J. Neumann2 and Great Historical Events That Were H. Flohn3 Signiticantly Affected by the Weather: Part 8, Germany's War on the , 1941-45.1. Long -range Weather Forecasts for 1941-42 and Climatological Studies'

Abstract 1. Introduction A brief account is given of Baur's long-range weather forecast pre- A study of the meteorological aspects of the war between pared in the autumn of 1941 forthe 1941-42 winter in Eastern Europe. Germany and the Soviet Union (USSR) for the autumn of Baur's forecast called for a 'normal' or mild winter but the winter turned out to be one of the most severe winters on record. The cold, 1941 and the winter of 1941-42 will be presented,using the icy winds and blizzards gravely hit the German armies and co- mostly unpublished information on long- and medium-range incided with the first major Soviet counteroffensive of the war. A weather forecasts and German climatological studies that Soviet weather forecast for , also called for a mild were prepared either for the attack on the USSR or in the month. course of the war proper.4 The information that the authors A review of the climatological studies prepared for the war indi- cates that the occurrence of mud periods of considerable intensity in have on the German "side" is far more detailed than that we autumn was not considered. The autumn 1941 mud period immobi- have for the Soviet side. And, although, as far as forecasts go, lized most of the German armies for a month and caused the at- primary interest is in long- and medium-range predictions, tempted final German assault on to take place in an early mention will be made of a few short-range forecasts made by and severe winter. Hitler would not tolerate the mention of winter and still less the Soviet meteorologists for some particularly important events mention of the retreat of 's Grande Armee from . or operations. Special attention will be devoted to the severe The support given by Soviet meteorologists and hydrologists to 1941-42 winter and the "mud period" preceding it and will the is sketched. For the 1941-42 winter the more-impor- consider the effects of the 1941-42 autumn and winter on the tant short- to medium-range forecasts included a forecast for 7 No- fighting and on the troops. vember (anniversary of the October Revolution) at Moscow and a forecast for the start of Zhukov's counteroffensive in the in . 2. Baur's forecast for the winter 1941-42 During the 1930s the German meteorologist Franz Baur 1 Part 1, "The Mongol Invasions of Japan," was published in the November 1975 BULLETIN (56,1167-1171); Part 2, "The Year Lead- made a name for himself in the field of experiments on long- ing to the Revolution of 1789 in France," was published in the Feb- range weather forecasts. In addition to studies of the prob- ruary 1977 BULLETIN (58, 163-168); Part 3, "The Cold Winter lem, he prepared forecasts for several days ahead, as well as 1657-58: The Swedish Army Crosses Denmark's Frozen Sea monthly and seasonal forecasts; he coined the notion and Areas," was published in the November 1978 BULLETIN (59, 1432-1437); Part 4, "The Great Famines in Finland and Estonia, term Grosswetterlage, often used by German meteorologists. 1695-97," was published in the July 1979 BULLETIN (60, 775-787); At the time of outbreak of World War II (WW II), Baur and Part 5, "Some Meteorological Events of the and Their his institute were part of the Reichswetterdienst (The State Consequences," was published in the December 1980 BULLETIN (61, Weather Service of the Third Reich). After the war's out- 1570-1583); and Part 6, "Inundations and the Mild Winter 1672-73 Help Protect Amsterdam from French Conquest," was published in break, his institute was subordinated to the chief of the the July 1983 BULLETIN (64, 770-778). Part 7, "Protestant Wind- Weather Service of the German Air Force. In actual fact, Popish Wind: The Revolution of 1688 in England," was published in Baur's institute was not moved from its pre-war location at the June 1985 BULLETIN. Bad Homburg, which was maintained throughout the War, 2 Emeritus, Department of Atmospheric Sciences, the Hebrew in contrast to some other laboratories of the Reichswetter- University, Jerusalem, Israel. (Now visiting with the Department of Meteorology, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland.) 3 Emeritus, Meteorological Institute, University of Bonn, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany. 4 This article is chapter I of a wider study. Subsequent chapters will discuss some of the important weather forecasts during the years 1942-45 of the German-Soviet War. A special chapter will be de- voted to the actual weather of autumn 1941 and winter 1941 -42 and © 1987 American Meteorological Society its effects on the War. 620 Vol. 68, No. 6, June 1987

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC Bulletin American Meteorological Society 621 dienst, which were closed down altogether. Also subordi- cow (at Krasnaya Polyana, see Fest, 1975, p. 890) and ad- nated to the chief of the Weather Service was the Central vance elements of the division 25 km from the Soviet capital Weather Group (C WG), which was the weather analysis and (see Hoepner's letter in Bucheler, 1980, p. 159), a steep and forecasting center of the German Air Force. large drop of temperature took place in western USSR (see Baur was requested by the headquarters (HQ) of the Ger- Table 1 for the air temperatures at Moscow and Smolensk man Air Force to distribute his long-range forecasts to about [morning temperatures only are available for Moscow in 25 military offices. A forecast for winter 1941-42 was issued published form]). At Moscow, the morning, 07 LST, temper- by him, probably at the end of October 1941, based on atures dropped about 28°C from 30 November to 7 De- regional climatology and (supposed) sun-spot-climate cember; 18°C from 3 to 5 December; at Smolensk the drop relationships. The prediction called for a normal or a mild was nearly as large. The lowest value at the capital was winter. Baur's main justification for this rested with the asser- reached on the 7th when it amounted to —29°C; the next tion that never in climatic history did more than two severe day the temperature rose sharply to — 15°C (Zhukov, 1984, winters occur in a row. Since both of the preceding two win- p. 324).5 For Smolensk, which at the time was the HQ of the ters, 1939-40 and 1940-41, were severe in Europe, he did not German Army Group Center (the German Army Group expect that the forthcoming winter would also be severe. most directly involved in the battle for the Soviet capital), the Turning to the actual winter 1941-42, from 3 to 5 Decem- records of observations are held with the Deutscher Wetter- ber, at a time when a Panzer division of the 4th Panzer Group dienst at Offenbach/M. As far as temperatures go, they in- of Colonel-General Hoepner was but 30-km north of Mos- clude observations at three fixed hours of the day as well as maximum and minimum temperatures. TABLE 1. Morning air temperatures (°C) at Moscow and Looking through the charts of the Daily Series, Synoptic Smolensk, 15 November-15 December 1941 Weather Maps, Part I, Northern Hemisphere, Sea Level, pre- pared after the War by the United States Weather Bureau, 1941 Moscow0 Smolensk* for December 1941, it becomes clear that the temperatures November 07 LST 07 LST Timi nc reported for Moscow and Smolensk and listed in Table 1, 15 -6.7 -10.2 -12.2 were influenced by the well-known "heat-island" effects of 16 -5.6 -11.3 -12.4 cities. These effects are most prominent in the cold season 17 -7.8 -8.0 -10.6 and under statically stable conditions. We can therefore be 18 -10.6 -4.8 -6.5 sure that under inversion conditions and, generally, under 19 -8.9 -6.0 -7.4 stable conditions (inversions should be rather frequent over 20 -6.7 -7.0 -7.8 snow-covered land in northern USSR), air temperatures in 21 -3.3 -7.1 -7.1 22 -4.4 -4.3 -5.2 the open fields, where most of the movements and fighting 23 -3.9 -4.9 -6.5 went on, must have been lower than indicated in Table l.6 24 -8.9 -7.8 -8.3 25 -10.6 -7.4 -12.0 26 -8.9 -10.8 -13.0 27 -7.8 -10.5 -13.9 5 Marshal Zhukov, who, then a general of the army, was the com- 28 -5.6 -11.0 -14.5 mander-in-chief of what the Soviets called the "Western Front". In 29 -1.1 -5.0 -8.2 fact, the Western Front was the Soviet Army Group directly in- 30 -1.1 -1.8 -4.0 volved in the Battle for Moscow. 6 Shkliarevich (1974, Fig. 1) has published the results of a compari- December son of air temperatures, measured along the Leningrad Television 1 -7.8 -6.2 -12.1 Tower inside the city, and at Voelkovo, at the rural or nearly rural 2 -11.1 -7.5 -13.0 site of the Main Geophysical Observatory of Leningrad. Unfortu- 3 -7.2 -3.8 -4.6 nately, the height of the lowest level of measurement is not clearly 4 -17.8 -10.4 -15.0 stated (10 m ?), but the difference ATur (urban minus rural) at this 5 -25.0 -22.0 -22.0 level between the two locations is 3°C in stable conditions (and about —1.5°C in neutral situations). A chart by Oke (1979, Fig. 13) shows 6 -26.1 -24.2 -24.6 the relationship between city-population size and the maximum ur- 7 -28.9 -16.8 -20.2 ban-heat-island effect ATu-r in Europe (and America). Restricting 8 -15.0 -1.8 -9.4 attention to the data for Europe, Oke's figures indicate that cities 9 -4.4 +0.2 -1.0 with a population of a few million can have a ATu-r (max.) of about 10 0.0 -8.1 -11.5 8°C. Considering that the latter figure is a maximum and that Lenin- 11 -5.6 -11.4 -13.0 grad and Moscow almost certainly produced less heat in conditions 12 -2.2 +3.6 -6.2 of severe wartime scarcity of heating materials, we can assume that 13 -21.7 -7.6 -9.0 air temperatures in the open fields were perhaps 3°C-5°C lower than 14 -18.9 -11.4 -13.4 those shown in Table 1. Leningrad was under siege for about 800 15 -27.2 -12.2 -12.8 days from late summer 1941 onward. In late autumn and winter 1941-42 the city suffered from starvation conditions. Not only were Notes: a) The opening and closing dates of the table are dictated food and medicines short, but there was a grave dearth of heating by what is available in published form for Moscow (Zhukov, 1984, materials (see Pavlov, 1965). In the latter part of November Lake p. 234). The published values are for 07 LST only, b) The data for Ladoga froze over and then it was possible to send in supplies along Smolensk are for "Smolensk North" and they were recorded by the what was called "winter road" or "ice road" or more affectionately, official German meteorological station. Copies of the original ob- "road of life." The total number of victims of the siege among the servation logs are kept by the Deutscher Wetterdienst, Offen- civilian population is given by some authors as up to one million. bach/M. c) Temperatures in open areas near the two cities are likely Pavlov (1965, p. 125) says that during the period of blockade, to have been 3-5°C lower, especially in Moscow's case. 632 000 people died of starvation alone.

