as a branch of the A bicameral national legislature will be Central Bank of Sudan. Essentially, the established: the National Assembly will dual banking system means that banks be comprised of specific percentages will be commonly stationed with two (NCP 52% SPLM 28% other northern different windows for service. parties 14% other southern parties 6%); two representatives from each Two separate currencies in the north state will be represented in the Council and south are to be recognized until of States. the Central Bank has designed a new currency that reflects the cultural Elections will be held by the end of the diversity of Sudan. third year of the interim period. National and southern funds for reconstruction and development will be established along with two multi- donor trust funds. Note: each summary includes relevant provisions from the corresponding implementation modalities agreement. 32 Accord 18 Accord 18_43 13/12/06 13:32 Page 33 The Resolution of the The Resolution of Conflict Security Arrangements Abyei Conflict (2004) in Southern Kordofan and (2003 & 2004) Blue Nile States (2004) Abyei will be accorded special During the six-year interim period, administrative status during the The two states will be represented at Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) of 21,000 interim period, following the definition the national level in proportion to their soldiers are to be formed with equal of the Abyei areas by the Abyei Border population size. At the state level, numbers from the Sudan Armed Commission. the NCP will comprise 55% and the Forces (SAF) and the SPLA. They are to be deployed to sensitive areas such as Abyei will have representation in the SPLM 45% of the State Executive and the three disputed areas and will be legislature of Southern Kordofan and State Legislature. commonly stationed but maintain Warap states; at the end of the six-year Southern Kordofan State (SKS): the separate command and control interim period, Abyei residents will southern portion of West Kordofan structures. If, after the interim period, vote in a referendum either to State (WKS) will be incorporated into the south decides to secede, the JIUs maintain special administrative the SKS. The state legislature will have will unify into a 39,000 strong force. status in the north or to become part 36 members from the SKS component of Bahr al-Ghazal (Warap) state in and 18 from the former WKS The SAF and the SPLA will also the south. component, subject to readjustment continue to operate as separate armies with both considered part of Sudan’s Wealth-sharing of oil revenues from following a census. The state executive National Armed Forces. Each army is Abyei is to be split between the will have 7 from SKS and 4 from WKS. to be downsized and the parties are north and south (50:42) with small Al-Fula will have branches of all state to implement demobilization, percentages of revenues allocated to ministries and institutions headed by disarmament and reintegration (DDR) other states and ethnic groups: 2% a deputy. The legislature will convene programmes. No other armed group each to: the Ngok Dinka people, the sessions alternatively at Kadugli and will be tolerated outside the umbrella Misseriyya people, Bahr al-Ghazal Al-Fula. of the three services. (Warap) state, and 1% each to Governorship of each state shall rotate Southern Kordofan state (SKS) and between the NCP and SPLM during There is to be a redeployment of the Western Kordofan sub-state the interim period. 91,000 SAF troops from the south to component of SKS. north within 2 years. The SPLA has Wealth sharing: the 2% of SKS oil due 8 months to withdraw its force from to the state is to be shared between the north. the two state components. The 2% share of Abyei’s oil due to the state A permanent cessation of hostilities is shall be equally divided between two provided for, detailing disengagement state components. The 2% forming and the creation of various committees the Misseriyya share in Abyei oil for enforcement and oversight. shall benefit the previous Western DDR and reconciliation are provided Kordofan component. for through a number of commissions. The legislature of the two states will Monitoring is to be carried out by a UN evaluate the implementation of mission to support implementation, as the CPA. provided for under Chapter VI of the State Land Commissions are to be UN Charter. established (in case decision clashes with National Land Commission and cannot be reconciled, the Constitutional Court will decide the matter). A summary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 33.
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