DOCSLIB.ORG

Signals Produced by Inconel Mineral Insulated Coaxial Cables in Neutron and Gamma-Ray Fields

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Signals Produced by Inconel Mineral Insulated Coaxial Cables in Neutron and Gamma-Ray Fields AECL-6876 ATOMIC ENERGY ^fflS L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE OF CANADA LIMITED TiBV DU CANADA LIMITEE SIGNALS PRODUCED BY INCONEL MINERAL INSULATED COAXIAL CABLES IN NEUTRON AND GAMMA-RAY FIELDS Signaux produits par des cables coaxiaux a isolation minerale en Inconel dans des champs de neutrons et de rayons gamma C.J. ALLAN and G.F. LYNCH Chaik River Nuclear Laboratories Laboratoires nucle'aires de Chalk River Chalk River, Ontario July 1980 juillet ATOMIC ENERGY OF CANADA LIMITED SIGNALS PROVUCEV BV INCONEL MINERAL INSULATED COAXIAL CABLES IN NEUTRON ANP GAMMA-RAV FIELPS by C.J. Allan and G.F. Lynch Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories Chalk River, Ontario KOJ 1J0 1980 JU1^ AECL-6876 L'ÉNERGIE ATOMIQUE DU CANADA, LIMITÉE Signaux produits par des câbles coaxlaux â isolation minérale en Inconel dans des champs de neutrons et de rayons gamma par C.J. Allan et G.F. Lynch RÉSUMÉ Les câbles à isolation minérale, employés de concert avec des détecteurs de flux auto-alimentés dans les réacteurs CANDU, ont leur gaine et leur fil de noyau faits en Inconel 600 et leur isolation faite en MgO. On a entrepris une étude pour mieux connaître fondamentalement les processus produisant du courant dans les câbles à isolation minérale et pour déterminer dans quelle mesure ces processus sont apparentés aux geometries des câbles. Un certain nombre de câbles en Inconel-Inconel ont été irradiés dans le NRU, le ZED-2 et les réacteurs piscines d'essai à Chalk River ainsi que dans un irradiateur Gammacell-200 au cobalt-60. D'autres données ont été obtenues dans la centrale nucléaire Bruce A. Laboratoires nucléaires de Chalk River Chalk River, Ontario KOJ 1J0 Juillet 1980 AECL-6876 ATOMIC ENERGY OF CANADA LIMITED SIGNALS PROVUCEV BY INC0NEL MINERAL INSULATED COAXIAL CABLES IN NEUTRON ANP GAMMA-RA/ FIELDS by C.J. Allan and G.F. Lynch ABSTRACT Mineral insulated (MI) cables used with self-powered flux detectors in CANDU reactors employ Inconel 600 as the sheath and core-wire material, and MgO as the insulation. A study was undertaken to obtain a more fundamental understanding of the current producing processes in such MI cables and to determine how these processes are related to cable geometries. A number of Inconel-Inconel cables were irradiated in the NRU, ZED-2, and Pool Test reactors at CRNL and a Gammacell-220 6°Co irradiator. Additional data were obtained from the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station-A. Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories Chalk River, Ontario KOJ 1J0 1980 July AECL-6876 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF FIGURES [II) LIST OF TABLES \lv) 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 The Use of Mineral Insulated Cables in 1 Reactors 1.2 The Interaction of Reactor Radiation with 2 Cables 1.3 Cable Geometries Studied 5 2. EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 5 2.1 Gamma-Ray Studies 5 2.1.1 Gammacell Tests 5 2.1.2 Reactor Gamma Rays 12 2.1.3 Conclusion on y~RaY Sensitivity 17 2.2 NRU Irradiations 18 2.2.1 Introduction 18 2.2.2 Variation of Signal with Core 21 Penetration 2.2.3 Variation of Sensitivity with 24 Core-Wire Diameter 2.2.4 Conclusions 34 2.3 Irradiations in the Pool Test Reactor 35 2.4 ZED-2 Tests 38 2.5 Results Obtained from Bruce NGS-A 43 2.5.2 Results from Unit 3 43 2.5.3 Summary . 55 3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 56 4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 58 5. REFERENCES 58 \U] LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 Variation of the y-ray Sensitivities for Lead Cables SC-601 to SC-606 with Sheath Mass FIGURE 2 Variation of the yray Sensitivities for 11 Lead Cables VC-501 to VC-505 and TC-101 to TC-105 with Sheath Mass FIGURE 3 Schematic of the Test Section of the X-6 14 Test Loop in the NRX Reactor. The Detectors are Designated RV for Vanadium, RP for Platinum and RC for Cobalt. In Total, some 14 Detectors are Mounted Along the Length of the Pressure Tube. Only the 6 Detectors Contained Within the 3He Coil Are Shown Here. FIGURE 4 Cross Section of the NRU Test Assembly in 19 Which the Lead Cables Were Irradiated FIGURE 5 The Current Generated in the Miniature 20 Fission Chamber Used to Measure the Lead Cable Sensitivity as a Function of TFD Position FIGURE 6 Variation of the Total Sensitivities of 26 the IMI Cable with Core-Wire Diameter FIGURE 7 Variation of the (n,g) Sensitivity, 28 S(n,$) with Core-Wire