The Soldier’s Dilemma: Military Responses to Uprisings in Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, and Syria

by Dorothy Smith Ohl

B.A. in Political Science and Islamic Civilization and Societies, May 2009, Boston College M.A. in Political Science, August 2014, The George Washington University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2016

Dissertation directed by

Marc Lynch Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Dorothy Smith Ohl has passed the Final Examination for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy as of July 29, 2016. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

The Soldier’s Dilemma: Military Responses to Uprisings in Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, and Syria

Dorothy Smith Ohl

Dissertation Research Committee:

Marc Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director

Nathan J. Brown, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

Caitlin Talmadge, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

ii

© Copyright 2016 by Dorothy Smith Ohl All rights reserved

iii Dedication

To my mom, who taught me never to ask if something would be difficult, but rather whether I wanted to do it.

iv Acknowledgements

This study would not have reached the level it has without the support of many people who helped me in the field as I researched this challenging topic. I received funding from the Zeit Foundation, David L. Boren Fellowship, Cosmos Club Foundation,

Project on Middle Political Science, GWU Institute for Middle East Studies, and GWU

Department of Political Science and thank them for their generous financial support. In the field, many people listened to the description of my dissertation research and learned of my study, were clearly still greatly affected by the events they had witnessed and participated in, and decided to speak with me and share their stories anyway. This took great courage, and I thank them.

As I researched the Syrian case study from Jordan I was greatly aided by two research assistants who kept up on our contact leads and helped me navigate the streets of

Amman, Irbid, and Ramtha to find our interview locations. Their presence during those meetings was indispensible, and over tea after the interviews we often had conversations that opened up what I was studying in new ways. I would also be remiss not to extend a hearty thanks to the bedbugs that infested my first apartment in Amman. As a result of our harrowing experience my landlord took pity on me and offered to help me in any way possible moving forward. It was then that I learned he was a retired Colonel from the

Jordanian military, and thus my first week into fieldwork I had a lead into a research community.

My dissertation committee might be better described as a dream team. Marc

Lynch never questioned my harebrained scheme to research military defections in historic and even ongoing conflicts. Instead, he constantly pushed me to be more creative

v in seeking data and getting into the field. He has offered concrete advice on my writing that has helped me communicate my arguments and findings more clearly. This mentorship will stay with me for years to come. When I was accepted to GWU, and called up Nathan Brown to talk more about the PhD program, he said: “Are you the same

Dot who contacted me about your senior thesis a few years ago?” This sums up his vast memory and commitment to students’ scholarship. Since Day 1 at GWU he has listened to my questions and concerns, discussed research leads, and been a beacon of positivity.

He was also a really fun person to TA for. My dream team was rounded out by the addition of jedi master Caitlin Talmadge. Caitlin once showed up to a comparative politics workshop at which I was presenting, without me having asked her, and despite the fact that she attends a whole range of IR seminars and workshops. Not only did she come to this second-year’s session, she came having read the paper and prepared a series of spot-on critiques that would help me publish that work before finishing my PhD. From that time through now she has offered insights from a military studies perspective and worked to purge my writing of dangling modifiers. I also thank Stephen Biddle from

GWU and Kathleen Cunningham from University of Maryland for reading this work and providing the insightful feedback that will help press it forward pass the dissertation stage.

Many others at GWU and beyond have continuously supported my research and teaching, including Kimberly Morgan, Brandon Bartels, Evgeny Finkel, Yon Lupu, Mike

Miller, and others. The graduate students in GWU’s Political Science Department are intellectually sharp but actually fun to be around. Jessie Anderson, Fabiana Perera, and

Annelle Sheline were amazing cohort mates. Abdulwahab Al-Kayyali not only was a spectacular member of the graduate program, but also his family took me in during the

vi aforementioned bedbug incident, and he exposed me to the music scene in Jordan. GWU alumni Madeleine Wells and Alanna Torres-Van Antwerp were particular mentors throughout this research and writing process as well. Finally, Holger Albrecht and Kevin

Koehler have been stellar research collaborators, and also introduced me to real German beer.

My mom is my longest supporter. During the PhD she delivered healthy food during stressful exam and writing periods; took care of our dog when I was in the field and when my husband was unexpectedly deployed; and was my constant cheerleader.

The Ohl family and all my friends have been great supporters of my adventures as well.

Malcolm, thank you for unconsciously inspiring my interest in military studies.

We have been together from my first trip to study Arabic in Egypt to the defense of this dissertation nearly a decade later. In the past few years you read innumerable drafts of this study and made each one better. You helped me keep my head down when I was questioning my research. You made me comfortable when I was finishing this dissertation at nearly nine months pregnant. Most importantly, you have always made sure to celebrate every little victory along the way. I love you and thank you. And Teddy, you are a new joy in my life; thank you for giving me a deadline to finish this dissertation.

vii Abstract of Dissertation

The Soldier’s Dilemma: Military Responses to Uprisings in Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, and Syria

Why do some soldiers remain part of the military hierarchy during a domestic crisis, while others shirk orders, flee their positions, or defect to the opposition entirely?

Existing literature on military institutionalization leads us to expect that the armed forces will either remain loyal or defect from a regime in crisis. Yet, civil conflicts are often accompanied by a fracturing of the military into both loyal and disloyal units, as was the case in Iraq (1991) historically and Yemen and Libya (2011) amid the Arab Spring, for example. Alternative arguments suggest that individual-level factors influence a soldier’s willingness to fight civil revolt, and scholars and observers often suggest that ethnicity in particular determines soldier behavior in such circumstances. Evidence from this dissertation, however, suggests that soldiers who share protesters’ ethnic identity have often used lethal force against mass movements, as was the case in Jordan (1970) and the early stages of the Syrian revolt (2011). Additionally, when coethnics do leave the armed forces, existing arguments fail to explain why some soldiers flee the conflict environment, whereas others actively join in fomenting rebellion.

This study argues that soldiers’ decisions during unrest are influenced by both persuasive and coercive influences. Troops who are persuaded that domestic unrest represents a threat to national security are more likely to see it as their duty to use force to suppress it. In this research I identify two primary influences on this perception during civil unrest: whether the soldier perceives the uprising is foreign-backed, and whether he views the protesters’ tactics as illegitimate. However, in the civil unrest context a

viii soldier’s perceptions of the uprising do not directly translate to his behavior, due to the effects of fear and fatigue in such crises. A second factor thus has a significant impact on a soldier’s behavior in such circumstances: coercion. A regime is able to coerce soldiers into fighting when orders are made clear, behavior is monitored, and insubordination is regularly punished.

A controlled comparison of soldier behavior within uprising events in Jordan

(1970), Iraq (1991), Bahrain (2011), and Syria (2011-2014) is utilized to test the argument. The study’s diverse data include more than 100 interviews conducted during in-depth fieldwork in the region and Arabic-language archival records, among other sources. The findings indicate that persuasive and coercive forces interact to produce variation in whether soldiers fight, flee, or foment revolt. The context of a domestic crisis has a substantial influence on how soldiers respond to it. But a soldier’s position in the military hierarchy moderates his ability to act on his preferences to support or fight those participating in an uprising. These findings have implications for how we assess military cohesion, regime stability, and the efficacy of mass mobilization campaigns.

ix Table of Contents

Dedication ...... iv Acknowledgements ...... v Abstract of Dissertation ...... viii List of Figures ...... xi List of Tables ...... xii Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 Chapter 2: Theory ...... 20 Chapter 3: Jordan and Black September, 1970 ...... 77 Chapter 4: Iraq and the Page of Treachery and Treason, 1991 ...... 169 Chapter 5: Bahrain and the Pearl Revolution, 2011 ...... 217 Chapter 6: Syria and a Slow-Burning Civil War, 2011 and 2012-2014 ...... 275 Chapter 7: Conclusion ...... 396 Bibliography ...... 419

x List of Figures

Figure 3.1: Jordan Political Map ...... 99

Figure 4.1: Iraq Political Map ...... 181

Figure 5.1: Bahrain Political Map ...... 226

Figure 6.1: Syria Political Map ...... 292

xi List of Tables

Table 1.1: Dependent Variable Explanations Based on Independent Variable

Combinations ...... 8

Table 2.1: Operationalizing the Dependent Variable ...... 27

Table 2.2: Leading Explanations for Military Fighting ...... 28

Table 2.3: Dependent Variable Explanations Based on Independent Variable

Combinations ...... 62

Table 2.4: Jordan 1970 Case Study Leverage ...... 67

Table 2.5: Iraq 1991 Case Study Leverage ...... 68

Table 2.6: Bahrain 2011 Case Study Leverage ...... 69

Table 2.7: Syria 2011 Case Study Leverage ...... 69

Table 2.8: Syria 2012-2014 Case Study Leverage ...... 70

Table 3.1: Key Palestinian Resistance Groups in 1970 ...... 93

Table 3.2: Anticipated Outcomes for Jordan 1970 Based on Independent Variables .... 111

Table 4.1: Anticipated Outcomes for Iraq 1991 Based on Independent Variables ...... 185

Table 5.1: Anticipated Outcomes for Bahrain 2011 Based on Independent Variables .. 231

Table 6.1: Anticipated Outcomes for Syria 2011 Based on Independent Variables ...... 302

Table 6.2: Anticipated Outcomes for Syria 2012-2014 Based on Independent

Variables ...... 303

xii Chapter 1: Introduction

Puzzle

In September 1970 a Jordanian junior military officer found himself deployed to confront a domestic uprising. Two years earlier he had faced the Israelis at the Battle of

Karama; this was now an entirely different assignment. The Palestinian resistance fighters he was facing, he perceived, outnumbered the military two to one. Urban warfare clashes took place in the middle of the Jordanian capital, parts of which the resistance held firmly in its control. Despite the struggle, this officer remained in his post and fought the rebellion.1

Two decades later, a spontaneous uprising broke out in Iraq following the country’s defeat at the hands of an international coalition in the Gulf War. Troops returning from the Kuwaiti front in 1991 streamed north towards the capital of Baghdad.

What they found was a country in revolt and Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party was not pleased with their response to the unrest. A party member, in reflecting on the uprising, described how the troops present in the southern rioting areas “did not fight as needed” and in fact “a large number surrendered.” He went on to report that “all the Basra

[southern Iraq] national defense brigades joined, with their weapons, the ranks of the saboteurs,” in effect fomenting revolt.2

Moving another twenty years forward, demonstrations broke out in Syria in 2011 amid the wave of contentious politics that became known as the Arab Spring. One man

1 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62 (Amman, Jordan, March 3, 2015, 1pm). 2 Handwritten Letter from Arbil Comrade, to the Baath Party, Dated May 8, 1991 (Electronic Record), Box 01-3185-0003-0215 to 0219, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).

1 had the unfortunate luck to be conscripted into the armed forces during the events and, moreover, assigned duties in an elite armored division commanded by President Assad’s brother. After participating in missions to quell the unrest, he finally decided to leave his position. He evaded detection to initially desert, and spent months moving from

Damascus, to Palmiyra, to Swedeh and Deraa in Syria, before finally fleeing to Jordan.3

Why had this Jordanian officer chosen to fight internal rebellion, while the Iraqi soldier fomented revolt, and the Syrian fled his position? The decisions were consequential. Each uprising represented a significant crisis for the respective regime, which relied on its soldiers’ loyalty to confront mass discontent with its rule. But these regimes were surprised by such variation in soldier decision-making during these events.

The Jordanian regime was able to rely on a largely fighting force and this allowed the state to regain control of its capital in less than two weeks. The Iraqi regime lost significant control over its armed forces as many fomented revolt; as a result, it expended much greater violence and time in reasserting authority throughout the country. Finally, the ongoing Syrian conflict illustrates the effects of a military that has continuously been sapped of its strength by fleeing soldiers. In consequence, the regime has increasingly relied on irregular and foreign troops, which has internationalized the conflict and contributed to its decline into a slow-burning civil war.

Military deployments to confront domestic unrest are not limited to the Middle

East. There have been more than 300 mass movements globally since 1900.4 Uprisings as scattered geographically as the Iranian Revolution (1978-1979), People Power revolt in

3 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Sergeant in 4th Division, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 24 (Amman, Jordan, August 20, 2014, 7:30pm, follow-up May 7, 2015, 2pm). 4 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

2 the Philippines (1986), Argentinian riots (2001), and Ukrainian Orange Revolution

(2004-2005), have put the respective military in a difficult position: Will its soldiers side with citizens on the streets, or the regime in power? Given the breadth of such internal conflicts, and the significance of military decision-making during them, it is surprising that current research does not go far in elucidating puzzling patterns in soldiers’ behavior.

Whereas there is more substantial scholarship on how militaries intervene in politics in the form of coups d’état, 5 and military effectiveness in conventional warfare, 6 far fewer works investigate this study’s research question: Under what circumstances do soldiers fight for the regime, flee the confrontation, or actively join in fomenting revolt? Existing accounts of military responses to unrest are limited in their ability to answer this question and explain the different decisions soldiers made in Jordan, Iraq, and Syria when confronted with similarly widespread civil unrest. This limitation is primarily a result of the fact that these studies focus narrowly either on the structural constraints on soldiers’ decision-making during such events, or the extreme contingencies presented by unrest and thus the very immediate impacts on troops’ behavior.

A structural theoretical approach argues that slow-moving factors, such as the military’s form of organization, affect how “the military” responds to unrest. Existing literature has argued that when a military lacks a distinct hierarchy, meritocratic

5 Jonathan Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups D’état," Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 6 (2012): 1017-1040.; Naunihal Singh, Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).; Andrew T. Little, "Coordination, Learning, and Coups," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Online First (2015); Varun Piplani and Caitlin Talmadge, "When War Helps Civil–Military Relations Prolonged Interstate Conflict and the Reduced Risk of Coups," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Online First (2015). 6 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).; Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (New York: Cornell University Press, 2015).

3 promotion, and equal recruitment, it is likely to support the status quo.7 By undermining military institutionalization, such as via coup-proofing, leaders can make the armed forces more dependent on the regime and therefore incapable of acting against it.8 In contrast, when a military develops a corporate identity, it envisions life for itself outside the regime and has greater latitude to not comply with a repression order.9 An institutionalized military also considers it harmful to its prestige to assault its own citizens and carry out internal security duties.10 Professionalism, or institutionalization, is proposed to determine the military’s behavior amid unrest. Similar military-level arguments are made about the “cohesion” of the armed forces.11 Yet, adopting this view of military behavior during unrest leaves us with several puzzles. In particular, these explanations generate observable implications at the military-level alone. They predict that the entire military will fight, flee or foment revolt, based on the organization’s overarching institutionalization or cohesion. The empirical reality could not be more different. Amid the Iraqi uprising in 1991, for example, the army fractured completely.

Some forces remained in their positions and fought, others abandoned their posts, and

7 Richard Snyder, "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992): 379-399.; Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-157. 8 Risa Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes (London: Routledge, 2013).; James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 131-165. 9 Bellin, The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective; Risa Brooks, "Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011," Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 205-220. 10 Ibid.; David Pion-Berlin, Diego Esparza and Kevin Grisham, "Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century," Comparative Political Studies 47, no. 2 (2014): 230- 259. 11 Florence Gaub, "The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-Proofing and Repression," Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 221-244.; Terence Lee, "Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia," Armed Forces & Society 32, no. 1 (2005): 80-104.; Terence Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia," Comparative Political Studies 42, no. 5 (2009): 640-669.; Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability," Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 04 (2012): 869-889.

4 still others joined in the revolt. Militaries confronting unrest in Yemen (2011), Libya

(2011), and Syria (2012-2014) saw similar splits within the armed forces, suggesting that the military’s level of institutionalization does not fully explain why particular soldiers or certain units behave as they do when deployed against civil unrest.

In contrast, contingency theorists argue that in the highly uncertain environment of regime-challenging unrest, soldiers are influenced by the course of events on the ground. Scholars have studied how protesters attempt to fraternize with soldiers and urge their defection,12 and how the opposition’s use of violent tactics to challenge the regime may encourage soldiers to fight.13 They have also investigated whether desertion cascades might develop, in which case soldiers leaving the ranks early in the conflict inspire a tidal wave of further defections.14 These arguments also leave us with puzzling phenomena, however. First, in reality, soldiers do not enter the conflict environment with a blank mental slate which would allow them to be wholly swayed by ongoing events. Instead, their perceptions of the mass movement they are expected to suppress are influenced by a range of both current but also historical influences on them. In addition, although soldiers’ perceptions of the uprising may influence their true preferences to support or suppress it, these troops are not operating in a constraint-free environment. The soldier is instead situated in a military hierarchy that can easily limit his freedom of action. Structural approaches are limited in their ability to explain why we ever see within-military variation in soldiers’ decisions to fight unrest; at the same time, the contingency

12 Anika Locke Binnendijk and Ivan Marovic, "Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004)," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 411-429. 13 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. 14 Timur Kuran, "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," World Politics 44, no. 1 (1991): 7-48.; Theodore McLauchlin, "Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion," Comparative Politics 42, no. 3 (2010): 333-350.

5 approaches able to explain variation in behavior within the armed forces often fail to situate the soldier in his military hierarchy and therefore lead us to over-predict insubordination.

Argument

My argument is that soldiers’ decisions during unrest are influenced by both persuasive and coercive forces. The context of a domestic crisis has a substantial influence on how soldiers respond to it. But a soldier’s position in the military hierarchy moderates his ability to act on his preferences to support or fight those participating in an uprising.15

The first factor influencing soldier decision-making is persuasion. Troops who are persuaded that domestic unrest represents a threat to national security are more likely to see it as their duty to use force to suppress that threat. In this research I identify two primary influences on this perception during civil unrest: whether the soldier perceives the uprising as foreign-backed, and whether he views the protesters’ tactics as illegitimate.

When it appears that an uprising is populated by foreign citizens, funded by foreign powers, or advocating a foreign agenda, the soldier feels the nation-state is under attack.

As a result, he sees as activated his role as member of the military and this increases his support for defending the country against an external threat. A soldier is similarly influenced when he views the uprising’s participants as employing illegitimate tactics to achieve their ends. If soldiers perceive that the opposition is composed of saboteurs,

15 In this study I use the terms “soldiers” and “troops” to refer generically to all military personnel. In addition, I use the terms “military” and “armed forces” to reference a state’s military organizations. I use the male gender to refer to members of these organizations throughout the study for consistency and because all interviews for the Middle East case studies were conducted with male soldiers.

6 terrorists, or those operating outside prescribed norms of protest, the opposition will be viewed as a threat to law and order. This again is an avenue to activating the soldier’s sense of duty and increases his likelihood of suppressing the unrest. The opposition’s missteps, the regime’s rhetoric, and external interference can all contribute to persuade a soldier that unrest is foreign-backed and employing illegitimate tactics, stimulating his will to fight.

However, in the civil unrest context a soldier’s perceptions of the uprising do not directly translate to his behavior. Indeed, the very perceptions of foreign and disorderliness that may prompt a soldier to feel he has a duty to fight the uprising may at the very same time inspire great hesitation in him. A foreign enemy that employs, for instance, indiscriminate violence is a fearful foe. Additional variables influence a soldier’s feelings as well. During the crisis he may be far from his family, without basic provisions, and generally fatigued. For all of these reasons, regimes that rely solely on persuasion to urge soldiers to fight stand on a single—and sometimes weak—pillar of support.

A second factor thus has a significant impact on a soldier’s behavior in such circumstances: coercion. A regime is able to coerce soldiers into fighting when it communicates clear orders regarding the behavior that is expected of them. Once expectations for fighting are set, the regime and its military commanders are effective in coercing compliant behavior if they have the ability to convince the soldier that his actions are being monitored and that any insubordination will be detected and punished.

When these conditions are met, soldiers are likely to remain in their positions to fight, often even if they disagree with the mandate to do so.

7 Persuasive and coercive forces interact to produce variation in whether soldiers fight, flee, or foment revolt, as summarized in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Dependent Variable Explanations Based on Independent Variable Combinations

Persuasion High Low (Foreign and (Homegrown illegitimate and legitimate tactics) tactics) High Fight Fight or Flee

Coercion Low Flee Foment

When persuasion and coercion are high, soldiers will likely fight. In such circumstances, the soldier views the uprising as foreign-backed and also employing illegitimate tactics to achieve its aims. It therefore views the uprising as threatening national security and sees his role as soldier activated. When this high degree of persuasion is complemented by strong coercion within the military, the regime has the greatest confidence that soldiers will follow through in the fight. Despite their potential fear of deployment, and the crisis pressures that may influence their morale, the threat of punishment for insubordination keeps these soldiers in their positions and encourages them to fight to protect the regime.

In contrast, when persuasion is high but coercion is low, soldiers are most likely to flee the rebellion. If an uprising is perceived as foreign-inspired and employing illegitimate tactics, soldiers will feel it is within the military’s mandate to protect national security by combatting the unrest. However, lacking clear orders or any monitoring and

8 punishment mechanisms, they are unlikely to risk fighting the revolt themselves. The soldier may find it unclear whether the military has even been ordered to confront demonstrations. Or, he may question whether there is a specific operational plan in effect to do so. Barring such communication of his role in the repression and how the regime and military stands behind such operations, he is unlikely to put his life on the line. This is especially true when the protests themselves are seen as foreign-supported and disorderly. Under such circumstances, the protests are likely viewed as frightening and potentially harmful for the soldier.

In circumstances in which both persuasion and coercion are low, soldiers are most likely to join in and foment demonstrations. Soldiers who perceive the uprising as homegrown and using legitimate tactics are most likely to feel a connection to the protest’s cause. Without any constraints on their behavior, due to the lack of clear orders and punishment for insubordination, they have the greatest latitude in supporting those on the streets as well.

Finally, when persuasion is low but coercion is high, soldiers may either fight or flee the revolt. Those who perceive the uprising as homegrown and using legitimate tactics will have a true preference for allowing the protests to continue, as they will not see them as a threat to national security. However, these soldiers’ preferences are not easily translated into action because they are operating under a strong command. As a result, oftentimes these soldiers will prioritize their safety and security by following their orders and using force against the unrest. However, if these soldiers are consistently put in a position in which their perceptions of the uprising do not match the actions they are being ordered to undertake, cognitive dissonance may lead them to flee the revolt. They

9 are likely to flee rather than foment for multiple reasons, the strongest of which is that the military’s strong command and control means that they will seek to leave the conflict environment for fear that their insubordination will be detected and punished.

Evidence

I test this argument by analyzing variation in military behavior during unrest in

Jordan (1970), Iraq (1991), Bahrain (2011), and Syria (2011-2014). Such domestic conflicts are difficult to study given the challenge posed by accessing conflict settings, even years after the peak of violence or contentious action. But they are particularly difficult to study when the focus of the analysis is military behavior. There are obstacles to locating military personnel who participated in the conflicts. Additionally, questions regarding the decision to fight, flee, or foment are sensitive to the soldier, who may have used force against fellow citizens or abandoned his colleagues during the events.

Questions are also sensitive politically. Many mass uprisings occur in countries that are less than free states. Leaders and their security apparatuses have an interest in uncovering who turned against them at their time of need. Moreover, all states aim to reduce shirking and absence without leave among their troops, and thus speaking about fleeing and fomenting revolt is difficult.

As a result of these difficulties, we have little systematic information on soldiers’ context, thoughts, and decisions during such crises. I surmount these challenges by drawing on diverse data sources in this study. First, I interviewed more than 100 military participant and civilian conflict witnesses. This allowed me to better understand the circumstances of the events I studied. But, more importantly, I heard from soldiers

10 themselves about how they lived during these crises, whether they were deployed to confront the opposition, how they perceived the uprising, what considerations they had when continuously updating their decision-making processes, and ultimately how they fought, fled, or fomented revolt. Second, I made use of archival resources to gain a multifaceted understanding of the circumstances of these conflicts. It is difficult to shed light on how a regime plans and executes operations to contain and suppress a civil uprising. However, such regimes do not always stay in power. I have conducted research in three Iraq archives, for instance, and uncovered documents that explain how Saddam

Hussein’s regime tracked the 1991 revolt and organized its military to assault the demonstrators. In all, this study brings to light exceptional data that elucidate these conflicts and will be of use to scholars across disciplines.

My case studies on Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, and Syria lend evidence to the propositions I have outlined. In September 1970 King Hussein installed a military government that had a clear plan for reigning in the Palestinian resistance, and was successful in maintaining a high level of coercion within the armed forces. In addition, due to the resistance’s missteps, government propaganda and external intervention, there were strong signals that the resistance was foreign-backed and employing illegitimate tactics. As a result, this study’s theory expected that soldiers would obey orders and use force to fight the commandos. This was in fact borne out by the empirics. Of Jordan’s

55,000-strong force, an estimated 50,000-52,000 remained in their positions to fight. This was despite the fact that half of the service members were of Palestinian origin, that many sympathized with the resistance, and that it was unclear whether King Hussein would remain standing. The study’s theory also expected that soldiers would flee if they had

11 received clear orders but did not perceive the resistance as foreign and disorderly. And indeed, the minority of service members who did leave their positions during the crisis fled the country, which lends support to this proposition. A small fraction of soldiers perceived that the resistance was truly fighting for Palestine’s liberation and its fighters were their brothers. As the theory anticipated, they did not join the commandos’ side to actively foment revolt; instead, they fled Jordan and formed a fighting brigade for future struggles. In sum, comparing the behavior of Jordanian soldiers during the Black

September crisis brought strong evidence to bear in support of the theory.

In March 1991 Saddam Hussein faced a significant domestic uprising with an

Iraqi military that was in no way united by the coercive and persuasive influences on soldier behavior desired if he wanted to stay in power. A core portion of the Republican

Guard troops had maintained command and control despite the international coalition’s defeat of the Iraqi military in Kuwait in February 1991. Those Guard units not only received clear orders to face the unrest, and were monitored throughout the campaign to reassert control in Iraq, but were also manned by the troops most likely to perceive the rebellion as serving foreign interests and thus deserving of suppression for the sake of

Iraq’s national security. The situation was completely different for the northern National

Defense Battalions (NDBs) and the regular army passing through Iraq’s southern regions.

Both sets of troops had arguably no degree of coercion exerted over them, and therefore no incentive to put their lives on the line to confront widespread rebellion. What differed from North to South, however, was how these military and militia personnel perceived those in revolt. In the North, the Kurdish soldiers staffing the NDBs had been previously deployed against these rebelling populations, and Hussein framed these missions as

12 subverting infiltrators’ and guerillas’ efforts to undermine Iraq. Though the troops shared a Kurdish ethnicity with those rebelling, and though some of the NDBs may have been increasingly sympathetic with the Kurdish fighters in the late 1980s, they still knew of these populations’ foreign connections. At the same time, the rebels operating in Iraq’s

North were employing discriminate violence specifically targeting the Baath Party, and this resulted in soldiers perceiving these rebels as utilizing more legitimate tactics. With no coercion exercised over them, but still realizing the opposition’s foreign connections, the NDB members split between fleeing and fomenting revolt. In contrast, in Iraq’s South, the predominantly Shia troops not only lacked clear orders and monitoring, but also perceived that this was a homegrown revolt. As a result, they actively joined in the rebellion, until they witnessed the rebels’ tactics becoming increasingly illegitimate, at which point they fled the conflict in greater numbers rather than joining the rebel ranks.

Beginning in February 2011 the Bahraini regime witnessed a significant challenge to its rule as more than one-fifth of its population had joined the mass movement calling for political reform in the Kingdom. Observers have often pointed to the regime’s recruitment of a Sunni military force as the driving factor behind the military’s continuous loyalty to the regime in the face of civilian uprisings. However, my analysis digs deeper into the factors influencing soldiers’ decision-making in 2011. Troops in

Bahrain were operating in an environment in which they received clear orders, were monitored, and knew the punishments that will be delivered if they deviated from what was commanded. In addition, opposition missteps, government propaganda, and external interference contributed to soldiers’ perceptions that the uprising represented a foreign,

13 terrorist threat to Bahraini national security. As a result, I show, the Bahraini military remained highly cohesive and fought the unrest.

In Syria in 2011 soldiers used lethal force against their fellow citizens. These troops were given clear orders to use “any means necessary” to contain and suppress the revolt. More importantly, the execution of these orders was closely monitored and soldiers took threats of punishment—from arrest, to torture, to their death, to their families’ persecution—seriously. This may have been the single most important reason soldiers fought at the start of the uprising. However, the regime also worked to complement coercion by preventing the development of sentiments of support for the opposition. It did so by controlling soldiers’ access to information, and then painting the uprising as foreign and disorderly in state-backed media outlets, military propaganda, and deployment orders themselves. As a result of these two trends, only an estimated 10,000 soldiers had left the Syrian armed forces in the first year of the conflict. Things changed with time. As the conflict entered its second year and the regime shifted to a “military solution” to the rebellion, so too shifted soldiers’ decision-making environments. Troops still had clear and monitored orders to crack down on the demonstrators. But now, many soldiers felt that regardless of their actions they were in danger of dire punishment within the military. With the threat of random arrest and imprisonment increasing, the risks of remaining within the armed forces began to approach those of fleeing or fomenting revolt.

This change was accompanied by transformations in soldiers’ perceptions of the uprising as well. With time, it became more difficult for the regime to control soldiers’ access to information. Whether through their own witnessing of the opposition when repeatedly deployed, visits to their hometowns on the rare occasions leave was granted, or in phone

14 calls eventually snuck with family members, soldiers developed greater awareness of what was happening in Syria. Many who had initially believed regime rhetoric that the armed forces were facing foreign terrorists now viewed those rebelling as Syrians who had been pressured into using violence by the regime’s own response to initially peaceful demonstrations. Knowing that the opposition was homegrown and had been pressed into violence led many soldiers to form a true preference for siding with the opposition. As my theory anticipated, these changes in coercive and persuasive forces prompted at least

100,000 Syrian military personnel to leave their posts starting in 2012.

Implications

The theory and empirical findings contribute to both political science theoretically and policymaking practically. First, this work seeks to better understand the connection between coercive power and regime strength. Existing studies have begun to offer explanations for military decision-making during unrest. Yet, they are limited by taking

“the military” as the unit of analysis, and often lack a focus on the particular context of a domestic uprising. They also often rely on secondary sources to infer the causes of desertion. My approach advances existing scholarship. First, rather than collapsing the dependent variable to a study of loyalty versus defection, I ask why some soldiers remain in their positions, while others flee, and still others join the uprising. This outcome variable more closely mirrors reality. In addition, the language I employ does not impute motivations behind soldier behavior; an officer might sympathize with an opposition, but due to coercive influences, remain in his position. If the soldier fights I do not assume he has “loyal” feelings with respect to the regime. This research also dissects the military

15 itself, which is an emerging trend in civil-military relations work,16 to compare variation in soldiers’ actions within the same unrest event. My research therefore explains more fine-grained behavior amid unrest, including whether soldiers simply abandon their posts or actively join the opposition.

In addition, this study contributes to our understanding of military cohesion, and group cohesion more broadly. The military cohesion literature is general and lacks a deep consideration of context. In addition, there are innumerable factors theorized to influence cohesion, as I describe in the following chapter. My research starts from the assumption that militaries that may be very cohesive in interstate conflict or times of peace may experience sudden changes of cohesion during domestic crises. This alternative approach to studying cohesion contributes to this literature by emphasizing that cohesion may not be the slow moving and sticky variable it is often described as, but rather change based on circumstances and more immediate threats.

Finally, this work has a direct impact on studies of contentious politics and political violence. It is clear that some mass demonstrations have relatively minor results, such as limited arrests and injuries. Others devolve into slow burning civil wars, with widespread civilian and military casualties, migration, damage to infrastructure, and further destruction. A better understanding of when and why military defections occur amid unrest will shed light on why some conflicts lead to more political violence than others. Indeed, it is important to explain when soldiers are likely to flee or foment revolt, because this will influence the protests’ likelihood of succeeding, the regime’s stability,

16 Theodore McLauchlin, "Desertion and Collective Action in Civil Wars," International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 4 (2015): 669-679.

16 the composition of the armed forces moving forward, civilian casualties, and refugee flows.

It is hoped that this work will also be of use to officials in policymaking positions.

Widespread domestic unrest is often triggered unexpectedly and can develop rapidly. As a result, officials need to know which factors to focus on amid the noise—and my research shows that distinct coercive and persuasive influences go far in explaining how soldiers behave in these contexts. This research will also help us understand how to mitigate conflict by investigating the factors that drive military personnel to simply opt out of the repression versus actively join in the opposition. Anticipating such variation in military reactions to unrest will enable practitioners to envision the potential trajectory of conflict and work to prevent it before it escalates. Understanding military cohesion or lack thereof amid unrest is also crucial in post-conflict settings, when policymakers consider how to create meaningful security sector reform. In all, this study provides those dealing with an emerging conflict with a better understanding of the foundations of violent unrest and contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of the efficacy of nonviolent resistance.

Plan of the Study

The study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 delves deeper into the paper’s theory, justifies the project’s research design, and elaborates on the data used to test the argument outlined. The following four chapters are in-depth analyses of unrest events using the proposed analytical framework.

17 Chapter 3 takes up the Jordanian uprising that began in 1970 and became known as Black September. An estimated 90% of soldiers fought during the crisis, and I bring to light evidence that this occurred because soldiers had clear orders to combat the

Palestinian resistance and also perceived the resistance as foreign-backed and employing illegitimate tactics. The remaining 10% of soldiers fled the revolt and I present data indicating that although they had explicit orders to use force against the resistance, their beliefs led them to perceive the uprising as homegrown and legitimate, and risk insubordination.

Chapter 4 focuses on the Iraqi revolt of 1991, which the Baath Party labeled the

Page of Treachery and Treason. In this case study, fighting, fomenting, and fleeing were all witnessed during the conflict. The chapter investigates how the argument’s key independent variables varied across military units in Iraq and explains why this led to the

Republican Guard soldiers remaining in their positions, the Kurdish northern troops fleeing and fomenting revolt, and the southern regular armed forces joining the rebellion in its early stages.

Chapter 5 investigates Bahrain’s Pearl Revolution of 2011. This represents the study’s sole case in which all military personnel fought amid the conflict. My data indicate that this was because of uniformly clear and monitored orders for confronting the unrest, and a continued campaign to frame the uprising as foreign-backed and disorderly.

Chapter 6 represents the final empirical analysis and is an exploration of the contemporary Syrian civil war. Although this study as a whole focuses on soldier decisions at the start of unrest, the Syrian case study is used to compare how troops behaved at the beginning of the uprising in 2011, to how they responded as a civil war

18 developed between 2012 and 2014. I argue and marshal evidence to suggest that there were in fact clear and monitored orders to crack down on the initial protests and that the regime framed the opposition as terrorizing groups operating based on foreign interests.

In contrast, I show that as the uprising devolved into civil war, the clarity of orders was no longer a factor compelling loyalty, as punishment became more random within the armed forces. In addition, I explain how the developing conflict changed the way soldiers viewed the uprising, as it polarized troops’ perceptions of either an organic and legitimate revolt, or a foreign-backed effort to bring down Syria. The case is helpful in testing the study’s theory but also suggesting implications for how it might be adapted to better understand military behavior in emergent civil war contexts.

Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the study’s theory and findings, discussing its generalizability and limitations, assessing its contributions, and considering the implications for future political science research.

19 Chapter 2: Theory

“Crisis, that which threatens group survival—in past or future tenses, in either real or imagined terms—is the final and most abrupt change for any soldier. Crisis is the environment in which the last gentle expectations of civilian life are completely shed, and in which a world filled with the terrors of the unexpected engulfs the men.”1

Introduction

Why do some soldiers remain part of the military hierarchy during a domestic crisis, while others shirk orders, flee their positions, or defect to the opposition entirely?

Lichbach has argued that there is a rebel’s dilemma during such civil unrest events. As he explains, oppositionists have an interest in fueling collective dissent so their cause becomes stronger. Yet potential rebels, even those sympathetic to the opposition, have an interest in remaining free riders. By doing so they can secure their own safety and later reap the public benefits of concessions or regime change.2

A similar dilemma confronts soldiers at the start of an uprising. The outcome of widespread demonstrations, protests, and riots is unknown when they first begin. The soldier has questions about what is going on precisely, who is involved, and whether his unit will be deployed to confront the unrest. In such contexts, soldiers may be sympathetic to a challenged regime or to the nascent opposition. But there are challenges to decisive action in support of either group. As Olson has succinctly explained, “‘Just as it does not normally pay a typical individual to rebel, so it also does not pay for the typical policeman or soldier or bureaucrat who happens to believe the regime to go out of

1 Bruce Watson, When Soldiers Quit: Studies in Military Disintegration (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), 24. 2 Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Economics, Cognition, and Society) (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

20 his way to help the regime survive simply because he favors the regime.’”3 Going out of one’s way to be loyal often requires using force—including lethal force—against one’s fellow citizens and putting oneself at risk by joining the front lines. On the other hand, shirking the regime’s orders may carry similar or heightened risks. The political and security apparatus may be monitoring soldiers’ behavior and enforcing punishments for insubordination to a greater extent, given the crisis. Leaving one’s position during a national state of heightened alert is not likely to be simple; instead, it may well involve deserting from the site of the confrontation and navigating state checkpoints. In sum, when a domestic crisis hits, and in an environment of limited information, the soldier faces physical and emotional challenges that pull on desires to remain loyal or desert the regime and this complicates his decision-making during unrest.

From the regime’s perspective, continued military loyalty is required for its survival. The military is a regime’s linchpin; without its support, the country’s leadership may fall to the opposition. This prominent role for the military is an outcome of its multifaceted legitimacy and power. The military is an organization that often embodies traditional, bureaucratic, and charismatic legitimacy.4 Moreover, the fact that militaries

“control a significant portion of the state’s coercive apparatus”5 means they have resources to press directly for the fulfillment of their interests. While these singular characteristics make the military an interesting institution to consider in any light, they make it particularly significant to study with regard to issues of regime stability. This

3 Ibid., 257. 4 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1961); Robin Luckham, "The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues," African Studies Review 37, no. 02 (1994): 13-75. 5 William R. Thompson, "Corporate Coup-Maker Grievances and Types of Regime Targets," Comparative Political Studies 12, no. 4 (1980): 485-496.

21 military legitimacy and strength pose a complex problem for a state’s leadership: a military must be strong enough to defend the regime, but not strong enough to undermine it.6

Domestic unrest heightens these civil-military tensions. When facing an uprising, an autocrat is forced to rely on his military. Although police and intelligence forces are typically willing to exercise their powers over internal security, they are not always capable of suppressing mass demonstrations and larger-scale rebellions. In cases in which domestic unrest is significant, the regime will implicitly or explicitly order the military to protect the government. At such moments, militaries step prominently into politics.7 As

Andreski has succinctly explained: “So long as the government retains the loyalty of the armed forces, no revolt can succeed.”8 The significance of the military at these times has been repeated by other observers. Zimmerman has written that, “Whether [the revolutionaries] will indeed be successful depends on the strength and loyalty of incumbents’ coercive forces,”9 and Chorley has explained that: “Owing to the immense technical superiority of trained and fully equipped troops, it can be laid down that no revolution will be won against a modern army when that army is putting out its full strength against the insurrection.”10

6 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 57. 7 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006). 8 Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1968), 71. 9 Ekkart Zimmermann, Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions (Routledge Revivals): Theories and Research (New York: Routledge, 2013), 402. 10 Katharine Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution (London: Faber and Faber LTD, 1943), 243.

22 Although the regime relies on the military’s loyalty during such crises, the armed forces are not a “passive instrument in the hands of the government.”11 Why do some soldiers remain subordinate to their civilian and military leaders, whereas others shirk their duties in such circumstances? In this chapter I outline how I conceptualize military behavior during domestic unrest, focusing on how soldiers fight, flee, or foment revolt. I then review existing explanations for variation in this outcome, comparing those that focus on intra-military versus extra-military variables. I argue that these explanations provide a foundation for understanding military behavior in the circumstances studied, but that they do not go far enough in predicting outcomes across a variety of cases. I therefore offer my theory for why we see variation in fighting, fleeing, and fomenting not only across domestic conflicts, but also often within militaries facing the same crisis. My argument is that military behavior is shaped by both persuasive and coercive influences on the soldier. I conclude by outlining the project’s research methodology, case selection rationale, and data sources. This lays the foundation for my analysis of significant cases of unrest in the subsequent chapters.

Dependent Variable

The first task in conceptualizing military loyalty during civil unrest is to elaborate the unit of analysis, and the majority of studies have taken the military institution as the unit of study.12 Few have disaggregated the military to look at the loyalties of subsets of

11 Ibid., 98-99. 12 Zoltan Barany, How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016a).; Maria Josua and Mirjam Edel, "To Repress Or Not to Repress—Regime Survival Strategies in the Arab Spring," Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 2 (2015): 289-309.; Terence Lee, Defect Or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).; Pion-Berlin, Esparza and Grisham, Staying Quartered: Civilian Uprisings and

23 individuals,13 such as the top brass versus subordinate officers;14 soldiers of different ethnicities, hometowns, or units;15 and individuals of different security organizations.16

My theory operates at the level of the individual; I argue that certain factors influence an individual soldier’s likelihood of remaining loyal. This is an important starting point because a quick review of military responses to domestic conflict shows that the armed forces often do not act in concert. Taking the Arab Spring as example, the world witnessed loyal and disloyal military units face off against one another in Libya and

Yemen; and in Syria, individual soldiers deserted and defected from the armed forces, while others remained fighting. Although there is value in detecting broad trends in whether the military as a whole remains loyal during domestic crises, a more fine-grained analysis that is able to explain differing patterns at lower levels of military organization promises to shed greater light on the conflict’s escalation or resolution.

The second task is understanding how the unit of analysis behaves during unrest.

In existing scholarship, Lee’s work studies when the armed forces will defend versus defect from an autocratic regime,17 and Barany and Makara investigate under what

Military Disobedience in the Twenty-First Century; David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, "Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking during Constitutional Crises in Latin America," Comparative Politics 42, no. 4 (2010): 395-411. 13 Some theories argue that changes occur on an individual level but reduce their data collection to the institutional level. This leads Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), for instance, in their quantitative analysis of military desertion’s affect on the efficacy nonviolent resistance, to code the Iraqi military in 1991 as not split in its loyalties, even though my research indicates that large swathes of the military were insubordinate and even joined the tide of protests. 14 Hicham Bou Nassif, "Generals and Autocrats: How Coup‐Proofing Predetermined the Military Elite's Behavior in the Arab Spring," Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 2 (2015b): 245-275.; Holger Albrecht and Dorothy Ohl, "Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in Authoritarian Regimes," Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1 (2016): 38-52. 15 McLauchlin, Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion; Theodore McLauchlin, "Desertion, Terrain, and Control of the Home Front in Civil Wars," Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 8 (2014): 1419-1444.; McLauchlin, Desertion and Collective Action in Civil Wars. 16 Alejandro Pachon, "Loyalty and Defection: Misunderstanding Civil-Military Relations in Tunisia during the ‘Arab Spring’," Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 4 (2014): 508-531. 17 Lee, Defect Or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia, 3.

24 circumstances militaries support or oppose an uprising, or whether they fracture during crisis.18 Although the majority of existing studies investigate a dichotomous variable of military subordination or insubordination,19 this study goes a step further to distinguish between two types of insubordination: whether the soldier actively joins in the opposition or rather flees his position and disregards orders. Again, this study’s decision is driven by a desire to match the conceptualization with the empirical reality of military behavior in conflict settings. For instance, when considering the Cuban revolution of 1959, one scholar noted that soldiers’ “degree of unwillingness [to fight] ranged from reluctance to fight and readiness to surrender, to outright conspiracy against the regime and defection to the rebels.”20 In addition, this research’s move to expand the dependent variable mirrors recent work on rebel group behavior, which has investigated variation in insurgents’ loyalty, demobilization, and defection amid conflict.21 In this project I similarly seek to understand to what extent soldiers choose among three specific responses, which I label fighting, fleeing, or fomenting revolt.

Fighting entails actively using force to suppress demonstrations. In reflecting on

World War II, Samuel Marshall wrote that: “it is the soldier who fights who wins battles, that fighting means using a weapon, and that it is the heart of man which controls this use.”22 By participating in operations when deployed to confront unrest soldiers are choosing to fight. This includes employing typically non-lethal force to quell the unrest,

18 Barany, How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why.; Michael Makara, "Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring," Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (2013): 334-359. 19 An exception is Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2010), who investigate whether a corporate military remains represses, rebels, or remains quartered during unrest. 20 Diana EH Russell, Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa (New York: Academic Press, 2013), 27. 21 Ben Oppenheim et al., "True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why," Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 794. 22 Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 23.

25 including the use of tear gas and water cannons, and may also include using lethal force against protesters. In the cases I studied, fighting took different forms. It included the

Jordanian soldier who used artillery against the Palestinian movement in 1970, and the

Bahraini who fired on demonstrators in 2011, for instance.

Fleeing refers to standing on the sidelines or leaving one’s post during these events. This is the first type of insubordination, or deviance, from the military hierarchy I study. A soldier is recognized as fleeing the unrest when he remains quartered despite orders to deploy to confront the uprising. Fleeing is also witnessed when troops leave their units to live locally or exit the country altogether. Going absent without leave

(AWOL), deserting, or demobilizing during a conflict are synonymous with fleeing. In the cases I studied, fleeing included the Jordanian soldier who left his position and moved to Syria in 1970, and the Iraqi Kurdish troops who, facing an uprising, simply opted not to confront it.23

Finally, fomenting entails joining with the emerging opposition to actively encourage their cause. This is evidenced by a soldier leaving his post to participate in peaceful demonstrations. Or, soldiers may foment revolt by joining a violent opposition group; such was the case for numerous Syrian military defectors I interviewed, who had joined the opposition’s Free Syrian Army. Soldiers who foment revolt are also sometimes

23 What I cannot easily theorize about and thus remove from my analysis is the space between full-fledged fighting and physical fleeing. Between those categories we know that many soldiers may practice forms of everyday resistance (James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008) Soldiers could take longer in executing orders, exert themselves less when interrogating arrestees, and aim poorly when firing on a crowd. This would indicate that they are reluctant to comply with what is expected of them, but still are remaining in their positions. It is difficult to judge what portion of soldiers engage in these behaviors, as it is likely that many of them continue to fight. For this reason, and because I am interested in the more permanent decision to flee the military and deprive it of any of a soldier’s fighting capacity, I refrain from theorizing about such everyday resistance.

26 labeled defectors—those who not only desert their positions, but actively defect to and join another side of the conflict.

Table 2.1: Operationalizing the Dependent Variable

Degree of Variable Indicators compliance values Fighting - Participating when deployed to confront unrest - Using non-lethal force, such as tear gas and water cannons, to confront demonstrators - Using lethal force against protesters Fleeing - Remaining quartered despite orders to deploy to confront unrest - Remaining behind, although ordered to confront demonstrators - Going absent without leave (AWOL) while remaining local or exiting the country Fomenting - Actively joining the opposition, as evidenced by

Low High participating in peaceful demonstrations or joining a violent rebel group

As Table 2.1 illustrates, even with an expanded three-category variable there is still a range of soldier responses to unrest within each category. For instance, two soldiers might both flee, yet one may remain in the barracks when ordered to deploy while another escapes from his home country completely. Still, the value of the present categorization is that it more accurately classifies types of behavior by the degree to which soldiers’ actions are compliant with a regime’s desire for them to remain in their positions and protect it. This understanding of how soldiers may fight, flee, or foment revolt lays the foundation for understanding how scholars have described and explained military loyalty in previous research.

27 Existing Explanations

There is not substantial scholarship on the precise question of why soldiers remain in their positions during civil unrest. However, there is a much broader literature on military cohesion and desertion in international conflicts, and soldier interests more generally. This work can be divided into explanations that argue fighting is influenced by intra-military factors, and those focusing on extra-military forces.

Table 2.2: Leading Explanations for Military Fighting

Intra-Military Explanations Extra-Military Explanations Primary group cohesion Identity and ethnicity Institution-level cohesion Material incentives Opposition tactics Perceived regime strength Opportunity

Intra-Military Explanations

A solid grasp on the causes of military fighting amid unrest is linked to our understanding of military cohesion in the face of an uprising. Such cohesion is of particularly high consequence during civil unrest, which might be best described as “a short notice, come-as-you-are war.”24 Within a large institution such as the military, and in the face of an immediate and pressing threat to the regime, cohesion serves as “the social referent in which individual morale is anchored and the medium through which esprit is transmitted.”25 Many scholars highlight that cohesive militaries are those able to achieve military effectiveness, both in interstate and internal conflicts. Here I contrast two camps in this cohesion scholarship—one that focuses on primary group solidarity,

24 Larry H. Ingraham and Frederick J. Manning, " Cohesion: Who Needs it, What is it and How Do We Get it to Them?" Military Review 61, no. 6 (1981): 4. 25 Ibid., 8.

28 and another concentrating on institution-level cohesion. I argue that both literatures are important because they direct our attention to the need to focus on a soldier’s position in the military hierarchy and institution. However, after reviewing the theories’ arguments and empirical examples of cohesion and its breakdown, I find that existing accounts of military cohesion do not go far enough in providing more precise predictions regarding what soldiers will do during a civil conflict.

Primary Group Cohesion

Cohesion studies at the primary group level examine how the smallest military units— usually squads of eight to twelve persons, but also platoons of thirty to forty—stand up over time, and how soldiers in these units relate to one another. For these scholars,

“cohesion represents feelings of belonging, of solidarity with a specifiable set of others who constitute ‘we’ as opposed to ‘them’”26 and manifests itself when the soldier’s, group’s, and unit leader’s aims align.27 Such solidarity, some argue, is particularly linked to a fighting force’s military effectiveness.28

Scholars have argued that repeated interactions, on and off the job, build this small unit solidarity.29 Through shared experiences in the course of daily life, “group norms and standards emerge, accompanied by sentiments of loyalty, trust and commitment to the group and other group members.”30 As a result, soldiers are more

26 Ibid., 6. 27 William D. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 4. 28 Christopher C. Straub, The Unit First: Keeping the Promise of Cohesion (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988). 29 Ingraham and Manning, Cohesion: Who Needs it, what is it and how do we Get it to them?, 8. 30 Ibid., 9.

29 likely to trust their unit leaders and bond with the men in their unit.31 There has been some empirical support for this theorized influence of small unit cohesion on desertion.

Shils and Janowitz’s classic study of cohesion in the Wehrmacht military found that primary group cohesion strengthened the armed forces as a whole; in contrast, towards the end of World War II, the scholars found that “hastily fabricated” units had undermined fighting abilities.32 McLauchlin found a similar pattern to hold in a domestic uprising, the Spanish Civil War, where within-unit mistrust appeared to spur defections.33

However, this explanation still leaves us with one particularly significant puzzle: might not strong within-unit solidarity just as well prompt soldiers to collectively dissent rather than fight during a conflict?34 Indeed, this point is argued by Little, who has stated that, “[p]rimary group cohesion does not automatically ensure that an organization will perform effectively” because “cohesive primary groups can at times supply the basis for group opposition to the goals of management.”35 For every instance of strong primary unit solidarity associated with fighting, there are empirical examples of solidarity fostering fleeing or fomenting during revolt. In his analysis of Confederate Army desertions in the American Civil War, for example, Bearman found that as the war progressed units with “strong solidarity” were more likely to witness desertions as compared to “heterogeneous companies.”36 More modern conflicts also provide numerous examples of militaries exhibiting arguably strong small unit solidarity, leading

31 Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, 13. 32 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1948): 288. 33 McLauchlin, Desertion and Collective Action in Civil Wars. 34 Hew Strachan, "Training, Morale and Modern War," Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 2 (2006): 213. 35 Roger W. Little, "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance," in The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization, ed. Morris Janowitz (New York: Science Editions, 1967), 195. 36 Peter S. Bearman, "Desertion as Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the US Civil War," Social Forces 70, no. 2 (1991): 324.

30 cohesive units to abandon the fight. This includes the Yemeni military in the Arab Spring, which fractured such that relatively cohesive fighting units supported both loyal and defecting military commanders.37

Yet another puzzle arises when we consider how some militaries that are characterized by frequent personnel turnover do not suffer from lack of cohesion or increased desertion levels during conflict. This fact was brought to light, for instance, amid the debate regarding whether the U.S. military would allow homosexuals to openly serve in the armed forces. Scholars and policy analysts pointed out that although some had argued this move would undermine primary group cohesion, the U.S. military had not historically found small unit cohesion essential for military effectiveness. The U.S. armed forces frequently rotated personnel in and out of units, and yet maintained an effective fighting force.38 Similarly, scholars have shown that hastily formed units do not always suffer cohesion shortfalls. During the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli Defense Forces were prompted to create temporary combat teams, and yet the IDF preserved its military effectiveness.39 These scholarly observations appear to be supported by soldiers’ own perceptions. A study of military life in World War II found that when asked: “‘What was most important to you in making you want to keep going and do as well as you could?’” soldiers cited “‘solidarity with the group’” less than 15% of the time.40 A final critique is that there is also disagreement as to the direction of a potential cohesion-fighting relationship. It may be the case that rather than primary group solidarity causing vigorous

37 Albrecht and Ohl, Exit, Resistance, Loyalty: Military Behavior during Unrest in Authoritarian Regimes. 38 Elizabeth Kier, "Homosexuals in the US Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness," International Security 23, no. 2 (1998): 5-39. 39 Uzi Ben-Shalom, Zeev Lehrer and Eyal Ben-Ari, "Cohesion during Military Operations A Field Study on Combat Units in the Al-Aqsa Intifada," Armed Forces & Society 32, no. 1 (2005): 63-79. 40 William M. Hix and Robert J. MacCoun, "Cohesion and Performance," in Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: A Update of RAND's 1993 Study (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 144.

31 fighting, units that fight well become more cohesive. In this way, although primary group cohesion appears to influence the soldier’s life in garrison, it does not clearly predict soldiers’ fighting decisions during conflict.

Institution-Level Cohesion

Rather than center their attention on primary group solidarity, other scholars focus on cohesion at the military institution level. Castillo defines such cohesion as both “the capacity to fight with determination and flexibility on the battlefield” as well as “the ability to resist internal pressures to collapse as the likelihood of winning a war decreases.”41 Institutional cohesion, in this way, is more related to esprit de corps, which

“denotes feelings of pride, unity of purpose, and adherence to an ideal” linked to the broader military organization.42 Such institutional cohesion is thus seen to relate to the military’s will to fight,43 and indeed, this has been a common starting point for scholars’ analyses of military behavior in the specific context of civil conflict. Researchers such as

Barany and Lee have sought to understand whether the military is institutionalized in such a way that a level of organizational cohesion is established, explaining whether militaries fracture or hold together when a domestic crisis hits.44 Barany, for instance, in unpacking uprisings has considered whether there have been generational, military branch, or other cleavages affecting corporate unity preceding unrest.

41 Jasen Castillo, Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 2. 42 Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer, Nijhoff, 2013), 46. 43 Castillo, Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion, 8. 44 Zoltan Barany, How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016b).; Lee, Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia.; Lee, The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia.

32 This approach to understanding military responses to unrest also leaves us with unresolved puzzles. This study seeks to explain varying patterns in military breakdowns during unrest. Yet, the institutional cohesion hypothesis does not offer clear predictions regarding how exactly militaries might fracture during crisis, and particularly whether soldiers simply flee their positions or actively join in the revolt. The institution-level focus on cohesion would also seem unable to explain swift shifts in military desertion patterns during conflict. In addition, although the primary group cohesion argument can be more easily operationalized—by cataloguing within-unit turnover, or a soldier’s confidence in his colleagues—the institution-level argument is more difficult to define and measure, and therefore more susceptible to post-hoc reasoning. If the military has acted in unison, it is easy to overlook the fissures that existed on the eve of uprising. If the military has fallen apart, it is simple to focus on the many ways in which its forces were divided in the years before unrest.

The military cohesion literature provides substantial groundwork for extended research into soldier decision-making amid civil conflict. This existing research presses scholars to consider how the soldier is embedded in the military hierarchy and therefore part of not only a small-unit environment, but also the total military institution. And yet, as many have noted, although cohesion “has often been studied and is widely used as a variable in research” it in fact “remains problematic as a concept and in its measurement.”45 Taking the existing literature as a foundation, I am interested in identifying factors that explain specific patterns in military cohesion—why some

45 Guy L. Siebold, "The Evolution of the Measurement of Cohesion," Military Psychology 11, no. 1 (1999): 5.

33 militaries witness the vast majority of their soldiers remaining in their positions, while others experience differing patterns of fleeing and fomenting revolt.

Extra-Military Explanations

Identity and Ethnicity

When scholars step outside the military to explain why some soldiers fight they often turn to the power of an individual’s identity, and this is linked to a discussion of ethnicity.

Those focusing on ethnicity, however, are varied in how they understand this form of identity to be related to loyalty and desertion. One argument is that soldiers refuse to fight when their identity is close to that of demonstrators. In the wake of the Arab Spring,

Lutterbeck argued, for instance, that a “firm connection” linking the military and society was likely to serve as a “restraining factor” for troops deployed to confront unrest.46 In this way, it is hypothesized that a shared affinity between soldiers and demonstrators, based on their close identities, restricts fighting. Lyall has similarly suggested that regimes recruiting soldiers from excluded “out-groups” will find these troops suffer from lower morale and poorer training, which will make them more likely to desert.47 Others contend that it is not ethnic affinity or grievances per se that explain military behavior, but rather the information identity markers send regarding a soldier’s expected loyalties during a crisis. According to this theory, when militaries recruit on the basis of ethnicity,

46 Derek Lutterbeck, "Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil–Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society 39, no. 1 (2013): 33. 47 Jason Lyall, Why Armies Break: Explaining Mass Desertion in Conventional War (Unpublished Manuscript, 2014).

34 all soldiers assume troops from the ethnic in-group will remain loyal to the regime amid unrest; in such circumstances, general military cohesion is argued to remain high.48

Regimes certainly believe identities influence soldier behavior. This is arguably why Saddam Hussein recruited Sunni Tikritis to join his elite Republican Guard, and why

Saudi leaders have drawn heavily from the ruling Al-Saud family.49 There is also some evidence to suggest that ethnic identity is associated with fighting or deserting during conflict. In the Wehrmacht military, for instance, units that were extremely ethnically heterogeneous were reported to have higher desertion and surrender rates.50 In addition, one retrospective analysis found that Soviet military units with a higher proportion of non-Slavic members were “most likely to have problems.”51

These existing explanations underscore how a soldier’s identity is linked with his actions during these substantial crises. But they leave us with a number of puzzles as to the exact relationship between ethnicity and identity, and fighting. First, why would soldiers from an excluded ethnic group even serve in the military to begin with, and how can we explain heterogeneous militaries that maintain their cohesion and military effectiveness during conflict? Henderson has pointed out, for example, that although it can be helpful to recruit among coethnics, leaders can also work to socialize particular soldiers so that they “do not form autonomous minority groups with separate norms incongruent with army norms.”52 This appears to have been the case for the Soviet military over time; as one soldier explained, “‘After the first term of service, the relationship among nationalities becomes more equal; all become more like brothers.

48 McLauchlin, Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion. 49 Quinlivan, Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East. 50 Shils and Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, 285. 51 Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, 34. 52 Ibid., 26.

35 During the first term of service, Uzbeks make friends only with Uzbeks, Russians with

Russians, Jews with Jews, and so forth. But in subsequent service, this is leveled out.’”53

In other words, and as scholars focused on intra-military dynamics would urge us to recognize, ethnicity does not appear to simply and directly affect behavior during unrest.

Instead, it is likely that the soldier’s place in the military culture and hierarchy moderate the influence of ethnicity and identity on action. There is evidence that some mediating factor must be at work, influencing the effect of ethnicity on decisions to stay in or leave the armed forces. Otherwise, why would the majority of Palestinian soldiers serving in the Jordanian military in 1970 decide to stay in their positions and use force against the Palestinian guerillas that year? And, why did the majority of Sunni conscripts in the Syrian military in 2011 initially remain in the ranks and use force against mainly

Sunni protesters? Ethnicity arguments highlight broad patterns by showing which soldiers, on average, may be more likely to refuse to fight. However, they do not explain why some soldiers do in fact remain in their positions during an uprising populated by their coethnics.

The need for a more nuanced understanding of how ethnicity influences soldier behavior is also evident when we realize that existing explanations leave us puzzling over the forms of dissention among out-group soldiers, if they in fact leave the military. This literature leaves us wondering why it was the case that the small number of Palestinians in Jordan who did leave their units in 1970 chose to flee the country, rather than immediately join the Palestinian uprising and fight with it. Turning to Iraq in 1991, although the Kurds chose not to fight the Kurdish uprising in the North, they did not join

53 Ibid., 37.

36 in the protests in large numbers; in contrast, the majority of Shia serving in Iraq that year were swept up in the southern riots and participated in fomenting the revolt. Again, it is clear that soldiers’ identities influence how they react to an uprising. Existing explanations can be pushed forward, however, to explain under what circumstances and in which ways identity influences specific behaviors during civil conflict.

Opposition Tactics

Political science has a growing literature on the efficacy of protest techniques in swaying security forces’ actions during revolt. One hypothesis that has gained particular traction in scholarly and practitioner spheres is that protestors practicing non-violence are more likely to encourage soldiers to refrain from using force to suppress them. In their study of domestic unrest in Serbia in 2000 and Ukraine in 2004, for instance, Binnendijk and

Marovic found that non-violent demonstrators corrupted security forces’ willingness to use force against them,54 and Chenoweth and Stephan came to a similar conclusion in their study of civilian movements globally.55

Yet, again, this explanation still leaves us with a number of puzzles, the most important of which is: Why then do soldiers ever use violence against non-violent protesters? This was the case in China during the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, as well as in the early demonstrations in Bahrain and Syria in 2011, which I research in this study. Similar to the argument about ethnicity, the opposition tactics perspective is important because it orients us to the power of soldiers’ perceptions. In this account, it is

54 Binnendijk and Marovic, Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004). 55 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.

37 not only the soldier’s own identity that influences his behavior and how he views the uprising, but it is also how he views the nature of the opposition.