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC 622 Vol. 68, No. 6, June 1987 Since the early 1950s, a very large body of literature has tion. Late in 1984, Sch werdtfeger prepared a paper of remi- appeared in West Germany on the war with the USSR. Some niscences of his service with the CWG in 1943-45. When he of these books are war diaries of army commands, as for in- passed away unexpectedly in January 1985, his family and stance, the war diaries of the Army High Command (Kriegs- the University of Wisconsin Department of Meteorology tagebuch des Oberkommandos der , 1965), the asked H. Lettau to translate into English and edit the paper, War Diary of Colonel-General Haider, chief-of-staff of the which has been published in Weather (Schwerdtfeger, 1986). army until 1943 (Haider, 1964); others are diaries of army In his reminiscences the author writes that during the units; still others are histories of WW II, such as that of summer of 1942 the field HQ Hitler requested a forecast of Lieutenant-General von Tippelskirch (1963); recollections of temperatures in Eastern and Central Europe during the winter former high officers, as, for example, those of Guderian of 1942-43 and that, in turn, Diesing asked Baur to prepare (1951), a famous , and books that draw infor- the forecast. According to Schwerdtfeger, Baur's long-range mation from published and unpublished "histories" of army forecast was that the coming winter would not be cold, since units, private diaries, and letters, such as books by Carell the preceding three winters, and particularly two of the three (1963) and others. Most of these quote temperatures mea- were rather cold; a sequence of four cold winters in a row has sured by individuals (as distinct from official meteorological never been seen in the 150-year-long series on hand. Schwerdt- stations). Thus the Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der feger adds that the winter of 1942-43 turned out much below Wehrmacht (1965), which almost daily gives a brief statement normal and that the failure of the prediction and the suffer- on the weather in the theaters of war in the East, reports for ing caused to the troops impaired the reputation of meteorol- the area held by what was called Heeres-Gruppe Mitte (Ger- ogists in the eyes of many a military leader.8 Table 2 shows a man Army Group Center [GAGC]), that is, the German comparison of the winter temperatures of 1942-43 derived Army Group most directly involved in the Battle for Mos- by the authors. cow, a temperature down to —35°C on 5 December 1941; Haider (1964) cites a temperature report of —36°C on the same day for the Tula area (160-km south of Moscow), and a 3. German climatological reports on the Soviet temperature of —38°C on the 6th, about the peak day of the Union, 1940 and 1941 cold outbreak, in the Tikhvin region (480-km NNW of Mos- cow, rather near Leningrad), see Haider (1964, pp. 327-328).7 The cold outbreak of early December, coming after a cool- At the time of Hitler's Germany attack on the USSR (22 June to-cold October and November (mean temperatures of Mos- 1941) very few current reports were available on the climate cow: In October 2.1°C, in November —5.3°C; as against the of the European territory of the USSR. They were issued by 1931-60 CLINO values of, respectively, 4.5°C and -1.9°C) the Reichsamtfur Wetterdienst (Air Force). One such study gravely hit the German armies that were not appropriately concerned itself with the soaking of the soil during the melt- clothed (Hitler expected to break the resistance of the USSR ing period. Although this was a careful study, it limited itself before the coming of winter) and which were not equipped to the spring season whereas there also is such a 'mud period' with armaments, tanks, and motorized vehicles that could in autumn.9 As a matter of fact, the first such mud period de- properly function even in a "normal" winter in the northern veloped in autumn 1941. It was very intense and lamed mili- parts of the USSR, let alone in a winter as rigorous as that of tary operations for about a month. Another investigation 1941-42. examined the beginning of snow cover, partly based on Rus- On or about 8 December, K. Diesing, chief of the CWG sian publications that appeared prior to 1941. Both reports and scientific adviser to the chief of the Weather Service of contain maps of the state of the soil and snow cover for 10- the Air Force (General Spang), asked Flohn to listen in on a day periods; both studies suffer from the shortness of record. second earphone to a telephone call to Baur. In the call, Die- Other official reports prepared in 1941 deal with cloudi- sing cited to Baur the reports of very low temperatures in the ness (especially low clouds), visibility and winds, average East and asked him if he maintains his seasonal forecast in temperatures and precipitation, based on available sources. face of the reports. Baur's response was "the observations These reports were hastily collected and used recent synoptic must be wrong." This reply of Baur's greatly impaired the es- data; the accompanying texts were short and apparently teem held for him by his colleagues. derived from textbooks. The sections on Russian winter Diesing passed away in June 1943, and in September emphasized the extreme stress due to strong winds even at Werner Schwerdtfeger was asked to take over Diesing's posi- moderately low temperatures and extreme stress due to bliz-