Diameter FIGURE 8 The Variation of the So-Called Reduced 30 Sensitivity, SR, with Core-Wire Diameter FIGURE 9 Variation of the (n,Y,e) Sensitivity 32 with Core-Wire Diameter for the IMI Cables Irradiated in NRU FIGURE 10 The Currents Generated in Lead Cables 36 TC-101 to TC-105 and VC-501 to VC-505, as a Function of Core-Wire Diameter, for an Irradiation in the Pool Test Reactor LIST OF FIGURES (continued) Page FIGURE 11 The Current Generated in Lead Cables 39 TC-101 to TC-105, as a Function of Core-Wire Diameter, for an Irradiation in the ZED-2 Reactor FIGURE 12 Schematic Representation of the ZED-2 40 Reactor Showing the Location of the Test Rod Relative to the Fuel Assemblies FIGURE 13 Schematic Representation of the Test 4 2 Assembly Used for Irradiating Lead Cables UC-103 to UC-106 in the ZED-2 Reactor FIGURE 14 Schematic Representation of the Bruce 44 NGS-A Reactor Showing the Location of Flux Detector Assemblies NFM-1 to NFM-20 FIGURE 15 Schematic Representation of Flux Detector 4 5 Rod, NFM-1, Installed in the Bruce NGS-A, Unit 1 Reactor FIGURE 16 Relative Sensitivities of Lead Cables 4 6 TC-101 to TC-105, as a Function of Core-Wire Diameter, Determined in the Bruce NGS-A, Unit 1 Reactor FIGURE 17 The Signal for a Test Lead Cable, 50 Installed in the Bruce NGS-A, Unit 3 Reactor, as a Function of Time, Following the Reactor Trip. The Results were Obtained During Phase B Commissioning of the Reactor FIGURE 18 Relative Sensitivity for the 1.0 mm 53 O.D. Lead Cables Installed in the Bruce NGS-A, Unit 3 Reactor as a Function of Core-Wire Diameter FIGURE 19 The Flux Distribution Along Flux 54 Detector Rod NFM-6, Bruce NGS-A, Unit 3, Determined During Phase B Commissioning of the Reactor LIST OF TABLES Page TABLE 1 Description of Experimental Cables 6 TABLE 2 Summary of the Dimensions of the Lead Cables 8 Irradiated in the Gammacell-220 Irradiator and the y~RaY Sensitivities Determined in These Irradiations TABLE 3 Summary of the Lengths and the Experimental 23 Results Obtained with the Lead Cables Which Penetrated the NRU Core to Different Elevations TABLE 4 Summary of the Dimensions and the 25 Sensitivities of the IMI Lead Cables Irradiated in the NRU Reactor TABLE 5 Summary of the Sensitivities Determined for 41 Lead Cables UC-103 to UC-106 in the ZED-2 Reactor and NRU Reactor TABLE 6 Summary of the Currents from the Lead 48 Cables Installed in the Bruce NGS-A, Unit 3 Reactor as a Function of Time During Phase B Testing. The Reactor was Raised to 10~2 of Full Power at t=0 and Tripped at t=327 min. These Data Have Been Used to Estimate the Current Due to the Decay of 5eMn and 65Ni, I,(n,B), as Discussed in the Text. TABLE 7 Summary of the Results Obtained from 49 the 1.0 mm and L6 mm IMI Lead Cables Installed in the Bruce NGS-A, Unit 3 Reactor TABLE 8 Summary of the Currents Generated by 55 1.0 mm O.D. Lead Cables of Different Lengths, for the Nominal Bruce Core, as a Function of Time After Reaching 10~2 Full Power. The Lengths of the Lead Cables are Shown in Figure 16. SIGNALS PROVUCEV BV INCOMEL MINERAL INSULATEP COAXIAL CABLES IN NEUTRON ANP GAMMA-RA/ FIELPS by C.J. Allan and G.F. Lynch 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 The Use of Mineral Insulated Cables in Reactors Because self-powered detectors (SPDs) are relatively simple, rugged, and cheap to manufacture, they are used exten- sively in CANDU nuclear reactors to (i) provide information on the distribution of flux throughout the core [1], (ii) for bulk and spatial control of the reactor [2], and (iii) for overpower protection. In most applications, a SPD consists of a coaxial cable having a metallic outer sheath, frequently the Ni-Cr-Fe alloy Inconel 600; a mineral oxide insulation layer, usually MgO or Al_O,; and a metallic central wire, commonly called the emitter. When such a device is placed in a radiation field, as for example in the neutron field in the core of a nuclear reactor and the central conductor is connected to the sheath through an ammeter, a current flows between the two electrodes without an external bias being applied. The magnitude of the current is proportional to the intensity of the radiation field, and hence can be used as a measure of the field strength. In most reactor applications, a SPD is used to measure the average flux over a localized region of the core and a lead cable must be used to bring the current signal from the detector to the measurement instrumentation. In CANDU reactors, the lead - 2 - cable is a mineral insulated (MI) coaxial cable, 1.0 mm O.D., with reactor-grade Inconel 600 being used for the sheath and core wire, and compacted MgO being used as the insulant.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Heu Repatriation Project
