Mowat research #122 | June 2016

Creating a High-Performing Canadian Against a Backdrop of Disruptive Change By Mark Jarvis Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the current and former public servants and other interview participants who generously shared their insights, experiences and time for this project.

He would also like to thank members of the advisory panel for their generous support of the project. He would particularly like to acknowledge the special contributions of Jennifer Robson, Ailish Campbell, Amanda Clarke, Tony Dean and Alex Himelfarb. In addition, he would like to thank Karine Levasseur and Ryan Androsoff for their helpful advice.

At the Mowat Centre, Adrienne Lipsey, Sara Ditta, Nevena Dragicevic, Noah Zon, Rachel Parker, Reuven Shlozberg, Sunil Johal, William Forward and Matthew Mendelsohn all provided valuable feedback and assistance with the research. Special thanks to Elaine Stam for her help with the design of the publication.

Finally, the author would like to thank Mark MacDonald and Josh Hjartarson at KPMG for their generous support of this work and their valuable insights.

The views expressed in the report are the authors’ alone. Author Advisory Board Mark D. jarvis Ailish Campbell Daniel Weinstock Luc Juillet Associate Assistant Deputy James McGill Professor, Faculty Associate Professor and Founding Mark D. Jarvis was Practice Lead, Minister (General Director), Finance of Law, McGill University; Director, Director, Graduate School of Public Government Transformation at McGill Institute for Health and and International Affairs, University Social Policy of the Mowat Centre. Prior to joining Alex Himelfarb Mowat, Mark worked for more than a Chair, WWF Canada and the Dylan Jones Mel Cappe Canadian Alliance to End , Western Economic Professor, School of decade in the federal civil service. He Homelessness and Former Clerk Diversification Canada and Governance, University of has also written and edited a number of the Privy Council and Secretary Toronto; Former Clerk of the Privy Evert Lindquist of books and articles on governance, to Cabinet Council and Secretary to Cabinet Professor, School of Public accountability and democratic Amanda Clarke Administration, University of Sevaun Palvetzian reform, including co-authoring Assistant Professor, School of Victoria; Editor, Canadian Public Chief Officer, CivicAction Public Policy and Administration, Administration Democratizing the Constitution: Carleton University Tony Dean Reforming , Guy Lodge Professor, School of Public Policy the recipient of the 2011 Donner Hon. Anne McLellan Director of Kivu International and and Governance, University of Senior Advisor at Bennett Jones Associate Director at the Institute Toronto; Former Secretary of the Prize for the best public policy book LLP, Public Policy Group; Former for Public Policy Research (IPPR) Cabinet and Head of the by a Canadian. Deputy Gary Gannage B. Guy Peters Former President of AMAPCEO This report is part of the Maurice Falk Professor of American Shifting Gears series, Government, University Jennifer Robson supported by KPMG. of Pittsburgh Assistant Professor, Clayton H. Riddell Graduate Program in Political Management, Carleton University

mowatcentre.ca @mowatcentre 439 University Avenue The Mowat Centre is an independent public policy think tank Suite 2200, Toronto, ON located at the School of Public Policy & Governance at the M5G 1Y8 Canada University of Toronto. The Mowat Centre is Ontario’s non-partisan, evidence-based voice on public policy. It undertakes collaborative applied policy research, proposes innovative research-driven recommendations, and engages in public dialogue on Canada’s most important national issues. ©2016 ISBN 978-1-77259-019-7 Contents

Introduction 1

The Six Key Characteristics of a 1 High-Performing Civil Service 3

2 Canada’s Record of Reform 5

3 Innovation 9

4 Transparency 14

5 Accountability 19

6 Collaboration 23

7 Evidence-Informed Analysis 27

8 Public and Political Commitment 31

Conclusion and Recommendations 35 If the civil service is to fulfill its role in delivering publicUre dologoods officimpos and protectingvolore viduci the blab publicid quam interest, alitatus it musterferunt be more faceatem resilient,asInim.Ciendis more res efficientaut fugitium and more volo effective.volorep elendit 4 | chapter x: description IN troduction The civil service is purposefullyunderthepoliticalcontrolThe civilservice ofthegovernment oftheday through a doesnotworkforthepublic.Nor itworkforParliament. notingthatthecivilservice It isworth http://www.occ.ca/Publications/UnlockingPublicServiceEconomyOntario.pdf.Services. Economy1 OntarioChamber ofCommerce. inOntario:ANewApproach to (2014).UnlockingthePublic Service in Public-Private Partnership product. ofournationalemploymentsector initsownright,accountingfornearlyaquarter and gross domestic often have asignificantimpact onthelives ofCanadians.Thepublicsectoreconomyisasubstantial other orders ofgovernment. Civil servants atalllevels ofgovernment exercise substantialauthorityand thatareopportunities discussed–andtherecommendations thatare made–canbeequallyappliedto This report focusesprimarily onthefederal inCanada,butmanyof thechallengesand civilservice responding tothecontextinwhichitoperates. good newsisthatweknowcivilservants themselves are eagertoadaptandbemore nimblein must bemore resilient, more efficientandmore effective, anditmustdeliver outstandingresults. The istofulfillitsroleIf thecivilservice indelivering publicgoodsandprotecting thepublicinterest, it Canadians. This failure tosufficientlymodernize hasslowly eroded thecivilservice’s abilitytomeettheneedsof because there were noclearconsequenceswhenreform failed. insulation hashadpredictable results. Past reform have oftheirobjectives, efforts oftenfallenshort company oranot-for-profit organization might oreven otherlevels ofgovernment have faced.This because it hasn’tin part facedimminentthreats from competitorsinthesameway thataprivate For hasremained toolong,theCanadiancivilservice largely immunetodisruptionandtransformation, austerity have been,theworldisgoingtochangealotmore. decreased trustininstitutions,thepolarizationofpolitics,changingdemographics andongoing itselfisalreadyThe civilservice facingnewchallenges.But,asdisruptive asglobalization,digitization, adaptable civilservice. economic prosperity. Thiskindofprogress dependsonthecontinuedworkofahigh-performing, Canada’s hasplayed role civilservice animportant inbuildingmodernsociety, socialcohesionand It’s timeforacriticalconversation aboutthecivilservice. Introduction 1 Its efficiencyandeffectiveness are centraltoCanada’s economic performance.

1 | The Mowat Centre 2 | introduction reform. thenextstepsneededtorealizearticulate that recommendations reform forcivil service andto andpractitioners,inorderwith experts to make has undertaken research andbuiltadialogue As thenextstepinthiswork,MowatCentre digitally-enabled andfocusedonresults. is more citizen-centred, engaged withpartners, anemerging modelthat supporting civilservice navigating them.Past reports have focusedon and provided strategicrecommendations for challenges facingCanadiangovernments research serieshasreviewed thetrends and The MowatCentre andKPMG’sShiftingGears Parliament andvoters. –ultimatelyaccountableto departments with ministers–astheheadsofgovernment systems ofpublicgovernance andadministration, This establishesthedemocraticcontrol over accountability from subordinate tosuperior. from superiortosubordinate, withcommensurate from chain ministersdown thedepartmental hierarchical structure, withauthoritydelegated ______from ministers down. authority delegated structure, with through a hierarchical government of the day political control ofthe purposefully under the is The civil service Handbook ofPublic Accountability M.D.2 Jarvis, (2014). “Hierarchical Accountability.” TheOxford 2 , 405-420. service reformsservice are focusedandsuccessful. touchstone forhelpingtoensure future civil asanimportant These questionsserve 4. Are theproposed reforms politicallyfeasible? 3. Doeseachreform have aclearobjective 2. Are theproposed reforms likely todiminish 1. Doeseachspecificreform helptoenhancethe considered inproposing anyreforms: We suggestfourcore questionsthatoughttobe sufficient. changes tothestatusquo.Butthataloneisnot should berealistically likely toleadpositive implementation. At aminimum,anyreforms willbeimprovedhow thecivilservice by their can –andshouldbedebatedintermsof preferred measures. Themeritsofallreforms unto themselves. Otherswillhave theirown The reforms proposed inthisreport are not A Test forReform against whichprogress canbemeasured? government orthepublic? andthe trust betweenthecivilservice d) administeringprograms andoperations? and/or; c) delivering services; b) implementingthegovernment’s decisions; a) advisingandinformingthegovernment; one and/ormore ofitscore responsibilities: civil service’sabilityorcapacitytodeliver on ends The Six Key Characteristics of a High-Performing 1Civil Service

Three lines of research inform this report. While the opportunity and limits to moving in these directions will vary by type of organization3 First, we convened an expert advisory panel. It and the ideological perspectives of the was composed of a number of former senior government of the day regarding the role of the public servants and other practitioners, former civil service, we believe these characteristics are politicians and senior political staff, and a number the hallmark of a modern, forward-looking civil of leading scholars and other expert observers service. from Canada and abroad. The advisory panel discussed the challenges facing the civil service, 1. Innovation deliberated on what reforms are necessary and To meet the changing circumstances facing considered if and how reforms could actually be government, the civil service needs the capacity accomplished. and skill to develop new approaches to policy development and service delivery. A strong Second, we conducted semi-structured interviews culture of innovation goes beyond a policy on with 20 individuals from different levels of innovation or focusing on a particular project or government. Participants were identified by initiative on a one-off basis. Instead, it requires advisory panel members and through other as a broader cultural shift. This could include the parts of the research process. introduction of structures and incentives that lead to greater experimentation and a renewed focus Third, we reviewed existing literature. on continuously finding better ways to do things. Innovation needs to become a core competency Based on these three lines of research, of the civil service. we identified six characteristics of a high- performing civil service: innovation, transparency, accountability, collaboration, evidence-informed 2. Transparency analysis and public and political commitment. With very limited exceptions, the civil service Many of these will be familiar from our earlier should operate based on a foundational Shifting Gears work. ‘Public and political presumption of transparency. Instead of a commitment’ is an important addition. Members reactive approach that centres on releasing data, of the advisory panel identified this as a documents and other information prepared for necessary pre-condition to making progress on a

reform agenda. 3 Kernaghan, K., Borins, S.F. and Marson, B. (2000). The new public

