Political-Bureaucratic Relationships and Tensions

POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIPS AND TENSIONS

IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

VALENCIA DA SILVA

Integrated Studies Project

submitted to Dr. Angela Specht

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts – Integrated Studies

Athabasca, Alberta

August 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. ABSTRACT...... 3

2. INTRODUCTION...... 4 Setting the stage ...... 4 Broader issue of concern...... 5 Subject of this research study ...... 6

3. RELEVANCE AND VALUE OF THIS RESEARCH ...... 8 Interdisciplinary nature of the research...... 9

4. LITERATURE REVIEW AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES...... 11

5. PROJECT OVERVIEW...... 25 Description and objectives ...... 25 Major goals of this study...... 25 Questions explored and analyzed ...... 26

6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS...... 26 Participants’ rights and protection ...... 26 Data reliability and protection ...... 27

7. METHODOLOGY...... 28 Data collection method ...... 28 Sampling and recruitment procedures ...... 29

8. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS...... 30 Statement regarding data validity...... 30 Survey statistics...... 30 Key findings and conclusions on the state of the political-bureaucratic relationship...... 31 Summary conclusions based on the data...... 37

9. RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 37

10. CONCLUSION...... 40 Strengths and limitations of this study ...... 40 Suggested areas for further research...... 41

REFERENCES...... 42

APPENDIX A Letter of information and consent form for potential participants ..………46

APPENDIX B Research survey ...... 50

1. ABSTRACT

The growing institutionalization of political intervention and sensitization within the public service raises significant questions about the capacity of the public sector to be a neutral entity in the service of the public interest. This preliminary study explores the political-bureaucratic dynamic within the Canadian federal government, with particular emphasis on the implications of political-bureaucratic relationships, interactions and tensions as they affect contemporary public servants and the future of the public service institution. The paper presents a literature review of secondary data sources pertinent to the focus of this study. This is followed by a discussion of findings from a small, non-representative survey of public servants. The paper proposes recommendations for improvements to the governing system and offers some ideas for further research.

2. INTRODUCTION

Setting the stage

The federal public service of Canada is an institution used to working in the midst of

tensions. While it prides itself on delivering vital programs and services to Canadian citizens, it

also faces frequent public criticism that it is slow, unresponsive, and out of touch. It seeks to

hire the best and the brightest in Canada’s labour market, but those same much-sought-after

recruits chafe under the rules and regulations that permeate the public sector and keep innovation

and risk-taking initiatives in check. The public service has traditionally cultivated a character

that encompasses professionalism, non-partisanship, impartiality, ethics, and above all,

protection of the public interest, but some of these characteristics face increasing pressure from

the juxtaposition of partisan political interests and the greater common good.

The public service has two masters: the governing party of the day, which has its political

agenda, and the common good, which is far more amorphous but is also the higher incentive that

draws many toward employment in the public service. Serving two masters is never easy, but

never more so than when the ultimate goals of the two can have tendencies to be contradictory or

even incompatible. By serving the elected government faithfully and effectively, public servants

are thought to serve the common good by extension as well, but tricky dilemmas arise when the

two interests collide against each other.

The example most often cited to demonstrate this conflict between political and public

interests is the sponsorship scandal of 2002. The Liberal government of the time developed a

creditable goal to strengthen Canadian unity and shore up federalist support in the province of

Quebec. However, the funding program created to achieve these goals was subject to severe and

willful mismanagement by program managers and political officials. The resulting political

maelstrom spotlighted issues of both political patronage and challenges for civil servants in regard to keeping said patronage in check. The public outrage over the sponsorship scandal cost the Liberals the ensuing general election, and the victorious Conservatives implemented a

Federal Accountability Act that was designed to “change the way the government works” and to

“restore Canadians’ trust in government and the democratic process” (Treasury Board

Secretariat, 2006) by addressing, in part, concerns about reducing conflicts of interest and increasing transparency in public administration. But the essential underlying conflict between political and public interests was not – and cannot – be solved by enacting laws.

This conflict cannot easily be solved by a code of conduct either. The Values and Ethics

Code of the Public Service (Canada, 2003) states: “Ministers are responsible for … maintaining the tradition of political neutrality of the Public Service and its continuing ability to provide professional, candid and frank advice” (p. 7) and in turn, “public servants must … maintain the tradition of the political neutrality of the Public Service” (p. 8). But clashes between political and public interests are lived and experienced every day by individual public servants working across a variety of departments, agencies, Crown corporations, boards and commissions, and these conflicts repeatedly put public servants’ integrity and impartiality to the test.

Broader issue of concern

While coping with the complexities of divergent political and public interests, politicization of the public service – i.e., influence of the political ranks on the functioning of the public service – has come to represent a related and equally important challenge to the traditional neutrality of the public service. Politicization of the public service takes many forms. It can be conceived as politically based recruitment and appointment of senior positions within the public service, such as is done in the United States, where heads of government departments are apt to

change with each new administration and where political appointments of the most senior public

service positions are an accepted practice (House of Commons, 2007). This, however, is not the

case in the Canadian governing system. In fact, some commentators consider that the degree of

depoliticization in deputy minister appointments in Canada “is unique among comparable

countries” (Gow, 2004, p. 8), to the point of being “anachronistic” (Côté, 2007, p. 7).

In Canada, politicization of the public service is seen in the normalization of the once-

rare practice of summoning public officials to provide information or evidence to parliamentary

committees on behalf of ministers. This practice has sometimes led to the ‘naming and shaming’

of public servants who find that blame for departmental errors or irregularities are thereby laid at

their door rather than at the minister’s door, while not enough attention is paid to the role played

by structures of accountability or decision-making. A less controversial manifestation of

politicization came into being more recently when the Federal Accountability Act of 2006

assigned an accounting officer role to deputy ministers, thereby making them responsible to

Parliament for the administration of public funds allocated to their departments. It is noteworthy

that this is the first codification in law of the responsibility of public officials to answer and

account to Parliament directly in their own right, rather than on behalf of their ministers as per

previous tradition.

Subject of this research study

Finally, politicization of the public service also comes into play as civil servants contend

with political pressures in performing their core daily functions: providing policy advice to the

government and delivering programs and services to citizens. The relationships and interactions

between public servants and politicians or political staff, and more importantly the tenor of those interactions, have a direct bearing on the range of policy advice prepared for ministers, on the

policy decisions that are made, on program choices and delivery models that are implemented, and thus by extension, on the ability of public servants to serve both masters effectively, impartially and with integrity.

Maria Barrados, President of the Public Service Commission, has noted that the behaviours and actions of individual public servants “have cumulative impacts on the political neutrality, real and perceived, of the public service as an institution, not simply of individual public servants” (May, 2009). Less attention has been given to an understanding of how and how much political influence directs the behaviours and actions of public servants and what effect there might be on their non-partisanship and objectivity. It is apparent to many public servants that significant political consideration and sensitivity imbues the work that they do.

Donald Savoie, author of over 30 books on the Canadian public service, a well-known academic and former senior public servant, has argued that political pressures have resulted in a more politicized public service. Savoie (quoted in Doyle, 2008) also contends that “[Senior] public servants are … as much hired to manage crises, to manage political demands, to manage process, as they are because of their intimate knowledge of any sector." This suggests that the contemporary political reality demands a public servant who is not only aware of the needs of political masters, but is also attentive and accommodating to them.