    HEU REPATRIATION PROJECT RATIONALE In April 2010, the governments of Canada and the United States (U.S.) committed to work cooperatively to repatriate spent highly- enriched uranium (HEU) fuel currently stored at the Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario to the U.S. as part of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, a broad international effort to consolidate HEU inventories in fewer locations around the world. This initiative PROJECT BACKGROUND promotes non-proliferation This HEU is the result of two decades of nuclear fuel use at the by removing existing weapons Chalk River Laboratories for Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) grade material from Canada research reactors, the National Research Experimental (NRX) and and transferring it to the National Research Universal (NRU), and for the production of U.S., which has the capability medical isotopes in the NRU, which has benefitted generations of to reprocess it for peaceful Canadians. Returning this material to the U.S. in its existing solid purposes. In March 2012, and liquid forms ensures that this material is stored safely in a Prime Minister Harper secure highly guarded location, or is reprocessed into other forms announced that Canada and that can be used for peaceful purposes. the U.S. were expanding their efforts to return additional Alternative approaches have been carefully considered and inventories of HEU materials, repatriation provides the safest, most secure, and fastest solution including those in liquid form. for the permanent disposition of these materials, thereby eliminating a liability for future generations of Canadians. For more information on this project contact: Email: [email protected] Canadian Nuclear Laboratories 1-866-886-2325 or visit: www.cnl.ca persons who have a legitimate need to PROJECT GOAL know, such as police or emergency response To repatriate highly-enriched uranium forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
    Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Performance Report For the period ending March 31, 2007 ________________________ ________________________ The Honourable Gary Lunn Linda J. Keen, M.Sc. Minister President and Chief Executive Officer Natural Resources Canada Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Table of Contents SECTION I: OVERVIEW........................................................................................................... 1 Message from the President and Chief Executive Officer...................................................................3 Management Representation Statement ...............................................................................................4 Summary Information..................................................................................................................... 5 Mission.................................................................................................................................... 5 Governance ............................................................................................................................. 5 Regulatory Framework ........................................................................................................... 5 Funding of CNSC Operations................................................................................................. 6 Additional Funding Resources Received for 2006-07............................................................ 6 Financial Resources ...............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Supplementary Information Written Submission from Lake Ontario
    CMD 19-M24.7A Date: 2019-10-30 File / dossier : 6.02.04 Edocs pdf : 6032342 Supplementary Information Renseignements supplémentaires Written submission from Mémoire de Lake Ontario Waterkeeper Lake Ontario Waterkeeper et and Ottawa Riverkeeper Sentinelle Outaouais Regulatory Oversight Report for Rapport de surveillance réglementaire Canadian Nuclear Laboratories des sites des Laboratoires Nucléaires (CNL) sites: 2018 Canadiens (LNC) : 2018 Commission Meeting Réunion de la Commission November 7, 2019 Le 7 novembre 2019 This page was intentionally Cette page a été intentionnellement left blank laissée en blanc Amendments have been made to these submissions to reflect additional information that has been received by Ottawa Riverkeeper and Lake Ontario Waterkeeper since October 7. In addition to some typographical corrections, the following changes were made to these previously submitted main report: 1) Recommendation #20 no longer requires that CNL confirm whether a DFO permit has been issued for any Chalk River facilities. This