7 In citing the temperature near Tikhvin, Haider notes: "Very 8H. Flohn and O. Schuster remember (verbal communication great frost (minus 38), many frostbites." Carell (1963, pp. 327-328) from Schuster to Flohn) that in 1942 no long-range prediction was quotes from printed "histories" of some German Army units that asked from Baur and that Schwerdtfeger, who was not with the were fighting in the battles for Moscow and Leningrad, temperatures CWG before September 1943, "projected" the forecast for winter of between —45°C and —50°C. Comments of these very low and 1941-42 to the following winter. Schuster was a member of the scien- questionable temperature reports will be set forth in chapter II of tific staff of the CWG from its inception, Flohn from after late June this study, which will deal with the weather of autumn 1941 and win- 1941. The winter of 1942-43 was not very cold—as far as winters go ter 1941-42. Particularly questionable is a report of —40°C in the in the USSR. It was certainly much milder than the winter 1941-42 area on 27 November. Stolfi (1980, p. 227) lists some of 9 In highly rainy summers there can be a 'mud period' in sum- the low temperatures reported in the literature. See a graph of mer too. The occurrence of such summer mud periods is much less temperatures for December 1941 in the Battle for Moscow area, pre- frequent and when they occur, they are, generally, of a somewhat pared from histories of units, (Carell, 1985). shorter duration. Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC Bulletin American Meteorological Society 623

TABLE 2. Winter 1942-43 compared with some other winters in the Western Soviet Union. ro Station Winter N D J F M (D-F) Leningrad 1939-40 +0.7 -6.0 -14.6 -14.5 -8.4 -11.7 1940-41 +1.1 -5.9 -14.0 -8.6 -5.9 -9.5 1941-42 -4.2 -12.6 -18.7 -12.4 -11.5 -14.6 1942-43 -2.4 -4.1 -11.8 -3.1 -0.3 -6.3 1931-60 -0.2 -4.4 -7.6 -7.9 -4.3 -6.6 Moscow 1939-40 -0.6 -7.4 -19.4 -11.8 -5.2 -12.9 1940-41 +1.5 -7.6 -14.2 -10.6 -6.3 -10.8 1941-42 -5.3 -12.8 -20.2 -11.8 -9.7 -14.9 1942-43 -4.0 -7.7 -15.3 -6.3 -2.4 -9.8 1931-60 -1.9 -6.8 -9.9 -9.5 -4.2 -8.7 Oktjabrsky 1941-42 -8.1 -11.7 -19.3 -16.3 -11.4 -15.8 Gorodok 1942-43 -5.8 -10.7 -17.8 -12.4 -7.7 -13.6 1916-20 1941-60 -4.2 -9.1 -12.6 -12.0 -6.7 -11.2 Note: Since no published data are available for the same years for Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), we are substituting the available data of Oktjabrsky Gorodok (formerly Nikolavskoe), 51°38'N, 45°27'E. N = November, D = December, etc. (D-F) = December-February. zards. The mud period of the autumn, setting in before the connection of Germany's attack on the USSR. Whether cor- frost comes, is not mentioned at all. The efficacy of that period rect or not, it is probably true that Hitler and his high com- in autumn 1941 came quite unexpectedly. mand paid little attention to meteorological (and other) A report of J. Kolzer, chief meteorologist of the army at reports. Army HQ () was issued in Oc- Few people are acquainted with the fact that even before tober 1941, with an appendix added in February 1942. It dis- the onset of the cold winter of 1941-42 in the areas of the Bat- cussed "Breaking-up of river ice and spring floods," based tle for Moscow (and Leningrad), a mud period immobilized on pre-1914 Russian sources, covering 20-30-year periods, the greater part of the Panzer, artillery, and mechanized excluding the extremely cold winters around and before units, in general, of the German Army for about four weeks; 1870. Both reports appear to be hastily written, mainly from from about 10 October to 10 November 1941. The Red Army the point of view of classical climatology, with hardly any at- was less hampered by the mud for two reasons: The Soviet tempt to look at the subject from the point of view of synop- tanks had, in the main, wider tracks and larger bogie wheels tic climatology. than the German Panzers and their mechanized vehicles had An atlas of military geography of the USSR (Wehrgeogra- a higher ground clearance; second, during the period of con- phischer Atlas der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken) cern here, the Soviet forces were fighting a mostly defensive was distributed in 1941 by von Niedermayer (or to quote war where movement was not an overpowering factor. his full title and name: Colonel Professor Dr. Oskar Ritter At the time of WW II, there were very few paved roads in von Niedermayer) of the Military-Political Institute of the the USSR. Rains and low evaporation rates of the fall season University of Berlin. It contains a large number of maps, in- would turn unhardened roads and fields into quagmires in cluding charts of isotherms, isobars and wind directions, pre- which many of the tanks, pieces of heavy artillery, and other cipitation, river icing, cloudiness, snow cover, probabilities mechanized transports would dig their own graves by trying of disturbed weather, weather maps for three specific dates to move on. The Germans called this Schlamm Periode, that and many other charts of nonmeteorological elements. Ac- is, mud period. The Russians call the periods, when roads cording to the author, the atlas is based on Soviet atlases of and fields became impassable, by the name rasputiza. This the 1930s, including a Red Army Commanders' Atlas of 1938, rasputiza is a nearly always returning "fixture" of spring and as well as on statistical data of earlier years. autumn in many parts of the USSR. It is mainly the length and intensity of it that varies from year to year and, as was pointed out in footnote 9, it will also develop in excessively wet summers. Rasputizas played a more-or-less important 4. Mud periods role in earlier Russian history, such as in the campaign of Charles XII, a military king of Sweden at the beginning of the In view of the lack of preparedness of the German High 18th century, the Pugachov rebellion later in the same cen- Command for mud periods (and the lack of adequate recog- tury and in 1812, in Napoleon's retreat from Russia; they also nition of their incidence and frequent severity in autumn by played a minor role in the Crimean War in 1854. The effect of German scientists), special attention is given to a report the autumn 1941 mud period on the German Army fighting issued under the aegis of the Armed Forces Operations De- to reach Moscow will be discussed in chapter III of this study partment. Part of the report relates to the problem of ground in some detail. trafficability. The report is mentioned not because of its Because of the severe effects of the 1941 autumn rasputiza scientific value and usefulness, but rather to illustrate the in- on the German Army, mention is made here of a report correctness of some of the studies made in preparation or issued by an operations department of the German Army's

