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Neurosciences and the Human Person 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 1 Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 2 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 3 Pontificiae Academiae Scientiarvm Scripta Varia 121 The Proceedings of the Working Group on Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities 8-10 November 2012 Edited by Antonio M. Battro Stanislas Dehaene Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo Wolf J. Singer EX AEDIBVS ACADEMICIS IN CIVITATE VATICANA • MMXIII 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 4 The Pontifical Academy of Sciences Casina Pio IV, 00120 Vatican City Tel: +39 0669883195 • Fax: +39 0669885218 Email: [email protected] • Website: www.pas.va The opinions expressed with absolute freedom during the presentation of the papers of this meeting, although published by the Academy, represent only the points of view of the participants and not those of the Academy. ISBN 978-88-7761-106-2 © Copyright 2013 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, recording, photocopying or otherwise without the expressed written permission of the publisher. PONTIFICIA ACADEMIA SCIENTIARVM • VATICAN CITY 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 5 Man’s greatness lies in his capacity to think of God. And this means being able to live a conscious and responsible relationship with Him. However, the relationship is between two realities. God – this is my thought and this is my experience, but how many, yes- terday and today, share it! – is not an idea, even though very lofty, fruit of man’s thought. God is reality with a capital “R”. Jesus re- veals it – and lives the relationship with Him – as a Father of good- ness and infinite mercy. Hence, God doesn’t depend on our thought. Moreover, even when the life of man on earth should finish – and for the Christian faith, in any case, this world as we know it is destined to fail – man won’t stop existing and, in a way that we don’t know, nor will the universe that was created with him. Scripture speaks of “new heavens and a new earth” and af- firms that, in the end, in the where and when that is beyond us, but towards which, in faith, we tend with desire and expectation, God will be “all in all”. … Jesus was sent by Abba “to preach good news to the poor, to proclaim release to captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord” (Luke 4:18-19). Pope Francis, Letter to Eugenio Scalfari, La Repubblica, 11 Sep- tember 2013. Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities 5 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 6 6 Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 7 Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities 7 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 8 8 Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 9 Contents Prologue Antonio M. Battro, Stanislas Dehaene, Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo and Wolf J. Singer....................................................................................... 12 Programme......................................................................................... 14 List of Participants ............................................................................. 17 Scientific Papers ORIGINS OF MIND Hominid Evolution and the Emergence of the Genus Homo Yves Coppens ...................................................................................... 21 Human Origins from a Genomic Perspective Svante Pääbo........................................................................................ 36 Mind and Soul? Two Notions in the Light of Contemporary Philosophy Enrico Berti......................................................................................... 41 THE DYNAMIC BRAIN AND CONSCIOUSNESS The Neuronal Correlate of Consciousness: Unity in Time Rather than Space? Wolf Singer.......................................................................................... 51 Brain Rhythms for Cognition and Consciousness Earl K. Miller and Timothy J. Buschman............................................... 68 The Brain Mechanisms of Conscious Access and Introspection Stanislas Dehaene ................................................................................. 79 Consciousness and Self-Consciousness in Favour of a Pragmatic Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind Jürgen Mittelstraß ................................................................................ 97 Neuroscience of Self-Consciousness and Subjectivity Olaf Blanke.......................................................................................... 106 Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities 9 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 10 CONTENTS TOWARDS A NEUROSCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF FREE WILL Neural Mechanisms Underlying Human Choice in the Frontal Cortex Tim Behrens........................................................................................ 121 False Perceptions & False Beliefs: Understanding Schizophrenia Chris D. Frith & Karl J. Friston............................................................. 134 Addiction: A Disease of Self-Control Nora D. Volkow and Ruben Baler ........................................................ 149 Understanding Layers: From Neuroscience to Human Responsibility Michael S. Gazzaniga............................................................................ 156 Self-Knowledge and the Adaptive Unconscious Timothy D. Wilson............................................................................... 170 Seven Ways Neuroscience Aids Law Owen D. Jones ..................................................................................... 181 Interaction Between Two Readings: The Naturalistic and the Socratic “Know Thyself” Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo.................................................................... 195 SOURCES OF HUMAN COMPREHENSION AND INCOMPREHENSION Are There Innate Mechanisms That Make Us Social Beings? Uta Frith.............................................................................................. 215 Natural Cooperation Martin A. Nowak................................................................................. 237 Spiritualité de l’âme Georges Card. Cottier, O.P. .................................................................. 241 Developmental Sources of Social Divisions Elizabeth S. Spelke ............................................................................... 250 CAN NEUROSCIENCE IMPROVE THE BRAIN AND MIND? How Genes and Experience Shape the Human Will Michael I. Posner, Mary K. Rothbart, Pascale Voelker & Yi-Yuan Tang ..... 273 10 Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 11 CONTENTS New Interfaces for the Brain John Donoghue ................................................................................... 287 Homo Docens and the Teaching Brain Antonio M. Battro ............................................................................... 296 FINAL STATEMENT Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities Georges M.M. Card. Cottier, Silvia Arber, Antonio M. Battro, Timothy Behrens, Enrico Berti, Olaf Blanke, Thierry Boon Falleur, Yves Coppens, Stanislas Dehaene, Christopher D. Frith, Uta Frith, Earl K. Miller, Jürgen Mittelstraß, Martin Nowak, Svante Pääbo, H.E. Msgr. Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo, Wolf J. Singer, Nora D. Volkow ................... 305 Tables ................................................................................................. 315 Neurosciences and the Human Person: New Perspectives on Human Activities 11 00_PRIMA PARTE SV 121_pp_1-18.QXD_Layout 1 24/09/13 15:18 Pagina 12 Prologue Working Group 8-10 November 2012 – Each generation of neurosci- entists, philosophers and theologians has the task of analyzing and assessing new advances in the understanding of the human person, dignity and value within nature. The Pontifical Academy of Sciences acknowledged this responsibility through two important workshops which should be seen as milestones. The first was held in 1964 and was on 'The Brain and Conscious Expe- rience' (Study Week, 28 Sept.-3 Oct. 1964, SV 30. Chairman: John C. Ec- cles; edited by Pietro Salviucci). The second was held in 1988 and was on 'Brain Research and the Mind- Body Problem. Epistemological and Metaphysical Issues’ (5 Oct. 1988, SV 79. Round Table Discussion. Chairman: Carlos Chagas; edited by Giuseppe del Re). In 1964 the President of the Academy was George Lemaître and the Chancellor was Pietro Salviucci. There were 24 participants, including the Academicians John Eccles, Corneille Heymans, Giuseppe Moruzzi and Roger Sperry. Among the invited scientists there were Edgar Lord Adrian, Creutzfeldt, Ragnar Granit, Hebert Jasper, Benjamin Libet, Vernon Mount- castle and Hans-Lukas Teuber. In 1988 the President was Carlos Chagas and the Directors were Enrico di Rovasenda and Renato Dardozzi. There were 22 participants. The theologians were Enrico di Rovasenda,
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