recommendation still requests that any assessments accompanying the permit application be provided. Now it also requests a timeline for CNSC staff consideration of the permit; 2) Recommendation #21 no longer requires that CNL confirm whether there are any ECAs for the Chalk River site. This recommendation still requests any assessments that were undertaken to determine whether one was necessary; 3) Discussions of issues concerning DFO permits and ECAs on page 20 have been updated to reflect the fact that Ottawa Riverkeeper is no longer waiting for confirmation of whether there are any DFO permits or ECAs for the Chalk River site. However, formal access to information requests are still ongoing to provide more background information on both DFO and ECA assessments, and CNL has still been asked to provide this information as well; and 4) Discussions of the Port Hope Harbour wall collapse on page 26 have been amended to reflect additional disclosures received since October 7.
    [Show full text]
  • NRC Collection of Abbreviations
    I Nuclear Regulatory Commission c ElLc LI El LIL El, EEELIILE El ClV. El El, El1 ....... I -4 PI AVAILABILITY NOTICE Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following sources: 1. The NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., Lower Level, Washington, DC 20555-0001 2. The Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P. 0. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20402-9328 3. The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161-0002 Although the listing that follows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publica- tions, it is not intended to be exhaustive. Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Document Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investigation notices; licensee event reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission papers; and applicant and licensee docu- ments and correspondence. The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the Government Printing Office: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference pro- ceedings, international agreement reports, grantee reports, and NRC booklets and bro- chures. Also available are regulatory guides, NRC regulations in the Code of Federal Regula- tions, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances. Documents available from the National Technical Information Service Include NUREG-series reports and technical reports prepared by other Federal agencies and reports prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Documents available from public and special technical libraries include all open literature items, such as books, journal articles, and transactions.
    [Show full text]
  • General Vgs Template
    Chapter 5 - Safety Systems Introduction - Special Safety Systems Functions In previous chapters we have referred to the four safety functions required in a nuclear reactor: • shut down the reactor • remove decay heat • contain any radioactivity • monitor the state of the plant. In this chapter we shall describe the major systems that perform these functions. We shall concentrate on CANDU for our examples, although other reactor types have similar systems. Shutdown Systems Shutdown is one of the most important safety functions in a reactor because it reduces the amount of energy that has to be removed from the fuel after an accident. It is usually accomplished through rapid insertion of a neutron-absorbing material into the core. Another way is to remove from the core material which is essential to the chain reaction - e.g. the moderator. There are more radical concepts possible in principle, such as removing fuel or changing the core geometry, but they are not in widespread use for fast shutdown. Before a shutdown system is designed, the requirements should be defined (although again historically, the two went along together). Here are some of the questions that must be asked, and answered: • how do we get negative reactivity into the core? • how fast does the system have to act, once it receives a signal? • how much reactivity depth must it have (how many negative milli-k?) • how reliable must it be? • what are the acceptance criteria? • what sort of signals are available and practical to trigger the shutdown system for each accident? • what sort of environment must the shutdown system be designed to withstand? • how do we ensure that a fault which could affect the control system or a shutdown system does not affect both? Or both shutdown systems? • how do we know the systems will work as designed? • how does the operator know the system has been required, and that it has worked? 1 Chapter 5 - Safety Systems.wpd Rev.