organization. Toronto: Institute of of Canada. C entre Mowat 3 | T he 4 | chapter 1: The Six Key Characteristics of a High-Performing Civil Service public andtoavoid duplication. unnecessary –bothtodeliver tothe betterservices partners experienceandskillsfromexpertise, diverse new collaborative approaches wouldleverage areand withoutsidepartners needed.Ideally, across working withindepartments, departments rather thangovernment-wide. New ways of government have oftenbeenproject specific toimprovework. Past efforts collaboration in Collaboration isabouthowgovernments oratin 4. Collab decisionsandbehaviour.performance, are actuallybeingheldaccountablefortheir parliamentarians andthepublicthatindividuals requires a credible reporting mechanism to inform effectively Third, dealwithpoorperformers. it it needstoreward andto goodperformers onaday-to-daytheir performance basis.Second, civil servantslearn,sothatthey canimprove accomplish three things.First,itneedstohelp At aminimum,meaningfulaccountabilitymust 3. Accountabilit narrowmeets avery setof exceptions. analysisandadviceunlessit all civilservice exist, thedefaultshouldbetoproactively disclose public consumptionorforwhichnoexceptions program development. impact must beatthecentre of policyand what doesn’t –evaluation ofpolicyandprogram decisions basedonwhat works–whileavoiding expenditures. Ifagovernment wishestomake its the effectiveness ofprograms and thevalue of government tomake informeddecisionsabout information possibleinorder toenablethe The objective shouldbetoprovide thebest informed by relevant, timelyandrobust evidence. Policies, programs shouldbe andservices Anal 5. Evidence-Informed y sis y Canadians. on economicprosperity andthequalityoflife of and resources neededtohave apositive impact tohavecivil service the authority, independence sufficient politicalwill,itwillbedifficultforthe Political commitmentisalsoneeded.Without resources well,includingthecivilservice. the government oftheday oughttomanageallits andtoreinforcecivil service theexpectationthat both tofosteranunderstandingoftherole ofthe – Engaging thepublicinadialogueisnecessary capacity todeliver Canadiansneed. theservices willbelimitedinits politicians, thecivilservice Without anengagedpublicandcommitted Commitment 6. PublicandPolitical 4 Lau,E.(2000). Government ofthefuture. Paris: OECD appropriately resourced civilservice. commitment to,anempowered, independentand for,building greater publicsupport andpolitical can leadtoimprovements inothers,including failure. Reforminanyofthesixcharacteristics aculturesupport ofinnovation that tolerates innovate andcollaborate.Trust from citizens can accountability canincentivize civilservants to for usingevidence indecision-making.Improved Greater transparency provides a strong imperative and potentiallyintensionwithoneanother. they are alsointerrelated, mutuallyreinforcing While eachofthesixcharacteristicsisdiscrete, 4 2 html#0.2.RRFY3S.WMBIYG.I3CW9G.E http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/meth_gde_e_10222. Management Reform: Progress, Setbacks andChallenges 6 OfficeoftheAuditor General ofCanada.(2001). Ottawa. Government of Canada1962-1991 5 Johnson,A.W. (1992).ReflectionsonAdministrativeReform inthe to five years, was onenewmajorpushforreform every three between the1960sandearly1990sthere Oneestimatesuggeststhat the civilservice. There ofattemptstoreform hasbeennoshortage number ofrespects,” haveefforts unquestionably ledto“progress ina these initiatives andothermore targeted reform initiatives isnotentirely clear. Ontheonehand, The impactofthesecostlyandtime-consuming and, mostrecently,Public Service Blueprint 2020. Committee on the Modernization Act, the Advisory V Service for Canadians,theTask Force onPublic been undertaken suchasLaRelève, Results early 1990s,several majorreform have efforts time. Following thelaunchofPS2000in There hasbeennoslowingdownsincethat Commission). Management andAccountability(Lambert and theRoyal CommissiononFinancial Government Organization (GlasscoCommission) reform wasnotachieved orintended. Indeed, innovative practiceswhere wholesalestructural alues and Ethics, the Public Service alues andEthics,thePublicService 5 of Reform Canada’s Record includingtheRoyal Commissionon 6 includingtheadoptionof . OfficeoftheAuditor General, Public Service Public Service . Ottawa. change.” that reforms have atbest“yieldedonlymarginal to deliver. Systematicexaminationsuggests transformative impactthatthey were expected that mostpastreform have efforts nothadthe At thesametime,there isbroad consensus initiatives.” of overlapping andonlylooselycoordinated has attimesresulted in“abewilderingseries management. Worse, incompleteimplementation capacity andmodernizinghumanresources accountability forresults, strengthening policy as improving tothepublic,enhancing service realized.” equally successfulgeneralimprovement hasbeen that “althoughnotalloftheinitiatives have been and digitization.Thishasledsometoconclude delivery such asaccesstoinformation,service Canada has,attimes,beenaworldleaderinareas Management to NewPublicGovernance, 271-313. complished inthe DialecticsofAccountability?” From New Public (2012). “TheLimits ofAccountability:Whatcanand cannotbeAc respect to accountabilityreforms M.andThomas,P. seeJarvis, comparative analysis G.(2004). 9 Pollitt C.andBouckaert, html#0.2.RRFY3S.WMBIYG.I3CW9G.E http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/meth_gde_e_10222. Management Reform:Progress, SetbacksandChallenges 8 OfficeoftheAuditor General ofCanada.(2001). 91-120. 1999–2010.“public service, Canadian PublicAdministration 7 Charko,P. (2013).“Managementimprovement intheCanadian 8 7 Thisisespeciallytrueinkey areas such

9 . Oxford University Press. For adiscussion with Public managementreform: A Public Service Public Service . Ottawa. , 56(1), -

5 | The Mowat Centre 6 | chapter 2: Canada’s Record of Reform ______to deliver. that they were expected transformative impact have efforts nothad the that most past reform There is broad consensus fairness andconsistencyledtomore suggests someNPMreforms have decreased the NewPublicManagement(NPM). jurisdictions withmajorreform initiatives suchas it didnotgoasfarorfastsomeother New Zealand, Australiaandothers.For example, cautious modernizer thantheUnitedKingdom, been introduced, Canadahasbeenamore Despite theratewithwhichreform have efforts nal ofPublicAdministration public management andtheNewZealand model.” Australian Jour 12 Duncan,G.,and Chapman,J.(2010).“Newmillennium, new Publishers. SystemsinAnglo-AmericanCountries. EdwardCivil Service Elgar balancingvalues andmanagement.”service: Halligan,J.(ed.), 11 Dwivedi O.P. andHalligan,J.(2004).“TheCanadian public public administration,3-17. Canada incomparative perspective.” The handbookofCanadian Policy; Borins,S.(2002).“Transformation ofthepublicsector: comparative perspective. Montreal: InstituteforResearch onPublic 10 Aucoin, P. (1995). reforms. now scalingbackand/ordismantlingsomeNPM jurisdictionssuchasNewZealandadopter’ are for otherstodive in(andfail)first.Some‘early At times,Canadahasbenefitedfrom waiting administration. the capacityforamore balancedmodelofpublic suggested thatthisapproach hasmaintained 12 Andpost-reform evidence from theUK 11 The newpublicmanagement:Canadain

, 69(3), 301-313. 10 Somehave - past efforts: key obstaclestoreform canbeidentifiedfrom past successesare nolongersuccessful.Three successes have beensuccessfulandwhysome toaskwhycurrentIt isimportant andpast the scaleofdisruptioncurrently takingplace. onsolidfootingtoeffectivelyservice respond to Norhaveservice. pastreform setthecivil efforts address thecore challengesconfronting thecivil that pastreform initiatives didnoteffectively and avoiding faddishreforms, ourresearch found Notwithstanding thebenefitsofbeingcautious expensive government. Institute forPublic Policy Research (IPPR). Reform ment. International Perspectives onCivil Service 15 Lodge,G.,and Kalitowski, S.(2007). Paris: OECD. 14 OECD(2005).ModernisingGovernment: The Way Forward. plaints.” Governance Years ofNewPublicManagement: HigherCosts,More Com- 13 Hood,C.,andDixon, R.(2015).“WhatWe Have to Showfor30 quite die,even asinterest wanes. initiatives thatneitherrealize reform norever to evaluate impacthasoftenledtozombie-like totrackprogresseffort onimplementationand of follow-through onimplementation. Alackof have beentangible,there hasoftenbeenalack has beensuccessful.Even where reform efforts benchmarks fordeterminingwhethertheinitiative a concrete strategyformeetingobjectives and/or been, toooftenthey have lacked clearobjectives, As well-intentionedaspastreforms have efforts implementation Focused andsustained of control. and accountabilityreducing levels important separating policyfrom delivery, inhibitinglearning about theimpactofpastNPMreforms, including satisfaction, have improved transparency andcustomer 15 14 there have alsobeenconcerns , 28(3),265-267. 13 While mostgovernments While Innovations inGovern- . London: high-performing civilservice. high-performing address inthecharacteristicsofa shortcomings prioritized inorder toovercome obstacles andto prescription –shouldbeambitious,focusedand reform –basedonanaccuratediagnosisand Even ifcomprehensive changeisnotpossible, pressing. Reformshouldnotlanguishanylonger. facesarechallenges thecivilservice real and and tootameintheirimplementation.The Reforms mustnotbetoomodestintheirgoals anything aboutit. noconstituencycarescivil service, enough todo constituenciesmayimportant complainaboutthe has reinforced while thestatusquo.Inshort, from politicalactors andthebroader public complacency andalackofdemandforreform isoftenatargetthe civilservice ofcriticism, reform. ofcivilservice While the importance around policyandpublicadministration lacks apopularpublicandpoliticaldiscourse As discussedlaterinthisreport, Canada forrefrm Demand consequences frfailure Incentives forsuccessand force inotherorganizations. pressures thatdrive modernizationwiththesame face samekindofcompetitionorotherexternal market correction. doesnot Thecivilservice would bemetwithsomekindofsanctionor organizations, repeated failure tomodernize have beenfew ornorepercussions. Inother or failedtorealize theobjectives they set,there To date,whenreform have efforts loststeam

7 | The Mowat Centre Reforms must not be too modest in their goals and too tame in their implementation. The challenges the civil service faces are real and pressing. Reform should not languish any longer. 8 | chapter 3: innovation 3 gc.ca/pses-saff/2014/results-resultats/bq-pq/00/org-eng.aspx. Survey. http://www.tbs-sct. Results by QuestionforthePublicService 17 Treasury Board Secretariat. Employee (2014). 2014PublicService Secretariat, 13-28. stitut d’administrationpubliqueduCanada CasesfromExpenditure theCommonwealth,In Management:Country and innovation intheCanadiangovernment. Innovations inPublic 16 Joyce, M.,andKingston, information C. (2011).Performance innovative ortotake initiative intheirwork, or somewhat)thatthey are encouragedtobe While 63percentofcivilservants agree (strongly more generally. the efficiencyandeffectiveness ofgovernment for innovation toplay abroader role inimproving improving delivery, service but there is also a need in government ismostcloselyidentifiedwith totakeand having thesupport risks.Innovation capacity forinnovation withinthecivilservice things. Thiswillrequire buildingskillsandgreater from tofindbetterways othersinaneffort todo means continuouslyexperimentingandlearning needstobemorecivil service innovative. This To successfullymeetfuture challenges,the How isCanadadoing? Canada hasbeenslowtoadoptmore Compared tootherWestern governments, it hasfacedandwillcontinuetoface. and flexibilitytorespond tothedisruptive change willlacktheresiliencewithout it,thecivilservice culture ofinnovation. Aculturalshiftisneeded; not clearthatthishastranslatedintoabroader Innovation 16 . Toronto: ,Commonwealth 17 itis - public sectormutualsandcommissioning. focused approaches suchasWhatWorks centres, meaningful transformation. this consistentlytimidapproach hasnotledto arrangements. potential benefitsofoutcomes-basedfunding has moved slowlyinexperimentingwiththe innovative approaches. For example,Canada , 121(1), 30-50. Theory games: ageneral frameworkwithapplications.” Journal ofEconomic 21 Hoppe,H.C., and Lehmann-Grube,U.(2005).“Innovation timing Essays inHonourof Peter C. Aucoin. McGill-Queen’s University Press. M. D. (Eds.). From NewPublic Managementto New Political Governance: really signifytheendofaccountability?”inBakvis, H.,andJarvis, archy: dohorizontality, anddistributedgovernance partnerships 20 Howard, C.,and Phillips, S.(2012).“Moving away from hier- ter_outcomes_for_public_services.pdf. http://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publications/91_bet Services 19 Gold,J.andMendelsohn,M.(2014). ter_outcomes_for_public_services.pdf. http://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publications/91_bet Services 18 Gold,J.andMendelsohn,M.(2014). focused onfollowingrulesandprocedures. by ahierarchical culture thatremains steadfastly thinking, theimpactofthosechangesislimited toward becomingmore innovative andforward Even where Canadahastaken positive steps models todeliver publicgoods. as traditionalgrantandcontributionfunding driven understandingsofaccountabilityaswell Instead, Canadahasremained tiedtoprocess- benefit tobeingsecondoreven tenth “mover”, While, asacknowledgedearlier, there canbea . Toronto: MowatCentre. . Toronto: MowatCentre. 18 Thisisalsotrueofoutcomes- Better OutcomesforPublic Better OutcomesforPublic 19 20

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9 | The Mowat Centre Canada’s ability to Canada’s ability to innovate is also stifled by its weak evaluation capacity and a lack of focus on innovate is also stifled evidence. A culture of innovation must be tightly by its weak evaluation wed to an emphasis on active experimentation and rigorous evaluation of the efficacy of different capacity and a lack approaches to tackling problems. Understanding what works is central to the success of new of focus on evidence. service delivery models.22 Evaluation standards ______applied in recent years have been inadequate, as has the use of evidence to inform policy and program decisions.23 A strong culture of innovation goes beyond focusing on a single project or initiative. While Moving Forward it may not be desirable for all civil servants to innovate in their individual roles, innovation needs to be a core competency of the civil service. The civil service should: Unfortunately, Canada is far from a leader » Dedicate a fixed percentage of in this regard. Other jurisdictions have gone departmental budgets to innovation, farther, and moved faster, in experimenting including creating innovation incentives with new approaches to policy development for individual middle managers and and service delivery. Around the world there employees. are local, regional and national government » Create mechanisms and incentives innovators who are drawing on human-centred to allow for more fluid exchanges and design, user engagement, open approaches to innovation, cross-sector collaboration and using movement at all career stages between data and evidence to transform governing and the civil service and other sectors. policymaking.24 » Adopt a new system of appointments for deputy ministers that will create It’s true that some governments at all levels more independence for civil service in Canada have recently created or partnered leaders and open the door to merit- with other organizations to create promising based external appointments. innovation or design labs, but compared to others, » Strengthen the capacity to evaluate we are still playing catch-up. Countries such as Denmark (MindLab), the UK (Behavioural Insights the impact of experimentation and Team; What Works Centres; Government Digital innovation. Service) and the United States (18F) have moved much more quickly to address a wide range of policy problems.

