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CODES of CONDUCT in DEFENCE MINISTRIES and ARMED FORCES WHAT MAKES a GOOD CODE of CONDUCT? a Multi-Country Study

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CODES of CONDUCT in DEFENCE MINISTRIES and ARMED FORCES WHAT MAKES a GOOD CODE of CONDUCT? a Multi-Country Study CODES OF CONDUCT IN DEFENCE MINISTRIES AND ARMED FORCES WHAT MAKES A GOOD CODE OF CONDUCT? A multi-country study INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE AND www.transparency.org.uk SECURITY PROGRAMME www.defenceagainstcorruption.org CODES OF CONDUCT IN DEFENCE MINISTRIES AND ARMED FORCES 1 Transparency International (TI) is the civil society organisation leading the global fight against corruption. Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, Germany, TI raises awareness of the damaging effects of corruption, and works with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it. For more information, please visit www.transparency.org Transparency International’s international Defence and Security Programme (TI-DSP) helps to build integrity and reduce corruption in defence and security establishments worldwide through supporting counter-corruption reform in nations, raising integrity in arms transfers and influencing policy in defence and security. To achieve this, the TI-DSP team works with governments, defence companies, multilateral organisations and civil society. TI-DSP is led by Transparency International UK on behalf of the TI movement. Information on TI’s work in the defence and security sector to date, including background, overviews of current and past projects, and publications, is available on TI’s Defence Against Corruption website, www.defenceagainstcorruption.org. TI-UK would particularly like to thank all those who assisted with the translation of reference material: Phil Brunetti (Spain), Nada Elzeer (Saudi Arabia), Julie Helmersberg Brevik (Norway), Claudia Milne (Argentina), Aistë Narvilaitë (Lithuania), Peter Nordström (Sweden) and Justyna Peirzynska (Croatia). Their contributions have been invaluable. While acknowledging the debt TI-UK owes to all those who have contributed to and collaborated in the preparation of this publication, we should make clear that TI-UK alone is responsible for the content of the document. Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of March 2011. Nevertheless, TI-UK cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use for other purposes or in other contexts. While believed to be accurate at the time, the publication should not be relied on as a full or detailed statement of the subject matter. Transparency International UK International Defence and Security Programme 32-36 Loman Street Southwark London SE1 0EH United Kingdom +44 (0)20 7922 7969 [email protected] First published in May 2011 Reproductions in whole or in parts is permitted, providing that full credit is given to Transparency International UK and provided that any such reproduction, whether in whole or in parts, is not sold unless incorporated in other works. © 2011 Transparency International UK. All rights reserved ISBN: 978-0-9566194-5-7 Publisher: Transparency International UK Authors: Thomas Shipley, Anne-Christine Wegener, Mark Pyman Design: Greg Stevenson (www.digshot3.com) Editorial support: Stephanie Debere © Cover photo: www.istockphoto.com Preface Transparency International UK (TI-UK) works with This report presents the conclusions arising from this governments, defence companies and civil society second multi-country study of 12 nations: Argentina, organisations to reduce the risks of corruption in Australia, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Kenya, defence and security. Our approach is non-partisan, Lithuania, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden and neutral and focused on constructive ways of addressing Ukraine. Ten of these nations had also participated in the issue of corruption. Phase 1; two of them – Argentina and Saudi Arabia – were participating for the first time. Defence officials and senior military officers are themselves very clear why they care about corruption risk in defence and security establishments. The three ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS main reasons are that: TI-UK thanks all the participating countries for their openness and for disclosing the information requested. We would in particular like to thank the officials who were the points of contact in each nation for their time • corruption wastes scarce resources in compiling the material in response to our research • it reduces operational effectiveness questions and for reviewing drafts of this report. • it reduces public trust in the armed forces The report itself is the work of TI-UK. and the security services. I hope you find this report useful. We welcome your feedback and further engagement. Part of the solution to these risks is clear guidance on the behaviour expected of senior officers and officials, and strong