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC 624 Vol. 68, No. 6, June 1987 high command on 10 June 1941 and a statement made by Panzer general). Hitler persuaded himself that the conquest Hitler on 4 August in which he alleges to quote "experts on of the south will deprive the USSR from much of its resources the seasons and weather of Russia." Also quoted will be a as well as enrich those of the Reich. Meteorologically, he statement made by Stalin on 31 July concerning the rasputiza tried to justify the diversion from Moscow to the south by expected in the fall of 1941. quoting unnamed "experts on seasons and weather of Rus- The report referred to above was prepared by Plett (1941) sia," according to whom the autumn-rain season of Southern of the War Maps and Survey Department of the German Russia begins in September, whereas in the Moscow region it Army and was issued by Operations Department I of the sets in about mid-October. A summary of Hitler's statement General Staff of the Army. It is a brief review (or overview is reproduced as Document 88 in the Kriegstagebuch der [Uberblick]) of the climatic conditions of European Russia Wehrmacht (1965, pp. 1041-1042). during the months August through October.10 While the re- With reference to Hitler's meteorological statement, it is view seems to be correct in light of the meteorological data not correct to speak of an autumn rain season either in the available at the time, the author's remarks concerning the central or in the northern regions of the western USSR. The trafficability of roads in the USSR are not. On page 118 of the maximum of precipitation is in July and August. It is not document (page 2 of the report), Plett says that in summer and precipitation but the excess of precipitation over evaporation autumn the roads become impassable only after abundant that increases from summer to fall, as can be seen in Table 3. rainfalls. Then he goes on to make the statement that "in ac- Added to Table 3 are evaporation estimates by Soviet meteo- cordance with the rainfall amounts, road trafficability is ex- rologists, as quoted in Lydolph's (1977) tables at the end of pected to be worse in August than is September-October." his volume. The estimates are those of actual evaporation. On page 121 (page 5 of the report), he adds that in western Curiously enough, four days before Hitler's above cited Russia as far as Moscow, "the month of October offers good meteorological pronouncements, an essentially similar state- possibilities for military operations." As has been pointed ment was made by Stalin—but with an important difference. out earlier in this section, October and the beginning of On 31 July, Harry L. Hopkins, President Roosevelt's special November 1941 produced deep layers of mud in most battle- envoy, had a long conversation with Stalin in the Kremlin, at field areas of the USSR. The author does not seem to have a time when the action of the German Army was been acquainted with the simple facts of road and ground still powerful. In the conversation, Stalin expressed his con- conditions that recur with some degree of regularity every fident opinion that "it would be difficult for the Germans to spring and autumn in many parts of the USSR. The author operate offensively after the first of September, when the also did not take into consideration the factor of evapora- heavy rains begin, and after October first the ground would tion, which is relatively large in summer and which drops off be so bad that they would have to go on the defensive" appreciably as from September, making for an increasing ex- (Sherwood, 1948, p. 339). Stalin's expectation was fulfilled. cess of precipitation over evaporation in autumn (see Table We have pointed out earlier that a mud period, from about 3). Further, he does not appear to have been aware of the re- the tenth of October to the tenth of November, immobilized port of the soaking of soil during the spring-melting period most of the German mechanized forces. Despite Hitler's cited in the opening paragraph of section 3. statement of August that the "autumn rain season of the Despite the fact that Plett's report was issued by an opera- Moscow region begins about mid-October," in September he tions department of the Army High Command, it appears authorized a renewed thrust at Moscow to be launched 2 Oc- that it received no attention in higher echelons, for we find TABLE 3. Precipitation in 1941 (P4I), mean precipitation 1931-60 that at the beginning of August 1941 Hitler made a different (P) and estimates of mean actual evaporation (E) in the Western statement. Toward July's end Hitler began to waver about Soviet Union. All quantities are in mm. the most important objectives of the next operations. Against the advice of some of his generals out in the East Leningrad Moscow Kiev (e.g., Field-Marshal von Bock, commander-in-chief of the GAGC, Guderian and some other important generals), as P4i P E P41 P E P41 P E well as against the advice of some of the generals at his HQ, J 28 36 <10 26 31 5 25 43 <10 he wanted to divert the efforts from the capture of Moscow F 35 32 <10 26 28 5 70 39 <10 and concentrate instead on the reduction of Leningrad on the M 23 25 <10 22 33 10 49 35 >10 one hand, and on a major thrust to the south, on the other. A 9 34 30 59 35 30 62 46 50 The thrust to the south was to aim at the Donets Basin with M 23 41 70 72 52 70 98 56 <70 its mineral and industrial wealth, as well as at the oil fields of J 51 54 >70 72 67 70 62 66 >70 Maikop in the Caucasus. (As from 1941 the Reich increas- J 21 69 >70 33 74 70 118 70 >70 A 87 77 50 82 74 40 60 72 >50 ingly suffered from shortages of raw materials, including oil.) * On 4 August Hitler flew to the HQ of the GAGC, accompan- S 43 58 30 75 58 20 47 >30 O 30 52 >10 52 51 10 * 47 20 ied by Field-Marshal Keitel, General Jodl, and others. On N 14 45 <10 13 36 5 * 53 <10 the part of the GAGC the conference was attended by von D 37 36 <10 65 36 5 * 41 <10 Bock, Guderian, and Hoth (Hoth was another important Year 401 559 <400 597 575 340 615 -400 Sources: Precipitation in 1941: World Weather Records. Mean pre- 10 The 12-page report forms pages 115-126 of a document held cipitation 1931-60 and estimates of actual evaporation: Tables at under classmark RH2/v. 1326 at the (German) Federal Military Ar- end of volume by Lydolph (1977). The estimates of actual evapora- chive (Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv) at Freiburg i. Br. tion are due to Soviet meteorologists.

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC Bulletin American Meteorological Society 625 tober. Typhoon' was the code name given to this operation. Large-scale operations are impossible during the muddy About a week after Typhoon's start, the operation got season. In the autumn of 1941, an entire German army was bogged down in the mud of an intense rasputiza for a month. completely stopped by mud. The muddy season of that The paralyzing effect of the mud period inevitably landed the year began in mid-October and was more severe than any continuation of the assault on Moscow into the winter. other muddy season experienced in World War I or World Returning to the matter of approval of Operation Ty- War II. During the first stages cart and dirt roads were im- phoon to begin on 2 October, it is worth pointing out the fol- passable, and then the road from Roslavl' to Orel became lowing: Hitler appears to have decided on the attack on the mud-choked. Supply trucks broke through gravel-top USSR in July 1940 (Greiner, 1951, pp. 116-117). Soon after roads and churned up traffic lanes until even courier serv- taking the decision, he told his closest associates that he ice had to be carried out with tracked vehicles. Finally only wanted the attack to start in autumn (1940). It was Field- horse-drawn vehicles could move; all other transport and Marshal Keitel, who was not yet completely subservient to the bulk of the tanks and artillery were stopped dead. The Hitler at the time, and who succeeded then to convince him muddy season lasted a month. that the period of a few weeks remaining to the autumn is not sufficient for preparing such a vast campaign, and, further, that the Schlamm Periode of the autumn season and the up- coming winter would hamper operations in the USSR. There 5. A climatological study of the Central Weather is no evidence that in summer 1941 when the operations Group (German) against Moscow were approved to start early in October, After 25 June 1941 at the CWG, Flohn was requested to in- Keitel would have pointed to the risk of a mud period and vestigate the winter climate in the western USSR in a com- those of winters in the USSR. But in 1941, Keitel was totally parative manner. This study was based on the long series of obsequious to Hitler. temperature data for St. Petersburg-Leningrad since 1743, In referring to the autumn 1941 muddy season, Marshal published by Wahlen (1881). In Wahlen's volume the mean Zhukov (1984, pp. 287-288) says the following: "Much has daily temperatures of each month of the years 1743-1878 are been said in postwar years about the complaints of Hitler's printed on pages 15-17; the absolute minima of the individ- generals and bourgeois historians concerning the impassabil- ual months on pages 43-46; and the absolute extremes of ity of the Russian roads, the mud, Russia's frosts . . ." Then each of the calendar days on pages 24-29. It was found that he goes on to describe how thousands upon thousands of the sum of "degrees of frost" (Kaltesumme in German, or Moscow women, who were completely unaccustomed to sum of coldness) was a convenient tool for characterizing the heavy digging, dug antitank ditches and trenches. However, severity of any given winter. he makes no mention on the effects of the quagmire on the A diagram of the variation of coldness sums of severe and Red Army. It is known from German Army observations of mild winters was prepared, including the "famous" winter that the Soviet forces also suffered from the muddy condi- of 1812-13. The severity of the latter winter was surpassed by tions, except that they suffered less, for, as was pointed out several other winters of the late 18th and 19th centuries, i.e. earlier, in October-November 1941 the Soviets were fighting during one of the peaks of the "Little Ice Age," e.g. in a mainly defensive campaign and were less in need of a high 1808-09. Figure 1 has been drawn after a yellowish copy of degree of mobility; moreover, Soviet tanks and transports one of the later versions of the diagram (during the relatively were better adapted to muddy terrain. Zhukov also says (p. mild winter of 1942-43). A similar diagram—with cumula- 288) that "I may add for those who are inclined to use mud to tive graphs for other winters and the updated track of actual camouflage the real reasons for their defeat at Moscow that data measured at a mobile weather station 20-km southwest in October 1941 the period of impassable roads was compar- of Leningrad—had been demonstrated during the winter of atively short. At the beginning of November the temperature 1941-42 to high-ranking officers and also to Hitler, see fell; it snowed, and the terrain and roads became passable below. Flohn added the data for Potsdam, thus bringing out everywhere." clearly the great differences in winter climate. Lacking better Not all will agree with Zhukov's statement that makes resources, such simple investigations formed the basis of light of the autumn 1941 mud period. For instance, a US CWG reports and forecasts. Army publication Effects of Climate on Combat in European Early in December 1941 the diagram was presented to Russia (1952, p. 31), authored by a committee of former Hitler. As was stated earlier, the diagram included the data German generals and general staff officers,10 has the follow- for 1812-13. A witness whose name is not remembered, re- ing to say: ported that Hitler, seeing the diagram, furiously exclaimed: "These damned meteorologists, also they are talking about Napoleon." Hitler would not tolerate the mention of winter 1812-13. Nevertheless, members of his staff frequently dis- 11 The principal author is Colonel-General E. Raus who in the War of Germany against the USSR commanded successively a cussed it among themselves in the days of the December 1941 panzer division, a panzer army, and an army group of the German crisis. Major-General Warlimont (1962, p. 237), deputy chief Army. The work is based on personal experience and memory and of the Armed Forces Command Staff, who was with Hitler's lacks the documentation required in a scientific paper. For instance, HQ, writes that in the discussion among the staff, the book the statement that "the muddy season of autumn 1941 in the USSR was more severe than any other muddy season experienced in World recording the conversations between Napoleon and General War I and World War II" while it may be entirely correct, it is left Caulaincourt (Napoleon's Ambassador to Tsar Alexander I undocumented. until 1811), conducted during the 13-day long journey back