22 Gold, J. (2014). International Delivery: Centres of government and the drive for better policy implementation. Toronto: Mowat Centre and Institute for Government. http://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/ uploads/publications/97_international_delivery.pdf. 24 Bason, C. and Colligan, P. (2014). “Look to Government—Yes, 23 Aucoin, P. (2005). Decision-making in government: The role of Government—for New Social Innovations.” Harvard Business Review. program evaluation. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/tools-outils/ https://hbr.org/2014/11/look-to-governmentyes-governmentfor-

10 | chapter 3: innovation 10 | chapter aucoin-eng.asp# sec1. new-social-innovations. more than 70 mutuals have been launched to date. workers working in mutuals by 2015– government hadsetatarget ofhaving onemillion has beenslowerthananticipated–theUK experts quickly.experts authorities thatallowthemtobringinexternal also oftenempowered withspecialized hiring in theirwork. government, orthosewhowantmore autonomy programs more efficientlyor effectively outside attractive toemployees whofeel they candeliver suggestingthey mayand othersupports, be public sectormutuals,providing how-toguides an active role inencouragingthecreation of In theUK,forexample,government hastaken are anoffshoot. forefront of“commissioning,” ofwhichmutuals Australian andUKgovernments have beenatthe control ofstaffwho are former civilservants. The effectively –underthe privatizing delivery service mutuals are organizations thathave “spunout”– creation ofpublicsectormutuals.Public Other countriesare alsoexperimentingwiththe testing newideas. – allowforfailure oftheprocess aspart of rapid responses and–perhapsmostimportantly approaches, are predisposed toproviding more reduce hierarchy, unnecessary testdifferent standard government inthatthey departments These unitsdistinguishthemselves from five-lessons com/public-leaders-network/2013/apr/30/public-sector-mutuals- sector mutual.” TheGuardian 28 Farrow-Smith, D. (2013).“Oneyear on:five lessonsforpublic vice-mutuals 27 See:https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/public-ser - abc_hr_prof_ODEP_508%20compliant.pdf. non-competitive basis.http://www.dol.gov/odep/pubs/scheduleA/ federal agenciesto accessadiverse andvibranttalentpoolona 26 For example,intheU.S.Schedule Ahiringauthorityallows better-collaboration-for-better-government/. Government. Toronto: TheMowatCentre. http://mowatcentre.ca/ 25 Johal,SandDitta,S.(2015). 27 Whilethecreation ofnewmutuals 26 25 Theseorganizations are , April30http://www.theguardian. Better Collaborationfor 28 phtml?e=fjtcgvtyandid=422. tor Management in theirownworkandtheofstaff. forinnovationunambiguous support –both leaders needtobeseenasproviding fulland than justtalkingaboutinnovation, civilservice atthetop.Rather starting of thecivilservice, the needforaradicalchangeinculture The greatest obstacletomoving forward is test theimpactshouldbemade. as withallexperimentation,arigorous to effort and otherinnovative approaches. And,ofcourse, But more couldbedonetoexperimentwiththese hollowingoutthecapacityofstate. service, locate innovative practicesoutsideofthecivil the impactonsomeoftheseapproaches that Andthereservice. are legitimateconcernsabout a silver bullettoimproving innovation inthecivil None oftheseapproaches shouldbeconsidered Ten Years Later.” 31 Lindquist,E.(2012)“Horizontal Management inCanada tence%20of%20Innovation%20in%20Government.pdf www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/The%20Persis A guideforinnovative publicservants.” Innovation Series 30 Borins,S.(2014).“Thepersistence ofinnovation ingovernment: Secretariat, 13-28. stitut d’administrationpubliqueduCanada CasesfromExpenditure theCommonwealth,In Management:Country and innovation intheCanadiangovernment.” Innovations inPublic 29 Joyce, M., and Kingston, information C.(2011).“Performance support. to dosoisoftenhindered by alackofpolitical innovation withintheirorganizations, theirability leaderscandomore civil service tosupport isalsoessential.While Political support governments attempttoissue-manageall for negative newsinanenvironment where opportunities. approaches toresolving problems andexploiting focus onflexibilityandtakingmore proactive to seekoutprocess improvements, arenewed of informationtechnology, continuousefforts interorganizational collaboration,greater use This canbeaccomplishedthrough increased 31 There isoften“zero risktolerance” . 42(3).http://www.optimumonline.ca/print. Optimum Online:The JournalofPublicSec 30 . Toronto: Commonwealth . http:// - 29

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11 | The Mowat Centre aspects of governing.32 Innovation is inherently any perverse or unintended consequences.33 unpredictable and includes surprises. It is often Without a bold political commitment to not known what will work, what benefits – if innovation, the incentives will remain for the any – will be achieved and to whom they will civil service to continue to take a timid approach accrue, whether or not positive outcomes can to innovation. Civil servants could do more to be replicated by rolling out the approach more support this kind of shift by better explaining how broadly and whether or not innovation will lead to they want to innovate, what the actual risks are as best they understand them and how they can mitigate those risks, and by ensuring that there is a concrete system of accountability in place for when things go wrong. There should be no expectation that there will be carte blanche for innovation.

Other concrete changes can be taken to support a greater culture of innovation. In addition to strengthening evaluation, more could be done to liberate the civil service from ineffective processes. Traditionally, the civil service has adopted highly formal approaches to accountability and oversight. While recent research suggests that the focus of civil service accountability is already shifting away from process and toward results, there is still room for improvement. This could include placing greater emphasis on outcomes rather than outputs, and ensuring that accountability for measured results cascades down through bureaucratic hierarchies to the individuals deemed responsible for their achievement.34 This has the potential to encourage a degree of greater experimentation – the stated goal of commissioning.

33 Perrin, B. (2002). “How to and How Not to Evaluate Innovation.” Evaluation, 8(1), 13-28 34 Jarvis, M. D. (2014). “The Black Box of : Interrogat- 32 Interview with former Prime Minister’s Office official conducted ing Accountability in the Public Service.” Australian Journal of Public

12 | chapter 3: innovation 12 | chapter Wednesday, March 11, 2015. Administration, 73(4), 450-466. countries. independent process amongtheWestminster appointment process isregarded asthemost rejection andreasons foritpublic.NewZealand’s recommended candidatesolongasitmakes the In turn,cabinetcandeclinetoappointthe Commission followingmerit-basedcompetitions. just theprimeminister–by thePublicService are recommended tocabinet–ratherthan for example,deputyministerappointments InNewZealand,members ofthecivilservice. be tochangetheappointmentprocess forsenior One way toestablishgreater independencewould capable ofresponding tofuture challenges. innovation, butalsotomake more thecivilservice independence. Notonlytofostergreater canbegivenin whichthecivilservice greater Finally, consideration shouldbegiven toways delivery. inservice performance stimulate innovation and improve organizational have beenusedinsomejurisdictionsto Further, employee empowermentstrategies sub100.pdf/$file/sub100.pdf. budget to innovation. http://rd-review.ca/eic/site/033.nsf/vwapj/ dedicateonepercentof their opment suggested eachdepartment Panel Review to ofFederalthe Expert Research Support andDevel - 36 For example,theSocialInnovation Generation’s submissionto Public AdministrationResearch, 23(1), 155-187. andTheory ment to encourageinnovative behavior inthepublicsector.” Journal of 35 Fernandez, S.,andMoldogaziev, T. (2013). “Usingemployee empower- innovation andtheevaluation ofresults. fixed percentage budgetsto of departmental called onthefederal government todevote a whentheythe civilservice return. Somehave apply whatthey learninotherorganizations to to broaden and theirexperienceandexpertise are alsopossible.Thiswouldallowcivilservants andothersectorsatallcareerservice stages exchanges andmovement betweenthecivil 35 More fluid 36 and strengthening performance. that facilitateinnovation, greater collaboration introduce andapproaches newideas,expertise values andstructures. But,this couldhelp understanding ofthepublicsectorenvironment, merit-based competitionandpossessadeep should, ofcourse,meetthedemandsrigorous for more outsidecandidates.Externalhires process couldalsohave thebenefitofallowing that appointedthem.Changestotheappointment not feel asdirectly beholdentotheprimeminister may bemore takingrisksifthey comfortable do positive impactoninnovation. Deputyministers isappointedcouldhaveof thecivilservice a Changing theway inwhichtheseniorleadership recommendations thatare rejected. should beapublicwrittenexplanationforany open competitive process; and,second,there all appointmentsshouldbetheresult ofan a more independentappointmentprocess. First, the NewZealand modelare essentialinensuring prime ministerortocabinet–twoprinciplesfrom or whethertherecommendation ismadetothe Commission, Senior OfficialsorthePublicService recommendation ismadeby theCommitteeof appointment process canvary –e.g.,whetherthe While theexactdesignofamore independent

13 | The Mowat Centre 14 | chapter 4: transparency 4 worst record amongthefive. Zealand andCanadafoundto have the transparency inAustralia,Britain,Ireland, New eng/pin-to-pin-nip-a-nip.aspx. tion atriskfrom instantmessaging 40 InformationCommissioner ofCanada(2013) 352-359. of freedom ofinformation.”, 27(4). Government Information Quarterly 39 Hazell, R.,andWorthy, B.(2010).“Assessingtheperformance ber (pp. 12-35). World Conference ofthe InternationalOmbudsmanInstitute A.S.(2012).“Transparency38 Roberts, introubled times.” In Tenth Public Service. accountability: Aframeworkforreform. Ottawa:CanadaSchoolof 37 Aucoin, P., M.D. andJarvis, (2005). Modernizinggovernment as aconstraintongovernment secrecy. to adoptanaccessinformationsystem was oneofthefirstnationalgovernments area Canada was,atonetime,aworldleaderinthe How isCanadadoing? phones). technology (e.g.,text-basedinstantmessagingon operations, suchastheuseofcommunications ofroutine scandalsandaspart to particular transparency have beenraisedbothwithrespect by civilservants andelectedofficialstoobstruct number ofconcernsaboutdeliberateattempts has diminished. of Canada’s accesstoinformationsystem government, andinrecent years theeffectiveness since thentopromote greater transparency in Unfortunately, hasbeenmade littleeffort of transparency. TheGovernment ofCanada 40

Transparency 38 In2011,astudycomparing . Ottawa.http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/ 39 Sincethen,a Access to informa 37