From some perspectives, this reality, which further blurs the line between the political and public sectors, might be considered practical and even necessary in today’s media-driven culture with its rigorous scrutiny of political and bureaucratic deeds and misdeeds. But serious concerns have been raised in regard to how far the current government has gone in implementing the new order. During its 2008 campaign to end the legal market monopoly held by the

Canadian Wheat Board, the federal Conservative government instructed Canadian Grain

Commission employees to refrain from openly criticizing the government’s actions when communicating with their Members of Parliament at risk of casting doubt on their ability to adequately perform their jobs (Weston, 2008). This example illustrates how a government in power can exert pressure on a supposedly neutral public service, not just within the confines of their work life but also extending into their personal life. “Harper's speak-no-evil style of governance is beginning to leach beyond the federal executive suites into the working bureaucracy. … for those who think the Internet is the ultimate forum for free speech, here is the

Harper government's official position on that subject: “We would like to remind you that inappropriate behaviour by employees on websites, blogs and public fora (newspapers and meetings, etc.) could result in administrative and/or disciplinary action. We encourage you to consult your manager should you need further clarification and guidance’" (Weston, 2008).

If the government feels it is appropriate to exert control on what public servants say and do in their capacity as private citizens, it naturally invites thought about how much control it might exert on public servants in their capacity as employees. Considering the implications for effective governance, it is worth asking: to what degree does this control exist, what forms does control take, is it considered acceptable or appropriate by public servants, and what are its intended or unintended effects? The implications of political-bureaucratic relationships, interactions and tensions in the federal government are thus the subject of this research paper.

3. RELEVANCE AND VALUE OF THIS RESEARCH

This research study has academic relevance in both the political science and public administration fields of study. The results of this research may guide the building or refinement of theory in the political science and public administration disciplines. It also contributes to policy debates in relation to the nature, trends, and implications of political influence exerted on

the federal public service. Other disciplines may also be interested in the outcomes of this study as explained further in the following discussion of interdisciplinarity.

The knowledge gained during this study could be used to identify key areas of inquiry for a more in-depth study in the future. An extensive literature search indicated that while this subject has occasionally been addressed within existing bodies of research, it has not been the focus of a direct, in-depth study. It is therefore hoped that the results of this research project will give new prominence and spur deeper reflections on the politicized nature of public service work.

A variety of stakeholders in the public service community and field of practice may be interested in learning about the nature and extent to which political considerations influence public servants’ work and decision-making. Awareness and candid discussions of the significance and effects of this issue would be beneficial to Parliament, political officeholders of all parties, the public service, and the public at large.

Interdisciplinary nature of the research

Interdisciplinarity is embedded in this research study in various ways. The following describes how I conceptualize interdisciplinarity manifesting in this research study. First, my research topic explores the political-bureaucratic dynamic within the federal government, with particular emphasis on the implications of political-bureaucratic relationships, interactions and tensions. While the topic is naturally of interest to practitioners in the fields of political science and public administration, it encompasses issues of relevance to a broad range of other disciplines:

1. Human ecology – Similar to other types of workers, public servants develop adaptive

strategies (e.g., behaviours and actions) to manage the demands and influences of their

working environment. They influence and are influenced by their working environment.

2. Sociology – Public servants interact with their fellow citizens across the country directly and

indirectly through policies, programs and services that are developed to regulate or facilitate

the daily lives of Canadians.

3. Psychology – The work that public servants do and the context in which they do it shapes

their self-perceptions, behaviours, actions, emotions, and relationships.

4. Organizational psychology – The different elements (including the political element) that

underpin the characteristics of the public service environment variously contribute to or

detract from employees’ motivation in the workplace, organizational culture, job satisfaction

and commitment, productive behaviour, and leadership.

5. Applied ethics or business ethics – Driving forces in the workplace (such as explicit

directives or implicit expectations) influence public servants in making ethical judgements

and responses (including ‘speaking truth to power’).

Second, this research project could create knowledge that helps to find common ground between insights of different disciplines, a contribution that Szostak (2007) observes as one way to promote interdisciplinarity. This research could benefit different fields of study by assisting in the emergence of theories and understandings of how political factors impact the public service as individuals and as an organizational entity. In this way, this research meets one definition of interdisciplinarity as being “always transformative in some way, producing new forms of knowledge in its engagement with discrete disciplines” (Moran, 2002, p. 16). For example, these understandings could enrich and deepen concepts, beliefs and assumptions conceived in relation

to many aspects of work – working conditions, workplaces, power relations, organizational theory, and organizational culture – within different disciplinary bodies of knowledge or epistomologies. If students and practitioners were to reach across boundaries and mingle disciplinary ideas to find points of shared and divergent interest, that itself would constitute an act of interdisciplinarity. The interdisciplinarity embodied in this research “thus allows discussions that usually take place within the boundary of one’s department or discipline to emancipate from such boundaries” (Heintz & Origgi, 2004) and allows those engaged in the process to “acquire a fuller appreciation for the epistemological similarities and distinctions between and among the disciplines” (Seipel, 2005, p. 5).

Finally, the data I needed to conduct my research was collected in the form of narratives by public servants that addressed the context of their work lives, the effects of political influence on their image and identity as public servants, the level of control they feel they have over their work, and how effective they feel as guardians of the public trust. These narratives took the form of self-identified behaviours, experiences, events, judgments, values and attitudes as expressed by a cross-section of public servants, and therefore represented information that would be of interest to many different disciplines as identified above.1

4. LITERATURE REVIEW AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

I undertook an extensive review of secondary data sources in preparation for this study, focusing on works that addressed the politicization of the public service and the relationships between politicians/political staff and public servants. While the thinking and analysis done by other researchers and commentators provided a good framework to support my own research, I found that the specific focus of my study – the nature and extent of political pressure or influence

1 This interpretation of interdisciplinarity in the context of data that is usable and valuable across different disciplines was shared during course discussions by Prof. Pat Rasmussen of Athabasca University.

on public servants, and the broader implications on the public service and the public interest – has not been given in-depth attention in existing bodies of research. The following section presents an overview of key ideas and works that were most pertinent to my inquiry.

The relationships and interactions between politicians and public servants have not generated strong or sustained dialogue in Canada, insofar as it relates to the effect of political pressure or influence on the work done by public servants. By contrast, British Parliamentary committees have been more exercised by the topic, holding hearings and drawing on expert evidence from numerous politicians, researchers, journalists, Permanent Secretaries (equivalent to Canadian deputy ministers), and Cabinet Secretaries (equivalent to Canadian Clerks of the

Privy Council). A recent series of inquiries was conducted by the British House of Lords

Constitution Committee regarding the exercise of power by agencies at the centre of government

(primarily the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office) as well as by the House of

Commons Public Administration Select Committee on the desired nature of relationships and the proper delineation of accountability between ministers and public sector heads of departments.

Both British parliamentary committees first asked an overarching question: how well is the traditional Westminster style of government is working for today’s public servants and politicians who function in a high pressure, globalized environment? Within the scope of that umbrella, the committees went on to look at questions that fed into my own inquiry, such as whether the relationship between politicians and civil servants was productive and appropriate to their required roles and duties, whether the relationship had changed for the better or for the worse since the establishment of the civil service, and what factors and forces had intervened to bring about changes in how civil servants and ministers work together. A number of change agents were identified, namely, the 24/7 media spotlight, a faster pace of work, a much blurrier

line between politicians and civil servants, and perceived micro-management or interference by politicians and/or central agencies on the operations of line departments.

The House of Lords Constitution Committee (2010) examined the changing function and application of accountability in the government and paid much attention to Permanent

Secretaries (deputy ministers) who relayed concerns that when certain policies come under public scrutiny, departmental officials find themselves pressured by politicians to be solely accountable to parliamentary committees even though the political rank may have been the foremost advocate for those policies in the first place (para. 142). Such concerns prompted the committee to issue a recommendation that since “greater involvement and influence by the Prime

Minister on policy delivery is inevitable in the modern age … the Prime Minister's role and the centre's role in policy delivery must be transparent and accountable to Parliament” (para. 43).

