Nordia Geographical Publications 43: 1, 87–99 Pasi Tuunainen

New approaches to the study of Arctic warfare

Pasi Tuunainen PhD, Docent of History, University of Eastern Finland

Abstract: This article uses the Russo-Finnish of 1939–1940 as a case study to introduce several approaches that can be employed when studying Arctic warfare in winter. The study of Arctic warfare is a highly context-related field: the Finnish-Russian border area had a character of its own. Combat here essentially was sub-Arctic forest fighting. Unpreparedness for such peculiarities and special conditions, in particular for the harsh sub-zero weather, ice, deep snow and shortened days of winter, complicated military action and even led to military failures. Many historical antecedents show that those armies that have adapted and correctly realised the implications of the effects of adverse weather on terrain and of the northern environment on soldiers, materiel, organisation and operations could prevail. Unlike in many places, the hostilities normally have not ended in the Far North of Europe as the winter set in. Winters were utilised for offensive combat operations provided that the attacking force had secured its over- snow mobility and logistical support. The Finnish case demonstrates that the terrain and weather not only dictated the operational capabilities in northern forests but also that better preparation in the utilisation of the possibilities offered by military geography explained the eventual outcome of military operations. Arctic warfare is an important research area with wider significance. Surprisingly, the literature on the topic is scant.

Keywords: Arctic warfare, the Winter War (1939–1940), northern operations, winter tactics, forest fighting, military geography, terrain analysis

Introduction did not realize this fact until after the war was in progress. The German troops which “The features peculiar to the theater of were sent to Finland during World War II operations in the Far North of Europe were not prepared for the special difficulties have given the recent wars in the Finnish they encountered in combat in that trackless area a character all their own. Terrain and wilderness, in the endless virgin forests, and climate always have a decisive influence on during the long Arctic night. Only after warfare. The tactical rules which had been paying dearly for their experiences did they worked out on the basis of experiences become adjusted to the requirements of in central European theaters of war and that theater” (Erfurth 1951, 19). which are adapted to normal conditions General Erfurth was a German liaison officer in the Finnish High Command were applicable only to a limited extent in the cases of Karelia and Lapland. In many during the (1941–1944), respects warfare in the Arctic follows rules and his text confirms that the Wehrmacht of its own. The German High Command soldiers stationed in Finland ignored military

87 New approaches to the study of Arctic warfare NGP Yearbook 2014 geographical factors of the Arctic regions effectiveness in winter? Arctic operations at their peril. The German (Austrian) could be conducted in all seasons but in Mountain Jaegers had been trained to fight this essay I will focus on military action in in mountainous surroundings, and were winter. To this end I will look at preparations unable to perform their offensive tasks and training in the Finnish Army. I will also in the Finnish-Soviet border areas as the demonstrate how geographical factors northern flank of affected the planning and execution of even in summer, let alone in winter. The winter operations in northern regions. correct appreciation of weather, terrain Terrain analysis is investigated in depth as it and daylight conditions have proved to be may explain why commanders and soldiers of paramount military importance as they acted as they did. set the limits on operations and relate to the ability of the individual soldier and his unit to live, work, move and fight in the Military geographical sub-Arctic and Arctic. Unpreparedness for characteristics of the such peculiarities and special conditions, Finnish-Russian border in particular for the harsh sub-zero winter areas as cold regions weather, ice, deep snow and shortened days of winter, could complicate military At the time most of the Finnish territory action and even lead to military failures. was forested sub-Arctic i.e. the forested Many historical antecedents show that cold weather regions south of the actual those armies that have made winter an Arctic that include most of Alaska, Canada, ally and systematically exploited weather Iceland, northern parts of Scandinavia, and climatic conditions could compensate Siberia, northern Mongolia, and even the for inferior numbers and achieve success. northernmost areas of the British Isles. This is exactly what the Finns managed to Only one third of the Finnish territory accomplish in World War II, especially in the lies above the Arctic Circle and constitutes Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–1940, treeless tundra, with just a few mountains. a famous contemporary armed conflict in Finland has reasonably high summer the age of total war fought in its entirety in temperatures, cold winters and snow cover the Arctic winter. for over half of the year. The summer This article uses the Winter War as days are long, but in winter darkness an example to introduce some novel prevails. The Arctic regions have been approaches to the study of Arctic warfare. battlefields in all seasons, often in winter. I will explore what Arctic warfare was in the The existing natural obstacles (such as Nordic context, and how it can be studied. swamps, marshlands, lakes, rivers etc.) have What kind of factors need to be taken into presented a serious hindrance to movement account when researching various aspects in summer conditions. Likewise the autumn of Arctic warfare and what could be and spring thaws caused by the melting of possible explanations for Finnish military snow, ice and permafrost can lead to huge difficulties.