, Novem- - discussions) have hadasimilareffect. background cabinet materialsthatsupport to notrelease othertypesofinformation(e.g., areas, decreased overall transparency. is collectedand,notwithstandinggainsinsome data. Thishasweakened thereliability ofwhat the sametime,government iscollectingless not silencedcritics,whocorrectly notethatat meet thestandard ofbeingopenby default. and updatetheAccesstoInformationAct to accelerateandexpandopendatainitiatives, Canada’s newfederal government haspromised than hasbeenexpected. result isthatpolicymakinglesstransparent than 200,000datasetsaccessible. 16), citingprogress suchashaving mademore Canada’s ActionPlanonOpenGovernment 2014- to make government more transparent (e.g., Canada’s previous government announcedefforts government.pdf government. https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/08/a-fair-and-open- ofCanada. (2015). 44 LiberalParty University Ottawa). ficer ofthegovernment ofCanada. communications technologies:therole ofthechiefinformation 43 Brown, D. C. (2011). Comingto termswithinformationand da/vanishing-canada-why-were-all-losers-in--war-on-data/. Ottawa’s warondata.” Maclean’s http://www.macleans.ca/news/cana- 42 Kingston, A.(2015).“Vanishing Canada:Whywe’re alllosers in government-2014-16. 16. http://open.canada.ca/en/content/canadas-action-plan-open- 41 Canada.(2014). (or may not)follow, thesecommitmentsare senseoftheresultswithout acertain thatmay these commitmentsremains tobeseen.Even Whether thegovernment followsthrough on Canada’s Action PlanonOpenGovernment 2014- (Doctoral dissertation, Carleton (Doctoral dissertation, Real change:Afair andopen 41 Y et thishas 42 43 Decisions The 44 - Moving Forward evidence ofwhatworks. decisions andtobasepolicyprograms on for government todoitsduediligenceinmaking Transparencyimportant. provides anincentive transparent, accessibleadvice. citizens andparliamentarians withmore publicly orientedmanner, includingserving of theday, itcanfulfillitspolicyrole inamore thegovernment serves While thecivilservice » Initiateaconsultationprocess to » Returnto thetraditionofpublishing » Mirror jurisdictionslike NewZealand The civilser should andnotbemadepublic. kinds ofgovernment information define when,where andhowvarious establish newguidelinesto clearly policy issues. “green” papers”onpressing and“white government decision-making. advice andanalysisthatsupports in proactively disclosingcivilservice and municipalgovernments inOntario vice should : making ortofostergreater publicengagement. public’s understandingofgovernment decision- government decision-making,toincrease the evidence suggeststhat they dolittletoimprove information systemscanincrease transparency, resource intensive. Further, whileaccessto access toinformationsystemiscostlyand system willnotbesufficient.Theexisting attempting toupdatetheaccessinformation How cansuchashifttake place?Simply gabriel-makhlouf-treasury-new-zealand/. New Zealand. 47 Agbonlahor, W. GabrielMakhlouf, Treasury, (2015). Interview: default-2.pdf. https://dr6j45jk9xcmk.cloudfront.net/documents/2428/open-by- 46 Ontario.(2014).Openby Default:ANewWay Forward for Ontario ofaward-report.pdf. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/foi/ESRC-end- toment. ConstitutionUnitendofaward report ESRC,RES062230164 45 Hazell, R.andWorthy, B.(2009).ImpactofFOIoncentralgovern- particularly aroundparticularly policyadvice. the twosystemswaslevel oftransparency, arguedservice, thatthekey difference between andaformermemberoftheUKcivil department Makhlouf, theheadofNewZealand’s Treasury New Zealand’s respective Gabriel civil services, discussing thedifferences betweentheUK’sand and digitalengagement. experimenting withopendata,information More isrequired. Leadingjurisdictionsare now Open data: Open dataisreleased proactively whenever possible. readable formatwithminimalrestrictions onitsuseorre-use. which ismadeavailable to thepublicinastructured, machine- is notsubjectto privacy, securityorlegislative restrictions and Data Policy. OpenInformationand SOURCE: Government ofAlberta Open information: information isreleased proactively whenever possible. is notlimitedto, studies,maps,legislation,etc.Open reports, minimal restrictions onitsuseorre-use. Thisincludes,but restrictions andwhichismadeavailable to thepublicwith whose release isnotsubjectto privacy, securityorlegislative http://www.globalgovernmentforum.com/interview- refers to government-owned datawhose release meansgovernment-owned information 46 In an interview Inaninterview 47

45

. .

15 | The Mowat Centre Going forward, a accessible in advance of the meeting.49 This presumption of is meant to allow council, the community, and the media to review, formulate questions and transparency could generate ideas for discussion.

serve as the foundation Going forward, a presumption of transparency for how the civil service could serve as the foundation for how the civil service – and government more broadly – works. – and government more Instead of only releasing documents prepared for public consumption or information for which broadly – works. no exceptions exist, the default could be to proactively disclose all civil service analysis ______and advice unless it meets a very narrow set of exceptions. This is what it means to be “open by default.” It recognizes that there is a public New Zealand’s Official Information Act requires good in having evidence used in decision-making that civil service advice to ministers be made available for outside use and scrutiny. public following a decision being taken on the matter, with limited exceptions. This sets New Civil service advice to ministers could be Zealand apart from Canada, as well as the UK. published in real time, prior to decisions being In contrast, in Canada, advice to ministers is taken. When deputy ministers sign off their generally kept secret. In practice, under the approval on departmental briefing material and New Zealand system, the amount of time that recommendations, the documents and supporting it takes to release advice can vary, but even on materials could be posted on the departmental major policy decisions like the budget, advice website. Limited exceptions will have to be made is routinely made public within a couple of either in terms of exact timing of releasing advice months.48 or in terms of redacting some advice, depending on the issue being considered. Exceptions While the dynamics and structure of local could be made based on a very narrow list of governance are considerably different from other considerations (e.g., proprietary information; levels of government, Ontario municipalities national security considerations) by deputy have gone even further. Rather than posting ministers. documents meant to support decision-making after decisions have been taken, many Ontario Some will outright dismiss such an approach municipalities post reports by impartial municipal suggesting that advice needs to be kept secret. civil servants on issues being debated and voted Many others will have reservations about such on ahead of council or committee meetings. an approach. First, some may raise concerns While a strict reading of the Municipal Act only that disclosing advice will lead to more cautious, requires public notice of meetings, this has been conservative advice. However, public scrutiny – interpreted by most Ontario municipalities to and potential criticism – may actually improve require that agenda material also be publicly the quality of civil service advice. This could also

16 | chapter 4: transparency 16 | chapter 48 ibid 49 Interview with municipal official conducted Tuesday April 28, 2015. predisposition toward trustandnationalculture. on factorssuchaspriorknowledge,general impact ontrustwiththepublicdepending evidence thattransparency canhave anegative consequences. For example,there issome increasing transparency couldleadtounintended Second, anargument canbemadethat collaboration. andgreateroutside thecivilservice innovation or lead toadoptingnewinnovative ideasfrom those tive Experiment.” PublicAdministration Review,73:575–586. Transparency onTrust inGovernment: ACross-National Compara jsen, S.,Porumbescu, G.,Hong,B.andIm,T. (2013).“The Effect of , 24(1):137-157;Grimmelikhui Administration Research andTheory organization: Evidence from an onlineexperiment.” JournalofPublic transparency ofagovernment ontheperceived trustworthiness 50 Grimmelikhuijsen,S.G.,&Meijer, A.J.(2012).“Theeffects of transparency. of,greater with,andsupportive be comfortable requires thatleadershipwithinthecivilservice a newstyleofpoliticalleadership,italso “open by default”approach notonlydemands democratic systemisintendedtowork.This deem tobemostappropriate. Thisishowour this adviceandtomake thedecisionsthatthey Governments are ofcoursefree todisregard analysis thatstandsuptopublicscrutiny. to provide robust advicebasedonsystematic understanding thatitistherole ofthecivilservice is required. Trust shouldbepredicated onan advice.Achangeofexpectations civil service when thegovernment choosesnottofollow their staff,andseniorcivilservants, particularly will underminetrustbetweenelectedofficials, Third, somewillsuggestthislevel oftransparency wrestle withwhenmakingdecisions. considerations andtrade-offsthatgovernments nuanced publicdiscussionaboutthedifferent trust andprovide abasisformore robust and coulddemystify andrebuildcivil service public At thesametime,exposingworkingsof 50 - -

perhaps otherstakeholder groups aswell. technical briefingsforoppositionandmedia, papers” onpressing policyissuesandconducting practices, suchaspublishing“green” and“white could bestrengthened by areturn totraditional improve transparency. For example,transparency There are arangeofotheroptionsforhowto public. how various kindsofinformationshouldbemade disclosure couldclearlydefinewhen,where and be shielded.Newguidelinesforproactive public be disclosedby defaultandtheactualadvice advice (reports, statisticalanalysis,etc.)could could betaken. For example,theinputsto Different approaches astowhatisreleased advice withco-production oropenpolicymaking. a closed system of might notbepossibletomarry may require greater transparency. For example,it Further, otherobjectives suchascollaboration Social expectationsmay bedeterminative here. position todecidehowtransparent itwillbe. Ultimately, may thecivilservice notbeina argument infavour ofthestatusquo. loopholes willalways exist.Thisisnotasufficient No reform toexploit isperfect. Opportunities toavoidoutside thecivilservice, scrutiny. done “offthebooks,” through oraladviceor transparency couldleadtomore thingsbeing Finally, there isafear thatincreasing

17 | The Mowat Centre 18 | chapter x:5: accoundescriptionTability their jobs. to do civil servants how we expect implication for has a practical of accountability different purposes emphasize the about, define and How we think 5 improving performance. effective accountabilitysystemfocused on leveldepartmental –thishasnotledtoan requirements andprocesses –mostlyatthe considerable expansioninformalaccountability management approaches donotprovide the sort Peter C.Aucoin Public Management to NewPolitical Governance: Essays inHonourof of Accountability?” InBavkis, M. D. H.,andJarvis, (eds.), From New ability: WhatCanandCannotBeAccomplished intheDialectics M.D.,52 Jarvis, andThomas, P.. 2012.“TheLimits ofAccount Administration ing AccountabilityinthePublicService.” Australian JournalofPublic M.D.51 Jarvis, (2014). “TheBlackBox ofBureaucracy: Interrogat on aday-to-day basis. a meansoflearningandimproving performance culture thatembracesindividualaccountabilityas First, Canadahasnotdeveloped acivilservice Canada isstrugglingineachoftheseregards. » assure thoseoutsidegovernment thatcivil » effectively address and, poorperformers; » helpindividualcivilservants learninorder to accomplish three things: accountability forcivilservants needsto learning, results –ataminimum,meaningful – suchasdemocraticcontrol, assurance, differentWhile accountabilitycanserve purposes How isCanadadoing? servants areservants actuallyheldtoaccount. improve theirperformance; , 73(4),450-466. . Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Accountability 51 Whilethere hasbeen 52 Formal performance - - in theirworkunit. employee ismanagedeffectively performance federal civilservants agree thatunsatisfactory civil servantsthemselves. Only33percentof Thisproblemperformers. iswellrecognized by of itsfailure toeffectively dealwithpoor suffersSecond, thecivilservice asaresult could be. improveservants asmuchthey performance accountability practicesare nothelpingcivil of the civil service asawhole. of thecivilservice they workin,orwiththeculturedepartment rather thanwiththeculture oftheparticular exclusively manager, associatedwithaparticular officials dodescribethisoccurring,itisalmost acknowledge andlearnfrom mistakes. Where andallowsindividualsto good performance of rich,regular, ongoingfeedback thatrecognizes gc.ca/pses-saff/2014/results-resultats/bq-pq/00/org-eng.aspx. Survey. http://www.tbs-sct. Results by QuestionforthePublicService 55 Treasury Board Employee Secretariat. (2014). 2014PublicService gc.ca/pses-saff/2014/results-resultats/bq-pq/00/org-eng.aspx. Survey. http://www.tbs-sct. Resultsby Questionforthe PublicService 54 Treasury Board Employee Secretariat. (2014).2014PublicService Administration ing AccountabilityinthePublicService.” Australian JournalofPublic M.D.53 Jarvis, (2014). “TheBlackBox ofBureaucracy: Interrogat remarkably lowdismissalrateinthecivilservice. ishighlightedby the dealing withpoorperformers performance intheirworkunit. performance senior managementtoaddress unsatisfactory report thatthey received from support necessary responsibilities withsupervisory participants , 73(4),450-466. 54 Further, only61per centof 53 55 Inthissense, The difficultyof -

19 | The Mowat Centre Each year, less than 0.1 per cent of the federal civil is dismissed for performance, according to Moving Forward the government.56 Given the lengthy and taxing human resource processes for recruiting, hiring The civil service should: and firing individuals in the civil service, this is not entirely surprising. » Work with unions to develop a new substantive focus on accountability Finally, civil service accountability is undermined that improves performance and by its failure to effectively inform those outside of establishes a simplified system of government that civil servants are actually held credible incentives and sanctions, to account. Care must be taken to respect the including making it easier to dismiss privacy rights of individuals, but those outside poor performers. government are rarely able to tell whether and/ » Support managers by providing the or how civil servants are held to account, except training and tools needed to deliver when a legal or political controversy ensues.57 The meaningful ongoing feedback, in civil service lacks a mechanism for effectively addition to periodic formal performance assuring parliamentarians, the public, and the media that civil servants are held to account management processes. for their performance, behaviour and decisions, including when they are dismissed or otherwise 58 sanctioned. There are more than 210,000 civil servants in the core federal public administration Canada is not alone in this regard. Recent alone, accounting for one of the largest single comparative research suggests that other expenditures in the federal government budget. 59 countries are struggling with these same issues. Civil servants at all levels of government exercise For example, while the dismissal rate is higher in substantial authority and often have a significant both the United States and in Australia, the rates impact on the lives of Canadians. They influence are only marginally higher at 0.6 per cent and how policies are developed, how taxes are spent 60 0.1 per cent, respectfully. This seems no less and how services are delivered. troubling than the Canadian rate. Improving individual accountability will require a two-pronged approach aimed at dramatically changing the culture of accountability within the