The committee reaffirmed the call made by public officials for “structures of accountability to mirror structures of power” (para. 8). In recognition of evolving demands made in the name of accountability, the committee further proposed that Parliament “ensure its accountability mechanisms adapt to the changing nature of policy formation and delivery, [while] the government should ensure that the mechanism of the policy formation and delivery process remains transparent” (para. 154). In my view, the ongoing question of who should be accountable to whom and for what in the domain of public administration would be greatly clarified by undertaking these recommendations.

I now turn to the work done by the House of Commons Public Administration Select

Committee (2007) on politicization of the public service and the relationships between politicians and departmental officials. This committee offered some views in line with that of its

House of Lords counterparts in recognizing the gap between legislated, traditional, and de facto

accountability structures in the British system of government (p. 3). While acknowledging that there can be no clean demarcation of responsibility between the political and public ranks, it echoed other stakeholders’ calls for a more concrete definition of responsibilities between the two groups (p. 3).

However, whereas the House of Lords Constitution Committee called for more precision in defining and instituting accountability systems within the machinery of government, it did not offer any critique of the fact that the increasing power and influence wielded by the political ranks has changed the workings of public administration in Britain, and not always in a manner that is conducive to the fair treatment of public officials. Conversely, the House of Commons

Public Administration Select Committee demonstrated that it explicitly accepted and even approved of politicization of the public service, going to the extent of saying that the governing party of the day has a natural right to exert influence over the work done by public servants.

Further, the committee was careful to point out the difference between neutrality and independence, cautioning that neutrality enjoins public servants to serve the government of the day with impartial advice and effective implementation of its plans, whereas independence suggests that the public service answers to no one, when in fact answering to the elected government of the day is its core duty (p. 8). The committee further agreed with the contention made by one expert witness that “many of those who have complained about what they believe to be politicization are, in fact, objecting to overt shifts of power which are entirely within the government’s prerogative, but which may upset the old balance between politicians and officials” (p. 9).

The committee acknowledged that debates about politicization of the public service hinged on the perspective of each individual commentator in assigning priority to the public

service’s role in efficiently implementing the agenda of the ruling government, or to its role in providing a challenge function to the government by providing evidence to Parliament when called upon and upholding the stipulations of the constitution when the government fails to do so itself (p. 10).

I find it noteworthy that in this description of the fundamental duties of the British civil service, no mention was made of protecting the broader public interest. Based on a review of testimony from numerous expert witnesses and conclusions drawn by committee members, it appears that the British governing system does not consider safeguarding the common good as part of the raison d’être of the public service. This is in contrast to the Canadian governing system, where most commentators do draw attention to this duty, although it is sometimes seen as an intermediate goal (i.e., the public interest is considered to be upheld when officials faithfully carry out the wishes of the elected government), and sometimes as an ultimate goal

(i.e., protecting the public interest is the special and specific province of public servants and should not take lower precedence to any other duties).

One prominent committee witness who appeared before the House of Commons Public

Administration Select Committee offered the view that deliberate politicization of the public service is both useful and necessary, because it strengthens electoral responsibility, the tie that binds politicians and voters. The witness, a former Permanent Secretary, elaborated that politicization also allows ministers to exercise strong political leadership and control over their departments and more easily achieve their political goals, which in any event should not be challenged by public servants as their proper role is to offer impartial advice and practical solutions, not value judgements of political objectives (p. 9-26). This view has been debated and dismissed by Canadian public administration scholars, notably Tait, 2000, p. 15-16. The

committee also did not express agreement with this view, due to an overriding perception that a non-partisan civil service can and should be able to “work effectively with elected governments, command the confidence of ministers”, and provide a long-term institutional perspective which ministers generally do not have (p. 9).

In closing, the committee conceded that it did not find consensus among its expert witnesses in relation to the appropriate extent of political control of departments and the extent to which the civil service should be responsive to political direction. It recommended consideration of a Civil Service Bill to “guard against the potential for [undue] politicization of the civil service” and to “codify the governance arrangements of the Civil Service in statute” (p. 39).

I now examine existing research in the Canadian public service context. The most recent study that addressed some issues of concern to my inquiry is the Canadian Public Service Career

Satisfaction Survey, designed and carried out in January 2010 by the Centre for the Study of

Democracy at the Queen’s University School of Policy Studies. The survey was targeted to graduates of the Queen’s Master of Public Administration (MPA) and participants (senior public service executives) in the Queen’s Public Executive Program (Axworthy & Burch, 2010).

The survey revealed that, notwithstanding an 80% job satisfaction rate, there was high concern among respondents about the political-bureaucratic relationship. A majority were uneasy about the division of accountability between political staff and departmental officials, with many stating that public servants “are not adequately trained to deal with politicians and ministerial assistants are not adequately trained to deal with their public administration duties”

(p. 15). Accordingly, the study’s authors, Axworthy and Burch, followed in the footsteps of the

British Parliamentary committees in advocating for greater debate and clarity to be applied to the division of accountability between politicians and public servants, such as via the establishment

of an Accountability Code to outline “the responsibilities of public servants, ministers and the staffs that ministers employ. This code, passed as a non-binding resolution in Parliament and the provincial legislatures, would become the benchmark to guide future accountability disputes” (p.

7).

With over half of respondents contending that “their organization suffers from undue political interference and … that political staff are seldom capable and trained adequately for their responsibilities”, prominent author and former senior public servant Donald Savoie has proposed that “civil servants should have a legal basis for resisting instructions from elected politicians to perform essential partisan acts” (p. 10). Further to this assertion, Axworthy and

Burch pointed out that there is an existing guide for ministers and political staff. The Privy

Council Office’s Accountable Government: a Guide for Ministers and Ministers of State, published in 2008, “specifically instructs that ‘exempt staff do not have the authority to give directions to public servants’ … and have a ‘responsibility to respect the non-partisanship of pubic servants’” (p. 14).

Yet this unequivocal directive belies the reality of public servants who feel exposed to undue political pressures in their daily work. To offer a real life example, I can describe an occasion when I have experienced political staff intervening to direct public servants to rewrite alternatives or recommendations that were presented in a memo to a particular minister, because the minister’s preferred option was not in line with departmental advice. In this case, the minister could have responded to the original, unedited memo by noting on the decision page that consideration had been given to the department’s advice but that the minister’s decision was to go in a different direction. However, it was considered important to create the appearance that the department was not only in agreement with the minister, but that it had independently

developed and supported the policy choice the minister already selected. The implied reasoning for this course of action, which represented a serious ethical lapse on the part of both political and bureaucratic staff who did not raise a protest, was that should the minister later be called to publicly account for the policy decision, he could rely on the memo to be excused, if not validated, by ostensibly having followed advice given to him by the department. The memo would also provide support if it later proved necessary for the minister to point the finger of blame at the department. Further, should the memo be released under access to information legislation, there would be no indication that the department had originally recommended a different and opposite option altogether.

Axworthy and Burch have concluded that “our traditional system of a partnership between a professional non-partisan public service and strong ministers advised by competent political assistants is worth preserving. Politicization of the public service must be resisted …

[however] political staff should be regarded as a legitimate and critical part in the policy process” (p. 22). The message that emerges from the case discussed above suggests that turning these recommendations into reality would be a task fraught with difficulties, as there is little indication that public servants will easily unlearn their suspicions and disenchantment in relation to the political ranks and equally little indication that politicians and their staff will easily learn to respect the boundary at which their partisan interests must cease in working with the public service.