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The Finnish-Russian border area, There are numerous examples of how extending 1400 kilometres in the 1940s, ill-prepared armies have suffered serious was characterized by long distances, military setbacks. Training, equipment and underdeveloped road networks and vast overall preparation, particularly logistical wilderness areas. Physical geographical support, have been the keys to effective factors shaped military operations in military performance in the Arctic and many ways, and topography determined sub-Arctic. Many of the non-combat all operations. The terrain constrictions casualties were due to the cold. “General channelled movement, shaped the Winter”, as the harsh cold Russian winter battlefields, and influenced events. Climatic weather is known, has contributed to the conditions and seasonal changes could demise of many invading armies, including create advantages and disadvantages or the Swedish Charles XII’s attack in 1707, obstacles to military forces. The weather ’s campaign of 1812 and Hitler’s and terrain could help one side or become Eastern Front in World War II (O’Sullivan their worst nightmare. Success in northern & Miller Jr. 1983, 65–66; Winters et al. 1998, operations depended on the ability to adapt 74–96). to conditions, to overcome and to exploit In most wars larger scale fighting ceased them. as the winter set in and armies went to In cold regions (including mountainous winter quarters. In northern Europe, areas receiving snowfall) the armies have however, winter operations have been two adversaries: the cold and the opposing conducted for centuries. Winters have been force. Cold weather reduces the efficiency utilized for offensive operations provided of men and machines. Appalling weather that the attacking force had secured its over- could be fatal to soldiers and make weapons snow mobility and logistical support. The dysfunctional. This placed requirements best time has usually been from midwinter on the preparation and training of soldiers to early spring prior to the breakup period. and units. The effect of the northern For instance, the Russian Army started its environment could be hard on personnel, war against Sweden-Finland in the winter matériel, organization and operations. The of 1808 because the defence of the reign’s soldiers needed to be issued with the right Eastern provinces was based on the arrival kind of protective clothing and equipment. of reinforcements from Sweden, and, They also needed to be taught to adapt with the freezing of the Baltic Sea, boats their use of weapons and equipment to the could not sail. The Gulf of Finland rarely circumstances. Moreover, the soldiers had froze completely, except suddenly during to be acclimatized, tempered and taught the extremely harsh winter in early 1940, relevant survival skills and field craft, and offering the the opportunity needed to be physically and mentally fit to to advance along the ice of the Bay of be able to survive and fight in the adverse Vyborg to the right flank and rear of the weather conditions of the North (Nelson main Finnish forces. The opening of this 2006, 13–20). “ice front” seriously threatened the Finnish

89 New approaches to the study of Arctic warfare NGP Yearbook 2014 supply lines. The Finns could only contain The proper ability to conduct winter the bridgehead by the end of the Winter operations depended on technical tests and War with difficulty. experiments. The results of the Finnish developmental activities were published in Talvisotakäsikirja – T.S.K.K. (Winter Logistics, shelter, clothing, Warfare Handbook) in 1928. The Finnish weaponry and equipment Army, the Border Guards and the Civil Guard Defence Corps had systematically Logistical preparation and support were improved their capability to orienteer and then the key military considerations in bivouac in a trackless wilderness. They had winter operations. These could require an manufactured heated tents and portable box up to 50% increase in supplies compared stoves, allowing the troops to operate in a to summer operations. Diet and nutrition wintery forest for a sustained period of time. requirements grew. Exposure to extreme In the Winter War the Finns, having secured cold could cause accidental hypothermia, their own well-being, employed scorched and soldiers could even freeze to death. earth tactics in the border areas thus leaving Sometimes winter soldiers also risked the Red Army with no shelter. Their ability dehydration, snow blindness and sunburn. to keep warm, wear dry and clean clothing These dangers posed additional challenges and eat hot meals contributed to their to logistical support units and field medical ability to maintain combat effectiveness all care. year around. Finnish Army personnel were The training program is worth studying provided with proper clothing and special because it reveals the actual preparedness footwear to prevent frostbite. Garments to conduct winter operations. It is were practical: they protected the soldiers surprising that the Red Army that invaded against climatic factors by dressing in Finnish territory in 1939 was not equally insulating and ventilated loose layers and well prepared. Some of its units were used traditional tried and tested items, such in summer uniforms. In contrast, the as Laplander’s beak boots. This way they Finns had accepted the geographical could balance heat production, loss and conditions as a basis for the war plans and moisture, protecting the skin and the body. tactics, so equipment and training had been One of the basic principles of keeping developed and purchased accordingly. All warm in winter clothing was avoidance of Finnish conscripts, regardless of their role, overheating. Equipment had to be kept to a underwent the winter training program minimum. Axes, billhooks and bucksaws of designed to make everyone capable winter ideal sizes and light weight were constructed fighters. The effectiveness of training is, to for military usage (Partanen, Pohjonen & a large extent, an organizational and cultural Tuunainen 2007, 85–93). matter. Therefore, it could be studied The Finnish Army did not favour from a comparative viewpoint. The armies technological determinism. Instead it had can, for example, be viewed as learning chosen not to overly rely on the mechanized organizations. approach, and weapons were relatively