56 Clement, T. (2013). Speech from Tony Clement, President of civil service. the , to the Association of Professional Executives of the . Ottawa: May 28. http:// www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/media/ps-dp/2013/0528-eng.asp First, holding individuals accountable for

b ility 57 Uhr, J. (2014). “Accountable Civil Servants”. The Oxford Hand- a performance must be made a priority for book of Public Accountability, 236-241. 58 Aucoin, P., and Jarvis, M. D. (2005). Modernizing government managers. Managers cannot hold their accountability: A framework for reform. Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service. subordinates to account without adequate 59 Jarvis, M. D. (2014). “The Black Box of Bureaucracy: Interrogat- support, however. This includes supporting ing Accountability in the Public Service.” Australian Journal of Public Administration, 73(4), 450-466. the development of necessary skills, creating 60 Clement, T. (2013). Speech from Tony Clement, President of incentives that encourage greater accountability the Treasury Board of Canada, to the Association of Professional

20 | chapter 5: accoun T 20 | chapter Executives of the Public Service of Canada. Ottawa: May 28. public management.” of continuousimprovement ingovernance and accountability asakey to“learninginpursuit Second, greater focuswillhave tobeplacedon isnotsufficient. poor performers –thoughsimplyfiring to dismisspoorperformers will require structural changesthatmake iteasier and emphasize thedifferent purposesof of resources. How wethinkabout,define outcomes andensuringcareful management meet desired objectives, suchasdelivering accountability practiceswithinthecivilservice It’salsoaboutwhetherday-to-dayimportant. when thingsgowrong, thoughthat’sobviously Accountability isn’t just aboutwhathappens pressuresshort-term todeliver. feedback isoftenpushedasideinpursuitof feedback are necessary. toprovidethat efforts more meaningful,ongoing reviewsperformance may begoingtoofar, but suggested thathethinkseliminatingformal CommissionerJohnLloydService hasrecently frequent informalfeedback. reviewsformal performance infavour ofmore of large private sectorfirmshave noweliminated improved they promised. performance Anumber to deliver effective accountabilityorthekindof management,havesuch asperformance failed rewards andsanctions. and providing managerswithmore credible YE.twitter. eyes-private-sector-hr-lets-bandwagon-pass/#.Ve05qpw4_ 64 http://www.themandarin.com.au/50756-aps-commissioner- d4e716d0-4508-11e5-846d-02792f854297_story.html. moving-away-from-traditional-performance-reviews/2015/08/17/ washingtonpost.com/business/economy/more-us-companies- rid-of-annual-performance-reviews-and-rankings/; http://www. on-leadership/wp/2015/07/21/in-big-move-accenture-will-get- 63 For examplesee:http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ University Press. Centre forManagementDevelopment. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s inpublicmanagementreform. Canadian ability forperformance 62 Aucoin, P. andHeintzman,R.(2000). Administration ing AccountabilityinthePublicService.” Australian JournalofPublic M.D.61 Jarvis, (2014).“TheBlackBox ofBureaucracy: Interrogat , 73(4), 450-466. 62 Formal approaches, 61 64 Part ofthesereforms Part More meaningful 63 AustralianPublic The dialecticsofaccount - - ______resources. careful management of outcomes and ensuring such as delivering meet desired objectives, within the civil service accountability practices about whether day-to-day things go wrong. It’s also about what happens when Accountability isn’t just how weexpectcivilservants todotheirjobs. accountability hasapracticalimplicationfor ability in PublicAdministration.” The Oxford HandbookofPublic Account Administration ing AccountabilityinthePublicService.” Australian JournalofPublic M.D.66 Jarvis, (2014). “TheBlackBox ofBureaucracy: Interrogat Administration ing AccountabilityinthePublicService.” Australian JournalofPublic M.D.65 Jarvis, (2014). “TheBlackBox ofBureaucracy: Interrogat skeptically by bothmanagersandemployees. ins andannualratings–whichare oftenviewed approaches –practicessuchasperiodiccheck- management conventional formalperformance A real focusonlearningwillneedtotranscend , 211-225. , 73(4), 450-466;Peters, B.G.(2014).“Accountability , 73(4), 450-466. 65 66

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21 | The Mowat Centre The kind of informal accountability practices One of the biggest obstacles to overcome will be and coaching that support day-to-day learning a transformation of a human resources regime and improvement are not easily observable and unionized culture that protects too many outside of the civil service. This conflicts with an poor performers, with negative consequences increasingly cynical public. In order to meet the for both the system and the vast majority of demand for transparency, a mechanism is needed civil servants, who perform well. While poor for informing both Parliament and the public performers may account for a small number of that civil servants are being held to account in a civil servants, dealing with them ineffectively has meaningful way. serious internal (e.g., morale) and external (e.g., perception) consequences. The United Kingdom benefits from having a parliamentary committee dedicated to examining While some might suggest that civil servants public administration. A similar committee in themselves may stand in the way of reform, the Canada would provide a credible venue for the large number of civil servants who recognize leadership of the civil service to inform Parliament the problem suggests this is not the case.67 and the public about accountability practices Collective agreements could provide a basis for within the civil service, as well as an opportunity more meaningful performance management. to discuss matters of public administration more To this end, civil service leadership could work broadly. It would also give deputy ministers an with relevant unions to develop a new approach incentive to ensure that accountability is being to performance and accountability that both taken seriously throughout their organizations. reduces transaction costs associated with dealing with poor performers, and facilitates improved performance for the civil service as a whole. A renewed approach could also lead to credible consequences that discourage unwanted behaviour without the onerous level of effort that currently deters managers from addressing poor performance in a meaningful way. b ility a

67 Kelman, S. (2005). Unleashing change: A study of organization-

22 | chapter 5: accoun T 22 | chapter al renewal in government. Brookings Institution Press. 6 the government intranet. via edit thesameinformationsimultaneously” any civilservant to“access,commenton,and across government. For example,GCpediaallows civil servantstocollaboratewithcolleagues emerged, makingiteasierfordigitally-enabled #w2p networkandGCpedia/GCconnex–have Some promising practices–suchasthe done goingforward. internally andexternally, even more willhave tobe government hasdonetostrengthen collaboration Government-Good to Go? in Stoney, C.(ed). HowOttawaSpends, 2014-2015:TheHarper er? ...Information, Collaboration, andtheHarperGovernment.” 70 Clarke, A.(2014).“One ofTheseThingsIsNotLike the Oth- ment, 42(3). Years OptimumOnline:TheJournalofPublic Sector Manage Later”. 69 Lindquist,E.(2012).“Horizontal ManagementinCanadaTen of PublicService. centralagenciesandleadership partments, 68 Juillet,L.,andBakvis,H.(2004). orministries. departments to address thoseissuesthatcutacross multiple coordination inaneffort andcollaboration,partly hasbeenworkingtowardservice improving For atleastthepasttwodecades,civil implementation ofprograms, policies and services. and skills,leading to more efficient design and governments toleverage experience expertise, –allows with internalorexternalpartners Collaboration –theprocess ofworkingclosely How isCanadadoing? boration Colla . McGill-Queen’s University Press. 69

70 Thischipsaway at 68 The horizontal challenge:Linede Asmuchasthe . Ottawa:CanadaSchool - - results have beenmore insular thanengaging. suggeststhat analysis ofsomethoseefforts the greater useofsocialmedia,forexample– some stepstoward realizing thatgoal–through need forgreater collaborationandhastaken collaborative andinnovative culture.” “to nurture amore performance-oriented, suggest thisreflects therecognized need across, oreven within,departments. approaches thatrestrict informationsharing the “siloed”nature ofinformationmanagement public. academicsandthegeneral sector partners, includingnot-for-profitpartners, groups, private civil servantstoworkmore freely withexternal approaches, asoneexample.Thiswouldfree up be donetomove past“whole-of-government” culture ofcollaborationhasemerged. More could There islessevidence tosuggestthatabroader Government-Good to Go? in Stoney, C.(ed). HowOttawaSpends, 2014-2015:TheHarper er? ...Information, Collaboration, andtheHarperGovernment.” 74 Clarke, A.(2014).“One ofTheseThingsIsNotLike the Oth- Government-Good to Go? in Stoney, C.(ed). HowOttawaSpends,2014-2015:The Harper er? ...Information, Collaboration,andthe HarperGovernment.” 73 Clarke, A.(2014).“One ofTheseThingsIsNotLike the Oth- clerk.gc.ca/local_grfx/docs/18rpt-eng.pdf. ofCanada ister onthePublicService 72 Wouters, W. to thePrime Min (2011).EighteenthAnnualReport model.” Government informationquarterly, 18(2), 122-136. J. (2001).“Developing fullyfunctionalE-government: Afourstage Review ofAdministrative Sciences ment: modernizingBritishgovernment withICTs.” International 71 Bellamy, C.(2002).“From automation to knowledgemanage 73 While the civil service recognizes Whilethecivilservice the . McGill-Queen’s University Press. . McGill-Queen’s University Press. , 68(2),213-230;Layne K.,andLee, , p.13.Available athttp://www. 71 72 Proponents 74 - -

23 | The Mowat Centre 24 | chapter 6: collaboration externally. reduce procedural burdens –bothinternallyand is tooccur, needstodomore thecivilservice to costs ofcollaboration.Ifgreater collaboration not gonefarenoughtoreduce thetransaction andaccountability haveto funding,reporting and time-consumingadministrative approaches than therule.Further, toreduce pastefforts rigid and implementation–isstilltheexception rather arepartners fullyinvolved inpolicydevelopment initiatives, ahigherlevel ofcollaboration–where resulted inbeneficialoutcomesforspecific even betteroutcomes. tomaximize efficiencyandrealizeopportunity collaboration andintegrationpresents an collaboration. levels ofpowersharing,from consultationto governmentspartnerships, canadoptdifferent governmental organizations. Whenforming withnon- potential benefitsofpartnerships Government hasalsofailedtomaximize the University Press. management: New strategiesforlocalgovernments 78 Agranoff,R.and McGuire, M.(2004). tions/57_integrating_human_services.pdf Centre. http://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publica . Toronto:an AgeofFiscalRestraint:AShifting GearsReport Mowat J.(2012). 77 Gold,J.,andHjartarson, Canada.” Canadian PublicAdministration forandresistance tosupport redefining themeaningofcharityin 76 Levasseur, K.(2012). “In thenameofcharity:Institutional Canberra: Australian NationalUniversity, 3-12. Collaborative Governance: ANewEraof Public Policy inAustralia? sions, drivers andoutcomes.” InO’FlynnJ.andWanna J.(eds.), 75 Wanna, J.(2008).“Collaborative government: meanings,dimen- remained siloed. delivery,service hasoften back-officesupport integrated “single-window”approaches improved from pastsuccesses. For example,while Moreover, existtopushforward opportunities 76