Another indication arising from the above example is that the ideal of mutual trust and respect between public servants and politicians does not have a complement in reality. Trust has been eroded by ministers who hang departmental officials out to dry as a tactic to protect their own political status. A recent case in point includes the firing of Linda Keen as head of the

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), for shutting down a nuclear reactor in Chalk

River, Ontario, due to safety concerns as it was liable to cause a meltdown in case of a natural disaster such as an earthquake. Since the reactor was relied upon by the international medical community for the production of medical isotopes used in cancer diagnoses and treatments, the

Conservative government ordered Ms. Keen to reopen the reactor. As the head of a quasi- judicial tribunal operating at arm’s length from the government, she refused to do the government’s bidding and wrote a public letter to the minister of Natural Resources, Gary Lunn, accusing the government of improperly interfering with the independence of the CNSC. Ms.

Keen’s claim seemed to be borne out by the fact that the government’s code of conduct forbids ministers from intervening or even appearing to intervene in decisions made by quasi-judicial tribunals. Finally, Ms. Keen, described by Prime Minister Stephen Harper as a “Liberal appointee” in an effort to add political colour to the situation, was fired just hours before she was to appear before a parliamentary commission. The government then announced that it was not appropriate for her to bear witness at the parliamentary hearing (Canadian Broadcasting

Company, 2008).

Another high profile example of political will overriding bureaucratic administrative decisions and professional standards emerged from the resignation of Dr. Munir Sheikh as chief statistician of Canada in July 2010, following a highly criticized decision by the Conservative government to switch from a mandatory census to a voluntary survey due privacy concerns.

Following the precedent set by other ministers to validate political arguments by claiming the public service as an ally and thereby profiting from the latter’s reputation as a professional, non- partisan policy advisor, the minister of Industry Canada, Tony Clement, justified the government’s decision to alter the census process by stating that Statistics Canada had not only

endorsed, but itself proposed the course of action taken by the government. This cast serious doubt on the credibility and reputation of Dr. Sheikh as a senior public servant and the head of

Canada’s primary data gathering and analysis body. He posted a letter on the StatsCan website

(which was quickly replaced by a notice backdated seven days earlier to refer all further questions to Mr. Clement’s office) to inform his staff of his resignation. He was careful to note that the advice he gave Mr. Clement would remain confidential as required by the laws governing the conduct of public servants, but he also left no doubt about his rejection of the government’s decision to alter and invalidate the census, thereby making it clear that the government was being disingenuous about the role played by Statistics Canada in the controversy. Further, in using a publicly accessible website to address his staff and at the same time deliver a message to the wider public community, Dr. Sheikh embodied the view that public servants have had to “learn public relations skills to survive” being pushed or pulled into the line of fire by their ministers (Axworthy & Burch, p. 20). The outcome of government interference in the integrity of Statistics Canada’s operations exemplifies inappropriate political influence in another way, as employees at the agency have indicated that in recent times, the partisan interests of the government have impacted this once relatively autonomous body by compelling it to increase its concentration on economic data analysis (a priority of the government) at the expense of social data analysis (Chase & Grant, 2010).

A final example of the political and the bureaucratic ranks clashing over governance issues relates to an case drawn from my experience of departmental officials who were working on the launch of a pilot program and sought approval from their deputy minister’s office to communicate details of the new program on the departmental website as the fastest and most transparent way to inform clients of the new program options available to them. To the program

officers’ surprise, the deputy minister chose to indefinitely postpone news of the launch, fearing the possibility of negative media scrutiny falling on the minister as a result of certain unrelated but high profile actions taken by existing clients that might have reflected negatively on the minister. Program officials felt that this politically motivated decision to restrict communications of the pilot were more properly the province of the minister or his political staff and should not have been made by the supposedly non-partisan deputy minister, who should have put the interests of the wider client base ahead of political fears and sensitivities. The deputy minister, a senior public servant, politicized the decision-making process due to an understanding developed in his relationship with the minister that the latter expected the department to be proactive in protecting his political interests. This case epitomizes a finding by the 2000 Tait Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics that a number of public servants, especially at the middle and lower levels feel that “the senior public service sometimes shows too much zeal in serving the government of the day, failing at times to make clear the risks or drawbacks of certain policy options, or to communicate fully the concerns of those on the front line of delivery” (Tait, 2000, p. 15). This failure to speak truth to power may stem from public servants being co-opted by the political ranks or from public servants fearing to run afoul of the minister. In either case, it represents a serious dereliction of duty.

This development is also seen as a symptom of “glaring systemic problems” in the professional relationship between ministers and their deputies (Côté, 2007, p. 12). Experts within the public administration field have observed that deputy ministers who exercise their duty to speak truth to power might well have found to their cost that this is a career limiting move. The reality of the contemporary political-bureaucratic dynamic means that ministers come to office not expecting neutrality from departmental officials, or even receptiveness, but

rather open, partisan investment and cooperation in implementing the political agenda. This is far from the governance norm known and welcomed 25 or 50 years ago (Côté, 2007, p. 10-11;

Savoie, 2005, p. 52).

I now shift this literature review to some further conclusions offered by Tait on public service leadership and balancing upward and downward accountability. These are important constituents of the political-bureaucratic relationship. The Tait Task Force on Public Service

Values and Ethics (2000) underscored the high wire balancing act required of senior leaders in the contemporary public service. A globalized environment with complex, competing, and sometimes incompatible interests requires senior executives to take on multi-faceted responsibilities, relationships and leadership roles, which must at all times embody public service values (2000, p. 46). Tait also pointed out that “one of the important tasks of leadership for senior public servants is to communicate downward, through words, symbols and gestures how they are managing their upward accountabilities, how advice and options are presented to ministers in a full, responsible and balanced manner” (2000, p. 47). Such advice is well taken and could be useful in allaying the concerns of some public servants that senior leaders are too zealous in assisting the political ranks in attaining their objectives and that impartiality and detachment from partisan aims are relinquished in the process.

Elaborating on the theme of multiple accountabilities, one cannot fail to recognize that senior public service leaders function in an environment fundamentally unlike that faced by their private sector counterparts due to the tug of war that goes on among their myriad of relationships and accountabilities. Côté (2007) offers this picture of the unique web within which deputy ministers operate:

In performing their duties, deputies must manage upwards by supporting and

advising their Minister, downwards in the management of their department,

horizontally by contributing to the collective management of the government, and

outwards with the provinces and territories, the public and with other non-

governmental actors. This array of relationships and accountability arrangements

inevitably result in conflicts about obligations to Minister or Government, and

management priorities, which are often exacerbated by the variety of interests that

are pushing and pulling at any given time. (p. 10)

In scrutinizing the views put forward by the highly respected sources quoted in this literature review, I find it important to address their conceptions of the public service’s duty to uphold the greater common good or the public interest. The most common interpretation offered by many sources was that public servants have an obligation, at times described as a constitutional obligation, to serve the principles of democracy. According to this definition, the best expression of democratic values is for a public servant to provide strong professional advice and service to elected ministers, even if this advice is unwelcome or contrary to the minister’s known preferences, and to ensure that the laws of the land are not contravened by political decisions. In fact, Tait concluded his task force report by calling for a revitalization of the “core democratic values of the public service of Canada – accountability to ministers and through them to the citizens of Canada, the rule of law, and loyalty to the public interest – as the foundation of all other public service values” (p. 54). At this point, however, I would like to draw attention to a deficiency in the existing body of research. I found it curious that no commentator interpreted the definition of the public service’s duty to the public interest as encompassing the safeguarding of the best interests of citizens from partisan political goals that are often targeted at a particular

special interest group, a voting bloc or a vocal and politically active constituency base, rather than a broad cross-section of citizens. Critics of this expanded definition have argued that:

Faithful execution of democratic decisions is what a public service is for, not to

substitute for them some other definitions of the public good … Public servants

must remember what they are – delegates of their minister – and what system they

serve — a democratic system where elected officials have legitimacy to define the

public interest. Once public servants have done their best to advise, they must

accept the legitimate decisions of their ministers. (Tait, 2000, p. 16-17)

As a counter-argument, I would argue that many public servants, seasoned by continuity of service under a succession of governments, have developed a longer term horizon and cross- disciplinary knowledge which helps them judge or assess the value of policies and programs outside a political framework. Granted, public servants are not elected officials, and cannot replace the function and significance of such office holders, but their perception of themselves as guardians of the public interest does give them a unique standing in being able to look above the political fray that should be valued and preserved. This view is supported by a number of commentators. Keating (1996) cautioned that while ministers’ views are legitimized by their elected office, there may always be “issues of probity that are not black-and-white legal questions” (p. 56). Sutherland (1991) remarked that “because of the amateurism of politicians and the weakness of party and public discussion of policies, there is a danger of the political will being capricious, and a partly-autonomous bureaucratic sector can counterbalance this danger”

(p. 91). Finally, Lemieux (2000) observed that the legitimacy of an elected government rises and falls with its standing in the court of public opinion: “If indicators point to a significant drop in a government’s popularity, its representative character and legitimacy will be reduced and it will

thereby lose one of the primary attributes of power” (p. 122). Furthermore, groups in the non- governmental sector are increasingly seen as holding additional, if not greater, legitimacy in the public policy domain. This especially applies to community-based groups which, through outreach and front-line experience, can justly claim to be the true voices of citizens and stakeholders.

5. PROJECT OVERVIEW

Description and objectives

The growing institutionalization of political intervention and sensitization within the public service raises significant questions about the capacity of the public sector to be a neutral entity in the service of the public interest. In response to this issue, I developed a research project to undertake an analysis of the political-bureaucratic dynamic within the federal government. My aim was to do a preliminary study exploring how political-bureaucratic tensions manifest in the work lives of public servants. I also had questions about the implications of these tensions for today’s public service and for the future of the public service institution. During my study, I asked public servants to share their impressions and understandings of the interactions and conflicts between the political and bureaucratic ranks in Canada’s governing system.

Major goals of this study

This research study examines:

• How the existence and ongoing handling of political-bureaucratic relationships and

tensions affect public service work

• How these relationships and tensions shape public servants’ image of themselves as

servants of public interest

• How they shape public servants’ conception of the public service as a publicly

responsible and accountable institution

• How public service action can affect the public interest

Questions explored and analyzed

1. How do employees react to the standard perception of the public service as being neutral and

free from political influence in its work?

2. How do employees describe or define the political vs. bureaucratic dichotomy within the

federal government?

3. Are employees faced with political interventions or pressures in their work and if so, what

adaptive strategies have they developed?

4. How do employees see the role of executives (e.g., in terms of their leadership and

management skills) in managing political-bureaucratic tension, keeping in mind

organizational structure, corporate culture and employee expectations?

5. How does political-bureaucratic tension affect employee views of their role as guardians of

the public interest and of the institution of the public service?

6. How is the public interest regarded, represented and protected in cases of political-

bureaucratic tension?

6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Participants’ rights and protection

Since my research involved human subjects, ethical considerations were a fundamental component of the project. My actions to safeguard participants’ rights and protection included the following:

1. Upon being contacted, participants were informed of the objectives the research project

intended to achieve, how the study would be conducted, and what would be done with the

results.

2. They were asked to provide explicit consent for me to record, collect, use, and potentially

publish their responses.

3. They were informed about their rights (e.g., to not answer any of the survey questions at their

discretion, to insert extra questions or comments they felt were necessary to clarify their

opinions) and about the steps I would take to protect their identities and confidentiality.

4. Individuals who chose to drop out partway through the process had the freedom to do so

without any explanation being required, and any information they provided was discarded in

its entirety. Only once completed surveys were sent to me via email was the information

considered part of the study database and hence no longer eligible for withdrawal.

5. Participants were advised that they could create anonymous email accounts through which to

send me their completed surveys. This option offered protection of participants’ anonymity

and also encouraged them to feel comfortable about candidly sharing their thoughts.

Data reliability and protection

I undertook the following steps to ensure data reliability and protection:

1. I communicated with participants via my personal and private email address and did not

permit any outside access to this account.

2. Survey data was stored on my personal computer in password-protected documents.

3. Analysis and results included not only summarizations of responses but also direct quotes

(albeit unattributed to protect privacy) to give a fair and adequate representation of

participants’ opinions.

7. METHODOLOGY

Data collection method

To gather needed data for this preliminary study, I set a goal of conducting 4-5 in-depth surveys within the employee ranks of the public service. Information about political- bureaucratic relationships and tensions would be sought in the form of self-identified behaviours, experiences, events, judgments, values and attitudes expressed by respondents. The population of interest was comprised of public servants in the policy and program fields as these individuals are more likely to encounter the political-bureaucratic dynamic in their daily work.

Surveys were conducted using the electronic mail method. This technique was chosen for its negligible financial cost and simple administration. My influence on participants as the researcher was diminished as the survey was answered in a private setting. In addition, my physical absence hopefully encouraged participants to be more candid in their responses as they did not have to articulate their thoughts and opinions face to face as they would have in an interview format.

Attention was paid to effective principles of survey methodology as suggested by

Andrews, Nonnecke & Preece (2003). This involved sequencing requested information in a particular way (e.g., demographic data was requested before information relating to subjective issues). I established my credibility as a researcher by explaining that the study was conducted as part of my master’s studies at Athabasca University. I also facilitated independent verification of the authenticity of the survey by providing contact information for my research supervisor as well as the Athabasca University Research Ethics Board. I used multiple recruitment avenues to solicit participation – sending customized email invitations to members of the federal government community on the professional networking site LinkedIn and asking former

professional colleagues to forward my survey invitation to others within their professional circle.

Finally, I employed response management techniques by sending two-week and four-week reminder notifications to persons who had asked for the survey to be sent to them. This approach was considered not overly intrusive and resulted in timely achievement of my target of 5 completed surveys.

Sampling and recruitment procedures

The sampling frame I created for my study was structured to include individuals who met the following conditions:

• Are listed in the online Government Electronic Directory Service (GEDS)

• Work in a policy or program related branch within their organization (i.e., not in support

services such as Finance, Human Resources, Facilities Management, or IM/IT)

• Occupy an officer or analyst level position (i.e., not the executive level)

• Are not on an extended leave of absence during the time the survey is to be conducted

• Are willing to consider participating in such a project

I originally intended to run a search on program and policy branches in federal government departments and agencies, create a list of 45 individuals who met the conditions in the sampling frame, and select every third name to create a random sample. However, I soon ran into roadblocks, forcing my strategy to be adapted. I discovered that GEDS no longer consistently publishes email addresses for employees. This made it much harder and more time-consuming to create an overall list of 45 individuals from which to create the random sample of 15.

I then decided to solicit interest from members of the Government of Canada discussion forum on the LinkedIn professional networking website. Concurrently, I requested assistance

from former professional colleagues who agreed to forward copies of my survey invitation to members of their own professional circles.

My introductory letter to potential participants served the following functions:

• Explained that I am a federal government employee conducting a survey as part of my

master’s studies

• Described the purpose of the research and intended benefits (which hopefully provided a

motivation to participate)

• Offered to send a copy of a detailed information sheet and the survey form if requested

• Stated that participants’ responses would be compared and analyzed, and that results would

be shared with my university and possibly disseminated to other groups as well

• Explained how participants’ confidentiality and survey data would be protected

• Requested participants’ written consent to use the information they provided for the purposes

of my study

The letter of information, consent form and survey are appended to this paper.

8. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Statement regarding data validity

Due to the preliminary nature of this study reflected in the small sample size, the data does not provide a true representative sample. The comments provided reflect only the opinions and perspectives of those who participated in the surveys. Generalized conclusions will not be drawn.

Survey statistics

Out of 84 customized invitations and 7 generalized invitations forwarded on by intermediaries to groups of indeterminate size, I received expressions of interest from 15

individuals. 5 completed surveys were returned by respondents working across 4 different departments (Indian and Northern Affairs, Industry, Citizenship and Immigration, and Natural

Resources). 3 of the respondents were veteran public servants with close to 20 years’ experience, while the other 2 were newcomers with less than 3 years’ experience.

Key findings and conclusions on the state of the political-bureaucratic relationship

1) How do employees react to the standard perception of the public service as being neutral and free from political influence in its work?

Most respondents provided qualified concurrence that the public service is able to carry out its functions free of political influence. It was observed that this ideal is sometimes blemished by public servants who are too mindful of political preferences. Some also noted the existence of pockets or areas within the public sector where political interventions are more common. This could be attributed to heightened public scrutiny for high visibility issues, e.g., job growth or public health protection, or there might be instances where the minister has a “pet project”, particularly one that impacts positively on his/her constituency and so he/she wishes to be personally involved in the execution of it. The systemic bonds between the political and the bureaucratic were pointed out as a feature that introduces an inherent political tint to dealings between the two groups.

2) How do employees describe or define the political vs. bureaucratic dichotomy within the federal government?

The general sense that emerged was that the political rank sets policy direction based on party platform choices (it was pointed out that these choices are not always ideological but sometimes have cross-party support) and also from advice offered by departmental officials. The bureaucratic level offers a support structure by generating non-partisan policy alternatives and

expert advice for ministerial consideration and then managing the execution of the selected option. The role of the bureaucratic level in providing permanency or continuity through change in governments was also mentioned.

3) Are employees faced with political interventions or pressures in their work and if so, what adaptive strategies have they developed?

Responses to this question typified the notion that perspective steers beliefs. One respondent indicated that political preferences are an underlying institutional feature of the public service environment, making the existence of pressures or interventions both natural and expected.

However, most other respondents took a contrary view, reporting with frustration that they experienced frequent, if not continual, political pressure in their roles. In part, this was attributed to the propensity of media scrutiny to attach political nuance to issues where none is warranted – i.e., to “create” a story – in order to increase the interest accorded to their reports.

A number of respondents indicated that political interventions also run rife in the area of media releases or direct public communications. This may be unwelcome but it is not unexpected, given that the current Conservative government has developed a reputation of exerting tight control over all public messaging. Respondents expressed strong dissatisfactions in that this tight control sometimes results in the production of media releases or responses that are altered in the political approval process in such a manner that they are deliberately not fully or adequately “true to life,” instead painting a picture that is overly simplified or adjusted for public consumption according to the political context.

This discussion of altered public communications calls to mind the Conservative government’s introduction of political bias into public service communications through its somewhat official (but now defunct) directive to replace the traditional title “Government of

Canada” with the more pointed label “Canada’s New Government”. This partisan nomenclature cropped up frequently in public service communication products during the first mandate of the

Conservative party that ran from 2006-2008, but was dropped during its current term of office.

The change was widely interpreted as an attempt to underline the break from a succession of past

Liberal governments but public servants raised concerns about the appropriateness of such usage in supposedly non-partisan departmental websites and brochures.

One respondent provided the following observation: “In the last few years it has become the norm for the Minister’s office to approve all responses to the media and often changes are made to the response recommended by the department. … it can be frustrating and stressful when you feel that the response approved by the Minister’s office is not adequate or lacks context. There is not much to do but accept this. Once you have provided your best advice and explained your rationale, if it is not accepted you have to move on. Unfortunately, it is the public servant who is left to deliver the message to the reporters, who are often vocal in voicing their displeasure with the answers provided. It is also particularly frustrating when you see that the result would have been better had your advice been followed. I know that many people in my field are increasingly frustrated with this increased intervention.”

Respondents suggested that useful strategies to combat or cope with political pressures include restricting political-bureaucratic interactions to the most senior public service levels only rather than allowing permeation to the upper-middle or middle levels. This is particularly important in the public affairs or media relations divisions of departments, as the nature of communications work brings employees in these branches face to face with political pressures on a more regular basis than counterparts at a similar hierarchical level but in different fields of practice. Respondents also stated that they relied on professional standards, ethical values and

legal obligations to guide their actions when under political pressure. One respondent applied what he called “The Globe and Mail test” – i.e., posing the question: What would the public or media reaction be to what we’re doing? to help assure himself of the soundness of the advice he was preparing, and to help him balance professional commitments as well as the public interest in the midst of such pressures.

4) How do employees see the role of executives (e.g., in terms of their leadership and management skills) in managing political-bureaucratic tension, keeping in mind organizational structure, corporate culture and employee expectations?

There was a certain consensus among respondents that in Canada’s governing system, the political level trumps the bureaucratic ranks. In practical terms, the political ranks have the authority to issue directions while senior bureaucratic leaders have the responsibility to translate those directions into action. There was a suggestion that if political directions are deemed to be misguided or inappropriate, they are implemented with less enthusiasm and effort. One individual remarked that there seemed to be a ‘see no evil’ approach taken at her department, as executives downplayed or ignored instances of political-bureaucratic tensions due to discomfort at addressing the very existence of such tensions or a disinclination to give the issue visibility and thus bring it onto employees’ radar screens.

One respondent discussed the approach taken by senior leaders in his department in regard to political-bureaucratic tensions, proposing that such conflicts could be mitigated if new ministers educated themselves upon receiving a portfolio outside their area of expertise: “There is a well- evolved culture – at least in our Department – of briefing an incoming Minister and allowing for a familiarization period in which the Minister is learning the portfolio. Executives spend a lot of time on transitions to ensure that the Minister and Minister's staff have enough nuanced

information to begin to make informed policy choices within weeks. Usually, Ministers know they cannot barge into a department and demand a particular reform; however, sometimes their mandates require a particular policy change and this has to be worked out in the context of all the rest of the department's activities. Trust is required, and it has to be earned. However, it is appropriate for Ministers during transition to hesitate until they understand the full consequences of their decisions.”

5) How does political-bureaucratic tension affect employees’ views of their role as guardians of the public interest and of the institution of the public service?

There were mixed responses to this query. Two of the respondents were unequivocal that political-bureaucratic tensions had little to no impact on either the public service or the public interest. A third individual observed that there was indeed an impact, but that it could be mitigated with public service creativity in crafting robust policy options that also met political criteria. Finally, two respondents were very blunt in stating that political-bureaucratic tensions have resulted in a deterioration of the state of the public service as an institution. Politicization of the public service is taking root whereby bureaucrats are pushed to extreme measures to keep their ministers out of political hot water but at the same time, they find themselves facing parliamentary questioning unaided by ministerial support when called before committees to defend or rationalize decisions that were made at political levels.

Politicization is also being felt in a context in which access to information requests have mushroomed, leading to more and more internal controls being placed on working policy documents to eliminate the potential for future political embarrassment should those documents become public. This assertion is echoed in the case discussed earlier in this paper regarding instances when political staff have directed public servants to rewrite policy recommendations to

purport the view that potentially contentious decisions were independently recommended by the department, thus shifting any possible blame for ill-advised decisions away from the political ranks.