90 Nordia Geographical Publications 43: 1, 87–99 Pasi Tuunainen low-tech, designed to offer reliability in Russians had also begun to deploy ski units. adverse conditions. The battles in the When suppressing the Karelian uprising in northern forests proved the usefulness of the beginning of the 1920s the Red Army the Finnish made 9 mm Suomi submachine used ski troops. It is striking that in the gun, ideal for combat at close range. Light Winter War very few Soviet soldiers could mortars were also handy. The equipment ski. In the 1930s practically all the Finns was winterized. Weapons needed proper could ski, and army personnel were trained maintenance in the cold. The Soviets used to operate on and off skis. petroleum lubricants that often jammed The Finns favoured economical cross- their weapons. The Finns went for a country (Nordic) skiing but the skiing mixture of alcohol and glycerine or none speed was to be kept low in cold weather to at all. To avoid freezing, the weapons had avoid undue perspiration in order to keep to be kept outside the warm shelter. Many the men fit for battle. The skis were fitted technical devices had not been designed to with bindings without heel straps, allowing operate in freezing temperatures. Special for quick dismounting (30 centimetres of measures were taken because radio batteries snow was the limit for effective movement froze easily. Radiators had to be filled with by a foot soldier). The Finnish skiers hauled antifreeze, and vehicle engines needed to ahkios, the boat-hull deep snow toboggans be started and kept running frequently to or sleds. Ahkios were utilized to evacuate ensure their functioning in cold weather. the wounded, to transport munitions and The men wore white camouflage suits and equipment, and as a firing platform for equipment was painted white. machine guns. With pack horses the Finnish Army duplicated the methods of farmers and loggers. The horse-drawn sleighs Movement on snow transported heavy arms and even artillery pieces on sleighs. This provided them with A researcher of Arctic warfare should place manoeuvrability in a trackless terrain. The emphasis on movement. Mobility was the Winter War demonstrated that mechanized main tactical principle of winter operations and armoured units tied to narrow unpaved in the Arctic for the Finns. This is logical gravel roads became a burden to the Red as the wide and empty spaces of the Army. Vehicular traffic was not possible Arctic regions permit almost unrestricted along slippery icy roads in winter without manoeuvre and movement for those troops clearing the roads first (even several times that possess over-snow mobility. a day after blizzards). There is a long tradition of military skiing in the Nordic countries and . In an attempt to indoctrinate them, all Finnish conscripts of the interwar period were told about the peasant ski troops enveloping a much large Russian foe in March 1555 at Joutselkä. By the the