    [Show full text]
  • Fifth Canadian National Report for the Joint Convention
    Canadian National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management © Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 2014 PWGSC catalogue number CC172-23/2014E-PDF ISSN 2368-4828 Extracts from this document may be reproduced for individual use without permission provided the source is fully acknowledged. However, reproduction in whole or in part for purposes of resale or redistribution requires prior written permission from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. Également publié en français sous le titre: Rapport national du Canada pour la Convention commune sur la sûreté de la gestion du combustible usé et sur la sûreté de la gestion des déchets radioactifs Document availability This document can be viewed on the CNSC website at nuclearsafety.gc.ca. To request a copy of the document in English or French, please contact: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 280 Slater Street P.O. Box 1046, Station B Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5S9 CANADA Tel.: 613-995-5894 or 1-800-668-5284 (in Canada only) Facsimile: 613-995-5086 Email: [email protected] Website: nuclearsafety.gc.ca Facebook: facebook.com/CanadianNuclearSafetyCommission YouTube: youtube.com/cnscccsn Publishing history October, 2011 Fourth Report October, 2008 Third Report October, 2005 Second Report October, 2002 First Report ii Preface Information in this report covers the period up to March 31, 2014. However, in some instances the reporting period extends beyond this to the time of writing the report: July 31, 2014. Examples include the current status of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission’s regulatory documents, the Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s (NWMO) Adaptive Phased Management (APM) approach, and Ontario Power Generation’s (OPG) Deep Geologic Repository (DGR).
    [Show full text]
  • Decommissioning Projects at the Chalk River Laboratories Over the Next 5 Years and the Challenges with Delivery
    Waste Management, Decommissioning and Environmental Restoration for Canada’s Nuclear Activities September 11-14, 2011 CW -508300-CONF-003 UNRESTRICTED DECOMMISSIONING PROJECTS AT THE CHALK RIVER LABORATORIES OVER THE NEXT 5 YEARS AND THE CHALLENGES WITH DELIVERY K. Schruder, J. McKenna and A. Winter Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River Laboratories Chalk River, Ontario, Canada ABSTRACT Nuclear research and development carried out on behalf of the Government of Canada have resulted in 60 years of nuclear legacy liabilities at the Chalk River Laboratories. The liabilities consist of shutdown reactors, research facilities and supporting infrastructure. The Government of Canada in 2006 initiated a five-year, $520 million start-up phase and in April 2011 entered the next 5-year program of decommissioning as part of the long term strategy to address the legacy liabilities. A number of planned projects in Facilities Decommissioning, at the Chalk River Laboratories, have been defined for the next 3 years and will be described in this paper in combination with operational lessons learned for future decommissioning project work. 1. INTRODUCTION The Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) is the Canadian nuclear research facility located near Chalk River, Ontario, approximately 180 km north-west of Ottawa, on the Trans-Canada Highway. CRL is a site of major research and development to support and advance nuclear technology. CRL has expertise in physics, metallurgy, chemistry, biology, and engineering and consists of both operating and shutdown unique research facilities. CRL was conceived in 1942 from collaboration between British and Canadian nuclear researchers, where a research laboratory established in Montreal under the National Research Council of Canada (NRC).