The impact of these trying times for some respondents has led to them making career decisions to avoid certain fields that appear to end up as political playgrounds, such as the communications arena. They also perceive a worrisome decline in levels of trust and respect on the part of the current government where the public service is concerned, which indicates that the quality of policy debate carried on at the political level is no longer bolstered by public service expertise to the degree that it was in the past. As one respondent wrote: “I think there is an attitude of mistrust towards public servants by the government and a dismissal of their advice.

This makes me question my role as a public servant and why I bother. It also makes me worry about the institution, about preserving the neutrality and about attracting smart young people to the profession.”

6) How is the public interest regarded, represented and protected in cases of political- bureaucratic tension?

Respondents took pains to point out that impacts of policy decisions on the public are always given great attention and deliberation at the public service level. In terms of protecting that interest, there was division in views. Some felt that ministers, as elected officials, have the ultimate authority to determine what the public interest is. A differing opinion was that senior public service leaders have a particular duty to balance their obligations to provide the best possible policy advice and efficient program delivery in conjunction with consideration of ethical responsibilities, including the duty (and no doubt the courage) to raise red flags when the situation warrants. Another opinion was that in this politicized governing system, the public

interest is likely often sacrificed to political expediency, i.e., protecting the image of the decision-makers, and that both departments and politicians may be guilty of such actions.

Summary conclusions based on the data

The difficulty of resolving political-bureaucratic tensions is caused by an incongruence of values and philosophies between the two groups, and by the difficulty, perhaps even incompatibility, of simultaneously balancing duties to ministers and duties to citizens. This raises the prospect of a number of big picture issues:

• Now that politicization of the public service is on the way to being institutionalized, there is a

need for new and clearer accountability frameworks to both protect and enhance the pubic

service as an entity.

• Renewed efforts must be made to preserve the principle of public service neutrality, while at

the same time recognizing that to some degree the principle of anonymity has been lost to the

demand for transparency. Tied in to the notions of accountability and transparency is the

need for a safe and effective mechanism whereby public servants can disclose unethical

behaviour when it arises.

• Public servants are finding it difficult to offer full personal engagement and commitment in

their jobs at an individual level and to the institution of the public service at a broader level,

given that they feel devalued and pressured to compromise their professional and ethical

standards in favour of political objectives.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

Many of the opinions articulated in the survey were substantiated by conclusions drawn by prominent commentators and analysts in the field whose positions were discussed earlier in the literature review section of this paper. I now present some key ideas put forth by those

commentators in order to put forward some feasible ways to bring about positive change in political-bureaucratic interactions in the federal government.

1) Repairing the political-bureaucratic relationship

The British House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee began its report by underscoring the belief that “it is essential that the key governing relationship between ministers and civil servants is kept in good repair, both for effective government and proper accountability” (2007, p. 3). This goal can be supported by initiating a strong and sustained dialogue in Canada about where to draw proper boundaries in the relationships and interactions between the political and the bureaucratic ranks, the extent to which the public service should be responsive to or insulated from political direction, and what kind of effective protections could be instituted in cases where lines are crossed. This dialogue should take into consideration the challenges of the contemporary public service context, e.g., a 24-hour news cycle, unceasing access to information requests, heightened and usually negative media scrutiny, a less trusting and satisfied citizenry, and politicians who are extremely anxious to avoid negative coverage, particularly in a minority government.

The dialogue should be extended to consideration of training and a code of conduct and ethics for political staff which would be comparable to the Values and Ethics Code for the Public

Service. Such a code would help political staff understand the limits of their rights and responsibilities with respect to interactions with the public service. Further, it has been suggested that both political staff and public servants would benefit from coaching on how to work productively together (Axworthy & Burch, 2010, p. 15-22).

2) Developing a new public service bargain

The British House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee recommended the development of “a new public service bargain underpinned by a governance code” (2007, ¶

3). Such an undertaking would be welcome in Canada as well. The implication of this suggestion is that ministers must be able to expect that the public service will respect and respond to political priorities as appropriate. At the same time, the public service must function within the ethical and legal space to allow it to meet its professional obligations effectively and without undue political interference. Further, public servants should only be held responsible for actions and events that can justifiably be attributed to their control.

3) Creating better accountability mechanisms

While admitting that there can be no “neat division of responsibility” between the political and the bureaucratic ranks, the British House of Commons Public Administration Select

Committee called for greater correspondence between structures of power and structures of accountability (2007, ¶ 8). This is seen as especially important in building enhanced accountability and transparency into decisions made in the course of policy development and implementation processes. Put simply, it would help clarify assessments of the question: who should be accountable to whom and for what.

4) Strengthening pubic service leadership

“Nothing is more important for the future of public service values than the quality of leadership at the top levels of the public service” (Tait, quoted in Côté, 2007, p. 15). Senior public service leaders are uniquely tasked with managing a web of relationships and interests that span across political, economic, and social arenas. To manage the constant complexity and

change occurring in the public service, four leadership styles have been identified as important

(Côté, 2007, p. 17-18):

• Change leadership, which calls for developing and executing strategic plans

• Risk and courage leadership, which is required for difficult decisions and in times of crisis

• Day to day leadership, which fosters organizational cohesion and employee engagement

• External leadership, which creates productive networks of partners with other departments

and other levels of government domestically and internationally

Public service leaders are also charged with reinvigorating, through their daily words and deeds, a climate of speaking truth to power and adhering to ethical conduct, especially when questionable activities are in progress (White & Green, 2007; Tait, 2000, p. 49).

10. CONCLUSION

The blurring of the line between the political and bureaucratic ranks of the federal government raises important questions that have a bearing on effective governance and proper accountability. Public servants, analysts and commentators find themselves wondering about the impacts and consequences of the growing political sensitization of the public service. Beyond consequences for the public service as a supposedly neutral and professional entity, it should be kept in mind that the public service reaches into the lives of all citizens, resulting in implications for the nature of the governing system and social system that Canadians choose to live under.

Strengths and limitations of this study

The survey conducted as part of this study could have benefited from being piloted with a few testers or reviewers. Low uptake of the survey might be attributed to ambiguous or complicated phrasing of questions. Piloting the survey might have helped identify and address such problems before distribution and administration to a wider population.

However, despite the small sample size of the survey, the findings can be taken as a starting point for further research efforts. Directions for future inquiries were suggested through the identification of a number of themes of importance and concern to public servants. Further, it is hoped that the study as a whole will jumpstart honest and productive conversations about political-bureaucratic relationships and tensions n the Canadian government as public and parliamentary dialogue on this issue has been lacking to date.

Suggested areas for further research

Drawing on ideas discussed in this paper, the following are some subjects worthy of further research:

• A study with similar research themes but using a sample composed of senior public service

executives (specifically, the deputy minister and assistant deputy minister cadres)

• A report on uses and abuses of access to information legislation, and ideas for balancing the

public’s right to information with the public service’s need to function in a reasonably

confidential workplace

• A review of the current culture of increasing rules and regulations in conjunction with a

practice of “naming and shaming” public servants, viewed in light of the need for a public

service that is engaged, innovative and forward-thinking in order to keep up in a globalized

context

• An analysis of the impact on national policy coherence caused by the evolution in federal

politicians’ priorities from the traditional focus on national issues (statesman role) to a

contemporary focus on constituency issues (ombudsman role)

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2010 from http://www.winnipegsun.com

White, Jodi & Green, Ian. (2007). Canada’s public service in the 21st century.

