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Syria's Political and Economic Relations with the West Have Improved Markedly Since Damascus Participated in the Anti Iraq

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Syria's Political and Economic Relations with the West Have Improved Markedly Since Damascus Participated in the Anti Iraq 1995 Basilal-Assad’sDeath–IsraelandtheGolanHeights–Relationswiththe US –Assad MeetsClinton–TowardsaMarket-orientedEconomy Syria’s political and economic relations with the West have improved markedly since Damascus participated in the anti Iraq coalition of 1990–91. At the same time, the government is convincing local and international businessmen that it is serious about strengthening the role of the private sector, though further re- formsareneededanditstillhastoaddresstheproblemofcorruption. DeathofBasilal-Assad For years the main preoccupation of Syria watchers has been who is to succeed President Hafez al-Assad, who suffers from blood-sugar disorders and who had a heart attack in 1983. Since 1991, when he played a central role in organising his father’s presidential election campaign, the leading contender had been Basil al-Assad, an army officer who had lately been put in charge of the security forces. Posters of him with his father and graffiti supporting the ‘noble son’ also hadappearedonwallsofcitiessinceaboutthesametime. But although Basil was a distinguished horseman who had built a genuine popularity among Syrian youth, he had appeared sincerely unwilling to accept the mantle of successor – which his father had been careful never officially to bestow. Nevertheless, Basil’s death once again threw into focus the question of the succession. Assad, a member of the minority Alawi community, must at least outwardly pay attention to the constitution if the majority Sunni population is to accept another Alawi ruler without subjecting Syria to a potentially ruinous civil war. This explains why the president’s brother Rifaat al-Assad, still techni- cally one of three vice presidents, has been ruled out of the running for the time being due to his reputation for dishonesty and his long absence from political life. In early 1994 attention shifted onto another vice president Abdel-Halim Khaddam. A junta of Alawi generals, keen to retain their privileged position among the Sunni majority, began to promote the candidacy of Khaddam, a Sunni. However, a second faction led by Defence Minister Lt-Gen Mustafa Tlass began to advocate the president’s second son, Bashar al-Assad (an eye doctor), who in February 1994 had been appointed to take over from his late brother Basil © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:�0.��63/978900439�533_0�0 218 1995 to head the government’s efforts to combat corruption. Still another option was Tlass himself, suspected by some of using Bashar as a stalking horse to con- cealhisownambitions. PeaceMoveswithIsrael Syria, once the most hard line of the Arab states sharing a border with Israel, made significant progress in the Arab/Israel peace process. A major impetus came at an historic meeting between President Assad and US President Bill Clinton in Geneva on 16 January 1994. After the summit Assad for the first time publicly committed his government to the normalisation of relations with Is- rael as part of the wider Middle East peace process. Despite Damascus’ opposi- tion to the May 1994 agreement establishing the Palestinian mini-state of Gaza/Jericho on the ground that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) signed independently with Israel, informal Syrian-Israeli talks took place in Da- mascus on 30 April–l May 1994 and on 14 May 1994, with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher shuttling between the two camps. Syria also seemed in- creasingly willing to compromise on the central issue of its dispute with Israel – the return of the Golan Heights, which have been under Israeli occupation since 1967. Although Damascus continued to demand total Israeli withdrawal from the territory, it appeared likely to negotiate a timetable for this withdrawal. But by June 1994 Israel’s proposed timetable of a phased withdrawal over eight years remained at variance with Syria’s idea of a withdrawal carried out overjustmonths. Another sticking point was Israel’s insistence on holding a referendum on handing back the Heights: this was seen as unlikely to take place before late 1994/early1995andcouldwellresultina‘no’vote. Damascus also remained anxious to secure additional concessions in the peace process, including a new agreement over regional water supplies and aid ortradeagreementswiththe EuropeanUnion (EU)oreventhe US. OtherRelations The rapprochement with the US still has a long way to go: in April 1994 Clinton criticised Damascus for not doing enough to combat the narcotics trade in Leb- anon’s Beqa’a Valley, which is under Syrian control. The US also refused to re- move Syria from the list of countries which it accuses of sponsoring interna- tional terrorism. Washington also is unhappy with Syria’s continued refusal to ease the Arab League boycott of Israel, which has been in force since the late 1940s. Damascus is the home of the League’s Central Boycott Office (CBO), and many foreign firms seeking oil-related contracts in Syria came into problems forcontraveningthetermsofthesecondaryandtertiaryboycotts..
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