    [Show full text]
  • Management and Storage of Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Proceedings Series
    Spine for 280 pages: 14,48 mm Management and Storage of Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Research Reactor Spent Storage of Management and Proceedings Series Management and Storage of Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Proceedings of a Technical Meeting held in Thurso, United Kingdom, 19–22 October 2009 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA ISBN 978–92–0–138210–8 ISSN 0074–1884 MANAGEMENT AND STORAGE OF RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency: AFGHANISTAN GUATEMALA PANAMA ALBANIA HAITI PAPUA NEW GUINEA ALGERIA HOLY SEE PARAGUAY ANGOLA HONDURAS PERU ARGENTINA HUNGARY PHILIPPINES ARMENIA ICELAND POLAND AUSTRALIA INDIA PORTUGAL AUSTRIA INDONESIA AZERBAIJAN IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF QATAR BAHRAIN IRAQ REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA BANGLADESH IRELAND ROMANIA BELARUS ISRAEL RUSSIAN FEDERATION BELGIUM ITALY Rwanda BELIZE JAMAICA SAUDI ARABIA BENIN JAPAN SENEGAL BOLIVIA JORDAN SERBIA BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA KAZAKHSTAN SEYCHELLES BOTSWANA KENYA SIERRA LEONE BRAZIL KOREA, REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA KUWAIT SINGAPORE BURKINA FASO KYRGYZSTAN SLOVAKIA BURUNDI LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC SLOVENIA CAMBODIA REPUBLIC SOUTH AFRICA CAMEROON LATVIA SPAIN CANADA LEBANON SRI LANKA CENTRAL AFRICAN LESOTHO SUDAN REPUBLIC LIBERIA SWAZILAND CHAD LIBYA SWEDEN CHILE LIECHTENSTEIN SWITZERLAND CHINA LITHUANIA COLOMBIA LUXEMBOURG SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC CONGO MADAGASCAR TAJIKISTAN COSTA RICA MALAWI THAILAND CÔTE D’IVOIRE MALAYSIA THE FORMER YUGOSLAV CROATIA MALI REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA CUBA MALTA TOGO CYPRUS MARSHALL
    [Show full text]
  • Submissions of Lake Ontario Waterkeeper and Ottawa Riverkeeper
    Submissions of Lake Ontario Waterkeeper and Ottawa Riverkeeper Re: 2018 CNSC Staff Regulatory Oversight Report Meeting concerning Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Sites Notice of Public Meeting: Ref 2019-M24 October 7, 2019 Submitted to: Participant Funding Program Administrators [email protected] ad the CNSC Secretariat [email protected] 1 Table of Contents Executive Summary …………………………………………………………………………………...…. 3 About the Intervenors ………………………………………………………………………………..….. 4 Current Intervention Opportunity …………………………………………………………………..…. 4 Concerns with current Commission Meeting intervention processes …………………………….….. 5 Timelines ……………………………………………………………………………………….… 6 Access to Information ……………………………………………………………………….……. 6 ORK Review: Chalk River Laboratories ………………………………………………………...….…. 7 Chalk River’s Ecological Context …………………………………………………………………7 Chalk River’s Historical Context ………………………………………………………………..…9 Review of Selected CRL Facilities and Associated Ecological Concerns ………………….…….. 9 Chalk River Regulation: Licences and Permits …………………………………………….………..... 16 Public Access to Information Concerning Chalk River ………………………………………………. 20 Proactive Disclosure by CNL ……………………………………………………………………. 21 Reportable Events ……………………………………………………………………………….. 22 LOW Review: Port Hope Area Initiative ……………………………………………………………… 23 Port Hope Harbour and the Port Hope Area Initiative …………………………………………… 23 Port Hope Harbour Incident Lake October ………………………………………………………. 24 Appendix A: Information Request Summaries Appendix B: Expert Report of
    [Show full text]
  • 2020 NEA Annual Report
    2020 NEA Annual Report Nuclear Power in 2020 NEA Activities by Sector General Information 2020 NEA Annual Report NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development The NEA in Brief – 2020 Governing body: The Steering Committee for Nuclear Energy (Established 1956) 33 member countries (27 participating in the Data Bank) 62 years of international service 8 standing technical committees and 1 management board 75 working parties and expert groups 25 international joint projects funded by participants 3 major international initiatives served by the NEA 41 publications produced in 2020 18 online events in 2020 The NEA and its mission The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is a semi-autonomous