Material Incentives

According to another argument, when deciding whether to fight, a soldier questions whether his material concerns are heavily dependent on his military employment. Indeed, it is important for a regime to adequately remunerate its soldiers if it expects them to continue in the service.56 In the context of unrest, the logic is that soldiers whose income is dependent on the regime comply with orders; for soldiers whose income is diversified or lacking under the current regime, there should be greater variation in compliance decisions. After reviewing evidence of intramilitary rivalry on the eve of protests in Asia, for example, Lee argued that military officers considered potential material rewards for abandoning embattled autocrats.57 Similarly, Nepstad has recently claimed that regimes that privilege an ethnic group in the armed forces are more likely to guarantee their loyalty if in-group members receive selective benefits.58

Money alone does not appear to ensure military loyalty, however, as “[s]ecurity cannot be purchased in the long run.”59 Although a soldier’s financial circumstances will weigh on him in everyday life, this factor is less likely to influence his ability to potentially sacrifice himself in combat.60 On both the Confederate and Union sides of the

56 Andreski, Military Organization and Society, 98. 57 Lee, The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia, 642. 58 Sharon Erickson Nepstad, "Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria," Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 345. 59 David C. Rapoport, "The Praetorian Army: Insecurity, Venality, and Impotence," in Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies, eds. Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 263. 60 Paul C. Stern, "Why Do People Sacrifice for their Nations?" Political Psychology 16, no. 2 (1995)220

38 American Civil War, for example, there is evidence that the poor and wealthy deserted.61

One study hypothesizes that material incentives did not play a substantial role in ensuring soldier loyalty during that conflict because the respective regimes, which were fighting for their very existence, were often unable to show a credible commitment to maintaining promised financial incentives. Moreover, those who the military sought to tempt with battlefield promotions—and thus greater pay—may have been just as easily dissuaded from accepting these material perks, given the fact that prominent military figures were more likely to be targets in the conflict.62 Again, the critique here is not that soldiers are unlikely to consider their material circumstances when deciding whether to remain in their positions. Patronage has been recognized as an “important source of elite cohesion” yet one that is particularly helpful in maintaining “elite cooperation during normal times.”63 When faced with domestic unrest, it is more likely that soldiers have higher- priority considerations, including their own safety and security, as well as moral positions connected to their own identities and perceptions of the opposition.

Perceived Regime Strength

There are two final existing explanations that I take into account. These are less well established; nevertheless, on the surface they provide potentially intuitive accounts of why soldiers fight during a conflict.

One is that soldiers will base their decisions on their perceptions of how strong

61 Bearman, Desertion as Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the US Civil War, 324.; Katherine A. Giuffre, "First in Flight: Desertion as Politics in the North Carolina Confederate Army," Social Science History 21, no. 02 (1997): 256. 62 Matthew E. Kahn and Dora L. Costa, "Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War," Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 2 (2003): 522. 63 Levitsky and Way, Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability

39 the regime is. The assumption is that when a regime appears to be severely challenged, soldiers may join the bandwagon to land on the right side of history. In contrast then, regimes that appear to be more in control of the conflict will retain their military personnel. Despite the intuitiveness of this argument, there are conspicuous accounts of soldiers fighting desperately for militaries that serve severely embattled regimes. This was certainly the case for the German Army in World War II. Indeed, with respect to that conflict Shils and Janowitz found that soldiers’ expectations about the war’s outcome did not clearly influence their behavior; those who expressed great “pessimism as to final triumph” often fought until the end.64 In the current study, the case of Jordan’s opposition to the Palestinian resistance in 1970 also provides evidence against this hypothesis. King

Hussein had ceded much autonomy to the commandos ahead of the operations to suppress the resistance, and many inside the country as well as regionally and internationally questioned his ability to retain the throne. Even in the shadow of the relentless challenge to the Jordanian regime, the vast majority of soldiers fought the unrest.

Opportunity

An additional argument is that those soldiers who have the opportunity to defect will, and those who lack such a window will not. Again, this theory has not been greatly elaborated on in the literature, but may very well be at work in the civil unrest context. In an echo of this argument Fearon and Laitin argued that insurgencies are more likely to develop in areas that are highly mountainous and disconnected from a state’s effective control; in

64 Shils and Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, 301.

40 other words, rebellion is argued to be more likely when oppositionists have greater opportunity to organize their dissent.65 One application of this logic to the circumstance of desertions comes from McLauchlin, who drew evidence from the Spanish Civil War to show that soldiers from mountainous hometowns were more likely to desert, on average, than colleagues from other areas.66

Yet the nascent opportunity thesis leaves gaps in our understanding of soldier decision-making during domestic unrest. It is likely true that soldiers require a means of leaving the service. But the opportunity argument stands too close to the observation of desertion and defection itself. It is difficult to separate the cause of insubordination from the act when one focuses on opportunity. Did a soldier simply desert, because he could?

Moreover, it does not appear that combatants often make quick desertion decisions to take advantage of windows of opportunity. After interviewing more than one hundred

Viet Cong (VC) defectors, a RAND study found that the vast majority had decided to defect more than one month before they finally did so. On the day of their ultimate defection they undoubtedly took advantage of some opportunity to leave their posts. But does this help us understand why these individuals eventually stopped fighting, while others did not? It seems that much more is at work explaining why these soldiers had a motive to desert or defect. Indeed, each of these individuals was seen as passing “through a number of stages, from loyal VC member, and later potential defector, to active seeker of ways to defect, and, ultimately, successful defector.”67 Similarly, in my own extensive interviews with Syrian military deserters and defectors, these individuals stressed their

65 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90. 66 McLauchlin, Desertion, Terrain, and Control of the Home Front in Civil Wars. 67 Leon Goure, Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors (RAND Corporation, 1968), 15.

41 motives for leaving the fight and argued that only afterward did they consider not only how to avail themselves of opportunities to defect but also how to create such opportunities where others would not have seen them to exist.

Summary

Existing intra and extra-military explanations for soldier fighting in civil unrest contexts are incomplete. The former set of arguments suggests that a soldier’s military environment influences his actions during combat. The latter reminds us that not only does a soldier’s martial context matter, but so too does that individual’s identity, his practical considerations, and his perception of the opposition and the environment in which he operates. Although these existing accounts are unable to provide systematic explanations regarding why soldiers fight, flee or foment revolt—even within the same military confronting the same uprising—they form a basis for the development of my theory.

Persuading and Coercing to Fight Unrest

Soldiers always have a level of grievances that form “an underlying basis of discontent” that can undermine the military’s level of cohesion.68 The context of domestic unrest has the potential to exacerbate and add to these annoyances of daily life. Soldiers confronting a mass movement are likely to face combat stress, fatigue, and the heightened possibility of injury if deployed. They may also worry for family members when soldiers are separated from their kin. As one Confederate soldier wrote to his

68 Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution, 128.

42 family in the American Civil War: “‘You know not how…Depressing it is to get letters that breathe a spirit of Discontent…one-half of the Desertions from the Southern army is caused by the letters they receive from…home.’”69 In order to deal with these many grievances that cut into the average soldier, a regime seeks to ensure there is “political control over the military,” which, “entails depriving it of both the means and the motives to challenge the regime.”70 During a civil unrest crisis, I argue that there are two axes that go far in explaining whether regimes combat soldier grievances and encourage fighting: persuasion and coercion.

Persuasion Axis

Soldiers will be more likely to remain in their positions during crisis if persuaded they want to fight and have an interest in doing so. Otherwise, dissonance “between the demands of the military and pre-existing values and norms” is likely to fuel insubordination.71 In response to this challenge, “social control” aims “to reduce goal divergence so as to avoid conflicts of interest in the first place.”72 Such persuasion contributes to a fighting mentality, as it undermines a soldier’s sense of individualism and ties him to the institution’s mission.73 Soldiers will be more likely to fight when they merge their individual goals with “the collective end (shooting people to gain control of a hill).” 74 Conversely, it is difficult to fight when the soldier does not believe in the cause.

For instance, some have argued that discipline in the U.S. armed forces was undermined

69 Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle, 179. 70 Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, 19. 71 Devorah Manekin, The Limits of Socialization and the Underproduction of Military Violence: Evidence from the IDF (Unpublished Manuscript, December 2015): 27. 72 Ibid., 8. 73 Bearman, Desertion as Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the US Civil War, 325. 74 Ibid., 325.

43 in the Vietnam War because antiwar demonstrations and media fostered “‘a climate of doubt and lack of sense of purpose’” among troops.75 As social control plays a key role in soldiers’ motivations to fight, understanding the sources of this persuasion is key to explaining military responses to unrest.

Existing Arguments on Persuasion: Socialization and Ideology

One recognized method of persuasion is through socialization within the armed forces.

This is the process by which individuals experience their “‘rebirth’ as group members through initiation rituals,” which, “typically meld individual recruits into a cohesive unit in which loyalties to one another are felt to be stronger than previous loyalties, such as those to family.”76 Basic training socializes recruits, for instance, as they undergo shared hardships.77 Indeed, one can expect such socialization to be potentially powerful within the military, as the organization has the potential to control “nearly every aspect of an individual member’s behavior,” from uniform requirements to deployment orders.78

Moreover, some have argued that once in combat, recruits experience the

“internationalization of group norms, cognitive dissonance reduction, habituation to violence…and dehumanization of the victimized group,” which may sustain these combatants’ will to fight.79

However, there is reason to expect that socialization can only go so far in spurring soldiers’ behavior during a civil conflict. As Manekin argues, when researching the

75 Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle. 76 Elisabeth Jean Wood, "The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks," Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 546. 77 Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle, 73. 78 Devorah Manekin, "Violence Against Civilians in the Second Intifada the Moderating Effect of Armed Group Structure on Opportunistic Violence," Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 10 (2013): 1279. 79 Wood, The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks, 546.

44 Israeli Defense Forces’ counterinsurgency campaigns, once deployed “the messy conditions of fighting begin to undermine the clear normative framework espoused during training” and, thus, the socialization that may have altered soldier thinking and behavior in garrison is likely to weaken during combat operations.80 Scholars of other militaries have pointed to cases that highlight the mutability of military socialization effects. For instance, in his work on the Yugoslav military’s sudden breakdown, Peled was puzzled by rapid changes within an armed forces that seemingly “overnight” transformed from a multinational force into “a xenophobic ethnic militia.”81 In other words, soldiers long socialized to absorb a particular set of norms quite suddenly shifted their identities.

An additional concern with this argument in the context of civil unrest is that it is unlikely that socialization’s outcomes are experienced uniformly. Instead, it is probable that socialization’s effects vary once soldiers are deployed, and particularly depending on how soldiers perceive their mission and the use of violence. Indeed, there is some research to suggest that the process of socialization itself may be inherently limited for a variety of soldiers, including “reservists, older soldiers, or individuals with compelling outside obligations.”82 Thus, there is reason to expect that socialization may explain soldier behavior in peace time better than crisis moments, and additionally that socialization does not influence soldiers’ decision-making in a uniform fashion.

80 Manekin, The Limits of Socialization and the Underproduction of Military Violence: Evidence from the IDF, 13. 81 Alon Peled, A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), xi. 82 Manekin, The Limits of Socialization and the Underproduction of Military Violence: Evidence from the IDF, 28.

45 A further method of persuasion is ideological indoctrination, which “cements the armed forces to civilian society and validates the strains and sacrifices of the soldier,” according to Strachon.83 Ideology is thought to enhance leaders’ control over their combatants by suppressing individual motivations to group needs and as a result

“dampening principal-agent problems, prioritizing competing goals, and coordinating external actors including civilians.”84 Indeed, Castillo has argued that militaries that have the will to fight, and perform well on the battlefield, achieve control over both their societies and militaries through ideological indoctrination.85

The importance of ideology in combat has a mixed empirical record, however. On the one hand, Castillo points to the German military in WWII, and North Vietnamese military in the 1960s and 1970s, as evidence for the impact of ideological strength supported on military cohesiveness in combat. There have been other empirical examples of ideology persuading soldiers to fight as well. Shils and Janowitz found in their study of the German army that a “‘hard core’” of 10-15% of enlistees were essential for supporting primary group cohesion and the military’s effectiveness throughout much of

World War II.86 In a series of questionnaires, ideology was also found to be “the single most important factor” spurring American volunteers to continue to fight during the

Spanish Civil War. 87 And during the American Civil War, data suggests that those who enlisted in the South near the start of the conflict—those who the researchers believed had a greater belief in the Confederacy’s ideology—were less likely to desert in the

83 Strachan, Training, Morale and Modern War, 214. 84 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Ideology in Civil War Instrumental Adoption and Beyond," Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 213. 85 Castillo, Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion, 28-29. 86 Shils and Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, 286. 87 Kahn and Costa, Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War, 520.

46 course of the war.88 Finally, some scholarship on ideology within rebel groups has found that “ideologically motivated combatants are less likely to side-switch” during conflict.89

Ideology may very well be a force in persuading soldiers; but, similar to socialization, it appears to have its limits. First, it is rare that regimes are able to exert as powerful of an ideology over society and military as Castillo states is required to keep militaries cohesive based on this form of persuasion. But moreover, others have questioned the extent to which grand ideologies influence the average soldier’s actions during conflict. According to Strachon, for instance, evidence points to the fact “that

German and British soldiers, in both world wars, regarded political education with boredom at best and deep cynicism at worst.”90 Indeed, Shils and Janowitz, who themselves recognized the National Socialist true believer core within the German Army, pointed out that this was a minority of soldiers and argued that more personal considerations influenced soldiers’ willingness to fight in World War II.91 Similarly,

Williams has reflected that although ideology may play a large role in acclimating a conscripted soldier to military life in garrison, ideology is less salient an influence on the deployed soldier.92

Persuasion Reconsidered

Rather than focus on social control through long-term socialization or ideological indoctrination processes, I consider shorter-term influences on soldiers’ perceptions and

88 Ibid., 539. 89 Oppenheim et al., True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why, 814. 90 Strachan, Training, Morale and Modern War, 214. 91 Shils and Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, 281. 92 Robin M. Williams, "The American Soldier: An Assessment, several Wars Later," Public Opinion Quarterly 53, no. 2 (1989): 163.

47 how these may persuade combatants to fight. This shift to focus on how soldiers’ perceptions are formed and transform as a civil crisis unfolds more accurately reflects the position this soldier is in when potentially facing an order to suppress civil dissent. As

Lehrke has noted, “as an order moves down the hierarchy it goes to a unit further from the regime and closer to the threat, which can mean different perceptions and priorities.”93

This reflects military scholars’ observation that the ordinary soldier on the battlefield is not as connected to the larger institution as he is to those closer to him. In studying the

U.S. military in the Korean War, Little argued that soldiers were not motivated “by identification with some formal symbols of a particular organization or its traditions.”

Instead, “the Army began with their buddies and extended little farther than the platoon and company. Beyond these levels the organization was as meaningless as it was complex.”94

I therefore focus not on persuasion through lofty ideology or abstract nationalism, but rather narratives specific to the conflict at hand. Indeed, as Gould has argued:

Short-term events highlight certain collective identities at the expense of others but rarely in a completely unambiguous way. That is why, during moments of political turmoil or state collapse, hundreds or even thousands of would-be shapers of events compete to provide definitive interpretations of what is going on—interpretations that invariably include statements about who the relevant collective actors are. Revolutions and insurrections are enormously generative of this sort of interpretive activity precisely because they seem to permit the construction of so many more versions of what is happening than is usually the case with institutionalized politics.95

The generation of competing interpretations of unfolding events is what I study here.

Under what circumstances are soldiers persuaded that a mass movement is legitimate,

93 Jesse Paul Lehrke, "A Cohesion Model to Assess Military Arbitration of Revolutions," Armed Forces & Society 40, no. 1 (2014): 158. 94 Little, Buddy Relations and Combat Performance, 204. 95 Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 201.

48 and thus the soldier should not fight it? Or, conversely, when does a soldier view an uprising as threatening to national security, and thus feel a duty to suppress the revolt?

Drawing from research on principal-agent relationships, military behavior and police interactions with protests, I argue that a soldier’s perceptions of an uprising’s degree of foreignness and the legitimacy of its tactics influence his motivation to fight. In the following I outline why these particular perceptions are significant and how they are formed. Then, at the conclusion of this section I develop propositions regarding how these persuasive perceptions interact with coercive measures to produce variation in fighting, fleeing, and fomenting revolt.

Foreign

When an uprising is perceived as foreign-backed, soldiers are more persuaded to fight.

An uprising that is labeled as foreign-inspired and supported will enhance the soldier’s sense that the military is being confronted by an outside actor because “the intensity of the feeling of solidarity varies inversely with the intensity of the feeling of hostility towards outsiders.”96 Scholars have noted how units become more cohesive in response to external threats, and also how citizens become mobilized to support a defense effort in the face of an foreign enemy.97 When a soldier perceives that the uprising has foreign connections this influences his behavior, through his sense of duty and fear.

First, such an uprising is more likely to activate a soldier’s feeling of the duty to fight. Some militaries have mandates to defend their nation against internal threats.98

96 Andreski, Military Organization and Society, 7. 97 Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle, 175. 98 Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking during Constitutional Crises in Latin America.

49 However, it can be difficult for a state to argue for what constitutes a significant and legitimate internal threat, a point I consider further when discussing the extent to which an uprising employs legitimate protest tactics. In contrast, all militaries have a mandate to protect the nation’s security from external threats. When an uprising is painted as foreign, the us-versus-them dividing line for soldiers is clear: “our country” versus “the foreign enemy.” When soldiers perceive that the nation-state is under attack, this enhances their sense of nationalism and increases their support for the threatened homeland.99 As a result, when the civil opposition is seen to be linked to foreign groups, soldiers feel more justified in using force to contain and suppress it.

In contrast, when soldiers perceive an uprising as homegrown, they are more likely to question whether to fight it because it is less evident that national security is imperiled. There are clear examples of soldiers questioning the legitimacy of fighting when facing what they perceive to be a national rather than foreign movement. For instance, Ketchley has argued that Egyptian civilians’ fraternization with soldiers led to the latter’s unwillingness to use force against the people during the Arab Spring. By raising chants such as “the army and the people are one hand!”, climbing on top of tanks and taking photos with soldiers, these protesters demonstrated that this was an Egyptian uprising.100 The danger posed to a regime if an uprising maintains a homegrown character is also evidenced by the fact that regimes are reticent to deploy troops in their own hometowns. The North Vietnamese Army was noted for its policy of stationing soldiers far from their own villages, for instance.101 One reason regimes are worried about soldiers

99 Stern, Why do People Sacrifice for their Nations? 100 Neil Ketchley, "“The Army and the People are One Hand!” Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution," Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 1 (2014): 155-186. 101 Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat: 41.

50 being deployed to areas with which they are familiar is that these troops will not see residents from their hometowns as particularly threatening to national security and therefore in need of fighting. It has been observed, for example, that army units stationed around Beijing were unwilling to repress the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in

1989,102 and thus troops from outside the capital were deployed to suppress protests.

An uprising that is framed as foreign may give a soldier greater confidence that the unrest is more worthy of fighting; but, it may simultaneously enhance the soldier’s fear of combatting that very unrest. Indeed, countries have often sought to heighten soldiers’ fears of the foreign enemy in the face of interstate conflict. The Nazi Party published radio broadcasts and dropped leaflets to troops103 in an effort to create

“‘strength through fear’” in the enemies Germany faced.104 In this way, convincing soldiers that the uprising is foreign-backed may persuade soldiers of the worthiness of fighting but also discourage them from doing so due to concerns for their own safety. As

Grauer has argued in his study of surrender in interstate war, soldiers are rational actors and are ultimately interested in their own survival.105 I argue that this is one reason coercion is also necessary for a fighting force, as I explain later in this section.

Illegitimate Tactics

The degree to which soldiers perceive a movement’s tactics as legitimate also activates the soldier’s sense of duty and fear. This reasoning differs from a more direct argument

102 Mark N. Katz, "Democratic Revolutions: Why some Succeed, Why Others Fail," World Affairs 166, no. 3 (2004): 163-170. 103 Shils and Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, 308. 104 Ibid., 309. 105 Ryan Grauer, "Why do Soldiers Give Up? A Self-Preservation Theory of Surrender," Security Studies 23, no. 3 (2014): 628.

51 contending that nonviolent protest leads to regime concessions and soldier defections.106

The difference here is that this study focuses not only on the distinction between violent or non-violent tactics, but rather the way in which tactics are employed and in what context. Both violent and non-violent oppositionists may be viewed as disorderly and illegitimate in their challenges to a regime. When protestors use violence against civilians or generally indiscriminately, soldiers are more likely to view their tactics as illegitimate.

But also, among non-violent demonstrations, when protestors remain on the street, disrupt daily life or continue protesting despite regime accommodations, soldiers are increasingly apt to view the protests as illegitimate.

Soldiers are more likely to fight an uprising they view is using illegitimate tactics because they feel it is their duty to do so. When soldiers perceive movement members to be saboteurs and terrorists such perceptions influence how security forces respond to unrest. Indeed, research on police responses to protest allows us to draw a useful parallel to the soldier’s dilemma amid domestic unrest.107 Evidence from research on this area in

France, for instance, has found that although “every demonstrator has the [legal] right to equal treatment, it has become clear both through studying demonstration reports and through conducting interviews with police officers that they always pass an implicit judgment on the demonstrators’ legitimacy, according to the perceived characteristics of the protest organization.”108 In this way, the tactics a movement employs influence the degree to which members of the coercive apparatus view that movement as legitimate.

Again turning to France, researchers have found that security forces have viewed workers’

106 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. 107 Olivier Fillieule and Fabien Jobard, "The Policing of Protest in France: Toward a Model of Protest Policing," in Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies, eds. Donna della Porta and Herbert Reiter (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 85. 108 Ibid., 85.

52 protests as more legitimate in comparison to those led by what they consider to be

“young, privileged, student senseless looters.’”109 Police officers in Britain were found to similarly discriminate between what they considered to be legitimate and illegitimate protests. Those in the former camp abided “by the unwritten rules of institutionalized protest” and would communicate with the police during demonstrations. In contrast, protests by leftist and anarchist groups were seen as operating outside the normal “‘game’” and thus even those committed to nonviolence drew different police responses.110 A similar pattern was found when studying the Federal German Republic in 1970s. One scholar argued that the state developed a strong police force in that period in reaction to increasing threats of terrorism directed against the state, which had “led to a renaissance of arguments for a strong state that must defend itself against attacks from both the left and the right.”111 When security forces observe a disorderly opponent, they perceive a greater threat to national security and their sense of duty is activated. Soldiers, in effect, feel they are forced to fight, a phenomenon reflected in the context of interstate war as well. For instance, it was common to hear German prisoners of war report that they “had been forced to fight for [their] life.”112 When a opposition’s tactics are perceived as legitimate, conversely, soldiers question whether it is within their mandate to fight the movement and are less likely to do so.113

109 Ibid., 85. 110 P. A. J. Waddington, "Controlling Protest in Contemporary Historical and Comparative Perspective," in Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies, eds. Donna della Porta and Herbert Reiter (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 129. 111 Martin Winter, "Police Philosophy and Protest Policing in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1960- 1990," in Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies, eds. Donna della Porta and Herbert Reiter (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 200. 112 Shils and Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, 302. 113 Kelly Rae Kraemer, "Dealing with Military Defectors," Peace Review 26, no. 1 (2014): 14.

53 Although such conditions may increase a soldier’s perception of the legitimacy of using force against the uprising, they may also inspire greater fear in facing the unrest.

When an uprising is seen as disorderly, soldiers do not know what to expect during their deployment to confront the demonstrators and thus are likely to become more fearful of them. As was the case in facing a perceived foreign uprising, this fear is a primary reason

I later point to the supplementary importance of coercion when preparing soldiers to fight.

Formation of Perceptions of Foreignness and Illegitimate Tactics

If soldiers are more persuaded to fight uprisings that are viewed to be foreign and employing illegitimate tactics, then the natural question becomes: How are such perceptions formed? During a civil conflict, regime framing, opposition actions, and direct foreign interference may suggest that a revolt has foreign linkages.

First, regimes may work to discredit the civilian, domestic nature of a revolt by presenting or fabricating evidence that it is in fact connected to foreign interests. Regimes try to monopolize the conflict narrative, insinuate that protestors are linked to external actors, and assert that participants are connected to foreign financial supporters.

Opposition groups can work to undermine their own foreign framing, particularly by fraternizing with soldiers once an uprising begins.114 However, they may also harm their own cause. Persecuted groups may receive asylum in neighboring areas before returning to advocate for their cause; or, citizens may receive external training in protesting or fighting methods. In some circumstances, and particularly when a regime exploits these developments, an opposition’s foreign connections can hurt its credibility. Finally,

114 Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution, 247.

54 external actors can influence a soldier’s perception of the uprising’s degree of foreignness.

A regime may not paint an opposition as alien, and the group may actively work to underscore its domestic character and aims. Yet, a regional or international actor may intervene to support the opposition rhetorically, financially, or militarily and thus create the perception of a foreign-backed revolt. Aspects of regime framing, opposition action, and foreign interference influence whether soldiers view as activated their role as national security protector and whether they are persuaded to suppress a revolt.

Coercion Axis

Persuasion is often not enough to keep troops fighting, however. Although soldiers’ perceptions as to an uprising’s degree of foreignness and use of illegitimate tactics can increase their sense of duty to fight, they may also heighten these soldiers’ fear in doing so. In such cases, there remains a divergence of interests between military commanders and their soldier agents. Moreover, even if soldiers are not overly frightened by those on the streets, morale may be difficult to maintain because the “army is still a crowd, though a highly organized one;” as a result, during “times of great stress it is subject to the same laws which govern crowds and it is only the presence of strong control which keeps it from acting like a mob.”115 Everyday as well as combat dynamics influence a soldier’s will to fight, even if he believes in the purpose of the effort. For instance, in the American Civil War, a Union soldier was more likely to leave his position during periods when death rates spiked in his unit and the Confederacy had gained advantage on the battlefield.116 Similarly, researchers interviewing Viet Cong

115 Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command, 148. 116 Kahn and Costa, Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War, 539.

55 defectors found that many were motivated to stop fighting because they suffered from personal hardship, fear of death, and family economic hardship.117

A military seeks to persuade its soldiers to fight and build norms that support cohesion.118 However, when stress is high and persuasion falters, an embattled regime benefits from the formal control necessary to maintain cohesion.119 Indeed, the soldier often “fights because of his lack of alternatives or because he is actuated by the instinct of self-preservation.”120 Such formal control “aims to align diverse preferences through incentives and sanctions”121 so as to deter defection.122 Discipline in the military serves many purposes, such as socializing the recruit. But its “primary purpose is to ensure that the soldier does not give way in times of great danger to his natural instinct for self- preservation but carries out his orders.”123 Indeed, such discipline and sanction systems were recognized in the Wehrmacht military124 as well as England’s New Model Army, which was noted for its discipline, “so crucial a part of the coercion necessary for an effective army.”125 Here I argue that formal control, or coercion, operates when a soldier receives clear orders, when his behavior is monitored, and when he perceives he will be punished for behavior that violates orders.

117 Goure, Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors, xi. 118 Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, 13. 119 Ibid., 25. 120 Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle, 304. 121 Manekin, The Limits of Socialization and the Underproduction of Military Violence: Evidence from the IDF, 8. 122 Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle, 133. 123 Ibid., 89. 124 Shils and Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, 297. 125 Jonathan R. Adelman, Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History (Boulder, Colorado: Rienner, 1985), 26.

56 Clarity of Orders

The Milgram studies publicized how “ordinary people can engage in incredibly destructive behavior if so ordered by legitimate authority.”126 Indeed, the first step in coercing compliant behavior from a soldier is providing clear orders regarding what in fact is the desired behavior. Such clarity is required because although authority figures influence whether soldiers kill on the battlefield, a military “leader’s mere presence is not always sufficient to ensure killing activity” but rather he “must also communicate a clear expectancy of killing behavior.”127 The soldier needs to know plainly what is expected of him and therefore what behavior is punishable and not punishable. The clarity of orders can easily vary during a domestic uprising. At one extreme, the regime has articulated what the military is charged with executing amid the unrest and the military leadership has communicated to soldiers how this plan will be carried out. In this case, political leaders have articulated to their commanders that soldiers are to use a particular level of force to quell the uprising. Then, military leaders articulate these orders from the highest echelons of the armed forces to the most basic units. From there, general orders are well- defined when followed by instructions regarding how they are to be executed.

Such an understanding of how clarity of orders influences military reactions to unrest is supported by research on military cohesion in other contexts as well. Watson, for instance, found that breakdowns in cohesion during interstate conflict were often preceded by breakdowns in communications,128 which disrupted militaries’ ability to relay orders and instructions regarding their execution. More historical examples

126 Susan T. Fiske, Lasana T. Harris and Amy JC Cuddy, "Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners," Science 306, no. 5701 (2004). 127 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Back Bay Books / Little, Brown Company, 2009), 144-145. 128 Watson, When Soldiers Quit: Studies in Military Disintegration, 158.

57 corroborate the importance of communication between political and military leaders, and their soldier subordinates. During the French revolution, one commander was responsible for 30,000 troops, ostensibly enough to protect the Bastille from falling. Yet the officer felt he had not received clear orders from the government. As a result, he stationed the majority of his soldiers outside of the city center and “decided on tactics of inactivity.”

When the “insurgents” attacked the Bastille, those few troops stationed inside the city, and without clear orders, were reported to have joined in fomenting the revolt.129

Similarly unclear orders undermined soldiers’ fighting during the Thermidor in 1794 when the masses again threatened the French government and the National Guard was rallied. After being summoned, the troops stood by for hours “without orders and with no real knowledge of the cause for which they had been called out or the interests they were being asked to defend.” As a result, “bored, hungry, and bewildered” they slowly left the rallying point and no fighting force remained when the “insurgent troops” arrived.130 This led one scholar to reason that if a regime wants its military to fight a rebellion, it must first convey clear instructions to its soldiers such that “failure to obey orders can only be construed as open mutiny, a decisive breaking of their allegiance which many may hesitate to take.”131 Clear orders are necessary to clarify to soldiers what they are tasked with accomplishing and therefore what qualifies as insubordination.

Monitoring

The provision of clear orders does not ensure they are followed, however. To effectively coerce soldiers, there must then be monitoring so that troops are less likely to shirk these

129 Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution, 153-154. 130 Ibid., 155. 131 Ibid., 155.

58 commands. In non-martial contexts, this is akin to a performance evaluation, which establishes control over subordinates through monitoring and judging their behavior.132

Monitoring’s value has been acknowledged in the military context as well. Grossman has found that authority figures in the armed forces are most effective and most likely obeyed when close to the subject,133 and thus able to better monitor the execution of their orders.

Such surveillance capabilities are necessary to discover when a soldier deviates from the norm, push him back in line, and maintain cohesion.134 This monitoring may be carried out by a separate intelligence service, military intelligence, or special military detachments.135

Monitoring has significantly altered behavior in numerous militaries. There is evidence that during the Vietnam War, surveillance and internal reports prevented desertions from the North Vietnamese Army when weak leadership, extended hardships, and physical insecurity threatened cohesion.136 Such monitoring was a significant factor limiting desertions among Viet Cong rebels as well.137 According to one VC leader, members of three-person cells were charged with observing each combatant’s behavior; according to this VC member: “‘That was why I couldn’t rally [defect] before.’”138 In addition to within-cell monitoring, there were “constraints on freedom of movement” as well as “screening by guerrillas charged with checking strangers,”139 all contributing to the monitoring of behavior and thus limiting defections. As these examples show, when

132 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, "Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches," Management Science 31, no. 2 (1985): 134-149. 133 Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, 144. 134 Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, 25. 135 Kahn and Costa, Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War, 520. 136 Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat, 64. 137 Goure, Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors, x. 138 Ibid., 20. 139 Ibid., 20.

59 field conditions deteriorated, soldiers often stayed in their positions simply because they knew their actions were being observed.

Punishment

In addition to receiving clear orders and having their behavior monitored, coercion requires that soldiers assume detected insubordination will be punished. There are many examples of the fear of punishment influencing a soldier’s decision to remain working despite desires to desert. The American Civil War featured two military forces with relatively weak discipline, and one scholar described the Union Army’s particular lack of coercive abilities and infrequent punishment of desertion.140 The war saw extremely high desertion rates on both sides of the conflict as a result of weak coercion. There is evidence, however, that in the course of the war the introduction of greater discipline at times influenced the likelihood of desertion. One Confederate soldier, for instance, recorded how he abandoned the idea of deserting to help his family at home once he witnessed harsher punishments exacted on deserters.141 A similar story was told of some

British soldiers serving in World War I, who were under the belief that machine gunners had been instructed to shoot deserters. In addition, ahead of the Battle of the Somme troops were reportedly told that military police would fire on those who failed to proceed with the assault.142 For German soldiers in WWII, not only were deserters in physical danger of punishment should their actions be caught, but the regime would also target their families.143 Such threats to punish deserters’ loved ones also arose in Stalin’s WWII

140 Kahn and Costa, Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War, 528. 141 Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle, 136. 142 Ibid., 146. 143 Shils and Janowitz, Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II, 290.

60 military144 as well as for the Viet Cong.145 These examples suggest that threats of punishment for insubordination influence a soldier’s decision-making during conflict.

Summary

Soldiers cannot always be persuaded to fight. If an uprising appears to be homegrown, if a mass movement operates in an orderly fashion, if the soldier’s morale is weakened by fatigue or fear, and in other circumstances, formal control is necessary to maintain a soldier’s steadfastness and continued service. As Lynn argued when studying combat motivation in revolutionary France: “For an army to operate properly, for battles to occur, soldiers must do what they are told to do, no matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task.”146 Coercion requires that orders are clearly conveyed from leader to military commander, and from commander to subordinates. In turn, soldiers’ behavior must be monitored and punishments made clear and enforced. If this does not happen, in other words, “[w]hen commanders are weak and lack authority” then “competing sources of authority can emerge undermining the hierarchical group structure” and orders will be shirked “as commanders will be less able to enforce rules and norms.”147

Propositions

Combinations of low and high levels of persuasion and coercion produce variation in soldier fighting, fleeing, and fomenting during unrest. The explanations for

144 Kahn and Costa, Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War, 520. 145 Goure, Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors, 23. 146 John A. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791-94 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 23-24. 147 Manekin, Violence Against Civilians in the Second Intifada the Moderating Effect of Armed Group Structure on Opportunistic Violence, 1280.

61 values of the dependent variable, based on combinations of the independent variables, are summarized in Table 2.3 and described below.

Table 2.3: Dependent Variable Explanations Based on Independent Variable Combinations

Persuasion High Low (Foreign and (Homegrown illegitimate and legitimate tactics) tactics) High Fight Fight or Flee

Coercion Low Flee Foment

Proposition 1: When persuasion is high and coercion is high, soldiers are likely to fight.

In combination, a clearly articulated and monitored plan to confront the unrest, and the perception that a revolt is foreign-backed and disorderly, create the regime’s ideal conditions for fighting soldiers. In such circumstances, troops are persuaded that national security is imperiled and therefore feel it is appropriate that the military deploy to confront the unrest. Even though the soldier may be hesitant to face the uprising, the existing orders, monitoring, and punishment measures in place coerce him when his will to do so falters.

Proposition 2: When persuasion is high and coercion is low, soldiers are likely to flee.

If we remove coercion from the first scenario, it is likely that soldiers will change their behavior and instead flee their positions. A lack of clearly communicated orders

62 means that a soldier is unsure of the military’s response to unrest. He may find it unclear whether the military has been ordered to confront demonstrations, or, what operational plan is in effect to do so. Barring such communications of his role in the repression and whether the regime and military stands behind such operations, he is unlikely to put his life on the line. This is especially true when the protests themselves are seen as foreign- supported and disorderly. Under such circumstances, the protests are likely viewed as frightening and potentially harmful for the soldier. An unruly, mob-like protest receiving the backing of an external actor is the most difficult force to confront. Without a plan to do so, and barring the monitoring and punishment that accompanies clear orders, the soldier is likely to flee his position and evade the conflict context.

Proposition 3: When persuasion is low and coercion is low, soldiers are likely to foment.

Although a lack of clear orders spurs non-compliance in any scenario, when coupled with a homegrown and orderly opposition the opportunity arises for the soldier to join in fomenting rebellion. Soldiers will be loath to use violence against fellow citizens who by all assessments are pursuing a domestic reform campaign. Indeed, in such circumstances soldiers are likely to be most sympathetic to the mass movement’s national cause and thus most likely to support the uprising in some way. The soldier also has no explicit constraints on his ability to participate in the demonstrations or unrest, because he has not received orders to the contrary. As a result, he is not at a high risk of punishment for participation in the unrest and therefore has few restrictions on his behavior.

63 Proposition 4: When persuasion is low and coercion is high, soldiers may fight or flee.

The most challenging situation in which to predict soldier reactions to unrest is when the regime does give clear orders to suppress the revolt, but soldiers perceive that the demonstrations are in fact homegrown and employing legitimate tactics. The soldier is likely to feel torn in such circumstances. On the one hand, clear and monitored orders communicated through the military hierarchy tend to coerce compliance with such orders.

On the other hand, soldiers may feel opposed to using force against peaceful, civilian dissenters.

I argue that fighting is likely to be the baseline for soldiers with clear orders, as they have directives from superiors and are often monitored and punished in the regime’s effort to limit shirking. However, in cases in which soldiers perceive that the opposition is thoroughly homegrown and employing legitimate tactics, and especially when the conflict is prolonged, they may choose not to fight despite the risks. In such circumstances, they are likely to flee the conflict rather than foment rebellion. This is because the soldier will be aware that fellow service members have been clearly ordered to crack down on the revolt. As a result, he will not want to use force to attack former colleagues who are “forced” to carry out those orders. Moreover, the strong command and control exerted by the military means that the apparatus has a greater ability to track down the insubordinate soldier and punish him; for this reason, the soldier will avoid entering the conflict environment after leaving the armed forces. Finally, because a clear military plan is in place the uprising’s efficacy is in doubt and therefore there are fewer incentives for the soldier to risk direct participation in the unrest.

64 It is likely that this is one of the combinations with the fewest empirical observations. Regimes know that soldiers are loath to use force against fellow civilians, if those civilians are seen as navigating their own agenda and are employing legitimate protest tactics. It is also damaging for a leader’s domestic and international reputation if there is clear evidence that he has ordered the suppression of spontaneous, domestic protests. In such scenarios, when regimes are unable to control the uprising’s narrative, they are less likely to give clear orders to repress homegrown dissent.

The logic of my argument implies that fighting, fleeing, and fomenting can vary within militaries at the start of an uprising. One unit may receive clearer orders than another; and one unit’s experiences or characteristics may lead it to view the uprising as more foreign-inspired than others, for instance. It also implies that decisions may vary across soldiers within the same units, if perceptions of the uprising’s foreignness or tactics differ. Finally, these outcomes may vary over time if a soldier’s decision-making environment changes.

Research Design

To test the preceding propositions this study employs a controlled comparison of case studies, which are analyzed through process-tracing analysis of qualitative data. In this section I explain how my case selection strategy provides leverage in ruling out existing explanations for military decision-making during domestic crises. I then outline the diverse data collected to test this study’s theory. The chapter concludes with a summary of how the subsequent case study chapters follow through on this research design.

65 Case Selection

Seawright and Gerring highlight a comparativist’s tough position—we seek to conduct a rigorous analysis of a small number of cases, but often have innumerable potential cases from which to choose.148 In selecting unrest events for this study, I follow the advice of Slater and Ziblatt, who argue that controlled comparisons maximize internal and external validity when they “operationalize their chief subject of concern in terms of general variables or mechanisms, that seek out representative variation that attempts to mirror a broader population, and that engage with theory to select cases that maximize control.”149 I have already constructed a theory in terms of general variables that can be assessed in any domestic uprising context. In addition, I select cases with an eye to both enhancing the diversity of the countries studied but also controlling the potential alternative explanations, which would interfere in my causal analysis. Such an approach ensures that the case studies can be used in developing and testing theories.150

In choosing case studies for this analysis, my primary goal was to select unrest events that allow for within-event comparisons of military decision-making. In this way, my main comparisons are among soldiers serving in the same militaries at the same time.

However, my secondary goal was to choose a diverse group of unrest events. This will allow me to assess whether the argument has significant limitations in its generalizability over time, space, and other factors held constant when implementing a within-event analysis.

148 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 294-308. 149 Dan Slater and Daniel Ziblatt, "The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison," Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 10 (2013): 22. 150 Harry Eckstein, "Case Studies and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

66 I first considered how potential cases allowed for a within-event comparison of military decision-making. As Table 2.4 shows, the Jordan 1970 case study allows me to hold constant two existing explanations for soldier behavior, as material incentives were consistently average and opposition violence was constantly high throughout the country.

Despite this, there was both fighting and fleeing during the conflict. In addition, an ethnic identity argument does not fully explain the observed outcomes. Although deserters were more likely to be Palestinian, a substantial portion of Palestinians remained in their positions and fought during the unrest.

Table 2.4: Jordan 1970 Case Study Leverage

Majority of troops Minority of troops Ethnic Identity 50% Jordanian 1% Jordanian 50% Palestinian 99% Palestinian Material Incentives Average Average Opposition High High Violence Coercion High High Persuasion High Low Outcome Fighting Fleeing

The Iraq 1991 case study provides similar leverage over alternative explanations, as indicated in Table 2.5. Opposition violence was uniformly high across the country, and so this cannot explain variation in behavior during the crisis. Material incentives also appear to be poor predictors of the varied fighting, fleeing, and fomenting. It is difficult to characterize the Iraqi army’s monetary incentives, as Saddam Hussein frequently promised financial rewards for loyalty but it was unclear whether such rewards would be forthcoming. In any case, material incentives were on a par among the troops in Iraq’s

North and South, and yet there was variation in fleeing and fomenting. Finally, ethnicity

67 again does not provide a complete picture of soldier decision-making during the crisis.

When Kurdish troops faced the revolting Kurds in Iraq’s North, many simply fled the revolt. In contrast, when the Shia majority soldiers faced the predominantly Shia population revolting in Iraq’s South, many decided to join in the revolt initially. Ethnic identity was not a clear predictor of the exact soldier behavior observed during unrest.

Table 2.5: Iraq 1991 Case Study Leverage

Republican Guard Kurdish, northern Southern, retreating troops troops Ethnic Identity Majority Sunni 100% Kurdish Majority Shia Material Incentives Higher (assumed) Average Average Opposition High High High Violence Coercion High Low Low Persuasion High Medium Low Outcome Fighting Fleeing Fomenting, and Fomenting Fleeing with time

I have also conducted an analysis of Bahrain’s 2011 uprising. As Table 2.6 shows, in this case there is no variation in how military personnel responded to events. However, the case allows me to investigate more fully the opposition violence argument. In Bahrain in

2011, opposition violence was extremely low at the start of the unrest and yet there was strong fighting. In addition, it was not monetarily advantageous to serve in the Bahraini forces. Despite this, soldiers fought those on the streets. This case requires that I unpack the ethnic identity argument and compare it closely with the evidence related to my argument, to adjudicate between the two.

68 Table 2.6: Bahrain 2011 Case Study Leverage

All troops Ethnic Identity 99% Sunni 1% Shia Material Incentives Average Opposition Low Violence Coercion High Persuasion High Outcome Fighting

The contemporary Syrian crisis is the final event this research investigates. This study is focused on military decision-making at the start of crises. For that reason, I begin by analyzing soldier behavior in the first months of the Syrian conflict in 2011. In this period, all soldiers in the Syrian armed forces had relatively poor pay, and so financial incentives do not explain why the vast majority fought when deployed. Similarly puzzling is the fact that the uprising originally employed non-violent tactics, and yet soldiers remained in their positions. Finally, although a small number of Sunni soldiers did leave the military in 2011, most fought the unrest. As a result, the case study shows that soldiers deployed against coethnics do not always and immediately defect to the opposition.

Table 2.7: Syria 2011 Case Study Leverage

Majority of troops Less than 10,000 troops Ethnic Identity Alawis, Minorities, Primarily Sunnis Sunnis Material Incentives Average Average Opposition Low Low Violence Coercion High High Persuasion High Low Outcome Fighting Fleeing primarily

69 I also include the Syria case in an effort to understand how military decision-making might transform once a domestic uprising devolves into a prolonged civil conflict. For that reason, I include a further analysis of how fighting, fleeing, and fomenting patterns varied between the initial conflict (2011) and civil war (2012-2014).151 In this case, material incentives remained constant across the military, and yet this later period witnessed much greater variation in soldier behavior. The opposition increasingly used violence as the conflict devolved into civil war, and this high level of violence is another constant in the second phase that cannot explain variation in soldier decision-making.

Finally, as the conflict continued although the vast majority of fleeing and fomenting troops were Sunni, there were also Sunnis that remained in the armed forces. In this way, military behavior in the Syria case study remains puzzling without investigating how coercion and persuasion varied as the conflict progressed.

Table 2.8: Syria 2012-2014 Case Study Leverage

Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Ethnic Identity Alawis, Sunnis Primarily Primarily Minorities Sunnis Sunnis Material Average Average Average Average Incentives Opposition High High High High Violence Coercion High High Low Low Persuasion High Low Low Low Outcome Fighting Fighting Fleeing Fomenting

This case selection strategy also gives me greater confidence in the extent to which I can generalize my findings. Although all located in the Middle East, these

151 The second Syria analytical narrative stops at 2014 to restrict analysis of an ongoing conflict.

70 countries exhibit variation across significant political variables—they represent monarchies and republics, occur in different decades, and are defined by distinct ethnicity dynamics. Leaders ranged in age from 34 to 61 years old during the crises, and events were both anticipated, violent encounters but also more peaceful, spontaneous uprisings.

Finding a similar pattern to hold across such diverse contexts will suggest that my causal claims apply to a variety of unrest events.

Finally, these cases are of strong substantive interest for policymakers and area specialists. Conflict in Jordan in 1970 shaped the demography of the Levant and nature of the Palestinian conflict; suppressing the 1991 unrest in Iraq allowed Hussein to remain in power until the 2003 war; Bahrain’s fighting military quelled threats to the Al-Khalifa monarchy; and the Syrian uprising has devolved into a protracted and internationalized civil war. Although these mass mobilization campaigns have had an outsize influence on regional and international politics, there are few accounts of military decision-making during these crises. The chronology and details of the four events remain unclear in part because we lack oral histories from the soldiers themselves. My research will contribute to improving assessments of political-military relations in the Middle East by detailing and analyzing patterns in soldier defection during these turning-point crises.

Analysis and Data

In analyzing the cases, I am seeking to maximize “causal-process observations” rather than discrete data points.152 In other words, I will test my theory through process- tracing, by identifying how my independent variables are connected to the dependent

152 Henry E. Brady and David Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010).

71 variable through the mechanisms I have elaborated on in my theory.153 To do so, my project exploits qualitative data from eight months of fieldwork in Bahrain, Jordan and the Palestinian territories; interviews; archival documents; and secondary resources.

Interviews are a crucial component of my data. As Wood wrote when researching why individuals rebelled in El Salvador’s civil war:

my principal research strategy was to ask participants in the insurgency why they supported it, and to ask others why they did not. For revolutionary social movements, this is not usually done; the scholarly analysis of peasant rebellions, revolutions, civil wars, and even some social movements often relies on official or elite sources. 154

When beginning this project, I found a similar hesitancy among scholars of political- military relations to go into the field and ask soldiers why they did what they did during a domestic crisis. My focus on conducting interviews for each case study was designed to access the very people about whom I am theorizing. I conducted a total of 111 interviews for my research: 51 with individuals who were in the respective military at the time of the unrest; and 60 with other unrest participants, such as individuals who participated in the protests and key political figures at the time. In addition, I held innumerable informal conversations with international experts on these countries, militaries and unrest events, as well as individuals working in the fields of human rights and security studies. All interviews were conducted according to an Institutional Review Board-approved protocol.

The bulk of my interviews were conducted in the field between 2013 and 2015.

From Jordan I had access to retired Jordanian soldiers and was able to interview individuals on the 1970 uprising in that country. In addition, many Iraqi soldiers and

153 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 154 Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 31.

72 citizens have moved to Jordan following the 1991 uprising and subsequent violence in

Iraq, facilitating Jordan-based interviews on that case study. Finally, the recent civil war in Syria has forced more than 600,000 Syrians to move to Jordan, which provided an opportunity to interview Syrians in Jordan. In addition, I traveled to Ramallah, in the

Palestinian Territories, to interview Palestinians who had fought with the resistance in

Jordan in 1970, and I carried out a research trip to Bahrain to interview individuals for that case study as well. Finally, a limited number of interviews were conducted via Skype and telephone, with individuals based in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.

Locating interviewees, particularly current and former military officers, presented challenges. I was not able to identify the total pool of potential respondents and therefore could not randomly sample this population to construct a representative sample of soldiers exposed to conflict in each case. Still, I took steps to enhance the variation within my data. First, I had multiple entry points into communities to which I sought access for each case study. I recruited potential interviewees by utilizing my existing networks in the Middle East, meeting researchers on the ground, and conducting informational interviews at human rights organizations, to name a few examples. After having conducted initial interviews with the target population I pursued respondent-driven chain referral, also known as snowball sampling. Current interviewees were asked to identify contacts that fit the parameters of the study and nearly all leads were followed due to the restrictiveness of the population I aimed to study. There was no systematic trend in the individuals who did or did not proceed with interviews. Two political figures declined interviews, likely due to the sensitivities of the case studies examined. In addition, a small number of Syrian deserters based in Jordan refused an interview, as it was not

73 compensated. This was not seen to bias the pool of respondents, as many of the Syrian deserters who were interviewed suffered economically as well.

Most interviews occurred in the interviewee’s accommodations or office, although a few were held in public settings. For interviews on the Syria case study, a

Syrian research assistant (RA) typically accompanied me. This served multiple purposes.

First, this RA kept track of our research leads and corresponded with potential recruits to organize the interview date and time, particularly when interviews were held outside the capital. Second, the RA living outside the capital was able to navigate us to the interview location. Third, given the sensitivity of the topic studied, the all-male interview pool and fact that I am a woman, and the reality that Syrian interviewees preferred to be interviewed in the privacy of their own homes, I was aided in being accompanied by a male RA. To provide an indication of the degree of sensitivity of the research, some interviewees put on the television and radio in an effort to contain the sound of our conversations. Finally, the RA was immeasurably helpful in the course of the interview.

Interviews were typically conducted in Arabic, and I could pause the interview and ask a clarifying question to the RA if I could not understand the injection of Syrian colloquial.

In addition to practical challenges to recruiting interviewees and conducting the interviews themselves, the interview research presented analytical challenges. Again turning to Wood’s work in El Salvador, she acknowledges openly that interviewees’ responses “were shaped by three factors: the accuracy and intensity of the respondent’s initial memories, the subsequent shaping of those memories through social and cultural processes, and the respondents’ objectives in the ethnographic setting of the interview

74 itself.”155 I also assume these factors were at work during my conversations in the field.

Wood goes on to argue that there is scholarly evidence that memory is aided when the topic of discussion is an event of high intensity and strong emotional valence.156 This may suggest that the soldiers and civilians I interviewed were more likely to recall the events I sought to discuss, as these mass uprisings and subsequent regime crackdowns were significant emotional events. I sought to focus interviewees’ recollection in the course of conversation. When speaking with deserters, for instance, I asked, “what happened in the last month before you left the military?” Similarly, I followed Fujii’s lead in assessing not only the spoken content of oral testimonies in conflict settings, but also analyzing the

“meta-data” conveyed in these interviews by reflecting on what participants chose to say and not to say, for instance.157 Finally, I took steps to triangulate information from interviews with data available in other forms. Pearlman has recognized how “[p]ersonal narratives might contain omissions or misrepresentations, or might harden into social scripts;” yet, she points out that written documents have similar pitfalls and encourages scholars to overcome these obstacles “by critically comparing multiple sources.”158 This study therefore draws on much more than interview data to make an argument regarding the significance of military persuasion and coercion during times of civil conflict.

The second main data source for this study is archival resources. I have exhausted the Saddam Hussein archives hosted by the National Defense University, and Iraq archives housed at the University of Colorado Boulder and Hoover Institution at Stanford

University. In the archives I accessed Baath Party documents detailing responses to

155 Ibid., 33. 156 Ibid., 33. 157 Lee Ann Fujii, "Shades of Truth and Lies: Interpreting Testimonies of War and Violence," Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 232. 158 Wendy Pearlman, "Narratives of Fear in Syria," Perspectives on Politics 14, no. 1 (2016): 22.

75 repression orders, which gives me a fuller picture of the population of military loyalists and defectors in 1991. In addition, I made use of Palestinian archival documents, which were accessed at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Ramallah, as well as available U.S. archival documents. Finally, I draw on sources including personal memoirs, previously recorded oral histories, human rights reports, contemporary media coverage, and additional secondary sources. The following chapters pull from this data to test my argument regarding the power of coercive and persuasive influences on the soldier’s dilemma in civil conflict.

76 Chapter 3: Jordan and Black September, 1970

“They call it Black September (aylul al-aswad); I call it White September (aylul al-abiyad).”1

Introduction

“It is premature to predict where this situation is heading,”2 wrote Henry

Kissinger to President Nixon on September 21, 1970. Five days had passed since the start of the Government of Jordan’s crackdown on Palestinian resistance fighters based in the country, and it was still unclear whether King Hussein would hold onto his throne. He estimated that 25,000 Palestinian commandos were now based in Jordan.3 They were no longer simply conducting cross-border raids into Israel, but were now establishing what many viewed as a “state within a state” in the country, raising revolutionary slogans about the power of the resistance as well as harassing his political elite and average soldiers. A U.S. Army officer in Amman at the time recalled how each “day there were rumors of the impending collapse of the regime”4 and a Jordanian diplomat on a plane returning to Jordan recalls a foreigner asking him: Who will win the inevitable showdown?5 The government won the showdown—which was launched on September

16, 1970 in a crisis that would come to be known as Black September—in large part

1 Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian Close to Political and Military Figures in 1970, Interview ID 103 (Amman, Jordan, May 14, 2015, 4pm). 2 "305. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 21, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/21/70, Secret, Sensitive." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 860. 3 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice" (Central Intelligence Agency, December 1970), 19. 4 Norvell B. DeAtkine, Ambassador Dean Brown and the Jordanian Crisis of 1970: A Study in Leadership (American Diplomacy, 2001). 5 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 57 (Amman, Jordan, February 24, 2015, 4:30pm).

77 because the vast majority of its military personnel remained in their positions and fought the commandos.

It was not inevitable that the preponderance of soldiers would in fact fight as they did. The Jordanian military did not provide soldiers with exceptional material incentives to fight, and the force was not trained in the urban warfare that Black September would require. It was also not clear that King Hussein would remain in power, particularly once

Syria invaded Jordan’s northern border on September 21. Moreover, an estimated 50% of soldiers serving in the Jordanian military at the time were of Palestinian origin. The resistance marketed itself as a liberation army seeking to regain Palestinians’ land and dignity. Many had friends and relatives in the resistance network, or at the very least knew individuals living in the Palestinian-majority areas that would be targeted in the urban warfare campaign to crush the resistance. Why was it the case that the vast majority of these Palestinians remained in their positions and fought the commandos?

I argue that the Jordanian government exercised a high degree of coercion over soldiers in 1970. King Hussein ensured that there were clear orders for how the military would assault the Palestinian resistance, and that those orders would be conveyed to the troops. In addition, persuasion was at work in the conflict. Resistance missteps, government manipulation, and external intervention painted the Palestinian fighters as a foreign threat to Jordan’s stability. In combination, this resulted in soldiers’ increased willingness to stand firm and fight the resistance, regardless of their potential sympathies and connections to the broader Palestinian cause. Finally, although orders were clearly communicated throughout the entire military, I argue that a small portion of the fighters were true believers in the Palestinian resistance. They viewed the uprising as homegrown

78 and were thus not persuaded to combat the unrest, nor were they moved by the regime’s efforts to coerce them into fighting. As a result, they fled their positions during the events, as my theory would expect.

In large part because the majority of soldiers fought in September 1970, and those who deserted fled rather than fomented revolt, the regime-threatening crisis was downgraded in a week and a half. By July 1971 the Palestinian fighters had fully fled the country or were arrested. The military’s cohesion not only resolved the regime’s crisis in

1970 but also had long-lasting effects both on Jordanian society and the Palestinian resistance. A new form of “Jordanian Jordanian” identity was inspired once the resistance was expelled from the country, and Palestinians were informally purged from sensitive positions such as those in the armed forces. For the resistance itself, although the deserters had not joined in fomenting rebellion in 1970, they had fled to Syria to advance the cause. These 3,000-5,000 former soldiers from the Jordanian military went on to form a brigade called Quwat al-Yarmouk, which would play a significant role in the resistance’s armed struggles during the Lebanese civil war. Thus, both the fact that most soldiers remained loyal, and the fact that those who deserted chose to flee, had a pronounced effect on Jordanian and Palestinian politics in years to come.

This chapter draws on diverse data sources. A significant source is the forty-three interviews held with Jordanians and Palestinians. These interviews were conducted in

English or Arabic, based on the interviewee’s preference, and took place in Jordan

(Amman, Madaba, and Salt) as well as the Palestinian Territories (Ramallah) between

2014 and 2015. I spoke with individuals who had served in the Jordanian armed forces in

1970—both those who stayed in their positions and those who deserted during the crisis.

79 In addition, I interviewed political and military figures affiliated with a variety of

Palestinian resistance commando groups at the time. Finally, I spoke with a limited number of individuals who were civilian conflict witnesses to Black September, both of

Palestinian and Jordanian descent. In addition to interview data, I exploit a range of archival documents from the United States government and Palestinian resistance movement, in both English and Arabic. This includes, for example, telegrams between

Washington, D.C. and the U.S. Embassy in Amman during the crisis; U.S. National

Security Council meeting minutes discussing the strength of King Hussein’s regime; and

Palestinian resistance statements ahead of and during the conflict. Finally, there is a body of work on the Jordanian military’s composition following the 1967 war as well as the political climate in Jordan in 1970. These books and articles are written by Jordanians,

Palestinians and others, and I exploit this available secondary research in my study.

These sources aid in triangulating information gained through interview research and represent the most thorough analysis to date of military decision-making during Black

September.

This chapter begins with a description of King Hussein’s military and its relationship with the Palestinian resistance, which provides a foundation for understanding the Black September conflict. I then elaborate on how studying this domestic unrest event provides leverage over existing explanations of military decision- making. The following section explains why the majority of soldiers fought in 1970, providing evidence that they were influenced by coercion but also often persuaded that the uprising was foreign and disorderly. I then analyze why a minority of soldiers fled during the conflict, showing that although orders were also explicit for these soldiers,

80 they were true believers in the resistance and so perceived it was of the people and thus not their duty to fight. The chapter closes with a discussion of the implications of this pattern in soldiers’ decision-making in Jordan.

King Hussein’s Military and the Fedayeen

Establishment of the Jordanian State and Military

The Emirate of Transjordan was created in 1921, and with it a reserve force used to enforce tax collection in the territory. Shortly after, the Arab Legion was formed and used as a volunteer police organization. The Jordanian military gained greater institutionalization with the arrival of British commander “Glubb Pasha” in 1930 as he worked to incorporate Jordan’s Bedouin population into the Arab Legion.6 In the early years of the force, the Legion was deployed to fight internationally, including in 1941 amid World War II.

Jordan gained full independence from Britain in 1946, but retained Glubb Pasha and British military advisers for years to come. Many interviewees have shared their belief that this history of British training has enhanced the Jordanian military’s professionalism. The Jordanian military was described as professional due to its British training and organization, and the fact that it inherited the British’s degree of military discipline; Israel only feared the Jordanian military, recalled one officer.7 Another portrayed the Jordanian armed forces as a “national army” (jaish watani) rather than a

“party army” (jaish hizb), and underscored how the armed forces were “non-political”

6 Ronen Yitzhak, Abdullah Al-Tall, Arab Legion Officer: Arab Nationalism and Opposition to the Hashemite Regime (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 13. 7 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General, Interview ID 17 (Amman, Jordan, August 10, 2014, 12:30pm).

81 (ghiyar musayas),8 similar to their British trainers. A former Palestinian political figure remarked that the Jordanian military has been characterized by its strength, discipline, and a good uniform; as he expressed it, from head to toe Jordan inherited its culture from the British.9 With the passage of time, the Jordanian armed forces continued to exhibit a

British influence. A Central Intelligence Agency analysis from the 1960s described how senior Jordanian leaders, including the King, received training at British military academies and had pride in their army.10

The state of Jordan has also had a history intertwined with that of the Palestinians.

In 1948 the Arab Legion played a crucial role in the Palestinians’ war with Israel. During that conflict, the Legion was comprised of approximately 6,500 officers and soldiers.11 At the time, it appears some Arab officers resigned their commissions to join the irregular, popular brigades participating in the conflict to support the Palestinians. Due to the loss of the war, Jordan became host to a wave of Palestinian refugees. In 1949 the country adopted a new name, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which incorporated some

Palestinian territory. Upon unification of these “East” (Jordanian) and “West”

(Palestinian) Bank territories, and as a result of the war, the Hashemite Kingdom now hosted roughly 800,000 Palestinians in addition to 400,000 Jordanians, or East Bankers.12

8 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105 (Amman, Jordan, May 17, 2015, 11am). 9 Author Interview with Palestinian Political Figure, Interview ID 65 (Amman, Jordan, March 9, 2015, 10am). 10 Intelligence Memorandum: Jordan’s Armed Forces (Central Intelligence Agency, January 17, 1967), 2. 11 Yitzhak, Abdullah Al-Tall, Arab Legion Officer: Arab Nationalism and Opposition to the Hashemite Regime, 25. 12 Adnan Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), 54.

82 From Arab Legion to Jordanian Arab Army

The reign of Transjordan’s first king, Abdullah I, was brought to an end in 1951 with his assassination in Jerusalem. The 1950s devolved into a contest for control of the

Jordanian state, and this included a substantial threat from Jordan’s own military.

Following Abdullah I’s death, the military did not interfere in the political transition and

Abdullah’s brother Talal acceded to the throne.13 Talal was soon removed by the legislature, however, and Abdullah I’s grandson Hussein assumed the throne at age eighteen.14 The young King Hussein, educated quickly at the British military academy

Sandhurst, was to face many challenges in his first years at the helm. In 1955 demonstrations broke out in the country in the wake of a cabinet shake-up, and due to popular discontent with discussion of Jordan joining the Baghdad Pact, a pro-Western defense organization. These demonstrations continued in early 1956. Likely partially due to a desire to implement a popular reform amid palpable domestic discontent, King

Hussein moved abruptly to remove British command over the Arab Legion and declared the forces a Jordanian Arab Army. Servicemen had grown discontent with British command of the Legion as they suffered from ammunition shortages15 and, moreover, felt

Britain had a de facto policy of limiting Arabs’ ascent in the Legion’s ranks.16

As a result of a changing political and demographic context, the Arab Legion grew from 8,000-10,000 soldiers in the late 1940s to approximately 25,000 by

13 George Haddad, Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States - Part I (New York: Roger Speller and Sons, 1971), 489. 14 His age based on the Islamic calendar. 15 Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: King Hussein's Life in War and Peace (London: Penguin, 2007), 75. 16 Ibid., 100.

83 1956.17 The Legion’s expansion included the incorporation of a number of West Bank

Palestinians in addition to recruits from Jordan’s cities, in comparison to the previous solely-Bedouin recruitment. There were reports, however, that these new recruits served in “technical and engineering services” more often than combat roles.18

In the thick of Middle East Cold War alliances and coup cascades in neighboring countries, King Hussein likely worried about his officers’ loyalty and potentially their external connections. What has come to be known as the “Zarqa incident” only reinforced these concerns. The events of April 1957 have become clouded with time and opinions.

But what appears clear is that troops under the command of General Abu Nuwar were maneuvering near the capital without the authorization of Jordan’s high command or

King Hussein. The King summoned Abu Nuwar for questioning regarding this military

“exercise,” but soon learned there was a disturbance in the Zarqa military camp.19 As supporters of the monarchy reported later, King Hussein himself rode out to Zarqa, 15 miles from Amman, to investigate and quell any dissent.