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Operations and tactics in their detonators would not function in the cold weather and deep snow cold. Moreover, the Red Army soldiers could not benefit from their air superiority The multi-faceted phenomenon of military as snow blizzards and overcast skies often effectiveness has been explained by scholars grounded planes. The Finns had correctly in many ways, mostly in non-quantifiable anticipated that operations would take time, terms. Since success in northern operations supply lines would be overstretched and the is heavily dependent on certain skillsets, width of the front would be increased. The the art of war is a useful framework for poor road network favoured the defenders, studying Arctic warfare. The Finns noticed and the advancing Red Army could not that successful operational art and tactics shift its point of gravity due to the lack of were based on the correct understanding connecting roads. and appreciation of the effects of the Even though Finland was waging a northern environment on the combat defensive Winter War, offensive had actions of troops. All operations and achieved a clear primacy in Finnish tactical tactical methods needed to be adapted to thinking. The use of envelopment gave the specific terrain and weather conditions. them a chance to achieve the element of In the north the focus was on the action of surprise, their leading tactical principle. In small units. Yet even decisive battles were the North mobile ski troops could quickly sometimes fought in the Arctic. mount surprise attacks deep into the The military effectiveness of the Finnish unprepared enemy’s most vulnerable points, Army in the Winter War was primarily its long flanks and rear, lay down enfilading linked to the exploitation of harsh and fire, and then disengage without the threat difficult forested terrain and climatic of being pursued. They could also benefit conditions. The Finns sought to place from deception and the darkness typical their own strengths against the weaknesses of Arctic winters. Local knowledge was and comparative disadvantages of the often vital, and the Finns could orienteer Soviets. In addition, they aimed at inflicting accurately even in the pitch dark. The Soviet heavy casualties on the Red Army while troops lacking skis were often road-bound attempting to keep their own losses to a in long columns leaving most of their flanks minimum. These are normally considered wide open. In the Winter War operations the signs of combat power, another possible north of Lake Ladoga the Finns cut off and research approach. The Finns had appraised encircled the Red Army units by the roads. the military geographical factors that would These encircled units were divided into limit the Red Army’s offensive capabilities smaller segments, or mottis, to be destroyed and freedom of manoeuvre in the border piecemeal. This tactic is known as defeat in areas in various seasons. It had been realized detail. In other encircling attacks the Finns that the Soviet military would be unable were able to confuse the Soviet plans and to utilize their overwhelming firepower break their battle array. The majority of in winter. The effect of artillery shells in the Finnish plans were targeted to cut the deep snow was practically nullified, and Soviet lines of supply and communication,

92 Nordia Geographical Publications 43: 1, 87–99 Pasi Tuunainen in order to hurt the Soviet troops suffering counterfactual approach could turn out to from the effects of cold. The Finns counted be merely speculative reasoning. that combat fatigue due to cold associated A student of Arctic warfare can benefit with hunger and sleep deprivation as a from organizational theory. Knowledge result of continuous harassment would transfer has proved a useful concept in slacken Red Army discipline and could lead investigating the activities and influence of to apathy. Controlled by fear, however, very a group of some 20 ex-Finnish officers who few besieged Soviet soldiers surrendered joined the US Army in 1947 as enlisted men. (Tynkkynen 1996; Tuunainen 2006, 107– At first, they were assigned as cross-country 108; Tuunainen 2013, 121–147). ski instructors but at the same time they also The Finnish mottis bear a resemblance developed winter equipment based on the to a German tactical innovation, the Finnish models and lectured about winter storm troop tactics of the Great War. In tactics. These former Finnish officers determining what factors explain the speed disseminated their know-how by serving of this adoption process, my research has in various military schools, planning winter been informed by Everett M. Rogers’s book exercises and acting as umpires in them. Diffusion of Innovations, whose theory has They revised the US Army and US Marine proved a useful interpretive framework to Corps cold weather and Arctic manuals. regard the Finns as adopters of German The Finns tried, in vain, to argue that Arctic military innovation. I was able to identify operations are separate from mountain the various channels through which ideas operations, and that troops should receive were transmitted since 1915 and finally special training for these. Their leader, tested in motti battles in early 1940. As the Colonel Alpo K. Marttinen, remarked to Finns considered manpower as their most The New York Herald Tribune in late 1951 important resource in costly frontal attacks, on the possibilities of training US soldiers they found the storm troop tactics “cost- as “acceptable Arctic fighters” in eight effective” (Tuunainen 2008). weeks. He said: “If the weather dropped Finnish tactics were, indeed, a European from twenty to forty degrees below, the military art. Although strongly influenced only problem a (Finnish) commander had by Swedes and Germans, the Finnish was whether to change the ski wax” (The officers applied general principles to the New York Herald Tribune, December Finnish conditions. Yet was this unique to 1951). Finnish winter war expertise was Finland? A Swedish volunteer brigade was incorporated into US-British-Canadian in charge of a quiet front in Lapland in early cold weather doctrines. The US manuals 1940. It is, however, not certain that the were re-written only after 60 years but they Swedish Army that was practically equally still retain much of the Finnish content well prepared and accustomed to a similar (Tuunainen 2012, 205–280). terrain and weather could have fought with The Finns could not use similar tactics similar effectiveness in the Winter War as everywhere. The areas of operation were the Finnish Army did. It is impossible to different in terms of military geography. say for sure in hindsight, and this kind of The Finns had accurately predicted that