body within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), headquartered in the Paris region of France. The Agency is a platform for co-operation among countries with the most advanced nuclear energy infrastructures, developing policies, data, best practices and joint action to address issues of mutual interest. The mission of the NEA is to assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally sound and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 2 | NEA Annual Report 2020 Table of Contents Message from the Director-General 5 Nuclear Technology in 2020 6 NEA Activities by Sector Nuclear Development 25 Nuclear Safety and Regulation 31 Human Aspects of Nuclear
    [Show full text]
  • Responses to Questions Raised from Peer Review of Canada's National Report for the Joint Convention
    5HVSRQVHVWR4XHVWLRQV5DLVHG)URP 3HHU5HYLHZRI&DQDGD¶VSixth1DWLRQDO 5HSRUWIRUWKH-RLQW&RQYHQWLRQRQWKH 6DIHW\RI6SHQW)XHO0DQDJHPHQWDQGRQ WKH6DIHW\RI5DGLRDFWLYH:DVWH 0DQDJHPHQW April 2018 Responses to Questions Raised From Peer Review of Canada’s Sixth National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management © Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 2018 PWGSC catalogue number CC172-23/1-2018E-PDF ISSN 978-0-660-26134-8 Extracts from this document may be reproduced for individual use without permission provided the source is fully acknowledged. However, reproduction in whole or in part for purposes of resale or redistribution requires prior written permission from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. Également publié en français sous le titre: Réponses aux questions découlant de l’examen par les pairs du sixième Rapport national du Canada pour la Convention commune sur la sûreté de la gestion du combustible usé et sur la sûreté de la gestion des déchets radioactifs. Document availability This document can be viewed on the CNSC website at nuclearsafety.gc.ca. To request a copy of the document in English or French, please contact: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 280 Slater Street P.O. Box 1046, Station B Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5S9 CANADA Tel.: 613-995-5894 or 1-800-668-5284 (in Canada only) Facsimile: 613-995-5086 Email: [email protected] Website: nuclearsafety.gc.ca Facebook: facebook.com/CanadianNuclearSafetyCommission YouTube: youtube.com/cnscccsn Twitter: @CNSC_CCSN Responses to Questions Raised from the Peer Review of Canada’s Sixth National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management This document supplements the sixth Canadian National Report for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
    [Show full text]
  • P Re L I M I N a R Y P Ro G Ra M
    Preliminary Program September 11 to 14, 2011 Marriott Toronto Downtown Eaton Centre Hotel Toronto, Ontario The conference is being organized The Canadian Nuclear Society The Canadian Nuclear Society (CNS), is a by the Canadian Nuclear Society in technical society dedicated to the exchange of information on all aspects of nuclear science cooperation with the International and technology which supports conferences, courses and specialty programs. For membership Atomic Energy Agency, and is co- contact the CNS offi ce at www.cns-snc.ca sponsored by the American Nuclear Society, the Argentina Nuclear Technology Association, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan, the Chinese Nuclear Society, the Indian Nuclear Society, the Korean Nuclear Society, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD and the Romanian Nuclear Energy Association. 3 Conference Organizers Conference Chair Technical Program Inquiries Colin Allan, AECL (retired) Mark Chapman mail: [email protected] Plenary Program Chair Ken Dormuth, AECL (retired) General Conference Inquiries Elizabeth Muckle-Jeffs Technical Program Committee Chair Conference Administrator Alan Melnyk, AECL The Professional Edge 1027 Pembroke Street East, Suite 200 Organizing Committee Pembroke, ON K8A 3M4 Barbara Gray, AECL (retired) North American Toll-free Tel: 1-800-868-8776 Kathleen Hollington, NRCan International Tel: 613-732-7068 Don Howard, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Fax: 613-732-3386 Jamie Robinson, NWMO Email: [email protected] Dave McCauley, NRCan Joan Miller, AECL Conference Registration
    [Show full text]