At the same time, 1957 saw significant external political and internal civilian pressure on Jordan. There were Syrian troops in northern Jordan until Saudi Arabia deployed forces and the Syrians withdrew. The threat of domestic unrest was so strong that King Hussein imposed martial law, deployed “loyal” Bedouin troops to contain populations and conduct arrests, and imposed a curfew.20 The following year witnessed the dissolution of a suspected coup plot, and King Hussein evading death when his plane was nearly shot flying over Syrian airspace. In 1959 he gained intelligence on another

17 P. J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921-1957 (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1967), 7. 18 Haddad, Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States - Part I, 483. 19 Ibid., 504-505. 20 Ibid., 507.

84 coup plot, and had the conspirators arrested while he traveled abroad. In sum, the 1950s were a challenging period for Hussein as he held onto his newly gained political power.

Raids, Reprisals, and War Alter Palestinian Politics in Jordan

If Hussein girded himself against internal, regime threats to his rule in the 1950s, the 1960s saw increasing threats from other quarters. One was the burgeoning and militarizing Palestinian resistance movement. The Palestine Liberation Organization was created in 1964 and soon began attacking Israeli targets from across the Jordanian border.

In November of 1966 there was a domestic political crisis and substantial unrest in Jordan when Israel conducted a reprisal attack on Samu’ after a PLO raid into Israel. The Israeli assault infuriated the Palestinian national movement, but it also angered Jordanians and the monarchy. According to a CIA report from the time, King Hussein and the government were “badly shaken” from the attack, and the Israeli raid greatly “humiliated the Jordan army.”21 In fact, an Agency report from the following year pointed to the

Israeli incursion on Samu’ as having “put a severe strain on the army’s confidence in itself as an effective military force,”22 which in turn affected morale and discipline within the armed forces.23 Only a month later, in December 1966, U.S. Ambassador Burns and

CIA agent O’Connell met with King Hussein and later reported that he was very emotional, given the West Bank population’s persistent demonstrations in the wake of

Samu’. He also worried that the military was becoming less and less of a reliable partner

21 The Jordan Regime: Its Prospects and the Consequences of its Demise (Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum, NSF, Country File, Box Number 146, Jordan, Memos Vol III 12/66-5/67, December 13, 1966), 3. 22 Intelligence Memorandum: Jordan’s Armed Forces, 1. 23 Ibid., 3.

85 in his reign, and was concerned that only “traditional loyalty” kept the now 50,000- person force on his side.24

Events in 1967 would begin to greatly alter the military’s operating environment in Jordan. The country was brought into the 1967 war and served as the primary military actor attacking Israel in the West Bank, while Egypt faced Israel in the Sinai Peninsula.

The result was a horrific defeat for Jordan. Militarily, it is estimated that Jordan suffered

6,000 casualties, and lost the majority of its Air Force as well as armored assets.25

Territorially, Jordan lost the West Bank and thus, demographically, gained another wave of refugees. The territorial setback also meant that Jordan had forfeited the West Bank’s economic contribution for the Kingdom, which was not insignificant.26

Most of all, the defeat in 1967 was a psychological blow to Palestinians, the

Jordanian military, and citizens in the Middle East more broadly. In the span of twenty years Arab states had twice been defeated by Israel.27 One Jordanian former diplomat described the “psychological impact that it left on the Arab world,” discussing the fact that the second defeat revealed that no Arab military had ever been prepared to the standard necessary to defeat Israel.28 Another Jordanian political figure recalled living in a military camp at the time, as his wife’s father was serving in the armed forces. When they heard that Egypt’s President Nasser, the war’s instigator and figurehead for Arab nationalism, offered to tender his resignation upon the defeat, he cried. He and many

24 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: King Hussein's Life in War and Peace.; Intelligence Memorandum: Jordan’s Armed Forces, 231. 25 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: King Hussein's Life in War and Peace, 255. 26 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 56 (Amman, Jordan, February 22, 2015, 7pm). 27 Ibid. 28 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106 (Amman, Jordan, August 13, 2015, 9am).

86 others felt that a giant had collapsed. In addition, they knew the Jordanian king felt responsible. This was the bitterness felt when the West Bank was lost.29

The failure of Arab armies to defeat Israel had ramifications for Palestinian nationalism, which impacted politics in Jordan. Palestinians now felt they had to “scratch our own itch,” meaning, they had to work for their own cause and not wait for others to operate on their behalf.30 Indeed, a more militarized Palestinian resistance blossomed in the wake of the defeat. Described as commandos, guerillas, and fedayeen (men of sacrifice; singular: feda’i), the resistance fighters found recruitment to their cause easier following the war. In addition to popular support for the fedayeen, they also enjoyed rhetorical backing from regional powers. Arab leaders used their public support for the

Palestinians as a way of deflecting attention from their own incapacities, which had been exemplified in the 1967 loss. At a time when their own populations expressed discontent with regime policies, supporting the Palestinians was an extremely popular stance.31 The

Palestinian resistance movement was thought of as a “romantic cause” that satisfied the

“craving among Arab populations for an heroic image, magnified by the war’s humiliation.”32 In particular, the Jordanian population was sympathetic with the nascent

Palestinian organizations as Jordanians and Palestinians felt these groups were fighting to regain Palestinian territory.33 Rhetorically, in January 1968, King Hussein and his prime minister met leading members of the PLO and “welcomed the revival of PLO

29 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 59 (Amman, Jordan, March 1, 2014, 4:30pm). 30 Author Interview with Palestinian Who Worked in Fatah's Media Department, Interview ID 89 (Amman, Jordan, April 1, 2015, 12pm). 31 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Officer in Security Services, Interview ID 72 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 16, 2015, 11am). 32 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice", ii. 33 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 56.

87 activity in the country ‘without reservation.’”34 At the same time, King Hussein realized that public support for the resistance had to be tempered with measures to contain the guerillas’ activity on Jordanian soil, and numerous agreements were signed in the coming years in an effort to preserve Jordan’s autonomy.

The following year, however, Israel took a more decisive approach towards the commandos and demonstrated it would not tolerate feda’i activity from Jordanian soil across the Jordan River. Following the loss of the West Bank, and tacit Jordanian support for their anti-Israeli activities, the fedayeen had established a significant presence in

Jordan’s Al-Ghour valley.35 As a result of the massing of Palestinian fighters in this area of western Jordan, and the commandos’ continued incursions from Jordan into what was now considered to be Israeli territory, Israel launched a reprisal raid across the river in

February 1968. Employing artillery and air power, it reportedly struck locations across thirteen Jordanian villages and one refugee camp, causing civilian injuries and the destruction of homes. In the wake of the attack, King Hussein stated in a national address that “‘anyone who chooses to operate from our territory should do that through us and according to our planning,’”36 a clear warning to the fedayeen that they could not continue operating unilaterally from Jordanian territory.

An even more brazen Israeli attack arrived the next month, and became a turning point for the Palestinian movement’s trajectory in Jordan. At 5AM on March 21, 1968,

15,000 members of the Israeli Defense Forces crossed into Jordan in what became known

34 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 177. 35 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 56. 36 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, 170.

88 as the Battle of Karama.37 According to one participant, the battle had fronts along three bridges: Jisr Amir Mohammad, Jisr Malak Hussein, and Jisr Amir Abdullah.38 Israeli forces were mainly directed towards Al-Karama village, a fedayeen stronghold, as well as

Ashuna.39 The Jordanian military had anticipated the battle, and was in a position to respond forcefully; it was also aided by approximately 300 Palestinian fighters.40 By midday Israel had asked for a ceasefire. Jordanian and Palestinian fighters as well as political figures underscored this as a major feat for the anti-Israel resistance. In their eyes, Israel had never before asked for a ceasefire.41 Even more importantly, King

Hussein denied the request, a fact they were proud of, and instead vowed to continue the fight until the last Israeli soldier left the East Bank.42 A tertiary victory for the Jordanians was Israel’s loss of armored assets in the battle; it was reported that many Israeli tanks had been abandoned in Jordan, another unprecedented win against the Israelis.43

The Battle of Karama put wind back in the Jordanian military’s sails. Observers noted that the victory seemed to give back to the military its “prestige” (haiba).44 As a retired officer described, the military considered this the Battle of Karama not only because Karama was the attacked village’s name, but also because karama means

“dignity” in Arabic and this victory symbolized the dignity felt by the military when it

37 Iris Fruchter-Ronen, "Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity," Civil Wars 10, no. 3 (2008): 245. 38 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91 (Al-Salt, Jordan, April 6, 2015, 10:30am). 39 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General, Interview ID 17. 40 Fruchter-Ronen, Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity, 246. 41 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General, Interview ID 17.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64 (Amman, Jordan, March 5, 2015, 1pm). 42 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. 43 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General, Interview ID 17.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. 44 Author Interview with Palestinian Political Figure, Interview ID 65.

89 emerged victorious. It was perceived that the battle changed the balance of power in the region as well. Previously, many had thought Israel could not be defeated. But at Karama the Jordanian army showed that even a recovering military could push back the Israelis.45

Explosion of the Fedayeen and Confrontations with the Military

If the Palestinian commandos had gained popularity following the 1967 defeat, their support after Karama soared. By all accounts, the fedayeen played a minor role in the battle due to their few numbers, lack of coordination between fedayeen sub-groups, and limited arms and equipment.46 Yet, after the battle, the fedayeen used the victory and their (if minimal) role to paint a picture of their strength against the occupier. As one

Jordanian former diplomat described, this led the military to view its achievement as

“hijacked” by the PLO,47 and thus served as a turning point in military-guerilla relations.48

The victory at Karama thus emboldened the fedayeen operating in Jordan. It was said that in three days alone, Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) of the Fatah Palestinian resistance movement enrolled nearly 5,000 new fedayeen recruits.49 Karama was the true

“birth of the revolution” (milad al-thuwra), as one Palestinian resistance political figure described, as popular sentiment was: “We were all fedayeen” (kulna fedayeen).50 Indeed, many felt the fedayeen represented the hope of freedom in the region, to the extent that

45 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. 46 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91. 47 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 48 Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 139. 49 James D. Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography (London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1989), 118. 50 Author Interview with Palestinian Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 71 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 15, 2015, 12pma).

90 even the King stated he was “feda'i #1.”51 As another Jordanian said, the people in his village were extremely sympathetic to the Palestinian liberation movement in this period; they would collect donations on Fridays for the cause, for instance.52 Similar stories were repeated to me of social evenings and modest dinners held to gather money for the resistance. A former Minister recalled receiving donations from throughout the country that he collected and distributed to the fedayeen.53 Although some well-integrated

Palestinian members of the bourgeoisie felt the commando cause would lead nowhere and were thus cynical about the resistance, most were pro-fedayeen.54 The PLO and other groups imposed themselves, but with full support of Arabs who felt a sense of a new awakening when the PLO formed.55

With their popular support the fedayeen grew increasingly autonomous from

Jordanian authority.56 Karama opened up the playing field for the fedayeen, who transitioned from operating secretly to openly in Jordan.57 This occurred despite the state’s fervent desire to rein in the fedayeen’s authority. In November 1968 the Jordanian government signed a seven-point agreement with the PLO regarding commando activities in Jordan, which established that:

Members of these organizations were forbidden to walk around the cities armed and in uniform; they were forbidden to stop civilian vehicles in order to conduct searches; they were forbidden to recruit young men who were fit to serve in the

51 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60 (Amman, Jordan, March 2, 2015, 10:30am). 52 Author Interview with Jordanian General Speaking of Experience as Civilian Youth in 1970, Interview ID 102 (Madaba, Jordan, May 13, 2015, 10am). 53 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as a Diplomat, Interview ID 95 (Amman, Jordan, May 6, 2015, 11am). 54 Author Interview with Palestinian Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 75 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 17, 2015, 4:30pm). 55 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 56 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: King Hussein's Life in War and Peace, 279-280. 57 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Member, Interview ID 69 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 12, 2015, 10:15am).

91 Jordanian army; they were required to carry Jordanian identity papers; their vehicles were required to bear Jordanian license plates; crimes committed by members of the Palestinian organizations would be investigated by the Jordanian authorities; and disputes between the Palestinian organizations and the government would be settled by a joint council of representatives of the king and of the PLO.58

However, fedayeen groups did not abide strictly by the agreement and their authority expanded. The primary Palestinian resistance groups in this period are outlined briefly in

Table 3.1.

In addition to the umbrella Palestinian Liberation Organization, three of the largest groups were Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). These groups, and others within the resistance movement, differed greatly in terms of their stance on

Jordan’s sovereignty, vision for Palestine, and desired tactics used to achieve their aims.

On the matter of Jordan, Fatah was known to pursue a policy of non-interference in

Jordan’s internal affairs, thinking the country should maintain its sovereignty. In contrast, the PFLP, an organization with a Marxist-Leninist ideology,59 initially avoided proactively seeking out confrontations with the state but vowed to respond to any instigation. Finally, the PDFLP was the principal actor pressing for the weaponization of the resistance and confrontation with the Jordanian regime.60

58 "Black September, the PLO's Attempt to Takeover [Sic] Jordan in 1970," www.eretzyisroel.org/%7Esamuel/september.html. 59 William B. Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, Document R-782- ISA (RAND Corporation, 1971), 73. 60 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Member, Interview ID 69.

92

Table 3.1: Key Palestinian Resistance Groups in 1970

Group Notable Leaders Estimated Number of Armed Members, Fall 1970 Palestine Liberation Ahmed Shukairi, N/A Organization (PLO), Yasser Arafat umbrella organization Palestine Liberation Army 3500.61 (PLA), PLO-affiliate Palestine Liberation Forces 1,000.62 (PLF), PLO-affiliate, PLA’s guerilla arm Palestine National Yasser Arafat 7,000.63 Liberation Movement (Fatah) Popular Front for the George Habash 1,000.64 Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Popular Democratic Front Naif Hawatmeh 700.65 for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) Popular Front for the Ahmad Jabril 200.66 Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) General Command Saiqa, Syria 2,000.67

As the fedayeen’s activities expanded, there were more substantial conflicts between the state’s military and resistance commandos. In November 1969 the armed forces struck Fatah and PFLP locations in three Palestinian refugee camps between

Amman and Zarqa, resulting in twenty-nine deaths and an additional one hundred wounded.68 King Hussein and his uncle, the army commander Nasser bin Jamil, presented

61 Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, Document R-782-ISA, 83. 62 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice", 6. 63 Ibid., 6. 64 Ibid., 8. 65 Ibid., 8. 66 Ibid., 8. 67 Ibid., 10. 68 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 184.

93 elevated demands to the fedayeen after the attacks. These included for the commandos to

“notify the army before conducting attacks on Israel or the West Bank,” avoid recruiting men of military enlistment age, and operate within Jordan’s court system. Yet, these demands were largely ignored.69

1970 did not see improved relations between the guerillas and Jordanian state. In

February, the King published another policy statement on Palestinian activity in Jordan, demanding that Palestinians cease operating politically, withdraw from interfering in the security forces, and not assemble except with the Ministry of Interior’s assent. The resistance fighters not only ignored the demands, but formed a “united military headquarters” in the wake of the publication. Skirmishes in Amman on February 10 resulted in 300 deaths. Instead of cracking down on Palestinian activity, however, the

King stated: “‘We are all fedayeen,’” and forced the Minister of Interior to resign, as he relented to fedayeen demands.70 Mass demonstrations were common that spring as well.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco traveled to Cairo in April 1970 but was pressed to cancel his trip to Amman due to the discontent.71

The low level conflict soon began to escalate. By May, the army took control of two commando camps in the Jordan Valley.72 Clashes occurring in Amman and Zarqa that June killed nearly 300. The American military attaché was murdered, assassinations were attempted, and the PFLP led a series of kidnappings of foreigners.73 The commandos’ primary aims were to pressure the Jordanian government into relieving

69 Ibid., 184. 70 "Black September, the PLO's Attempt to Takeover [Sic] Jordan in 1970." 71 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process. 72 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 251. 73 Haddad, Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States - Part I.; Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, Document R-782-ISA.

94 Nasser bin Jamil and Zaid bin Shaker of their military commands. The King agreed to the demands but also published a ten-point plan for dealing with the PLO.74 There were also reports that in June the King had offered the position of prime minister to Arafat,75 and that the latter had turned down the offer.

Uprising Background: Black September

Things began to come to a head when on July 26, 1970 Jordan followed Egypt in accepting the Rogers Plan, a proposal to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the wake of the 1967 war and the following war of attrition. The Palestinian resistance movement virulently opposed the plan and its endorsement. In an emergency PLO

Central Committee meeting that month, Fatah military commander Salah Khalaf (Abu

Iyad) argued for downgrading tensions with the Jordanian government, but his was a minority opinion.76 In late August, the Palestinian National Council held another meeting and published a provocative statement that read that “‘the Palestine-Jordan arena is a single arena of struggle ... [and] we are working with all means to turn it into a stronghold of the armed, popular revolution and soldiers.’”77 Retrospective analysis indicates there were an estimated 9,000 commandos based on Jordanian soil, in addition to Saiqa and other resistance affiliates on Jordan’s borders. But in terms of the perception of the fedayeen’s strength, “Arafat’s estimate in the fall of 1970 was that there were 30,000 fedayeen militia in Jordan; the Jordanian estimate was 25,000.”78

74 Haddad, Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States - Part I, 539. 75 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 252. 76 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, 180. 77 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 260. 78 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice", 19.

95 There were skirmishes in the final days of August and on the last day of the month, the military attacked Amman refugee camps, known to be strongholds for the commandos.79 On September 1 there was an attempt on King Hussein’s life near the airport outside Amman, and by September 2 the “PLO central committee declared itself in constant session and put its forces on full alert.”80 The Jordanian government was forming plans as well. On September 4, King Hussein gathered his advisers and close members of government, including Nasser bin Jamil, Zaid bin Shaker, Crown Prince

Hassan, former Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, Military Intelligence head Muhammad

Bashir, and Intelligence head Nathir Rasheed.81 Their first effort was to move Jordan’s troops from the border with Israel and expel commandos based in the South.82

The conflict soon escalated as the PFLP hijacked three planes en route to Jordan and one to Egypt,83 landing two at an airstrip in Jordan on September 6 and another in

Jordan days later.84 The action converted what had been primarily a Jordanian unrest event into an international crisis. On September 8 a U.S. State Department telegram from

Washington, DC to Amman discussed recommending to King Hussein that his military warn the PFLP of the consequences of harming the hostages. Questioning the troops’ loyalty, the telegram added: “We would hope that if matters do come to such a tragic pass the Jordanian forces would in fact implement such a threat.”85 The next day, the United

79 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 259. 80 Ibid., 259. 81 Ibid., 259. 82 Ibid., 259. 83 Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, Document R-782-ISA, 80. 84 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice", 13. 85 "210. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan,” September 8, 1970, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12, Secret, Immediate, Nodis, Drafted and Approved by U. Alexis Johnson and Cleared by Sisco and Eliot." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam

96 States discussed whether it would send troops to Jordan in case of an elevated emergency, or whether Israel might instead stand behind the monarch.86 After days of tension, on

September 12 the guerillas blew up three—empty—planes.87

By this point, it was reported and is remembered that a contingent of King

Hussein’s troops were showing their alacrity to fight the uprising and did not think the monarchy’s response was strong enough. Yezid Sayigh writes that soldiers in Nuzha and

‘Arda considered attacking the Amman refugee camps despite lack of orders at the time to do so. As a result, King Hussein “was compelled to intervene in person to bring his mutinous troops under control and was received with open hostility.”88 This is reflected by Kissinger’s account as well, as he wrote that he received a September 8 report “saying that Hussein had lost control and that the First Brigade had defied the King and moved into Amman.”89 One individual who served as a staff officer and tank commander in

September 1970 remembered readying to advance to Amman and fight the fedayeen that month. As he recalled, Zaid bin Shaker came out to meet the troops and try to calm them down. After that, Prince Hassan emerged and told them to leave but they still refused.

Finally, King Hussein arrived and asked them to relax. One non-commissioned artillery

M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 612. 86 "214. Minutes of a Combined Washington Special Actions Group and Review Group Meeting, September 9, 1970, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Nodis, this Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room, Kissinger is Not Listed as a Participant but He Chaired the Meeting." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 621. 87 "Black September: Tough Negotiations," BBC News, January 1, 2001. 88 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 260. 89 "214. Minutes of a Combined Washington Special Actions Group and Review Group Meeting, September 9, 1970, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Nodis, this Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room, Kissinger is Not Listed as a Participant but He Chaired the Meeting," 622.

97 officer then stood up and reportedly said accusingly: You sold us to the fedayeen; you are the fedayeen. The King responded that he felt both these men and the fedayeen were his sons. He argued that something was wrong in Jordan but that he needed time to work it out. The army was boiling at that point, in this officer’s memory.90

Another individual close to political leaders at the time remembered two additional points at which certain military units were champing at the bit to respond to what they perceived as the fedayeen’s excesses. In one case, the individual was at a dinner with King Hussein, Sharif Nasser bin Jamal and others, when a military aide de camp (ADC) interrupted and stated he had to speak privately with a senior military figure there. The ADC confronted the figure, stating that he had not realized that this man and the King were cowards, and then asked why the leadership was not giving orders for the army to attack. The military leader walked back into the room, undisturbed, and conveyed the ADC’s message to the King.91 In another instance, the individual remembers how a military unit arriving from Al-Ghour Valley reached her elite neighborhood outside Amman, seeking to speak with a senior military commander and the King. Their message was clear: If you do not want to give us orders, each one of us, each unit, wants to go its own way and seek revenge.92 As another interviewee remembered, the Jordanian armed forces began accusing the King of weakness; they wanted to fight to keep their country and defend their families.93 There were troops so

90 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General, Interview ID 17. 91 Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian Close to Political and Military Figures in 1970, Interview ID 103. 92 Ibid. 93 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64.

98 loyal to King Hussein that they wanted to preemptively strike at the fedayeen, this major general recalled.94

Figure 3.1: Jordan Political Map95

94 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Major General in the Air Force, Interview ID 87 (Amman, Jordan, March 25, 2015, 10am). 95 Jordan Political Map, 2004 (University of Texas Libraries).

99 The days of September 7 and 8 indeed saw an elevation in the crisis, but King

Hussein had not yet committed himself to a full-scale confrontation with the fedayeen.

On September 7 it was reported that the U.S. Embassy in Amman painted “a gloomy picture of the security situation in the capital” and described “a near-anarchical condition in most areas of the city, with instances of shooting, auto theft, and persons subjected to search at Fedayeen roadblocks.”96 Indeed, the following two days saw heavy shelling in

Amman and Zarqa.97 On September 9 the British government had lost communications with its Amman Embassy and there were continued reports of “heavy firing” in the capital.98 That day there appears also to have been shelling in Irbid, in Jordan’s North.99

Still, Zaid al-Rifai, a prominent Jordanian political figure, reported to the U.S. Embassy that only one battalion that had been based in Amman was conducting the firing, and that additional troops had not yet been deployed to the capital.100

Things began to change on September 9, however. According to U.S. archival documents, a radio broadcast announced that the King, Prime Minister, and Chief of Staff had instructed the military leadership “to take steps to guarantee peace.”101 At this point,

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Davies stated: “I interpret this announcement to mean that Hussein has asked the Army to take over the country…I think he is entrusting

96 "208. Paper Prepared by the NEA Working Group in the Department of State Operations Center, September 7, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Drafted by Albert A. Vaccaro (INR/RNA/NE) and Peter A Sutherland (NEA/ARN) and Cleared by Seelye." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 609. 97 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 260. 98 "214. Minutes of a Combined Washington Special Actions Group and Review Group Meeting, September 9, 1970, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Nodis, this Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room, Kissinger is Not Listed as a Participant but He Chaired the Meeting," 622. 99 Ibid., 622. 100 Ibid., 622. 101 Ibid., 622.

100 the Army with the task of restoring order—I hope so, at least.”102 The King had appointed

Mashur Haditha Al-Jazy commander of the army, and on September 10 Al-Jazy oversaw a ceasefire agreement.103 In addition, on September 13, an Arab delegation traveled to

Amman to discuss the crisis,104 but two days later the PFLP still had a series of what were considered “unacceptable demands” that prevented reconciliation with the government.105

Meanwhile, lower-level fighting and preparation for a confrontation continued. On

September 13 there was a significant “clash” between the resistance and Jordanian forces in the North.106 The next day the U.S. defense attaché reported that all was relatively quiet in the capital, and yet the calmness presaged more intense confrontations to come.107

By September 15 Hussein had decided to declare martial law and the decision led to a complete overhaul of the government and military’s leadership. It appears the United

102 Ibid., 622. 103 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993.; "216. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 9, 1970, Source, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Sent for Information, Haig Initialed for Kissinger, the Date and Time are Handwritten at the Top of the Page, A Notation on the Memorandum Indicates that the President Saw It." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 260. 104 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 260. 105 "246. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 15, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Sent for Information." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 683. 106 "239. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 14, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, the Time is Handwritten at the Top of the First Page." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 675. 107 "240. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 14, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Sent for Information, the Time is Handwritten at the Top of the First Page." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 677.

101 States had advanced notice of the move, as internal communications reported that:

During the early hours of tomorrow [September 16] morning he will establish a military government. This will be announced at 7 a.m. in Amman (1 a.m. EDT). Army units will be pre-positioned around the city but Hussein will not force the issue unless the fedayeen do. The army will only enter the city against the fedayeen if necessary. The military government will take over communications and if necessary declare a curfew.108

The cabinet was asked to resign and a military government appointed. During the conflict, one retired Intelligence Directorate official recalled the new government meeting at the army headquarters; it was impossible to travel to any ministry as this area was under occupation.109 Martial law was officially declared and the government “ordered all

Palestinian militia forces in the cities and refugee camps of the kingdom to surrender their weapons.”110

In response to the government’s declaration of martial law, the PLO worked to unify the disparate commando factions in Jordan. The Central Committee declared

Yasser Arafat Commander-in-Chief and ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya Chief of Staff; in addition, it named September 17 as a strike day.111 On September 16 Arafat “ordered the immediate unification of all Palestinian forces” and as a result of the state’s steps in forming a military government there were reports that the resistance fighters were “on full combat alert.”112 Still, Fatah was uncomfortable with what seemed an inexorable

108 "246. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 15, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Sent for Information," 683-684. 109 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92 (Amman, Jordan, April 29, 2015, 10am). 110 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 261. 111 Ibid., 261. 112 "248. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 16, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Printed from an Uninitialed Copy." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W.

102 march towards war. In particular, Khalil al-Wazir, Khalid al-Hassan, and Walid Nimr thought the move to confront the Jordanian government was militarily unwise.113 Their anxieties went unheeded and weapons were distributed to the various commandos in the

Kingdom.114

The first true day of armed assault was September 16, when the Jordanian 60th

Armored Brigade attacked fedayeen strongholds in Amman, Irbid, Salt, Sweileh, Baqa’a,

Wihdat, and Zarqa.115 In concert with the move, the 99th Brigade was tasked with monitoring the Iraqi Army’s 3rd Armoured Division, which had been based in Jordan since 1967;116 in all, 30,000-35,000 troops were deployed in Zarqa to prevent Iraqi interference in support of the fedayeen.117 In the first days of the conflict the primary goal was to clear Amman and Zarqa of fedayeen control, to be followed by more intense operations in the North.118

On September 17 the military deployed “armored cars, tanks, and at least one company of infantry” to attack commando positions in the capital. Fighting was particularly intense near the U.S. and U.K. embassies as well as the Intercontinental

Hotel.119 A former PDFLP fighter who was in Jordan at the time recalled the military

Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 690. 113 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 261. 114 Ibid., 261. 115 Uriya Shavit, "Out of Jordan," Haaertz, April 10, 2002. 116 Kenneth Michael Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 343. 117 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 261. 118 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91. 119 "253. Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 17, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/17/70 AM, Secret, Sensitive, the Time is Handwritten at the Top of the First Page, Printed from an Uninitialed Copy." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds.

103 confrontation from the fedayeen’s perspective. The military would conduct operations by moving from its rather limited secure area (beginning close to the palace) and ramming its way into occupied territory. In his memory, it took the military nine days to move from the prominent roundabout of Dawar Dakhiliya to Jabal Hussein inside the capital.

Throughout the confrontation, fighting was continuous and sometimes persisted into the night.120 Fighters’ recollections are supported by those of a U.S. Army Foreign Area

Specialist based in Amman during the conflict. As he described it:

The attack columns would start out with the infantry close behind but as the volume of fire from the Palestinian positions increased the infantry would fall behind and the tank would soon be isolated. Tanks would fire their main gun at individual Palestinian snipers. Four or five Palestinian fighters would fire upon advancing Jordanian troops, inflicting casualties, and when finally located by the Jordanians, would simply move a hundred meters to another house and resume firing. 121

According to reports, September 17 saw the army “make early gains in Amman and

Zarqa,”122 but the Palestinians were reportedly in command of Irbid in the North123 and the military’s progress was not as swift as expected.

One reason for the delay in suppressing the unrest was that on September 18 Syria deployed an armored brigade across Jordan’s northern border, and in the course of the

Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 699. 120 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Who Fought in Jordan, Interview ID 79 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 12pm). 121 Norvell B. DeAtkine, "Amman 1970, A Memoir," Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 4 (2002). 122 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 264. 123 "254. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting. September 17, 1970. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret; Sensitive, Nodis, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 702.

104 next seventy-two hours additional mechanized infantry forces joined them.124 The Syrians reportedly draped their tanks in Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) banners so as to brand this as part of the Palestinian uprising and not an international intervention on the part of

Syria itself. The Jordanian 40th Armoured Brigade and 2nd Infantry Division were soon sent north to respond to the Syrian incursion, and there were reports that the military was attempting to surround Ramtha, near the Syrian border.125 However, the next day, on

September 19, the PLA Hittin Forces entered Jordan from Syria and headed for Irbid,126 and Syria gained control of the border crossing.127 The Jordanian armored division was soon pushed back by two Syrian armored brigades,128 which enabled additional PLA forces to make their way to Irbid.129 On September 20 the Israelis informed the United

States that there were an estimated seventy Syrian tanks in Jordan, and the Jordanian military was now using its airpower to combat them.130 The situation finally turned on

September 21 and 22 when the Jordanian Air Force compelled the Syrian ground troops’

124 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 264. 125 "272. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 19, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/19/70, Secret, Sensitive, an Attached Map is Not Printed." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 759. 126 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 264. 127 Ibid., 265. 128 "275. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 20, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V, Secret, Sensitive, Sent for Information, the Time is Handwritten at the Top of the First Page." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 766. 129 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 265. 130 "280. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 20, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/20/70, Top Secret." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 771.

105 to retreat. U.S National Security Meeting notes indicate the United States had intelligence that Syria lost approximately 120 tanks in the conflict.131 By September 23 three armored brigades were retreating to Syria.132

Concomitant with the Syrian incursion, the Jordanian military faced fedayeen resistance in the capital. On September 20 the army’s “mopping up” operations continued and the U.S. Embassy in Amman remained in contested territory.133 The next day,

Kissinger asked whether the security situation was in fact deteriorating in Amman, and the answer was yes.134 Up until September 23 the Jordanian armed forces appeared to be

“holding their own” against the rebellion, and yet sporadic fighting continued.135

131 "313. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, September 22, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970, Top Secret, Sensitive, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Cabinet Room." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 882-883. 132 "318. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, September 23, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970, Top Secret, Sensitive, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Cabinet Room." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 899. 133 "280. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 20, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/20/70, Top Secret." 134 Kissinger’s reply was “I thought they had the stinking town under control.” "295. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation among the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and Secretary of State Rogers, September 21, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files, no Classification Marking, the Time, “prob. about 6:15 Am,” is Handwritten, all Brackets are in the Original." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 820-821. 135 "316. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 23, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–076, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/23/70, Secret, Nodis, the Tabs are Attached but Not Printed, all Brackets are in the Original." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 892.

106 Meanwhile, the Jordanian crisis was not occurring in a vacuum as regional powers were particularly invested in the outcome. An Egyptian envoy arrived in Jordan on September 19 to “discuss the situation” with King Hussein.136 Two days later a Cairo summit was publicized and it was announced that the King would participate.137 Ahead of the meeting, on September 22 the Sudanese president arrived in Amman to discuss the crisis.138 The next day, the military government’s head, Muhammad Daoud, was sent to

Cairo for the talks,139 during which he “offered to permit 600-1,000 ‘honourable’ guerrillas…to remain in Jordan, subject to operational and administrative coordination with the army.”140 As a result of the meeting the King announced that he and a captured

PLO representative had agreed to a ceasefire; yet, the announcement did not halt the conflict.141

Despite their ability to prolong the unrest, the commandos were no longer faring well. They had largely withdrawn from Irbid by September 23, 1970.142 By September 25, the government had control over Wihdat camp and much of the hills surrounding

136 "272. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 19, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/19/70, Secret, Sensitive, an Attached Map is Not Printed," 759. 137 "303. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, September 21, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Sensitive, Nodis, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 844. 138 See footnote in: Ibid., 844. 139 In an interesting turn, however, soon after arriving in Cairo Daoud resigned from the government. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 266. 140 In an interesting turn, however, soon after arriving in Cairo Daoud resigned from the government. Ibid. 141 "316. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 23, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–076, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/23/70, Secret, Nodis, the Tabs are Attached but Not Printed, all Brackets are in the Original," 894. 142 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 266.

107 Amman,143 and they could claim complete control of the areas in Zarqa falling outside the refugee camps.144 The rebels had been essentially expelled from Jordan’s most central cities, and between September 26 and 27 the King accepted a ceasefire, which was in part mediated by Egypt.145 On September 26 the United States noted that the ceasefire held longer than previous attempts as fighting was quelled in the North; still, parts of Amman and at least one refugee camp remained restive.146 King Hussein formed a civilian cabinet to replace his military government and announced that Palestinian figure Ahmad Toukan would serve as prime minister.147 A Cairo summit attended by both King Hussein and

Yasser Arafat finalized the deal.148

The uprising was largely resolved within a week and a half. In September 1970,

King Hussein estimated that 2,000 had been killed in the conflict and a Red Cross representative projected at least 5,000 casualties.149 Later reports pushed these estimates down, approximating that 400-500 individuals had been killed and 3,000-5,000 wounded by October.150 However, a slow-brewing conflict continued past fall 1970 despite efforts to achieve a new status quo with the guerilla fighters. A protocol signed on October 13

“granted the guerrillas much of the political, military, and administrative freedom they

143 Ibid., 267. 144 Ibid., 267. 145 Ibid., 267. 146 "328. Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, September 26, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V, Secret, Nodis, the Time is Handwritten, A Stamped Notation Indicates the President Saw the Memorandum." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008x), 916. 147 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, 185. 148 Nasser died the next day, on September 28. 149 Paul Lalor, "Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971" (PhD, St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1992), 274. 150 Ibid., 290.

108 had previously enjoyed.”151 Finally, on October 31, Arafat signed an agreement recognizing Hussein’s control over Jordan and agreed to demilitarize the PLO.

The PFLP and PDFLP did not accept the agreement, however, and clashes continued between these groups and the Jordanian forces in early November 1970. On

November 20, fedayeen fighters in Amman faced off against the Jordanian army for thirteen hours, reportedly after the guerrillas hit a police station target.152 Later that month,

Brigadier General Zaid bin Shaker commanded operations to expel the PLO from Jordan and scenes of urban warfare were reported in Ajloun and Jerash, north of the capital. In the last month of 1970 the army finally gained control of Jerash, and captured a number of PLA soldiers who were held prisoner.153 The PFLP continued guerilla attacks throughout December, and gained control of Salt, outside of Amman.154

At the start of 1971 the Jordanian military set it sights on controlling the road between Amman and Jerash. During these operations, as guerillas escaped to Syria or redeployed throughout Jordan, the army was able to regain control over many refugee camps surrounding the capital.155 Faced with an increasingly in-control Jordanian state, the commando factions came together and the PLO Central Committee announced on

January 21 that it would “abide by the agreement with the government.”156 By the end of

March the army was again in control of Mafraq and Irbid.157 In April 1971 the fedayeen moved roughly 2,000 personnel to Ajloun and deeper into the Jordan Valley, and by mid-

June the Jordanian military had driven a substantial group of fighters to Jerash and

151 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 268. 152 "Guerillas Battle Jordanian Troops 13 Hours in Amman," Chicago Tribune, November 20, 1970. 153 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 275. 154 Ibid., 276. 155 Ibid., 276. 156 Ibid., 277. 157 Ibid., 277-278.

109 Ajloun as well. In a four-day battle, Fatah’s commander in northern Jordan, Walid Nimr

(Abu Ali Iyad), was killed, as were many others. When the guerillas refused an order to evacuate their remaining fighters from Ajloun in July, the Jordanian government shelled their positions and attacked their fighters in the Valley. Approximately 120-200 were killed and the army regained control of the territory,158 while another 2,300 fedayeen surrendered.159 Black September, which had extended much further than September, had come to a close.

Considering Existing Explanations

The vast majority of the Jordanian armed forces fought the Palestinian uprising in

1970. Of roughly 55,000 service members,160 approximately 3,000-5,000 instead fled, mainly to Syria. Why did things unfold this way? I argue that the majority of soldiers fought because they experienced the dual influences of coercion and persuasion. Most soldiers remained in their positions because they had clear and well executed orders to fight, and many also viewed the resistance as foreign and employing illegitimate tactics.

Still, despite the fact that orders were uniformly clear across the military, some individuals had a different perception of the revolt and this influenced their decision to flee the armed forces. These soldiers perceived the resistance as organic and domestic and therefore did not feel it was their duty to use force against it.

158 Ibid., 279. 159 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, 187. 160 Peter John Snow, Hussein: A Biography (Washington, D.C.: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1972), 237.

110 Table 3.2: Anticipated Outcomes for Jordan 1970 Based on Independent Variables

Persuasion High Low High

Jordan 1970 (Majority) Jordan 1970 (Minority)

Prediction: Fight Prediction: Fight or Flee

Coercion Low N/A N/A

This argument, summarized in Table 3.1, provides a more complete and nuanced picture of soldier decision-making when compared to existing explanations of military behavior amid uprisings.

Ethnic Identity

A conventional explanation is that when a soldier shares an ethnic identity with the opposition group he is more likely to join the resistance. Yet, this understanding of military behavior is complicated when we look at the empirics of the Jordan 1970 case study. At least 50% of the Jordanian military was of Palestinian descent; however, at most, 20% of these Palestinians left their positions during the crisis. In addition, those who refused to fight were not drawn to immediately participate on the side of the fedayeen during the crisis; instead, they fled Jordan. Here, I review evidence regarding the ethnic composition of the Jordanian armed forces on the eve of the revolt. I later argue that rather than automatically trigger military reactions to the unrest, ethnicity’s impact on behavior was moderated by both coercive influences on the soldier and also the

111 way in which regime rhetoric, opposition missteps, and external interference manipulated soldiers’ perceptions of their coethnics’ cause.

In 1965, Jordan disbanded its 40,000-troop-strong National Guard (al-haras al- watani), which had been used as a militia in towns close to the Israeli border since 1951.

Part of the government’s motivation in disbanding the Guard was to distribute Palestinian troops rather than have a single, primarily Palestinian force. Many former militiamen were incorporated into the regular armed forces.161 Ahead of the 1967 war, it was estimated that anywhere from 28%162 to 50%163 of the Jordanian army was Palestinian, and on the eve of 1970, 55%164 to 60%165 of the military was thought to be of Palestinian origin. One Palestinian member of the armed forces at the time recalled that there were

Palestinians and Jordanians serving in each unit, but that most leaders and the true decision-makers were Jordanian.166 A Jordanian political figure pointed out that there were high commanders of Palestinian origin;167 however, in the view of Palestinian servicemen, the occasional Palestinian chief of staff was the exception that proved the

161 Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989), 146-147. 162 Intelligence Memorandum: Jordan’s Armed Forces, 6. 163 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. 164 "329. Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, September 26, 1970, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN, Secret, Exdis, Drafted by Sisco and Davies, Cleared by Seelye, and Approved by Davies, it was Sent Priority to Amman, and was also Sent to Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Tripoli, Benghazi, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, and USUN." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 918.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 165 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 59.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82 (Amman, Jordan, March 21, 2015, 11am). 166 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 16, 2015, 1pm). 167 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 59.

112 rule.168 Although Palestinians could attain command of a company, it would be surprising to find a Palestinian serving in the more prestigious role of battalion commander. As one military deserter remembered, only two of fourteen high-ranking generals were

Palestinian in 1970.169 There were many reports that a soldier’s geographic origin might affect not only his rank, but also his unit assignment. According to a 1967 CIA assessment, Bedouin as well as northerner (more urban) East Bank populations were the core of the regime’s support in the military.170 Bedouin populations comprised approximately 30% of the military, and these troops overwhelmingly served in what were considered the most sensitive positions, particularly armored brigades, the royal guard, and infantry units.171 In contrast, it was reported that Palestinians served primarily in

“technical services,” as well as artillery and infantry units.172

Given the substantial proportion of Palestinians in the military, and the fact that the resistance was Palestinian, I asked my interviewees whether they had believed many

Palestinians would defect and join the fedayeen or desert their posts. One officer agreed that there were many Palestinians in the military and that there were general concerns regarding how “loyal” these individuals would be at the start of the crisis in 1970.173

Another officer recalled that they had worried about Palestinian defections in 1970 as they thought many Palestinian soldiers would not be ready to kill their cousins and uncles among the fedayeen. He said this resulted in the military not relaying some information

168 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as Fatah Commander in Jordan, Lebanon, and Elsewhere, Interview ID 83 (Amman, Jordan, March 21, 2015, 1pm). 169 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74. 170 Intelligence Memorandum: Jordan’s Armed Forces, 5. 171 Ibid., 5. 172 Ibid., 6. 173 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Major General in the Air Force, Interview ID 87.

113 to Palestinians in the military, due to questions about their loyalty.174 An Air Force general concurred that Palestinians were distrusted in 1970 because the Jordanians, as he phrased it, went back to their old tribal customs. He argued that there were no conscious efforts to marginalize Palestinians ahead of the conflict, but there were unconscious motivations. He remembered working with Palestinian officers he very much respected and stated that there was no official effort to reorganize the Jordanian military to suppress

Palestinians. Moreover, the King was adamant that Palestinians were not to be spoken ill of in front of him, and the King never “badmouthed” Palestinian leaders such as Arafat.

Of course, this officer said, a commander could turn around to his chief of staff and speak poorly of them.175

Yet, despite Jordanians’ fears that Palestinians might desert, very few did. This was in spite of many Palestinians’ support for the resistance or fear that they were putting their own communities in danger by striking guerilla strongholds. One woman, married to a senior military figure, remembers a story her husband told her. A Palestinian sergeant major serving in an artillery (madfaiya) position during the conflict was deployed to Jabal

Amman as part of the operation to strike Wihdat camp. He was crying because his family was living in the camp; but, he was still serving.176 Similarly, an individual of Palestinian descent working in Jordan’s diplomatic sector remembered how individuals with connections to Palestine had divided loyalties in 1970. He himself recalled feeling extremely unhappy with the confrontation and subsequent fighting in Amman. The

174 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General, Interview ID 58 (Amman, Jordan, February 26, 2016, 10am). 175 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86 (Amman, Jordan, March 24, 2014, 10am). 176 Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian Close to Political and Military Figures in 1970, Interview ID 103.

114 diplomat considered submitting his resignation in protest, but decided against it upon reflection and receiving what he described as better counsel.177 Interviewees shared many stories to this effect: Palestinians in Jordan were either sympathetic with the Palestinian national movement or concerned for their families’ safety, but the vast majority remained in their posts in 1970.

Overall, most agreed that the conflict was never simply about “Jordan versus the

Palestinians,” and many disagreed with any portrayal of a large divide between these populations in the years leading up to Black September. A Palestinian political figure argued that the relationship between Palestinians and Jordanians had always been strong historically due to geography and intermarriages. In his words, the two are really one people.178 Another Palestinian, who ultimately fled military service in 1970, agreed. In his mind, the conflict was not about a split between Jordanians and Palestinians. In fact, there were millions of Palestinians in Jordan, and Jordan had always supported the Palestinians, in his opinion.179 As the conflict came to a head, one Jordanian of Palestinian descent acknowledged that there was growing polarization between the two groups, but that the identity debate revolved around who truly represented the Palestinians. He described

Black September as not a civil war between two ethnic groups, but a conflict between revolutionary forces and the regime, a theme I expand on as I discuss the power of persuasion later in this chapter.180

177 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as a Diplomat, Interview ID 95. 178 Author Interview with Palestinian Political Figure, Interview ID 65. 179 Author Interview with Jordanian Who Left in 1970, Interview ID 93 (Amman, Jordan, May 2, 2015, 3pm). 180 Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian of Palestinian Origin, Interview ID 84 (Amman, Jordan, March 23, 2015, 11am).

115 The monarchy sought to reinforce this idea of ethnic unity and downplay differences among the populations. In fall 1970 the Jordanian military magazine Al-Aqsa published an article “signed by ‘A Jordanian Soldier of Palestinian Descent’” who says:

‘By God, the Jordanian people are great, noble, courageous, and magnanimous…By God, what produces a people more than he for the Palestinian causes and no other people loved the Palestinian people more [than the Jordanians], and after drawing attention to the Jordanian people ‘sharing’ with the Palestinian people…what we have found here in Jordan us Palestinians won’t find in any other country on the face of the earth.’ 181

In another incident, a Fatah media official remembered a press conference immediately following the start of Black September in which an American journalist used the word

“civil war” to describe the events. The journalist was summarily cut off and told that

Jordan faced both Palestinians and Jordanians who participated in commando operations and thus this was not a war between two clear groups.182 This individual also described what he felt was evidence against the framing of Black September as a civil war between identity groups. He recalled that in 1970 he was fourteen years old living in Wihdat

Palestinian refugee camp, but his family soon moved to a Jordanian village nearby. There were some isolated incidents of animosity in the new area, but in general the move would not even have occurred had this been a true war between identity groups.183 Ethnicity was a substantial backdrop to Black September. And yet, identity did not translate automatically into civilian attitudes and military decision-making during the conflict.

181 Khalil Al-Hindi, "Jordanian Mobilization Against the Palestinian Resistance before the Attack of September 1970 [ARABIC]," Palestinian Affairs 4 (1971), 39. 182 Author Interview with Palestinian Who Worked in Fatah's Media Department, Interview ID 89. 183 Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian of Palestinian Origin, Interview ID 84.

116 Material Incentives

If identity does not clearly explain military decision-making ahead of the unrest, does money? Evidence suggests this is also unlikely. Palestinians served in the Jordanian armed forces because they believed they would be fighting for the cause of returning

Palestine to the people. They also joined for economic reasons, as when they became refugees they lost their livelihoods. Many Palestinian refugees decided to travel to the

Gulf in search of a new career, but some remained closer to home and joined the

Jordanian armed forces.184 Still, although nearly every Palestinian had at least one family member in the Gulf, not every family had someone in the military, in contrast to

Jordanian families.185 One Jordanian intelligence officer commented that although the military might have provided a job for Palestinians, the pay was not lucrative. He stated that East Bankers (Jordanians) were attracted to the service because it was seen as prestigious among their communities, not because of the pay.186 This was the economic condition of the soldier on the eve of the conflict.

As it became clear that a showdown would take place, the monarchy did seek to present soldiers with material rewards for their continued service. Between 1967 and

1970 soldiers received a pay increase from ten to eighteen dinar.187 In July 1970 the King ordered another inducement, as Chief of Staff Haditha announced: “‘it has been decided to cancel the livelihood allowance deduction for all ranks, which increases [a soldier’s]

184 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74. 185 Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian of Palestinian Origin, Interview ID 84. 186 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92. 187 Al-Hindi, Jordanian Mobilization Against the Palestinian Resistance before the Attack of September 1970 [ARABIC], 44.

117 salary by an estimated 5 dinar and 900 fils each month, starting on July 1.’”188 By August

5 there were further policy changes as modifications were made to the military retirement law to reward those with many years of service.189 Measures were taken in the lead up to

September 1970 to improve soldiers’ material conditions. However, evidence suggests that the economic position of the soldier was not high when compared to other sectors in

Jordan’s economy and thus continued military service was not pursued exclusively or primarily for its financial payoff.

Opposition Violence

Finally, observing the level of opposition violence in Jordan in 1970 was a poor predictor of military behavior during Black September. The Palestinian commandos employed violent tactics across the country, as I describe further below. Given that the opposition’s use of violence was constant during the conflict, this factor does not go far enough in explaining why a minority of soldiers chose insubordination during the conflict, and why they specifically fled the country rather than join in fomenting the revolt.

The Fighting Majority

The majority of Jordanian service members fought in the intense conflict in fall

1970 and the ensuing operations through July 1971. In the early days of the uprising, on

September 18, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Davies stated: “It is significant that there have been no indications of Jordanian troops being anything but loyal and

188 Ibid., 44. 189 Ibid., 44.

118 disciplined.”190 I argue that the majority of these Palestinian and Jordanian soldiers fought because of both the coercive and persuasive influences on them.

Coercion

Preparation of Operational Plan

The preponderance of Jordanian soldiers stayed in their positions and fought the resistance because they were given clear orders to do so. Because the Palestinian resistance movement’s showdown with the military was anticipated, it was easier and more natural for the Jordanian government to have prepared a plan of attack. In August

1970 General Zaid bin Shaker was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and was charged with detailing the operations necessary to confront the commandos. Lunt writes: “It came as a surprise to discover that no plans of this nature existed in the headquarters. Shakir and his staff had to start from scratch and they worked day and night for two weeks to produce a plan.” According to bin Shaker, the lack of firm intelligence on the fedayeen’s manpower, weaponry, and ammunitions made preparations difficult.191

However, a plan was now in place. Jordan would pursue two lines of attack (South/North and West/East) with the intention of converging in Amman by September 19. According to Lalor, the “strategy was to isolate the [capital] city and drive the fedayeen from the hilltops into the centre. This was to be accomplished by artillery fire on strong points,

190 "264. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, September 18, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Sensitive, Nodis, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 739. 191 Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography, 129.

119 while mechanized infantry drew fire and silenced it at source.”192 In addition, the establishment of a curfew and cutting off of utilities in the capital were meant to undermine fedayeen activities.193

Once the crisis began, the “atmosphere at the Hummar [Palace]” was described as

“that of a command post on the eve of battle.”194 King Hussein, who had dithered in the months before the final confrontation, had finally decided that he would respond to the fedayeen with full force. On September 15, the King contacted the U.S. Embassy in

Amman and stated he would move that night and into September 16 to “establish law and order” in Jordan once again.195

When the civilian cabinet resigned King Hussein named its replacements. The key figures included Brigadier General Muhammad Daoud, of Palestinian descent, as Head of the military government; Habis al-Majali, brought back from military retirement, as

Commander-in-Chief; and General Zaid bin Shaker, the King’s cousin, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.196 In all, there was a combination of West and East Bankers represented in the military government.197 King Hussein donned his military uniform198

192 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 252. 193 Ibid., 252. 194 Snow, Hussein: A Biography, 221. 195 "246. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 15, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Sent for Information," 683.; "214. Minutes of a Combined Washington Special Actions Group and Review Group Meeting, September 9, 1970, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Nodis, this Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room, Kissinger is Not Listed as a Participant but He Chaired the Meeting," 624-625. 196 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 261. 197 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process , 181. A significant previous military leader not included in the new government was Mashur Haditha Al- Jazy It is unclear whether Al-Jazy—married to a Palestinian woman, and with a history of working with the commandos on the battlefield against Israel—resigned from his post or was dismissed. At least one source close to the events at the time argues that he was dismissed. See: Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who was a Political Figure in Jordan, Interview ID 90 (Amman, Jordan, April 3, 2015, 4pm).

120 and by September 16 “Amman radio broadcasted martial music interspersed with orders, threats against law breakers and appeals to the nation to rally behind the army.”199

Throughout the conflict, it was reported that the Jordanian government enjoyed “a central command with good communications”200 as well. By September 18 the United States had also received news that military commanders had been instructed to “look for and liberate the hostages as quickly as possible.”201

Clear Orders Coerce Fighting Despite Tough Conditions

Clear orders and a plan for their execution were necessary to ensure troops’ fighting, because the military would face hardships in the conflict. The Jordanian armed forces were generally perceived to be professional and troops’ confidence had been revived, as mentioned, following the Battle of Karama. Indeed, the United States—although worried about the military’s will to fight—did not question its ability to do so. On September 9

CIA Director Richard Helms argued: the Jordanian armed forces “don’t need help to handle the Fedayeen.”202 The same day, another U.S. analysis predicted: “If Husain shows disposition…to contemplate fedayeen roll-up we believe JAA [the Jordanian Arab

198 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 270. 199 Ibid., 250. 200 Ibid., 252. 201 "263. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 18, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V, Secret, Sensitive." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 735. 202 "214. Minutes of a Combined Washington Special Actions Group and Review Group Meeting, September 9, 1970, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Nodis, this Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room, Kissinger is Not Listed as a Participant but He Chaired the Meeting," 631.

121 Army] adequate for job.”203 But despite the military’s technical capabilities, it was yet to be seen whether the armed forces would have the ability to conduct urban warfare and suppress large-scale unrest.

Once orders were given, the pace of military operations was unrelenting as soldiers were asked to go to great lengths to confront the fedayeen. A Jordanian officer at the time recalls that on September 17 the army was ordered to clear the country. Once this began, as he put it, they did not stop working until they finished their job.204 Soldiers who were already disciplined and organized now had clear instructions and were therefore more willing to stay in their positions despite the difficult nature of the conflict.205 The showdown, once started, became much more intense than military leaders expected, leaders who had predicted it would take only two days to control fedayeen bases.

In particular, the Jordanian military was ill-prepared to conduct urban warfare.206

Commandos in the capital, for instance, made use of the city’s drainage trenches to organize and defend themselves against the military.207 In comparison, the “Jordanian army had had little experience of street fighting, which is essentially an infantry task. It had been organized for mobile operations, but tanks are vulnerable in cities, and artillery

203 "217. Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, September 9, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Immediate, Nodis, Received at 8:20 P.M. it was Repeated to Tel Aviv." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 635. 204 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. 205 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63 (Amman, Jordan, March 4, 2015, 3pm). 206 DeAtkine, Amman 1970, A Memoir. 207 Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography, 129.

122 finds it hard to bring its weight of fire to bear.”208 One officer who served in the Special

Forces during the conflict remembered the hardships of the fighting. The clashes that took place in Amman were typical of urban warfare and he remembered not knowing what soldiers would find when they were attempting to retake an area; the military suffered losses because the fedayeen were so well-trained in guerilla conduct, he felt.209

Another former officer recalled that there were 187 fedayeen bases in Amman alone.

Their presence, in addition to the urban warfare, made progress difficult. He remembered feeling he would have rather faced 1,000 enemies outside of a house than one enemy hidden in a house—urban warfare was so challenging.210 A PDFLP member also described the conflict’s intensity from the Palestinian resistance standpoint. The confrontations were extremely violent, he said, as the military tried to employ counter- insurgency tactics to strike a swift and brutal blow to the resistance and show civilians that the threat was being handled decisively.211

Not only was the style of warfare taxing, but the pace was also grueling. An intelligence official recalled that Jordan did not give the fedayeen one day to rest after mid-September.212 Another officer remembered going three days without even bread, just consuming biscuit and tea as operations proceeded.213 The operation was “not a joke.”

When you begin a war, he said, you have to “do it the right way or don’t do it.” To do it

“right” soldiers were asked to bomb their capital.214 Moreover, the military was soon

208 Ibid., 135. 209 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62. 210 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. 211 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 81 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 5pm). 212 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92. 213 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105. 214 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92.

123 facing not only the Palestinian threat, but also a Syrian incursion in Jordan’s North and the potential for Iraqi military intervention.

In sum, although the Jordanian military enjoyed a degree of professionalism prior to the conflict, it was not trained for the specific operational plan in September 1970. In addition, soldiers came to participate in a much more grueling campaign than initially expected, which very well could have tested their resolve to fight. Coercive measures were important for keeping soldiers in their posts. There was a plan for dealing with the fedayeen, one that was communicated and to which they were held accountable for executing. The very stringency of this plan and operational control was evident in interviews, to the extent that participants in the conflict did not mention monitoring and punishment over them—they were ordered to fight, observed doing so, and the pace of operations did not allow most to consider doing otherwise. This coercion, paired with persuasive influences, led to a largely fighting force.

Persuasion

Perception of Foreignness Develops

The opposition in Jordan in September 1970 could have been framed as a domestic, organic uprising. Following the 1967 war and refugee crisis, there was great sympathy for the Palestinian resistance, significant intermarriage between those of East and West

Bank descent, and even a number of Jordanians fighting with fedayeen groups. As one retired Air Force officer put it, Jordanians and Palestinians had an intertwined society.

But, and as he elaborated, this in fact served increasingly to frame the fedayeen

124 commandos as outside actors.215 Multiple factors contributed to this framing of the fedayeen as an external force, including the fedayeen’s own missteps, the regime’s efforts to paint the fedayeen as foreign, outside actors’ unilateral interference in the conflict, and the lack of a spontaneous civil uprising in concert with the confrontation in 1970.

Fedayeen Missteps

The fedayeen’s own actions largely contributed to their being painted as a foreign, not domestic, actor in Jordan on the eve of Black September. Fedayeen members and particularly leaders were perceived as foreign on various levels. The first level was variation in individuals’ origin within Palestine. Many of the Palestinians incorporated into Jordanian society following 1948 were West Bankers. In contrast, many resistance leaders, including those forming Fatah, were from the Gaza Strip on Palestine’s

Mediterranean coast.216 A Jordanian political figure of Palestinian descent drew a contrast between West Bank Palestinians “indigenous” to Jordanian territory and those who came to Jordan as refugees from other areas of Palestine. In his estimation, it was the latter category of Palestinians who revolted throughout the 1950s. These “refugees” were not as well incorporated into Jordan’s Palestinian community and when the PLO was established it was able to absorb the loyalty of such people who felt they had no home.217

In addition to these demographic differences in the Palestinian community in

Jordan, which influenced the types of individuals most likely to join the resistance, were the foreign ties of these groups’ most prominent figures. Interviewees in Jordan were

215 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 216 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, 108-109. 217 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 59.

125 quick to underline how PLO leaders such as Arafat and Salah Khalaf had resided in the

Gulf, had never lived in Jordan, and did not understand the relationship between Jordan and the West Bank. In the view of a Jordanian former diplomat, the resistance movement was not organic. It “wasn’t coming out of refugee camps” but rather emerged from a well-established business community in the Gulf.218 The appointment of additional figures to the resistance’s leadership, such as PLO Chairman Shukairi, who had served as

Saudi Arabia’s ambassador at the United Nations, reinforced this image. One individual expressed his opinion that although these groups claimed to represent the refugee camps, the actual leadership “was this gang that was formed by I don’t know who in Kuwait.”219

Even the rank and file was perceived by some to be composed of foreign actors. As one former diplomat said: “In 1970, we had people from North Vietnam, from North Korea, from China, from all Arab countries fighting with the fedayeen against the army.”220

The fedayeen were also eager to accept support from foreign governments, which internationalized their cause further. The PLO was created in 1964 and has been described as serving as “virtually an Egyptian puppet” until 1969.221 It was generally perceived that each Arab country contributed rhetorical, financial, or in-kind support to the fedayeen “since anti-Israel sentiment provides one of the few unifying issues in the divided Arab world.”222 This led some Jordanians to feel that regional governments elevated organizations such as the PLO to the status of nation-states themselves. One diplomat remembered, for instance, Jordan being bullied into allowing the PLO a say in

218 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 219 Ibid. 220 Ibid. 221 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice", 18. 222 Ibid., 1.

126 who would become prime minister in Jordan.223 Among regional actors, Syria was a particularly strong supporter of the resistance. It reportedly supplied groups such as Fatah directly, but also facilitated the transfer of items, including Chinese weapons, to the fedayeen.224 Outside the Arab world, the commandos received significant support as well.

In 1968 Arafat traveled to the Soviet Union for a secret meeting225 and the Chinese, in addition to providing arms, also trained a number of commandos.226

Loose international connections were reinforced by the creation of commando groups explicitly affiliated with foreign militaries. Every Arab country had its own

Palestinian resistance group, one retired officer remembered, leading to a “cocktail” of fedayeen organizations.227 Syria hosted the Saiqa forces and also supported the PLA’s

Hittin Forces brigade, which was directly attached to the Syrian army.228 Many individuals who later joined the PLO’s Palestine Liberation Army also had experience fighting in the Egyptian and Iraqi militaries.229 Moreover, once Black September was launched, the fedayeen only reinforced the perception of their foreign-backing by calling for external interference. A PLO appeal on September 18 stated:

The critical battle the Palestinian revolution is waging against the client authority in Jordan is a battle of the Arab nation as a whole, and requires the concerted efforts to win and triumph. We are asking for participation in the battle, immediate intervention in it, and support of the revolution’s forces to bring down the rule of treason and conspiracy.230

223 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 224 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice", 16. 225 Ibid., 30. 226 Ibid., v. 227 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105. 228 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice", 16. 229 Ibid., 5. 230 "686. Appeal from the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Iraqi Forces in Jordan [ARABIC], Fatah, September 18, 1970." Palestinian Arab Documents, 1970, ed. George Khoury Nasrallah (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), 781.

127 The final aspect of fedayeen actions that contributed to their perceived foreignness was the ideologies embodied by particular groups. In particular, the PFLP and PDFLP were seen as Marxist, Leninist, communist organizations. Palestinians and Jordanians alike often portrayed their problems with the resistance as falling with these leftist organizations, which were perceived as linked to transnational organizations and foreign countries. A Palestinian political figure stated that the leftist fedayeen drove a wedge between the resistance and Jordanian government following Karama.231 Among

Jordanians, it was common to hear in my interviews that organizations such as Fatah were giving hope to Palestinians; but, as one Jordanian officer put it, the Leftists were considered easterners,232 or, foreigners.

The connection to communism and Marxism also increased these groups’ ties to foreign movements and governments. It was popularly perceived that these “communists” had ties to the Soviet Union, Iraq and China,233 and by the summer of 1970 there was evidence that they benefited from “material support from Bulgaria, Poland, and possibly

East Germany.”234 The most commonly discussed connection, however, was between the fedayeen and Vietnam. In early 1970 Abu Iyad and Arafat visited the country and held discussions with a general officer there.235 In his book, Adnan Abu Odeh described how the fedayeen began thinking of regime change in Jordan, considering Amman the Hanoi of the Arabs, and arguing that Hanoi (Amman) had to be liberated in order to liberate

231 Author Interview with Palestinian Political Figure, Interview ID 65. 232 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 233 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62. 234 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice", 41. 235 Nathir Rasheed, Between Dream and Fulfillment: Memoirs from the Old Guard Era in Jordan (Cairo, Egypt: Altawiel and Sanabil Bookshop, 2012), 206.