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC 626 Vol. 68, No. 6, June 1987 The statement pointed out, additionally, that there is no comparison between Russian and German winters; even a "normal" Russian winter would be considered a very cold winter in Germany. (The temperature of winter, December through February, is around 0°C in Berlin, but —7°C to -10°C in Moscow.) The text of the statement was approved by Diesing and it was presented to Goring, commander-in-chief of the German Air Force, in the presence of Colonel-General Jeschonnek, chief-of-staff of the Force, by O. Schuster, liaison officer of the CWG to the chief-of-staff. In Schuster's memory (verbal communication to Flohn), Goring's reaction was to bang his fist on the table and shout furiously: "In Russia it will never be colder than — 15°C, the war goes on!"12 After the meeting Jeschonnek ordered Hitler's air force adjutant to report the statement to Hitler. It appears, how- ever, that this was never done. As was pointed out in the pre- vious section, the Russian winter was not to be mentioned in Hitler's presence. A kind of an exception is described in the next section.

7. Early December 1941 at the German High Command—Severe cold and a powerful Soviet counteroffensive FIG. 1. Growth of the sum of degrees of frost (°C) at Leningrad during 1941-42 and 1812-13; sums of temperatures below 0°C dur- The first great and successful Soviet counteroffensive of the ing selected winters at Leningrad (left) and at Potsdam (right). The war in the Battle for Moscow, prepared and directed by average for Leningrad is 953°, for Potsdam 200°C, but the periods Zhukov, opened on 5-6 December 1941. The counteroffen- are different. In the graph N = November, D = December, etc. sive, its ferocity and strength took the GAGC and the Ger- man High Command by surprise. The shock was all the greater that at the beginning of December some German to Paris (Napoleon left the sorry remains of his Grand Armee Panzer units stood but 25-30 km from Moscow. The Soviets on 5 December 1812) was frequently mentioned. Fest (1975, were effectively able to conceal the massing of their troops, note No. 75, p. 1136) quotes Haider (through a book by Dal- tanks, equipment, and supplies for the offensive. Undoubt- lin) that Caulaincourt's Memoires were withdrawn from cir- edly, the success of concealment was largely due to weather culation in Germany during the winter of 1941-42. conditions that made it hard to carry out any aerial and other reconnaissance activities. Moreover, some three days before the start of the offensive the cold outbreak, to which refer- 6. Meridional circulations and the reactions of ence was made in an earlier section of this paper, struck the some high-ranking officers German troops. They did not have appropriate winter cloth- ing; many items of German weapons, tanks, and mechanized Late in September 1941 and shortly thereafter, meteorolo- vehicles stopped functioning in the great cold. Even many of gists at the CWG noted signs of a trend to blocking situations the German train engines malfunctioned below — 15°C (see with pronounced meridional type of circulation, involving Appendix A). the flow of cold polar air to Northern Europe. Such flows The stunning success of the Red Army's offensive prompted were prevailing in the cold winter of 1939-40, too, and were, Hitler and his staff to ascribe it to "a surprisingly early out- in fact, responsible for the harshness of that winter. The de- break of a severe winter in the East" (Hitler's Instruction No. velopment of these circulations cast doubt, even before the 39, dated 8 December 1941; reproduced in Hubatsch, 1962, cold outbreak of early December, on the possible correctness p. 171). On 7 December, about a day after the launching of of Baur's prediction; the comparative coldness of October Zhukov's counteroffensive, O. Schuster, Diesing's deputy and November was connected with these meridional circula- and liaison officer with the German High Command, was tions. These observations, coupled with Flohn's investiga- tions of the long series of observations of Imperial Russia led members of the CWG to formulate a cautionary statement 12 In a letter answering some questions raised by General Hoss- late in October. The statement referred to the meridional cir- bach (1951 pp. 211-212), J. Kolzer, chief meteorologist of the Army seems to refer to the above incident with Goring and says that presen- culations and suggested that, if this pattern persists, another tation of the statement took place in September. Tlie time point cold winter should be expected in the Russian theater of war. given by Kolzer is not correct. It was the meridional circulations that The first severe cold wave was anticipated to come in the first were beginning to show as from late September, after they occurred decade of November, an expectation that proved correct. frequently in summer 1941.