75 Whilethisflexibilityhasoften 77 Improving plane” “vertical 78

Integrating Human Services in Integrating HumanServices , 55(2), 181-202. Collaborative public . Georgetown - of PublicService. centralagenciesandleadership partments, project-specific. collaboration ingovernment, they are often for collaborationonsenior civilservants. To thanCanadainplacing theresponsibilityfurther (APS)hasgone The AustralianPublicService require culturalandstructuralchanges. Moving Forward 80 Juillet,L.,and Bakvis,H.(2004). Flexible%20Final%20Report_EN.pdf. 79 http://www.ppforum.ca/sites/default/files/Flat%20Forward%20 needed. greater internalandexternalcollaborationis To make government more effective andefficient, » Usemore collaborative “results teams” » Create amore collaborative culture by to reduce» Redoubleefforts internaland The civilser sectors. governmentsacross and departments, actors atthehighestlevels from of outcomes,andbringtogether accountabilities ontheachievement or “results secretariats” thatfocus range ofindividualsandorganizations. to engagemore publiclywithabroader andprovideservants thetools needed and GCConnex,thatempowercivil suchasGCpedia expanding onefforts, accountability requirements). andother (such asfunding,reporting andcollaboration of partnerships those thatinhibittheeffective use external procedural burdens, especially 79 Whilethere are toimprove efforts 80 Strengthening collaboration will vice should The horizontal challenge:Line de . Ottawa:Canada School : - approach andsharingpowerwithpartners. common purpose,insistingonawhole-system leadership ofthe highest quality.” responsibility toprovide “APS-widestrategic oftheir boundaries”aspart agency andportfolio agencies, includingtodeliver outcomesacross to promote “cooperationwithinandbetween Senior Executive memberisdirected Service Act,each As pertheAustralianPublicService collaboration insideandoutsideofgovernment. servants are statutorily responsible for supporting overcome organizational self-interest, seniorcivil publications/Collaborative%20working.pdf. 85 http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/ of PublicService. centralagenciesandleadership partments, 84 Juillet,L.,andBakvis,H.(2004). tioners 83 Dean,T. AGuideforPracti (2015).BuildingBetterPublicServices: Toc394926968. www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2014C00511/Html/Text#_ Act1999,Section35.3(b)https://82 Australian PublicService cations-archive/connecting-government/culture. 81 http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/archive/publi identify prioritiesforcollaboration. priorities –mandateletterscouldalsobeusedto andgovernment-wideministers todepartmental use –identifyingtheexpectedcontributionof on cross-cutting files.Beyond theirstandard be usedasatooltoincrease collaboration ministers andpremiers toministers could also Ministerial mandateletterssentby prime ofcollaboration. statement abouttheimportance responsibility inlawisasymbolicallysignificant capacity ofcentralagencies This couldincludestrengthening thecoordination facilitate coordination oncross-cutting issues. institutional arrangementsandprocesses to More couldalsobe done toestablishnew more collaborative approaches. areministers anddepartments alsoengagingin creating anincentive toensure thatdeputy collaboration couldhave a“trickledown” effect, accountability forministerswhenitcomesto . Toronto: Friesen Press. The horizontal challenge:Linede 84 toensure a . Ottawa:CanadaSchool 82 Enshrining this Enshrining 83 Increasing 85

81 - -

- measurable objectives forcollaboration. agreements canbeusedtoincentivize anddefine government-citizen interactions.” more publicized, politicallysensitive realm of information sharingandinvolve “themuch likely tosucceedasthey move beyond internal media andotherformsofcollaborationare less toexploitthepotentialvalueefforts ofsocial for mistakes andriskinmostgovernments, However, given thecurrent level ofintolerance down process-driven barrierstocollaboration. long-term engagementandtrust,breaking greater collaborationandinnovation by building with broader audiences.Thiscouldfoster media offers agreater toengage opportunity hasrecognizedthe civilservice thatsocial Asdiscussed, withexternalpartners. particularly risk willalsoberequired toexpandcollaboration, As withinnovation, greater politicaltolerancefor into otherareas. toextendcollaboration consult onopportunities and monitor existingcollaborative efforts to Central agenciescouldalsoleadefforts Government-Good to Go? in Stoney, C.(ed). HowOttawaSpends, 2014-2015:TheHarper er? ...Information, Collaboration, andtheHarperGovernment.” 90 Clarke, A.(2014).“One ofTheseThingsIsNotLike the Oth- social-media.htm. 89 http://www.oecd.org/gov/public-innovation/government-and- cations/78_public_service_transformed.pdf. Mowat Centre. http://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publi formed: HarnessingthePower ofBehavioural Insights 88 Galley, Trans A.,Gold,J.andJohal,S.(2013).PublicService plete_Survey-2014.pdf. egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2014-Survey/E-Gov_Com- 2014: E-government fortheFuture We Want. http://unpan3.un.org/ 87 UnitedNations(2014).E-Government Survey tions/57_integrating_human_services.pdf. Centre. http://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publica . Toronto:an AgeofFiscalRestraint:AShiftingGearsReport Mowat J.(2012). 86 Gold,J.andHjartarson, collaboration. mechanisms are alsocriticaltosuccessful responsibilities andeffective accountability 87 For example,performance 86 . McGill-Queen’s University Press. Clearlydefinedroles and Integrating Human Services in Integrating HumanServices 90 . Toronto: 88 - - 89

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25 | The Mowat Centre 26 | chapter 7: Evidence-Informed Analysis structural changes. require cultural and collaboration will Strengthening often project-specific. government, they are collaboration in are toimprove efforts needed. While there collaboration is internal and external efficient, greater more effective and To make government 7 due toalackofappropriate data. address policyandprogram effectiveness found thatevaluations stilldidnotproperly In 2013,theOfficeofAuditorGeneral( analysis. of appropriate dataandalackofindependent activities andoutputsinsteadofoutcomes,alack of limitationsincludingtoomuchfocuson Effectiveness ofPrograms. Ottawa. Auditor GeneralofCanada to theHouse ofCommons:Evaluating the html; Officeofthe Auditor ofthe GeneralofCanada.(2009). Report www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201304_01_e_38186. onEvaluatingReport theEffectiveness ofPrograms Auditor GeneralofCanadato theHouseofCommons:Chapter1Status 93 OfficeoftheAuditor GeneralofCanada.(2013). International comparisons G.,andHalligan,J.(2007). Managingperformance: 92 Bouckaert, outils/aucoin-eng. asp#sec1. program evaluation 91 Aucoin, P. (2005).Decision-makingingovernment: Therole of is substandard. in allocating resources performance departmental effectiveness ofprograms andpolicies Canada’s record ofusingevidence onthe by relevant, timelyandrigorous evidence. policies, programs thatare andservices informed ischaracterized civilservice byA well-performing How isCanadadoing? have beenmadeaboutprograms andrelated program evaluation” and,“as aresult, decisions weaknesses continuetolimitthecontributionof is clearabouttheimplications:“Significant 92

Analysis Evidence-I . Retrieved from: www. tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/tools- 91 Criticshave notedanumber . Routledge. 93 TheO . Ottawa.http:// Report ofthe Report AG AG) ed nformed demand fornewpolicyideasandoptions. been taken by electedofficials—overtaking the policydecisionsthathave— supporting already to agrowing preference forempiricalevidence in more evidence-informed analysis. toengage of analyticalpolicycapacitynecessary haveobservers suggestedCanadalacksthelevel havethe civilservice alsoemerged. Concerned Broader concernsabout thepolicyfunctionof innovative. also underminesCanada’s abilitytobemore report, lackofarigorous evaluation function their effectiveness.” expenditures withincompleteinformationon mance atrisk.” Governance - publicadministration andmanagementperfor systems: Impartial 97 Aucoin, P. (2012).“Newpolitical governance inWestminster University Press. management to newpoliticalgovernance ernance.” M.D. InBakvisH.andJarvis, (Eds.), 96 Peters ,B.G.andSavoie, D. (2012).“Insearch ofgoodgov- Administration based policy-making:Lessonsfrom Canada.” CanadianPublic 95 Howlett,M.(2009).“Policy analyticalcapacity andevidence- oag_201304_01_e_38186.html. Ottawa. http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_ onEvaluating theEffectivenesster 1StatusReport ofPrograms the Auditor GeneralofCanadato theHouseofCommons: Chap 94 OfficeoftheAuditor GeneralofCanada.(2013). erosion ofmedium-tolong-termpolicycapacity. politicization andbudgetcutshave ledtoan the actualreality. Italsopointstoconcernsthat ofevidence inpolicymakingand the importance points toadisjuncture betweenthenarrative of While concernsabouttheimpactofpoliticization , 52:153–175. 94 , 25(2), 177-199. Asnotedearlierinthis , 29–45.McGill-Queen’s From newpublic 95 They point Report of Report 96 This - . 97

27 | The Mowat Centre and austerity measures on impartial civil service have demonstrated a stronger commitment to policy advice are acute here, they are not unique integrating more rigorous analytical approaches to Canada.98 to improve policy outcomes.100 In the US, both the executive – through the Office of Management Moving Forward and Budget (OMB) – and the legislative branches – through the Government Accountability Office (GAO) – provide evaluation analysis through a The civil service should: competing system of independent assessment. » Invest heavily in ongoing analytical The OMB is responsible for assisting the Office skills training and development to of the President with budget preparation and bolster medium-to-long term policy and administrative oversight of federal agencies, evaluation capacity. including integrating evidence into budget, management and policy decisions.101 The GAO » Centralize evaluation capacity – in the is an independent, nonpartisan agency reporting absence of a truly independent external to congress with responsibilities that include evaluation body – and separate it from measuring how well government programs and policy and program delivery, to enhance policies are meeting their stated objectives.102 the credibility of evaluation findings.

» Invest in What Works centres – This is not to suggest that the evaluations whether internal or external – dedicated undertaken by the OMB and GAO do not have to synthesizing and disseminating limitations. But what is valuable about the US leading research on the effectiveness approach is having independent evaluation and efficiency of different approaches functions rather than relying solely on the in strategic policy areas. government’s own account of its successes. While internal monitoring of programs and performance is important, relying exclusively on self-reporting on impact by departments within While evidence is never perfect, more can be done government is simply not credible.103 As noted to centralize its role in decision-making. The civil in previous Shifting Gears work, the incentives service has a responsibility to provide advice in Canadian civil service culture do not favour based on the best evidence available – allowing admitting failure, even as a means of improving that what constitutes best available evidence performance.104 may be different in different contexts. There is also a public good in having that evidence

nalysis nalysis available for outside use.

While it will not displace political judgment and 100 Bouckaert, G., and Halligan, J. (2007). Managing performance: International comparisons. Routledge. the need to balance different interests, evaluation 101 Office of Management and Budget. https://www.whitehouse. and the use of evidence are fundamental to gov/omb/evidence. 102 U.S. Government Accountability Office. http://www.gao.gov/about/. rigorous policymaking.99 Other jurisdictions 103 Aucoin, P., and Jarvis, M. D. (2005). Modernizing government accountability: A framework for reform. Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service. 98 See for example, Tiernan, A. (2015). “Craft and Capacity in the Pub- 104 Galley, A., Gold, J. and Johal, S. (2013). Public Service Trans- lic Service.” Australian Journal of Public Administration, 74(1), 53-62. formed: Harnessing the Power of Behavioural Insights. Toronto: 99 Institute for Government. (2011). Transformation in the Ministry of Mowat Centre. http://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publi-

28 | chapter 7: E vidence- I nfor m ed A 28 | chapter Justice: Interim Evaluation Report. London: Intitute for Government. cations/78_public_service_transformed.pdf. considerable variation withrespect toresource network ofWhatWorks centres. Whilethere is policy analysisby launchingtheworld’s first advanced itscommitmenttoevidence-informed Beyond strengthening evaluation, theUKhas flow from thelevel tothecentre. ofdelivery andensureexpertise thatmore informationwill will increase independencebasedonspecific agency evaluation staffwithinlinedepartments those whoscrutinize them,locatingcentral those whodeliver programs and andservices between challenge ofinformationasymmetry approach wouldnotcompletelyovercome the evaluation isnotfullycentralized. Whilethis files they are responsible for. whose Canada staffworkwithinthedepartments could behived off,like legaladvicewhere Justice responsibleservants evaluations forundertaking TransformedMowat’s PublicService report, civil and programs. Alternatively, assuggestedin directly responsible ofpolicies forthedelivery to provide greater independence from those (e.g., Treasury Board Secretariat) orotherbody could becentralized withinasingleagency of government, theconductofevaluation If evaluation istoremain thesoleresponsibility evaluated. those directly responsible fortheprograms being programs. Thiswouldensure independencefrom office toassesstheimpactofpoliciesand or theO agency (e.g.,theParliamentary BudgetOffice expanding themandateofaparliamentary management needsandatthesametime capacity thatisresponsive toimmediate by establishinginternalgovernment evaluation A similarmodelcouldbeachieved inCanada cations/78_public_service_transformed.pdf. Mowat Centre. http://mowatcentre.ca/wp-content/uploads/publi formed: Harnessing thePower ofBehavioural Insights 105 Galley, Trans A.,Gold,J.andJohal,S.(2013).PublicService AG) orby creating anewparliamentary 105 Inthismodel, . Toronto: - - services.” inform choicesandleadchangeincriticalpublic programs are usingevidence to performing, the Centre is“tobuildcapacitytoassesshow in the2015provincial budget.Thepurposeof for Evidence-Based DecisionMaking announced with thecreation of anewCentre ofExcellence Ontario hastaken concrete stepsinthisregard facilitate orimpedetransferability. understand effective policyandwhatfactors robust evaluations andothersources tobetter available evidence from systematicreviews, policy development by drawing onthebest have thepotentialtopositively impactpublic to determinetheimpactofUKcentres, they the impactofpublicpolicy. Whileitistooearly have taken similarapproaches tounderstanding the UKandEU’sBetterRegulationinitiatives against government investment inthem–and different policyoptionswillatleastbreak even the effectiveness, cost andprobability that for PublicPolicy –whichfocusesonassessing social policy. quality evidence tobearondifferent issuesof approach toanalysisisdesignedbringhigh dissemination approaches, allocation, evidence standards, audiencesand en/budget/ontariobudgets/2015/papers_all.pdf. Ontario budget2015.” ofFinance Ministry 108 TheHonourable CharlesSousa.(2015).“Building Ontarioup: lication.pdf. system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136227/What_Works_pub centres forsocialpolicy 107 Alexander, D., andLetwin,O. (2013).WhatWorks: evidence SocialScience,10(2), 126-137. porary improve policyandpractice:theUKWhatWorks Centres.” Contem - 106 Bristow, D., Carter, S.(2015).“Usingevidence to L.,&Martin, for seekingscientificadvice.Theseguidelines United Stateshave developed formal protocols jurisdictions suchastheUnitedKingdomand could alsobetaken. For instance,other more systematicallyintegratedintoanalysis Measures toensure thatscientificevidence is 108 107 TheWashington StateInstitute . https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 106 this“Moneyball” . http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/ -