128 Saigon (Jerusalem).236 Among interviewees, I often heard references to the fedayeen and

Vietnam,237 and how the fedayeen treated Amman as if it were Hanoi.238

In addition to their foreign connections, the partisan fedayeen’s ideology and daily life was anathema to many in Jordan. First, these resistance fighters were seen as atheists, in comparison to Jordan’s predominantly Muslim population. One flashpoint that is both documented239 and popularly remembered is the PDFLP’s hanging of a red

(communist) flag on a prominent mosque in Jordan. As one Fatah member described it, the flag was huge, covering the side of the mosque from top to bottom, and the group also wrote “all power to the resistance.” This was leftist childishness (tafula yasaria) and a strategic error, he felt.240 A Jordanian officer at the time recalled fedayeen fighters taking

Qurans out of homes and replacing them with Mao Zedong’s book.241 Finally, many of the resistance groups incorporated significant female elements. Female PFLP member and plane hijacker Leila Khalid, for instance, became a poster-woman for the resistance.

In this way, the fedayeen’s freeness with women also rubbed many in Jordan the wrong way and signified the resistance’s non-nativeness.242

Through associations with foreign funding and international support, as well as transnational ideologies, the fedayeen may have gained greater prominence in the region.

However, at the same time, this perceived foreign backing made it more likely that the

Jordanian army would follow through on orders to suppress the Palestinian resistance, as

236 Adnan Abu-Odeh, Interviewed by Jean Krasno in Amman, Jordan (Yale-UN Oral History Project, March 14, 1998), 10. 237 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60. 238 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 239 Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography, 124. 240 Author Interview with Palestinian Who Worked in Fatah's Media Department, Interview ID 89. 241 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 242 Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography, 124.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86.

129 it was the Jordanian military’s mandate to protect the country from foreign threats. As one former Special Forces officer argued, although the fedayeen would call Jordanian soldiers mercenaries over the radio, it was in fact the fedayeen who were coming from outside the country and receiving foreign funding.243

Regime Rhetoric

In addition to the opposition’s missteps, which were often acknowledged by fighters in hindsight, the Jordanian government actively worked to link the fedayeen to actors outside Jordan and Palestine. Because the September 1970 confrontation was highly anticipated, the government had an increased ability to construct this frame before orders were given to assault the resistance fighters. As I describe in more detail below, when considering the perception that the revolt was using illegitimate tactics, the monarchy sought to portray the impending showdown as “between the government and dissidents rather than between the government and Palestinians,”244 and to aid in this effort Jordan emphasized the group’s foreignness as well. In a November 1968 news conference, King

Hussein alluded to the foreign aims of the fedayeen, saying:

On the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the people in both Banks gave expression to their feelings. It was expected that they would do so in Amman in a quiet and peaceful manner. However, certain elements tried to mar this picture. I find it extremely difficult to decide what were their motives. However, if we go back to similar circumstances in other places, we can say, in the light of what took place, that these elements or groups acted in accordance with a pre-arranged plan which did not emanate from any Arab country, and certainly not from Jordan either.245

243 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62. 244 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, 118. 245 "403. News Conference Statement and Remarks by the Jordanian King Hussein on the Clashes between Security Forces and a Commando Group (Excerpts), Amman, November 6, 1968."International Documents

130

Approaching 1970, the regime worked to reinforce an image of the fedayeen as alien atheists and communists. Government “propaganda described to soldiers that the authority’s struggle with the resistance was a struggle between atheism and faith” and emphasized that soldiers “were Muslims and that it was the Muslim duty to combat atheists.”246 There were also reports that before September 1970 pocket-sized Qurans were distributed to Muslims in the Jordanian military.247 In summer 1970 Al-Aqsa ran an article that exemplified this regime propaganda, as it constructed a dialogue between a pious soldier and Marxist feda’i. Another article described a “trap” in which Jordanians found themselves, “wherein atheist agents lit the darkness of disorder and blindness in our steadfast Jordan…in July [1970] the evil atheist elements moved and expansive measures were taken leading to pitting all international public opinion against us.”248

Such articles worked to suggest that the resistance was external to Muslim, Jordanian society.

In addition to framing the fedayeen as foreign-backed atheists, the government also frequently suggested that the commandos’ tactics were in fact supporting Israeli objectives in the region. It thus worked to frame the fedayeen, ironically, as agents of

Israel. In a letter to the military ranks addressed on August 2, 1970, King Hussein argued that “the enemy…was behind the provocations that we were exposed to in the past two months in the armed forces,” and that Israel was manipulating the fedayeen to destabilize

on Palestine: 1968, ed. Zuhair Diab (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies and University of Kuwait, 1971). 246 Al-Hindi, Jordanian Mobilization Against the Palestinian Resistance before the Attack of September 1970 [ARABIC], 40. 247 Ibid., 40. 248 Ibid., 41.

131 the Hashemite Kingdom.249 Following the plane hijackings in early September 1970, the government again sought to paint the developments as providing “the enemy” an opportunity to target Jordan.250 By mid-September 1970 these suggestions were becoming more pointed. An Al-Aqsa article from September 16 asked:

‘Who benefits from all that has happened? Israel benefits. Who benefits from advocates calling for a teachers’ strike and withholding culture from our children and students? Israel benefits. Who benefits from advocates calling for strikes so that the building blocks of the nation is immobilized, the movement kills, and life is assassinated throughout the country and disorder (fitna) spreads thereafter?…Israel benefits…Why is the military called agents, why all this injury and cursing against the Jordanian military that has given martyrs and pure blood.’251

Although the Jordanian government never accused the fedayeen of collaborating with the

Israelis, such statements through government mouthpieces sought to encourage soldiers to connect the Palestinian armed resistance with Israel’s advancement. The theme was repeated again on September 18 when an Al-Aqsa article argued: “‘This is not the voice of Palestine, that which is broadcast from Syria. We must check the waves and make sure that it is not released by secret Israeli radio, aiming to sow a new disorder (fitna) in our beloved nation.’”252 As I elaborate on below, such messaging indicates that the regime worked to represent the fedayeen as foreign-backed, and then further connect this to the illegitimate tactics of the resistance movement and need for the military to halt the fedayeen in their tracks.

249 Ibid., 41. 250 Ibid., 42. 251 Ibid., 42. 252 Ibid., 42.

132 External Interference

When the fedayeen shot themselves in the foot, the Jordanian government worked quickly to exploit these missteps to frame the resistance as foreign. But in addition, outside actors unilaterally interfered in the fedayeen-Jordan contention for their own purposes and this resulted in yet another layer of foreignness attached to the resistance.

Mutawi writes that by 1967 Syria was, on a daily basis, calling “on the people of Jordan to rise against their King and to kill him” and accusing Hussein of “persecuting the

Palestinians and the leaders of opposition movements and of protecting Israel by preventing Arab guerrilla raids into it.”253 A former Jordanian officer recalled that Syrian and Egyptian broadcasters constantly spoke of Jordan as an agent of imperialism as well.254

Once martial law was declared, international intervention escalated. At first, it was feared that the Iraqi military units stationed in Jordan would interfere to support the fedayeen. There were 19,000 Iraqi soldiers based in Jordan at the time,255 although the

U.S. government described these troops as “a ragged bunch” stationed in Jordan “as a form of political exile.”256 On September 10, 1970 Kissinger asked Richard Helms: “How good is the Iraqi Army?” to which the CIA Director replied: “As an Army, no good; as bandits, all right” and determined that the Jordanian military could likely counter an additional Iraqi threat should it arise in 1970.257 Although the Iraqi army was not seen as

253 Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 83. 254 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 255 "254. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting. September 17, 1970. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret; Sensitive, Nodis, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room," 709. 256 Ibid., 709. 257 "222. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, September 10, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114,

133 a formidable enemy, the threat of its potential intervention again linked the Palestinian resistance to an internationalized conflict. A Jordanian former political and military figure mentioned that the Iraqi army was connected to a Baathist Iraqi regime, one in principle against the King.258 In addition, a former officer and a Palestinian in Jordan at the time commented that popular belief was that the Iraqis might come to the aid of the fedayeen as they were sympathetic to these fighters.259 Reiterating these points, another

Jordanian officer mentioned that there were two brigades stationed in Mafraq that seemed to move closer to Amman during the crisis.260 The Iraqis were speaking loudly in support of the fedayeen before the crisis, although they did not act in the end, according to one

Palestinian fighter.261

Ultimately, although there was only suspicion as to whether Iraq would intervene,

Syria did so early in the conflict. On September 17, “Damascus Radio called on

Jordanian troops to revolt and fight with the Fedayeen” and this was followed by a meeting between the Jordanian Ambassador and Syrian Foreign Office in which the former was “informed that the Syrians would not stand idly by while the Fedayeen was

‘massacred.’”262 A Fatah fighter explained that he and other troops who had been

Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room, Kissinger is Not Listed as a Participant but He Chaired the Meeting." Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, eds. Linda W. Qaimmaqami, Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 645. 258 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60. 259 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. 260 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92. 261 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter, Interview ID 66 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 11, 2015, 8pma). 262 "253. Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 17, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/17/70 AM, Secret, Sensitive, the Time is Handwritten at the Top of the First Page, Printed from an Uninitialed Copy," 700.

134 stationed in Egypt were moved to Syria so as to be in position to fight in the September war (harb aylul).263 Days later, Syria invaded Jordan’s northern border. Interviewees uniformly referred to the Syrian intervention when describing their memories of Black

September. A former intelligence official recalled Syria preparing four armored brigades, which entered from the North.264 A Jordanian major remembered learning that the Syrian military had crossed the border at Ramtha and was heading to Amman. The Syrian tanks had PLA markers on them; however, everyone knew that the PLA did not have such armor and thus this was a Syrian intervention, he said.265 Other Jordanian officers recalled that Syria interfered and this left no choice for Jordan but to deploy its Air Force to push them back.266 A Palestinian also recalled how Syria intervened but withdrew due to domestic political in-fighting.267 Foreign threats to interfere and actual intervention internationalized the conflict and showed the Jordanian military that the resistance needed to be stopped in order to preserve Jordan’s sovereignty.

Lack of Spontaneous Uprising

A final factor contributing to the resistance’s foreignness was the lack of a spontaneous civilian uprising in association with the events in September 1970. A Jordanian officer commented that he considered the conflict to be a civil war of sorts. However, in the end, the fedayeen were in uniform and the people in the refugee camps were not revolting, he

263 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Fatah Fighter, Interview ID 76 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 9:30am). 264 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92. 265 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105. 266 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91. 267 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63.

135 said.268 This was a theme repeated by others. There had been civilian protests previously, such as opposing Nasser’s acceptance of the Rogers Plan. However, by September 1970 there seemed to be no role for the masses, in the opinion of one Palestinian. Once the

September conflict began, he recalled the military attacking civilian areas and some civilians screaming “Allahu akhbar” at points, but otherwise there was no civilian movement.269 Another Palestinian had similar memories, arguing that sometimes people would raise their voices calling for a ceasefire to alleviate their hardships, such as lack of electricity,270 but this was not a widespread phenomenon. Others pointed out that there were only limited demonstrations even in the most militarized camp in Amman,

Wihdat,271 and although there were protests following the showdown there were not substantial demonstrations during the conflict.272 The lack of mass, civilian demonstrations in concert with the initiation of conflict in September 1970 reinforced the army’s perception that it was suppressing a set of armed, foreign groups, rather than a domestic uprising.

Illegitimate Tactics

Much as King Hussein sought to avoid the characterization of the conflict as between

Jordanians and Palestinians by emphasizing the fedayeen’s international links, he also sought to do so by framing it “as a contest between the forces of law and order and the

268 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 269 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 78 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 11am). 270 Author Interview with Palestinian Who Worked in Fatah's Media Department, Interview ID 89. 271 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 81. 272 Author Interview with Palestinian, Interview ID 77 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 10am).

136 forces of anarchy.”273 Again, he was aided by the commando groups’ own actions. The commandos’ behavior came to be viewed progressively as unorganized and chaotic, in violation of law and order, and arbitrarily terrorizing citizens. Indeed, the fedayeen began attacking the King and elites, harassing the military, and calling for revolutionary regime change in Jordan. This disorder came to be viewed as the fedayeen creating a “state within a state,” and ultimately fostered soldiers’ beliefs that the resistance was adopting illegitimate tactics and thus decisive action was necessary to suppress this unruly uprising.

Opposition Missteps

The armed resistance’s lack of organization between 1968 and 1970 contributed to the perception that it employed illegitimate tactics to liberate Palestine. As indicated in Table

3.1, there were a multitude of primary commando organizations, not to mention the additional and lesser-manned factions. One Fatah member highlighted that there were many agendas for the fedayeen operating in Jordan. In his opinion, no one Palestinian leader was capable of reigning in these groups.274 A Jordanian military and political figure argued that King Hussein preferred to deal diplomatically with the resistance fighters, but that this effort was complicated by the fact that there were a variety of fedayeen factions. The Jordanian government might sit with Arafat and agree to a plan, the interviewee said, but then another faction would break it.275 This feeling of the fracturing of the resistance and therefore difficulty in negotiating with it was reinforced in a conversation with a Jordanian of Palestinian origin. He remarked that the period following the Battle of Karama saw a deterioration in the behavior of the resistance and a

273 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: King Hussein's Life in War and Peace, 329. 274 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 78. 275 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60.

137 power struggle among groups, some of whom ignored the existence of the Jordanian state.

In his estimation, this lack of organization resulted in some Palestinians feeling at odds with the resistance.276 A former diplomat agreed, arguing that once the fedayeen moved into the cities it became impossible to deal with them as they grew more and more unorganized; some groups had good intentions, he felt, but others were taking advantage of the political climate.277 In fact, a soldier who defected in 1970 himself argued that the resistance did not have clear policies and that some groups were choosing tactics, such as hijacking planes, which worked against the other groups’ strategies. It was felt that the organizations were ungovernable and this chaos drove a wedge between the Jordanian military and fedayeen.278 Indeed, one Palestinian reflected that the fedayeen’s behavior at the time was childish nonsense (sebiyaniat), that these groups were behaving irresponsibly, and that each group was working on its own without coordination among fronts.279 Even with the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization and other umbrella groups for resistance fighters, “fedayeen” was a term that encompassed a range of groups operating with their own agendas and often conflicting tactics in Jordan following the 1967 war.

This lack of organization fostered an image of the fedayeen as increasingly sowing chaos in Jordan rather than bringing justice to the Palestinians. As the fedayeen grew bolder and conducted more frequent cross-border raids into Israel, they inevitably imperiled the communities from which they launched their operations. A Jordanian diplomat described a sentiment of the time—that in conducting their raids commandos

276 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as a Diplomat, Interview ID 95. 277 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 278 Author Interview with Jordanian Who Left in 1970, Interview ID 93. 279 Author Interview with Palestinian, Interview ID 77.

138 were not only endangering themselves, but also jeopardizing the lives of those living in the valley near Israel, as Israel would respond with violence. He argued that due to the cross-border conflict, Al-Ghour Valley, which had previously served as Jordan’s breadbasket, became too dangerous to live in and many moved to the highlands and closer to Irbid to escape the attacks. This created friction on civilian, societal and economic levels, in his opinion.280 One Fatah figure who was in Amman in 1970 put it simply: it was chaos.281

As time drew on, the fedayeen were not only considered unorganized and generally chaotic, but there was a perception that they were unabashedly violating basic law and order in Jordan. The most common story repeated in personal narratives was the shift from citizens voluntarily contributing to the fedayeen’s cause, to guerilla fighters extorting and looting to gain resources. The fedayeen previously would walk through hotels and ask for donations.282 Over time, however, interviewees mentioned that the commandos would enter the Intercontinental Hotel carrying arms, insult the patrons, and induce payments for their cause.283 Another officer recalled a Palestinian soldier in

Mafraq, Jordan who was approached by a feda’i first asking him for money and then trying to blackmail him. The Palestinian soldier spit in the feda’i’s face, showing that he did not respect these Palestinian guerillas.284 There were similar stories of the fedayeen’s excesses. One Palestinian shopkeeper in Jordan described a typical day: “‘No sooner had we opened the shutters…than a party of them [fedayeen] would come swaggering in,

280 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 281 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 78. 282 Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian Close to Political and Military Figures in 1970, Interview ID 103. 283 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as a Diplomat, Interview ID 95.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 284 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86.

139 Kaleshnikov in one hand and a collecting tin in the other, asking for contributions.”285

Another individual explained that if a feda’i had a family member or friend who wanted to rent a house, the feda’i would approach the homeowner and coerce him into renting it for free.286 Although citizens had initially supported the fedayeen, the Jordanian officer explained, it became clear that they were simply “playing around” and their actions were in fact “destroying this country.”287

In addition to the fedayeen’s interference in economic life, many pointed out that the commandos increasingly flaunted their weaponry on the streets of Amman and elsewhere in Jordan. Many observers became disillusioned with the resistance’s behavior once every member had a rifle and a gun.288 Some felt they were witnessing things happening in Amman that would not be permitted in any other capital in the world at the time. One would see the guerillas’ cars driven through the streets, with weapons in the back of them, a Jordanian remembered.289 An officer also described this image of fedayeen pickup trucks with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) in their beds.290 It was popularly perceived that there were armed Palestinians in the streets everywhere.291

Their use of extortion, looting, and flaunting of weapons led many to view the fedayeen as disrupting life on an increasing scale in Jordan. Resistance groups led roughly twelve strikes between September 1969 and July 1970292 and the security services documented 497 crimes reportedly committed by the resistance between June

285 Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography, 118. 286 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 57. 287 Author Interview with Jordanian General Speaking of Experience as Civilian Youth in 1970, Interview ID 102. 288 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as a Diplomat, Interview ID 95. 289 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 57. 290 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 291 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General, Interview ID 58. 292 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 113.

140 and August 1970 alone.293 In July 1970 the PDFLP attacked a post office in Amman294 after a dispute arose regarding its hanging of propaganda there. More generally, individuals remembered the fedayeen disturbing the normal legal process in Jordan. One man recalled how the guerillas “‘used to go to courts all over the country when there was someone captured or accused, where they used to threaten judges and get persons released.’”295 The list of disruptions of law and order went on and included violating traffic laws and kidnapping citizens as well.296

The resistance was soon seen not only as violating law and order, but also arbitrarily terrorizing the population.297 One Jordanian described the fedayeen as

“renegades” who operated in “gangs,”298 and another remarked that the Jordanian military was not fighting a regime army (jaish nithami) when it confronted the Palestinian resistance but rather gang-like (asabi) groups.299 Another Jordanian reiterated that Black

September was not a civil war, but rather a war with gangs who wanted to take over the country.300 People did not feel safe in their homes, one man said, because life was similar to the old gangs of New York.301 As if to underline the extent of the terror, one interviewee stated that there were some Palestinians in Jordan who were opposed to this terrorism; he mentioned that his wife’s Palestinian family did not carry guns.302 By 1970 the guerillas had established checkpoints around cities, stolen cars, and “raced around the

293 Ibid., 201. 294 Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993, 255. 295 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 119. 296 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, 174. 297 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 298 Author Interview with Jordanian General Speaking of Experience as Civilian Youth in 1970, Interview ID 102. 299 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105. 300 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 59. 301 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 302 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General, Interview ID 58.

141 streets with sirens blaring.”303 Due to this terror, between June and September of that year: “People almost forgot about the relationship between the fedayeen and the resistance; they started to see the organizations as another arbitrary, disorganized authority to be feared but not respected.”304 The most high-profile terror tactic was the hijacking of planes, particularly the PFLP’s boarding, landing, and burning of planes in

September 1970.305

The fedayeen also specifically targeted Jordan’s leaders in ways that shook the country’s stability. Such elites were generally intimidated and humiliated; as one interviewee felt, if the prime minister traveled to his house at a certain time of day he would need to notify the PLO command first.306 The guerillas detained Princess Muna in

Amman in late 1969;307 kidnapped political and military figure Abdulsalam Al-Majali on

September 6, 1970;308 and mistreated political figure Zaid al-Rifai at a checkpoint.309 In

June 1970 Zaid bin Shaker’s sister was killed by fedayeen machine gun fire when she ventured onto the roof of the family home,310 and King Hussein survived multiple assassination attempts.311

More concerning for the military were the attacks on its own soldiers, which disrupted their normal lives. Between 1968 and 1969 the fedayeen began kidnapping

303 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 201. 304 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, 177. 305 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 81. 306 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 307 Snow, Hussein: A Biography, 210. 308 "Political Memoirs: Jordan’s Former Premier on ‘Black September’." Al Arabiya, February 6, 2015c. 309 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971), 215. 310 Snow, Hussein: A Biography, 214. 311 Abu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, 177.

142 coercive apparatus personnel.312 In addition, soldiers were reportedly humiliated and attacked by the fedayeen. One officer at the time recalled not being able to travel to his home for an entire month due to fedayeen snipers in the area, which he said inspired hatred (hiqd) in the military.313 Many service members felt they could not walk around in their military uniforms for fear of being targeted by commandos.314 They were advised to wear civilian clothes during leave to avoid being “beaten, humiliated by the fedayeen.”315

If not, the commandos might detain them and drive them throughout town “in a show of ridicule.”316 There were memories of commandos stopping army vehicles, insulting soldiers by taking their berets or stealing their cars, and telling the soldiers to walk.317 The commandos kidnapped intelligence Colonel Ahmed Obeidat,318 but even more gruesome stories were passed around. Two former officers recalled separately that the fedayeen had put a nail through one soldier’s head319 and another remembered commandos throwing hot oil on a soldier and burning him.320 There were additional stories of fedayeen “said to lure on leave soldiers to their deaths” and “of fighters using a soldier’s head as a football.”321 What is significant is that this harassment of soldiers appears to have been indiscriminate, with Palestinian service members not free of the fedayeen’s insults and attacks.322

312 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 118. 313 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105. 314 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60. 315 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 316 Adnan Abu-Odeh, Interviewed by Jean Krasno in Amman, Jordan, 18. 317 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 59. 318 Rasheed, Between Dream and Fulfillment: Memoirs from the Old Guard Era in Jordan, 181. 319 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General, Interview ID 17.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 320 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. 321 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971), 202. 322 Ibid., 203.

143 The unorganized, terrorizing commandos were not only disrupting basic law and order, and attacking the military, but also were demanding the overturning of the existing regime in Jordan and its replacement with a revolutionary government. This again contributed to their image as pursuing their agenda through illegitimate means. The PFLP and PDFLP were the groups most vocal in calling for the regime’s overthrow, which they agitated for by early 1970.323 In June 1970 a PFLP spokesperson published a statement following the fedayeen confrontations with the Jordanian military. In response to the question: “Do you want the overthrow of the monarchy in Jordan?” he said: “The resistance, and thus the Front, views undermining the monarchy in Jordan as not its responsibility. Rather, it is the responsibility of the nationalist, progressive Jordanian movement.” He went on to add a clear caveat: “However, it is the duty of the resistance to undertake, with all means necessary, the defense of its existence and freedom of movement.”324 Even Fatah, known for its more moderate policies, had written in April

1970 that “if the choice for Fatah becomes that of liquidation or seizing power, Fatah will not hesitate to seize power.”325 By August 1970 the PFLP’s Habash was stating that the group rejected peace plans “‘with all our strength by every means and with every single bullet at our disposal.’”326 Groups’ rhetoric escalated in 1970 and was increasingly confrontational to government in Jordan.

The single most pointed example of this revolutionary stance on the Jordanian regime was a slogan adopted by the PDLFP in the summer of 1970: All Power to the

323 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: King Hussein's Life in War and Peace, 316. 324 "348. Speech of the Official Spokesperson of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Concerning Jordan Events [ARABIC], Al-Hadaf, Issue 46, Bierut, June 11, 1970." Palestinian Arab Documents, 1970, ed. George Khoury Nasrallah (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), 444. 325 Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, Document R-782-ISA, 60. 326 Michael McGuire, "Commandos in Jordan Pose Threat to Peace in Middle East," Chicago Tribune, August 2, 1970.

144 Resistance (kul sulta lil-muqawama).327 As one Palestinian said, the adoption of this provocative slogan, mimicking a Russian revolution theme, was easy ammunition for the

Jordanian government.328 In hindsight, one PDFLP member agreed that the adoption of this slogan set the factions on a collision course with the government. Although he himself had contributed to the slogan’s adoption, he later realized it had been a strategic mistake because it was quickly exploited by the Jordanian regime and media as evidence that commandos were solely interested in gaining power for themselves. The PDFLP fighter mentioned that once the Front realized the misstep, it tried to adopt a different slogan; however, the first had latched on to people’s minds already.329 Another slogan was: “The road to Jerusalem (Al-Quds) runs through Amman.”330 Again, many perceived this to mean that Amman’s fall was necessary to liberate Jerusalem, and argued that the fedayeen had lost their original objective of freeing Palestine.331

Regime Rhetoric

The regime seized on the opposition’s numerous missteps to legitimize its negotiations and attacks on the fedayeen. In September 1968 King Hussein sent a message to his

327 Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, Document R-782-ISA, 91.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63.; Author Interview with Palestinian Political Figure, Interview ID 65.; Author Interview with Palestinian Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 71.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Joined the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 104 (Amman, Jordan, May 16, 2015, 11am).; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105. 328 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63. 329 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Member, Interview ID 69. 330 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 57.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62. 331 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 57.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62.

145 prime minister, in which he stated that although the Palestinian cause was “indissolubly linked” to Jordan, and that Jordan was the Palestinians’ homeland: “‘We have, however, announced that we are opposed to destructive anarchy, that we favour instead purposeful organisation that leads to desired, tangible and effective results.’”332 Soon after, following military clashes with the fedayeen in November 1968, the King argued “the last two or three days was merely a reaction to the attempts made by a small group of people in defiance of law and order and of the security forces of this country. This group had committed crimes against the civilian population.”333 Similarly, Prince Hassan argued that by the end of 1969 “‘it was a matter of restoring order. Graft, robbery, looting and other actions were affecting the establishment,” or, life in Jordan.334 The King reinforced this theme during the February 1970 crisis, when his government “announced a series of measures designed to ‘preserve law and order.’”335 Indeed, in June 1970 the King underscored what he considered to be the criminal tactics of the resistance, stating:

“‘There are armed gangs proceeding with robbery, looting, and killing, and they are exposed to the strictest suffering’” in Amman.336

The picture of chaos (fawdha) caused by the Palestinian resistance’s illegitimate tactics was exacerbated by the state media.337 A former PDFLP member remembered how the guerillas were omnipresent in Jordan in 1970. However, although they were very popular in the Palestinian camps their reputation was sullied among the Jordanian and

332 "382. Message from the Jordanian King Hussein to the Prime Minister of Jordan Al-Talhumi on Current Issues (Excerpt), Amman, September 13, 1968."International Documents on Palestine: 1968, ed. Zuhair Diab (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies and University of Kuwait, 1971), 436-438. 333 "403. News Conference Statement and Remarks by the Jordanian King Hussein on the Clashes between Security Forces and a Commando Group (Excerpts), Amman, November 6, 1968," 463. 334 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971), 124. 335 Ibid., 158. 336 Al-Hindi, Jordanian Mobilization Against the Palestinian Resistance before the Attack of September 1970 [ARABIC], 42. 337 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63.

146 Palestinian bourgeoisie communities who felt life had become too chaotic. In this fighter’s mind, the government and military exploited this feeling of chaos. By convincing the population that their life was not secure, the King could make a case that the insurgency had to be forcefully crushed.338

Indeed, it does appear that the state exploited the fractured nature of the resistance, and its increasingly disruptive tactics, to reinforce anti-fedayeen sentiment within the military. On June 24, 1970 Al-Aqsa published a letter from King Hussein to his military

Chief of Staff. In an allusion to the unruly nature of the resistance, he wrote: “‘just as it should be the case that a region’s commander is completely responsible for the discipline of his forces and their organization, it should be the case that he is completely responsible for preserving the security and orderliness of his region.’” The Chief of Staff’s response was published as well; he stated: “‘The organized nation, my sir, is the awaiting nation, and chaos is what defeats the nation before the enemy defeats her. And as we face the treacherous enemy at the [Jordan] river and along the combat front we will not accept facing chaos on our rear front.’”339 Here, the Chief of Staff implied not only that chaos is a state’s greatest challenge, but also that the fedayeen threat at home was putting Jordan at a greater risk against the Israeli enemy abroad. In this way, the government was adept at framing the resistance as chaotic and threatening to Jordan’s national security, and thus requiring a military response.

In particular, the regime sought to reinforce stories of commandos humiliating soldiers. In addition to advising soldiers to wear civilian clothes when off duty, it

338 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 81. 339 Al-Hindi, Jordanian Mobilization Against the Palestinian Resistance before the Attack of September 1970 [ARABIC], 43.

147 ultimately “forbid vacations” and allowed rumors to circulate regarding how the fedayeen targeted soldiers.340 Outlets such as Al-Aqsa provided daily updates on fedayeen insults and crimes against soldiers.341 More sinister were the reports suggesting that regime elements donned fedayeen-style clothing and perpetrated attacks on military figures to spread suspicion and hatred of the commandos. Two Fatah figures and a former PDFLP fighter separately stated that some fedayeen were mistreating Jordanian soldiers at this time; however, they also argued that the Jordanian security and intelligence services (al- mukhabarat) were perpetrating attacks on their own members periodically to push the military towards desiring a confrontation.342 The media seized upon the resulting stories to underscore that Jordan had to be rid of these bad people.343 Another resistance fighter recalled the mukhabarat spreading news and pictures of the red flags Leftists raised in the country to sow chaos and blame the fedayeen.344 Finally, just two weeks ahead of the

Black September confrontation, the military Chief of Staff wrote in his daily order: “‘As a result of the unfortunate incidents that Amman and some other areas have been exposed to in the Kingdom in recent days, and that were orchestrated by paid, corrupt elements and those provoking riotousness and sedition, many military and civilian martyrs, casualties, innocents have already fallen.’”345 A combination of opposition, regime, and external actions influenced soldiers’ perception on the Palestinian resistance movement,

340 Ibid., 40. 341 Ibid., 39. 342 Author Interview with Palestinian Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 71.; Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 81.; Author Interview with Palestinian Who Worked in Fatah's Media Department, Interview ID 89. 343 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63. 344 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter, Interview ID 73 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 16, 2015, 12:30pm). 345 Al-Hindi, Jordanian Mobilization Against the Palestinian Resistance before the Attack of September 1970 [ARABIC], 43.

148 convincing many that these guerillas represented a threat to the state’s national security that needed to be quelled.

Resultant Fighting

The majority of troops fought the Palestinian resistance in September 1970 because they were influenced by the power of persuasion and coercion. I have provided examples in the course of the analytical narrative regarding how soldiers perceived they had clear orders to fight, and how many viewed the uprising as foreign and disorderly and thus worthy of fighting. In this section I review how these factors impacted soldier decision-making and provide additional evidence that these concerns were the primary drivers of fighting in 1970.

Many soldiers were persuaded to fight because they increasingly viewed the

Palestinian resistance movement operating in Jordan as one that was connected to foreign interests and exploiting illegitimate tactics to achieve its ends, thus threatening Jordan’s national security. For these soldiers, the fedayeen’s actions amounted to creating a “state within a state,” which summarizes many civilian and military personnel’s view of the uprising, as interviewees repeated time and again.346 This recurrent image of the state within a state embodies the argument that movements that are framed as alien and disorderly are more likely to prompt a backlash from the armed forces.

346 Adnan Abu-Odeh, Interviewed by Jean Krasno in Amman, Jordan, 120.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64.; Author Interview with Palestinian Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 75.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who was a Political Figure in Jordan, Interview ID 90 (Amman, Jordan, April 3, 2015, 4pm).; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91.

149 It is clear that many soldiers viewed this state within a state as a foreign entity.

Indeed, the PLO had international recognition347 and its leaders ““travelled all over the

Middle East drumming up support, almost as representatives of an independent state” and in Jordan “they drove around like ministers, accompanied by armed escorts.”348 Moreover, the fedayeen accumulated power through controversial means, by accumulating arms, interfering in daily business and civilian life,349 attaining near “administrative autonomy” within the camps,350 and establishing “revolutionary” judicial and recruiting centers in the cities.351 A U.S. Army Foreign Area Specialist, who arrived in Jordan from Lebanon in

June 1970 described the formation of a state within a state:

The first thing I saw when the plane landed reflected the current situation in that city. There were two visa control and customs checks: one by Jordanian officials and another by PLO representatives. There were indeed two governmental authorities coexisting in an uneasy, confrontational relationship. Most of Amman and a large slice of northern Jordan were controlled by various Palestinian fedayeen factions. Their Toyota trucks with machine guns mounted in the back constantly patrolled the streets of the capital.352

The fedayeen were a foreign presence infringing on Jordan’s sovereignty, in the eyes of many troops. In September 1970 one soldier remarked “‘those are not our people there.

They wanted to make our country a second Palestine,’”353 showing that he considered the fedayeen to be external to Jordanian society as well as seeking to erect a state within a

347 Fedayeen – "Men of Sacrifice", 5. 348 Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography, 119. 349 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105. 350 The Wihdat camp alone was called Republic of Wihdat (Jamhurriyya Wihdat). See: Fruchter-Ronen, Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity, 247.; Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: King Hussein's Life in War and Peace, 315.; Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian of Palestinian Origin, Interview ID 84.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 351 Fruchter-Ronen, Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity, 247. 352 DeAtkine, Amman 1970, A Memoir. 353 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 291.

150 state in Jordan. Soldiers viewed the fedayeen as seeking to “establish government inside the government” and fully controlled areas of Jordan.354 They perceived they were restoring law and order, and protecting Jordan from international threats.

Revolutionary messages influenced troops’ perceptions of the fedayeen. In

December 1970 a soldier said that the troops were not “‘against the honest fedayeen, but

[George] Habash,’”355 showing that although the military may have tolerated more moderate and organized groups, it could not countenance the accumulating power of the revolutionary PFLP and PDFLP. It was commonly viewed that these leftist groups in particular had come to see themselves as a “superpower” and had lost their focus on fighting Israel.356 The resistance was no longer that—it was not seen to be working for the

Palestinians, but rather against the Jordanian government.357 Indeed, amid the heat of the events in September 1970, the sentiment of many soldiers could be summarized in the view of one, who told The Guardian that the fedayeen “‘are all alike…They are destroying our country, they insult us in the streets,’”358 showing how he connected the fedayeen to attacks on the military during the conflict. The accumulating power of the fedayeen and their perceived illegitimate tactics included their increasing (or at least increasingly publicized) attacks on soldiers themselves. In another soldier’s words at the time: “‘[the fedayeen] behave as if they are an army in conquered territory. How many times have I been stopped on the road, insulted, interrogated. They would requisition our

354 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. 355 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 291. 356 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 81. 357 Author Interview with Palestinian Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 75. 358 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 291.

151 cars and sometimes injure us.’”359 Reports of the resistance’s excesses were well circulated in the days immediately preceding the showdown, and often this news showed that the fedayeen threatened both the state’s national security as well as the vitality of the military itself. In early September, the media publicized news that two officers had been murdered and “left outside a mosque in Zerqa.”360 The opposition’s missteps, government framing, and external interference led many soldiers to believe that the fedayeen operating in Jordan were connected to foreign interests and attempting to create a state within Jordan, rather than liberate Palestine. For that reason, soldiers viewed suppressing the uprising as necessary.

The perception of illegitimate tactics was only underscored by the fact that King

Hussein had proffered numerous chances for reconciliation and power-sharing with the fedayeen. Despite the fedayeen’s foreign connections and disorderly behavior, the King appeared to be extremely conciliatory and offered the fedayeen many opportunities to incorporate into Jordan’s society and political process. And yet, it was perceived that the commandos continuously disrespected and disregarded his outreach.361 Two officers separately described how the military was pressuring the King to put an end to fedayeen excesses for these reasons; and yet, the King was not a bloody man and only turned to confrontation as a last resort and after having attempted many negotiations.362 This shows the prevailing view among military personnel that the monarchy and military had no choice but to fight the fedayeen to protect Jordan’s national security.

359 Ibid., 202. 360 Ibid., 232. 361 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as a Diplomat, Interview ID 95. 362 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62.

152 Indeed, in reflecting on autumn 1970 many soldiers described their actions as restoring law and order, and undermining the Palestinian state within a state in Jordan to protect the Kingdom. The feeling within the military was that things had come to a decisive head in September 1970, in which the military either had to fight or lose the country. As one officer felt, the question had become: the state or the fedayeen?363 The only option was purifying (tathir) the country of the fedayeen, as officers put it.364 The military wanted to defend its country (bidna difa ‘an baladna) and so it was necessary to put an end to the chaos (nakhlus min al-fawda).365 The timing was crucial for one intelligence official, who feared it would be difficult to put the country back together if the fedayeen made good on its call for a massive strike on September 17.366 Earlier that month the regime’s “propaganda was consistent, emphasizing that it was trying to enforce agreements, not liquidate the fedayeen.”367 Indeed, soldiers who had participated in the conflict repeated this theme. One was quick to highlight that Black September was not a contest between Palestinians and Jordanians but a battle against people who were not controlling themselves and the state.368 This led one officer to argue that the military did not see many defections because soldiers were concerned with Jordan’s stability were the regime to fall,369 and a diplomat underlined that the military was charged with reinstating the elements of a state in Jordan.370 In less diplomatic terms, one officer explained that during the September plane hijacking and hostage crisis: “‘All we talked

363 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who was a Political Figure in Jordan, Interview ID 90. 364 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91. 365 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105. 366 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92. 367 Lalor, Black September 1970: The Palestinian Resistance Movement in Jordan, 1967-1971, 252. 368 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 57. 369 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General, Interview ID 58. 370 Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106.

153 about all day long was what we would like to do to those damned Palestinians.’”371

Another Special Forces officer was involved in the thick of urban fighting in September.

He reaffirmed how his battalion had succeeded in imposing security and returning law and order.372 The majority of Jordanian soldiers fought during Black September to protect

Jordan’s national security. As one intelligence official put it: We “broke their back.”373

Although the conflict witnessed strong persuasive influences on soldiers, it was also the case that many would still have questioned their will to fight. This was natural, given the perceived strength of the fedayeen in Jordan, Hussein’s questionable grasp on the throne, and the hardships of fighting not only in urban warfare in Jordan’s populated areas but also against a foreign enemy in the North. In addition, although many

Palestinian members of the armed forces may have come to question the legitimacy of various fedayeen groups and even criticize their approach in Jordan, they were also likely to question the regime’s strong assault on Palestinian-majority communities in the country, which was a consequence of the resistance’s incorporation into the civilian community and military’s use of urban warfare. As a result, and as is the case in every conflict, there were likely a segment of troops who would have preferred not to fight in

1970, despite perhaps agreeing that the opposition had overstepped in Jordan. For this reason, it was crucial that the Jordanian government and military command exerted strong coercion over its soldiers during the conflict. The regime had provided clear orders to its commanders regarding how the uprising would be suppressed, and these were relayed to the soldiers participating in the operations. This strong command and control within the military at the time ensured that soldiers knew what was expected of them and

371 Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography, 133. 372 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62. 373 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92.

154 thus insubordinate behavior could more easily be detected. As a result of both persuasion and coercion, the majority of soldiers—including Palestinians—fought in 1970.

The Fleeing Minority

The minority of Jordanian service members fled the intense conflict in fall 1970 and the ensuing operations through July 1971. As I argued previously, the vast majority of Jordanian soldiers fought amid the crisis because they had clear orders to do so and because they increasingly viewed the fedayeen as foreign-backed and using illegitimate tactics. Here, I explain how although coercion was by all accounts uniform across the

Jordanian military, views on the fedayeen’s foreignness were not. I argue that only the most true believers in the resistance took the dangerous step of violating orders and fleeing their positions during the confrontation. In a significant turn of events, despite their strong feelings in support of the uprising, as I theorize, they did not join in and foment revolt but instead fled the immediate conflict setting.

Coercion Remains, But Soldiers are not Persuaded

Orders were clearly communicated for soldiers to use force against the Palestinian resistance. As one defector remembered, he received orders to suppress the fedayeen and attack the camps. The question was not whether the military had a plan to quell the revolt, but whether the soldier viewed the suppression as justified. Although the majority of soldiers did view the operations to suppress the fedayeen as appropriate—based on troops’ perception of the illegitimacy of the fedayeen’s actions—a small group of soldiers disagreed to such a degree that they risked their own security rather than attack those they

155 viewed as the standard bearers of the resistance to liberate Palestine.

One East Bank deserter reflected on his decision-making process when he was stationed in Al-Ghour Valley and received orders to kill, arrest, or contain anyone in the process of clearing the area in 1970. He considered this moment his “big test,” his moral test, and found he was against these orders. Although he was Jordanian, he had fought and was injured in the 1967 war, and he felt he had been injured in the pursuit of liberating Palestine. When he looked on the actions of the fedayeen, he thought it made sense that they should carry weapons because they were under Israeli strikes. What did not make sense was attacking these people, because he viewed this as forbidden by

Islamic law (haram). This Jordanian left his unit on September 19, 1970.374

Another deserter, of Palestinian descent, fled because he felt he was ordered to use force against his own people.375 He had initially joined the Jordanian military because he saw this as an opportunity to win back Palestine.376 As another Palestinian explained, soldiers sympathetic to the fedayeen following the 1967 war had two options. On the one hand, they could leave and join the resistance directly. But on the other, they could stay in the army if they felt they could actually affect greater change for the resistance through the Jordanian military.377 But, following the 1967 war, this deserter increasingly felt that the military was no longer working for the Palestinian cause and in contrast only the fedayeen remained a true resisting force. In his mind, there was significant evidence that this was the case. First, he was disheartened by the collapse of Jordan’s Air Force in 1967,

374 Author Interview with Jordanian Who Left in 1970, Interview ID 93. 375 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82. 376 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74. 377 Author Interview with Palestinian, Interview ID 77.

156 as he viewed airpower as necessary to face the region’s greatest threat—Israel. What this pointed to, second, was that Jordan was only concerned about protecting itself from internal threats and primarily protecting the regime.378 This view was reiterated by another Palestinian who argued that the fedayeen were the sons of the people (abna al- naas). Although you might not agree with everything they were doing, you still supported them because these were your people.379

It is significant to note that the fedayeen did little to try to actively inspire these feelings of brotherliness within the armed forces and encourage defections. Some recalled that there was an attempt to form a Fatah cabal within the military to inspire collaboration with the resistance. But one deserter mentioned that although he had been a part of this network, not all those who fled were members of the group.380 Some recalled that the resistance groups would encourage defections—by asking, how could an Arab kill an

Arab?—through radio broadcasts,381 and a PDFLP member recalls hoping and assuming that if one officer joined the fedayeen his unit would follow. But this was not the case; some officers were in communication with Fatah, but only a limited number were connected to the Front.382 It was more common to hear that these groups in fact made minimal effort to inspire military defections. One Fatah commander stated plainly that his group did not try to sow defections.383 An East Banker who did desert his military post argued that there was no fedayeen strategy to encourage defections, because there was no

378 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74. 379 Author Interview with Palestinian, Interview ID 77. 380 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82. 381 Author Interview with Palestinian Who Worked in Fatah's Media Department, Interview ID 89. 382 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Who Fought in Jordan, Interview ID 79. 383 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as Fatah Commander in Jordan, Lebanon, and Elsewhere, Interview ID 83.

157 unified fedayeen.384 Others noted that there was a feeling that the fedayeen should not expect or encourage defections because they did not feel they could or should rely on the

Jordanian military as a way to weaken the regime.385 In the end, a Palestinian remarked that there simply were not strong analyses made ahead of Black September regarding whether the resistance could anticipate defections.386

Once the crisis began, the PLO did take limited steps to encourage desertion and reinforce the image of the resistance as close to Jordan and its soldiers, rather than foreign. On September 19, the PLO publicized the names of those who had left the military.387 One deserter thought news of fleeing soldiers may have inspired others to leave, noting that you were more likely to desert if you had friends who had left.388 In a bolder move, on September 21, Yasser Arafat published an order directed at “the Officers and Soldiers of the 40th Brigade in the Jordanian Army.” He said, pointedly:

You must immediately surrender yourselves…and your ammunition to the revolutionary command headquarters in Irbid. The 40th brigade, which has been tracked and conquered, has already been torn apart, and so there is nothing in front of you but one outlet, and that is surrender and returning to the ranks of the people and the revolution, and this is your natural and correct place, and the revolution will guarantee you complete, brotherly treatment.389

Although the message contained allusions to the resistance, and how it was natural for

Jordanian soldiers to join it, the tone of the order for surrender was not encouraging. In

384 Author Interview with Jordanian Who Left in 1970, Interview ID 93. 385 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Member, Interview ID 69. 386 Author Interview with Palestinian, Interview ID 77. 387 "706. Statement of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization Concerning a Group of Officers from the Jordanian Military Joining the Palestinian Revolution [ARABIC], Fatah, September 19, 1970." Palestinian Arab Documents, 1970, ed. George Khoury Nasrallah (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), 790. 388 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82. 389 "719. Order Published by Mr. Yasser Arafat, Commander in Chief of the Forces of the Palestinian Revolution, to the Officers and Soldiers of the 40th Brigade in the Jordanian Army [ARABIC], Fatah, September 21, 1970." Palestinian Arab Documents, 1970, ed. George Khoury Nasrallah (Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972), 797.

158 any case, as one officer said, the army did not listen to fedayeen updates throughout the crisis.390

Resultant Fleeing, but not Fomenting

Despite the fact that there were clear orders to quell the unrest, and that resistance groups did not target soldiers with encouragement to resist, some individuals serving in the military did feel close ties to the resistance and persuaded of its legitimacy. Unlike resistance sympathizers, who may have been loath to use force against Palestinians but who were swayed to do so by the regime’s coercive capacity, these “true believer” soldiers fled their positions during the crisis. There are no exact desertion figures, and estimates of individuals polled ranged widely—from 1,500391 to 14,000 desertions.392 Yet the most repeated estimate was that between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers left the service during the crisis.393 There is similarly scant information on the backgrounds of these deserters. What is clear is that they were primarily of Palestinian origin,394 although a

390 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91. 391 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Who Fought in Jordan, Interview ID 79. 392 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter Aligned with Fatah, Interview ID 68 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 12, 2015, 2pm). 393 Rasheed, Between Dream and Fulfillment: Memoirs from the Old Guard Era in Jordan, 194.; Khalid Musmar et al., The Rifle Word: The Voice of the Palestinian Revolution, the Voice of the Storm, the Voice of Fatah [Arabic] (Place of Publication Unknown: Ministry of Media Publication Series, 2014), 168.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as Fatah Commander in Jordan, Lebanon, and Elsewhere, Interview ID 83.; Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian of Palestinian Origin, Interview ID 84.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92.; Author Interview with Jordanian Who Left in 1970, Interview ID 93.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 394 Snow, Hussein: A Biography, 237.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Major General in the Air Force, Interview ID 87.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91.

159 number of East Bankers fled as well.395 Palestinians, as mentioned earlier, were more likely to serve in technical areas. But deserters came from a range of military units, including engineering, artillery,396 and infantry battalions.397 There was also variation in military rank,398 including an estimated ten high-ranking officers who defected.399

Desertions occurred from those based both in Amman and the North. It may have been the case that they were more likely in the North;400 yet, one deserter noted that he did not think anyone had a more or less difficult time fleeing, but rather that it was difficult wherever one was based.401 Finally, soldiers typically left their positions on a person-by- person basis402 and therefore no complete units deserted.403

The most high-profile officer to flee was Said Sail, who served as Al-Hussain

Brigade commander. The PLO announced his desertion on September 19.404 When individuals looked back on Black September, Sail was the one deserter almost everyone remembered.405 It was reported that although his whole unit did not defect, a not

395 Author Interview with Palestinian Who Studied in Syria, Interview ID 70 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 15, 2015, 12pm).; Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian of Palestinian Origin, Interview ID 84. 396 Rasheed, Between Dream and Fulfillment: Memoirs from the Old Guard Era in Jordan, 194. 397 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82. 398 Rasheed, Between Dream and Fulfillment: Memoirs from the Old Guard Era in Jordan, 194.; Author Interview with Palestinian Former Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 78. 399 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82. 400 Ibid. 401 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74. 402 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Major General in the Air Force, Interview ID 87.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91. 403 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. 404 "706. Statement of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization Concerning a Group of Officers from the Jordanian Military Joining the Palestinian Revolution [ARABIC], Fatah, September 19, 1970," 790. 405 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82.; Author Interview with Palestinian Who Worked in Fatah's Media Department, Interview ID 89.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91.; Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92.; Author Interview with

160 insignificant number of his men joined him as they fled through Jordan’s North.406 Sail had served in the military since the 1950s and his father had worked in Jordan prior. He may have been imprisoned in Jordan at some point in the 1960s, but served as a battalion commander at the Battle of Karama in 1968.407 By 1970 it was reported that Sail was part of the Fatah network within the military.408

There were other limited senior desertions. Brigadier General Bahjat Muhaisin was commander of the 2nd Division and Jordan’s North amid the crisis.409 Muhaisan was an East Banker from Tafila410 who married a Palestinian woman,411 and he left the military in the crisis. In addition, head of the military government Muhammad Daoud left his post during Black September.412 Daoud was a Jordanian Brigadier General in the infantry and was of Palestinian descent.413 When traveling to Cairo for negotiations during the conflict, Daoud showed his emotions and how his part in suppressing the crisis was praying on him. According to one interviewee who met with Daoud at the time, the

General was concerned because his daughter—a fervent Palestinian liberation supporter—had accused him of being a traitor. Daoud had asked this other Jordanian of

Palestinian descent whether he agreed, to which the figure replied that Daoud was in fact a patriot. But it was clear that Daoud was feeling desperate. He formally resigned soon

Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105.; Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. 406 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Member, Interview ID 69.; Author Interview with Palestinian, Interview ID 77. 407 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74. 408 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Officer in Security Services, Interview ID 72. 409 Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography, 136.; Snow, Hussein: A Biography, 227; DeAtkine, Amman 1970, A Memoir. 410 Lunt, Hussein of Jordan: A Political Biography, 136. 411 DeAtkine, Amman 1970, A Memoir. 412 Author Interview with Palestinian Who Worked in Fatah's Media Department, Interview ID 89. 413 Snow, Hussein: A Biography, 222.

161 after,414 and remained in Egypt “as a political refugee.”415 Another military figure of note at the time was Mashur Haditha Al-Jazy. As mentioned previously, Al-Jazy, a Jordanian married to a woman from Nablus, Palestine,416 was asked to resign from his position ahead of the crisis and was not given a post in the military government.417 This was apparently due to the fact that he had “good relations” with Yasser Arafat.418 In effect, the regime sought to prevent his perceived likelihood of resigning or deserting amid the impending crisis. Finally, the PLO also announced on September 19, 1970 that a lieutenant colonel in engineering and a major company commander had deserted.419 Most desertions, however, were of lower-ranking personnel. Two first lieutenants had fled by

September 19,420 but the majority of desertions went unrecorded.

What is significant is that those who left the Jordanian armed forces did not foment the rebellion with which they sympathized, but rather fled their positions.

Specifically, at least 3,000 fled to Syria,421 where they joined to form the Fatah fighting organization Quwat Al-Yarmouk.422 As one defector estimated, at least 95% of the

414 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as a Diplomat, Interview ID 95. 415 Rasheed, Between Dream and Fulfillment: Memoirs from the Old Guard Era in Jordan, 201. 416 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter, Interview ID 67 (Ramallah, Palestine, March 11, 2015, 8pmb). 417 Rasheed, Between Dream and Fulfillment: Memoirs from the Old Guard Era in Jordan, 197.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who was a Political Figure in Jordan, Interview ID 90. 418 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: King Hussein's Life in War and Peace, 321-322. 419 "706. Statement of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization Concerning a Group of Officers from the Jordanian Military Joining the Palestinian Revolution [ARABIC], Fatah, September 19, 1970," 790. 420 Ibid., 790. 421 Musmar et al., The Rifle Word: The Voice of the Palestinian Revolution, the Voice of the Storm, the Voice of Fatah [Arabic], 168.; Snow, Hussein: A Biography, 237.; Author Interview with Palestinian Former Fatah Fighter, Interview ID 76.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as Fatah Commander in Jordan, Lebanon, and Elsewhere, Interview ID 83. 422 Musmar et al., The Rifle Word: The Voice of the Palestinian Revolution, the Voice of the Storm, the Voice of Fatah [Arabic], 167.; Author Interview with Palestinian Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 75.; Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Who Fought in Jordan, Interview ID 79.

162 deserters joined Fatah and these forces,423 which were commanded by the deserter Said

Sail.424 One Fatah commander interviewed claimed to have worked as an intake officer in

Deraa, Syria where he would greet and help organize newly deserted soldiers.425 Quwat

Al-Yarmouk was to play a substantial role in fedayeen fighting, particularly in Lebanon.

And yet this force and these deserters did not intervene in the ongoing conflict in Jordan.

Those soldiers who did view the resistance as organic and connected to their people fled rather than fomenting unrest, and I argue that they did so because they knew the Jordanian army had given clear orders for how it would confront the uprising and this influenced their decision-making. Deserters disagreed with these regime orders, but they expressed to me that they did not have a desire to fight against the Jordanian military.426

As one said, he did not want to fight for Jordan’s orders, but he also did not want to fight with the fedayeen against Jordan. He argued that Said Sail played a role in encouraging sympathetic soldiers who had deserted to flee rather than foment—telling them that their problem had been with the regime’s orders, not the regime itself. They disagreed with the

Jordanian military’s hardline approach, but did not want to fight it. This individual also reflected on his personal decision to flee rather than foment. He felt that he just could not shoot at the Jordanian military after he left. He did not want to target soldiers because he knew that these men on the ground had not been the decision-makers; they had not given the orders to do what they were doing. This is why he fled, moved to Syria, and joined

423 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63. 424 Rasheed, Between Dream and Fulfillment: Memoirs from the Old Guard Era in Jordan, 194.; Author Interview with Palestinian Who Studied in Syria, Interview ID 70. 425 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as Fatah Commander in Jordan, Lebanon, and Elsewhere, Interview ID 83. 426 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82.; Author Interview with Jordanian Who Left in 1970, Interview ID 93.

163 the revolution abroad.427 Another expressed similar feelings. The individuals who left, he said, disagreed with the Jordanian government, but the regime was not an enemy (bas mish ‘adu). He felt that the best evidence of the veracity of this was the fact that the deserters did not undertake any operations in Jordan; they did not launch a series of car explosions, for instance.428 It is likely that in addition to these motivations, deserters fled the conflict because they knew the regime was fully committed to combatting the resistance in Jordan—given the regime’s clear instructions for confronting the fedayeen—and therefore estimated that remaining in the country as deserters would be both perilous personally and lack efficacy from an operational standpoint.

As a result, deserters of this conflict were uncomfortable with the label “munshaq,” or defector. One deserter felt that his action was not defection (inshiqaq) because he had not fought against the regime.429 A member of the resistance also pushed back on the term munshaq to describe those who left their positions in Jordan. In the interviewee’s opinion, these were soldiers who left their posts individually, not en masse.430 Soldiers did not desert to foment rebellion against the Jordanian government, but rather fled the immediate conflict.431

427 Ibid. 428 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82. 429 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74. 430 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 85 (Amman, Jordan, March 24, 2015, 12pm). 431 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82.

164 Chapter Summary

In September 1970 King Hussein installed a military government that had a clear plan for reigning in the Palestinian resistance in Jordan. In addition, due to the fedayeen’s missteps, government propaganda and external intervention, there were strong signals that the resistance was foreign-backed and disorderly. As a result, this study’s theory expected that soldiers would obey orders and use force to fight the commandos. This was in fact borne out by the empirics. Of Jordan’s 55,000-strong force, an estimated 50,000-

52,000 remained in their positions to fight. In fact, it is not uncommon to hear individuals state that they will not call it Black September (aylul al-aswad) but rather White

September (aylul al-abiyad) because they felt justified in suppressing the foreign-backed and unruly Palestinian resistance.432 But interestingly, this was despite the fact that half of the service members were of Palestinian origin, despite the fact that many had sympathized with the resistance, and despite the fact that it was unclear whether King

Hussein would remain standing.

The study’s theory also expected that soldiers would consider fleeing if they had received clear orders but did not perceive the resistance as foreign and disorderly. And indeed, the minority of service members who did leave their positions during the crisis lends support to this proposition. Due to the significant layering of foreign and disorderly themes ahead of the highly anticipated crisis, many soldiers viewed the Palestinian resistance operating in Jordan as a serious threat to be stopped. Those who sympathized with the greater Palestinian cause or were concerned about using force against

Palestinians, and were thus less persuaded in 1970, still were largely coerced into fighting.

432 Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian Close to Political and Military Figures in 1970, Interview ID 103.

165 Yet, a smaller fraction of soldiers appear to have been true believers in the resistance and they perceived that the fedayeen were those truly fighting for Palestine’s liberation and were their brothers. As the theory anticipated, they did not join directly in the confrontation on the commandos’ side to foment revolt. Instead, they fled Jordan and formed a Fatah fighting brigade—another indication of their fervent believer status. In sum, comparing the behavior of Jordanian soldiers during the Black September crisis brought strong evidence to bear in support of the theory.

The pattern of fighting and fleeing in Jordan in 1970 had significant effects on the country and the Palestinian resistance in years to come. In the immediate term, the fact that the vast majority of soldiers remained in their positions and fought contributed to containing the unrest quickly. As one retired Air Force officer explained, the number of deserters was not large enough to influence army operations that September,433 and a

PDFLP fighter acknowledged that a lack of mass defections ensured the military’s cohesion during the crisis.434 Although the “mopping up” operation continued through

July 1971, it was only September that presented a significant challenge for the regime.

The lack of substantial fleeing and fomenting also had immediate effects on the

Palestinian resistance. Its fighters were either killed in battle, fled the country, or were captured and imprisoned in Jordan. As a result, the resistance had scant presence in

Jordan in the coming years.435 The harsh treatment of the fedayeen was also inspiration for some radicals to form what they called the Black September terrorist organization,

433 Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Major General in the Air Force, Interview ID 87. 434 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Member, Interview ID 69. 435 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Who Fought in Jordan, Interview ID 79.

166 which was responsible for the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in

1971 and the Munich Olympics attack in 1972.

The pattern of military decision-making had effects on both the Jordanian and

Palestinian armed forces in years to come. Comparatively few soldiers deserted during the conflict; however, the fact that deserters were largely Palestinian and the resistance had been Palestinian prompted informal changes in military recruiting. In one interviewee’s opinion, it was Prince Hassan who led the effort to Jordan-ize Jordan, and this included removing Palestinians from the ranks.436 Another Palestinian recalled that non-East Bankers were moved to less sensitive positions or forced to retire; in his estimation, this was a legitimate move for a military needing to protect itself.437 Even though many Palestinians were in fact loyal to the monarchy, one Fatah commander explained, there was a loss of trust (sar fi fuqdan al-thiqa) and so between 1971 and 1973 many were referred for retirement.438

While Palestinians serving in the Jordanian military were disenfranchised in the wake of Black September, those who fled to join the resistance outside Jordan’s borders were a boon to the fedayeen cause. Quwat al-Yarmouk, the brigade composed of former soldiers from the Jordanian military,439 developed into a highly disciplined military organization.440 As one military deserter explained, the brigade’s formation transformed the fedayeen from guerillas into a quasi-military force.441 As an indicator of their

436 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63. 437 Author Interview with Palestinian, Interview ID 77. 438 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as Fatah Commander in Jordan, Lebanon, and Elsewhere, Interview ID 83. 439 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Member, Interview ID 69. 440 Author Interview with Palestinian Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 71. 441 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82.

167 enhanced organization, a Fatah political figure explained, these forces now assigned ranks to their personnel.442 As a result, the deserters’ brigade played a substantial role in the resistance’s fighting during the Lebanese civil war.443

Soldiers’ reactions to the Palestinian uprising also carried long-term consequences for the Jordanian monarchy’s strength and Jordanian identity. King Hussein, who had faced domestic threats to his rule since his accession, now stood on firmer ground in

Jordan. But in addition, the decisive military crackdown on the fedayeen “marked the emergence of a distinct Jordanian identity.”444 In comparison to Hussein’s previous attempts to “blur the distinction between Jordanians and Palestinians,”445 this newly emerging identity highlighted the East Bank’s Bedouin heritage and Hashemite rule.446

There was little room for Palestinian-Jordanian solidarity at this time, and it would take nearly fifteen years, until Hussein permitted a Palestinian National Council meeting to be held in Jordan in 1984, for relations to begin to repair themselves.447

442 Author Interview with Palestinian Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 71. 443 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter, Interview ID 67.; Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as Fatah Commander in Jordan, Lebanon, and Elsewhere, Interview ID 83. 444 Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: King Hussein's Life in War and Peace, 344. 445 Ibid., 344. 446 Fruchter-Ronen, Black September: The 1970–71 Events and their Impact on the Formation of Jordanian National Identity, 252. 447 Author Interview with Palestinian Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 71.

168 Chapter 4: Iraq and the Page of Treachery and Treason, 1991

A military “‘does not fight only with its weapons’” but also “‘its moral and spiritual structure, based on conviction.’” –Saddam Hussein1

Introduction

In early April 1991, Saddam Hussein reflected on the state of his country. Not only had his army been defeated by an international coalition and forced to retreat from

Kuwait on February 26, 1991, but also, fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces revolted in the wake of the military loss. By April, the country was back in Saddam’s grip to the extent that he could reflect on how things had gotten so out of control. In particular, he wondered at the variation in the loyalty of his own troops across the country. In the South, many regular army soldiers retreating from Kuwait joined the demonstrations.2

Meanwhile, the Republican Guard soldiers remained compliant with regime orders, especially those based in central Iraq near Baghdad. And what puzzled Saddam in particular was why his northern, Kurdish troops had refused to support the regime during the uprising. As he said in one meeting with his advisers that April:

In the north, our troops were not so weak…. Initially they didn’t care about the American bombardment, and they didn’t incur losses, and they didn’t incur sacrifices. That’s why this is [bangs the table with his hand] this is what we should stop at and be a little harsher with our troops which were defeated in the north in a different manner that [sic] in the south. What do you see today? Your weapons are here, your properties are here, no one attacked you, you didn’t lose anything. Why did you retract and declare defeat?3

1 Michael Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes?: The Future of Iraqi Military Power (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Papers 36, 1993), 60. 2 A common story is that a returning solider was the one to set off the first demonstration in Basra. See, for instance: Tony Horwitz, "Reports Lift Veil on Shiite Uprising in Iraq," The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 1991.; Muhammad Abd Al-‘Atti, "Events of Southern Iraq in 1991, Two Versions of the Same Scene [ARABIC]," Al Jazeera, August 21, 2007. 3 Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Officials Discussing the State of the Iraqi Army, the 1991 Uprising, and the Withdrawal from Kuwait, April 3, 1991, SH-SHTP-A-000-739 (National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center, Accessed December 2014).

169

Indeed, what explains which soldiers fought, fled, or fomented rebellion in Iraq in 1991?