93 New approaches to the study of Arctic warfare NGP Yearbook 2014 the Karelian Isthmus, between the Gulf were responsible for preventing casualties of Finland and Lake Ladoga, would be the to frostbite. This was not always necessary location of the main Soviet thrust, because since Finland was an agrarian nation in it was closest to Leningrad and the terrain the 1930s. Most of the civilian soldiers of was suitable for tanks. The nature of the its reservist army were physically fit for war there would be trench warfare and frontline duty, and life at the fronts was not attrition. In all sectors the Finns enjoyed all that different from forest work, a very the advantages of the interior lines of common source of additional income for operations and the space to manoeuvre. the farmers in the wintertime. The soldiers were familiar with the terrain and weather conditions, and could protect themselves Peculiarities of command against the cold. Winter often increased and control in winter march times but the leaders were ordered to make sure that no troops were left exposed The limitations posed by military to the effects of cold weather, in particular geographical factors – the weather, the the wind-chill factor, for extended periods terrain and the daylight-darkness cycle – of time. This was not always possible, and influenced the decisions of Finnish military the Finns also occasionally suffered non- commanders. It is vital to examine how battle casualties. commanders and staff took the effects of A psychohistorical approach could be environment into consideration in their useful here as forest fighting has a significant planning and decision-making processes. psychological dimension (Clayton 2012, xv). Neither aerial reconnaissance nor maps The Ukrainians participating in the Winter revealed the hidden features and real War even feared the snowy forests of the trafficability of the terrain in winter. Winter North. The environment was not the only conditions also led to serious frictions, or, demoralizing factor for them. The Finnish in Clausewitzian terminology, “the fog of ski troops employing hit-and-run tactics war”. The key was how to cope with it added to these sentiments and the Soviet (Lowry 2012; Tuunainen 2011b, 40). soldiers came to call them The White Death Cold weather puts additional mental (Russ. Belaya Smert; Tuunainen 2011a, strain on individual soldiers. Close 240–241). The Finns had a long history of attention should be paid to factors such living in harmony with nature. They did not as the command culture and mentality. view the forests as a hostile environment In the study of wartime sociological and but rather as a source of protection. This psychological phenomena one needs is in striking contrast to German idea of to incorporate human factors, such as forests as a military nuisance (Tuunainen motivation and morale. Mental stamina 2008, 48). and fortitude should be evaluated as the A typical conceptual framework in quality of individual soldiers is critical to military history has been the “Great Man” fighting in the cold. The buddy system was approach. This focus on generalship does in place in the Finnish Army but the leaders not apply to the Finnish case. The Winter

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War was largely fought at the to reconstruct and interpret the actual company level. Large battle formations events as seen through the eyes of a could not operate in forests because the military commander and the geographical terrain separated them, and they were easily limitations and opportunities he faced when in disarray. This made the coordinated action appraising the situation and making his of larger units difficult. To study small-unit decisions at the time. OCOKA refers to action one can draw upon a theoretical base the elements of a battle plan and involves and methodology from social sciences, and deliberation of trafficability effects. The apply, for example, various small group acronym stands for: O = observation and theories and theories of group solidarity fields of fire, C = cover and concealment, to assist in explaining motivation. The O = obstacles, K = key terrain, and A endurance and sustainability of the Finnish = avenues of approach or withdrawal soldiers in the Winter War may also be (Vicksburg National Military Park: Cultural explained by the strong social cohesion of Landscape Report 2009, 243–245). the homogenous Finnish culture. Field of fire refers to an area that has a The Finnish Army command was also direct line of sight that a weapon may cover subject to external influences. The most or lay effective fire from a given position important command principle was the within its range. It is related to observation. German system of decentralized command The land which cannot be observed or fired (Auftragstaktik). With these mission- upon is dead space or ground. Observation type orders small unit leaders (and even and fields of fire are affected by contour soldiers) were delegated powers to exhibit and vegetation. While the treeless Arctic their initiative and independent action. is open terrain, in subarctic boreal forests The use of common sense and flexibility visibility is extremely limited, particularly were encouraged, as were “bottom-up” in old growth spruce forests. Even though improvisations, making way for the history the long spells of darkness restrict visibility from below approach. The Finnish military and observation capabilities, moonlight leaders made use of German tactical over a snowy terrain produces a contrary concepts and ideas but applied them to the effect. The accuracy of fire is affected local forest conditions (Tuunainen 2010, by foliage. The branches cause bullets 66–67). to ricochet. The use of hand grenades Terrain analysis is the process of analysing became complicated making engagements a geographical area to determine the effect close-quarter. The artillery shells usually and hindrance of natural and manmade detonated in tree trunks when the shell features on military operations. The burst was directed downwards. In the OCOKA system of Western armies is a Finnish-Russian border areas there were good analytical tool that can be developed many tree-covered hills. The higher ground into a descriptive theory. With an awareness attracted fire but enabled good observation, of the dangers of anachronism, OCOKA although it was impossible to see into the terrain analysis can be applied to a specific forests between the hills. historical case as it allows the researcher