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC Bulletin American Meteorological Society 627 ordered to a conference with Hitler at his headquarters in 8. A Soviet long-range weather forecast East Prussia (Wolfsschanze, near Rastenburg); also in at- for January 1942 tendance were Field-Marshal Keitel, chief-of-staff of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant-General Jodl, chief of the Armed A review of some of the medium- and long-range weather Forces Command Staff (chief of Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab), forecasts made by Soviet meteorological (and hydrological) and other high-ranking officers. Subject of the meeting was services in the war with Germany, as reported in Soviet litera- the weather situation in the East. According to Schuster (per- ture, will be presented. A Soviet weather forecast for January sonal communication to Flohn), during the coffee meeting 1942, a copy of which was accidentally found by German following the conference, Hitler repeatedly said: "If I had forces, will be discussed first. known this before." The forecast predicted a "normal" January for the area of Any repentance that Hitler may have had (or affected), it the Soviet Western Front, that is, for the Moscow Front, was short-li zed. The next day he was elated (Domarus, 1965, with a temperature departure of from 0°C to 1°C. We do not p. 1792) at the news of the , which re- know what was the precise value of the normal adopted by sulted in the outbreak of open hostilities involving the United the Soviet forecasters, but, if we take it that it was close to States. The same day he issued the above quoted Instruction what was to become the 1931-60 CLINO for Moscow, viz. No. 39; on the 11th he increased Germany's fatal entangle- — 10°C, and, if we compare this with the actual value of the ment by declaring war on the United States. On the 16th the meanof—20°C for January 1942 (see World Weather Records German High Command issued an order to the GAGC, and the forthcoming chapter III of this study), then the fore- which directs commanders and officers to see to it in person cast overestimated the actual mean by 10°C. That is, the So- that the troops put up "fanatical resistance" and hold their viet forecasters erred in the same direction as Baur.14 present positions, without regard to the enemy's possible Aside from the cold outbreaks in November and Decem- breakthrough to their flank or rear (Kriegstagebuch des ber (three major outbreaks in December) in the Western Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, 1965, Document No. 110, USSR, January 1942 turned out particularly cold, as indi- p. 1084). Document No. 111, dated 21 December repeats the cated by the aforementioned mean value for Moscow. Janu- "stick-to-your-position" order; item 5 orders that prisoners ary was cold on the whole, but an extreme cold wave invaded and inhabitants (of the USSR) should be stripped of their during the last few days of the month. On 24 January an ex- clothing without any consideration (rucksichtslos). Return- ceptionally cold pool of air {Kaltlufttropfen) was advected ing to the events of 8 December, German radio broadcasts of from the northeast to the general area of Kaliningrad (then the day spoke of a natural catastrophy (viz. the "a surpris- Konigsberg) and Riga. The diameter of the upper-tropo- ingly early outbreak of a severe winter") striking the German spheric cold pool amounted to, roughly, 500 km, and, al- forces.13 No word was said about the forceful Soviet though the pool center was about 700 km to the west of the counteroffensive. area of the Battle for Moscow, the latter was affected as well. This cold pool was so exceptional that it became a kind of a textbook example. Scherhag (1948, p. 233) refers to it as "one of the most memorable phenomena of this coldest winter of 13 The reference adopted by Hitler's HQ for the cold wave of early the last 200 years in northern and eastern Europe."15 Indeed, December 1941 in the Western USSR was used to cover up its own the mean temperature of the 500/1000 hPa air layer of this failure in preparing for the contingency of winter warfare and to conceal the disastrous effects of the unexpectedly powerful Soviet area of Europe was 1°C-2°C colder than the mean for the counteroffensive; from 30 November to 7 December, morning winter of Yakutsk, the cold pole of Siberia (Flohn, 1944). temperatures at Moscow dropped 28°C: from — 1°C to —29°C (Zhukov, 1984, p. 324). Temperature drops of nearly as large magnitude occurred in the past in the western USSR (Leningrad) around November's end (that is, somewhat earlier than in 1941) or at the beginning of December. Although the frequency of such cases is low, it is not justified to call their incidence as "unexpected." Three cases are mentioned here 14 The present authors wish to stress that the references to failures using Leningrad observations as daily temperature data are not of the above mentioned long-range forecasts, both of Baur and that available in published form for Moscow. of the Soviet meteorologists involved, is not to be construed as an act The three cases are as follows: 1812-13, 1855-56, and 1864-65. of criticism. The truth is that not even in 1986, i.e. 45 years after the According to Wahlen (1881, pp. Ill, 113, and 116), on 1 December two long-range forecasts, are long-range forecasts very successful, 1812, the mean temperature of the day was —0.4°C, on the 4th especially not in cases of extreme anomalies as in 1941-42. —21.2°C. (The mean daily rates of temperature decrease were: 15 We shall point out in chapter III that in Northern Europe the 3.5°C • day"1 in 1941, 5.3°C • day-1 in 1812.) In 1855, on 21 No- winter of 1808-09 was even colder than winter of 1941-42. The sta- vember +2.0°C, on 30 November -22.1°C. In 1864, on 20 November tions whose data indicate this are Leningrad, Stockholm, and —0.5°C, on the 26th -23.3°C. Thus in these three cases the drops Uppsala and the comparison is based on the not totally unquestion- amounted to 21°C to 24°C. Moreover, in both 1855 and 1864, the able assumption that the methods of measurement of the early 19th winters set in especially early. century compare well with those of the current century. Returning to If the results of measurements of the early 19th century are admiss- the data for January 1942, we do not have the daily values either for ible for comparison with those of recent decades, then November Moscow or Leningrad. German Army measurements indicate and, particularly, December 1812 were colder than the parallel (Deutscher Wetterdienst, Offenbach/M) that at Riga, the minimum months of 1941 in Leningrad. At the Imperial capital in 1812, No- temperatures of the 24th and 25th were about —32°C, as against the vember had a mean temperature of —5.2°C and December — 14.0°C mean monthly minimum of — 18°C. In Kaliningrad the minimum (Wahlen, 1881, p. 16) while the World Weather Records show that in temperature reached —34°C, at a nearby station even — 39°C. Copies 1941 the parallel quantities were — 4.2°Cand -12.6°C. However, the of the "official" meteorological logs of Riga are held with the modern data may be influenced by the growth of Leningrad. Deutscher Wetterdienst at Offenbach/M.

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC 628 Vol. 68, No. 6, June 1987 9. Soviet reports on long- and medium-range authorities of the party, the government, and the army had forecasts in support of major faith that Moscow would not fall.17 The forecast was deliv- military operations ered personally to Stalin. It called for clear skies on the 6th and overcast skies with low clouds and snowfall on the 7th. Part of the May 1985 issue of the Soviet meteorological jour- According to the authors, the predictions turned out correct. nal Meteorologiya i Gidrologiya is devoted to the 40th anni- On page 17 they present a time cross section of the weather versary of termination of WW II in Europe.16 In an article for the five days, 4-8 November. The observations for 08 h titled "The USSR Center of Hydrometeorological Forecast- on the 7th show snow falling, a surface temperature of—5°C ing During the Period of the Great Patriotic War" ("Great and a sky with 10/10 nimbostratus. The isotherms of the Patriotic War" is the designation used by the Soviets for cross section are drawn up to altitudes of 15-20 km and indi- World War II as far as the USSR was involved in it). The au- cate a "warm low" close to the surface, overlain by cold air. thor of the article, A. P. Zhidikov, states, on page 8 of his On pages 18-19 of their paper, Gaygerov, Golyshev, and paper, that in addition to short-range forecasts, the Central Pinus state that soundings of the Central Aerological Obser- Forecasting Institute regularly prepared forecasts for three vatory were of great importance in both the planning and days, for the "natural synoptic periods" (7-10 days), for implementation stages of the counteroffensive of the Soviets monthly and for three-month periods. On page 9 of the same in the Battle for Moscow in December 1941. They point out paper, the author writes that long-range forecasts were also that while the air was relatively warm at the beginning of the made for the maximum flood elevation, monthly maxima month (about —4°C) in the general area of Moscow,18 the and minima of water levels, dates of freezing, and breakup of aerological observations for 3-4 December showed a rapid ice cover of water bodies. Virtually no details are given and cooling of the troposphere with the approach of a cold front. no mention is made of any cases where the forecasts failed The forecast for 5-7 December, the start of the counteroffen- though the state of the art of forecasting was, and still is, such sive, called for a rapid drop in temperature and a decrease in that failures are likely to be incurred from time to time. cloudiness.19 Clearly, the forecast was of great operational In the same issue, in a paper carrying the title "The Central importance because it suggested that the Soviet Air Force Aerological Observatory During the Years of the Great Patri- would be able to participate in the battle.20 otic War," S. S. Gaygerov, G. I. Golyshev, and N. Z. Pinus describe a medium-range forecast prepared at a special demand for 7 November 1941, the 24th anniversary of the Appendix A. Lack of winter clothing and October Revolution. It was desired to hold a major military malfunctioning of equipment during the parade in Moscow, provided that a low-cloud cover develops winter of 1941-42 that day over the capital. The low-cloud cover was needed to prevent the German Air Force from bombing the parade. Hitler was directly informed that winter clothing for the It might appear, perhaps, at first sight, that the forecast German troops in the Easy lay for weeks at the Warsaw Rail was not of military significance. It was militarily significant Station by Colonel-General Guderian at a meeting on 20 De- in so far, as the parade was to raise the morale of the people cember 1941, (see Guderian, 1951, p. 242). Colonel-General and the army. About mid-October, the German forces were Haider, chief-of-staff of the German Army at the time, states but about 100 km from Moscow. This was a serious menace. in his war diary (Haider, 1964, p. 286; [entry for 10 Novem- At the order of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Defense Committee (one of the highest 18 Presumably, the temperature of —4°C cited by the authors is an organs of the wartime USSR), a partial evacuation of Mos- early afternoon temperature, as confirmed by a reference to the cow began on the night of 16 October (Zhukov, 1984, p. 286). Daily Series of Synoptic Weather Maps of the U.S. Weather Bureau, Several government and central committee offices and even which are for about 1500 Moscow LST (12 UTC). Table 1 of the present paper indicates a temperature close to —8°C at a Moscow some of the army directorates as well as the diplomatic corps station at 07 LST. Temperatures are likely to have been lower in the were moved to Kuibyshev, about 800-km east of Moscow. open fields. The parade was intended to indicate that Stalin and all the 19 "Decrease in cloudiness"—this implies that the weather was cloudy beforehand. We have pointed out in section 7 that weather conditions of late November-early December made it difficult for 16 The issues of this journal are regularly trans- the Germans to carry out reconnaissance flights. Thus, they re- lated into English and published (by Allerton Press, New York) in mained unaware of the massing of troops, tanks, and other equip- the journal Soviet Meteorology and Hydrology in the United States. It ment by Zhukov for the counteroffensive. is to be regretted that the Publishers (or Editors?) found it "right" 20 Returning to the topic of rapid decreases and rapid increases of not to translate and publish the articles of historical nature in the temperature, as, for example, at the beginning of December 1941, May 1985 issue, despite the fact that the pertinent articles are impor- such marked changes occurred even before, though on smaller scale. tant for the history of meteorology and for the role of meteorology in In October and November 1941 some of these alterations involved historical events of very great significance in human history. increases in temperature above the freezing point, causing thaws and 17 The gravity of the situation in November and the need for morale minor, short mud periods. These conditions led some German offi- lifting is illustrated by the following incident cited by Zhukov (1984): cers to write letters home (see, e.g., Paul, 1976) from the Battle for "I don't remember the exact date that Stalin telephoned me, but it Moscow, likening the changes to a Wechselbad, that is, alternating was soon after the Germans' greatest tactical breakthrough . . .— cold and warm baths. Even in December 1941, on the 11th, tempera- November 19,1 think. He asked: "Are you certain we can hold Mos- tures of up to +8°C are shown west of Moscow behind a cold front, cow? I ask you this with pain in my heart. Speak the truth, like a see the Daily Series of Synoptic Weather Maps, Part I of the U.S. communist." Zhukov replied: "We'll hold Moscow without doubt. Weather Bureau. The map for 5 December indicates temperatures But we have got to have at least two more Armies and no fewer than between — 19°C and —22°C. The maps are for the early afternoon 200 tanks." hours of the Moscow time zone (about 15 LST).