Amid the uprising, or intifada, of Hussein’s million-man army, an estimated 200-

300,000 soldiers left their posts.4 Many Kurdish regime fighters in the North fled or fomented revolt; Shia soldiers in the South fomented rebellion; and the majority of Sunni units remained loyal and fought the uprising. This military decision-making pattern, which ultimately allowed Hussein to remain in power, remains puzzling even after we apply existing scholarly arguments to try to explain it. First, ethnicity did provide a signal as to which troops were more likely to fight during the conflict. Sunni Republican Guard troops were not facing a Sunni uprising, and indeed they remained in their positions to put down the unrest. Ethnicity, however, does not tell us why soldiers confronting coethnics in Iraq’s North and South behaved differently during the conflict. While the

Kurdish troops in the North were split between largely fleeing and sometimes fomenting the revolt, in contrast, the majority of Shia troops in the South appear to have actively joined in the rebellion. What explains this divergent decision-making? Moreover, the

Kurdish troops’ insubordination in general is surprising, given the fact that throughout the 1980s Kurds used lethal violence against coethnics amid a regime genocide campaign.

Second, monetary rewards do not appear to decisively predict soldier decision-making in

Iraq. During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein promised payment for loyal behavior across the military, and so this constant does not explain variation in soldiers’ behavior. Finally, the argument that soldiers remain loyal when facing a violent opposition also fails to shed light on varied soldier responses. All opposition in the Iraqi conflict was violent, and yet many soldiers deserted or defected.

4 Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History (London; New York: Routledge, 2008).

170 I argue that soldiers serving in the Iraqi military were exposed to varying degrees of coercion and persuasion, and therefore we witnessed a range of responses to the conflict. Following the military’s retreat from Kuwait in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein retained the greatest control over his Republican Guard forces, and so these soldiers had significant coercive influences on their behavior. In addition, Guard troops were those most likely to be persuaded that it was their duty to put down the uprising. For these

Sunni troops serving in an elite unit, the demonstrators were perceived as foreign saboteurs seeking to undermine the Iraqi regime and society.

The coercive and persuasive influences were wholly different for Iraq’s other troops. In the North, the Kurdish battalions lacked clear orders and were not being monitored during the uprising. Although they perceived that the Kurds in revolt had foreign connections, they did not view the uprising’s tactics as illegitimate. Lacking coercion’s constraints, but not fully convinced of the legitimacy of the uprising, many simply opted out of direct participation in the conflict, although others joined in fomenting revolt. The Shia troops retreating from Kuwait and entering Iraq’s South lacked both command and control, and also the persuasion necessary to keep them in line to fight the growing uprising. As a result, these forces initially joined in fomenting revolt in great numbers. The Iraqi uprising thus represents a microcosm of all three behaviors soldiers can pursue when facing a domestic, mass crisis.

This pattern of soldier behavior had a significant impact on Hussein’s Iraq. On the one hand, the fact that the Iraqi regime could rely on its Republican Guard fighting core allowed it to regain control of a country in which the majority of the provinces had been in revolt in spring 1991. The regime’s restabilization that year contributed to it remaining

171 in power for more than two more decades. However, the fact that there was substantial fleeing and fomenting meant that the regime did not emerge from the crisis unscathed.

The Kurdish troops’ insubordination in the North allowed the uprising to gain a foothold, which contributed to the establishment and international recognition of a semi- autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq’s North. In the South, fomenting southern troops contributed to the uprising’s expansion. Yet, without international support and following the Republican Guard’s brutal suppression, the South was further marginalized rather than provided concessions. Soldiers’ reactions to the uprising also had significant consequences for the future restructuring of the armed forces, an outcome I discuss further in the conclusion.

This analysis draws on novel data, including documents recovered during archival research conducted at the Hoover Institution’s Baath Party Records, the National Defense

University’s Saddam Hussein Regime Collection, and the University of Colorado

Boulder’s Iraqi Secret Police Files. Together, these archives contain millions of pages of primary material from Saddam Hussein-era Iraq. These scanned copies include records of internal Baath Party communications, handwritten letters submitted to the regime by party members, military communications and reports, and other regime documentation.

There is also a more limited number of oral histories, including interviews with individuals who suffered under the Baath Party. The bulk of these materials is in Arabic and remains untranslated. In addition to archival resources, I have conducted a number of interviews with former Iraqi military personnel (ranging from soldier to general ranks) as well as individuals who participated in or were witness to the uprising in 1991. The interviewees have been based in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Jordan. I am also able to draw

172 on rich primary and secondary resources published alongside and after the events studied.

This includes Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) records from spring 1991, which identified and translated Iraqi and regional media into English, as well as news reporting from the time. Finally, a number of thorough monographs have been published on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Although there is no one English-language volume that covers the 1991 uprising in detail, these works’ substantial contribution to understanding the Baath Party and Gulf War contributes to my analysis.

This chapter begins by contextualizing the military’s behavior in 1991 by situating it in the development of Saddam Hussein’s military in the 1980s. This is followed by a synopsis of the uprising in 1991, which the regime labeled “The Page of

Treachery and Treason” and the people of Iraq often refer to as Al-Intifada Al-

Sha’abaniyya, after the Islamic calendar month in which the revolt erupted. It then considers how far existing explanations go in explaining soldier behavior within this unrest event. The chapter then focuses on the fighting Republican Guard, fleeing and fomenting Kurdish northern troops, and fomenting southern Shia troops, analyzing how variation in coercion and persuasion influenced these soldiers’ decisions during the uprising.

Saddam Hussein’s Baathist Military

Saddam Hussein became Iraq’s President formally in 1979, although he had served in key leadership roles since 1968 that included Deputy Chairman of the Baath

Party Revolutionary Command Council and general officer. By the start of the 1980s the

Baath regime had solidified under Hussein’s rule. The coming decade would present

173 challenges for the state and regime’s internal and external security, however, in the shadow of the Iran-Iraq War and subequent Gulf War fought against an international coalition. These conflicts had a substantial impact on the Iraqi military’s composition, command structure, and relationship with society, which set the stage for the degree to which coercive and persuasive influences would impact various sectors of the military during the 1991 uprising.

Iran-Iraq War and the Kurds

Saddam Hussein created the Fursan (knights) to serve as Kurdish National

Defense Battalions (NDBs) positioned in Iraq’s North. The northern Kurdish region had a history of revolt dating back at least to 1923, and the regime was particularly concerned with the potential for Kurdish groups to collaborate with Iranians once a war broke out between the new Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq in 1980. The two primary political groups were the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

(PUK), and infighting between the parties had been more common than collaboration between them. The Kurdish battalions were “charged with policing the countryside” during the war5 and many Kurds looked down on the NDBs, as these units were often used against fellow Kurds.6 Thus, a second, more derogatory name for these troops became jahsh (pl. jahush), meaning, mules rather than horsemen. Indeed, among the

PUK’s list of demands in 1982 was the dissolution of the jahsh troops.7

5 Joost R. Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 87. 6 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Senior Staff Officer in The intelligence Directorate, Interview ID 107 (Amman, Jordan, August 14, 2015, 6pm). 7 David McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds (London: IB Tauris, 2003), 350.

174 The deployment of the NDBs during the Iran-Iraq War was a key component in the Hussein regime’s brutal plan to crush any dissent in the Kurdish region and prevent collaboration with Iran. During the Iran-Iraq War, the KDP fought at times with the

Iranians in northern Iraq.8 In 1983, for instance, party members worked with Iranians in the battles of Haj Omran. As a result of their collaboration, the regime reportedly disappeared 5,000-8,000 Kurdish party members, and Hussein later said: “‘They betrayed the country and the covenant’” and “‘so we punished them severely and they went to hell.’”9 Similarly, PUK fighters reportedly collaborated with Iran, for instance in attacking economically significant areas in northern Iraq in 1986.10 By that year, however, a reconciliation led KDP and PUK forces to fight jointly.11 These parties’ fighting peshmerga forces, supported by civil defense units they had trained, “attacked Iraqi military positions and camps, harassing army convoys and putting great pressure on the jahsh militias.”12 By August 1987 it was reported that: “Iranian forces were penetrating virtually all the border areas held by Iraqi Kurds.”13 Hussein worked to highlight the relationship between the Iraqi Kurdish fighters and foreign enemy. He apparently had help in doing so based on the insurgents’ own missteps. For instance, one PUK leader stated: “‘We are preparing the Kurdish movement to recognize the moment has come for independence.’”14 Such statements were exploited by the regime to show that the Kurdish

8 Frederick W. Axelgard, A New Iraq?: The Gulf War and Implications for US Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 31. 9 Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja, 31. 10 Axelgard, A New Iraq?: The Gulf War and Implications for US Policy, 36. 11 Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja, 92. 12 Ibid., 93. 13 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 352. 14 Ibid., 353.

175 fighters were “not merely opponents of Saddam Husayn” but also working with the enemy to undermine the Iraqi state.15

In response to the continuing Kurdish revolt during the war, the regime developed a plan that it called the “Al-Anfal” (spoils of war) campaign, in which the regime would depopulate the rural North beginning in 1987 and remove the Kurdish insurgency’s leadership.16 By September 1987 the campaign’s head, Ali Hassan al-Majid, had begun to organize the deportation of “the families of ‘saboteurs.’”17 The Kurdish National Defense

Battalions were used in the Al-Anfal operations against their coethnics. NDBs often worked to round-up those they were told would be deported. By one account, during a given Al-Anfal operation the Kurdish battalions worked in cooperation with military units. First, the regular military units would shell the area under attack. Then, “Iraqi ground forces and their allied Kurdish jahsh irregulars had to do no more than surround the targeted area and wait for terrified villagers to run straight into their arms. And they did, in droves.”18 Although there were some incidents of apparent shirking, in which the troops aided women and children in their escape from threatened areas, it was reported that the Kurdish regime fighters were largely “dutiful servants of the Anfal.”19 As a result: “the Iraqi media gave prime coverage to the role of Kurdish jahsh militias in the

Anfal campaign to suggest that the peshmergas were outlaws enjoying little popular support.”20

15 Ibid., 353. 16 Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja, 93-94. 17 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 353. 18 Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja, 130. 19 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 358. 20 Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja, 108.

176 What these troops may not have known fully was that the regime’s campaign in the North would ultimately kill an estimated 150,000-200,000 persons by its conclusion, many through the use of chemical weapons.21 One of the most significant and horrific incidents occurred in Halabja in 1988. One army artillery brigade and four battalions

(3,500 soldiers), as well as four Kurdish regime battalions (approximately 3,600 troops) were stationed in and around Halabja.22 A PUK guerilla leader recalled having predicted that the vast majority of the fighters would defect to the insurgents’ side.23 And indeed, when the peshmerga and Iranians made an initial attack on these government forces,24 and gained the upper hand in securing territory in Halabja, by one report a number of

NDB troops fled this part of the confrontation.25 Yet, soon after, an estimated 5,000

Kurds and others based in the city were killed in the military’s poison gas attack. Iraqi leaders would reach back to Halabja during the 1991 revolt, in an effort to inspire fear among protesting Kurds regarding what would happen to them if they continued to rebel.26

Iran-Iraq War and the Shia

The Iran-Iraq war also influenced the regime’s relationship with the Shia in Iraq.

During the war Iraq faced a foreign enemy that represented a Shia majority country with a newly installed regime aiming to fuse religion and politics. The Hussein regime attempted to confront the potential threat of a fifth column in Iraq by balancing a policy

21 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 359. 22 Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja, 112. 23 Ibid., 112. 24 Ibid., 118. 25 Ibid., 118. 26 Ibid., 225.

177 of attacking those suspected of being “disloyal Shia” and remaining marginally inclusive of the rest of Iraq’s substantial Shia population, which, outside of Baghdad, was concentrated to a large extent in Iraq’s South.

The regime had persecuted politically active and oppositionist Shia before the war, but this effort escalated once the conflict began. The years of 1979 and 1980 saw a particular crackdown on the Al-Dawa party (Dawa),27 an Islamist and oppositionist party that recruited heavily among Iraq’s Shia. In June 1979 the regime also imprisoned

Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr, the prominent Shia Ayatollah who for a time supported

Dawa; the regime later executed the Ayatollah in spring 1980.28 Still, Dawa remained a destabilizing force and undertook multiple, high-level assassination attempts in the 1980s.

Joining Dawa was an offense that carried a criminal punishment, and the government arrested and executed hundreds of the party’s members and their kin in the 1980s.29 At the same time, a group of Iraqis founded the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI), “a Shi'a government-in-exile based in Tehran,” in 1982,30 with the mission of pursuing revolution in Iraq. As a result of the perceived Shia threat, the regime by some estimates expelled at least 30,000 “politically suspect Shi'is whom the regime claimed were Iranian in origin” from the country.31

At the same time, Hussein needed to retain the support of the general Shia population, which constituted a significant segment of his citizenry. During the war he allowed Shia access to the Baath Party, leant some economic support to Shia-majority

27 Axelgard, A New Iraq?: The Gulf War and Implications for US Policy, 22. 28 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 229. 29 Axelgard, A New Iraq?: The Gulf War and Implications for US Policy, 24. 30 Ibid., 24. 31 Ibid., 22-23.

178 areas, and backed the religious programs of those considered to be anti-activist Shia.32

Hussein also relied on the Shia to man his quickly expanding military during the war.

Shia conscripts composed the bulk of the regular army’s infantry units, and the tank and mechanized units were manned by “troops of mixed ethnicity.”33 Through forced conscription, many Shia joined the military. But, by focusing his attacks on “Iranian

Shia,” while emphasizing Iraq’s Arab identity, Hussein hoped to maintain the loyalty of his conscripts.34 Such propaganda may have influenced Shia conscripts’ morale during the war; however, Tripp points out that additionally it is likely they fought based on

“pragmatic considerations,” which included “the need to defend themselves against the attacking forces of Iran or the dire consequences for them and their families should they refuse to fight.”35 Although desertion was generally endemic during the war, Shia were noted for their largely fighting positions in the conflict.36

Uprising Background: The Page of Treachery and Treason

The Iran-Iraq War lasted from 1980-1988. Soon after, in August 1990, Saddam

Hussein had decided to again deploy his military, this time to occupy Kuwait in an effort to control its access to oil and thus alleviate Iraq’s debts.37 After occupying the country for half a year, Iraq faced an international coalition’s deployment to the Gulf. On

February 24, 1991, the United States began its ground attack against Iraqi armed forces in

32 Ibid., 23. 33 Timothy D. Hoyt, "Social Structure, Ethnicity, and Military Effectiveness: Iraq, 1980–2004," in Creating Military Power : The Sources of Military Effectiveness, eds. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 63. 34 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 234. 35 Ibid., 247. 36 Axelgard, A New Iraq?: The Gulf War and Implications for US Policy, 27.; Tripp, A History of Iraq, 247. 37 Ibid., 252.

179 Kuwait. A short three days later the Iraqi military withdrew and a ceasefire was established on February 28.

The withdrawal, as one former intelligence staff officer put it, “wasn’t good.”38 In addition to the psychological weight of retreat, the withdrawal proved gravely dangerous for soldiers. Whereas casualties had not exceeded 10-15% of the armed forces during the

Gulf War, during the withdrawal they were very heavy.39 Much of the military was forced to cross back into Iraq and head North to the capital on foot. They could not use cars or trucks for transportation, as they would be easy targets for the U.S. Air Force40 on what became known as the “Highway of Death.” One former Iraqi soldier remembers hearing his uncle relate his experience retreating from Kuwait. The soldier relative had been told that Saddam Hussein would in no case order a retreat. When the American attack began in earnest, many started to abandon the front lines just to save themselves. The soldier was waiting for reinforcements when he saw people running away, and they told him to leave as well because no one was coming to reinforce him.41 Thus was the chaos of the withdrawal.

Revolts spread throughout Iraq on the heels of the ground war. Those deployed to

Kuwait retreated to Basra, in southern Iraq, where demonstrations began by March 1.

Soldiers in the South, as Saddam reflected, must have been “concerned and anxious”

38 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Senior Staff Officer in The intelligence Directorate, Interview ID 107. 39 Ibid. 40 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Soldier, in Baghdad in Spring 1991, Interview ID 109 (Phone interview, Author in USA, Interviewee in Iraq, October 19, 2015, 9:30am). 41 Ibid.

180 because, in addition to the withdrawal, “they had to face the public, who said to them,

‘The regime in Baghdad collapsed.’”42

Figure 4.1: Iraq Political Map43

42 Saddam Hussein and Military Officials Discussing the Condition of the Iraqi Army and its Possible Enlargement, SH-SHTP-A-000-849 (National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center, Accessed December 2014). 43 Iraq Political Map, 2009 (University of Texas Libraries).

181 On March 1 the revolts were not only in Basra but also Al-Muthanna44 and by the next day had spread to Misan.45 March 3 and 4 there were demonstrations and riots in Al-

Najaf46 and Al-Qadisiyyah;47 in the coming days, conflict diffused to Karbala48 and Dhi

Qar49 as well. The South was in revolt. On March 4, in the North, there were reports of unrest in Rania50 and by March 10 there was rioting in Arbil.51 Both Zakhu and

Sulaymaniyah had “fallen” to the rebels on March 13,52 and there was much discussion of rioting in Dohuk. Iraq’s center was not devoid of unrest either. Samawa, in Salahuddin governorate northwest of Baghdad, witnessed riots53 early on March 5 and, according to

44 Handwritten Letter by Party Member Addressed to the General Director of the Secretariat, Signed March 2, 1991, (Electronic Record), 01-2211-0001-0034 to 0035, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 45 Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated April 3, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0273, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al- 'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 46 Handwritten Letter Signed by Individual from the Organizational Command of the Euphrates Bureau and Addressed to the General Director of the Secretariat, Dated March 3, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01- 2211-0001-0036, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 47 Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization, to the Secretariat, Reported Disseminated March 24, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0351, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al- 'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 48 Baath Party Secretariat, to the Presidential Diwan, Report Disseminated August 18, 1992 (Electronic Record), 01-3607-0000-0285, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). See also: Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated April 28, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01- 3455-0002-0206, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives. Accessed October 5, 2015). 49 Baath Party Secretariat, to the Presidency of the Republic, Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic for Party Affairs, Report Disseminated March 13, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0239, BRCC- Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 50 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 371. 51 Letter Addressed to Baath Party Arbil Branch Command, Signed June 16, 1991, Box 2299, Document 11 (University of Colorado Boulder, Iraq Secret Police Files Archives, Accessed September 2015). 52 Al‐Sulimaniyah Fall to the Hands of the Opposition in 1991, March 13, 1991, SH-MISC-D-000-947 (National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center, Accessed December 2014). 53 Letter Addressed to Saddam Hussein, Written by the Family of a Martyr in Al-Muthanna, Dated May 24, 1991 (Electronic Record), 039-01-06-237, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).

182 one journalist: “At its peak, the rebels take Al Hillah, an hour from Baghdad, and rioting erupts in Saddam City, a Shiite suburb of the capital.”54

At the height of the uprising, fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces were under rebel control. The Baath Party quickly branded the revolt as the “Page of Treachery of

Treason” (safhat al-ghadr wa al-khiyana). Those demonstrating and revolting were described as rebels (mutamaridin),55 criminals (mujramin),56 destructive saboteurs

(mukharibin),57 and mob elements (ghugha’in).58 Only Anbar province, in western Iraq, appears to have been devoid of unrest completely. This led Saddam to refer to Anbar (and,

54 Horwitz, Reports Lift Veil on Shiite Uprising in Iraq. 55 Baath Party Organizational Command of the South Bureau and Wasit Branch Command, to the Organizational Command of the South Bureau, Report Disseminated March 30, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0144, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).; Baath Party National Security Branch Command, to the Organizational Command of the Baghdad Bureau, Report Disseminated March 12, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0456, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).; Female Party Member’s Handwritten Report, Signed March 13, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0352 to 0353, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 56 Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated April 28, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0206, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al- 'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).; Baath Party Organizational Command of the Baghdad Bureau, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated March 11, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0517 to 0518, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).; Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated March 24, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0339, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 57 Baath Party National Security Branch Command, to the Organizational Command of the Baghdad Bureau, Report Disseminated March 12, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0456, BRCC-Boxfiles.; Directorate of General Military Intelligence, Report Disseminated March 5, 1991 (Electronic Record), 0783978, North Iraq Dataset (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).; Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization, to the Secretariat, Reported Disseminated March 24, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455- 0002-0351, BRCC-Boxfiles. 58 Baath Party Organizational Command of the Baghdad Bureau, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated March 24, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0335, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al- Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).; Baath Party Secretariat, to the Special Security Apparatus, Report Disseminated April 28, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0209, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).

183 to a lesser extent, Diyala, Salahuddin, and Mosul) as muhafatha bayda’—the White

Province.59

From as early as February 28, it is reported that Saddam issued orders to deal with the uprising by whatever means necessary.60 One general described the ensuing military operations as “action, reaction” (fa‘l, rad fa‘l),61 meaning that the regime was simply responding to events as they progressed. Hussein relied heavily on his senior intelligence and military personnel, and particularly Republican Guard, to respond to the uprising. A former intelligence staff officer recalled the formation of a five-officer crisis group, which would brief the president on developments. By March 9 the Republican Guard had initiated what would be a relentless campaign to pacify the revolting provinces—moving

South to North62—and the uprising was essentially quelled by mid-April 1991. Human

Rights Watch estimated that ten percent of Iraq’s population fled the country during the revolt,63 in addition to the significant number of citizens who were killed as the government regained control throughout the country.

There was great variation in soldiers’ behavior during the unrest, with some troops fighting, fleeing, and fomenting revolt. In the following sections I unpack why the

Republican Guard, based in Iraq’s center, fought the uprising; why the Kurdish National

Defense Battalions, based in Iraq’s North, largely fled their positions but also fomented

59 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Lieutenant General, Interview ID 88 (Amman, Jordan, March 26, 2015, 10am, follow-up May 5, 2015, 12pm). 60 Author Interview with Iraqi Former General, Interview ID 108 (Amman, Jordan, August 15, 2015, 5pm). 61 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Lieutenant General, Interview ID 88. 62 Military Analysis and Description of the Quelling of the 1991 Rebellion in the Northern and Southern Sectors, March 5 to April 21, 1991, SH-RPGD-D-000-581 (National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center, Accessed December 2014). 63 Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 - Iraq and Occupied Kuwait (Human Rights Watch, January 1, 1992).

184 revolt; and why the regular armed forces, retreating through Iraq’s South, actively joined in fomenting unrest at the start of the uprising.

Considering Existing Explanations

By focusing on the 1991 uprising I am able to exploit variation while holding a number of potentially competing explanations constant. First, there is variation in the dependent variable, with troops in the North fleeing and fomenting, Republican Guard forces in the center fighting, and retreating troops in the South fomenting revolt. At the same time, existing explanations do not vary in step with these outcomes.

Table 4.1: Anticipated Outcomes for Iraq 1991 Based on Independent Variables

Persuasion High Medium Low High Iraq 1991 N/A N/A (RG)

Prediction: Fight

Low

Coercion N/A Iraq 1991 Iraq 1991 (Fursan) (South)

Prediction: Flee Prediction: and Foment Foment

Ethnic Identity

In support of the existing argument about the power of ethnicity is the available evidence that some Sunnis’ hatred of Shia populations induced their loyalty in 1991.

Boustany, for instance, painted a scene in which: “Several men standing around…said

185 Iraqi tanks rolling into their towns had a motto inscribed on them: ‘No Shiites After

Today.’”64 Another journalist on the ground amid the uprising, Simpson, described similar Sunni animosity towards those of another Muslim sect:

When I talked to the crew of a Chieftain tank parked outside the shrine of Al Abbas in the Shia holy city of Kerbala last week, it was plain that Saddam had their total loyalty, at least. Like him, they were Sunni Muslims. They had even stuck pictures of him inside the tank. Finding them there was like finding the Ulster Defence Regiment outside the Pro-Cathedral in Dublin. They didn't like Shias much: one said they were dirty animals.65

In addition, Makiya has argued that, “soldiers deployed in the attack on Najaf (and in south Iraq generally) appear to have been selected from the Sunni towns of Hit, Mosul,

Shirkat, Beigi, and from the Yazeedi community, a tiny sect based in northern Iraq which has a history of conflict with Shi'a Muslims.”66 It appears as though Saddam tried to activate this potential loyalty mechanism amid the unrest. What I show in my analysis, however, is that Sunni troops did not simply feel that individuals of other ethnicities were involved in revolt. In particular, they saw these other ethnicities as linked to foreign powers, and thus representing a threat to Iraq’s national security that had to be quelled.

Moreover, a soldier’s ethnic identity influenced but did not decisively predict his exact behavior during the 1991 uprisings. For instance, amid the uprising, many Kurdish units deserted en masse. It was reported that 50,000 soldiers left their posts, “and were soon seen in the streets of the Kurdish cities, welcomed, fed and sheltered by Kurdish families.”67 The majority of the Kurdish NDB fighters fled amid domestic unrest, although evidence suggest a segment actively fomented revolt as well. There is reason to

64 Nora Boustany, "A Trail of Death in Iraq; Shiite Refugees Tell of Atrocities by Republican Guard," The Washington Post, March 26, 1991. 65 John Simpson, "Inside Iraq: The Voices Against Saddam," The Observer, April 28, 1991. 66 Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1994), 97. 67 Faleh Abd Al-Jabbar, "Why the Uprisings Failed," Middle East Report 22, no. 176 (1992): 2-14.

186 be skeptical of arguments that common ethnicity and feeling of closeness explained this insubordination, however. First, the NDBs had a history of using violence against the

Kurdish population; as detailed previously, they participated in the Al-Anfal genocide of

Kurds in the late 1980s.68 In addition, there is evidence that when the NDBs did perform small acts of kindness amid the Al-Anfal, it was the result of bribes69 and private deals with the army,70 rather than out of a feeling of connectedness with the Kurdish population.

Coethnicity is unable to explain why Kurdish units fought fellow Kurds in the 1980s, but then refused to crack down on the Kurdish revolt in 1991. Similarly, Iraq’s Shia conscripts fought fellow Shia in the Iran-Iraq War, but fomented revolt in southern Iraq in 1991. In this way, coethnicity has not directly predicted soldier behavior in combat in

Iraq historically.

An additional challenge for the existing ethnicity theory is that it cannot explain the exact nature of coethnic troops’ insubordination during civil conflict. Why did the

Kurdish troops largely flee the conflict, while many of the Shia troops joined in their coethnics’ revolt?

Material Incentives

Another explanation is that soldiers fight for the regime when their material interests are satisfied. The Iraqi regime tried to induce soldier loyalty in this way in advance of and during the uprising. According to Human Rights Watch, Saddam

Hussein’s commanders “encouraged soldiers to keep goods they seize during their operations” and there were stories of officers informing their soldiers: “‘The heads of the

68 Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds (Human Rights Watch, July 1993), 161. 69 Ibid., 163. 70 Ibid., 284.

187 people are for me, their property, for you.’”71 During the uprising, soldiers who deserted reported that the regime promised them 250 dinars for each baby or woman killed, and as much as 5,000 for adult males.72 But these promises of incentive pay were present across the military in 1991, and therefore cannot clearly explain variation in decision-making during the conflict.

The level of base pay may have varied across the military, however. It likely that the more elite Republican Guard troops were paid a higher rate than regular army personnel, and there is some evidence that NDB fighters may not have been paid regularly. If this is true, then higher pay may have contributed, on average, to Republican

Guard forces’ increased willingness to fight. However, if material incentives explain

Republican Guard loyalty in 1991, it is difficult to explain why members of these same forces had no qualms about insubordination shortly after the revolt, such as when they attempted a coup in 1992.73 Finally, among the poorer and less consistently paid troops, it is not clear why some decided to flee, while other chose to foment revolt.

Opposition Violence and Additional Constants

The unrest in both the North and South utilized violence. In Karbala, south of

Baghdad, for instance, one uprising participant described how the revolutionaries were initially armed with sticks, swords, lead pipes, and other simple weapons,74 and another

71 Eric Goldstein, Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and its Aftermath (Human Rights Watch, 1992). 72 Bob Drogin, "Saddam 'Offers Soldiers Bounty for Killing Babies'," The Guardian, March 29, 1991. 73 Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes?: The Future of Iraqi Military Power, 15-16. 74 "Karbala Revolutionaries Face Republican Guard Tanks with their Light Weapons [ARABIC]," Sawt Al- Iraq (Voice of Iraq), Undated.

188 described how he and his friends left home armed with AK-47s and other weapons.75

Other possible confounders are constant across the event’s locations. The general pattern of revolt appears to have been constant, as the revolts were spontaneous and began a short time after one another. Given that comparisons are occurring within an event, country and time level variables—such as regime type and international setting—are also held constant, making the case ideal for drawing inferences on the causes of fighting.

Fighting Republican Guard

The Iraqi Republican Guard (RG) was created prior to the Iran-Iraq War,76 and renamed the Republican Guard Forces Command in 1988.77 From its inception, the RG— which represented approximately 20% of the Iraqi army in 199078—distinguished itself from the regular armed forces in a number of ways. It was placed under the purview of the Special Security Apparatus and reported to the President, rather than the Ministry of

Defense.79 In addition, all RG soldiers were volunteers and therefore not military conscripts. As one former Lieutenant General reflected, the RG was always better trained than other military units.80 Indeed, Saddam explained that:

Joining the Republican Guard has certain requirements, besides training, since it is the Republican Guard; its soldiers are selected carefully, and based on certain descriptions, not only by selecting a name, and more precisely than selecting army soldiers. Since it is called the Republican Guard, determining its tasks was done

75 Khalil Malik Hassan Abu-Dhalam, "Karbala Uprising Remembered," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, April 7, 2011. 76 William D. Huggins, "The Republican Guards and Saddam Hussein's Transformation of the Iraqi Army," The Arab Studies Journal 2, no. 1 (1994): 31-35. 77 The Iraq War Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 343. 78 Hoyt, Social Structure, Ethnicity, and Military Effectiveness: Iraq, 1980–2004, 63. 79 Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 78. 80 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Lieutenant General, Interview ID 88.

189 cautiously, and it contains a very small percentage of non-fighters, which is the opposite of the army.81

Hussein had deployed the Republican Guard for the initial invasion of Kuwait, which began on August 2, 1990. But less than two months later, on September 27, 1990, there was an order published to withdraw the RG so that the regular armed forces could take control of the occupied territory82 and it was reported that the bulk of RG units were pulled back to be stationed in and around Baghdad.83 A number of the RG’s divisions, including the Medina, Tawakalna, and Hammurabi divisions, were based on the border as the Gulf War ground attack approached.84 During the war, the RG infantry units placed in the South were able to retreat North with more ease than the armored divisions, which were targeted by coalition forces.85 In the following I argue that due to the positioning of the RG in February 1991, these forces had both clear orders to quell the uprising and also perceived the revolt as foreign inspired; as a result, the Republican Guard fought forcefully to suppress the unrest.

Coercion

Republican Guard divisions were positioned throughout Iraq in 1990 to secure the regime as well as the country’s borders.86 As a Central Intelligence Agency assessment related in 1991, the government also formed four new RG divisions following its

81 Saddam Hussein and Military Officials Discussing the Condition of the Iraqi Army and its Possible Enlargement, SH-SHTP-A-000-849. 82 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Lieutenant General, Interview ID 88. 83 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Lieutenant General, Interview ID 88.; Author Interview with Iraqi Former Soldier, in Baghdad in Spring 1991, Interview ID 109 84 William F. Andrews, Airpower Against an Army: Challenge and Response in CENTAF's Duel with the Republican Guard (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1998), 64. 85 Richard G. Davis, Decisive Force: Strategic Bombing in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996), 71-72. 86 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 254.

190 occupation of Kuwait, none of which were deployed in the Kuwaiti theater.87 In this way, entire divisions of the Republican Guard evaded the chaotic retreat from Kuwait in

February 1991. There was both clearer communication between Saddam Hussein and RG commanders, and subsequently between commanders and their RG subordinates as a result. The Tawakalna, Medina, and Hammurabi divisions played a role in quelling the uprising.88 But it appears in particular that the newly-formed RG Al-Nida’ division was crucial in suppressing the unrest.

Once the Guards’ forces were in the field combatting the rebellion, political and military leaders were also able to monitor and provide orders for these forces. One of Al-

Nida’ division’s after action reports explained that the “Minister of Industry and Military

Industrialization and the Director of the Republican Guard Affairs Office visited the mobile headquarters and were orally briefed on the status. He asked that the resistance must be crushed quickly whatever the sacrifices are.”89 When clearly ordered to combat the uprising, the Republican Guard did so and the regime was able to oversee its operations in the field.

Persuasion

An important factor spurring the Republican Guard’s compliance with orders to fight the unrest was its perception that these revolts were enemy-backed, foreign-inspired operations. The Guard was primed to view threats this way; as its Special Forces training publication from 1990 stated:

87 Iraq's Ground Forces: An Assessment (Central Intelligence Agency, May 1991), 1-2. 88 Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes?: The Future of Iraqi Military Power, 50. 89 Military Analysis and Description of the Quelling of the 1991 Rebellion in the Northern and Southern Sectors, March 5 to April 21, 1991, SH-RPGD-D-000-581.

191 Our command has the basic mission of developing techniques for training the Armed Forces to enable them to optimally carry out their sacred missions of maintaining the country’s unity, warding off the Zionist, imperialist aggression, and facing down foreign ambitions…The RG troops bear a major responsibility in defending the homeland and resisting the ambitions of enemies. Therefore, these troops must undergo the most advanced level to execute the missions that will be assigned to them in the future by the command.90

In the wake of the Iran-Iraq War, and amid the Gulf War, RG soldiers were indoctrinated to believe that as elite force members they defended Iraq from strong and ever-present foreign enemies. The Baath Party worked hard to reinforce this fear of foreign intervention and link the demonstrations—first occurring in the South, and then the

North—as foreign-inspired. On March 13, the Baath Party Secretariat wrote to General

Intelligence (Mukhabarat) stating that it had information on the suspected movement of

Iranian agents.91 Two days later, it conveyed that the Baghdad Bureau had learned of the entrance of 8,000 sabotage elements from Iran, who had reportedly entered Iraq to undertake assassination operations, and to target party and military headquarters.92

The theme of foreign intervention was reverberated within Military Intelligence and the Special Security Apparatus as well. The former disseminated information on

March 5 on “the ranks of the sabotage factions” (sufuf zamr al-takhrib), specifically

“agents from Iran” in the border area.93 The Baath Party Secretariat also sent a report to the Special Security Apparatus detailing information received on March 30 regarding agents that had killed Baathist comrades and stolen their weapons by force. In the

90 Republican Guard Special Forces Command Training Publication Fo 1990, SH-RPGD-D-000-547 (National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center, Accessed December 2014). 91 Baath Party Secretariat, to the General Intelligence (Mukhabarat) Apparatus, Report Disseminated March 13, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0501, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al- Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 92 Baath Party Secretariat, to the General Intelligence (Mukhabarat) Apparatus, Report Disseminated March 15, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0478, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al- Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 93 Directorate of General Military Intelligence, Report Disseminated March 5, 1991 (Electronic Record), 0783978, North Iraq Dataset.

192 appended notes, there is information on “a group of religious gang members” (majmu‘at al-‘asabat al-diniya) and individuals within these “gangs” of Iranian origin.94 In remarks at the swearing in of new ministers in March 1991, the Baath Party Secretary spoke of the current situation, underscoring the same theme; he intoned: “The most important point of our obligation after the American aggression, or transferring overlapping with the

American aggression, is this betrayal of some, this treachery undertaken by some from outside the borders.”95 In this way, the regime sought to intertwine in its narrative a framing of the uprising as both foreign-backed as well as employing illegitimate tactics that threatened Iraq’s security.

The characterization of the revolt as alien and disorderly appears to have resonated with the Republican Guard. Al-Nida’s after action report on the uprisings, covering the period of March 5 to April 21, 1991, frames the riots as an American-Zionist plot conducted through Iran and the Kurds.96 The foreign-backed framing is underscored throughout the report. For instance, on March 15 the Special RG’s 1st Regiment was ordered to attack the Imam Ali shrine in Al-Najaf,97 a symbol of the Shia sect of Islam represented by Iran. In reflecting on the Page of Treachery and Treason, and planning how to prevent a similar occurrence in the future, Saddam advised in 1992 that the

Republican Guard, “should be kept away from any skirmishes. I mean, if it is mobilized,

I want it to be decisive. The [Republican Guard] will consider anyone an enemy on the

94 Baath Party Secretariat to the Special Security Apparatus, Report Undated itself but Detailing Information Received on March 30, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0302, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 95 Baath Party Secretariat, Deputy Secretary, Report Disseminated April 2, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01- 2765-0000-0257 to 0268, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 96 Military Analysis and Description of the Quelling of the 1991 Rebellion in the Northern and Southern Sectors, March 5 to April 21, 1991, SH-RPGD-D-000-581. 97 Ibid.

193 battlefield. I don’t want to complicate things for them.”98 This appears to have been the case in 1991; the RG perceived the uprisings as foreign-inspired enemy operations, and so fought.

Resultant Fighting

The Republican Guard formed the core regime response to the unrest. Again, because the regime retained the greatest degree of command over those RG divisions that had not been deployed to Kuwait, it was the newly-formed units that played an especially significant role in the initial fighting to suppress the rebellion. The Republican Guard Al-

Nida and Al-Quds Infantry Divisions led the retaking of Karbala and Al-Najaf, for instance.99 Turning again to the Al-Nida after action report, we find a description of which RG regiments and brigades supported operations. The report states that the

“dominant units that provided direct support to our [RG] command” in the southern sector were five artillery battalions and a rocket launcher battalion and “no detailed surveillance was carried out because of the short time and the necessity of accomplishing the duty as quick as possible according to the order and instructions of the high authorities.”100 The report states that the Republican Guard undertook combing operations

(‘amilayat al-tamshit) to combat the criminal elements and that the military operations targeted the elimination of the rioters for the benefit of the loyal sons of the people.101

Participants in the unrest also recall the deployment of the Republican Guard to retake

98 Saddam's Meeting with Military Commanders on February 29, 1992 Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, February 1992, SH‐RVCC‐D‐000‐610 (National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center, Accessed December 2014). 99 Iraq's Ground Forces: An Assessment, 1-2. 100 Military Analysis and Description of the Quelling of the 1991 Rebellion in the Northern and Southern Sectors, March 5 to April 21, 1991, SH-RPGD-D-000-581. 101 Baath Party Secretariat Report Disseminated March 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002 BRCC- Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).

194 fallen cities. As one revolutionary from Karbala remembered, Republican Guard brigades along with Special Forces troops entered the city and used heavy artillery, tanks, mortars, and rockets to fight the uprising.102 The Republican Guard was the regime’s pillar of strength amid the intifada.

Fleeing Fursan

As mentioned previously, the NDBs, also known as the Fursan or jahsh, were

Kurdish troops stationed in Iraq’s North. These units served under tribal figures who were called counselors or advisers (mustasharin)103 and units were formally positioned under the “operational command of military intelligence.”104 In comparison to the

Republican Guard troops and the retreating regular army soldiers, there is much more opaque information available on the actions of the Kurdish NDB fighters and how they responded to the rebellion that spread through Iraq’s North following the retreat from

Kuwait. Based on available data, I argue first that there was extremely little coercion exerted over the NDB troops when the uprising began. In addition, I show persuasion had only a moderate influence on the Kurdish troops ostensibly charged with protecting the regime in the North at the time. As a result, although these fighters had been complicit in regime campaigns to use violence against the Kurdish population in previous years, these same soldiers fled and fomented revolt in 1991.

102 "Karbala Revolutionaries Face Republican Guard Tanks with their Light Weapons [ARABIC]." 103 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 350. 104 Genocide in Iraq the Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds (Human Rights Watch, 1993).

195 Coercion

One former intelligence staff officer recalled that there were more than 300

Kurdish battalions by 1991,105 and by other accounts approximately 100,000106 or

150,000107 served in the NDBs during the Iran-Iraq War. It is difficult to estimate exactly how many Iraqi Kurds joined, as there were incentives for tribal leaders to exaggerate the number of men in their units.108 One Kurdish chief recalled, for instance, that although his records indicated that he commanded 1,500 NDB troops, in reality he had only fifty working full-time.109 The majority of those on his list, he said, “‘went to their houses and did nothing.’”110 These Kurdish troops operated primarily in the NDB framework, although some were attached to “special groups” or worked with the “emergency forces.”111 The NDBs were reported to be poorly trained generally.112

According to one former Iraqi soldier, the NDBs never approached a regular military force. The Government of Iraq had an interest in bringing Kurdish fighters under its authority to combat the continuously rebelling northern populations. It would agree to work with northern tribal leaders, pay their forces’ salaries, and provide weapons for the formation of pro-regime Kurdish battalions. Yet, in reality, it was not clear the degree to which command and control governed these units. According to this interviewee, it was well known that tribal sheikhs would pocket much of the proffered regime funds and that

105 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Senior Staff Officer in The intelligence Directorate, Interview ID 107. 106 Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes?: The Future of Iraqi Military Power, 47. 107 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 354. 108 Ibid., 354. 109 Ibid., 355. 110 Ibid., 355. 111 Ibid., 354. 112 Ibid., 354.

196 soldiers primarily used their Fursan membership to evade service in the regular military.113

As a result of the NDBs’ loose command structure these forces did not receive clear orders and instructions amid the 1991 uprising. Events spread quickly in the North, and it does not appear that Republican Guard or regular military units were in position to command the vast Fursan battalions. Indeed, a military major who served as a doctor for the Baath Party in the North later related how there were such “conflicting sources and news, and the loss of a source of confirmed truth, in transmitting facts” as rumors flew about the destruction (al-takhrib) and siege on Kirkuk. He also mentioned how quickly

Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, and Dohuk fell.114 There is only one available account in which the government communicated to NDB leadership that these battalions were to repress the unrest. The personal narrative relates that Sulaymaniyah’s governor met with a group of mustashars on March 6, “warning them to have their troops on standby;” according to this account, there was some movement of troops after this message, but in the end “to no avail.”115 In contrast to this isolated incident of a government representative contacting

NDB leadership, no evidence points to the regime’s plan to systematically disseminate orders regarding NDB operations in Iraq’s North. Moreover, as the episode of

Sulaymaniyah indicates, even in cases where minimal orders were proffered, there was no continued oversight coercing the NDBs to fight.

113 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Soldier, in Baghdad in Spring 1991, Interview ID 109. 114 Handwritten Letter from Military Major Comrade Who Served as a Doctor, to the Baath Party, Signed May 8, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0447, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 115 The Kurdish Uprising and Kurdistan's Nationalist Shop Front and its Negotiations with the Baathist/Fascist Regime (London: B.M.BLOB, 1991).

197 Lacking any clear orders, and with no command structure to monitor their behavior, the ostensibly pro-regime Kurdish militias had no incentive to proactively confront the unrest in the North. It is of note that this stands in stark contrast to the

Kurdish troops’ actions during the Al-Anfal operations. A primary difference between the two cases is that during the Anfal, Kurdish units often operated under the direct supervision—and thus coercion—of regular army units.

Persuasion

Although the NDBs were composed of Kurds, and the northern population was

Kurdish, it does not follow automatically that the protests were perceived as homegrown and civilian in character. The battalions themselves were created to combat Kurdish populations that were seen as linked to international actors. To peer into how the Baath

Party projected the Kurds’ foreign backing, we can look at a booklet published in

October 1990 by the General Security Directorate’s Political Affairs Section. The booklet describes different groups operating in Iraq and labels Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party as “The Descendants of Treason.” It writes:

This gang has adopted a new way of operating by directing its members to infiltrate the border into the areas near cities and hamlets to gather information about movements and force strength of military units and National Defense battalions, names of commanders and advisors, names of support companies and their leaders and their capabilities in counterattacks should there be confrontational sabotage operations in the area.116

Indeed, during the Iran-Iraq War “the PUK had earned the official Iraqi designation

‘Iranian Agents’ (‘Umala Iran), while the KDP was labeled the ‘Offspring of Treason’

116 A Booklet by the General Security Directorate, Political Affairs Section Comments and Description of Different Political Groups and Parties, October 1990, SH-IDGS-D-000-946 (National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center, Accessed December 2014).

198 (Salili al-Khayaneh).”117 Moreover, it does appear that during the uprising events in the

North were painted as foreign-backed. For instance, during the uprising, an adviser to

Saddam Hussein reported that Iran was giving passage to those fleeing through

Sulaymaniyah.118 Given the NDBs’ history, there was not an automatic camaraderie between the jahsh and rebelling populations it had previously been ordered to repress, and who were known to connect with parties and actors outside of Iraq.

At the same time, there were some exceptions to this feeling that the Kurdish rebels were foreign entities. Masud Barzani, KDP leader since 1979, reported that although in the mid-1970s there were Kurdish regime soldiers who “‘genuinely supported the government against the [Kurdish] nationalists,’”119 by the 1980s these troops were less consistently pro-regime. He argued that many within the NDBs’ ranks “‘were secretly affiliated’” with the Kurdish insurgency.120 Another source argues that a portion of the Kurdish government troops “had a real axe to grind against the nationalists” but others served in their positions with less vigor and even “acted as informants for their favoured party and others sheltered wounded peshmergas.”121 These claims suggest that

Kurds serving in the National Defense Battalions were persuaded to differing degrees of what the Kurdish rebels represented and to what extent they represented external interests.

The fact that the uprising was viewed as spontaneous122 also likely aided in persuading the Kurdish troops that although some actors in the North had strong ties abroad, the rebellion represented a much more homegrown challenge to the status quo.

117 Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja, 107. 118 Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Officials Discussing the State of the Iraqi Army, the 1991 Uprising, and the Withdrawal from Kuwait, April 3, 1991, SH-SHTP-A-000-739. 119 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 354. 120 Ibid., 354. 121 Ibid., 356. 122 An Opportunity Lost — the 1991 Iraqi Uprising (Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2015).; Tripp, A History of Iraq, 256.

199 Moreover, the uprising in Iraq’s North was not painted as extremely chaotic and disorderly. The Baath Party used the term mukharibin, or saboteurs, before and during the uprising to describe forces that were subverting the Baath Party in the North. But in the thick of the events, individuals in the North recalled that the uprising seemed more orderly than that in the South, described below. In the North, there was much less reporting on burning and destruction. Kanan Makiya argues that, indeed, the “Kurds killed thousands of Ba’this. Nonetheless, they did not kill indiscriminately—only Ba'this and collaborators with the regime,”123 in comparison to the random violence that took hold in the South as the uprising progressed. In sum, the uprising in the North was seen as linked to foreign agents, but not necessarily employing illegitimate tactics to achieve its ends, and as a result there was “medium” persuasion operating over the Fursan in

1991.

Fleeing and Fomenting the Uprising

In analyzing the behavior of Kurdish NDB troops amid the uprising, the challenge is determining the distribution of fighters who fled versus fomented revolt. Many accounts of jahsh actions during the unrest are imprecise. They claim, for instance, that the NDBs “rose in revolt”124 and that they “sided with the intifada,”125 but without detailing what exactly these troops did on the ground. According to one source, “the

Salah al-Din Forces (the Kurds called them jahsh, or donkeys), went over to the side of the people. Division 24, stationed at Chawar Qurna, did not fire a single bullet at the

123 Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World, 79. 124 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 256. 125 Isam Al-Khafaji, "State Terror and the Degradation of Politics in Iraq," Middle East Research and Information Project, no. 176 (1992): 19.

200 rebels and surrendered peacefully.”126 However, it is unclear whether joining “the side of the people” and surrendering led these troops to actively join in demonstrations and the taking of strategic locations, or whether these fighters simply deserted the conflict in the end. Similarly, it was reported on March 13 that, “1,000 Iraqi troops, including several senior officers, stationed near the Turkish border announced yesterday that they were joining the popular forces.”127 And, at Amadiya in Dohuk, that: “Only a few jash leaders opted to remain loyal to Saddam.”128 Again, it is difficult to detect the degree of the NDB troops’ insubordination from such general observations. Finally, on April 9 the Baath

Party in Dohuk announced an amnesty for these Kurdish troops, who collaborated with the “factions of sabotage” in the North, if they return to the national ranks, showing that the majority of the troops certainly did not fight amid the uprising and were encouraged to return to their positions after the revolt.129

It is challenging to pinpoint the degree to which NDB fighters fled or fomented revolt; yet, a piece of evidence comes from one of Saddam’s advisers, who stated:

In the south, people fought with them. But in the north, they did not fight with them. Even the regiments of the National Defense, they were not the way we thought first. They armed themselves by fear. They thought that the government was over. But no one fought or at least they fought with them the way they used to fight with us, I mean in the same manner. They would get defeated fast. They would drop their weapons fast, especially in the Hok sector. I mean, the Hok sector…gave up.130

126 Al-Jabbar, Why the Uprisings Failed. 127 Opposition Forces Claim Captured Cities, Areas, March 13, 1991, NC1303140691, Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic (FBIS-NES-91-050, March 14, 1991). 128 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 371. 129 Amnesty Decision, Signed by Baath Party Secretary of the Dohuk Branch Command on April 9, 1991, Box 2232, Document 1 (University of Colorado Bolder, Iraq Secret Police Files Archives, Accessed September 2015). 130 Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Officials Discussing the State of the Iraqi Army, the 1991 Uprising, and the Withdrawal from Kuwait, April 3, 1991, SH-SHTP-A-000-739.

201 As this official account suggests, it appears the majority of Kurdish troops fled rather than fomented revolt. A lieutenant colonel and Baath Party member reflected on “The

Page of Treachery and Treason” and criticized the inclusion of Kurds and Turkmens in the ranks of units in Kirkuk because “their role was negative during the events” and “the largest group of them deserted before the sabotage entered the city.”131 These pieces of evidence suggest that a large segment of the NDB troops simply fled the uprising context.

In contrast, particular Kurdish regime fighters fomented revolt. By some accounts,

Kurdish units sparked the revolution in Dohuk132 and actively fought to control Rania amid the uprising.133 In one U.S. diplomat’s recollection, some members of the Kurdish units participated in the uprising before the Kurdish political parties and their peshmerga forces attempted a more organized and continued revolt.134 In the end, the “majority of jash leaders were thus transformed from embarrassed collaborators with Baghdad into champions of the uprising” as they either fled or fomented rebellion.135

The clearest piece of evidence in the case of Iraq’s NDB troops in 1991 is that they lacked any coercion over their behavior. They neither received clear orders for how to combat the uprising, nor was there in place any degree of command and control over these forces able to monitor such instructions and punish infractions. As a result, it was clear that the Kurdish troops would witness high levels of insubordination amid the uprising—they had no incentive to risk their lives to combat the unrest. In addition to the lack of coercion influencing these soldiers, they also only had moderate regime

131 Handwritten Letter from Military Lieutenant Colonel Comrade, to the Baath Party, Signed May 8, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0493 to 0494, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 132 Al-Khafaji, State Terror and the Degradation of Politics in Iraq, 19. 133 Dave Johns, "The Crimes of Saddam Hussein: Suppression of the 1991 Uprising," Frontline, January 24, 2006. 134 An Opportunity Lost — the 1991 Iraqi Uprising. 135 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 371.

202 persuasion operating over them by spring 1991. Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, these troops were told that they were participating in operations to contain Kurdish saboteurs who were collaborating with the enemy, Iran. Yet the events in 1991 took place after the war, were seen as largely spontaneous uprisings, and although they utilized violence these uprisings appeared to wield it in a strategic and discriminate manner. Without clearly articulated orders, without military monitoring and with only a “medium” level of persuasion, Kurdish troops were likely to flee or foment revolt. This is in fact what was witnessed in 1991. Kurdish battalions that only years ago had been deployed in a campaign to displace and kill thousands of Kurds were now standing by as these citizens revolted and at times actively joining in their uprising.

Fomenting Southern Troops

Those troops retreating through Iraq’s South were distinguished from the northern

Fursan and centrally-located Republican Guard in a number of ways. First, these soldiers bore the brunt of the psychological and physical burden of the Gulf War; in concert, the uprisings began in the area through which they were retreating. Second, these men were largely members of the regular armed forces, and so in theory had greater institutionalization than the NDBs, but weaker indoctrination and elite culture as compared to the Republican Guard, particularly given the rapid expansion of the regular army’s size preceding the Gulf War. Finally, the majority of the regular armed forces was

Shia Muslim. One retired Iraqi general estimated that 60% of the military’s staff officers was Shia at the time of the Gulf War,136 and an Iraqi general who himself is Shia

136 Ra'ad Hamdani, Before History Leaves Us [ARABIC] (Beirut: Arab Scientific, 2007), 317.

203 estimated that amid the Iran-Iraq War 75% of the army was Shia.137 This is in comparison with the Republican Guard, which was largely recruited among Sunni populations also linked to Saddam by tribe, and the NDB troops, which, as mentioned, were Kurdish. In the following, I illustrate how a lack of clarity with regards to orders, and an initial perception that the uprisings were homegrown, led many of the retreating soldiers in the

South to join in fomenting revolt at the start of the 1991 uprising, or intifada. However, as the rebellion progressed, these soldiers’ decision-making environment changed. First, there was increasing control exerted over the regular army as Hussein’s regime,

Republican Guard, and ground forces regrouped following the retreat from Kuwait. But second, the persuasive environment in which these troops operated changed as the uprising was increasingly viewed as employing indiscriminate violence and being populated by foreign fighters. As a result, soldiers were increasingly likely to simple flee or even fight rather than actively join in fomenting the revolt as it continued.

Coercion

Saddam Hussein distrusted his regular armed forces and devoted the military intelligence unit to continuously monitoring military personnel’s loyalty.138 The regime threatened troops, explaining what would happen to them if they deserted. Ahead of the

Gulf War, Decree 11078 ordered “that defectors’ wives, children and other relatives be detained,”139 a euphemism, most likely. It was known that deserters would be

“punished…by cutting off their ears and branding them with a tattoo on their

137 Author Interview with Iraqi Shia Former General, Interview ID 94 (Amman, Jordan, May 6, 2015, 12:45pm). 138 Political and Personality Handbook of Iraq: A Research Paper (Central Intelligence Agency, January 1991), 10. 139 Al-Jabbar, Why the Uprisings Failed.

204 foreheads.”140 Indeed, amid the Gulf War, “death squads,” led by Iraq’s special forces, were sent to the front. As one young pilot related, a death squad member told him that:

if we ran away, we knew what would happen to us and he invited one of us to go and look at the bodies of 50 soldiers who had been executed. None of us would go to look at them. But later - five days ago, at the end of the war - one of my friends ran away. They caught him and brought him back and made us watch his execution. He waited for his death and cursed Saddam Hussein. Then they shot him.141

Yet, although such monitoring, threatening, and punishing might have coerced soldiers effectively in “normal” times, it does not appear to have done so amid the chaos of the

Gulf War ground attack and retreat from Kuwait. During the war Saddam was able to maintain a degree of command and control among his top commanders by employing

“mobile command posts,”142 which allowed him to at least partially orchestrate the withdrawal from Kuwait.143 Still, “‘communications links between Baghdad and its field army…had been greatly reduced in capacity’”144 and the military was thus “incapable of managing a major fighting withdrawal.”145 As the Central Intelligence Agency reported in

May 1991, coalition operation Desert Storm “[s]everely disrupted the Iraqi military command and control network”146 and the regular army suffered the most during the ground attack, to the extent that “many divisions were virtually obliterated.”147

Strong command and control requires communications and as one intelligence staff officer related, the Iraqi military did not have strong communications during the

140 Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki and Mark E. Stout, The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978–2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 210. 141 Robert Fisk, "Crisis in the Gulf: Caught between Bombs and the Death Squads," The Independent, March 1, 1991. 142 Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes?: The Future of Iraqi Military Power, 13. 143 Ibid., 47-48. 144 Ibid., 47-48. 145 Hoyt, Social Structure, Ethnicity, and Military Effectiveness: Iraq, 1980–2004, 73. 146 Iraq's Ground Forces: An Assessment, 1. 147 Ibid., iiii.

205 coalition bombardment.148 This is corroborated by military accounts at the time. A colonel reflected on the events in 1991 and wrote that as the corps was moving through southern Iraq, it did not have reliable communications; moreover, there were no officers attached for the purpose of communicating and transmitting orders. As a result, the general position in southern Iraq was unclear, he said.149 Soldiers returning from Kuwait did not understand what was happening in Iraq, were not part of cohesive units, and did not receive clear and monitored instructions regarding what to do next.

Persuasion

In addition to their lack of clear orders, soldiers in the South also appear to have viewed what they witnessed as spontaneous uprisings. In early 1991, Iraqis were suffering from electricity and telephone outages, as well as interruptions to water and gas supplies.150 The rebellion was thus viewed as targeting “a hated regime when it seemed that the power of that regime was broken.”151 In addition to their spontaneous start, the revolts soon gained the backing of local leaders, such as Shia Grand Ayatollah Al-Khoei, who “declared the rebels’ cause as just.”152 In fact, one military captain and Baath Party member in Hilla sided with the revolutionaries because although “he denounced the fundamentalist Shi'i organizations and the Iranians bitterly, he took his instructions

148 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Senior Staff Officer in The intelligence Directorate, Interview ID 107. 149 Handwritten Letter from Military Colonel, to the Baath Party, Dated May 11, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0349 to 0350, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 150 Iraq: Domestic Impact of the War (Central Intelligence Agency, January 25, 1991), 7. 151 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 255-256. 152 Dina Al-Shibeeb, "‘Dogs Ravaged Dead Bodies’: Remembering Iraq’s 1991 Uprisings," Al Arabiya, August 24, 2015.

206 during the intifada from the Shi'i spiritual leader in Najaf”153 in Iraq. Still, the Baath Party tried to underscore the foreign nature of the demonstrations. According to a letter written by a local party member in Al-Muthanna province, for instance, the rioting that took place in early March was on the part of people who fled to Iran.154 Another report, written by a female party member in Misan stated that those participating in the rioting were families from the Dawa, agent (‘amil) party, and families that had origins in vengeful

Iran.155 Yet, for those soldiers returning from Kuwait, the initial exasperation expressed by the local populations likely mirrored their own confusion and despondence. In addition, given that the majority of the regular armed forces was Shia, and the South was composed in large part by Shia populations, it is likely that many soldiers viewed these demonstrations in their home region simply as citizen-led rather than foreign-linked.

In addition to their perception that the uprising was organic, spontaneous and homegrown, soldiers also initially perceived that it employed the violence necessary to achieve its aims. As Human Rights Watch reported, high levels of violence characterized both the northern and southern uprisings, as: “Rebels and their sympathizers…openly took credit for executing personnel of the security forces and intelligence agencies during the uprising.”156 Yet the troops appear to have viewed this force as legitimate, given their and citizens’ exasperation with the regime. As a result, the revolt that spread in southern

Iraq was not perceived as foreign-backed and illegitimate, and thus soldiers were not persuaded in their need to fight it.

153 Al-Khafaji, State Terror and the Degradation of Politics in Iraq, 19. 154 Handwritten Letter by Party Member Addressed to the General Director of the Secretariat, Signed March 2, 1991, (Electronic Record), 01-2211-0001-0034 to 0035, BRCC-Boxfiles. 155 Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated April 3, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0273, BRCC-Boxfiles. 156 Goldstein, Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and its Aftermath.

207

Resultant Fomenting

It was clear that the retreating troops in the South fomented revolt in Iraq. This was reported by a former U.S. diplomat157 as well as reports emanating from Iran and

Arab countries at the time.158 In some cases the uprising leaders themselves appear to have been soldiers. Khoury writes that in Najaf, “rebellion leaders included a security officer, a food warehouse employee, a communist deserter, and the Najaf hospital director.”159 On March 6 there were reports that 2,000 soldiers joined the unrest in Basra and another 3,000 in Amara;160 on March 10 another 5,000 soldiers and more than 50 colonels joined the opposition in these areas.161 By March 14, a brigadier general and his infantry brigade were reported to have joined the “popular forces” in Basra.162 Another

150 officer and soldier defections were announced on March 19,163 and the next day there was news that a “large number of troops from this [20th infantry division] joined the uprising forces.”164 As late as March 30 there was news that 6,000 infantry soldiers had joined the uprisings in Amara.165

157 An Opportunity Lost — the 1991 Iraqi Uprising. 158 R. W. Apple, "After the War: The Overview; Iraqi Clashes Said to Grow as Troops Join in Protests; First Allied Captives Freed," The New York Times, March 5, 1991. 159 Dina Rizk Khoury, Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 137. 160 Opposition Leader Interviewed on Rebel Uprising, March 6, 1991, NC1503234991, Tehran RESALAT in Persian (FBIS-NES-91-054, March 20, 1991). 161 Opposition: Foreigners Not Interfering in Uprising, March 10, 1991, LD1003190691 (FBIS-NES-91- 049, March 12, 1991). 162 'Massive Demonstrations' Claimed, March 14, 1991, NC1403203291, Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic (FBIS-NES-91-051, March 15, 1991). 163 Situation Said to Favor Popular Forces, March 19, 1991, NC1903170791, Damascus SANA in Arabic (FBIS-NES-91-054, March 20, 1991). 164 Rebels Capture General, Storm Al-Basrah Sheraton, March 20, 1991, NC 2003205691, (Clandestine) Voice of Rebellious Iraq in Arabic (FBIS-NES-91-055, March 21, 1991). 165 Iraqi Refugee Reports Many Army Defections, LD3003174491, March 30, 1991, Tehran IRNA in English (FBIS-NES-91-062, April 1, 1991).

208 Although some of these reports originated from neighboring countries—with an interest in undermining confidence in the Iraqi regime’s strength—the defection reports are corroborated by Baath Party communications themselves. A party member reflected on the uprising, stating that the troops present in the rioting areas “did not fight as needed” so as to “prevent the armed saboteur elements from entering the Iraqi land” and in fact that “a large number surrendered.” He went on to say that “all the Basra [southern] national defense brigades joined, with their weapons, the ranks of the saboteurs.”166 The president of the General Federation of Iraqi Women in Karbala reported that those who abandoned performing the sacred duty in the armed forces aided the rioting,167 and the

Baghdad Bureau’s Baath Party Organizational Command wrote that the majority of those participating in rioting activities were those returning from their families in Iran as well as the soldiers who deserted from the military.168 As my theory anticipated, soldiers who lacked clear orders to put down an uprising, and who saw it as homegrown and using legitimate tactics, were under little pressure to continue to serve in the armed forces and also had a desire to support the cause at hand. This was the case for the regular army troops who, when retreating from Kuwait through southern Iraq, joined in fomenting revolt.

Greater Coercion and Persuasion Spur Fleeing and Fighting over Time

Although regular army soldiers actively participated in the start of the uprising in

166 Handwritten Letter from Arbil Comrade, to the Baath Party, Dated May 8, 1991 (Electronic Record), Box 01-3185-0003-0215 to 0219, BRCC-Boxfiles. 167 Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated April 28, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0206, BRCC-Boxfiles. 168 Baath Party Organizational Command of the Baghdad Bureau, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated March 11, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0517 to 0518, BRCC-Boxfiles.

209 Iraq’s South in 1991, as events progressed fewer soldiers joined in the revolts. This appears to have been the case because with time the regime was able to exert greater control over the armed forces and also soldiers were less convinced that the uprising was legitimate.