29 | The Mowat Centre help to ensure that external scientific advice servants to do this is not always clear.111 Further, from individuals and organizations is “politically central agencies can do more to ensure that the neutral; focused on the data and its appropriate requirement for high quality evidence in the policy interpretation; unbiased with respect to its use of process is enforced with concrete consequences data; explicit about what is known and unknown for those departments and programs that fail to and the quality of the available data; clear in meet specified standards. communicating probabilities and magnitude of effect; and, free from real and perceived conflicts While timely access to quality and relevant of interest.”109 Guidelines could also provide evidence, collaboration with policymakers and greater transparency about the use scientific strengthening analytical skills can facilitate advice, especially “with respect to complex and greater use of evidence,112 improving the quality controversial areas of decision-making.”110 of evaluation and strengthening evidence- informed policy analysis does not guarantee These changes could lead to a substantive shift that the resulting information will be used in toward generating evidence to support decisions ministerial or cabinet decision-making.113 Nor and openness. But there are, of course, also should it. The role of the civil service is not to obstacles to strengthening evidence-informed “win” every policy debate; it is to tender the best analysis. Measurement limits will always possible, analytically sound advice. Policymaking constrain what we can know. cannot be reduced to a technocratic exercise in measurement. It demands weighing a broad A more rigorous approach to evaluation and range of considerations. In doing so, as discussed policy will require an investment in medium-to- earlier in this report, it is perfectly legitimate for long term policy capacity. This could be achieved ministers to make decisions that do not follow through ongoing analytical skills development the advice provided. to enable more strategic use of different forms of evidence and structural change in how But none of these challenges are a sufficient evaluations are carried out and used. excuse for not having a stronger commitment to trying to understand the effectiveness of policies Further, as discussed elsewhere in this report, and programs. a lack of tolerance for negative news runs against a more rigorous, credible approach to understanding what works in policy advice. A credible focus on results will also demand a willingness on the part of senior civil servants nalysis nalysis to deliver advice that doesn’t support – or even contradicts – the policy preferences of elected officials. The willingness of senior civil 111 Savoie, D. (2015). What is Government Good at? A Canadian Answer. McGill-Queen’s University Press. 109 Gluckman, P. (2013). The role of evidence in policy forma- 112 Oliver, K., Innvar, S., Lorenc, T., Woodman, J., and Thomas, tion and implementation: A report from the Prime Minister’s Chief J. (2014). “A systematic review of barriers to and facilitators of Science Advisor. Office of the Prime Minister’s Science Advisory Com- the use of evidence by policymakers.” BMC Health Services Re- mittee, Auckland. search, 14(2). http://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6963-14-2. 110 Gluckman, P. (2013). The role of evidence in policy forma- 113 McDavid, J. (2014). “Have we built a system that contains a tion and implementation: A report from the Prime Minister’s Chief paradox?” Canadian Government Executive. http://www.canadian- Science Advisor. Office of the Prime Minister’s Science Advisory Com- governmentexecutive.ca/category/item/1593-have-we-built-a-

30 | chapter 7: E vidence- I nfor m ed A 30 | chapter mittee, Auckland. system-that-contains-a-paradox?.html. 8 info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. 115 World Bank.(2015). Politics (sixthedition) Public Service,” inBickerton, J.andGagnon,A.G.(eds.), 114 Thomas,P. (2014).“Two CheersforBureaucracy: Canada’s governing process.” pay scantattentiontodevelopments withinthe have “limitedknowledgeofgovernment and Therealityand itsimportance. isthatcitizens and politicaldiscussionaboutthecivilservice least, thisreflects theabsenceofacriticalpublic at the civilservice’s purposeandfunction.Inpart, Canada lacksaclear, shared understandingof How isCanadadoing? such policies. credibility ofthegovernment’s commitmentto formulation andimplementationthe from politicalpressures, thequalityofpolicy andthedegreecivil service ofitsindependence thequalityof the qualityofpublicservices, published data,whichmeasures perceptions of effectiveness intheWorld Bank’smostrecently 95th percentile for public faithingovernment information. For example,Canadaranked inthe perspectives exists,they provide limited While internationalbenchmarkingofcitizens’ public’s expectationsofthecivilservice. We alsohave limitedknowledgeaboutthe levels ofgovernment from orthecivilservice by andlarge, doesnotdisaggregate different Commitment Public andolitical 115 , Toronto: University ofToronto Press. But this sort ofinformation, Butthissort Worldwide Governance Indicators 114

Canadian . http:// service overservice thelongterm, that thishasnoteroded publictrustinthecivil diminishes publictrust.Whileevidence suggests term,sensationalizedIn theshort coverage political communicationsormediacoverage. civil servantsbehaving badlyinsensational scandals, withpoliticiansandjournalists“outing” does existtendstofocusonwrongdoing and With few exceptions, thelittlecoverage that Media coverage isalsolimited. ofthecivilservice wants andexpectsfrom thecivilservice. does notproduce asnapshotofwhatthepublic and measures ofgovernment effectiveness. This of corruption)gaugepredetermined perceptions survey indicators(e.g.,trustingovernment, level the government more broadly. Further, different Politics (sixthedition) Public Service,” inBickerton, J.andGagnon, A.J.(eds.), 118 Thomas,P. (2014).“Two CheersforBureaucracy: Canada’s cline?.” “Trust inthepublicsector: isthere anyevidence foralong-termde- 117 Van deWalle, S.,Van G.(2008). Roosbroek, S.,andBouckaert, servant 116 Kernaghan, K.,andLangford, J.(2014). more difficultby anincreasingly frayed political- remains arobust institution.Thisismadeallthe politicianslack anincentiveservice, toensure it With diminishedpublicexpectationsofthecivil government asawhole. itselfandthe distinction betweenthecivilservice by thereality thatcitizens tendnottodrawa International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74(1), 47-64. . Toronto: InstitutePublicAdministrationofCanada. , Toronto: University ofToronto Press. 118 117 thisisundermined The responsible public Canadian 116

31 | The Mowat Centre 32 | chapter 8: Public and Political Commitment creating additionalpressure initsownright. function ofgovernment, driven by theemphasisoncommunications government’s actionsoragenda,largely partisan expectation ofhyper-responsiveness tothe grappling with a world where there is an increased committees). consultations, appearancesbefore parliamentary civil servantsplay publicroles (e.g.,public challenges andmustdomore toaddress them. at leastshare intheresponsibility forthese are beyond itscontrol, seniorcivilservants reasons forthecurrent stateofthecivilservice Notwithstanding thatanumberoftheunderlying training. advice, research, regulatory enforcement and diminished capacityinkey areas suchaspolicy of leadershipisexacerbatingthesepressures. in thefaceofthesechallenges,orwhetheralack and breadth ofexperiencetoleadthecivilservice has the depth senior leadershipofthe civil service Additionally, questionspersistastowhetherthe administrative relationship. Answer 126 Savoie, D. (2015). WhatisGovernment Goodat? ACanadian tioners Dean,T.125 (2015) service-morale-bullying-stress-targets-job-cuts. www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2014/nov/04/civil- ‘You dread going into workinthemornings’.” TheGuardian morale: 124 Seeforexample,Dawood,S. (2014)“Civilservice how government decidesand why 123 Savoie, D. (2013). Whatever happenedto themusicteacher?: Answer 122 Savoie, D, (2015) nance andthePublicFaceServants of‘Promiscuous Partisanship’.” Gover- 121 Grube,D. (2014).“Responsibilityto BeEnthusiastic?Public mance atrisk.” Governance - publicadministrationand managementperfor systems: Impartial 120 Aucoin, P. (2012).“Newpoliticalgovernance inWestminster Answer 119 Savoie, D. (2015). WhatisGovernment Goodat? ACanadian This isnotuniquetoCanada. . 28(3): 305–320. . Toronto: Friesen Press. . Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press. . Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press. . Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press. 122 Notunrelatedly, moralehasbeenlow, 121 Building Better Public Services: A Guide for Practi- Guide A Services: Better Public Building Theimpactofrecent cutshas What isGovernment Goodat? ACanadian , 25(2), 177-199. 120 . McGill-Queen’s University Press. particularly where particularly 119 124 Civil servants are Civilservants . http:// 123 125

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Moving Forward organization underpolitical control. Thisensures earlier, ultimately, isahierarchical thecivilservice evidence-informed analysis–islimited.Asnoted transparency, accountability, collaboration,and characteristics setoutin thisreport –innovation, can achieve thestandards foreachofthekey commitment, thelikelihood thatthecivilservice political In theabsenceofnecessary whether there isexternalinterest ornot. responsible forthehealthofinstitution, isultimately The leadershipofthecivilservice day, themediaorpublic to demandchange. shouldidlywait forthegovernmentservice ofthe of Canadians.Thisisnottosay thatthecivil on economicprosperity andthequalityoflife appropriately resourced tohave apositive impact isempowered,the civilservice independentand A politicalcommitmentisrequired toensure » Update the Public Service Employment Employment UpdatethePublicService » » Establishaclearandaccessible The civilser » Establishacommitteeonpublic P arliament should Act (2005) to enshrine the charter inlaw.Act (2005) to enshrinethecharter service. civil ofahigh-performing importance shared understandingoftherole and asabasisfor a ofcivilservice charter discourse onthecivilservice. with thegoalofstrengthening public reform andcivilservice civil service and debateonmattersrelated to the administration dedicatedto scrutiny vice should : : and standards administration ofcivilservice Select Committee(PASC) examines thequality administration. ThePublic Administration committeeonpublic dedicated parliamentary The UKalsobenefitsfrom having a executives.service to inward focusingtrademagazinesaimed atcivil that focusonpublicadministration,they amount role insociety. WhileCanadahaspublications careerscivil service andnewsgovernment’s including policy, programs andpublicprojects, outlets cover arangeofpublicsectorissues, Sector InformantandTheMandarin.Allthree issues. Similarly, AustraliahasboththePublic through live chatsondifferent publicsector to engagethepublicandsectorofficials andprovidesto thecivilservice anopportunity Network, which provides coverage of news related Guardian newspaperpublishesthePublicLeaders dedicated topublicsectorissues.IntheUK,The the UKandAustraliahave mediapublications For ofthecivilservice. example,both importance topublicadministration,reflectingpertaining the have amore engageddialogueaboutissues easy feat. IncontrasttoCanada,othercountries public administrationinCanadawillnotbean Building abroader publicconversation about resources –well. –includingthecivilservice that thegovernment oftheday manageallits andtocreateof thecivilservice anexpectation is neededtofosteranappreciation oftherole without publicdemand.Arobust publicdiscourse This kindofpoliticalcommitmentisunlikely democratic governance. asinstrumentofrepresentativethe civilservice flowing from electedofficialstocitizens, over democratic control, withaccountabilityultimately Handbook ofPublic Accountability M.D.127 Jarvis, (2014). “Hierarchical Accountability.” TheOxford , 405-420. 127 recent controversies, and otherrelated matters.Notwithstanding the-last-parliament-is-now-the-most-degraded/. May 16. ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-most-successful-select-committee-in- the lastparliament isnowthemostdegraded.” http://blogs.lse. 128 Flynn,P. (2014).“Themost successfulSelectCommitteein calls have ofcivilservice beenmadeforacharter Calls forgreater clarityare notnew. Repeated responsibilities ofministersandcivilservants. more canbedonetoclarifytheroles and in thepolitical-administrative relationship, While there willalways be tensionandambiguity conversation withitself. shouldnotbe basedsolelyonaninwardservice and successfailures. Reformofthecivil effectively inadialogueaboutitsrole, importance andengagemoreof adynamiccivilservice profit sectororganizations thatrealize thevalue sector companies,thinktanksandothernon- should alsoincludeavitalnetworkofprivate role Amore ofthecivilservice. robust dialogue the government itsvisionforthe articulating greater publicinterest, there isstillvalue in Eventhe civilservice. ifitdoesnotleadto conversation aimedatclarifyingtherole of The government couldalsoinitiate apublic media coverage andbroader publicengagement. scrutinyanddebate, sustained parliamentary and otherrelated matters.Thiscouldleadto administration and functioningofcivilservice Committee, to examinethequality, standards after theUK’sPublicAdministrationSelect committee onpublicadministration,modeled Parliament could create aparliamentary andhowitcanbestrengthened.its importance conversation isfor, aboutwhatthecivilservice Different actorscouldtake a actiontojumpstart committees. UK parliamentary considerations andbeoneofthemosteffective considered tobeablesetasidepartisan 128 PASC haslongbeen