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Boreal forests could provide excellent Key terrain is an area the control of concealment and thus protection from which gives one side a significant advantage enemy observation and surveillance. Cover over the other. Normally it could be a is protection against enemy fire, both direct high ground, a river crossing or a bridge, and from shelling. Camouflage (in winter mountain pass or road junction. In white) can hide men and equipment, help Arctic regions road networks (lines of to prevent the detection of hidden units communication or “life lines”) and villages and thus minimize casualties. In forests and urban areas are few, and thus the most attackers could achieve surprise, which important terrain features such as the lack often guaranteed their success. This was of adequate shelter in winter may lead helped by the long periods of darkness to non-combat casualties and reduce the typical for the northern winter. impact of firepower. These added logistical Snow and ice are natural obstacles requirements dictated the key terrain. A that might prevent, restrict, divert, or dense wood or river network could also delay military movement. There are also be designated a key terrain if it anchored manmade terrain features, existing or the flank of a battle line. Ice roads to reinforcing, that determine the degree to facilitate off-road movement could also be which a certain terrain is restricted. Swamps constructed along lakes and rivers when the (or other wet surfaces), woods, and rivers ice was thick enough. that already exist on the battlefield are not An avenue of approach is a relatively real obstacles in winter. Heavy snow cover unobstructed ground route that leads to impedes movement but as the ground an objective or key terrain. These could be and waters freeze in winter the battlefield lines of communication and supply such as becomes larger. Certain terrain might be roads, rail lines, or rivers. A proper avenue unfavourable. Yet hardly any terrain is of approach must allow rapid movement totally impassable. Urban areas are existing all along its length. In the north avenues cultural obstacles that slow down military of approach were mainly man-made roads action. The enemy movement could be or trails. Skis aided movement but the stopped, slowed down, or controlled emphasis was on trail breaking to ensure (diverted) by placing reinforcing obstacles that the troops were not road-bound. such as earthworks, barriers and abattis. Permafrost might complicate digging in. Yet if supported by mines, barbed wire A note on sources and booby traps they require much effort to clear. Flooding is another useful method Literature on the topic is scant. Thus of creating obstacles, also in winter. For a historiographical approach is not example, letting additional water onto worthwhile. The sources for the study the ice of a lake was an effective factor in of Arctic warfare (or military action in slowing down the advance of infantry units, the northern forests) are abundant yet as keeping one’s feet dry and warm was scattered. Primary unpublished sources essential to combat effectiveness. include official documents and personal

