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The Wiretapping--Eavesdropping Problem: a Professor's View University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Minnesota Law Review 1960 The irW etapping--Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View Yale Kamisar Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kamisar, Yale, "The irW etapping--Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View" (1960). Minnesota Law Review. 2593. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2593 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Wiretapping- Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View Yale Kamisar* I. TAPs, LAws AND SOCIETY [N]o doubt the cave-man looked back to the good old days when meii were free to roam instead of being stuck in a damn hole in the ground.' I hope that if we somehow manage to get past the bombs and the missiles, future historians will be able to report that we, too, marched forward with our faces turned backward. In the mean- time, the more I think about The Eavesdroppers2 the better those "old days" look. Even crouching in a dark hole has some advantages over sitting in a glass house. To illustrate: One "private technician" has disclosed that between 1940 and 1956 he "bugged" five hundred residences -"from a tenement to a mansion in Beverly Hills"-for California police officials. And ap- parently he is still going strong.' The files of a typical private tapper in Chicago reveal that, even though one cautious "subject" moved from one hotel room to another every day for four successive days, he was unable to shake off electrical surveillance. Microphones were secreted in each of the four rooms he occupied, and taps were placed on each of the four phones he used." We also learn from the book that unobtrusive vehicles "readily mistaken for the kind of truck used by plumbers, painters and car- penters" may be fully equipped "to monitor and record conversa- *Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I am indebted to Dean William B. Lockhart and Professors John J. Cound and Robert J. Levy of the University of Minnesota Law School for their valuable criticism of the manuscript. I am also indebted to Charles H. Slayman, Jr., Chief Counsel and Staff Director for the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the United States Senate Committee on the judiciary, for providing me with much legislative material before it became generally available. 1. MuLL~i,, THE UsEs OF THE PAsT 65 (1952). 2. DAsH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959) [hereinafter cited as DASH]. 3. Id. at 188-89. 4. Id. at 228-29. MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:891 tions being broadcast through tiny concealed transmitters."5 We learn, too, that those who plant hidden listening devices in the inner- most places not infrequently appear in the guise of electrical repair- men, telephone company employees, or termite inspectors. 6 The outside and its dangers may have seemed terrible to the cave-man, but at least he had three walls and a big stone to close them off.' The "outside and its laws," 7 may become even more ter- rible to modern man because he cannot shut them out. He does not have, or soon may not have, a place where "he can open his collar .. and give vent to his own particular daydreams, his mutterings and snatches of crazy song, his bursts of obscenity and afflatus of glory." 8 For whether or not Samuel Dash has penned a "thriller" in Part I of The Eavesdroppers, "The Practice," as District Attorney Ed- ward S. Silver charges,9 Dash's colleague, Professor Richard F. Schwartz, certainly seems to have written a "chiller" in Part II, "The Tools." At the outset, Professor Schwartz pooh-pahs "a tendency to re- gard electrical and electronic eavesdropping as a kind of black magic,"' 0 but I find his treatment of "The Tools" all the more dis- turbing, all the more frightening, because it is a calm, conservative, matter-of-fact treatment of the subject. Nowhere, it seems, is one quite safe from the eavesdropper. Not in one's home or office or automobile. Not even in one's bathroom with the shower turned on The [wired] microphone itself may be hidden in the upholstery of a chair, in a pot of flowers, or in a desk drawer. In addition, microphones may be obtained through special suppliers which have all sorts of innocuous-look- ing housings, such as desk pads .... Fine, almost invisible wires may be used . under rugs, along baseboards, or even through walls.... 5. Id. at 210. 6. Id. at 74-76, 185, 214-15, 283. In one case where a tap was put on the phone of a hospital patient, the subject- thinking the tapper was a telephone employee- even got out of bed to help install itl Id. at 214-15. 7. I have taken this phrase from CAm, THE SENSE OF INJuSTncE 151 (1949). 