First, although the regime’s forces were thoroughly defeated in Kuwait, with time,

Hussein was able to organize some of the scattered regular army troops by putting them under the command of Republican Guard units.169 The other piece of evidence regarding the power of coercion comes from the fact that the most intact divisions were the first regular troops deployed to fight to contain the rebellion in Basra.170

As time elapsed, soldiers also received greater signals that what began as a homegrown uprising had been tapped by foreign interests. It was not uncommon to hear, for instance, uprising slogans such as “‘not Eastern, nor Western - Islamic Republican,’” which mimicked the Iranian Islamic Revolution.171 Similarly, although Saddam had always attempted to frame Iraq’s enemies as foreign, there was increasing evidence of the actual participation of foreign elements as the revolt progressed. Iraqi émigrés who had sought refugee in Iran became increasingly involved in the uprising,172 and members of the Badr Brigade crossed the Iranian border to fight in Iraq.173 These developments were reported in the international press, which argued by mid-March that Iran was actively

“organizing and arming many of the Iraqi rebels.”174 By the middle of the month U.S.

President Bush warned that “‘Iran must not and should not try to annex any of the

169 Iraq's Ground Forces: An Assessment, iiii. 170 Ibid., 2. 171 Al-Shibeeb, ‘Dogs Ravaged Dead Bodies’: Remembering Iraq’s 1991 Uprisings. 172 An Opportunity Lost — the 1991 Iraqi Uprising. 173 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 255-256. 174 Youssef M. Ibrahim, "After the War: Iran Organizes and Arms Rebels Fighting Hussein, Diplomats Say," The New York Times, March 20, 1991.

210 territory of Iraq.’”175 In this way, what began as a spontaneous uprising voicing the grievances of a cross-section of Iraqis gained a framing as a revolt that was being taken advantage of by Iraq’s historic enemy—Iran.

Conditions in the South also became increasingly disorderly over time. In his reporting, Simpson described how the “rebellion turned into a settling of scores with officials of the regime, and there was a good deal of looting. Law-abiding people withdrew their support fast; many welcomed the arrival of Saddam’s forces.”176 Over time, it appears that the southern rioters began to resemble the regime’s term for them: ghugha’in. As one former solider related, this term in Arabic connotes mob elements, people who are hungry, unorganized, revolutionaries. When he thought of ghugha’in, the image conjured was of people destroying, killing, and burning just to seek revenge or steal for themselves.177 Rebels were not only exacting revenge on Baath Party members,178 for instance, but were also persecuting any “regarded as agents of or collaborators with the regime.”179

As the uprising progressed, and soldiers were increasingly subject to either or both coercion and persuasion, fleeing or even returning to fight with the military became more common. In particular, the revolution’s increasing connection to foreign elements and chaotic appearance led one U.S. diplomat to reflect that: “These developments, in my view, caused the Iraqi military to rally around Saddam Hussein.”180 Indeed, one soldier from Najaf described his experience retreating from Kuwait. He said it was a tragedy—he

175 Gerald F. Seib, "Bush Warns Iran Not to Pull Away Regions of Iraq," The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 1991. 176 Simpson, Inside Iraq: The Voices Against Saddam. 177 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Soldier, in Baghdad in Spring 1991, Interview ID 109. 178 An Opportunity Lost — the 1991 Iraqi Uprising. 179 Tripp, A History of Iraq, 256. 180 An Opportunity Lost — the 1991 Iraqi Uprising.

211 and other soldiers were stranded outdoors, sleeping under cars in the cold. When they headed back to Iraq, the military was cordoning off roads and murdering people on the streets, as he put it. He laid low but eventually returned to the army a month after a pardon was issued.181 There was additional evidence of soldiers simply evading military duties. As an adviser put it to Saddam Hussein: “‘I witnessed in the army sir, an appearance of some soldiers as being slow on purpose and taking their own time.’”182 A military telegram from March 19 showed that even some officers were reluctant to fight the unrest. As the telegram wrote: “We apologize for sending you Staff BG […] Military

Engineer…It is necessary to withdraw the BG immediately because he will fail in this project since he is beginning to speak about humanities and other topics. It is quite clear that he does not wish to do this kind of work and would interfere in the work flow. We hope that you can release him from his duty immediately.”183 Even relatively close to the capital, in Babil province: “Several people…stated that some members of the armed forces from al-Hilla refused to fight against its people when government forces entered the city, and that they were executed as a result.”184 Letters written by a major and colonel report that there was military absenteeism in Basra185 and it was not uncommon for captains and lieutenants to leave for up to two weeks in March 1991 before returning to

181 Hammed Suhail Najem Abu Ousaibeh Short Video Testimony (Electronic Record), 1566, Iraq Memory Foundation Videos, Iraqi Testimonies with English Subtitles (Mu'assasat al-dhākirah al-'Irāqīyah [Iraq Memory Foundation] records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015). 182 Saddam Hussein Meeting with Officials Concerning the Uprising in the South, March 1991, SH-SHTP- A-000-614 (National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center, Accessed 2014). 183 Telegrams in Regards to the Activities during the 1991 Rebellion "Page of Treason and Treachery", March 1991, SH-GMID-D-000-621 (National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center, Accessed December 2014). 184 Iraq: Human Rights Violations since the Uprising: Summary of Amnesty International's Concerns (Amnesty International, July 1991). 185 Handwritten Letter from Military Major, to the Baath Party, Dated May 11, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0348, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).

212 their units.186 It appears to be the case that the increasingly disorderly nature of the southern protests prompted soldiers to move from fomenting revolt, to simply fleeing it or even being coerced to return to the armed forces.

Chapter Summary

In March 1991 Saddam Hussein faced a significant domestic uprising with an

Iraqi military that was in no way united by the coercive and persuasive influences on soldier behavior desired if he wanted to stay in power. A core portion of the Republican

Guard troops had maintained command and control despite the international coalition’s defeat of the Iraqi military in February 1991. Those units not only received clear orders to face the unrest, and were monitored throughout the campaign to reassert control in Iraq, but were also manned by troops most likely to perceive the intifada as serving foreign interests and thus deserving of suppression for the sake of Iraq’s national security. The situation was completely different for the northern National Defense Battalions and regular army passing through Iraq’s southern regions. Both sets of troops had arguably no degree of coercion being exerted over them, and therefore no incentive to put their lives on the line to confront widespread rebellion. What differed from North to South, however, was how these military and militia personnel perceived those in revolt.

In the North, the Kurdish troops had been previously deployed against these populations in missions claiming to prevent foreign infiltrators and parties with foreign ties from undermining Iraq. Though the troops shared a Kurdish ethnicity with those rebelling, and though some of the NDB fighters may have been increasingly sympathetic

186 Handwritten Letter from a Military Colonel from the Training Center in Al-Basra, to the Baath Party, Signed May 8, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0366, BRCC-Boxfiles (Hiẓb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al- Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives, Accessed October 2015).

213 with the peshmerga in the late 1980s, they still knew of these fighters’ and parties’ foreign connections. At the same time, the rebels operating in Iraq’s North were employing discriminate violence that specifically targeted the Baath Party, and this resulted in soldiers perceiving these rebels as utilizing legitimate tactics. With no coercion exercised over them, and with wavering persuasion, the Kurdish troops both fled and fomented revolt, as my theory anticipated. In contrast, in Iraq’s South, the predominantly Shia troops not only lacked clear orders and monitoring, but also uniformly perceived that this was a homegrown revolt. They actively joined in the revolt, until they witnessed the rebels’ tactics becoming increasingly illegitimate and felt the enhanced coercive influence of a regime that had restabilized itself. At that point, they fled the conflict in greater numbers rather than joining the rebels, or even returned to the military’s ranks.

Saddam learned in 1991 what he expressed the following year to his commanders,

“that a military ‘does not fight only with its weapons’ but also with ‘its moral and spiritual structure, based on conviction.’”187 A substantial portion of his troops in 1991 lacked the conviction to suppress the rebellion, and because they also were not coerced into fighting they left their posts. The regime remained standing only due to the fighting power of the Republican Guard. The case therefore shows that although military decision-making has a significant effect on regime stability during civil conflict, it is not necessary for the entire military to stand behind an embattled autocrat. In the case of Iraq in 1991, much of the armed forces dissolved and lacked any cohesion. Yet, due to the powers of coercion and persuasion in the Guard, the regime was able to regain control

187 Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes?: The Future of Iraqi Military Power, 60.

214 over the fourteen of eighteen provinces controlled at one point by rebels. What is clear, however, is that because a large swath of the Iraqi coercive apparatus was insubordinate in 1991, it took much more explosive violence for the regime’s limited fighting forces to defeat the rebellion. Indeed, by one estimate 50,000-100,000 Iraqis were killed amid the uprising.188

Although the fighting Republican Guard ultimately ensured Saddam’s survival, the fact that much of the regular army and NDBs fled and fomented revolt still had significant repercussions for Iraq’s political, social, and military landscape. The greatest political consequence of this pattern of soldier decision-making was the fact that the

Kurds were granted a semi-autonomous region in northern Iraq. This was partially a result of the territorial control the Kurds temporarily gained in the course of the uprising, which had been aided by the fleeing and fomenting NDBs during the intifada. It was supported, in concert, with international support for the formation of a Kurdish region in the form of the declaration of a no-fly zone in Iraq’s North.189 As a result, the Kurds pursued independent administrative and political activity in the semi-autonomous zone.

Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein viewed the southern rebellion as a continued threat for his regime’s security. In the weeks following the revolt, many Shia men were arrested or disappeared in the South.190 Following the uprising, Hussein also ordered the draining of

188 Al-Shibeeb, ‘Dogs Ravaged Dead Bodies’: Remembering Iraq’s 1991 Uprisings. 189 Kenneth Katzman, The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq (Congressional Research Service, February 5, 2008), 2. 190 Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 231.

215 the southern marshes so that “insurgents” lost the ability to hide in the terrain.191 The move had the consequence of also forcibly displacing the civilian population.192

In addition to these political and social consequences, the defeat in the Gulf War and continued breakdown in cohesion during the uprising pushed Hussein to restructure his armed forces. He did so first by “replacing or reassigning his defense minister, chief of staff, and nearly every other general staff officer and corps commander, as well as large numbers of senior and mid-ranking officers.”193 Hussein then “disbanded a large number of regular army active and reserve infantry divisions”194 as well as the National

Defense Battalions,195 although he reportedly soon began “arming Kurdish and Shi'i tribesmen in order to restore government control in outlying areas”196 once again. The

“Page of Treachery and Treason” was over, but its effects on Iraq and its armed forces were felt for decades.

191 The Iraqi Government Assault on the Marsh Arabs (Human Rights Watch, January 2003). 192 Eisenstadt, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes?: The Future of Iraqi Military Power, 68. 193 Ibid., 8. 194 Ibid., 50. 195 Ibid., 50-51. 196 Ibid., 50-51.

216 Chapter 5: Bahrain and the Pearl Revolution, 2011

“[A] group of the leaders of discord who called for the removal of the regime and conspired on behalf of foreign countries have been arrested.” –Bahrain Defense Forces General Command1

Introduction

In 2011, a fifth of the Bahraini population flooded the nation’s streets demanding political reform. Although Tunisia has been thought of as the birthplace of the Arab

Spring, Bahrain had been roiling throughout 2010, and for decades before. As Steve Coll wrote in The New Yorker in February 2011: “The street battles this week are typical of what has been going on in Bahrain, without much attention, on and off since the nineteen-eighties.”2 Indeed, this led many to see the Bahraini demonstrations during the

Arab Spring as inevitable, arguing “the question that arises is not why this happened now but why it took this long.”3 And yet, despite the significant portion of Bahrainis on the streets, and the elevation of demands from political reform to regime change, the Al-

Khalifa ruling monarchy stayed in power—with the help of its military.

Much as observers felt the uprising was inevitable, they also argued that the military’s loyalty to the regime was preordained. Bellin observed that “in Bahrain…the military elite and rank and file are predominantly Sunni while the majority of the

Bahraini population is Shia;” therefore, because the military was “primordially distinct

1 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (Manama, Bahrain, 2011), 148-149. 2 Steve Coll, "Bahrain's Long Revolution," The New Yorker, February 16, 2011. 3 Michele Dunne, The Deep Roots of Bahrain’s Unrest (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 18, 2011).

217 from the protestors…in Bahrain the army did not hesitate to shoot” at them.4 Barany agreed, emphasizing that the “key thing to grasp about the Bahraini military, however, is that it is not a national army. Rather, it is a fighting force of Sunni Muslims who are charged with protecting a Sunni ruling family and Sunni political and business elites in a country […] where about three of every four or five people are Shia.”5 Others have reinforced this thread. Lutterbeck has noted that although “some two-thirds of Bahrain’s population is Shia, their presence in the country’s security forces has been minimal,”6 and

Gaub characterized the Bahraini military as cohesive and professional with an allegiance to the regime rather than the state, explaining its loyalty during the Arab Spring.7 Unlike the 1991 uprising in Iraq, the Bahraini uprising of 2011 was anticipated and had precedent. And unlike the 1970 uprising in Jordan, observers had correctly expected that the military would fight should a conflict arise. Indeed, the fighting outcome and subsequent regime stability have often been perceived as over-determined in this case study.

I argue, however, that we have not fully explained the motivations behind soldiers’ decisions to fight in Bahrain. Conventional accounts argue that because Sunnis populate the Bahraini military, and because the majority of citizens (and therefore protesters) is

Shia, religious identity explains why soldiers used force against civilians. My analysis of the Bahrain case study helps advance our understanding of military decision-making and

Bahraini politics, though. Those who point to identity and claim it is linked to soldiers’ decision-making often do not identify by what mechanism identity influences soldier

4 Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 133. 5 Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military," Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 35. 6 Lutterbeck, Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil–Military Relations, 42. 7 Gaub, The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-Proofing and Repression.

218 behavior, and do not produce evidence that this mechanism is at work. This is understandable, because it is difficult to conduct research on ongoing conflicts and particularly in regimes that have restabilized. However, I draw on diverse sources to argue that soldiers’ coercive environment, as well as the specific framing of the protesters as foreign-backed and using illegitimate tactics, goes far in explaining why troops remained in their positions and fought in 2011. Still, the chapter reveals some of the theory’s limitations related to how soldiers who are ruling family members or hired mercenaries may react differently during unrest.

As a result of soldiers’ fighting, the Al-Khalifa regime restabilized and King

Hamad has remained in power. Bahrain remains governed by a Sunni monarchy, in a sub- region that seeks to maintain governance by Sunni leaders to counter the strength of Iran and local Shia populations. In addition, although voices were raised in spring 2011 regarding the moral and security impact of the U.S. Fifth Fleet naval base in Bahrain, such concerns quieted down since the largest demonstrations were quelled in February and March 2011. In sum, because of soldiers’ decisions to fight demonstrators in Bahrain, the status quo has been largely maintained.

A variety of data are employed to analyze this case study. First, I draw on twelve interviews conducted in Bahrain in 2013, as well as an additional interview with an active-duty BDF officer in Washington, DC. The interview context in 2013 made it difficult to interview current BDF personnel. At the time, numerous academics were denied access to the Kingdom itself and once in country studying the Pearl Revolution was challenging as the regime had restabilized. For this reason, I primarily draw on interviews with civilian conflict witnesses, defense lawyers who represented those who

219 interfaced with security personnel while detained, a former BDF officer, and others. In the case study I also draw on a variety of official publications. This includes the Bahrain

Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report on the crisis published in November

2011, as well as official statements including from the Bahrain News Agency, Saudi

Press statements, and U.S. Department of State remarks. Finally, I exploit contemporary news sources from local, regional, and international outlets.

This chapter begins with a brief section outlining the Al-Khalifa regime and its relationship with the Bahraini military, and then describes the course of the uprising in

2011. I then consider existing explanations for military fighting in Bahrain and present my own analytical narrative. The chapter concludes by summarizing the significance of the military’s behavior during the domestic unrest event.

Military Development on Al-Khalifa’s Archipelago

Like many Gulf states, the history of Bahrain is intertwined with Britain’s influence. The British first became involved in Bahrain’s defense in 1861, and had a large role in supporting the Gulf state’s police and military development in the twentieth century until withdrawing from Bahrain in 1971.8 By 1973 Bahrain had a constitution in place and held elections for a National Assembly for the first time.9 The country’s experiment with participatory politics was brief, however. The next October, leader Amir

Isa published a State Security Measures Law, in part prompted by a series of mass strikes throughout Bahrain. The State Security Law, as it was referred to, was sweeping, as it

8 James Onley, Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection (Georgetown University, Center for International and Regional Studies, Occasional Paper No. 4, 2009). 9 Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt (International Crisis Group, April 6, 2011), 2.

220 empowered the state to imprison individuals “suspected of having ‘perpetrated acts, delivered statements, exercised activities or [...] been involved in contacts inside or outside the country, which are of a nature considered to be in violation of the internal or external security of the country.’”10 By 1975 the Amir had dissolved the National

Assembly due to its protest of the new measures.11

From British to American Influence, and the 1990 Uprisings

Following Britain’s withdrawal, the United States’ presence expanded in Bahrain.

In 1991, the Bahrain-United States defense agreement was signed, with provisions regarding ports and military exercises.12 Increased partnership between the countries led to the stationing of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, the United States recognizing

Bahrain as a “Major Non-NATO Ally” in 2002, and the conclusion of a Free Trade

Agreement between the countries in 2006.13 This period signified a new era in domestic

Bahraini politics as well. A strictly Consultative Council was established in the early

1990s,14 but many in the country did not feel Bahrain had instituted thorough enough political reforms. Meanwhile, economic development plans had infringed on the private sector, fueled employment of foreign workers rather than Bahrainis, and stymied opportunities for women.15 As a result, in 1992 petitions were sent to the Amir regarding

10 Routine Abuse, Routine Denial (Human Rights Watch, June 1997). 11 Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 230. 12 "Bahrain Profile – Timeline," BBC News, April 21, 2015. 13 U.S. Relations with Bahrain: Fact Sheet (U.S. Department of States, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, September 13, 2013). 14 "Bahrain Profile - Timeline." 15 Fred H. Lawson, "Repertoires of Contention in Contemporary Bahrain," in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 91- 93.

221 the necessity for political reforms and the release of political prisoners.16 By 1994 opposition groups had issued an additional petition with the same demands.17 Finally, in

November of that year demonstrations escalated after the state’s use of security forces against previous protests.18 A particularly prominent critic of the regime was Shia Sheikh

Ali Salman, who advocated for the reinstallation of Bahrain’s National Assembly. The sheikh was arrested in December 1994, inspiring further protests, and Salman was deported a month later.19

The years of 1994-1996 would be remembered as a period of continuous uprising.

At the time, the agencies primarily responsible for containing and suppressing the unrest were the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Criminal Investigation

Department (CID), in addition to the Public Security Department (PSD). The British maintained a strong influence in these security services, to the degree that a British major general led the SIS.20 One participant recalled that in 1994 the reform-minded movement crystallized and women called on security forces to halt the use of indiscriminate violence and instead use restraint towards protesters.21 1995 was remembered by some as a year of total horror in Bahrain, in which many were sent to exile.22 By the end of the year: “Arson and bombings joined mass demonstrations as a major form of contentious activity on the islands,”23 and this included explosions at hotels in December 1995 as well

16 Ibid., 96. 17 Ibid., 96. 18 Laurence Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 237. 19 "Bahrain Profile - Timeline." 20 Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis (Amnesty International, September 1, 1995), 8. 21 Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 10 (Manama, Bahrain, March 18, 2013, 3pm). 22 Ibid. 23 Lawson, Repertoires of Contention in Contemporary Bahrain, 102-103.

222 as February and June of 1996.24 Car bombs and Molotov cocktail incidents continued into

1996,25 Shia Sheikh Abdul Amir Al-Jamri was once again arrested,26 and the state announced it had thwarted a coup plotted by Hezbollah-Bahrain.27 According to one report, the Bahrain Defense Forces were deployed on one day, December 10, 1996, at

“key locations,”28 and the uprising was suppressed by the end of 1997 without significant regime concessions.29

Succession and Turbulent Politics

A new period of Bahraini politics was marked by the succession of Sheikh Hamad upon the death of his father in 1999. There were initial hopes that Amir (later titled,

King) Hamad would pursue a reform agenda in the country. This optimism was inspired by the passing of a referendum in 2001 on a reformist National Action Charter. In May

2002, local elections were held and included the right for women to run; in October, there were parliamentary elections as well.30

The reformist agenda did not progress swiftly or completely in the eyes of many, however. Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, a leading opposition political group popular among the country’s Shia majority population, was founded in 200131 but boycotted the 2002 parliamentary elections.32 Indeed, a series of protests were held in

2005 demanding a “fully-elected parliament” rather than the division of membership

24 Ibid., 100. 25 Ibid., 101. 26 "Bahrain Profile - Timeline." 27 Ibid. 28 Lawson, Repertoires of Contention in Contemporary Bahrain, 102-103. 29 Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 10. 30 "Bahrain Profile - Timeline." 31 Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt, 14. 32 Laurence Louër, Bahrain’s National Dialogue and the Ever-Deepening Sectarian Divide (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 29, 2011).

223 between elected and appointed representatives.33 Still, Al-Wefaq joined the 2006 contest;34 that year, 40% of the vote went to Shia candidates and a Shii was appointed

Deputy Prime Minister.35 Public discontent was not limited to questions of representation, though. In 2004, for instance, Bahrain witnessed demonstrations against fighting in Najaf and Karbala, Shia holy cities in Iraq.36 In addition, by September 2010 twenty Shia were

“accused of plotting to overthrow monarchy by promoting violent protests and sabotage.”37

Bahrain has relied on its coercive apparatus to handle these periods of unrest and criticism of the regime. The country’s 2010 census reported a population of just fewer than 1.25 million persons, with approximately 550,000 Bahrainis and 650,000 non-

Bahraini residents.38 For this population, the country has the Bahrain Defense Forces

(BDF), composed of approximately 12,000 individuals; the Ministry of Interior (MOI), manned by 9,000; and a National Guard (NG) of 1,200, as well as additional National

Security Agency (NSA) intelligence forces.39 There are strong connections between the coercive apparatus and the monarchy. In advance of Bahrain’s 2011 unrest, for instance, most BDF major commands were headed by members of the Al-Khalifa ruling family, including Commander-in-Chief General Khalifa bin Ahmed al Khalifa; Chief of Staff

Major General Dajj bin Salman al-Khalifa; Commander of the Air Force Hamad bin

Abdullah al-Khalifa; Royal Guard Rapid Intervention Force Commander Khalid bin

33 "Bahrain Profile - Timeline." 34 Louër, Bahrain’s National Dialogue and the Ever-Deepening Sectarian Divide. 35 "Bahrain Profile - Timeline." 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Census Summary Result 2010: Population, Housing, Buildings, Establishments and Agriculture Census (Kingdom of Bahrain Central Informatics Organisation, 2011), 5. 39 Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 7.; Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry.

224 Hamad al-Khalifa, and more. An additional feature of the Bahraini armed forces and service services is that they have relied greatly on recruiting members from outside the country. After Bahrain’s 1970 independence, recruits were often brought from India,

Oman, and Yemen, with supervision from British nationals. Today, many come from

Baluchistan, Pakistan, Syria, and Jordan as well.40 One survey of a list of 1,000 NSA employees from 2009 found that 64% were non-natives,41 and a proponent of reform in

Bahrain has mentioned that he has a list of more than one hundred Jordanian security service members alone working in Bahrain.42 As a result, the Bahraini coercive apparatus is characterized by its connections to the ruling family and hired fighters, in addition to its Bahraini membership.

Uprising Background: The Pearl Revolution

The Pearl Revolution has been popularly understood as taking place amid the

Arab Spring wave of mass demonstrations. Protests erupted in Tunisia in December of

2010, and culminated in the fleeing of President Ben Ali in January 2011. Mass demonstrations were witnessed in Egypt in January 2011 and Hosni Mubarak abdicated the presidency in February of that year. Similar unrest and calls for reform broke out in

Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain—among other countries. And yet, Bahrain’s uprising, as

40 Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge (International Crisis Group, May 6, 2005), 2.; Luayy Bahri, "The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain," Mediterranean Quarterly 11, no. 3 (2000): 133; Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, 18.; Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 16.; Ian Black, "Bahrain Security Forces Accused of Deliberately Recruiting Foreign Nationals," The Guardian, February 17, 2011.; Ishaan Tharoor, "A History of Middle East Mercenaries," TIME, February 23, 2011.; Torture Redux: The Revival of Physical Coercion during Interrogations in Bahrain (Human Rights Watch, February 8, 2010). 41 The King of Bahrain Grants the National Security Apparatus (NSA) Full Power (Bahrain Center for Human Rights, August 25, 2010). 42 Author Interview with Bahraini Officer in Bahrain Defense Forces, Interview ID 13 (Washington, DC, April 5, 2013, 11am).

225 indicated previously, had deep roots preceding 2010.

Figure 5.1: Bahrain Political Map43

43 Bahrain Political Map, 2003 (University of Texas Libraries).

226

Early protests in 2011 culminated, however, in demonstrations on February 14, the tenth anniversary of a referendum that promised political development for Bahrain, when six thousand protestors took to the streets. These demonstrators called on the Al-

Khalifa ruling family to deliver on promises to reform Bahrain’s political system.

Protesters were met with a swift police response, which resulted in the death of at least one individual.44 After police confronted demonstrators that day, a reported eighty police vehicles were moved into the Pearl Roundabout area, where protests were coalescing.45

On February 15 another individual was killed, this time during a funeral procession for the previous day’s victim.46 In the following days, demonstrations grew. On February 16 an eyewitness described the atmosphere at Pearl Roundabout: “the number of people swelled considerably. Every square inch of the roundabout was occupied by people and a small city of tents had sprung up. A stage was erected and the day was once again taken up with speeches, singing, and chanting. Food and drink was handed out.”47

At this point, the regime moved to disperse the main protest grounds.48 The operation began on February 17 at approximately 3AM49 and forces from the BDF, MOI, and NSA were used to clear the area, with NG members brought in to occupy the space

44 Mohammad Al-Ghasra, "One Demonstrator Killed and Nine Injured in ‘Day of Rage’ in Bahrain [ARABIC]," CNN Arabic, February 15, 2011. 45 Tony Mitchell, "A Room with A View: An Eyewitness to the Pearl Uprising," in Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf, eds. Ala'a Shehabi and Marc Owen Jones (London: Zed Books, 2015), 70. 46 Timeline of the 2011–2012 Bahraini Uprising (Bahrain Observer, July 21, 2012). 47 Mitchell, A Room with A View: An Eyewitness to the Pearl Uprising, 71. 48 It appears that ahead of the culmination of the Pearl Roundabout demonstrations, Al-Wefaq was in discussions with the monarchy regarding the potential for political reforms in Bahrain but maintenance of the monarchy. However, a key sticking point in the discussions was the call to dismiss the Prime Minister, King Hamad’s uncle, as well as setting a precedent for reform and concessions in the Gulf. See: Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform (International Crisis Group, July 28, 2011), 9. 49 Targets of Retribution (Human Rights Watch, July 2011), 14.

227 thereafter.50 It was reported that the police were the first force used to enter the protest area and BDF soldiers were deployed as a second wave;51 shotguns and birdshot were used in the attack.52 Four were killed53 in what became known as “Bloody Thursday.”54

The next day, on February 18, Human Rights Watch documented that army and police personnel used “teargas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition” to disperse a peaceful crowd during Friday prayers in the vicinity.55 One person there at the time recalled these forces breaking up the gathering at night using tear gas. He interacted only with police personnel, who shot indiscriminately at the citizens, he said. During the operation the people were in shock and there were rumors flying. For instance, he remembered hearing some people say that the individuals detained were being moved to Saudi Arabia.56 In addition to the operations targeting protesters themselves, human rights groups have documented attacks on medical personnel who sought to transfer and treat those injured at the protest sites.57 After the clearing of Pearl Roundabout on February 17, an eyewitness reported the entrance of armoured personnel carriers and arrival of soldiers to the area.58 Military and service personnel vacated the Roundabout on February 19;59 however, unrest grew when the state allowed protestors to retake Pearl Roundabout in the coming days. Al-Wefaq’s parliamentarians resigned at this time. On February 21 and 22,

50 "The Army in the Streets of Manama After Deaths as Demonstrators’ Sit-in is Dispersed [ARABIC]," BBC Arabic, February 17, 2011.; "Bahraini Military Warns of Gatherings [ARABIC]," Al Jazeera, February 17, 2011. 51 Cortni Kerr and Toby Jones, A Revolution Paused in Bahrain (Middle East Research and Information Project, February 23, 2011). 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Timeline of the 2011–2012 Bahraini Uprising. 55 Bahrain: Army, Police Fire on Protesters (Human Rights Watch, February 18, 2011). 56 Author Interview with Bahraini Close to Police Officer Who Defected and is in Prison, Interview ID 9 (Manama, Bahrain, March 15, 2013, 6:45pm). 57 Targets of Retribution, 1-2. 58 Mitchell, A Room with A View: An Eyewitness to the Pearl Uprising, 74. 59 Timeline of the 2011–2012 Bahraini Uprising.

228 and again on March 2, more than 100,000 persons were in the streets60—nearly one fifth of the Bahraini population was out demonstrating.61 But some accounts, the Martyrs’

March of February 22 drew up to 200,000 people.62

Tensions ramped up in the month following the initial Pearl Roundabout protests.

February 20 marked the formation of the National Unity Gathering, a primarily Sunni- driven organization, which began to hold counter-demonstrations in Bahrain.63 Yet the anti-regime opposition held its ground. In a demonstration on March 1, protesters

“blocked the entrance to the parliament building and delayed the meeting of its bodies for six hours.”64 About a week later, even more radical groups were pressing things further.

Multiple Shia groups who disagreed with Al-Wefaq’s more moderate stances announced what they titled the Coalition for a Bahraini Republic, the most provocative and revolutionary move of the Pearl Revolution yet.65 Thus, by March 9, there were popular calls not only for regime reform, but also regime removal. This escalation of demands could be seen by comparing news coverage of the protests as they unfolded. Days before the February 14, 2011 protests, Bahrainis voiced their demands in Manama Voice for a more vibrant political life. But following the regime’s use of force against demonstrations, particularly the clearing of Pearl Roundabout, there were increased calls for the fall of the regime.66

60 "Huge Crowds Salute Bahrain’s Martyrs [ARABIC]," Al Wasat News, February 23, 2011l. 61 Census Summary Result 2010: Population, Housing, Buildings, Establishments and Agriculture Census, 5. 62 Timeline of the 2011–2012 Bahraini Uprising 63 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, 8. 64 Kenneth Katzman, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy (Congressional Research Service, March 21, 2011), 7. 65 Marina Ottoway, Bahrain: Between the United States and Saudi Arabia (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 4, 2011). 66 Hani Alfardan, "What do we Want on February 14? [ARABIC]," Manama Voice (Sawt Manama), February 12, 2011.; "Factbox: Demands of Bahrain’s Protestors," Reuters, February 15, 2011.; Michael

229 In response to the ramping up of rhetoric and demonstrations, the regime prepared its second large-scale operation to contain the protesters. Security forces deployed on

March 11 to confront protesters approaching the Royal Court,67 although these demonstrations still virtually shut down the financial district on March 13.68 By March 14, two thousand foreign troops had entered Bahrain; this included 1,200 personnel from

Saudi Arabia and 800 from the United Arab Emirates, with rhetorical support from the

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).69 King Hamad proclaimed a State of National Safety on March 15, “in light of the latest security escalations that affected national security and posed a serious threat to the citizens’ lives.”70

The foreign forces were argued to be protecting key infrastructure in Bahrain.

Bahraini military and police forces were again deployed on March 16 to clear Pearl

Roundabout71 using “teargas, sound bombs, rubber bullets, and birdshot pellets to disperse crowds.”72 Surrounding Shia neighborhoods were then cleared73 and the same day there were reports that the BDF had effectively taken command of the Salmaniya

Medical Complex, which had treated injured protesters since of the start of the uprising.74

By June 1 the King ended the State of National Safety,75 and the next month launched a

National Dialogue in an effort to frame the uprising as resolved and Bahrain as on the

Slackman and Nadim Audi, "Security Forces in Bahrain Open Fire on Protesters," The New York Times, February 18, 2011. 67 Targets of Retribution, 11. 68 Katzman, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, 7. 69 Ethan Bronner and Michael Slackman, "Saudi Troops Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest," The New York Times, March 14, 2011. 70 "HM King Hamad Declares State of National Safety," Bahrain News Agency, March 15, 2011. 71 Targets of Retribution, 22. 72 Ibid., 12. 73 Ibid., 12. 74 Ibid., 2. 75 Bahrain: A Tortuous Process (Human Rights First, July 2011), 2.

230 road to reconciliation.76

Considering Existing Explanations

Unlike the cases of Jordan’s Black September or Iraq’s Page of Treachery and

Treason, studying Bahrain’s Pearl Revolution does not provide within-case variation to explore. All soldiers fought in Bahrain in 2011; there were zero documented instances of fomenting or fleeing during the unrest. Nor does studying the Bahraini Arab Spring allow us to easily rule out confounding explanations for military behavior during unrest, as I elaborate on further below. So, what is gained by studying the Bahrain 2011 case? What I am aim to do here is conduct a careful analysis of the case to adjudicate among explanations that have the same observable implications. Whereas many observers have commented that certain features of the Bahraini military have led to its fighting, I go deeper in investigating what mechanisms triggered this outcome in Bahrain.

Table 5.1: Anticipated Outcomes for Bahrain 2011 Based on Independent Variables

Persuasion High Low High

Bahrain 2011 (All) N/A

Prediction: Fight

Coercion Low N/A N/A

76 Ibid., 3.

231 Ethnic Identity

Bahrain and its armed forces are notable for their ethnic composition. The

Bahraini population is an estimated 70% Shia Muslim,77 and Sunni Muslims therefore are the Kingdom’s minority. Dating even back to the 1950s, there were significant divides between the two sects in Bahrain. In 1955, Qubain wrote: “The Shi'is live in their own tightly-knit communities and do not intermix with the rest of the population to any considerable degree. Fighting—especially in the larger towns, when the two communities do come into contact—frequently breaks out between the two group.”78 Ethnicity has remained salient in Bahraini society for a variety of reasons. This has included the fact that Bahrain is Shia-majority and yet is governed by a Sunni ruling family; the perceived lack of authoritative political representation for the Shia community; and the influence of regional events and actors, such as following the 1979 Iranian revolution, in Bahrain.

Ethnicity has also influenced the composition of the armed and security forces in the country. Gause has drawn a contrast between, for instance, the Tunisian and Egyptian militaries that largely reflected their societies’ demographics, and the Bahraini military, which is almost wholly drawn from the Sunni population.79 One interviewee described to me how Shia in the BDF were moved out of their positions in the 1990s, when they were transferred to other government offices or offered retirement.80 Scholar Laurence Louër heard a similar story when interviewing a retired Shi'i soldier in 2002. He stated that although Shia had served in the armed forces previously, with the outbreak of unrest in

77 Frederic Wehrey, The Precarious Ally: Bahrain's Impasse and U.S. Policy (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2013), 4. 78 Fahim I. Qubain, "Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain," The Middle East Journal 9, no. 3 (1955): 271. 79 Gause III, F. Gregory, interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Is Bahrain's Regime Next to Fall? (Council on Foreign Relations, February 18, 2011). 80 Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 7 (Manama, Bahrain, March 14, 2013, 1:15pm).

232 the 1990s the state began a campaign to retire Shi'i personnel early.81 What is clear is that it is almost wholly Sunnis who are recruited into the armed forces today. Indeed, a 2011 randomized survey found that “not a single Shi‘i of all those interviewed reported being employed in the police or military, compared to 12 (or 12.1 percent) of the 99 working

Sunnis who gave their occupations.”82 Finding a position in the security services as a Shi'i reflects the same challenges. The most prominent police officer to defect from the regime during unrest, now in prison, is Shi'i. Those close to him have described the pains his father went through to get his son the police job in the first place.83 In general, the few

Shia able to find work in defense and security industries are given non-sensitive positions, such as traffic control and community policing opportunities.84

Ethnicity is salient in Bahraini politics and the BDF recruits based on ethnicity.

From these observations, one hypothesis is that as a result soldiers are more likely to fight during unrest. All members of the armed forces were Sunni and so a soldier’s ethnicity differed from that of the average protester. As a result, there was a lack of identity connection and he did not have motivation to desert or defect.

There is some confirming evidence for this hypothesis. I asked one interviewee whether soldiers remained in their positions because they were part of a favored in-group, or because of their religious principles. He replied that many sought to maintain their privileges. However, he argued that there was certainly a group of true believers within the armed forces. These, he described, were individuals who sincerely felt they were

81 Laurence Louër, "Sectarianism and Coup-Proofing Strategies in Bahrain," Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 247. 82 Justin Gengler, Group Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf: Rethinking the Rentier State (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2015), 114. 83 Author Interview with Bahraini Close to Police Officer Who Defected and is in Prison, Interview ID 9. 84 International Religious Freedom Report for 2011: Bahrain (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2011), 7.

233 doing the Shia a favor and saving them from further sin by killing them.85 There is some limited evidence of coercive apparatus personnel exhibiting this animosity amid the uprising. In particular, individuals’ accounts of their time in detention have featured stories of security personnel insulting Shi'i religious beliefs. One person detained that spring recalled being beaten and aggravated. When he asked “‘why are you beating me?’” the man stated: “‘Because you are a Shi'a.’”86 There were additional reports of guards singing “a song at night about slaughtering Shi'as.”87 Another injured protester treated at

Salmaniya Medical Complex remembered “three armed security forces” entering his ward and one shouting: “‘Grave worshippers! Sons of whores! Sons of Mut'a!’

(derogatory references to Shi'a Muslims).”88 There have also been reports that detained

Bahrainis have been made to insult Shia Muslims. One young man remembered: “‘They made me say bad things about the opposition leaders and say anti-Shi'a slogans,’”89 and another stated: “‘They told me to insult Shi'a leaders.’”90 Finally, some have argued that particular groups within the Bahraini military have stronger animosity towards Shia than others. In particular, Syrian recruits have linked Shia protesters to the Alawi, Al-Assad regime in Syria, which has fought a Sunni-majority rebellion. When serving as

Washington Director for Human Rights Watch, Tom Malinowski related the story of a

Bahraini student who was beaten by a Syrian policeman who was also yelling: “‘Do you like Bashar al-Assad? He is killing my family.’”91

85 Author Interview with Bahraini Journalist, Interview ID 2 (Manama, Bahrain, March 11, 2013, 12:30pm). 86 Bahrain: A Tortuous Process, 6. 87 Ibid., 6. 88 Targets of Retribution, 38-39. 89 Bahrain: A Tortuous Process, 7. 90 Ibid., 8. 91 Tom Malinowski, "Bahrain: Prison Island," Foreign Policy, May 7, 2012.

234 One thing stands out from the evidence we do have regarding religious animosity between Sunni and Shia in Bahrain—all accounts are of security personnel verbally and physically abusing civilians during the uprising. I have not gained access to stories of

BDF soldiers exhibiting the same animosity. If it is true that Sunni soldiers did not display this religious-based animosity, it could be for multiple reasons. First, soldiers were deployed strategically amid the unrest and were often used to clear demonstrators from areas or secure areas once controlled. In contrast, the broader security services had greater interaction with civilians and protestors, including in their arrest and detention. As a result, there would be greater opportunities for security rather than military personnel to display genuine sectarian animosities. If this is true, it could be the case that military personnel have the same animosities as their security comrades, but simply lack the opportunity and circumstances in which to display them. However, as I describe in my own argument in the next section, another possibility is that sectarian differences take new meaning for military personnel (and, likely, the majority of security personnel too).

It is not a genuine and primordial hatred of another sect that drives most to use force against the demonstrators. Instead, sect has been used to frame Bahrain’s Shia as foreign- backed and disorderly, as I describe below.

Finally, another factor that may be at work is the overlapping of a broader set of grievances with sectarian identity. In this case, sect divides are not representative of primordial differences between individuals but rather serve as markers of communities that face similar or different problems. In Bahrain, it has been argued that issues such as unemployment,92 political representation, and social concerns may be of greater

92 Bahri, The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain, 137.

235 importance for the Shia population when compared to Sunnis.93 Yet, there is readily available evidence disconfirming this hypothesis. On the one hand, many lower class

Sunnis and Shia share grievances, including “housing shortages, the corruption of the royal family, abuses of the judiciary, and, perhaps most importantly, a parliament that lacks full legislative and oversight authority.”94 And on the other hand, many upper-class

Shia businesspersons share interests with elite Sunnis, as “[b]oth are tied to state elites by patronage networks.”95 As a result, neither sect as animosity nor sect as grievance goes far enough in explaining why soldiers acted the way they did when deployed in Bahrain in 2011.

Material Incentives

There is conflicting evidence for the power of material incentives on soldier behavior as well. First, being a commander for King Hamad appears to have come with personal privileges. When driving around Manama, for instance, Bahrainis will point out high-end real estate known to belong to the BDF Commander-in-Chief.96 Because the highest-level military personnel were members of the ruling family, their substantial economic benefits were solely connected to the Al-Khalifa regime. Second, mercenaries were also heavily dependent on their government wages. These recruits were said to gain a salary ranging from 500-700 BD ($1300-1800) monthly.97 In addition, foreign recruits were given overtime pay, free housing, and compensation to their families should they

93 Ibid., 131. 94 Wehrey, The Precarious Ally: Bahrain's Impasse and U.S. Policy, 4. 95 Louër, Bahrain’s National Dialogue and the Ever-Deepening Sectarian Divide. 96 Author Interview with Bahraini Former Officer in Bahrain Defense Force, Interview ID 1 (Manama, Bahrain, March 10, 2013, 12pm). 97 Author Interview with Bahraini Journalist, Interview ID 2.; Author Interview with Bahraini Secular Opposition Figure and Human Rights Activist, Interview ID 3 (Manama, Bahrain, March 11, 2013, 2pm, Follow up March 13, 2013, 2pm).

236 die.98 Although many security force members are not born in Bahrain, some, particularly those working in the BDF, gained citizenship for themselves and their families once in country. For these individuals, regime change would almost certainly result in their losing their job, as demonstrators pointedly called for removing mercenaries from the security sector.

There is no evidence, however, that average Bahraini soldiers remained in their positions due to material incentives. As one former officer described, being in the military was a steady job with decent benefits, such as healthcare and a housing allowance. However, military service was not a privileged position in Bahrain and salaries were not described as lucrative. Indeed, from his experience it was difficult to recruit Bahrainis into the military because these individuals sought a more luxurious life, which the armed forces would not provide. Those who did join often served for five to ten years, he felt, and left once they were competitive for government or private sector work.99

In the Bahraini case, the upper echelons of the military had a material interest in the Al-Khalifa regime. Similarly, hired “mercenaries” had an outsized benefit in their service. In contrast, however, the bulk of the regular armed forces did not have a financial stake in their military employment. As a result, their fighting behavior remains puzzling.

Opposition Violence

Another hypothesis is that soldiers are likely to use force against the opposition when it employs violent tactics. The uprising in Bahrain began with protesters espousing non-violence. Witnesses heard demonstrators chanting “‘silmiyya, silmiyya’ (peaceful,

98 Author Interview with Bahraini Former Officer in Bahrain Defense Force, Interview ID 1.; Author Interview with Bahraini Journalist, Interview ID 2. 99 Author Interview with Bahraini Officer in Bahrain Defense Forces, Interview ID 13.

237 peaceful” as they marched to Pearl Roundabout.100 Despite this, soldiers used force to quell the demonstrations and break up the protest camps. As I elaborate on below, opposition missteps and government framing influenced soldiers’ perceptions of these initially peaceful demonstrations and contributed to troops’ willingness to fight.

The Fighting Majority

Coercion

Clear Orders

The first key to ensuring the fighting Bahraini military was the armed forces’ clear orders.

The military was first deployed on February 17, 2011, and from the start of the uprising there was an institutional forum within the coercive apparatus to strategize about the crisis, allowing commanders and their civilian elite peers to share information about the unrest and the state’s response to it. Bahrain’s Supreme Defense Council (SDC) was established in 1973 and has included members such as “the Commander-in-Chief of

Bahrain Defense Force, Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, National

Economy, Council of Ministers Affairs, Information, National Guard and Deputy

Commander-in-chief of Bahrain Defense Force.”101 The SDC provided a venue for military commanders to meet with one another and with elite civilians once unrest hit, and assess the regime’s strategy for responding to demonstrators.

As a result, on February 17, at 3AM, four police battalions received orders to

100 Ala'a Shehabi and Marc Owen Jones, "Introduction: Bahrain's Uprising: The Struggle for Democracy in the Gulf," in Bahrain's Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf, eds. Ala'a Shehabi and Marc Owen Jones (London: Zed Books, 2015), 4. 101 "His Highness Shaikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa: The Prime Minister of Kingdom of Bahrain," , accessed May 13, 2013, http://www.mofa.gov.bh/AboutBahrain/Goverment/HHthePrimeMinister/tabid/138/language/en- US/Default.aspx.

238 clear Pearl Roundabout, and NSA, CID, and BDF Intelligence forces were near the

Roundabout as well, although they reportedly did not take part in the initial clearing of the encampments.102 Later that day, the BDF “announced that some of its units would be dispatched to heighten security at vital locations in the capital.”103 Indeed, one BDF unit,

“armed with M16 assault rifles, Dilmun rifles and Browning .50 calibre machine guns mounted on top of armoured vehicles,”104 continued to support police forces as they secured the Roundabout on February 18.105 By evening, soldiers confronted additional protesters attempting to pass the unit’s barricade surrounding the Roundabout.106 By

February 19 the BDF had withdrawn from the Roundabout107 and its General Command announced that its mission had been “successfully executed” and soldiers “had been ordered to return to their bases.”108

After the military’s operations in mid-February, it does not appear to have been used again until mid-March 2011. At that point, on March 15, King Hamad issued Royal

Decree 18 proclaiming a State of National Safety. In doing so, he empowered the BDF

Commander-in-Chief “to take the necessary measures in order to implement the

Decree.”109 The military was promptly deployed on March 16 to re-clear Pearl

Roundabout. In addition, on April 4 the state clarified the expanded powers of the BDF and security services amid the State of National Safety, including its right to “censor television, newspapers, and the internet; restrict nongovernmental groups, political societies, and unions; curb movement and seal off parts of the country; and make arrests

102 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 73. 103 Ibid., 74. 104 Ibid., 77. 105 Ibid., 77. 106 Ibid., 77. 107 Ibid., 81. 108 Ibid., 82. 109 "HM King Hamad Declares State of National Safety."

239 of anyone suspected of threatening ‘the safety of citizens.’”110

Following the King’s declaration of a State of National Safety, the SDC also recommended the establishment of a National Safety Council (NSC) to supervise

Bahrain’s three-month State of National Safety.111 “The BDF Commander-in-Chief presided over this body in his capacity as the officer assigned the responsibility of maintaining order in Bahrain pursuant to Royal Decree No. 18” and the Interior Minister, a Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister, NSA Director, National Guard Commander, and BDF Chief of Staff also sat on the NSC.112 Building on the foundation of the SDC, the NSC provided another avenue for military commander coordination during the unrest.

As the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry of report details, throughout the period during which a State of National Safety was in force, the NSC acted as a forum for information-sharing and coordination between the agencies involved in implementing the measures prescribed in Royal Decree No. 18 of 2011. The NSC held a total of 12 meetings between March 16 and May 30, 2011. During these meetings, which were usually convened on a weekly basis, each of the participating agencies presented its evaluation of the unfolding situation in Bahrain, briefed the other agencies on the measures it had undertaken, and outlined its proposals regarding future measures that should be pursued to restore order in the country. At the conclusion of these NSC meetings, specific tasks and missions were assigned for execution by these agencies, either unilaterally or jointly with other government bodies.113

110 Bahrain: State of Fear Prevails with Arbitrary Detentions, Pre-Dawn Raids (Human Rights Watch, April 7, 2011). 111 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 47. 112 Ibid., 58. 113 Ibid., 58.

240 Monitoring and Punishment

Once orders were conveyed, there were formal mechanisms in place to monitor and punish soldiers, which deterred military shirking. A former BDF officer has related that there were intelligence personnel within each BDF unit. These individuals were Bahraini,

Syrian, and Jordanian and there were perhaps nine to fifteen of them per unit. According to the former officer, these intelligence officials could check a soldier’s phone, mail, who he talked to, what he said, and more. They were responsible for writing weekly or monthly reports about what they found. If a military member expressed anti-regime ideas and intelligence officials had evidence, that soldier could go to jail. Worse yet, the BDF had torture facilities on its premises, he said. If intelligence did not have sufficient evidence, they would make a note of the suspected behavior so that they could put pressure on the security member in the future. These were the perceptions of Bahraini soldiers in recent years.114

There were also informal mechanisms in place to monitor and punish, which deterred violating orders. It is reported that the regime used family networks to indirectly coerce security force personnel into keeping their heads down. A former BDF officer explained that when five members of a soldier’s extended family were serving, if that soldier stepped out of line he would not receive a phone call from an Al-Khalifa family member, but rather one from his own family member, advising him to modify his behavior.115

In addition, the regime pursued a strategy of composing units of both Bahrainis

114 Author Interview with Bahraini Former Officer in Bahrain Defense Force, Interview ID 1. 115 Ibid.

241 and non-natives.116 This seems to have achieved two purposes. On the one hand, by decreasing the number of Bahrainis in any one unit, the regime sought to decrease opportunities for collective action among Bahrainis in the military. While the average

Bahraini may grumble about inadequate pay, the necessity of certain reforms and more, there may not have been enough Bahraini soldiers serving together to make their true preferences known or to organize to better evade monitoring and punishment. The mixed composition also served to keep non-native Bahrainis loyal, responsible agents. For instance, both Bahrainis and non-natives were sent out on police patrols. The Bahrainis were not given hard tasks, but supervised the hired guns and ensured they used sufficient force against demonstrators.117 The same is likely true within the military.

The regime also provided evidence it would indeed punish insubordination during the unrest. Outside the military, police officer Ali Al Ghanami deplored the security forces’ response to the February 2011 demonstrations. His resignation and support for the opposition resulted in a 12.5-year jail sentence. Former BDF officer Mohammed

Albuflasa came out early on in the demonstrations, calling for unity and reform at a prominent rally. His remarks circulated around Bahrain as he was a Sunni Muslim stating that there were universal, Bahraini concerns. Albuflasa was soon arrested and imprisoned for six months, and has testified to being tortured during that time. Albuflasa’s case provides evidence that the regime and military commanders would equally punish Sunnis as well as Shia. In another account, a demonstrator was arrested and taken to a BDF base, where he was tortured. This man saw that there were more than a dozen BDF members around him; he stated that they were torturing another BDF member for not using enough

116 Ibid. 117 Author Interview with Bahraini Political Society Member, Interview ID 12 (Manama, Bahrain, March 19, 2013, 6:30pm).

242 force against protesters.118

Finally, monitoring and punishment threats were more credible given Bahrain’s geography. Coercion gain credibility in Bahrain due to the fact that it is an archipelago nation. It is more difficult to flee or foment revolt when a soldier can move to a limited number of places, all of which are located in close proximity to commanders.119

Saudi Supervision

In addition to the Bahraini military’s internal coercive pressures, it was evident that Saudi

Arabia supported the regime’s plan and would ensure it was sufficiently executed. First,

Saudi Arabia sent a clear, early signal that it supported regime stability in Bahrain. Saudi

Arabia was experiencing unrest among its own Shia minority population and did not want regime change in a Shia-majority, neighboring country such as Bahrain.120 Moreover,

Saudi Arabia had no interest in a fellow monarchy failing; during the Arab Spring, the monarchies painted themselves as more legitimate, representative, and flexible rulers as compared to Arab republics. Consequently, on February 20, 2011 the Royal Embassy of

Saudi Arabia in Washington, DC published a statement that the, “Kingdom stands by

Bahrain,” noting that it was “hoping for the restoration of calm and stability to that country under its wise leadership” and that the Kingdom stood “with all its capabilities behind its Arab neighbor.”121 Furthermore, on February 23, Bahrain’s King Hamad traveled to Saudi Arabia “to discuss the unrest engulfing the region.” The King was “seen

118 Author Interview with Bahraini Close to Police Officer Who Defected and is in Prison, Interview ID 9. 119 Ibid. 120 Henry Meyer, "Saudi Arabia Risks Shiite Unrest in Wake of Bahrain Turmoil," Bloomberg, February 20, 2011.; Bronson, Rachel, interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Tense Days for Saudi Leadership (Council on Foreign Relations, March 11, 2011). 121 Kingdom Stands by Bahrain (The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., February 20, 2011).

243 off” by the Saudi Arabian Assistant Minister of Defense and Aviation as well as the

Inspector General for Military Affairs.122 Bahrain’s Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme

Commander of the Bahrain Defense Forces, landed in Riyadh on March 2 and was accompanied by “a number of high-ranking civil and military officials.”123 During his trip, the Crown Prince met with the Saudi Minister of Interior, Assistant Interior Minister for

Security Affairs, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, and senior military representatives.124 On March 10, from its meeting in the Saudi capital of Riyadh, the Gulf

Cooperation Council pledged $20 billion in aid to Bahrain and Oman and stated that “the

Council considered any harm of the security of any of its members” as “detrimental to all members alike, triggering decisive and firm unhesitant response.”125 By March 14, the

Kingdom was sending more than diplomatic and monetary signals of support to

Bahrain—Saudi troops came across the sixteen-mile causeway to protect key infrastructure in Bahrain.126 In sum, there were significant coercive influences that would have prompted soldiers to fight unrest in Bahrain.

Persuasion

Foreign Framing

It was not inevitable that the uprising would gain a foreign frame. In February 2011 observers noted how “pro-democracy protesters, for their part, have maintained from the start that their cause is national” and that their “slogans have explicitly appealed to cross-

122 Michael Slackman and Nadim Audi, "Bahrain King in Saudi Arabia to Discuss Unrest," The New York Times, February 23, 2011. 123 "Crown Prince of Bahrain Arrives in Riyadh," Saudi Press Agency, March 2, 2011. 124 Ibid. 125 "GCC Foreign Ministers Reject Foreign Interference and Appropriate $20 Billion for Development in Bahrain and Oman," Saudi Press Agency, March 10, 2011. 126 "Gulf States Send Forces to Bahrain Following Protests," BBC News, March 14, 2011.

244 sectarian solidarity.”127 And yet, the uprising came to be perceived as foreign-backed by many. To a degree this was due to opposition missteps. But it was also a result of consistent government efforts to paint Bahrain’s persistent uprisings as foreign-backed, as well as external interference as the crisis unfolded.

Opposition Missteps

Opposition groups made missteps in Bahrain and oftentimes these were a consequence of the nature of the opposition movement in the country. First, social and political movements in Bahrain have long had international connections. Communists and leftists were the principal challenge to the regime in the 1960s, and had connections to their comrades in foreign countries. Bahrain’s Islamic movement had international roots as well. In the 1960s, Bahrain’s initial connection to Shia movements was through Iraq. In particular, students who had studied in the Iraqi city of Najaf often had experience with

Iraqi Islamist parties. As a result: “Bahrain became a centre of activism and, as a majority-Shiite nation, a hub for Shiite networks in the Gulf.”128 There have also been ties between Bahraini Shia and Iran, a country governed by a Shia Islamist government following the 1979 revolution. Such ties have often taken the form of Bahraini clerics studying in Iran.129 In general, it is more natural to perceive Shia movements as internationally-linked because the sect is more transnational than Sunni Islam.

Specifically, Shia Muslims turn to a religious reference point (marjaiya) for moral guidance. Bahrain has not had a local marjaiya and therefore “most of the island’s clergy and congregations look outside for religious leadership and emulate clerics from Iran,

127 Kerr and Jones, A Revolution Paused in Bahrain. 128 Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt, 9. 129 Gause III, F. Gregory, interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Is Bahrain's Regime Next to Fall?

245 Iraq and Lebanon.”130

In addition to these activist and religious ties, there have been limited cases in which locals have developed connections with international actors to specifically upset the balance of power in Bahrain. Following the Iranian revolution, for instance, Bahraini

Hadi al-Mudarrisi declared “he was the official representative of Ruhollah Khomeini in

Bahrain.”131 But this was most prominently the case with respect to the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain’s (IFLB) accused coup plot in 1981. The IFLB’s primary aims were the end of Al-Khalifa rule and establishment of a “‘free Islamic order.’”132 In

December 1981 Bahraini authorities arrested seventy-three individuals connected to the reported coup plot, a group which included Bahrainis but also Saudis and individuals from Kuwait and Oman.133 This incident shows either the connections among Shia groups in the region, or at least the regime’s persistent effort to link Shia resistance in Bahrain to foreign interests. It was argued that the detainees received training, equipment, and arms from Iran. In addition, the government claimed the group had “fake Bahraini police uniforms whose buttons had ‘made in Iran’ stamped on the back.”134 The IFLB’s documents reveal that members did in fact visit Iran,135 and additional information suggests that the group had established a media office there as well.136

Amid the Pearl Revolution, opposition missteps were similar to those made by

Bahraini movements historically. On February 14, 2011, young men formed the core of the initial protest movement in Bahrain, and they were not joined by the Shia Islamic

130 Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt, 10. 131 Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, 158. 132 Hasan Tariq Alhasan, "The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain," The Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (2011): 605. 133 Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, 160. 134 Alhasan, The Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain, 607. 135 Ibid., 609. 136 Ibid., 610.

246 political establishment until after these initial protests.137 Yet, soon the demonstrations took on a clear Shia dimension, as “chants of ‘We want the fall of the regime’” were

“followed by religious chants distinctive to Shia Muslims, such as ‘With our soul, with our blood, we will defend you oh Hussayn.’”138 What had begun as a spontaneous revolt calling for demands with which many Bahrainis sympathized began to be perceived as a mass demonstration for a Shia audience.

The transition to a framing of the protests as supporting the Shia population was hastened by the demonstrators’ increasing connections beyond Bahrain’s borders. For instance, scholar Toby Matthiesen, who witnessed the unrest in Bahrain, reported that a leading journalist criticized the divisive moves of Bahrain’s minority shirazi population in particular. Amid the uprising, this group projected “shirazi television channels from

Kuwait and Iraq.”139 In addition, during the uprising Hadi al-Mudarrisi, “a descendant of a clerical family of Iranian-Iraqi origin,” connected to IFLB and effectively expelled from Bahrain in 1979, began delivering “daily speeches about the situation in Bahrain” which were also broadcast in the protest encampments.140 As Matthiesen explains:

The other political groups, particularly the largest Shia opposition group, al-Wifaq, rejected all accusations of foreign links and tried not to be instrumentalized by foreign Shia actors. But the shirazis had put a screen up for their former leader, on which he was speaking out in the harshest ways against the Al Khalifa ruling family…Thereby, al-Mudarrisi and his Bahraini supporters were giving the hardliners in the regime evidence to cast this as a foreign plot. After all, an Iranian-Iraqi cleric with a long history of political subversion in the Gulf was urging the protesters to rise up via satellite television.141

137 Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that Wasn't (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 43. 138 Ibid., 67-68. 139 Ibid., 39. 140 Ibid., 40. 141 Ibid., 41.

247 Similarly, although the mainstream opposition group Al-Wefaq “was assiduous in publicly urging Iran not to meddle in Bahraini affairs,” in contrast, in late February 2011 a leader from the more radical Haq movement “threatened to seek Iranian assistance if

Saudi Arabia intervened.”142 On February 26, the movement’s exiled leader returned to

Bahrain via Lebanon, and the Bahraini regime stated that “the purpose of this visit was to consult with the Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon about the situation in Bahrain.”143

The international features of Bahrain’s political opposition movements— historical and present—likely influenced how soldiers perceived these protestors. Indeed, one active-duty Bahraini officer brought up in an interview that Bahrain had confronted many different ideologies. This included, he said, Baathism, Nasserism (pan-Arabism), the Iranian revolution, and the Bahraini coup attempt of 1981. In his mind, the problems of the Arab Spring, as he termed them, were not new for Bahrain.144 However, much like the cases of Jordan and Iraq, although the nature and tactics of the opposition lent themselves to being framed as foreign-connected, the government was the primary agent fostering such associations.

Regime Rhetoric

The Al-Khalifa regime has worked to frame the Bahraini opposition as foreign-linked since the 1960s. As one civil society member mentioned, in these decades the regime sought to portray dissenters as Communists145—implying their foreign connections. In this period, the regime was most challenged by leftist groups and therefore targeted their

142 Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 81. 143 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 92. 144 Author Interview with Bahraini Officer in Bahrain Defense Forces, Interview ID 13. 145 Author Interview with Bahraini Civil Society Member, Interview ID 4 (Manama, Bahrain, March 12, 2013, 5pm).

248 organizations by insinuating they had foreign ties. Following the Iranian revolution in

1979, however, “government practices – if not stated policy – to a large extent have been geared toward the manipulation of sectarian differences and fears.”146 As mentioned previously, amid the crisis with the IFLB in 1981, the government quickly sought to expose and play up the group’s training and connections to Iran.

Government efforts to frame the opposition as foreign gained new heights in the

1990s, however, as Bahrain roiled with unrest. In 1996, for instance, the state claimed that it had arrested members of a Hizbollah cell in Bahrain and extracted confessions from individuals “reporting directly to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei” and receiving

“training in Iran and Lebanon.” As the International Crisis Group reported, “there is reason to suspect that the 1996 trials were designed principally to divert attention from the uprising’s domestic sources and secure Western support for the crackdown.”147 Indeed, one Bahraini scholar wrote that government figures at the time “persisted in their accusations that there exists a Shi'i-inspired plot to overthrow the regime, and insisted that there is a Hezbollah underground organization in Bahrain. They also accused Iran of involvement in the plot by supplying the movement with arms and money.”148 Reflecting on the uprising between 1994 and 1997, Human Rights Watch noted the increasing sectarianization of the conflict and attributed this to the government having “dismissed the unrest as the work of ‘Hizb Allah terrorists’ instigated and supported by Iran.”149 One

Bahraini defense lawyer similarly recalled how the events in the 1990s came to be

146 Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt, 9. 147 Ibid., 10. 148 Munira A. Fakhro, "The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment," in The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion, eds. Gary G. Sick and Lawrence C. Potter (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 182. 149 Routine Abuse, Routine Denial.