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC Bulletin American Meteorological Society 629 ber 1941]) that the specific outfit will not be available to the 330th Rifle Divisions had only 30-50 percent of their troops before January in the case of the German Army Group quota of warm clothing. The lack of overcoats and un- South, and not before January's end in the case of the derwear was especially bad in the 324th Rifle Division. GAGC. Actually, the troops of the latter were engaged in the Battle of Moscow, and they needed the winter clothing even At the time the Soviet troops most properly dressed for the more than those of the , but the number winter (and envied by the Germans) were those of the divi- of locomotives, lines, various train-station facilities as well as sions brought over in October and November 1941 from the number of engine drivers were not able to cope with the Eastern Siberia, after Stalin was ready to give credence to demand, especially in the case of the center. In November, messages of his outstanding spy in Tokyo, Japan, Richard even before the great cold outbreaks, the GAGC received 16 Sorge, and other sources of intelligence that Japan prepares trains daily in the mean, as against the 31 required (Haider, to go against the United States and not against the USSR. 1964, p. 299, [entry for 19 November]). The situation wors- In August 1942 the German High Command brought out ened as November drew to its close, as in the cold many items a kind of a handbook Taschenbuch fur den Winterkrieg in of weapons, tanks, and mechanized vehicles stopped func- which a great number of suggestions were put forth on how tioning in many instances. Even the German locomotives to cope with winter conditions using the simplest local re- malfunctioned in the cold. A report of the GAGC to the sources. This handbook was translated and published under Army High Command, dated 10 December, a week after the the name German Winter Warfare (1943) by the Military In- first major cold outbreak, states that at temperatures below telligence Division of the US War Department. — 15°C the rail services could supply only 50 percent of the needs; on occasions of blizzards and snow flurries, the trains stopped altogether (quoted in Reinhardt, 1972, p. 216). The Acknowledgments. The authors are pleased to record their in- frost that was awaited by the German Army during the mud debtedness to the following scientists for their kind (and, in some period, came in with a vengeance. cases, repeated) assistance with information or copies of documents or translation from Russian-language literature: Hitler and his associates reckoned that Soviet resistance Prof. O. Schuster, Miinchen, who during World War II was Liai- will be broken by the winter and that, therefore, there will be son Officer of the Central Weather Group (CWG) of the German no need for winter clothing for the whole of the force engaged Air Force to the chief-of-staff of the air force, for valuable informa- in the war during summer and autumn in the USSR. After the tion on some of the meteorology-related events at the HQ of the air force and at the field HQ of Hitler; onset of the cold, the German population was urgently re- Archivamtsrat B. Meyer, Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg quested to collect furs, coats, warm underwear, and socks; in Br., for copies of documents and for useful comments on these the soldiers had to use newspaper under their uniforms for documents; thermal insulation. Deutscher Wetterdienst, especially Regierungsdirektorin Margret Zhukov (1985, p. 41) remarks that Kalb, Diplom-Meteorologe Barbara Hanle and Regierungsinspek- tor W. Strassburger, for copies of meteorological logs of some of the . . . it is true that Nazi soldiers wrapped themselves up in official German military weather stations held under German occu- pation in the USSR; clothing seized from the population and walked about Dr. Paul K. Schmidt-Carell, a former diplomat and author of a shod in unsightly home-made 'galoshes'. Warm clothing number of books on the war of Germany with the USSR, for copies and uniforms are also a weapon. [Authors' italics.] But of pages from "Histories" of German Army units, quoting tempera- the Nazi Army was not prepared for the winter. ture figures measured in eastern Europe; Dr. Dorothy A. Cross, Director, Pentagon Library, Washington, Despite the profound truth in Zhukov's maxim that "warm D.C., for copies of some U.S. Army publications; clothing and uniforms are also a weapon," the Soviet army Last but not least, to Mr. T. Vihavainen, Helsinki University Insti- tute of History, Miss Laura Rontu, Finnish Meteorological Institute was not adequately prepared for the winter either, especially and Ms. Paivi Paloposki, Helsinki University Slavic Library, for in the early part of winter 1941-42. Marshal, Golikov (1984, their repeated and kind translations from the Russian-language p. 314), commander-in-chief of an army formation in the literature. Battle of Moscow, writes the following: In mid-November (1941), the commander of the 323 Division sent me the following message: Tn connection with the onset of heavy frosts, I request your permission References to postpone the Division's drill for a few days, in view of the fact that the men are in summer uniforms, garrison Biicheler, H., 1980: Hoepner, ein deutsches SoldatenschicksaldesXX. caps and without gloves. During the November 12 drills Jahrhunderts. E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Herford, 228 pp. the Division had incidents of first degree freezing of the Carell,P., 1963: Unternehmen Barbarossa, derMarsch nach Russland. extremities.' Ullstein, Frankfurt/M-Berlin, 560 pp. , 1985: Unternehmen Barbarossa imBild. Ullstein, Frankfurt/M- Pages 315-316 refer to shortages of food, arms, and equip- Berlin, 465 pp. ment. He returns to the subject of lack of winter clothing and Domarus, M., 1965: Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945, writes as follows: Vol. II, 2nd half-volume 1941-1945. Suddeutscher Verlag, Miin- chen, 1643-2323. We were greatly worried by the lack of winter uniforms. Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia, 1952. Dept. of the The 323rd, 325th, and 328th divisions had no padded Army Pamphlet No. 20-291, U.S. Army, Washington, 81 pp. jackets and trousers, warm foot-cloths, caps with ear- Fest, J. C., 1975: Hitler, eineBiographie, 8th ed. Propylaen: Ullstein, muffs, or gloves, until mid-November. The 322nd and Frankfurt/M-Berlin, 1190 pp.