8. Ibid. If I may be permitted to add a homely footnote to this eloquent passage, I vividly recall the heated reaction of my company commander (who had been an enlisted man for many years) when, brand new infantry second lieutenant that I was, I entered the enlisted men's latrine, looking for a certain corporal. "Stay the hell out of there," he snapped: "that's about the only place those 'poor bastards' have to cuss out officers, to ridicule them, to brag about how they outsmarted them, etc., and if they couldn't do that much they'd probably 'bust."' Apparently some captains of industry are less sensitive. Thus, Dash has reported elsewhere: "We learned . that some managers of plants were hiding micro- phones, in the men's rooms and ladies' rooms, to spy on their employees." Transcript of The Big Ear, presented on "NBC Kaleidoscope," March 22, 1959, p. 21, copy on file in University of Minnesota Law School Library [hereinafter cited as The Big Ear]. 9. Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View, 44 Mnq-. L. REv. 835 (1960). 10. DASH 805. 1960] WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING Because of the small size, deceptive housings, and numerous types of microphones available, it is difficult to guarantee any certain way of detecting their presence.. It has been claimed that turning on a shower or creating some other sort of noise helps to foil a planted microphone... [But] the frequency discrimination of some microphone structures might make the use of a shower of no value, since the audio frequencies in this type of noise are generally higher than those in the human voice."- One investigator has reported building a wireless microphone circuit into a flat surface by using transistors and printed circuits. Such a construc- thick] behind tion enables the eavesdropper to plant2 the device [%inch a picture on a wall or under a rug.' A typical problem [with a "parabolic microphone," one type of highly directive microphone] might be to try to eavesdrop on a conversation taking place in an office on the opposite side of a hundred-foot-wide busy street.... [lt is perfectly possible that a conversation might be picked up so as to be intelligible. A second example of a possible use ...is in the eavesdropping on a conversation in a restaurant or caf6 from, say, a darkened balcony in the building. [A] successful recording of the conversation could probably 3 be made.' A small, continuously operating transmitter can be placed on an auto- mobile under surveillance, perhaps beneath a fender. Its signal is picked up by a receiver in another car or in a fixed plant. The use of two or more fixed plants would allow well-known triangulation techniques to be applied.' 4 Harold K. Lipset, who contributes the perspective and insights of a leading private investigator to this symposium, tells us The Eaves- droppers "should serve a useful purpose in allaying fears of the al- 5 most supernatural." ' I wonder. How "idle" are our fears when Lipset himself reports that both "an ultra-miniature wireless micro- phone, powered by atomic batteries and no larger than the eraser on a lead pencil" and "a complete recorder . built into a ciga- rette lighter" are "on the brink of reality"?' 6 The potentialities are almost infinite. Thus a fonner Massachu- setts Institute of Technology professor recently dwelt on the possi- bilities of putting a listening device in someone else's suit: [Y]ou could sew into it a very flexible, black, thin-looking thing - a man would not be aware of. This, for example, could be the transmitting antenna and this could be shaped and sewed into the shoulder on a suit 11. Id. at 341--4. 12. Id. at 343-44. 13. Id. at 350-51. (Emphasis added.) 14. Id. at 379. 15. Lipset, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Private Investigator's View, 44 MnN. L. REv. 873 (1960). 16. Id. at 888. 894 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:891 and the thread for radiating could be put up there. ... And if the man were to wear this suit you could hear him . up to a thousand feet- and you'd hear anything he said while wearing this suit. And we would say the batteries might last for a month's time.'7 What solace is there in the knowledge that these devices are "the natural outgrowth of technological advancement"? 18 How does the fact that "there is nothing mysterious about the equipment itself or the methods employed" 19 make wiretapping or electronic eaves- dropping less fearsome? After all, there isn't anything really myster- ious or supernatural about the hydrogen bomb or the interconti- nental missile either, is there? If anything, doesn't the fact that the relevant principles and methods are knowable and explicable make the electronic equipment -or the bomb or missile for that matter -more awesome? "Every new idea, every scientific discovery, every invention," it has been observed, "throws a burden on government-some of them tremendous burdens.
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