249 portrayed as a Shia uprising even though the movement was national. The only parallel with the Iranian revolution, the lawyer said, was that the people were asking for the end of tyranny. There was in fact no connection to pro-Iranian sentiment, as the protesters were not arguing that such a regime should be put in place in Bahrain.150

The regime’s attachment of opposition groups to foreign entities continued up until the Pearl Revolution began. In 2005, for instance, Sheikh Mohammad al-Sanad was arrested at the Bahraini airport and charged with inciting harm against the regime. Al-

Sanad was educated and had lived in Iran, and following his arrest he “was presented in the official media as an example of the harmful role played by Iranian agents in

Bahrain.”151 The regime went a step further in September 2010 when it revoked the citizenship of Iranian-born cleric Hussain al-Najati,152 and “arrested a Shi'a minister for allegedly funneling money to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.”153

Much as it had historically, the state also worked to paint the Pearl Revolution as foreign-backed. This was indeed noted by observers of Bahrain’s Arab Spring. The

International Crisis Group argued: “The regime has sought to portray the 14 February uprising as a distinctively Shiite revolt, inspired by Iran”154 and attributed this framing to a campaign by “[h]igh-ranking officials” who were “trying to undermine opposition unity by driving a wedge between Sunnis and Shiites and manipulating sectarian anxieties.”155

The opposition also attempted to shine a spotlight on this regime framing. One Bahraini defense lawyer argued that the regime now labeled protesters “youth, saboteurs, Iranian”

150 Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 10. 151 Louër, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf, 257. 152 "Bahrain Revokes Citizenship of Top Cleric: Report," Al Arabiya, September 20, 2010. 153 Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings, 74. 154 Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt, 7. 155 Ibid., 4.

250 even though, in the lawyer’s opinion, these individuals were calling for the same things that peaceful, educated, older Bahrainis called for years before.156 A former BDF officer put it bluntly: If Shia talk, the state says it’s Iran’s influence.157 These are general perceptions of the regime’s framing of the opposition as foreign. More specifically, the regime used government statements, forced confessions and sentencing, social and traditional media, and a Sunni counterrevolution to reinforce a picture of Bahrain’s uprising as foreign-backed and inspired.

First, the government maintained a strict vocabulary when describing the opposition and its actions, portraying the movements as foreign-backed. For instance, when protestors gathered in Pearl Roundabout and then used the circle as a spoke for marches towards different points of the city, the state cited this “as evidence of links to

Lebanon’s Hizbollah” as it compared the tactics to Hizbollah’s opposition activities in

Beirut in 2008. In addition, it argued, “that some Bahraini Shiites received civil disobedience in addition to military training in Hizbollah camps in Lebanon.”158 On

March 23, a number of Lebanese workers were “arrested on suspicion of links with

Hezbollah” and flights to Lebanon were halted.159 Commenting on the suspension of flights, the Bahraini Minister of Foreign Affairs argued it was “due to the threats directed at Bahrain from certain Lebanese elements that are calling for violence and sectarianism in Bahrain.”160 The government also sought to spin the events that occurred at Salmaniya

Medical Complex, which led the military and security services to take control of the hospital. In the view of the government, the opposition had taken control of SMC,

156 Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 10. 157 Author Interview with Bahraini Former Officer in Bahrain Defense Force, Interview ID 1. 158 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, 3. 159 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 157. 160 Ibid., 157.

251 “‘politicising it,’” and the regime argued that the protesters “had a ‘sophisticated communications device’ inside it with which they corresponded with foreign media such as Iran’s Al-Alam and Hizbollah’s Al-Manar.”161 In the words of the Public Security

Chief: “‘The hospital was hijacked, and it became a headquarters for the protesters and a base for propaganda.’”162 Finally, when the GCC-JSF entered Bahrain, it was ordered to prepare “to assist in the defence of Bahrain against any foreign intervention.”163 The

Bahraini Minister of Foreign Affairs then stated on March 18 that the country had

“restored order and security after being subjected to a ‘terrorist plot’ that sought to undermine its security and stability,” one that he argued had “clear foreign connections and has been replicated in other parts of the region.”164

The government not only framed the opposition as foreign-backed in its statements, but also in how it extracted forced confessions and sentenced protesters and those who aided them in 2011. One former detainee told Human Rights Watch that he was beaten during detention and then he and other arrestees were made “to say they belonged to Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia party and militia, and that he had been trained in Iraq.”165 Another personal narrative comes from a protestor recovering at SMC after the military operations on March 16. He recalled masked men entering his ward, turning on a video camera, and “demanding to know about their alleged relationships with opposition figures, Iran, and the Lebanese political party Hezbollah.”166

The state also sought to paint the opposition as foreign by exerting its control over

161 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, 5. 162 Ibid., 5. 163 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 134. 164 Ibid., 151. 165 Bahrain: State of Fear Prevails with Arbitrary Detentions, Pre-Dawn Raids. 166 Targets of Retribution, 36-37.

252 traditional and social media. The first traditional media controlled was Bahrain television.

Toby Jones has described its role during the crisis:

Bahrain TV’s most important role has been to frame the country’s domestic struggle not as a contest of democracy versus autocracy, but as a sectarian clash. The state media has used the specters of Iranian meddling and the potential empowerment of the country’s Shi'i population to frighten the smaller Sunni community into supporting the political status quo and the current crackdown.”167

Bahrain TV publicized video footage of the Pearl Roundabout protests “to accuse individual participants of sedition as part of an alleged Iranian coup plot.”168 On different occasions state television read “for hours” from “clandestine publications from the 1980s to make the point that Iran together with the IFLB had plotted the 2011 ‘coup’ for three decades.”169 In addition to state television, the majority of Bahrain’s newspapers were state-backed and amid the uprising these papers ran stories that sought to tie the opposition to foreign causes. For instance, in May 2011 the Gulf Daily News reported “on

Wikileaks disclosures that al-Wifaq had requested U.S. pressure on the Bahraini royal family and that its cadre had received training from the U.S.-based National democratic

Institute.”170 The only independent newspaper in Bahrain ahead of the uprising, Al-Wasat, was systematically declawed during the unrest, when its leadership was removed.171

The state moved to control the narrative on social media as well. One Bahraini journalist argued that the state called on individuals during the Pearl Revolution and had them set up Twitter accounts to denounce the opposition. According to him, these

167 Toby C. Jones, Bahrain, Kingdom of Silence (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 4, 2011). 168 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, 7. 169 Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that Wasn't, 41. 170 Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings, 84. 171 Clifford Krauss, "Editor Silenced, with the Help of Unreliable Sources," The New York Times, April 8, 2011.

253 accounts simply disappeared after the height of the unrest.172 Bahrain does indeed have a strong social media network. It is among the top three countries in the region in terms of

Facebook users per capita and prominent individuals have used Twitter to spread their message.173 According to Bahraini journalist Nada al-Wadi, the regime sought to exploit

(rather than shut down) the internet amid its Arab Spring: “For every opposition Twitter account or Facebook page, there are dozens of others recounting a completely different story.”174

Government statements, sentences, and control over media contributed to the inspiration of a counterrevolution in Bahrain. Sunni-dominated groups such as the

National Unity Gathering formed from the earliest days of the uprising. On February 21, for instance, a pro-regime rally was held outside a prominent Sunni mosque in the capital,175 and drew at least 120,000 to the demonstration.176 According to scholar

Laurence Louër, the regime initiated this counterrevolution, “headed by Sunni religious scholars who have explicitly tried to mobilize sectarian solidarity by presenting the demonstrators as Shia acting on behalf of Iran.”177 In this way, the regime pursued a multifaceted approach to connect what was largely a homegrown uprising to foreign interests.

Military Rhetoric

The military apparatus also appears to have framed Bahrain’s uprisings as foreign-

172 Author Interview with Bahraini Journalist, Interview ID 2. 173 Nada Al-Wadi, The War of the Words: Bahrain's Struggle Over Local Coverage (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 3, 2012). 174 Ibid. 175 Louër, Bahrain’s National Dialogue and the Ever-Deepening Sectarian Divide. 176 Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings, 80. 177 Louër, Bahrain’s National Dialogue and the Ever-Deepening Sectarian Divide.

254 inspired, altering soldiers’ perceptions of events on the ground. Some have argued that the military directly told its recruits that Shia were the enemy, and one Bahraini journalist argued specifically that the military defined Shia and Qatar as the enemy.178 A Bahraini defense lawyer asserted that the regime fed the BDF and MOI rhetoric such as—killing

Shia is good.179 There is no evidence, however, that soldiers and security force members were directly educated to hate Shia. Instead, there have been clearer indications that although these forces were not directly trained to discriminate against Shia, it has been implied in their advising and framed as combat training,180 such as against the Iranian military threat. Some claim that following military recruitment, Bahrain has implemented religious advising services within units to make sectarian divides more salient. One individual recalled the experience of his Shi'i neighbor who worked in the BDF two decades ago. This former security service member spoke of “mental advisors” in the organization, who presented hateful speeches against Shia.181 This reinforces the fact that it is not sectarianism per se that drives soldiers to fight the opposition in Bahrain; rather, it is the additional connection of the opposition to foreign ties that encourages fighting.

The military was also active in communicating publicly during the unrest, and many of its statements underscored the potential foreign threat posed by the uprising. On

March 16, the BDF Commander-in-Chief oversaw operations to restore order in the country, and units were “ordered to be prepared to defend against any possible foreign intervention.”182 The next day, on March 17, a BDF General Command statement argued that “‘a group of the leaders of discord who called for the removal of the regime and

178 Author Interview with Bahraini Journalist, Interview ID 2. 179 Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 7. 180 Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 10. 181 Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 7. 182 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 143.

255 conspired on behalf of foreign countries have been arrested,” and stated the “BDF

General Command will take all necessary legal measures in relation to these arrested individuals in accordance with the National Safety Decree and the laws applicable in the

Kingdom.’”183

External Interference

Finally, the Bahraini opposition gained a reputation for foreign-backing in part due to unilateral external interference. Again, this relates to the history of the opposition in

Bahrain as much as the Pearl Revolution itself. Iran has long alleged a right to Bahraini territory, a claim finally renounced in 1971 amid Bahrain’s negotiations for independence from Britain. However, according to Gause, still, “since the Iranian revolution in 1979, every once in a while you will find a journalist, or an official, or somebody in one of the official newspapers in Iran, or a cleric raise the issue of Iranian claims to Bahrain.”184

Amid the Arab Spring, despite government efforts to paint Iran as interfering in Bahraini politics, there was “little evidence of direct Iranian intervention.” Since, Iranian government representatives have critiqued the Al-Khalifa regime’s response to the uprising.185 For instance, following the Saudi intervention, “Supreme Leader ‘Ali

Khamenei and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad quickly joined in the chorus of Iranian condemnation. Pro-regime clerics from Qom and senior Revolutionary Guards officials demanded a firmer response by Iran, and the paramilitary vigilante group Supporters of the Party of God (Ansar-e Hezbollah) predictably announced plans for a jihad in

183 Ibid., 148-149. 184 Gause III, F. Gregory, interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, Is Bahrain's Regime Next to Fall? 185 Katzman, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, 7.

256 Bahrain.”186 In addition, Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah denounced the

Saudi intervention.187 In Iraq, the Shia Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali al-Sistani “took the unusual step of actively endorsing the protests,” Shia figure Muqtada al-Sadr pressed “his followers in Iraq to mobilize in support of the protesters,” and demonstrations drawing

20,000 people denounced the intervention and condemned the Bahraini and Saudi royal families.188 In addition to governmental and religious leaders attacking the Bahraini regime, Iranian, Iraqi, and Lebanese media have also done so189—in stark contrast to

Qatar-based Al-Jazeera’s notable dearth of coverage on the Bahraini uprising.190

Bahrain’s 2011 opposition largely adopted nationalist rhetoric and had few external connections. In addition, threatening foreign actors such as Iran had little to no direct influence on events on the ground during the uprising. Despite this, the regime was able to insinuate that the protesters were largely foreign-backed and inspired. It did so by using statements, sentences, and media to argue that protestors’ tactics and aims were connected to foreign Shia movements and governments. This regime propaganda and framing was reinforced by what appear to have been military efforts to frame Bahrain’s primary threats as Shia-linked, and principally Iranian. As a result, soldiers were more likely to stay in their positions and fight during the crisis.

Illegitimate Tactics

In addition to the Bahrain protests earning a framing as foreign influenced, they also came to be viewed as employing illegitimate tactics. Sunni cleric Sheikh Abd-al-

186 Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings, 82. 187 Ibid., 83. 188 Ibid., 83. 189 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, 6. 190 Shibley Telhami, Al Jazeera: The most-Feared News Network (Brookings Institution, June 15, 2013).

257 Latif Mahmoud spoke about why he formed the counterrevolutionary National Unity

Gathering, saying:

‘We put together the Gathering because after 14 February the Shiites began to threaten the Sunnis and treat them like enemies. This was very surprising, because we have always lived together…Before 14 February we had no problems with Al- Wifaq in parliament. We had no differences of principle. What happened after the 14th was different: it was about the existence of the state.’191

The NUG argued that its “supporters ‘joined from schools, workplaces, hospitals out of fear of Shi'a violence.’”192 This summarizes the sentiment of “fighters” in Bahrain in

2011. They perceived the uprising as challenging the very existence of the Bahraini state and were also disturbed by the uprising’s impact on every day life. One Bahraini researcher recalled, for instance, how Bahrain’s large expatriate community was anti- opposition and complained about the road blocks and infringements on daily life as a result of the protests. According to this researcher, many were glad when things returned to “normal” following the quelling of unrest.193 The view of the uprising as unnecessarily disorderly was a result of the increasing use of violence among opposition groups, as well as the government’s framing of protesters as violating Bahrainis’ human rights, terrorizing the population, and threatening to throw the country into civil war.

Opposition Missteps

The majority of Bahrain’s opposition was focused on using non-violent protest tactics in early February 2011. As mentioned previously, witnesses of the early demonstrations recalled hearing chants such as “‘silmiyya, silmiyya’ (peaceful, peaceful) and ‘the people

191 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, 8. 192 Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings, 80. 193 Author Interview with Bahraini Think Tank Researcher, Interview ID 11 (Manama, Bahrain, March 19, 2013, 2:30pm).

258 and the land are furious, our demand is a contractual constitution (dustur ‘aqdi).”194

Throughout the uprising, some demonstrators carried flowers “as a symbol of their peacefulness.”195 However, there was already a degree of “disorder” from the start.

The escalation of the protest’s tactics began rhetorically. On February 20, slogans such as “‘the people want to remove the regime,’” “‘death to Al Khalifa,’” and “‘down with Al Khalifa’” were heard.196 By March 11, the unlicensed groups “Al-Haq, Al-Wafaa and the Bahrain Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM),” who had proclaimed a Coalition for a Bahraini Republic, called for a demonstration near the royal palace. In addition, Al-

Haq’s head then spoke to the press and “called for the regime’s downfall through a peaceful escalation of protests and the establishment of a democratic republic.”197 Such escalation reportedly stalled negotiations with the government, but also disappointed many activists who felt this segment of the opposition had “overreached.”198

The opposition also escalated its use of violence, not simply in the course of the uprising, but in its direct interaction with BDF personnel. On February 18, for instance, soldiers and protesters met at a BDF barricade around Pearl Roundabout and,

“[a]ccording to subsequent BDF investigations, the protesters began to verbally abuse the military personnel deployed in the area.”199 The Bahrain Independent Commission of

Inquiry reported that soldiers used megaphones to “instruct the protesters to vacate the area;” however, the protesters did not follow the BDF’s instructions. As a result, the

194 Shehabi and Jones, Introduction: Bahrain's Uprising: The Struggle for Democracy in the Gulf, 4. 195 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 93. 196 Ibid., 85. 197 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, 2. 198 Ibid., 12-13. 199 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 77.

259 soldiers “claimed to have fired warning shots in the air” and police units employed “tear gas and shotguns to disperse the crowd.”200

A particular escalation occurred in March before the second deployment of the military in Bahrain. On March 13, “residents of various neighbourhoods reported that groups of unidentified individuals carrying knives, swords and wooden planks were roaming the streets and threatening passers-by, attacking vehicles and destroying public property” and “the spread of information about the presence of armed gangs and groups of vandals in many areas of Bahrain, caused a wave of fear among families for their safety and security.”201 Tom Malinowski, who was then in Bahrain with Human Rights

Watch, recalled meeting with the MOI, where his delegation was shown “videos of protesters throwing Molotov cocktails at police. In the opening sequences, the gas bombs are thrown from a distance; as the weeks go by the protesters get closer, until they are right in the officers’ faces before dousing them with flames.”202 A pro-regime Bahraini working in government related to me that it was poor form for oppositionists to focus on protester injuries but not mention any of the police deaths during the crisis.203 This was not only a government perception. Observers such as Fred Wehrey noted how protest tactics grew increasingly violent following the government’s crackdown. He noted, for instance, that opposition’s “increasingly sophisticated” improvised explosive devices

(IEDs).204

200 Ibid., 78. 201 Ibid., 126. 202 Malinowski, Bahrain: Prison Island. 203 Author Interview with Bahraini Moderate Government Support Working in Government, Interview ID 5 (Manama, Bahrain, March 14, 2013, 11:30am). 204 Wehrey, The Precarious Ally: Bahrain's Impasse and U.S. Policy, 8.

260 Again, the escalation of protest violence in March was directly experienced by deployed BDF personnel. On March 16, the police confronted Molotov cocktails and burning tents when entering Pearl Roundabout. BDF and National Guard forces backed up these police personnel but they also proceeded to main thoroughfares in Bahrain “to remove booby-traps that were feared to have been placed there during the previous days and to clear roadblocks and other objects obstructing traffic.”205 The joint forces clearing the Roundabout reported that they had found “large numbers of Molotov cocktails, metal rods, knives, and other sharp objects.”206 Police, BDF, and National Guard units were also deployed to “clear the Bahrain Financial Harbour and the nearby roads of demonstrators and roadblocks” and “some of the protesters in the area exploded gas cylinders in an attempt to hinder the advance of these units.”207 Violence and rhetorical escalation were matched by a change in the location of the unrest. Not only was the opposition targeting symbols of the monarchy, such as the palace in Al-Riffa, but also protests were moving into Manama’s financial district, which “scared companies with investments in the country.”208

It was not simply violence that prompted BDF fighting. In addition, individuals were suppressed when they refused to comply with BDF instructions. For instance, on

March 16 there were incidents in which vehicles did not stop for BDF checkpoints

“despite being requested to do so over a megaphone by the military personnel onsite” and as a result, “BDF personnel fired rounds from a .50 Browning machine gun” to stop the

205 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 144. 206 Ibid., 144. 207 Ibid., 144. 208 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, 14.

261 vehicle.209 Finally, some BDF soldiers also reported having found “markings painted on the entrances to their residences, which were considered threats of retribution against them and their families.”210 In this way, a section of the opposition developed strong-arm tactics and this reinforced a perception that it was increasingly disorderly.

Regime Rhetoric

The government capitalized on the fragmented nature of the uprising to paint it as employing illegitimate tactics, and it had a precedent in doing this. During Bahrain’s

1990s crisis the state similarly portrayed the unrest as the result of “‘extremist elements’” in Bahrain, and publicized the death of security services personnel and other acts of

“sabotage” during the events.211 When Amnesty International met with Bahrain’s

Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1995, he labeled the protesters

“‘saboteurs’” and showed the delegation “photographs of various public and private installations in Bahrain allegedly burned or otherwise destroyed…There were also photographs of the bodies of two law enforcement personnel who had been killed during recent protests.”212 In his words, the state needed to ensure these saboteurs, who were

“‘seeking to destabilize the country,’” failed in their efforts to do so.213 The Amir reaffirmed this theme in his 1995 National Day remarks, in which he said:

‘Over the past year,’ he said, ‘our country witnessed certain incidental adverse events aimed at disrupting the security of citizens, the nation and its prosperity. Such actions are, categorically, far from the nature and spirit of both this nation and various ranks and sectors of the people. The government dealt with them in accordance with the requirements of security, order and utmost interests of the

209 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 146. 210 Ibid., 149. 211 Bahrain: A Human Rights Crisis, 1. 212 Ibid., 4. 213 Ibid., 4.

262 country. It will continue to pursue the policy of firmness in order to maintain national security and to put into effect appropriate legal measures upon whoever violates it.’214

More recently, in August 2010 the Bahraini government arrested twenty-five leading opposition and human rights figures and detained them under the country’s anti-terrorism law.215

Similarly, during the Pearl Revolution the state sought to frame the opposition as violating human rights, participating in organized and armed rebellion, and generally fomenting what could devolve into a civil war in Bahrain. Indeed, observers noted how:

Bahraini authorities have mounted an aggressive public relations campaign aimed at advancing a narrative that focuses exclusively on what allegedly happened during the protest period between Feb. 14 and March 16 – and ignores everything that has happened since. Officials obsessively harp on what they claim protesters did, the “human rights” they violated, and the crimes they allegedly perpetrated.216

On February 17, for instance, a Ministry of Interior representative spoke on Bahrain

Television and showed video from the clearing of Pearl Roundabout:

The spokesperson explained that the demonstration at the roundabout had been unauthorised and that security forces had commenced the clearing operation by instructing the demonstrators using megaphones. He then stated that women and children had been evacuated first and provided with transportation out of the area, after which the operation had begun using sticks and tear gas. The spokesperson stated that shotguns had only been used for self-defence. He also showed examples of the injuries that police personnel had sustained during the operation, which included the cutting of the fingers of one police officer, and displayed the weapons found at the roundabout after the operation.217

This theme was repeated throughout the uprising. Bahrain’s Crown Prince reported that:

“The safety and security of the people of Bahrain comes above any other consideration, and the ‘legitimacy of demands must not come at the expense of security and

214 Fakhro, The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment, 185. 215 Dunne, The Deep Roots of Bahrain’s Unrest. 216 Faraz Sanei, "Challenging Manama’s Narrative," Global Post, August 29, 2011. 217 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 74-75.

263 stability.’”218 The Ministry of Interior continued to report on the variety of weapons uncovered in its operations, such as when clearing SMC in mid-March 2011.219

One key feature of the state’s ability to construct this picture of an opposition using illegitimate tactics was the declaration of a State of National Safety on March 15, which leant “a pseudo-legal cast” to its actions during the Pearl Revolution and use of force against protestors.220 One significant consequence of the State of National Safety was that after the accompanying “dragnet” citizens were tried in military courts,221 in which the lead judge was a military officer, supplementary judges were civilians, and

“the chief military prosecutor prosecuted the cases.”222 According to Human Rights

Watch, at least 2,000 individuals were convicted of crimes that included “‘inciting hatred of the ruling system’ and ‘participating in illegal demonstrations.’”223 Following the more radical opposition’s announcement of a Coalition for a Republic, a number of individuals known to be attached to the movement were accused of seeking regime change in

Bahrain and charged with spreading “‘false and tendentious news and rumors,’”

“‘inciting’ people to engage in demonstrations and marches,” and having contacts with

Hizbollah.224 Although the individuals had not in fact used violence, their rhetoric and behavior was framed and prosecuted for “inciting” disorder. As the courts argued, freedom of expression was not acceptable or legal “if ‘the intent is to incite hatred of the governing regime or show contempt for it … by throwing people into turmoil.’”225

Another instance of military court sentencing underlines the regime’s overlapping

218 Ibid., 130. 219 Ibid., 145. 220 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, i. 221 No Justice in Bahrain (Human Rights Watch, February 2012), 2. 222 Ibid., 10. 223 Ibid., 12. 224 Ibid., 12. 225 Ibid., 20.

264 of accusations regarding the opposition’s foreignness and use of illegitimate tactics.

Activist Abdulhadi al-Khawaja was accused of disorderliness, including “‘working to bring down the regime,’” and “‘advocat[ing] the overthrow of the regime, a willingness to sacrifice, disobedience, a general strike, and marches.’” But in addition, he was charged with being “‘involved in communications with the foreign press,’” and contributing to the establishment of a “‘foreign enterprise to enable the Shia to take over the government in Bahrain,’” leading to a life in prison sentence.226 The same themes were repeated in other verdicts. In April 2011 a group of newspaper editors were charged with “‘publishing fabricated news and made up stories ... that may harm public safety and national interests.’”227

Not only did the regime paint protesters as violating human rights and inciting hatred, but also there were more serious charges related to weapons, violence, and terrorism. In April 2011, for instance, a Bahraini minister stated that the government had

“found a variety of weapons, including sharp metal objects and firearms” inside the

Salmaniya Medical Complex and “that the hospital served as a command and control center for anti-government demonstrators.”228 Such language portrays how even those associated with treating the protest victims became accomplices to organized violence, and the state benefited from this framing as it aided in justifying the military’s takeover of the hospital amid the events.229 In another elevated charge, one individual was interrogated as a part of a “‘terrorist network’ investigation” and was accused of

“‘diffusing fabricated and malicious news on Bahrain’ and receiving funding from a

226 Ibid., 14. 227 Bahrain: Drop Charges Against Editor of Independent Daily (Human Rights Watch, April 11, 2011). 228 Targets of Retribution, 47. 229 Ibid., 24.

265 London-based ‘terror mastermind.’”230 As one interviewee described, Bahrain’s Sunnis painted the police as victims of Shia terrorism.231

The state reinforced this theme of a dangerous opposition by frequently pointing to what might have happened, in its view, had the state not intervened amid the protests.

On February 17, amid the height of the initial Pearl Roundabout demonstrations and the military’s first deployment to clear the encampments, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister stated that BDF and security personnel found that some demonstrators were armed and argued,

“the Pearl Roundabout was cleared to avoid a ‘sectarian abyss.’” In contrast to the violently-portrayed opposition, he claimed that the military and security personnel “had used a minimum of force” in clearing the Roundabout.232 Similarly, the Minister of

Human Rights and Social Development “told Human Rights First that without the imposition of the State of National Safety ‘this country would have gone to civil war.’”233

The state was portraying Bahrain as on the brink, and some of its civilian audience believed this. For instance, one pro-government Bahraini I interviewed stated that

Bahrain needed a strong rule of law. In his mind, the government had been too weak after the 1990s uprising in granting amnesty for those who broke the law, and he also mentioned the disorder Bahrain faced in 2010. He argued that there had been no consequences for those who had violated the law.234 As events ramped up in March 2011,

“Sunnis, government officials, as well as expatriate workers and diplomatic staff relate, they were frightened that total anarchy would spread across the island with risk to their

230 Joshua Colangelo-Bryan, "The Real Bahrain," The Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2010. 231 Author Interview with Bahraini Secular Opposition Figure and Human Rights Activist, Interview ID 3. 232 Katzman, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, 6. 233 Bahrain: A Tortuous Process, 11. 234 Author Interview with Bahraini Moderate Government Support Working in Government, Interview ID 5.

266 personal safety.”235

Military Rhetoric

In some cases, members of government were actively calling on the BDF to fight back against those they argued were sowing disorder in Bahrain. This was the case, for instance, on March 13 when a number of Council of Representatives members called on the King “to order the intervention of the BDF to maintain security and stability in

Bahrain, protect private and public property and confront any illegal acts that incite violence, terrorism, harassment of individuals, sectarianism, disruption of social order, harming the national economy or threatening the national interest of Bahrain.”236 In addition, however, the military itself deployed rhetoric at key moments in the crisis to suggest to its own troops and the public that it had a duty in suppressing the uprising to protect Bahrain’s national security.

On February 17, the BDF General Command stated that “armed BDF units had been deployed to Manama in an effort to ensure the safety and security of citizens and foreign residents and their property” and “affirmed that the BDF was prepared to take punitive action to restore stability.”237 Similarly, on March 16 the General Command stated that it had worked with other security apparatus forces to remove “from the GCC

[Pearl] Roundabout, the Bahrain Financial Harbour and SMC outlaws who had terrorised citizens and undermined the national economy” and further “affirmed that it would take all necessary measures to enforce security and public order in order to protect the nation

235 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform, 3. 236 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 131. 237 Ibid., 75.

267 and its citizens.”238 In combination, opposition fragmentation, government rhetoric, and military statements contributed to soldiers perceiving the Pearl Revolution as a threat to

Bahrain’s national security and stability.

Resultant Fighting

The Bahraini military fought in response to elevated demonstrations in February and March 2011. It did so because its reading of the opposition, and the government’s framing of that opposition, led it to see those on the streets as connected to foreign interests and inciting disorder in the Kingdom. One current officer expressed his opinion that the BDF was primarily focused on Bahrain’s external threats. However, when violence escalated in Bahrain in 2011, it had intelligence regarding bridge bombs, snipers and other dangers, and so felt it needed to contribute to Bahrain’s stability. The BDF was trained to combat external threats, but it could not simply let only the police and other services handle this.239 In other words, it was soldiers’ duty to contain the unrest. Indeed, there were no documented reports of military personnel fleeing or fomenting during the

2011 crisis. Instead, there is extensive evidence that soldiers participated in the clearing of Pearl Roundabout in February, as well as continued operations in March 2011. Masked and armed soldiers were documented guarding SMC on March 19, with the help of

“small tanks and armored personnel carriers.”240 Later that month, on March 28 there were eyewitness accounts of masked and officers patrolling inside SMC and questioning newly admitted patients.241 According to one account, a security services member was

238 Ibid., 145. 239 Author Interview with Bahraini Officer in Bahrain Defense Forces, Interview ID 13. 240 Targets of Retribution, 28. 241 Ibid., 28.

268 told by a nurse not to hurt the patients; he responded: “‘They are not your patients – they are criminals!’”242

In addition to observing the absence of fleeing and fomenting, we can gain insight on soldiers’ motivations for fighting in the remarks of the military during and after its deployment. Following the height of the unrest, Human Rights Watch wrote to the BDF

Commander-in-Chief regarding Bahrain’s human rights environment. The commander responded by framing the BDF’s actions and those of the government as conforming to

Bahrain’s legal framework. He argued that the King’s royal decree initiating a State of

National Safety was proclaimed in accordance with Bahrain’s constitution, which permitted “taking exceptional measures to confront exigent circumstances the country may face,” and he stated that the move was in accordance with the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows countries to adopt such processes amid a “‘time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.’”243 He went on to describe the specific crimes that had occurred in Bahrain:

During the circumstances experienced recently in the Kingdom of Bahrain, chaos and unrest spread due to illegitimate practices in the midst of which various, numerous crimes were committed, such as murder, abduction, arson, the occupation of government buildings and the obstruction of their operations, the usurpation of public monies, the cutting of roads, and other crimes against persons and property that infringe on the safety and security of the country.244

In addition, he argued that these “crimes” threatened Bahraini citizens and warranted the

State of National Safety, stating:

This so terrorized citizens and residents that they were compelled to abstain from their daily, normal lives, and it prevented them from exercising their right to work and move freely. It also entailed economic losses, both in the official and private sectors, and the emergence of sectarian strife. The Kingdom took action to deal

242 Ibid., 38-39. 243 No Justice in Bahrain, 79. 244 Ibid., 80.

269 with the practices that led to this situation with exceptional measures, choosing to declare a state of national safety as the constitutional means that is less oppressive and restrictive than martial law.245

The BDF Commander-in-Chief’s remarks represent the public viewpoint of an elite officer, and one tied to the ruling family. But although they have a limited ability to tell us what average soldiers were thinking when ordered to clear Pearl Roundabout, destroy the encampments, or take over Salmaniya Medical Complex, they show clearly how the military high command framed its orders. Political and military elites framed the armed forces’ response to the unrest as limiting the spread of a dangerous and foreign-linked opposition in Bahrain. The average soldier may not have swallowed this narrative whole- heartedly. However, he had clear orders, was monitored in their execution, and knew he would be punished if he did not comply. Moreover, because of the regime’s consistent framing of the opposition as illegitimate and dangerous, he had reason to suspect that the military’s deployment was not illegal or immoral and in fact was a necessary step to protect the country.

Chapter Summary

Beginning in February 2011 the Bahraini regime witnessed a significant challenge to its rule as more than one-fifth of its population had joined the mass movement calling for political reform in the Kingdom. Observers have often pointed to the regime’s recruitment of a Sunni coercive apparatus as the driving factor behind the military’s continuous loyalty to the regime in the face of civilian uprisings. However, my analysis delves deeper into the factors influencing soldiers’ decision-making in 2011. First, I have

245 Ibid., 80.

270 looked into a variable that appears completely ignored in popular accounts of the revolt and the state’s response to it: the high levels of coercion within the armed forces. Soldiers in Bahrain were operating in an environment in which they had clear orders, were monitored, and knew the punishments that will be delivered if they deviated from what was commanded.

In addition to being coerced into fighting, however, a number of troops have been persuaded to deploy as well, which makes them even more reliable during a domestic crisis. Although some of these Sunni soldiers might be driven by pure ethnic hatred of the

Shia citizens, I have shown how there are more subtle factors that influence how this ethnic distance between soldier and civilian is converted into fighting. Specifically, opposition missteps, government framing, and external interference have contributed to many soldiers perceiving the Arab Spring demonstrators in Bahrain as being influenced by foreign interests and employing illegitimate protest methods. Both of these factors enhanced soldiers’ sense of duty in containing the uprising, thus persuading them of the legitimacy of fighting. The dual power of coercion and persuasion allowed the Bahraini regime to contain the country’s unrest prior to the Saudi intervention in March, and in the coming years as well.

The pattern of unified fighting in Bahrain thus had an immediate impact on containing the conflict. In the course of the uprising’s suppression more than 1,000 civilians were detained, more than 1,200 lost their jobs in connection with their participation in the demonstrations, the regime cracked down on multiple professional associations, and at least thirty were killed.246 Because troops remained in their positions

246 Testimony of Joe Stork before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Hearing on the Human Rights Situation in Bahrain (Human Rights Watch, May 13, 2011).

271 and allowed the suppression to continue, Bahrain witnessed a severe backslide in its human rights record. Fatalities, mistreatment of arrestees, suppression of the media, trial of civilians in military courts, and deterioration in religious freedoms were detailed in the

Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report,247 as well as by Freedom House248 and U.S. Department of State annual human rights249 and international religious freedom reports for Bahrain.250

The regime’s attempts to frame the uprising as foreign-backed and using illegitimate tactics not only served to influence soldiers’ willingness to fight, but also had the perhaps unintended consequence of severely inflaming sectarian tensions in Bahrain.

Although a National Dialogue was launched, either to genuinely mediate political reforms or in an attempt to paint the regime as open to reform, this Dialogue suffered as a result of the increasing politicization and polarization of communities in the country. As one observer noted, “the dialogue will have difficulty in achieving genuine rapprochement, as the political scene has undergone increasingly prevalent fragmentation.”251 Indeed, the unrest, the regime’s framing of the conflict, and the military’s fighting response all contributed to the formation of new political groups in

Bahraini politics, and ones unknown to the mainstream government and opposition. For the oppositionists, this included the emergence of the February 14 Coalition, which maintained a high degree of anonymity during the uprising. For the Sunni establishment, this included the formation of the National Union Gathering as well as Sahwat al-Fatih,

247 Bassiouni, Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. 248 Freedom in the World | 2012: Bahrain (Freedom House, 2012). 249 2011 Human Rights Reports: Bahrain (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, May 24, 2012). 250 International Religious Freedom Report for 2011: Bahrain. 251 Laurence Louër, Houses Divided: The Splintering of Bahrain’s Political Camps (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 4, 2012).

272 the NUG’s youth splinter organization. These elevated sectarian tensions, and competition within camps for who represented the Shia opposition and Sunni establishment in Bahrain, may have been a driving force in influencing some Bahrainis’ contribution to another sectarianized conflict—the Syrian civil war. A Salafi member of parliament visited a Syrian armed rebel group location in August 2012,252 and in 2013 there was additional evidence that Bahrain’s Sunni Salafi party, Al-Asala, was providing more substantial support—including a limited number of Bahraini fighters—to the Sunni extremist Al-Nusra Front in Syria.253

The fact that the Bahraini military remained in its position and fought the unrest also influenced the Gulf regional political order. Although the United States temporarily suspended arms sales to Bahrain, it resumed these in a limited capacity in 2012,254 and more fully in 2015.255 In addition, although think tanks and policy circles in Washington,

DC debated the stationing of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Manama at the start of the conflict, these discussions waned as the regime’s steady grasp on the throne continued through

2011. More significant were the effects of the regime’s strength on other Gulf states.

Political and civic activism has not completely subsided in Saudi Arabia’s towns with large Shia populations; yet, the Saudi regime undoubtedly feels more secure now that the

Bahraini uprising reflects the suppression of a opposition rather than its empowerment.

Indeed, the uprising in Bahrain prompted much greater unity among the Gulf

Cooperation Council regimes. Despite the fact that there continue to be tensions among

252 Frederic Wehrey, Syria’s Sectarian Ripples Across the Gulf (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 18, 2013). 253 Frederic Wehrey, A Local Solution for a Local Conflict (Carnegie Endowment for International Piece, October 24, 2013). 254 "U.S. Resumes Bahrain Arms Sales Despite Rights Concerns," Reuters, May 11, 2012. 255 Felicia Schwartz, "U.S. Resuming Arms Sales to Bahrain’s Military," The Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2015.

273 the Gulf states, the Bahraini uprising—although resolved—showed the danger of empowered populations in the region. In the wake of 2011, and the GCC Peninsula

Shield Force deployment in Bahrain, these states have increasingly discussed shared security threats and security assistance cooperation. In sum, the Bahraini uprising and the military’s unified fighting force had a substantial impact not only on the immediate regime crisis, but also the human rights and political landscape in Bahrain, as well as geo-politics in the Gulf.

274 Chapter 6: Syria and a Slow-Burning Civil War, 2011 and 2012-2014

The timing of my defection means I spent a year and a half in the army since the start of the uprising before I defected. I saw massacres, arrests, Syrian children crying, old women without food, children without schools because they were destroyed in airstrikes. So, what was I waiting for? –Syrian colonel deserter1

Introduction

Protests had erupted in Tunisia in late 2010 and Egypt in early 2011, toppling dictators, and yet Syrians did not think it was possible in their country. In interviews with

Syrian civilians and soldiers, none expected demonstrations. As one lieutenant said, when he looked around the region and saw militaries’ responses to protests in other Arab countries, he simply thought this would never happen in Syria because people were never thinking of regime change.2 In the eyes of one colonel, citizens had always murmured about the possibility of political change in Syria, but everyone was shocked when the revolution actually happened.3 As protests continued despite the state’s efforts to contain and repress them, many individuals remained suspect of their efficacy. One civilian imagined they would peter out within one, two, maybe three months.4 The protests were small things, in an intelligence colonel’s estimation, and he assumed local units would prove sufficient in resolving the protests.5 As the unrest continued, military personnel remained suspicious of the course of events. At the beginning of the uprising, one captain

1 Field notes: Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35 (Irbid, Jordan, January 17, 2015, 12:30pm). 2 Author Interview with Syrian Former Lieutenant in the 1st Corps, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 25 (Amman, Jordan, August 21, 2014, 9pm). 3 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Training Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 33 (Irbid, Jordan, August 25, 2014, 3pm). 4 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Originally from Palmyra, Interview ID 96 (Ramtha, Jordan, May 7, 2015, 1:30pm). 5 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35.

275 reflected that he kept thinking that the situation—the protests and the regime’s response to them—might change.6 Indeed, the start and trajectory of the Syrian uprising was not only unexpected for civilians and military personnel, but it also “came as a surprise to most outside commentators, Damascus-based diplomats and Syrian officials.”7

The lack of clarity that accompanied the start of the uprising has persisted.

Although the Assad regime has attempted “to project a sense of normalcy”8 throughout its initial counterinsurgency campaign and the subsequent civil war, nothing in Syria has felt normal since 2011. My interviewees routinely mentioned that their estimations of the regime’s strength changed as the conflict progressed. Soldiers who ended up leaving their military posts both thought the President and his system of rule were likely to fall—and that this system would never bow down to dissent. One lieutenant felt that the scale of the unrest in 2011 portended the regime’s collapse.9 Some, like one captain, felt that international intervention was inevitable and would tip the scales against Al-Assad.10

Others felt strongly that the regime could withstand any challenge to its rule, even when the regime was severely tested in mid-2012.11

Uncertainty as to Bashar al-Assad’s political strength was complemented by the lack of clarity concerning the ability to successfully deploy his military to quell the unrest from the start of the conflict. Indeed, there were factors that could have led commentators

6 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37 (Irbid, Jordan, January 24, 2015, 10am). 7 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution (International Crisis Group, July 6, 2011). 8 Ibid. 9 Author Interview with Syrian Former Lieutenant in the 1st Corps, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 25 10 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 11 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel Working in Military Finance Office, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 36 (Irbid, Jordan, January 17, 2015, 2:30pm).; Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Interview ID 98 (Ramtha, Jordan, May 7, 2015, 3:30pm).

276 to predict either outcome for the regime. On the one hand, the relatively young president had not been a hated figure in Syria to the degree that the elderly Mubarak and Ben Ali had been in their respective countries. As one loyalist Sunni, whose father remained a general in the Syrian military amid the uprising, stated, Bashar was popular in some circles.12 A military security conscript admitted that he did not originally hate the Syrian regime, but only felt that way after seeing how it responded to the conflict over time.13 In addition, some observers noted that Al-Assad benefitted from a military officer corps overwhelmingly staffed by his Alawi co-religionists, and that this would ensure that the military fought during the unrest. Others, however, pointed out that the bulk of the Syrian armed forces were conscripted Sunnis and that Sunnis also held positions even at the highest echelons of power.

Yet, of roughly 450,000-500,000 service members, only a scant number fled or fomented revolt by late 2011. In contrast, in the first half of 2012 alone at least 50,000 soldiers left the Syrian armed forces.14 A cumulative 100,000 or more Syrian military personnel have left their since the start of the uprising.15 Why was insubordination so rare at the start of the conflict? In contrast, why did it become more common, particularly in

2012? Can my theory for the causes of military decision-making at the start of a conflict be applied to understand whether soldiers fight in the middle of a civil war?

12 Author Interview with Syrian Sunni Civilian Regime Supporter, Originally from Aleppo, Interview ID 15 (Amman, Jordan, July 1, 2014, 8pm) 13 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20, August 18, 2014, 6pm) 14 Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War (Institute for the Study of War, March 2013) 15 Raja Abdulrahman, "Syria Army’s Weakness Exacerbated by Draft Dodgers," The Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2015.; Sylvia Westall, "Assad's Army Stretched but Still seen Strong in Syria's War," Reuters, September 18, 2014.; Anne Barnard, Hwaida Saad and Eric Schmitt, "An Eroding Syrian Army Points to Strain," The New York Times, April 28, 2015.

277 This chapter answers these questions. I argue that soldiers largely fought at the start of the conflict because they were given clear and monitored orders to do so, and the regime was highly adept at framing demonstrators as foreign-backed terrorists. As the conflict progressed, however, soldiers’ decision-making environment changed. Troops continued to receive instructions on suppressing the unrest, and those orders were consistently monitored. Yet many Sunni soldiers became subject to the regime’s own oppression, undermining its coercive control over them. In addition, with the passage of time soldiers’ perceptions of the uprising were altered by their experiences when deployed and receiving news from their families. This led many soldiers to view the uprising as homegrown and justified in its use of violence. Moreover, my research shows that the regime physically endangered both soldiers and their families as the unrest continued, which often proved to be a soldier’s trigger for acting on his desire to leave the military. As a result, there was a sharp increase in desertions and defections beginning in early 2012.

This pattern of soldier desertions had significant consequences on the Syrian uprising. Fighting at the start ensured that the regime was not quickly deposed, and thus

Al-Assad avoided the fate of Mubarak and Ben Ali. Despite troops’ fighting, however, the conflict in Syria was not resolved in a matter of weeks, and fleeing and fomenting increased. Still, these desertions and defections occurred over time and did not represent the defection of whole military units to support the opposition, which might have left the military debilitated. As a result, the military’s steady leaking of soldiers between 2012 and 2013 occurred at such a rate that the regime could work to bolster its forces with the introduction of support from civilian militias, Hezbollah fighters, and Iran’s

278 Revolutionary Guard. The metastasized conflict has claimed the lives of at least

470,000,16 displaced 6.6 million internally,17 and pushed more than 4.8 million Syrians to migrate outside the country’s borders18 as of 2016. Since President Bashar al-Assad’s regime’s brutal crackdown on demonstrations, an armed and fragmented opposition has proliferated. Groups such as the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Free Syrian Army are in combat with the government, which itself is fortified by arms, men, and financing from international actors. What began as a peaceful revolution has become one of the most significant humanitarian and political crises of recent memory.

My analysis of the Syrian case draws on diverse data. A significant source is the forty-six interviews I conducted with Syrian conflict participants. This included interviews with twenty-nine former military personnel as well as seventeen civilian conflict witnesses and participants. These interviews were conducted in English or Arabic, based on the interviewee’s preference, and took place in Jordan (Amman, Irbid, and

Ramtha) between 2014 and 2015. The former military personnel I interviewed were primarily Sunni Muslims, although I interviewed one Druze officer. The interviewees varied on a range of additional measures, however. I interviewed conscripts, non- commissioned officers, company-grade officers, field-grade officers, and a general.

Individuals had served in a variety of units, including the Special Forces, the 4th Division,

Military Security, Military Police, Air Force Intelligence, and other units. Some men were single with no children; others were married with large families. Some were

16 Anne Barnard, "Death Toll from War in Syria Now 470,000, Group Finds," The New York Times, February 11, 2016. 17 Key Figures: People Internally Displaced by Violence (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, March 2016). 18 Syria Regional Refugee Response: Total Persons of Concern (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, April 26, 2016).

279 conscripted at the start of the uprising; others had served as volunteers for decades. These soldiers came from a variety of hometowns, although the majority was from Deraa in southern Syria close to the Jordanian border. Men had been deployed throughout the country at their time of desertion. Interviewees also varied significantly when it came to the timing of their defection as well as the nature of their insubordination. A number of interviewees had both spent time outside of Syria and also time fighting as part of the opposition within its borders. I also interviewed a number of civilian Syrians. This included conversations with individuals ranging from a former Communist, to a Christian apolitical youth, to a tribal sheikh, and many others with their own perspective and eyewitness stories from Syria’s uprising.

Despite the variation within the population of interviews I conducted based in

Jordan, it might still be the case that the types of people who had entered Jordan by 2014 and 2015 were different from Syrians still living in the country or displaced elsewhere. I took numerous steps, therefore, to enhance my pool of data for the case analysis. First, I participated in a collaborative research project in which additional scholars interviewed and surveyed military deserters based in Turkey and Lebanon. In the current analysis, footnotes indicate when data is drawn from these scholars’ interviews. In addition, although reporting on the conflict has been limited for a number of reasons, journalists and human rights organizations have still managed to gain access to revelatory information since 2011. These articles and reports in English and Arabic provide direct quotes from former military and security personnel, as well as civilians impacted by these soldiers’ and officials’ actions. Finally, I draw on primary sources such as Syrian Arab

News Agency (SANA) statements when referencing the Assad regime’s rhetoric during

280 the uprising. These sources aid in triangulating information gained through my own interview research.

This chapter begins with a brief background on the Assad regime and its military forces. I then outline the course of Syria’s Arab Spring and proceed to discuss my theoretical expectations as to soldier behavior during the unrest and the limits of existing explanations. The first analytical narrative discusses soldier behavior in 2011, and I offer detailed evidence that clear and monitored orders, foreign framing, and perceptions of illegitimate tactics contributed greatly to soldier fighting that year. I also acknowledge the aberrant cases of fleeing and fomenting in 2011. I then present a second analytical narrative in which I explain how soldiers’ decision-making environments were substantially altered by the second year of the conflict. I acknowledge that orders and their monitoring remained clear in Syria. However, I introduce evidence that Sunni soldiers no longer felt that “fighting” saved them from the regime’s punishment, and therefore the military’s coercive capacities were undermined. In addition, many soldiers no longer perceived the uprising as populated by foreign terrorists, and I explain how this contributed significantly to their desire to flee or foment revolt by 2012. I argue and present evidence that because the regime directly harmed soldiers and their families during the shift to civil war, soldiers increasingly acted on their desires not to fight, disobeyed orders to do so, and fled Syria or joined its growing opposition insurgencies.

The chapter concludes with an analysis of the implications of the Syria case findings for altering my theory to shed light on soldier behavior not only at the start, but also throughout civil conflicts.

281 Al-Assad’s Military

Hanna Batatu once observed: “At the heart of Syria’s regime stands a cluster of military officers. They hold in their hands the crucial threads of power. This much is obvious. Their common military profession, however, does not explain why they cling together and act in concert.”19 In an effort to explain the behavior of the Syrian military over time, this section delves into the formation of the Baathist regime and its armed forces; the military’s response to another period of civil unrest in Syria—from 1979-

1982; the military’s development from the late years of former President Hafez al-Assad through the transition to Bashar’s rule; and the state of the military on the eve of the uprising.

A Baathist Military

Contemporary Syrian politics are intertwined with the history of its military.

Following a cascade of coups in the 1950s and 1960s, a military takeover in 1963 brought into power the Baath Party that has governed Syria through today. After an intra-Baath

Party coup in 1966, Hafez al-Assad gained the position of Minister of Defense. By 1970 he had unseated Syria’s president and begun to consolidate his own rule. Hinnebusch has argued that Assad worked to gain “autonomy from each of the groups in his power base by balancing them against each other.”20 First, he drew on his support within the military to rise above the Party’s “ideological constraints.”21 After this, Al-Assad worked to form an inner circle, a gang (jama’a), around him. He drew on those he considered to be

19 Hanna Batatu, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance," Middle East Journal 35, no. 3 (1981): 331. 20 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above (New York: Routledge, 2004), 67. 21 Ibid., 67.

282 loyalist Alawis—those from his minority ethno-religious sect—and especially members of his family, and he often placed these individuals in “crucial security and military commands.”22

This ethnic component to political balancing had precedent. Alawis had already come to control the Baath Military Section23 and grew to dominate the higher officer corps, Batatu argues, because Sunnis were extremely divided, especially ideologically;

Alawis were allies during purges and this led to their accrual of power.24 At the same time, though, Sunnis “retained a significant presence in the Syrian officer corps” through the early 1970s, and as many as half of the officers in the military academy’s 1970 cohort were Sunnis.25 Indeed, in seeking to balance the interests of Syria’s majority Sunni population Al-Assad also brought urban Sunnis into his regime through elite positions in the party and government.26

Popular Uprising and the Hama Massacre of 1982

The Syrian military had a high degree of influence in the Middle East at the start of Al-Assad’s tenure as President, especially as it interfered in the Lebanese civil war that decade. The armed forces were also used in the domestic arena. In particular, it is significant to consider Hafez al-Assad’s military’s reaction to a Syrian uprising in the late

1970s and early 1980s as there are parallels between the military’s response to that conflict and the one that began in 2011. Lawson notes that the 1979-1982 revolt was

22 Ibid., 67. 23 Batatu, Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance, 343. 24 Ibid., 342. 25 Hicham Bou Nassif, "‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces," Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (2015): 6. 26 Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, 67.

283 underpinned by deteriorating economic circumstances and poor regime economic policy from the late 1970s through the culmination of the revolt in Hama, Syria in 1982.27

However, the unrest also gained a strong Islamist frame and came to be seen as a contest between the Muslim Brotherhood (or, Muslim Brethren) and government.

The confrontations between the Brotherhood and regime escalated beginning in

1976, when the group transitioned from provoking the regime’s repressive apparatus, to undertaking the targeted killing of Alawi officials, to attacking government buildings and military personnel.28 In addition, the number of Brotherhood fighters was increasing. In the northern province of Aleppo, for instance, they rose from approximately 500 fighters in 1975 to 5,000 in 1978, and “perhaps nation-wide to 30,000” that year.29 By 1980 the opposition movement was escalating its attacks on the government, “buoyed by the

Revolution in Iran and sensing the isolation of the regime.”30 Mass demonstrations broke out in Aleppo, and resistance was apparent in areas such as Hama, Homs, and Deir al-

Zour as well. Protests criticized lack of political expression, security service abuses, political prisoner detention, economic circumstances, and weakness of Islamic law.31 It was reported that “whole quarters slipped out of government control” in Aleppo32 and by

June 1980 there was an attempt on Hafez Al-Assad’s life.33

A series of missteps by the opposition, and the government’s framing of those stumbles, contributed to the security and military forces’ crackdown on this regime-

27 Fred H. Lawson, "Social Bases for the Hama Revolt," Middle East Research and Information Project 12, no. 9 (1982): 24-28. 28 Hanna Batatu, "Syria's Muslim Brethren," Middle East Research and Information Project 12, no. 110 (1982): 12-36. 29 Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, 94. 30 Ibid., 99. 31 Ibid., 99. 32 Ibid., 99. 33 Ibid., 100.

284 threatening case of unrest. The opposition’s “missteps” were part and parcel of their ideology but were exacerbated by their actions. In terms of its ideology, Hinnebusch has argued that the movement’s Islamic focus was too narrowly defined to appeal to the masses in Syria, much less minority populations. Importantly, the movement also specifically threatened Syria’s military as it verbally attacked the state and governing apparatus.34 The movement’s actions only reinforced perceptions that it was disorderly and threatening, particularly to military personnel. Members of the opposition killed a prominent family in Aleppo, inspiring fear in the landowning class that it would be physically harmed by the movement.35 More central to the military’s perceptions, in 1979 oppositionists murdered more than fifty military cadets in Aleppo—all of whom were

Alawi.36 Batatu writes that in the wake of the massacre: “Many Syrians, regardless of their political beliefs, were appalled by the killing or maiming of innocent cadets.”37 The opposition also targeted Syria’s governing elite, as was exemplified in the assassination attempt on the president in June 1980.38 The opposition’s use of violence, and particularly its indiscriminate use of force against “innocents,” did not endear it to a large portion of

Syrians and many members of the military.

In addition to the opposition’s own missteps, the regime specifically worked to frame the movement as completely foreign. For instance, the President by 1980:

began linking, in terms free from ambiguity, the Muslim militants to U.S. policy in the region. “It is the U.S. Central Intelligence,” he said on March 11, 1980, “that recruits and provides these agents with the means of death and destruction

34 Ibid., 102. 35 Ibid., 100. 36 Raymond Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Baʻthist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 293. 37 Hanna Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 266. 38 Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, 100.

285 and directs their activities from centers not far from the Syrian borders.” In subsequent statements he maintained that “the U.S. believes that by causing problems of this kind for us, it can force us to yield to Israel’s will,” and that in point of fact “there is no U.S. policy in this region but an Israeli policy that the U.S. carries out.”39

By 1981 the regime was also reporting that leading Brotherhood figures had traveled to

Iraq to secure training, funds and arms, and that they also visited Jordan.40 Such statements worked to frame the opposition as perpetuating foreign interests and thereby worked to discredit the movement in the eyes of those questioning what it represented.

Ultimately, events came to a head in Hama in February 1982, when the Al-Assad regime deployed 10,000 soldiers to violently suppress the unrest.41 Facing the prospect of urban warfare, the regime decided to simply use “helicopter gunships, bulldozers and artillery bombardment against the city, virtually razing whole quarters and killing many thousands,”42 and this put an end to the revolt at its climax. Records indicate that the majority of the military obeyed orders to fight the uprising in Hama. However, there were also reports of limited insubordination during the conflict. For instance, one Sunni, who commanded a brigade composed of substantial numbers of soldiers from Hama, questioned the orders he was given and was arrested.43

Late Hafez Years and Bashar’s Succession

If the 1970s had been a period of the Syrian military’s relative strength, the 1980s represented its waning capabilities. Funding and support for the armed forces decreased

39 Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics, 272. 40 Ibid., 268-269. 41 Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery," in Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies, eds. Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 72. 42 Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, 101. 43 Ibid., 86-87.

286 that decade, particularly with the dismantling of the Soviet Union.44 The Syrian regime was also undergoing its own challenges in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1983, the President’s brother Rifaat moved to usurp power while Hafez was taken ill.45 Although Hafez regained his health and fended off his brother’s advances, the future of his regime was again thrown in doubt with the death of Basil al-Assad in 1994. Basil was intended to take on the governing mantle following his father’s passing. Instead, now Bashar al-

Assad, another son, would be taking the lead. To prepare for the transition Bashar immediately returned to Syria from London and began his military training.46 In the years leading up to Hafez’s death in 2000, the President also undertook a series of preemptive purges designed to facilitate Bashar’s assumption of the reigns.

When Bashar al-Assad became president in 2000 he inherited a country that had been characterized by the regime’s fostering of a personality cult around Hafez al-Assad to dissuade challenges to the status quo.47 And yet, it appeared that Bashar’s rule might be accompanied by a measure of reform. On top of his late father’s purges, Bashar al-Assad introduced his own personnel changes, with an estimated 60% of “regime, party, and local government and members of Parliament…replaced by younger figures.”48 The new president also announced a series of political promises that heralded a reformed Syria. A

44 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 29. 45 Batatu, Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics, 232. 46 Shmuel Bar, Bashar’s Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview (The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, 2006), 369. 47 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 48 Bar, Bashar’s Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview, 371.

287 final signal of the regime’s potential for reform came with Syria’s withdrawal from

Lebanon in 2005.49

Despite his moves to form a new inner circle, it was not clear if Bashar had the strong, personal support of elites that Hafez enjoyed, particularly of his military and security commanders. As Bar has observed: “In the Hafez al-Asad era, the various organs of the regime carried out the president’s orders out of a combination of personal loyalty, fear, deference to the wisdom of his decisions, and faith in the stability of the existing order. These components are considerably lower in regard to Bashar”50 because the new

President had not formed a “personal relationship” with those surrounding him.51 One facet of the changing nature of elite relations in Syria under Bashar was the simultaneous change in elites’ identities. For the new generation, Bar argued in 2006: “Their reference group is no longer the Alawite tribes they sprang from, but their associates in the military, business, or academic worlds in Damascus, most of them Sunnis.”52 As he goes on to explain, this younger cohort lived almost exclusively in Damascus and often married into

Sunni families—as had both Bashar al-Assad and his brother and military commander

Maher al-Assad. In this way, Bashar al-Assad’s presidency saw changes in Syria’s elite coalition.

49 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 3. 50 Bar, Bashar’s Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview, 375. 51 Ibid., 375. 52 Ibid., 383.

288 Military on Eve of Uprising

On the eve of the Arab Spring, the Syrian military was composed of almost

300,000 personnel as well as an estimated 315,000 reservists.53 Of those serving, approximately 70% were conscripts.54 A significant component of the Assad coercive apparatus was the variety of overlapping security services, including “Military

Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, State Security, and Political Security.”55 Despite the formal hierarchy of the armed forces and security services, those close to Al-Assad reported that the regime’s inner circle in fact “ignores” these command structures and

“controls the country itself.” 56 A final feature of the military ahead of the uprising was the fact that Al-Assad family members served in the highest ranks. This included: Maher al-Assad, Bashar Al-Assad’s brother, who commanded the 4th Armored Division; Zou al-

Himma Shalish, Bashar’s cousin, who was “in charge of units responsible for the safety of the president and his family;” Hafiz Makhluf, Bashar’s cousin, who led “unit 251 in the General Intelligence and is widely considered to be the real commander of that service;” Hilal al-Assad, Bashar’s cousin, a 4th Armored Division Military Police commander; and Asif Shawkat, Bashar’s brother-in-law, who “was the strong man in the intelligence apparatus until his death in 2012.”57 These were the broad strokes of the military’s manpower and organization on the eve of the uprising.

The Syrian military appeared to be fairly disciplined by 2011, but lacked preparedness for international combat. In interviews with me, officers expressed that they

53 "FACTBOX- Syria's Military: What does Assad have?" Reuters, April 6, 2011. 54 "Defectors from the Syrian Army," PRI's the World, November 8, 2011. 55 Ahed Al-Hendi, "The Structure of Syria's Repression: Will the Army Break with the Regime?" Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2011. 56 Ibid. 57 Bou Nassif, ‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces, 14-15.

289 felt the military had a degree of discipline preceding the uprising. Syria had such an advanced, well-equipped, well-trained military, one colonel emphasized in our conversation.58 The armed forces were a true institution in Syria, a captain commented, and one that exercised discipline through training and rules.59 However, higher-level officers also saw their power wane during Bashar’s reign. According to one “regime insider,” who spoke in 2011: “‘military officers, together with the army as a whole, have been on a steep decline. They used to be able to pick up their phones to get whatever service they requested. Today, a minister won’t feel compelled to take a call from an army general.’”60 Conscripts had a particularly poor picture of military service and the institution. The rank and file in Syria “live in overcrowded barracks lacking in basic hygiene, wear worn-out military fatigues and boots, and are provided with often defective

Russian rifles.”61 Conscripts could never serve in their hometowns and so were typically stationed far from their extended families and communities, which also impacted their quality of life.62

In all, many soldiers and outside commentators recognized the limits of the force.

In his interviews with Syrian officers, Hicham Bou Nassif felt that the vast majority assessed the armed forces’ capabilities as in decline since the 1990s and that it had

58 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel Working in Military Finance Office, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 36. 59 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 60 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 29. 61 Bou Nassif, ‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces, 12. 62 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Working for Human Rights Organization, Interview ID 26 (Irbid, Jordan, August 23, 2014, 12:45pm, follow-up August 25, 2014, 12pm).; Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Non-Commissioned Officer with Tanks Specialty, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 28 (Irbid, Jordan, August 23, 2014, 3:30pm).

290 “reached abysmal lows on the eve of the 2011 uprisings.”63 According to Bou Nassif, this deterioration in combat preparedness was due to old equipment, lack of maintenance, and lack of technological advancement in particular, all a result of the regime’s desire to keep the military in check but also due to rampant corruption.64

Uprising Background: Syria’s Arab Spring

The demonstrations that began in Tunisia in December 2010 inspired a series of protests and revolts across Middle Eastern countries in early 2011; yet, many expected

Syria to be the exception. Still, although the Syrian uprising took citizens and ordinary soldiers by surprise, the regime was not caught off guard. The security services reportedly “scrambled to understand what had happened” to cause Ben Ali’s downfall, even going as far as to seek “insights from Tunisians living in the country.”65

Start of the Uprising: 2011

In Syria, limited protests began in February 2011 and were met with “a number of measures designed to placate public opinion.”66 At the same time, Bashar al-Assad decided to use sticks to discourage further demonstrations of citizen discontent. When a

“Day of Rage” was announced for February 4, for instance, he “deployed a large number of plainclothes officers in central Damascus”67 to monitor and contain the unrest. By

March 2011 Syria saw much more widespread protests. On March 15 there were

63 Bou Nassif, ‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces, 11. 64 Ibid., 11-12. 65 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 4. 66 Ibid., 5. 67 Ibid., 6.

291 demonstrations in Hamidiya market in Damascus and video of the protests was circulated so that it “aired on satellite news channels virtually in real time.”68

Figure 6.1: Syria Political Map69

68 Ibid., 10. 69 Syria Political Map, 2007 (University of Texas Libraries).

292 The turning point in this first phase of the uprising came on March 18 with demonstrations in the southern province and city of Deraa. Individuals took to the streets that day calling for the release of children who have been imprisoned for painting anti- regime slogans. Demonstrators gathered near Al-Umari Mosque that Friday. According to one observer, the young men wanted to go to the center of the city to confront government officials because they had been promised the opportunity to talk about their needs. However, the demonstrations were met with the regime’s use of violence and two individuals were killed.70 On the same day, citizens protested in Homs city before demonstrations were broken up by the security services.71 There were even reports of protests in Latakia on March 26, which is significant given the city’s substantial Alawi population.72

These disturbances led Al-Assad to propose a series of reforms on March 30.