application of those standards of behaviour. Previous research by TI-UK in 2009 across 32 participating countries showed that these standards Mark Pyman vary greatly from one country to another, and that Programme Director, there are wide variations in the effectiveness of their International Defence and Security Programme application. Transparency International UK May 2011 This work met with much interest from nations. However, it was limited in the amount of detail it was able to cover, and we had not entered into review and discussion with the participating nations. Accordingly, in order to develop more detailed guidance and to be able to quote more examples of good practice, we invited nations to collaborate with us in a second, more detailed review of current practices. CODES OF CONDUCT IN DEFENCE MINISTRIES AND ARMED FORCES 1 Contents Executive Summary 5 Template of Good Practice 6 Introduction 8 Comparative Overview 12 1.1 OVERARCHING APPROACH 13 1.2 CoRE COMPONENTS OF GUIDANCE 15 1.3 PRESENTATION AND STYLE OF DOCUMENTS 19 1.4 READABILITY 21 1.5 IMPACT 24 Key Corruption Risk Areas 26 2.1 BRIBERY 27 2.2 GIFTS AND HOSPITALITY 31 2.3 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 37 2.4 POST-SEPARATION ACTIVITIES 42 Implementing Change 46 3 STRENGTHENING BUSINESS CONDUCT STANDARDS; LEADING CHANGE 47 Annexes 50 4.1 ANNEX ONE: QUALITATIVE RANKING AND SUMMARY TABLES OF GOOD PRACTICE 51 4.2 ANNEX TWO: LIST OF KEY REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 56 4.3 ANNEX THREE: POINTS OF CONTACT 58 CODES OF CONDUCT IN DEFENCE MINISTRIES AND ARMED FORCES 3 Executive Summary THIS REPORT HAS A SIMPLE PURPOSE: to show defence officials and military officers how they can strengthen their organisations and reduce the risks of corruption in defence through improving their codes of conduct – the standards and norms that govern the ethical behaviour of people in defence and the armed forces. Part of the solution to these risks is clear guidance on This means that the presentation and readability of the behaviour expected of senior officers and officials, reference documents is commonly poor, which is a and strong application of those standards of behaviour. significant obstacle to ensuring that regimes are fully understood and that they reach key audiences. This report presents the conclusions from an analysis of the written codes of conduct and related documents The study closely examines four functional areas from 12 participating nations: Argentina, Australia, of business conduct: bribery, gifts and hospitality, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Kenya, Lithuania, Norway, conflicts of interest and post-separation requirements. Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine. It builds on The main conclusion is that there is rarely practical an earlier study of the same subject among 32 nations. guidance for officers and officials on how to act if Ten of the nations in the current study also participated confronted by a particular ethical dilemma. It is also in the first round; the other nations were Albania, evident that there are different levels of attention paid Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Finland, Georgia, to each issue. For example, while all countries have Ireland, Latvia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, guidelines on gifts, a minority look at the ‘grey area’ Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, of hospitality. Regulations on conflicts of interest are Tanzania, Uganda, UK and USA. generally thorough, but these are rarely extended to personnel after leaving service. In order to illustrate The key finding of the study is that although all the our findings we offer examples of what works for countries surveyed have in place a legal framework to each functional area, and in some cases what doesn’t, regulate business conduct, this is usually not placed in order to facilitate cross-country learning and within the wider framework of acceptable ethical sharing of experiences. The report also describes some behaviour. excellent examples from fully integrated ethics systems. • Codes of conduct are in general not used to From analysis of the documents from the twelve simplify regulations for defence personnel and nations, we present a template containing what we aid ethical decision-making. believe constitutes good practice. This is presented on • There is often insufficient attention to corruption the following page. We hope this template will serve as issues, especially to the particular risks faced by a foundation for countries seeking to improve their own defence personnel. standards in ethics and business conduct. • A majority of regimes are ‘compliance-based’ – i.e. rather legalistic in nature. CODES OF CONDUCT IN DEFENCE MINISTRIES AND ARMED FORCES 5 Template of Good Practice The principal output of this study is the identification of those aspects of defence business conduct regimes that
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