96 Nordia Geographical Publications 43: 1, 87–99 Pasi Tuunainen files. Most of the relevant archival sources, on site. The seasons do matter: The best such as training and operational planning time to visit the battlefields would be winter. documents, orders, various after-action This way the researcher could avoid the and other reports and correspondence impact of undergrowth on visibility. On are deposited in the Finnish National the other hand, the landscapes of war, if Archives (Kansallisarkisto). War diaries are still uninhabited, could look quite different all available online. In Finland, the archival after 75 years. It would, therefore, be wise system, some museums and historical to compare the actual wartime archival societies hold oral history transcripts. The documents, photographs and maps with papers of individual actors could prove current images and cartography. In this GIS useful since individuals, not organizations, might also prove useful. developed the art of war and winter techniques. These persons might also have published memoirs. Conclusion The study of military art is close to the history of ideas and intellectual history. Warfare in the north has been, as we have Military instructional literature and the seen, geographic in nature. The Finnish articles and debates published in military experience from World War II clearly professional magazines are among the shows how distinct weather and terrain relevant sources. significantly affected military operations. The most important secondary published Therefore it is important to incorporate sources are winter warfare manuals, some military geographical considerations guidebooks, and regulations. Close reading into the study of Arctic warfare. A of this instructional literature is revealing as geographical perspective can even act as an it provides doctrinal guidance (on tactical overall research framework. Mountain and doctrine and how to take the effects of winter warfare have often been considered the environment into consideration) and is common fields of historical inquiry. This produced to disseminate codified explicit does not, however, apply to the Finnish knowledge. In Finland, however, manuals case. Winter combat practiced in Finland were considered as a basis for application has essentially been sub-Arctic forest rather than as set rules and methods. fighting. The illustrative examples discussed Non-textual sources and remains might above suggest that the terrain and weather prove useful. Visiting the battlefields could conditions of the far north of Europe and give the researcher additional insights into the Finnish-Russian border area had, indeed the conditions and what the troops could in a military sense, a character of their own. or could not see and do in that specific kind Even though it is possible to draw limited of terrain. The OCOKA terrain analysis parallels and make some generalizations – indicating the connection between the based on the Winter War, it is fair to say terrain and features of the battlefield that the study of Arctic warfare is a highly landscape and the military tactics employed context-related field. by army commanders – could be conducted

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Furthermore, the Finnish case indicates Finnish-Russian border in northern that success in Arctic warfare and the Europe, where the Arctic East met the prevention of non-battle casualties could Arctic North, were a part of the evolution be achieved by meticulous planning, of land and forest warfare in Europe. Arctic thorough training effort, and preparations. warfare is an important research area with Many historical cases demonstrate that wider significance, which can be studied if a belligerent correctly realized the by employing many different approaches. implications of the effects of adverse Amazingly, the topic has so far received weather on terrain and of the northern very little research attention. environment on soldiers, equipment, weapons, and operations and allied himself with the winter, he could prevail. The Finns References demonstrated on many occasions that with securing over-snow mobility and logistics Clayton, A. (2012). Warfare in Woods one could compensate for numerical and Forests. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, In. weaknesses and thus fight effectively against Erfurth, W. (1951). Warfare in the Far North. a formidable but ill-prepared adversary. US Department of the Army Pamphlet No. Contrary to the common conception that 20–292, Washington D.C. in winter snow and ice or forests constituted Field, M. (1951). Basic Arctic Manual. (FM) 31‒70. US Department of the Army, a hindrance, the Finns viewed them as an Washington D.C. aid to operations and to rapid and surprise Gregory, B. (1989). Mountain and Arctic movement of troops. Forests also gave Warfare: From Alexander to Afghanistan. some protection to the soldiers and units Patrick Stephens, Bath. exposed to the elements. The Finnish case Lowry, M.J. (2012). The Enemy, the Weather, and the Terrain: The Effects of Weather discussed above seems to confirm that on Historic Battles. Outskirts Press, the circumstances, terrain, weather, and Denver, Co. short daylight hours not only dictated the Nelson, B. (2006). General vinter: Vinterkrig operational capabilities in northern forests genom tiderna. Svenskt militärhistoriskt bibliotek, Hallstavik. but also that better preparation in their O’Sullivan, P. & J.W. Miller Jr. (1983). The utilization explained the eventual outcome Geography of Warfare. Croom Helm, of military operations. Guildford. Arctic warfare requires great mental Partanen J., J. Pohjonen & P. Tuunainen stamina. Therefore motivational (2007). Erkki J. Raappana: Rajan ja sodan kenraali. Otava, Keuruu. interpretations focusing on sociological and Rogers E.M. (1983). Diffusion of Innovations. psychological phenomena are possible. The Third Edition. The Free Press, New York. Finnish military culture could also invite Swinzow, G.K. (1992). On Winter Warfare. culturally-oriented societal explanations U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12–48. for military effectiveness. Nevertheless, the US Department of the Navy, Washington wider context should not be disregarded: D.C. the winter warfare experiences obtained Talvisotakäsikirja (1928). Otava, Helsinki. by the Finns in World War II along the

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