Unauthenticated | Downloaded 10/10/21 07:51 PM UTC 630 Vol. 68, No. 6, June 1987 Flohn, H., 1944: Zum Klima der freien Atmosphare iiber Sibirien. I. kommando des Heeres/Generalstab des Heeres/Op. Abt. I, pp. Temperatur und Luftdruck in der Troposphare iiber Jakutsk. 117-126. Held under classmark RH 2/v. 1326 at the Federal Mili- Meteor. Z, 61, 50-57. tary Archive, Freiburg i. Br. Gaygerov, S. S., G. I. Golyshev and N. Z. Pinus, 1985: The Central Reinhardt, K., 1972: Die Wende vor Moskau. Das Scheitern der Aerological Observatory during the Years of the Great Patriotic Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/42. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, War (in Russian). Meteorologiya i Gidrologiya, No. 5/1985, 16- Stuttgart, 355 pp. 20. Scherhag, R., 1948: Neue Methoden der Wetteranalyse und Wetter- German Winter Warfare, 1943. Military Intelligence Div., U.S. War prognose. Springer, Berlin, Gottingen and Heidelberg, 424 pp. Dept., Special Series, No. 18, 215 pp. Schwerdtfeger, W., 1986: The last two years of Z-W-G. Weather, 41: Golikov, F. I., 1984: "To Moscow's rescue." In Stalin and His Gen- Part 1, 129-133; Part 2, 157-161; Part 3, 187-191. erals, S. Bialer ed., 311-318, Westview Press, Boulder and Lon- Sherwood, R. E., 1948: Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History. don, 644 pp. Harper & Broth., New York, 979 pp. Greiner, H., 1951: Die oberste Wehrmachtfuhrung 1939-1943. Limes Shkliarevich, O. B., 1974: Characteristic properties of wind and Verlag, Wiesbaden, 444 pp. temperature vertical distribution under urban conditions (in Rus- Guderian, H., 1951: Erinnerungen eines Soldaten. K. Vowinckel, sian). Meteorologiya i Gidrologiya, No. 7/1974, 42-46. Heidelberg, 464 pp. Stalin and His Generals, Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II, Haider, F., 1964: Kriegstagebuch, Vol. Ill: Der Russlandfeldzug bis 1984. S. Bialer, ed. Westview Press, Boulder and London, 644 pp. zum Marsch auf Stalingrad(22.6.1941-24.9.1942). H.-A. Jacobsen Stolfl, R. H. S., 1980: Chance in history: The Russian winter of ed., W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 589 pp. 1941-1942. J. Hist. Assoc., 65, 214-228. Hossbach, F., 1951: Infanterie im Ostfeldzug 1941/42. Giebel & Von Niedermayer, O., 1941: Wehrgeographischer Atlas der Union der Oehlschlager, Osterode (Harz), 247 pp. Sozialistischen Sovietrepubliken. Reichsdruckerei, Berlin, 233 Hubatsch, W., 1962: Hitlers Weisungen fur die Kriegfuhrung 1939- plates. 1945. Bernard & Graefe, Verlag fur Wehrwesen, Frankfurt/M, Von Tippelskirch, K., 1951: Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs. 330 pp. Athenaum, Bonn, 731 pp. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmacht- Wahlen, E., 1881: Der jahrliche Gang der Temperatur in St. Peters- fuhrungsstab), Vol. I: 1 August 1940-31 Dezember 1941. Collated burg nach 118-jahrigen Tagesmitteln. Imperial Acad. Sci., St. and interpreted by H.-A. Jacobsen. Bernard & Graefe, Verlag fur Petersburg. Repertorium fur Meteorologie, Vol. VII, No. 7, 119 Wehrwesen, Frankfurt/M, 1288 pp. pp. Lydolph, P. E., 1977: Climates of the Soviet Union. World Survey of Warlimont, W., 1962: Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht Climatology, Vol. 7. Elsevier, Amsterdam, Oxford and New York, 1939-1945. Grundlagen, Formen, Gestalten. Bernard & Graefe 443 pp. Verlag fur Wehrwesen, Frankfurt/M, 540 pp. Oke, T. R., 1979: Review of Urban Climatology, 1973-1976. WMO Zhidikov, A. P., 1985: The USSR Centre of Hydrometeorological Technical Note, No. 169, Geneva, 100 pp. Forecasting during the period of the Great Patriotic War (in Rus- Paul, W., 1976: Erfrorener Sieg. Die Schlacht um Moskau 1941/42, sian). Meteorologiya i Gidrologiya, No. 5/1985, 7-10. 3rd rev. ed. Bechtle, Esslingen, 413 pp. Zhukov, G. K., 1984: First victory. Pp. 318-336 in Stalin and His Pavlov, D. V., 1965: Leningrad 1941, The Blockade. Univ. Chicago Generals, Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II. S. Bialer ed. Press, 186 pp. Westview Press, Boulder and London, 644 pp. Plett, 1941: Kurzer uberblick uber die klimatischen Verhaltnisse im , 1985: Reminiscences and Reflections, Vol. 2. Progress Publish- europaischen Russland in den Monaten August bis Oktober. Ober- ers, Moscow, 486 pp. • announcements (icontinued from page 406) teorological Society, will be held from 29 September to 1 Oc- 1 January 1988 Fulbright Scholar Awards tober 1987 at the Wiirzburg, Federal Republic of Germany (March 1987 BULLETIN, p. 243) Congress Center. Tentative lecture groups at the symposium 1 February 1988 Fulbright Scholar Awards include evaluation of meteorological and pollutant measure- (March 1987 BULLETIN, p. 243) ments; dispersion and transport models for emissions from Other domestic heating, traffic, industry, and power plants; chemical reports for Wind Mitigation Group transformations and dispersion models; dispersion models for 1 June 1987 (April 1987 BULLETIN, p. 328) accidental releases; dry deposition; wet deposition; physical abstracts for NOAA/ERL Al workshop modeling through wind tunnels and water tanks; urban cli- 15 July 1987 (May 1987 BULLETIN, p. 485) abstracts for First Annual Workshop mate and atmospheric pollutants; microclimate in agriculture 31 December 1987 in Earth System Science and forestry; and environmental meteorology and urban, re- (April 1987 BULLETIN, p. 357) gional, and country planning. 1 February 1988 manuscripts for CIB Conference (March 1987, BULLETIN, p. 246) Deadlines calendar

Fellowships, grants, etc. 15 June 1987 Macelwane Annual Award (this issue, p. 644) 15 June 1987 Hanks and Orville Scholarships corrigendum (this issue, p. 644) 15 September 1987 Fulbright Scholar Awards (March 1987 BULLETIN, p. 243) In the program for the 18th Conference on Agricultural and Forest 1 November 1987 Fulbright Scholar Awards Meteorology (May 1987 BULLETIN, p. 563) pages 569 and 570 were (March 1987 BULLETIN, p. 243) inadvertently transposed. •

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