Discussion paper prepared for the Public Policy Forum. Retrieved February 20, 2010

from http://www.ppforum.com

APPENDIX A

Letter of information and consent form for potential participants

Project title: Political-Bureaucratic Relationships and Tensions in the Federal Government of Canada

Researcher: Valencia da Silva

Sponsoring institution: Athabasca University

About this research project

This research project aims to examine the existence, management and impact of tensions between the political and bureaucratic ranks in the Canadian federal government. I aim to discover how the existence and handling of these tensions affect public service work, how they shape public servants’ image of their role as servants of the public interest as well as their conception of the public service as a publicly responsible/accountable institution, and how the public interest is represented and affected.

About the survey process

To gather information for analysis, I am conducting a survey to draw on the perspectives of public servants in the non-executive ranks. Federal public servants who work in a variety of departments and agencies across Canada are invited to participate.

Surveys will be shared in the form of MS Word documents and should take 20-30 minutes to complete. Participants will be asked to share their experiences and perceptions pertaining to the issues being studied. A sample of the survey questions is provided below:

1. The public service is commonly described as an institution that is neutral and free from political influence in its work. Do you feel this is a fair and accurate description?

2. The public service environment brings together the political element and the bureaucratic element. Do you see a distinction or divide between what is political vs. what is bureaucratic? How would you define or describe it?

3. Do you encounter political sensitivities, interventions or pressures in your work? In what situations or circumstances does it arise most often?

Risks and benefits

There are no known or expected risks associated with participation in this study. It is hoped that the results of this research project will lead to new understandings and reflections on the political-bureaucratic dichotomy within the public service environment. Practitioners in the

public service and stakeholders in the wider community may be interested in learning about the nature and implication of issues explored in this study.

Participant protection and rights

Your participation is completely voluntary, anonymous, and confidential. If you choose to take part in the survey, you can decline to answer any given question at your discretion. You can also insert extra questions and comments that you feel are necessary to clarify your thoughts. Should you wish to withdraw from the process at any time, all you need do is inform me via email. No explanation will be requested and any information you may have shared up to that point will be discarded in its entirety. However, once your completed survey is emailed to me, it becomes part of the study database and cannot be withdrawn.

In order to participate, you must send me an email with a consent declaration stating that you understand what participation in the survey entails, and provide me with explicit permission to use the information you provide in this research project. The consent can be sent prior to or along with the completed survey.

To protect your anonymity and confidentiality, you will not be asked to name yourself on the survey form. In addition, you are welcome to send me the consent declaration and completed survey by means of anonymous email accounts such as Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmail, etc.

Access to information

Please note that respondents’ names and other personal identification details will not be shared with anyone and will not be used at any stage of this study. These details will be held completely private.

Raw survey answers will be accessible only to me and my research supervisor. To ensure participant confidentiality, information will be grouped and summarized for the purpose of disseminating the results. Some direct quotes (albeit unattributed to protect privacy) will also be included to give a fair and adequate representation of the opinions expressed by participants.

You may obtain the results of the final draft of the study by sending me an e-mail request to notify you when it is complete. Any comments or feedback you wish to provide at that point would be welcome.

Throughout the research project, all data and related analysis will be maintained in password- protected computer files that are only accessible to me and my research supervisor. Once the study has been completed, and a final mark has been assigned, all participant information collected in conjunction with this study will be destroyed through the deletion of electronic files. This is expected to occur in approximately November 2010.

Publication of research results

The existence of the research will be listed in an abstract posted online at the Athabasca University Library's Digital Thesis and Project Room, and the final research paper will be publicly available. The results of this study could potentially be used as secondary data by other researchers interested in a similar or related subject.

How to proceed if you wish to participate

Participating in this study indicates that:

1. You are over the age of 18, 2. You understand to your satisfaction the information provided to you about your participation in this research project, and 3. You agree to inclusion of your data in this study.

If you would like to proceed, please copy and paste the consent declaration located at the end of this letter and email it to me at [email protected]. The completed survey can either accompany the declaration or follow at a later point, as you prefer. You are free to use an anonymous sender’s email address if you wish.

Questions or Concerns

If you have any questions or would like clarification regarding this research study or potential participation, please contact:

Researcher: Valencia da Silva Email: [email protected] Tel: 819-953-0567

Supervisor: Dr. Angela Specht Email: [email protected] Tel: 780-892-3598

The Athabasca University Research Ethics Board has reviewed this research study and can be reached by e-mailing [email protected] or calling 1-780-675-6718 if you have questions or comments about your treatment as a participant in this study.

PARTICIPANT CONSENT DECLARATION

I have read this Letter of Information and have had any questions answered to my satisfaction. I will keep a copy of this letter for my records. I confirm that:

I understand the expectations and requirements of my participation in this research study; I understand the provisions regarding confidentiality and anonymity; I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw at any time with no negative consequences prior to sending my completed survey to the researcher; I agree to the inclusion of information I provide for use in this study I am aware that I may contact Athabasca University or the identified research supervisor, in addition to the researcher, if I have any questions, concerns or complaints about any research procedures.

APPENDIX B

Research Survey

Political-Bureaucratic Relationships and Tensions in the Federal Government of Canada

Introduction

My aim is to examine the existence, management and impact of tensions or conflicts between the political and bureaucratic ranks in the Canadian federal government. By participating in the survey, you will help me learn more about how the existence and ongoing handling of these tensions affect public service work, how they shape public servants’ image of themselves as servants of public interest and their conception of the public service as a publicly responsible/accountable institution, and how public service action can affect the public interest.

There are no known risks to participating in this study. Federal public servants who work in a variety of departments and agencies across Canada have been invited to participate.

Instructions to participants

You will be asked to complete questions relating to your experience with tensions or conflicts between the political and bureaucratic elements of the government, and how they may have impacted your work and perceptions of the public service. To protect your privacy and confidentiality, you will not be asked to name yourself. You can also skip any questions or add additional ones if you wish. The survey should take approximately 30 minutes to complete.

Once you have finished, you can send the form to me at [email protected]. You may choose to create an anonymous email account with which to send me the completed survey. The reason for this is to protect your privacy and encourage you to feel comfortable about sharing your thoughts in the course of writing your responses.

Even though you have provided me with explicit consent regarding your participation in this study, you are free to withdraw from the process at any point until you email me your completed survey. After that point, your answers will comprise part of the study database and cannot be withdrawn.

Thank you,

Valencia da Silva Email: [email protected]

The first set of questions is intended to capture demographic information.

1. Sex

Male Female

2. Age range

18-24 25-34 35-49 50+

3. Ethnic group

Aboriginal Arab Black Caucasian Hispanic South or South-East Asian West Indian Other (specify) ______

4. Describe your political affiliation or philosophy, if any

5. Number of years you have worked in the federal public service

6. Department or agency where you currently work

7. Branch or division where you work

8. Job title

The next set of questions is designed to look at political and bureaucratic elements at play in the public service working environment.

9. The public service is commonly described as an institution that is neutral and free from political influence in its work. Do you feel this is a fair and accurate description?

10. The public service environment brings together the political element and the bureaucratic element. Do you see a distinction or divide between what is political vs. what is bureaucratic? How would you define or describe it?

11. Do you encounter political sensitivities, interventions or pressures in your work? In what situations or circumstances does it arise most often? How do they impact, influence or guide you in your work? Are there any approaches, strategies or behaviours that you use to cope with and adapt to these pressures?

12. Would you say that the differences or tensions between political and bureaucratic elements operate on a continuum (e.g., is there stronger tension in higher ranks or does tension increase over time)?

13. What are your perceptions of how executives in your organization manage differences between political direction/preference vs. bureaucratic judgments/analysis within the context of organizational structure, corporate culture and employee expectations?

14. Does political-bureaucratic tension impact your role as a public servant and the institution of the public service? If so, how?

15. How is the public interest regarded, represented and protected in cases of political- bureaucratic tension?

16. Additional statements or observations you wish to add?