33 | The Mowat Centre A civil service charter, as a means to achieve greater clarity and shared and the conversation understanding.129 Different models exist for the exact nature of such a document (e.g., The City that could serve as its of Toronto’s Public Service By-law; Guelph’s award winning Leadership Charter; New Zealand’s foundation, could help Cabinet Manual). These models highlight different considerations for the form (e.g., legislated or to more clearly frame non-legislated), nature (e.g., binding or guiding; relations between elected nature of enforcement) and content of a charter. and non-elected officials Such a charter, and the conversation that could serve as its foundation, could help to more and drive a commitment clearly frame relations between elected and non- elected officials. It could also make an important to an empowered, contribution to strengthening the public and political discourse around the civil service independent and and drive a commitment to an empowered, appropriately resourced independent and appropriately resourced civil service. civil service. If such a charter was established, the government ______could also update the Public Service Employment Act (2005) to include the charter as the preamble and ensure that all elements of the Act are consistent with the preamble and that the Act has the enforcement mechanisms to guarantee that the values it enshrines are upheld.

129 Heintzman, R. (2014). Renewal of the Federal Public Service: Toward a Charter of Public Service. Ottawa: Canada 2020. http:// canada2020.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2014_Canada2020_

olitical C o mm it m ent P olitical 8: P u b lic and 34 | chapter Paper-Series_Public_Service_EN_Final.pdf. vices 130 Drummond, D. forOntarians:APath to Sustainability andExcellence. (2012).PublicServices CommissionontheReform of Ontario’s PublicSer capacity andprocesses inplacetoactuallydeliver change. the publicandelectedofficialscanunderstand.They mustalsoensure hasthe thatthecivilservice The chosenreforms willdeterminespecificnextsteps,butmusthave clear objectives thatcivilservants, thatisshowingtroublingservice signsofneglect. also failedbecausethey lacked meaningfulconsequencesforfailingtomodernize. Theendresult isacivil andthepressing ofthecivilservice needforreform.discourse abouttheimportance Butpastreform efforts toreform haveefforts thecivilservice becauseofalackpopularpublicandpolitical failed,inpart, faces orthatitisresilient andflexibleenoughtomeetthechallengesitwillconfront inthefuture. Past atreformModest efforts willnotensure isprepared thatthecivil service tomeetthechallengesitcurrently expectationsandrealitiesmeet contemporary forthefuture ofpublicadministration. protecting thevalue andbenefitsofthetraditionalapproach tocivilservice andtheneedto – like the citizens –mustadapttochangingtimes.Thismeansreconciling itserves thetensionbetween Canadians extraordinarily moves well.Butasthe21stcentury on,itisequallyclearthatthecivilservice modelthathasexistedinCanadaformoreIt isclearthatthecivilservice than150years hasserved Recommendations Conclusion and face will further compromised.face willfurther past twodecadesisneeded. Withoutit,Canada’s ability tosuccessfullyrespond to thechallengesweall administration, amore comprehensive reform agenda thatresponds tothe disruptive societalchange ofthe While Canadaconsistentlyranksamongleadingindustrialized nationsintermsofthequalityitspublic and responsive. environmental changesandmeetcitizens’ expectationsthat government bemore transparent, accessible As aresult, islefttoconsiderhowfulfillitscore thecivilservice mission, respond topoliticaland based ontheinternalneedsandprocesses ofgovernment rather thantheneedsofpeoplethey serve. Despite theirbestintentions,manygovernments continuetodesignanddeliver publicpoliciesandservices government andcivilservice’s commitmenttofollowingthrough onimplementation commitments. as itgives internaland externalstakeholders toprovide anopportunity input,anddemonstratesthe the impactofchangesandtransparently reporting onresults. onresults important Reporting isparticularly Other elementsessentialtosuccessfulreform include measuringprogress onimplementation,evaluating will beneededtoovercome resistance tochange. . Toronto: Queen’s PrinterforOntario. 130 Strong leadershipfrom theseniorcivilservice -

35 | The Mowat Centre 36 | Conclusion and Recommendations » » » required fortruetransformation. drive, engagementandenergytoenact thebroad-reachingandsystemic reforms remains tobeseen, however, whether thegovernment cansustainsufficient If met,someofthese commitmentscouldachieve meaningful progress.It practical steps,including: commitments rangefromhighlevel, principledpromisestoclearlydelineated, The measures alignwiththethemesandrecommendationsmadeinthisreport. andchanginghowgovernment works.Someoftheproposed civil service number ofelectionandpost-electioncommitmentsaimedatrevitalizingthe Canada’s newfederalgovernment –elected Recent Signalsofeform Releasing tothepublic Opening up Commissioner of theInformation strengthen therole Officeand Minister’s to includethePrime coverage oftheAct default, broadenthe a policyofopenby reduce fees,alignwith to InformationAct Updating theAccess decision-making informs thegovernment key informationthat ideas crowdsource policy use technologyto including throughthe policymaking tocitizens » » » initiatives accelerating opendata Expanding and Making key Strengthening service making possible fordecision- best dataandevidence the availability ofthe government toensure independent of Budget Officerfully and theP as StatisticsCanada organizations such on reported assessed andpublicly that areindependently government services standards forkey and creatingservice availableservices online by makingmore delivery arliamentary arliamentary in October2015–has » » Devoting afixed Strengthening and improvement continuous innovation effects toencourage and measuringthe to existingproblems with newapproaches funds toexperimenting percentage ofprogram program files specific policyand mandate lettersfor individual ministerial collaboration in instructions for including specific external partners, ministers andwith collaboration between made a » strengthen thecapacity toevaluate theimpact » adoptanewsystemofindependent » create mechanismsandincentives toallow » dedicateafixed percentage ofdepartmental don’t work.We recommend thatthegovernment: fromliberating thecivilservice processes that policy development delivery, andservice while greater experimentationwithnewapproaches to A stronger culture ofinnovation willallowfor Innov Recommendations of Summary institution. abilitytofulfillitsroleservice’s asanonpartisan renewed commitmentnottointerfere inthecivil appropriately resourced; there mustalsobea beyond is justensuringthatthecivilservice andapoliticalcommitmentthatextends citizenry Achieving thisgoalwillrequire bothanengaged innovation tobetterserve thepublicinterest. evidence-informed analysis,collaborationand and accountableways whilestrengthening institution thatfulfillsitsrole inmore transparent evolving. shouldbearesponsive Thecivilservice As thisreport demonstrates,othercountriesare of experimentationandinnovation. external appointments;and, leaders andopenthedoortomerit-based create more independence forcivilservice appointments fordeputyministersthatwill sectors; career and other stages between the civil service for more fluidexchanges andmovement atall managers andemployees; innovation incentives forindividualmiddle budgets toinnovation, includingcreating ation

» » » mode. To achieve should: this,thecivilservice Transparency shouldbethecivilservice’s default Transparency » standard, should: thecivilservice isneeded. Toskills ofpotentialpartners meetthis better leverages experienceand theexpertise, A frictionlessapproach tocollaborationthat oratin Collab » » Toservice. should: thisend,thecivilservice meaningfully cultivated atalllevels ofthecivil An enrichedprincipleofaccountabilitymustbe Accountabilit initiate aconsultationprocess toestablishnew return tothetraditionofpublishing“green” and mirror jurisdictions like NewZealand and redouble toreduce efforts internalandexternal managersby providingsupport thetrainingand work withunionstodevelop anewand should andnotbemadepublic. how various kindsofgovernment information guidelines toclearlydefinewhen,where, and papers”onpressing“white policyissues;and, governmentsupports decision-making; adviceandanalysisthat disclosing civilservice municipal governments inOntarioproactively other accountability requirements); collaboration (suchasfunding,reporting and inhibit theeffective and useofpartnerships procedural burdens, especiallythosethat managementprocesses.performance feedback, inadditiontoperiodicformal tools neededtodeliver meaningfulongoing and, poor performers; sanctions, includingmakingiteasiertodismiss simplified systemofcredible incentives and improves andestablishesa performance substantive focusonaccountabilitythat y

37 | The Mowat Centre » create a more collaborative culture by Public and Political expanding on efforts, such as GCpedia and Commitment GCConnex, that empower civil servants and provide the tools needed to engage more A clear public and political commitment is publicly with a broader range of individuals and required to accomplish much of this reform. In organizations; and, order to foster this commitment:

» use more collaborative “results teams” or » Parliament should establish a committee on “results secretariats” that focus accountabilities public administration dedicated to scrutiny on the achievement of outcomes, and bring and debate on matters related to the civil together actors at the highest levels from service and civil service reform with the goal across departments, governments and sectors. of strengthening public discourse on the civil service; and,

Evidence-Informed » the civil service should establish a clear Analysis and accessible charter of civil service as a A more serious approach to policy analysis is basis for a shared understanding of the role needed. The civil service should look to more and importance of a high-performing civil robust evidence to assess the effectiveness service, and should update the Public Service of policies, programs and services, and should Employment Act (2005) to enshrine the charter specifically: in law.

» invest heavily in ongoing analytical skills As discussed at the outset of this report, these training and development to bolster medium- to reforms are not ends unto themselves. The merits long-term policy and evaluation capacity; of any proposed reforms can – and should – be » centralize evaluation capacity – in the absence debated in terms of whether or not they help to of a truly independent external evaluation body enhance the civil service’s ability or capacity to – and separate it from policy and program deliver on one or more of its core responsibilities, delivery, to enhance the credibility of evaluation are likely to diminish trust between the civil findings; and, service and the government and the public, have clear objectives against which progress can be » invest in What Works centres – whether measured, and are politically feasible. internal or external – dedicated to synthesizing and disseminating leading research on the A high-performing civil service is vital to the effectiveness and efficiency of different well-being and prosperity of Canadians. Its failure approaches in strategic policy areas. to respond effectively to the disruptive change that is transforming other sectors of society is, in many ways, an existential threat; if it is unable to meet the expectations of those it serves, both its reputation and the public’s trust will be further eroded. endations and R eco mm endations 38 | C onclusion reform isnolongeranoption. years ofgrowth andchange. Continuedfailure to toseeusthroughvital civilservice thenext150 decline in relevance. Canadians need a strong and comprehensive reform agendaitwillcontinueto is willingandabletodevelop anddeliver a against itswill,butunlessthecivilservice No onecanforce toreform thecivilservice

The Mowat Centre | 39 Creating a High-Performing Canadian Civil Service Against a Backdrop of Disruptive Change