However, despite the regime’s promises of concessions, protests escalated, leading one analyst to argue that although “March clashes in Dera’a sparked unrest…it was the April escalation in Homs that fanned the flames.”73 There were Friday protests throughout

Syria in April and the regime’s response to the unrest grew more militant. During protests in Daraa on April 8, for instance, citizens coalesced around the city’s Political Security headquarters. Fifty soldiers accompanied by many more mukhabarat personnel were deployed to confront the protesters,74 and more than twenty-five were killed in the

70 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Who Witnessed Events in Deraa March 2011, Interview ID 31 (Irbid, Jordan, August 25, 2014, 1:30pm). 71 “We Live as in War”: Crackdown on Protesters in the Governorate of Homs (Human Rights Watch, November 2011). 72 "Syria Unrest: Twelve Killed in Latakia Protest," BBC News, March 27, 2011. 73 Joseph Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An Operational and Regional Analysis (Institute for the Study of War, December 2011), 15. 74 “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror”: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces (Human Rights Watch, June 2011).

293 clashes.75 Subsequently, on April 19, clashes in Homs’s New Clock Tower Square left at least thirteen dead.76

By late April and particularly through May the military was increasingly deployed and using lethal force to contain the unrest. On April 25 both security and military vehicles were deployed in Deraa and “heavy gunfire” continued for nearly sixteen hours.77 Less than a week later army personnel were deployed in a town near Damascus; military forces reportedly participated in the suppression of unrest by serving as snipers posted throughout the town and arresting those suspected of joining the demonstrations.78

On May 6, military tanks and armored vehicles aided the security services in their deployments in Banyas and Homs.79 Less than a week later, similar forces were deployed in the southern Deraa governorate and mass arrests were reported.80 The army shelled the northwestern town of Talkalakh on May 15 and 16,81 and units were deployed to

Sanamain, Al-Harak, and Kfar Shams in Deraa,82 on May 19. At the end of the month, military tanks were employed in areas surrounding Homs and there were reports of

“shelling and firing machine guns at homes and residents, killing 11 people.”83 By June, demonstration activity had grown exponentially in Hama as well.84

Syria’s non-violent uprising—which called for the release of political prisoners and an end to corruption, among other demands—was met with few concessions and

75 Ibid. 76 “We Live as in War”: Crackdown on Protesters in the Governorate of Homs. 77 “We’ve Never Seen such Horror”: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Moni Basu, "Report: Syrian Brutality could Amount to Crimes Against Humanity," CNN News, July 5, 2011. 82 “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror”: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces. 83 Ibid. 84 Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An Operational and Regional Analysis, 15.

294 much violence from the regime. These were the general contours of the unrest. But how exactly did the military respond? First, the regime chose not to deploy large, whole military units to suppress the unrest. Instead, as analyst Joseph Holliday has brought to light, the Syrian regime “task-organized its maneuver units, meaning that it has taken units out of doctrinal formations and combined or broken them up in order to perform assigned missions.”85 This appears to have been the case, for instance, in the military’s deployment to Deraa in spring 2011. In addition to this task organization, the military adopted the strategy of drawing on both the Special Forces and well as conventional troops. This included, in particular, the use of the 35th, 41st, 47th Special Forces Regiments in the early stages of the conflict, as well as the conventional 132nd Mechanized Brigade, from the 5th Mechanized Division, and the 65th Armored Brigade, which had been

“stationed with the 3rd Armored Division.”86 In all, there was evidence that in these early stages of the conflict, military units were deployed from “the Presidential Guard, the 3rd,

4th, 5th, 9th, 11th, 15th, and 18th Divisions, and various Special Forces Regiments, including the 35th, 45th, and 46th Regiments.”87

The Syrian regime followed a pattern of deploying Special Forces and elite units to clear the “key centers of unrest and conduct large scale cordon and search operations.”88 A Special Forces first lieutenant I interviewed, for instance, recounted his experience while deployed to Rastan, near Homs city, near the start of the uprising in that city. He had orders to stop demonstrations and was sent into Baba Amr. As he remembered, all the other military units were afraid to enter Baba Amr. When Special

85 Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 13. 86 Ibid., 12. 87 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria (Human Rights Watch, December 2011), 18-19. 88 Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An Operational and Regional Analysis, 13.

295 Forces arrived the troops were glad the Special Forces would go in first.89 In addition to the use of elite personnel ahead of conventional forces, it was also common for a combination of forces to deploy. Army deserters spoke to Human Rights Watch in July

2011 and explained that they were often deployed alongside “plainclothes mukhabarat and shabeeha,”90 meaning, members of the intelligence services and civilian militias.

Once deployed, these units used lethal force against protesters, and the Military

Security, Republican Guard, and 4th Armoured Division’s use of force has been catalogued in particular.91 Military personnel were also used to detain individuals at checkpoints, cordon areas, and conduct mass arrests. One sergeant who deserted recalls working with Air Force Intelligence in Damascus and being assigned to man checkpoints during the crisis. An officer would give him a list of names and license plates; these were individuals he was to target for arrest.92 Arrest campaigns began in late March and April

2011 but escalated as the conflict progressed.93 There is some evidence that intelligence personnel most often physically conducted arrests and that “the military provided support during the arrest and transportation of detainees”94 and manning checkpoints. In addition,

Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence were reported to have undertaken significant efforts to “arrest and question political suspects” between April and August

2011.95 One soldier deployed to Talbiseh, outside Homs city, in early May 2011 recalled

89 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in the Special Forces, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 30 (Irbid, Jordan, August 25, 2014, 1pm). 90 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters (Human Rights Watch, July 9, 2011). 91 Al-Hendi, The Structure of Syria's Repression: Will the Army Break with the Regime? 92 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Sergeant in 4th Division, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 24. 93 “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror”: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces. 94 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 5. 95 Deadly Detention: Deaths in Custody Amid Popular Protest in Syria (Amnesty International, August 31, 2011), 7.

296 how the military worked with intelligence services to arrest “‘anyone older than 14 years—sometimes 20, and sometimes a hundred people.’”96 One soldier who manned a checkpoint between Latakia and Aleppo said he was given a list of 500 names and within five days his checkpoint arrested 200 individuals.97 Another former soldier recounted how by August 2011: “‘we were rounding up any young man we found, whether we were looking for him or not.’”98

President Bashar al-Assad relied on task-organizing his armed forces, employing

Special Forces in advance of conventional units, and deploying his military not only to use lethal force against the protesters but also to man checkpoints and conduct mass arrest campaigns. In addition, as the conflict progressed the regime increasingly utilized the military and security services in conjunction with civilian forces. For instance, one colonel recounted how in Damascus there would be demonstrations after Friday prayers.

In addition to the security elements, the regime would send out popular committees (al- lijan al-sha’abiya), which he described as being composed of sectarian loyalists, to bring the demonstrators under control.99 From early on in the protest, one lieutenant reflected, the regime deployed Military Security (al-amn al-‘askari), Air Force Intelligence (al- mukhabarat al-juwiya), Political Security (al-amn al-siyasi), and Special Forces (al- quwat al-khasa). Then, the regime began to recruit a civilian force (qawat madaniya) additionally. As this lieutenant perceived, the regime would go, for instance, to a Druze

96 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 6. 97 Ibid., 45. 98 Andrew Slater, "Former Syrian Soldier Describes Life in the Army at the Start of War," The Daily Beast, September 4, 2013. 99 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34 (Irbid, Jordan, January 17, 2015, 9:30am).

297 (minority) family, argue that those participating in the uprising were trying to kill the

Druze, and urge these populations to take up arms in self-defense.100

By fall 2011 more than 3,000 individuals had been killed by the regime in the course of the protests.101 As startling as this number of victims appeared in 2011, it soon became dwarfed by the number of Syrians killed as the uprising devolved into a civil war the coming year.

Devolution into Civil War: 2012-2014

The turning point for the conflict’s deterioration into a civil war came in early

2012 when the Assad regime pivoted to a “military solution” to the uprising. This was accompanied by not only an escalation and change in the nature of the regime’s use of violence, but also an accompanying proliferation of opposition groups and their increasing use of arms. As I later show, the devolution into civil war fundamentally changed soldiers’ decision-making in Syria, and led to a different pattern in fighting, fleeing, and fomenting revolt.

The International Crisis Group has argued that by late July 2011 the Assad regime transitioned to a “security solution” to the uprisings. This entailed allowing the “security services a freer hand to contain and roll back the popular movement”102 and involved setting up checkpoints throughout the country, amplifying sectarianism, and instilling fear in the protesters.103 But the security solution approach was not enough to contain the unrest. By fall 2011 the regime seemed to be in its most precarious position yet, as it was

100 Author Interview with Syrian Former Lieutenant in the 1st Corps, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 25. 101 “We Live as in War”: Crackdown on Protesters in the Governorate of Homs 102 Syria’s Phase of Radicalisation (International Crisis Group, April 10, 2012), 2-3. 103 Ibid., 2-3.

298 assailed internationally by the UN General Assembly and Arab League, while the opposition’s Syrian National Council was “gaining recognition internationally.”104 Thus, by January 2012 the regime pivoted to a “military solution,” one that relied on army units to regain land lost to the opposition near the capital and throughout Syria.105 The military had been deployed at the start of the conflict, but it was now deployed in new ways, including its use of artillery, helicopters, barrel bombs, and other extreme tactics and weaponry to suppress the uprising.

The year 2012 was first marked by the military’s increasing employment of artillery in its fight against the opposition.106 Analyst Joseph Holliday has argued that the use of artillery was significant for the regime because it allowed an “economy of force,” meaning the regime could exact maximum damage to rebellious regions while distributing and conserving its armed forces.107 The use of artillery also meant that entire residential communities were targeted, “trapping civilians in the crossfire.”108 Similarly indiscriminate of their targets were tanks, which shelled towns in Idlib governorate in northwestern Syria in March and April 2012.109 A desire for employing an economy of force in fighting a growing opposition also led the regime to increasingly use helicopter gunships, beginning in April 2012.110 By August 2012 the regime was also employing barrel bombs, “improvised bombs constructed from oil drums and dropped by Syrian

104 Uncharted Waters: Thinking through Syria’s Dynamics (International Crisis Group, November 24, 2011), 1. 105 Syria’s Phase of Radicalisation, 3. 106 Joseph Holliday, Syria's Armed Opposition (Institute for the Study of War, March 2012), 11. 107 Joseph Holliday, Syria's Maturing Insurgency (Institute for the Study of War, June 2012), 17. 108 Syria’s Phase of Radicalisation, 2. 109 “They Burned My Heart”: War Crimes in Northern Idlib during Peace Plan Negotiations (Human Rights Watch, May 2012), 2. 110 Holliday, Syria's Maturing Insurgency, 17.

299 helicopters,”111 and in December 2012 it began using surface-to-surface ballistic missiles as well.112 Massacres were yet another way in which the regime brutally crushed the opposition, with confirmed massacres occurring in Houla in May 2012113 and Ghouta in

August 2013,114 among other locations.115

The regime justified the “military solution” by arguing it was “struggling to restore law and order” and Al-Assad worked tirelessly to blame “the deteriorating situation on virtually everything – extremism within society, foreign media fanning the flames and a global conspiracy – save its own security personnel’s behavior.”116 Indeed, it continued to argue that a “handful of decisive military operations against residual terrorist pockets stood between the crisis and its resolution, all the while denying that peaceful demonstrations were being repressed.”117 These methods of violence exponentially increased the human lives lost in the conflict. By the end of 2012, at least 60,000 had been killed;118 that number jumped to a total of more than 130,000 deaths by the end of

2013.119

With the regime’s continued use of lethal force, the opposition increasingly resorted to violence itself. Groups that remained inchoate amid the “security solution” phase gained somewhat greater cohesion during the transition to a “military solution,” and “more rebel groups formed in both February and March [2012] than in the first ten

111 Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 24. 112 Ibid., 24. 113 "Houla: How a Massacre Unfolded," BBC News, June 8, 2012. 114 Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, "Ghouta Chemical Attack: Two Years Onward," Al Jazeera, August 21, 2015. 115 Syria’s Phase of Radicalisation, 4. 116 Ibid., 3. 117 Uncharted Waters: Thinking through Syria’s Dynamics, 2. 118 Nick Cumming-Bruce, "More than 60,000 have Died in Syrian Conflict, U.N. Says," The New York Times, January 2, 2013. 119 "Deaths, Refugees and Damage: Syria’s Crisis in Figures," Al Arabiya, January 15, 2014.

300 months of the uprising.”120 The most prominent actors became the Free Syrian Army, formed in August 2011; Jabhat al-Nusra, formally announced in January 2012 and connected in its inception to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq; and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, formed in August 2013 as an outgrowth of the Islamic State of Iraq.121

These “armies” or “insurgent groups” often served as loose umbrellas for fighting battalions. In addition to their numeric proliferation, rebel groups increased their use of violence as the conflict progressed. The most dramatic example of the opposition’s turn to lethal force was the March 2012 bombings that rocked “security installations in

Damascus and Aleppo” and were attributed to the opposition.122 This was followed in

July 2012 by the bombing of a national security installation in Damascus.123 There was greater evidence by summer 2012 that the opposition was not only receiving foreign funding, but was increasingly being shipped “weapons and ammunition” as well.124 In this way Syria devolved into civil war, one that has continued to rage through the time of writing.

Considering Existing Explanations

The vast majority of the Syrian armed forces fought the domestic uprising when it started in March 2011, and only a scant number fled or fomented by late 2011. In contrast, in the first half of 2012 alone at least 50,000 soldiers were estimated to have left the

120 Holliday, Syria's Maturing Insurgency, 17. 121 "Guide to the Syrian Rebels," BBC News, December 13, 2013. 122 Syria’s Phase of Radicalisation, 4. 123 Josh Levs, "Top Syrian Officials Killed in Major Blow to Al-Assad's Regime," CNN News, July 19, 2012. 124 Holliday, Syria's Maturing Insurgency, 29.

301 Syrian armed forces.125 A cumulative 100,000 or more Syrian military personnel left their posts from 2012 onward.126 Why did things unfold this way? I argue that the majority of soldiers initially fought because they had clear and monitored orders to do so, and also viewed the uprising as foreign and employing illegitimate tactics. As the conflict progressed, soldiers’ decision-making environment changed. Their clear orders to suppress the revolt persisted, but they no longer perceived the uprising as led by foreign terrorists. As a result they increasingly left the military. This argument adds to existing explanations of military behavior, which focus on the power of ethnicity, material incentives, and opposition violence in explaining whether soldiers fight, flee, or foment revolt.

Table 6.1: Anticipated Outcomes for Syria 2011 Based on Independent Variables

Persuasion High Low High

Syria 2011 (All) N/A

Prediction: Fight

Coercion Low N/A N/A

125 Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 27. 126 Abdulrahman, Syria Army’s Weakness Exacerbated by Draft Dodgers.; Westall, Assad's Army Stretched but Still seen Strong in Syria's War.; Barnard, Saad and Schmitt, An Eroding Syrian Army Points to Strain.

302 Table 6.2: Anticipated Outcomes for Syria 2012-2014 Based on Independent Variables

Persuasion High Low High Syria 2012-2014 Syria 2012-2014 (Alawis and minorities) (Sunnis)

Prediction: Fight Prediction: Fight or Flee

Low Coercion N/A Syria 2012-2014 (Sunnis)

Prediction: Foment

Ethnic Identity

It is commonly acknowledged that the Syrian military is ethnically stacked.

Traditionally, Alawis suffered economically in Syria as they lived primarily in Syria’s poorly developed rural mountains and plains.127 Minorities were particularly attracted to the ascending Baath Party in Syria due to its secular, socialist program. As a result, Alawi representation in the military increased. Prior to 1963, Alawis had significant presence within the soldier and non-commissioned officer corps.128 As the Baath Party gained power, Alawis found themselves on the Military Committee and thus they “determined who went to the military academies, choosing people from social backgrounds they trusted—most often Alawites or rural Sunnis.”129 With Hafez al-Assad’s consolidation of power in 1970, the new President sought to place his Alawi kinsmen, and particularly

127 Mahmud A. Faksh, "The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force," Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 2 (1984): 138-139. 128 Batatu, Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance, 340-341. 129 Nir Rosen, "Assad's Alawites: The Guardians of the Throne," Al Jazeera, October 10, 2011.

303 those from Latakia, in positions of power.130 Yet, as Hicham Bou Nassif has pointed out, although Alawis were often promoted over non-Alawis, there was also a privileging of

“Alawis who have connections with the political or military elite” so that they were

“more likely to be promoted than their coreligionists who do not.”131 It appears that the

Al-Assad regime also actively worked to “mitigate the sectarian image of its special combat units and intelligence agencies” by ensuring that a number of Sunnis were able to advance to high positions with the military as well.132

As a result of the regime’s policies, on the eve of the uprising the vast majority of

Syria’s approximately 300,000 conscripts were Sunnis,133 mirroring the country’s Sunni demographic majority. Then, of its up to 200,000 officers, an estimated 70%134 to 80%135 are thought to have been Alawi in 2011. Interviews with soldiers show their own perceptions of unit ethnic composition. One intelligence colonel, for instance, estimated that only 10% of service members were Sunni,136 and another soldier felt that only 15% of his unit was Sunni in 2011.137 Military personnel also articulated their perception that all decision-makers within the armed forces were Alawi,138 and that Alawis dominated the military and political spheres.139

130 Ibid. 131 Bou Nassif, ‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces, 10. 132 Ibid., 16. 133 Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An Operational and Regional Analysis, 10-11. 134 Ibid., 10-11. 135 Ibid., 10-11. 136 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. 137 Author Interview with Syrian Former Soldier, Interview ID 40 (Amman, Jordan, January 30, 2015, 6pm). 138 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. 139 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37.

304 The vast majority of protesters since 2011 has been Sunni. In addition, the vast majority of soldiers who left the military since 2011 has been Sunni. Clearly, ethnicity has not been an absent dimension of the Syrian uprising and civil war. Still, it is also clear that ethnic identity did not automatically translate into soldiers’ decisions when the uprising erupted. First, most Sunnis remained in their positions at the start of the conflict, and obeyed orders to use force against protesters, despite the fact that fellow Sunni

Syrians were demonstrating. Second, ethnic identity is a static factor; yet, the rate of

Sunnis fleeing and fomenting revolt increased as the conflict progressed. At the least, this indicates that ethnicity does not directly translate into action, but rather must be mediated by additional variables. Third, although minorities such as Alawis and Druzes deserted and defected at lower rates than Sunnis, some did do so—minorities did not universally remain in the armed forces during the uprising. Given that the ethnicity argument is more complicated than it first appears, this section provides background regarding the degree to which ethnic identity was salient within the military ahead of the uprising, and how this changed as the conflict erupted.

Ethnicity was not particularly divisive in the military ahead of the uprising. In interviews, soldiers and particularly officers routinely stated that they just did not think about sect on a day-to-day basis, even though ethnic recruitment and promotion was apparent. One intelligence colonel with thirty years of service insisted that prior to the revolution there was no sectarianism in Syria. If you had asked a Sunni: “What is sectarianism?” he would respond “I don’t know!”, he argued.140 Another colonel with thirty-three years in the military also felt that there was no distinguishing among sects in

140 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35.

305 those years.141 Similarly, a lieutenant stated that before the uprising he felt that the military was strong, and he did not feel sectarianism in the armed forces. There were many backgrounds represented in the military academy, for instance, he said.142 To illustrate the lack of sectarianism within the military, personnel often offered examples of how soldiers from different sects socialized prior to the uprising. As one colonel remembered, he lived in the same housing area as Kurds, Alawis and other minorities, and everyone was a friend. He also recalled living with Christians in Halab and celebrating each other’s respective holidays (‘ayad).143 Another colonel painted a picture of him and his Alawi neighbors breaking bread together, as his own Sunni family would make hummus and dine with the neighbors.144 As one civilian summarized, there had been good relations between officers of different sects, and they often went out drinking and attending festivals together.145 The day-to-day friendliness among soldiers of different sects may have been a result of the regime’s emphasis on maintaining a secular military environment. As one lieutenant reflected, soldiers were never allowed to pray openly in the military, nor were they to show any outward displays of religion, such as reading the Quran.146

In addition to a lack of day-to-day incivility among sects in the military, Sunnis,

Alawis, and other groups also shared grievances that surmounted sectarian identification.

141 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 101 (Irbid, Jordan, May 9, 2015, time unrecorded). 142 Author Interview with Syrian Former Lieutenant in the 1st Corps, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 25. 143 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29 (Irbid, Jordan, August 25, 2014, 11am). 144 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Training Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 33. 145 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Working for Human Rights Organization, Interview ID 26. 146 Author Interview with Syrian Former Lieutenant in the 1st Corps, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 25.

306 A primary struggle for Syrians on the eve of the uprising was the dearth of economic opportunities in Syria. As the International Crisis Group reported in July 2011: “Even

Allawites… have had reason to complain, chafing at the sight of an ever-narrowing elite that does not even bother to redistribute wealth to its own community.”147 The economic pressures on Syrians were complemented by a desire for political reform, and Van Dam has argued that: “Many Alawis are just as eager for political change in Syria, as other

Syrians.”148 Demonstrations that have occurred in minority-dominant areas lend credence to these claims. Such demonstrations have occurred in the Alawi area of Latakia in

March 2011,149 the Druze “heartland” of Swedeh in April 2011, and the Ismaeli town of

Salamiya in April 2011.150 There are also accounts of shared grievances against the regime within the military. One officer, for instance, “estimated that three quarters of his colleagues felt some sympathy for the protesters.”151

Near the start of the uprising, however, one observer cautioned that: “The fact that the issue of sectarianism has, thus far, not figured prominently in discussions on recent violent developments in Syria does not mean that it is not an important undercurrent which could fundamentally undermine the possibility of achieving democracy as demanded by Syrian opposition groups.”152 And indeed, despite shared grievances, there were still divisions across ethno-religious groups that could be exacerbated by the crisis.

For instance, Bou Nassif has argued that within the military there were distinct Sunni grievances, notwithstanding the relative amicable relations among average officers of

147 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, ii. 148 Nikolaos Van Dam, Syria: The Dangerous Trap of Sectarianism (Syria Comment, April 14, 2011). 149 "Syria Unrest: Twelve Killed in Latakia Protest." 150 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 25. 151 Ibid., 27. 152 Van Dam, Syria: The Dangerous Trap of Sectarianism.

307 different sects. In particular his conversations uncovered how Sunni officers complained

“that even the few of them who do reach midranking or senior positions do not get the clout that normally accompanies such relatively high standing in the military hierarchy.”153

Once the crisis began, the regime worked to convince members of the Alawi sect in particular that the uprising was an existential challenge for them.154 A primary means of stoking sectarianism was the distribution of weapons to Alawis and rhetoric instructing minorities to protect themselves. For instance, there were reports that the regime shipped

“weapons and bags of sand – designed to erect fortifications” to rural Alawi areas in the early days of the non-violent protests, while inflating or simply inventing “stories of the protesters’ alleged sectarian barbarism.”155 Many Sunni interviewees shared similar perspectives, as they painted the regime as scaring Alawi and minority groups so that these populations felt they either stood with the regime or risked their very existence.156

These actions not only had the effect of prompting civilian minorities to protect the regime, but also appear to have bolstered support for the regime among Alawis serving in the military and security forces. Writing in late 2011, International Crisis Group reported

153 Bou Nassif, ‘Second-Class’: The Grievances of Sunni Officers in the Syrian Armed Forces, 10. 154 Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An Operational and Regional Analysis, 10.; Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 2. 155 Uncharted Waters: Thinking through Syria’s Dynamics, 2. 156 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20.; Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 27 (Irbid, Jordan, August 23, 2014, 2:30pm).; Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34; Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political. Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48 (Irbid, Jordan, February 7, 2015, 10am, follow-up February 14, 2015, 10:15am).; Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Interview ID 14 (Amman, Jordan, June 28, 2014, 7pm).

308 that Alawi security personnel “have become convinced that their fate is either to kill or be killed.”157

Indeed, one captain working in the Military Police described how his office seemed to split into two based on members’ reaction to the uprising—there were the

Alawis, and then there was everyone else.158 A first lieutenant recalled an experience from mid-March 2011 that highlighted how members of different sects viewed events at the start of the uprising. He arrived at work, a military court, and his primarily Alawi colleagues began asking him about events in Deraa as they knew he was from that city.

What do you want in Deraa?, they wondered and asked him. The first lieutenant remembers how he responded rather sarcastically: We want freedom, we want Rami

Makhlif (the corrupt tycoon) to disappear, we want cheaper communications! Although he had used a joking tone, he remembers the absolute silence that followed his comments.

Then, an Alawi judge broke the silence saying: “We will burn Deraa.” As the conflict progressed, he said his Alawi colleagues continued asking him about the uprising and potential political solutions. He felt these questions were so off the wall that he wondered if the men asking “were from a different planet.” He soon realized Alawis were extremely frightened and thought they would be killed if the Sunnis gained control of

Syria.159 In this way, sectarianism was made salient once the uprising hit, and distrust among soldiers of different sects polluted unit dynamics during the conflict. As one colonel lamented, from the first days of the protest, it was as if decades of common military service were completely forgotten in an instant. This officer lived in military

157 Uncharted Waters: Thinking through Syria’s Dynamics, 3. 158 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 159 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Court, Interview ID 39 (Irbid, Jordan, January 24, 2015, 2pm).

309 housing and found it dangerous to talk to anyone about his personal views of the conflict.

His neighbors and colleagues began to ask him: “Why are you going by car to Deraa?

They aren’t doing good things there,” for instance.160

Sectarianism was not particularly salient within the armed forces before the Arab

Spring. And yet, it is clear that due to the regime’s actions sectarian fears were stoked once the uprising erupted. Knowing a soldier’s sect tells us whether he was more or less likely to support the regime—clearly, Alawis were more likely to fight during the conflict.

But it was not the presence of ethno-religious markers that inevitably predicted the Syrian military’s reaction to unrest in the country, a fact made clear by the reality that many

Sunnis fought at the start of the uprising. Instead, we need to know more about how the military commanded its troops and how this particular uprising was perceived to more precisely explain why soldiers did not initially leave the military in high numbers but did so increasingly as the conflict progressed.

Material Incentives

There is not sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that soldiers acted in

2011 based on their financial interests. At the start of the uprising, life as a conscript through the ranks of a senior non-commissioned officer in the military was a financial hardship. Indeed, oftentimes these soldiers report they had to pick up second jobs to make ends meet for their families.161 In contrast, officers were much better off financially and

160 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Training Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 33. 161 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Who Previously Served as Military Conscript, Interview ID 21 (Amman, Jordan, August 19, 2014, 12pm).; Author Interview with Syrian Former Non-Commissioned Officer in Military Judiciary, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 38 (Irbid, Jordan, January 24, 2015,

310 stood to lose more if they left the service. One colonel described how in addition to his decent salary he took fifteen days of vacation in France each year.162 A general related how while in the military he had four cars at his disposal, as well as drivers, and the promise of a not insignificant retirement pension.163 As another colonel put it, as an officer deciding whether to leave the military, he knew he had all of these good things from the regime; was he supposed to just give them up?164 What is interesting is that he did decide to give them up.

As the conflict progressed, economic circumstances did as well. This was first related to the fact that the value of the Syrian pound dropped significantly in the course of the uprising, although these changes may have been partially alleviated by government increases in military salaries in March 2011165 and June 2013.166 But there were additional material shifts as well. Some interviewees reported being offered additional financial incentives to follow the regime’s orders. One warrant officer stated that he was offered money to lead a group that would steal from the people, as he put it.167 There were also rewards offered for information on individuals associated with terrorists, according to another conscript.168 A colonel spoke of smuggling and looting as common occurrences to pad soldiers’ paychecks.169 Bribes were yet another financial layer to the conflict.

12:30pm).; Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution (International Crisis Group, July 6, 2011), 27. 162 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 101. 163 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48. 164 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. 165 "President Al-Assad Issues Decrees on Increasing Salaries and Reducing Taxes Imposed on Them," Syrian Arab News Agency, March 24, 2011. 166 "President Al-Assad Decrees Increasing Monthly Salaries of the State’s Civil, Military Employees and the Retired." Syrian Arab News Agency, June 22, 2013. 167 Author Interview with Syrian Former Warrant Officer First Class in Air Force Security, Interview ID 50 (Irbid, Jordan, February 7, 2015, 2pm). 168 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscript, Interview ID 53 (Irbid, Jordan, February 14, 2015, time unrecorded). 169 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 101.

311 Junior officers and conscripts could pay bribes to their superiors to take a few days of vacation. In addition, military and security personnel were reported to have benefited from arrest campaigns as they could accumulate bribes during the detention and release process.170

These were the economic conditions inside the military. But there were also financial considerations outside the armed forces that influenced soldiers. One was the potential to offset some of the financial hardship of leaving the military by being paid by another actor. Many interviewees in Jordan, for instance, mentioned that Qatar171 and

Saudi Arabia172 provided replacement salaries to deserters for a time, but that these payments dried up quickly. One colonel specifically recalled that he received a salary of

475 JD ($668) when he first arrived in Jordan as a deserter; however, in the following months he received only 150 JD ($211) and even that ended within the year.173 Another colonel mentioned that deserters would receive an initial $600 paycheck but face extreme hardship thereafter.174 These financial sacrifices were exacerbated by the fact that combatants could not register as asylum seekers with aid organizations such as the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Although many individuals ended up joining the opposition in Syria based on their desire to fight, there were economic considerations surrounding that choice as for a period of time certain rebel groups did provide a paycheck to these former military personnel.

170 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 46. 171 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Interview ID 16 (Amman, Jordan, July 25, 2014, 9pm, follow-up interview August 1, 2014, 9pm). 172 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Training Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 33.; Author Interview with Syrian Former Officer in Political Security, Interview ID 99 (Irbid, Jordan, May 9, 2015, 10:15am). 173 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. 174 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35.

312 What is clear is that military conscripts and lower-ranking personnel had the least at stake financially in their service. These individuals were paid extremely meager salaries and did not benefit greatly from corruption networks that predated the uprising or developed during the conflict. In contrast, higher-level officers enjoyed slightly more lucrative salaries, in addition to perks and retirement benefits. They were also better positioned to exploit opportunities for economic gain outside their channels of official remuneration. Military personnel who fled Syria after 2011 might have considered the promise of a salary substitute when deciding to leave; but in any case, it is unlikely they expected to be more highly remunerated as asylum seekers as compared to Syrian government employees. Similarly, these former personnel may have expected to be compensated for their service in rebel groups. However, rebel group salaries did not meet the same standards as their former paychecks.

In all, this means that the degree to which soldiers economically benefited from the regime may have influenced their propensity to leave the service. Conscripts deserted in greater numbers than higher-ranking officers, and this could very well be because those in the upper echelons of the military were better compensated and had more to lose financially should they leave their positions. However, understanding soldiers’ economic incentives does not get us far in explaining their decision-making during the progressing conflict. First, at the start of the uprising even though military conscripts received abysmal salaries, it was rare for them to flee or foment revolt. Second, even though higher-level officers had much at stake financially in their positions, increasing numbers of these officers left their jobs as the conflict escalated. I interviewed numerous colonels and a general, all of whom had many years of service and perks from their positions, and

313 yet they left their financially secure position in Syria for the known alternative of life as a struggling refugee. Why?

Opposition Violence

The existing explanation regarding the effect of levels of opposition violence on soldier desertion rates is most clearly out of step with the evidence of this case. The

Syrian uprising began as a non-violent resistance campaign. Only over time did the opposition take up arms to fight regime forces. Yet, this move to violence is what temporally coincided with an increase in soldiers fleeing and fomenting revolt as the conflict progressed. As I explain further below, there is evidence that although citizens were rallying to maintain a non-violent approach at the start of the uprising, the regime’s control of soldiers’ access to information skewed their perception of the revolt. This, in combination with their strong orders to crack down on dissent, led them to fight hard at the very time when the demonstrators were most peaceful.

Start of the Uprising: 2011’s Fighting Majority

The majority of Syrian service members fought in the first phase of the Syrian uprising, which I define as from March to December 2011. I argue that the majority of soldiers fought because they were provided with clear and well-monitored orders to use force against the demonstrators, and they often perceived those on the streets as foreign- backed, disorderly terrorists at the start of the conflict.

314 Coercion

Syrian military personnel were given clear orders to use force against demonstrators. The costs of insubordination—the targeting of one’s family, or one’s own life—were well known and considered to be very likely detected due to military and security personnel closely monitoring and reporting on soldiers’ actions. Thus, as I explain, having clear orders was a key reason soldiers largely remained in their positions and used lethal force against fellow Syrians at the start of the 2011 uprising.

Strategy Formation and Dictation of Orders

Understanding the distribution of orders to military personnel in Syria begins with understanding where these orders came from. From the start, there is evidence that the president signed orders for the deployment of troops to combat the country’s growing demonstrations in early 2011. Although the president remained the key decision-maker in

Syria, however, additional elites surrounding him were involved in influencing those decisions as well as disseminating them to subordinate commanders. These elite structures were both formal and informal. Formally, General Ahmed Tlass, who served as

Director of the Office of Contracts at the Ministry of the Interior prior to fleeing Syria for

Jordan, stated: “Everyone has heard of the Crisis Management Division, established at the beginning of the uprising and placed under the formal authority of the Assistant

Regional Secretary of the Baath Party.”175 But he went on to elaborate that the regime’s strategy to combat the uprising was not hammered out in the Crisis Management Division, but among a group “of officers from different services, selected one by one, by name,

175 Francois Burgat, Testimony of General Ahmed Tlass on the Syrian Regime and the Repression (NORIA Research, April 28, 2014).

315 who are specifically assigned to their tasks and who work at the Presidential Palace. This committee, if one can call it such, since it has no name, is headed by Bashar al-Assad in person.”176 In this way, Bashar al-Assad not only had in place a crisis team to help organize operations to suppress the unrest, but he had also hand-selected a group of high- level officers to help him formulate the strategy itself.

Once the political-military elite had decided the approach to containing and suppressing the unrest, evidence shows that they clearly communicated these orders to general and field grade officers for their further dissemination. This was the case, for instance, with respect to orders for Syria’s 4th Division, commanded by the President’s brother Maher al-Assad. One leaked document dated April 25, 2011 is from the General

Command of the Army and Armed Forces’ Strategic Operational Planning Authority to the 4th Division Command. It states that the: “Fourth Division must be 100% alert and ready from 8:00 on 23/4/2011 until further notice”177 and includes a closing from Bashar al-Assad. As one 4th Division sniper deserter related, units deployed to Izra’ and Deraa

“were under the direct leadership of Maher al-Assad. All officers took orders directly from him. I know this because I often overheard officers asking each other if they had received this or that order from Maher and asking each other what he said about this or that.’”178 The Syrian regime at the start of the uprising lacked a decisive approach to react to the growing popular discontent. However, once a “security solution” was decided upon

176 Ibid. 177 Michael Weiss, "My Interview with a Defected Syrian Soldier; Plus, More Leaked Syrian Documents," The Telegraph, August 9, 2011. 178 Hugh Macleod and Annasofie Flamand, "Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights," Al-Jazeera, June 29, 2011.

316 by Syria’s elite, and communicated to the top brass “they finally understood what they were expected to do”179 and reliably cracked down on protesters.

If these were the general deployment orders during the unrest, how were more precise instructions about the conduct of these operations communicated to average personnel? Interviews show that soldiers received orders primarily from general and field grade officers in early 2011.

There is substantial evidence that generals communicated orders to use force against protesters. One soldier from the 4th Division stated that the brigadier general commanding his regiment at first told the soldiers not to shoot demonstrations. However,

“‘then he [the brigadier general] received additional orders from Maher [al-Assad]. He had some kind of paper that he showed the officers, and then the officers pointed their guns at us, and told us to shoot straight at the protesters. These officers later told me that the paper contained orders from Maher to “use all possible means.”’”180 Another 4th

Division soldier also mentioned that a brigadier general as well as a major general had given orders to fire on protesters in and around Damascus.181 Soldiers in other military units have told similar stories. For instance, one Special Forces soldier was deployed to

Deraa in April 2011 and stated that “he received direct verbal orders from the commander of his unit, Brigadier General [withheld], to open fire at the protesters.”182 Another

Special Forces sniper, who was deployed in Homs in May 2011, stated that two brigadier generals had command of the operations in Homs.183

179 Conflict Risk Alert: Syria’s Tipping Point (International Crisis Group, November 3, 2011). 180 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 34. 181 Ibid., 4. 182 Ibid., 4. 183 Ibid., 33.

317 Other soldiers related how they received their orders from field grade officers. Air

Force Intelligence Special Operations soldiers stated that they received orders from their colonel to shoot at protesters in Damascus in April 2011,184 and another Air Force

Intelligence soldier deployed to Deraa stated that his colonel had “given his unit orders to

‘stop the protesters by all possible means.’”185 Another leaked document from April 2011 provided maneouvre orders to a 4th Division colonel in command of a column.186 There were indications that some majors were providing instructions to soldiers during the initial phase of the uprising as well.187 Finally, although most soldiers reported receiving orders from individuals within their unit’s chain of command, there were isolated stories of these orders coming from outside one’s unit, including from security branch officers.188

In all, it was often the case that orders were transmitted orally rather than in written form.189

Substance of Orders

These were the general contours of who formed the regime’s strategy in Syria and how high-level officers were charged with communicating these orders to their subordinates.

There is also substantial evidence regarding the substance of these instructions. First, there are indications that soldiers were ordered to contain demonstrations. As one 4th

Division soldier recalled, his commanding brigadier general initially ordered the troops

184 Ibid., 4. 185 Ibid., 4. 186 Weiss, My Interview with a Defected Syrian Soldier; Plus, More Leaked Syrian Documents. 187 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters. 188 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 189 Author Interview with Syrian Former Warrant Officer First Class in Air Force Security, Interview ID 50.

318 not to shoot on demonstrations.190 However, it is clear that orders escalated as the regime adopted its “security solution” and sought to repress the unrest by whatever means necessary.

Soldiers were soon instructed to use live fire when deployed. According to

Human Rights Watch’s research, commanders “gave both direct and standing orders to use lethal force against the protesters”191 and all of their deserter interviewees stated that officers told them to “to stop the protests ‘by all means necessary’” and that they

“universally understood the phrase ‘by all means necessary’ as an authorization to use lethal force, especially given the provision of live ammunition as opposed to other means of crowd control.”192 In the words of one Presidential Guard conscript deployed in the suburbs of Damascus in April 2011:

“They gave each one of us a Kalashnikov [rifle] with two magazines, and there was more ammunition in the vehicles. They also gave us electric tasers….We received clear orders to shoot at civilians…The exact orders were ‘load and shoot.’ There were no conditions, no prerequisites. We got closer to the demonstrators, and when we were some five meters away, the officers shouted ‘fire!’”193

Deserters repeated similar stories regarding orders to open fire at protesters.194 Many also stated that they had been instructed not only to use force against demonstrators, but also specifically to kill them. One colonel I interviewed argued that although they were initially ordered to shoot on protesters by aiming for their legs, so as to not hurt them as gravely, they later received orders to kill—and it was forbidden not to comply.195 Soldiers

190 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 34. 191 Ibid., 2. 192 Ibid., 4. 193 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters. 194 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters.; Katherine Zoepf and Anthony Shadid, "Syrian Leader's Brother seen as Enforcer of Crackdown," The New York Times, June 7, 2011.; "Defectors from the Syrian Army." 195 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29.

319 deployed to Deraa in spring 2011 independently reiterated their receipt of such orders, recalling how they “‘received orders to kill protesters,’”196 “‘were only following orders and their orders were to kill, not to take prisoners,’”197 and were instructed that should they meet anyone on the street they should “‘detain or shoot.’”198

Soldiers received pre-mission orders to use lethal force against demonstrators and also appear to have received clarifications to such standing orders.199 One Military Police service member recalled his deployment in Deraa. His unit commander read aloud an order from the Military Police commanding general, which authorized the forces to “open fire ‘if attacked.’” In addition to this, however, the battalion commander “clarified the order, adding that ‘if anybody or anything comes your way, fire at them!’”200 Once the security solution was in full force, deserters related that their orders were not to hold anything back. A sniper stated that he was “‘ordered to aim for the head or heart…We were not given specific numbers but told to kill as many as possible as long as there were protests.’”201 One warrant officer stated that commanders were giving orders to do anything necessary to stop the revolution and keep the people silent, including attacking protesters, killing them, and using any weapons necessary.202 Human Rights Watch’s interviews with deserters also revealed that commanders “ordered, authorized, or condoned” arrests and beatings203 as well as firing when deployed during protests and

196 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters. 197 “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror”: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces 198 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters. 199 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 28. 200 Ibid., 32. 201 Macleod and Flamand, Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights. 202 Author Interview with Syrian Former Warrant Officer First Class in Air Force Security, Interview ID 50. 203 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 6.

320 gatherings.

Monitoring Once Orders Communicated

Not only did average soldiers receive clear orders to use lethal force against demonstrators, but also they also closely monitored to ensure that these orders were executed and not shirked. Indeed, the fear of pervasive monitoring within the Syrian Arab

Army was established long before the Arab Spring. As one Air Force general painted the picture:

“The way the army was structured was that there was always fear. It relied on fear. If you prayed twice, in a mosque or even during your duty, you were flagged as a threat, they labeled you as religious and of course that meant you are a threat to them. You are put under surveillance and you are questioned, even in their security reports you are labeled as religious, it was enough for you to pray to become labeled as a religious man. They went into details of your surroundings, is your wife veiled or not, is your family also religious?”204

Once the Arab Spring began, surveillance within the military took new meaning. One colonel defector gave his perception that at the start of 2011, Al-Assad had “‘hired spies to harass us’” and soldiers felt they “‘were always under surveillance.’”205 From speaking with former military personnel it is clear they felt monitored from multiple angles. The first was by the security and intelligence services.206 An Alawi officer defector, who had previously served as director for the Air Force Intelligence’s Office of the Chairman of the Special Operations Section, described the role of the Air Force Intelligence amid the uprising. He stated that “‘the mission of this apparatus is executing instructions that are

204 Russell Chapman, Interview with Zaid Tlass, Nephew of Mustafa Tlass Ex Syria Defense Minister (Russell Chapman Personal Website, June 27, 2013). 205 Jonathon Burch, "War is Only Option to Topple Syrian Leader: Colonel," Reuters, October 7, 2011. 206 Lachlan Carmichael, "Analysts: Syria's Army is Loyal, but Not Fail-Safe," Middle East Online, May 27, 2011.; Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 42 (Irbid, Jordan, January 31, 2015, 11am).

321 issued via orders from the high command,’” and that “‘the Air Force Intelligence undertake the role of supervisor and monitor for all the state’s institutions.’”207 Indeed, this monitoring was felt throughout the armed forces. As one general officer stated, the security officer (dabit al-amn) was the most important part of the division; those working with Military Intelligence or Air Force Intelligence knew 100% of soldiers’ behavior in the unit—from conscript to commander. In this general’s view, if a security or intelligence officer decided that the commander was not performing adequately, he could have that man removed.208

Monitoring was not limited to those of the security and intelligence services, however. According to a sniper who later defected, he and his colleagues were “closely monitored by officers who deployed with the soldiers to make sure they followed orders.”209 Former military personnel reinforced the fear of monitoring by informers embedded in their units. One colonel stated that although people were always wanting to desert it was hard to do so because everyone was monitoring everyone in the armed forces.210 For instance, a first lieutenant felt that the regime would receive a new report every thirty minutes, from the first days of the revolution, and thus the President would know everything happening within Syria in half an hour.211 A civilian who works in human rights estimated that seven out of every ten persons in Syria were security informers,212 reflecting citizens’ paranoia that their actions were being monitored.

If soldiers were generally fearful of individuals monitoring their behavior, Sunni

207 "‘Alawi’ Officer, Defector from the Syrian Regime: Areas of ‘Free Syrian Army’ Control Include Cities [ARABIC]," Al Hayat, July 9, 2012. 208 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48. 209 Macleod and Flamand, Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights. 210 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Training Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 33. 211 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Court, Interview ID 39. 212 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Working for Human Rights Organization, Interview ID 26.

322 soldiers were even more paranoid that Alawis serving in their units were assessing their emotions and behavior during the crisis. As one Intelligence colonel explained, even though he held a senior position in the armed forces, who was he in command of? Mostly

Alawis, he said. He went on to argue that these Alawis, even though they were subordinates, could observe him and report bad actions to the regime.213 Any stray move on his part would lead to dangerous reports on his leanings, said a captain, even if the

Alawi who wrote the report was of a lower rank.214 Alawi officers were always observing

Sunni officers, a colonel related, and because of this Sunnis were constantly under pressure.215 As another colonel explained, soldiers could not talk to one another about desertion because so few colleagues were from their hometown and so many were

Alawi,216 which meant the soldier could not trust them.

Monitoring by security, military, and additional personnel appears to have been facilitated throughout the conflict by heavy restrictions on soldiers taking leave. As one volunteer officer who served in Damascus at the start of the uprising explained, “we were on alert when the revolution started. We were hardly allowed to go and see our families.”217 As a result, soldiers remained closer to those who sought to monitor them.

There is also some evidence that it may have been easier to monitor officers as compared to lower-ranking soldiers. One Intelligence colonel felt this was the case, as high-ranking officers were constantly observed by the intelligence services (istikhbarat), which he felt

213 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. 214 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 215 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel Working in Military Finance Office, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 36. 216 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. 217 Robert King, "Interviews with Syrian Army Defectors," VICE, November 28, 2012.

323 made defection more difficult.218

Perceived continuous monitoring struck paralyzing fear in the hearts of many soldiers. One first lieutenant felt that everything he did was under surveillance and continued to emphasize how strong the regime’s monitoring was.219 Another conscript related how a fear developed among soldiers such that no one trusted another and soldiers were afraid to say anything in front of their colleagues.220 It was impossible to talk about any feelings you had against the regime’s actions, explained a soldier. He would have left his position on the first day deployed to combat the uprising; but, he was so worried and his horrendous fear kept him in his post.221

Fear of Punishment for Shirking

Soldiers largely followed their orders because those commands were clearly communicated and monitored, and also because of the dire fear of punishment should shirking be detected. The first fear soldiers articulated in our conversations was fear for their families should they choose insubordination. Soldiers—from conscript222 to colonel223—cited fear for their families’ safety as their primary concern when contemplating their own desertion. An Intelligence colonel related that the regime had no mercy and that deserters’ family members would—at the least—be arrested.224 One

Special Forces first lieutenant had been arrested and jailed for one month during the

218 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. 219 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Court, Interview ID 39. 220 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscript, Interview ID 53. 221 Author Interview with Syrian Former Soldier, Interview ID 40. 222 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20. 223 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. 224 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35.

324 uprising. At the end of his time in jail, a colonel asked him: “If we set you free, will you make problems? Will you defect?” The colonel went on to threaten him: “If you do, we’ll bring people [those close to you] in and execute them.”225 Military personnel were worried that family members might be raped, and that their homes might be looted and destroyed, were the regime to uncover the soldier’s insubordination.226

These fears for families’ safety were not without justification. Many deserters told stories about the targeting of their families, or other deserters’ loved ones. Following desertion or when insubordination was suspected, family members went missing,227 were questioned,228 were imprisoned,229 and were tortured;230 in addition, families’ property was threatened.231 The fear for your family is more than the fear for yourself, as one non- commissioned officer put it.232 As a result, soldiers faced a substantial obstacle to their own desertion or defection. For instance, a sniper who left his position continued to discuss the potential for desertion with a friend in the military. But each time he encouraged his friend to defect, he refused. The deserted sniper realized the friend was worried about his family’s safety and so decided not to leave his post. The friend had heard that the sniper’s family had been “‘interrogated, harassed, ostracized in their community’” and the only reason the family had been spared greater persecution was the

225 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in the Special Forces, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 30. 226 Author Interview with Syrian Former Warrant Officer First Class in Air Force Security, Interview ID 50. 227 Kevin Koehler Interview with Special Forces Deserter, Interview ID Hatay 2 (Hatay, Turkey, December 15, 2014). 228 Author Interview with Syrian Former Warrant Officer First Class in Air Force Security, Interview ID 50. 229 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29. 230 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48 231 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Interview ID 16. 232 Author Interview with Syrian Former Non-Commissioned Officer in Military Judiciary, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 38.

325 fact that many others in the family were serving loyally in the armed forces, in addition to the ambiguity surrounding whether the sniper had died or defected.233 As an intelligence officer put it: “‘All I could think about was that I had to leave the army….But I had to secure my family first.’”234

Although soldiers were immensely worried for their kin’s safety, they were also facing extreme stress regarding their own survival should they be suspected of disloyalty and insubordination. Soldiers routinely communicated to me that they felt military personnel could be arrested for just about anything once the uprising began. One soldier explained that an officer had the unilateral ability to arrest and do anything with a soldier he claimed had not fired when ordered.235 Another colonel described how he had given subtle indications of his displeasure with the military’s orders and was subsequently arrested. These small hints were definitely enough (kafi jidan) to get him arrested, he said, because a soldier could be arrested for as little as not showing he was annoyed when watching television reports of the continued unrest.236

Soldiers were not only worried about the potential for arrests, however, but also their execution should insubordination be uncovered. Multiple soldiers related having heard stories of soldiers killed for refusing to obey orders237 or actually witnessing such executions,238 and civilians circulated these stories as well.239 The fear for losing one’s

233 Rania Abouzeid, "The Confessions of a Sniper: A Rebel Gunman in Aleppo and His Conscience," TIME, December 4, 2012. 234 Maria Abi-Habib, "Defectors Recount Tales of Conflict; 'Blood on My Hands'," The Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2012. 235 Author Interview with Syrian Former Soldier, Interview ID 40. 236 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Engineering, Interview ID 44 (Irbid, Jordan, January 31, 2015, 1:30pm). 237 Macleod and Flamand, "Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights."; “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 8. 238 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 8.

326 own life at the hands of the regime and its loyalists was a strong incentive for many to remain in the military at the start of the conflict. As one Military Security conscript explained, many soldiers were opposed to the use of force against the opposition.

However, their higher officers forced them to do this because they would shoot you if you did not obey their commands. The conscript went on to explain that he knew of an officer who had left his position at the start of the protests and was later arrested; at the beginning of the revolution, he said, many soldiers were killed in this way.240 An

Intelligence colonel similarly related his perception that the regime would target soldiers for any insubordination. He explained that the price of desertion could be prison, death, or torture. The colonel went on to relate the types of torture used against deserters: forced eating and drinking, no access to restrooms, zipcording peoples’ hands and hanging them up only by the wrists, and pricking the soldier’s body with needles.241

Many soldiers assumed they would be shot in the back if they did not implement orders when deployed. Some soldiers related having received explicit orders to shoot on any seen to desert during deployments as well.242 More often, soldiers were concerned that non-military personnel would carry out the punishment to shoot those seen to be shirking their orders. In its interviews with deserters, Human Rights Watch found that

“[v]irtually all” felt their officer or intelligence personnel would shoot them if they did not crack down on protesters. Specifically, soldiers described an approach in which army and intelligence conscripts formed the front line deployed to confront protests. Officers

239 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 18 (Irbid, Jordan, August 15, 2014, 1pm). 240 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20. 241 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. 242 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 30.

327 and other intelligence personnel were then deployed to give and monitor orders. Human

Rights Watch related that a number of times “officers and intelligence agents explicitly threatened to kill soldiers if they did not follow orders.”243

My own interviews with both protesters, civilian witnesses, and military personnel reinforce this finding that soldiers perceived they were deployed in front of personnel ready to turn their guns on the soldiers, were they not to implement their orders.

One military conscript told me that 5,000 soldiers had been killed by security (al-amn), which was positioned behind them when deployed.244 Others felt that if they did not shoot on those they were deployed to suppress, then the regime’s militias would shoot them.245

As one said: “If we didn’t shoot at protesters, they would shoot us. I saw with my own eyes when my friend beside me refused to shoot at the protesters. A sniper shot him in the head.’”246 Civilians again circulated stories that reinforced these perceptions, arguing that

Military Police247 or Hezbollah and Iran-backed groups248 were deployed behind regular forces in order to hurt any soldier refusing to use lethal force when deployed. This combination of strong instructions, monitoring, and fear of punishment contributed to coercing Syrian soldiers to fight in 2011.

243 Ibid., 9. 244 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20. 245 "Defectors from the Syrian Army." 246 Ibid. 247 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Interview ID 16. 248 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Working in Charitable Organization for Syrian Refugees, Interview ID 19 (Irbid, Jordan, August 15, 2014, 3pm).

328 Persuasion

In addition to coercion, many of Syria’s troops felt there was a purpose behind their deployment as a segment of the uprising was framed as populated by foreign and disorderly elements.

Foreign Framing

The Syrian uprising drew a mass of citizens onto the streets. These individuals raised demands for greater political freedom and less corruption.249 By May 2011 demonstrators were directing their slogan “Friday of the Guardians of the Homeland” to members of the military in an effort to capitalize on the institution’s relationship with Syrian nationalism.250 Indeed, this led some to argue that the “diversity of the protesters” should in fact “be a source of encouragement for many elements in the regime – especially those in the army – to side with the people.”251 Yet, despite the scale of Syrians protesting on the streets, the universality of their demands for reform, and their specific call for military personnel to support their national cause, many members of the armed forces initially perceived the uprising to be led by foreign agents and I argue this increased troops’ willingness to execute orders to use force against those on the streets. In this section I show how the Syrian uprising took on a foreign frame due primarily to the regime’s rhetoric and its initial, strict control over soldiers’ access to and discussion of information.

249 Van Dam, Syria: The Dangerous Trap of Sectarianism. 250 Carmichael, Analysts: Syria's Army is Loyal, but Not Fail-Safe. 251 Al-Hendi, The Structure of Syria's Repression: Will the Army Break with the Regime?

329 Regime Rhetoric

As demonstrations escalated in Syria, the regime quickly moved to label citizens’ protests as a “foreign conspiracy” and “external plot” to harm Syria,252 particularly through the

President’s own speeches and reports in state media outlets. Bashar al-Assad’s first speech to the nation was in front of the Syrian Parliament on March 30, 2011. In that announcement, he immediately characterized what was occurring in Syria as instigated and exacerbated by a foreign actors. As he said: “I am sure you all know that Syria is facing a great conspiracy whose tentacles extend to some nearby countries and far-away countries, with some inside the country.”253 After recognizing that not all protesters were

“conspirators,” he went on to say that it had slowly become clearer to the government that elements of sabotage were linked to a foreign conspiracy. “Some satellite T.V. stations actually spoke about attacking certain buildings an hour before they were actually attacked. How did they know that? Do they read the future?,” he asked rhetorically, implying that foreign-operating television stations were connected to events on the ground in his country. “They will say that we believe in the conspiracy theory. In fact there is no conspiracy theory. There is a conspiracy,”254 he declared. The President went on to claim that the government was dissecting the “whole structure of this conspiracy” but had already discovered that particular groups operating in various Syrian governorates had links to external actors.255

252 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 7. 253 "Speech to the Syrian Parliament by President Bashar Al-Assad: Wednesday, March 30, 2011," Syria Comment, last modified March 30, 2011, accessed May 25, 2016, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/speech-to-the-syrian-parliament-by-president-bashar-al-assad- wednesday-march-30-2011/. 254 Ibid. 255 Ibid.

330 In his subsequent speech on April 16, 2011, Al-Assad spent more time discussing the reforms he was pursuing in Syria, but also stressed the need to weaken the foreign conspiracy threatening the country.256 On June 20, 2011, in his third speech directed to the nation, the President had even more pointed remarks about foreign interference in the country. He began by implying that Syrians had been asking themselves a series of questions: “What is happening to our country, and why? Is it a conspiracy, and if so, who stands behind it? Or is it our fault, and if so, what is this fault?”257 He followed this by arguing that external actors were “applying pressure on Syria and trying to interfere in the internal affairs” of the nation.258 Then, Al-Assad worked to reinforce the notion that what was happening in Syria was populated by different elements—a portion of whom were

Syrian nationals, but many of whom were alien to Syria. He argued that some people calling for reform constituted “a part of our national component” and these individuals

“had no foreign agenda and no foreign connections” and in fact “were against any foreign intervention under any pretext.”259

Thus, from the earliest days of the uprising, Al-Assad sought to have his cake and eat it too in his official speeches. He did not attempt to paint the entire uprising as a foreign conspiracy. The President instead recognized, rhetorically, that a segment of the

Syrian population was working with the government to voice its concerns and build up

Syria. However, he also reinforced the message that a smaller, but extremely destructive, component of the upheaval in Syria was backed by foreign actors and those who sought

256 "Syria: Speech by Bashar Al-Assad," Al-Bab, last modified April 16, 2011, accessed May 25, 2016, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/syria/bashar_assad_speech_110416.htm. 257 "Syria: Speech by Bashar Al-Assad," Al-Bab, last modified June 20, 2011, accessed May 25, 2016, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/syria/bashar_assad_speech_110620.htm. 258 Ibid. 259 Ibid.

331 to involve other states in Syria’s internal affairs. These same messages were underlined throughout Syria’s state media, which pinned any critical and destructive elements of the emerging uprising on foreign actors. In April 2011, for instance, the Syrian Arab News

Agency (SANA) reported that the government had intercepted weapons, ammunition, and tactical equipment being smuggled in from Iraq.260 By May 2011, Syrian television was broadcasting what it stated were confessions from terrorists who had operated in Deraa, and who admitted to receiving funding and weapons from external actors.261 Indeed, the regime’s media worked specifically to implicate the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar others in the protest movement.262

Al-Assad also sought to cast a foreign “Islamist” framing for the events progressing in Syria.263 Doing so allowed the regime to frame a component of the opposition in Syria as Sunni radicalist; as a result, the emphasis on Salafism became a

“leitmotiv in the official narrative” and helped the regime “explain popular protests through a strictly religious and sectarian lens.”264 The regime succeeded in influencing soldiers’ willingness to execute orders to use force against the demonstrations not simply because it created a sectarian dichotomy. Doing so would have failed to influence the

Sunni rank and file’s decision to use force against those on the streets. Instead, by also linking the protesters to “Salafis, Jihadists, Muslim Brotherhood supporters, al-Qaeda and terrorists”265 the regime was disassociating the uprising from the grievances of Syrians and connecting the revolt to transnational networks. In his speech in June 2011, for

260 Nicholas Blanford, "Why does Syria See a Threat Coming from Tiny Lebanon?" Lebanon Wire, April 21, 2011. 261 "Syria TV Broadcasts Confessions of ‘Terrorist Group’," Al-Manar, May 8, 2011. 262 Syria: Quickly Going Beyond the Point of No Return (International Crisis Group, May 3, 2011). 263 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, i-ii. 264 Ibid., 20. 265 "Q&A: Nir Rosen on Syria's Armed Opposition," Al Jazeera, February 13, 2012.

332 instance, Bashar Al-Assad argued that in addition to legitimate protesters, and those serving foreign interests, “those who have extremist and takfiri ideology” represented a third and “more dangerous component” of the unrest in the country. In Al-Assad’s description, these religious extremists had “tried to infiltrate Syria” in previous decades— an allusion to the Islamic activism in the 1970s and early 1980s that contributed to the uprising in Hama, which the regime suppressed. State media again reinforced the theme that foreign-backed Islamist groups contributed to the unrest in Syria. That spring, for instance, Syrian television aired confessions of Muslim Brotherhood members, “who claimed to have been planning to incite protests and form armed groups” with guidance from a Lebanese member of parliament.266 The regime worked to highlight the differences between the ostensibly foreign interest-backed opposition and the true Syrian, nationalist regime supporters. For instance, in October 2011 state supported television covered pro-government demonstrations in Damascus in which participants “were waving Syrian flags, holding pictures of the president and chanting, ‘The people want

Bashar al-Assad’” under the banner “‘Long live the homeland and the leader of the homeland.’”267

The government’s efforts to paint the opposition as foreign-backed seemed to resonate with a section of Syria’s population. One Sunni whose father remained a general in the military throughout the conflict brought this up in our conversation. He mentioned allegations that the regime had used chemical weapons in confronting the uprising in

Syria. But he said that the regime did not have any use for such weapons and instead he pointed to the influence of third parties in Syria who were seeking to fan the flames

266 Blanford, Why does Syria See a Threat Coming from Tiny Lebanon? 267 Nada Bakri, "Defectors Claim Attack that Killed Syria Soldiers," The New York Times, October 26, 2011.

333 between Syrians and the regime.268 Many Alawis in particular seem to have felt resonate the government’s message concerning the role of foreign agents in Syria. One Alawi sergeant in the security forces spoke to a journalist and showed him a bullet injury he survived; the sergeant’s brother said simply: “‘It’s al-Qaeda.’”269 The real test, of course, was whether the regime’s soldiers would perceive the uprising as foreign-backed, and whether this would affect their behavior when ordered to use force against those demonstrations.

Regime Rhetoric Targets Soldiers

The regime worked to specifically market the uprising as foreign to soldiers. First, it made very general claims that soldiers would be deployed against foreigners. As one captain explained, the government framed the unrest as a foreign affair and thus any foreigner on the street was considered an agent during the uprising.270 It appears that this perception was conferred as part of the regular communication through the military chain of command. One Kurdish sergeant recalled being told when deployed “that the eight we had killed in the protest had all been foreigners.”271 Other military personnel described daily meetings held to transmit information to the soldiers. One sniper, for instance, described morning meetings in which officers “‘would repeat the conspiracies against

Syria, such as people being planted by foreign forces among protesters to kill civilians and soldiers.’” As he explained, “‘They would say: “Of course we will not accept

268 Author Interview with Syrian Sunni Civilian Regime Supporter, Originally from Aleppo, Interview ID 15. 269 Rosen, Assad's Alawites: The Guardians of the Throne. 270 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 271 Slater, Former Syrian Soldier Describes Life in the Army at the Start of War.

334 protesters calling for the toppling of our beloved President Bashar al-Assad. Those people chanting like this are hired by foreign forces and we should get rid of them.”’”272 I interviewed one general who had worked in Political Administration and discussed how the Baath Party implemented psychological war (harb nifsiya) in military units by using lectures, distribution of particular pictures, and film to frame the uprising as a foreign conspiracy.273

Soldiers frequently described the specific foreign entities that they were told backed the unrest in Syria. At the head of the list were the United States and Israel. A conscript mentioned that there was much propaganda during the conflict characterizing events as an Israeli intervention; he remembers, for instance, being shown pictures of individuals in Baniyas raising the Israeli flag.274 Deserters told Human Rights Watch that the 3rd Division commander and 65th Brigade commander told their forces that “they would need to fight armed groups ‘supported by Israel and the US.’”275 Similarly, a deserter deployed to Deir al-Zour recalled his colonel battalion commander beating detainees as he “‘demanded that they confess to being terrorists, having weapons, and receiving money from the US and Saad al-Hariri [a former Lebanese prime minister].’”276

There were also frequent claims that Gulf actors, mentioned as U.S. allies, were supporting the opposition in Syria. One general argued that the regime had worked to frame the uprising as originating outside Syria, including in the Gulf (khaleej).277 A former Special Forces member deployed to Syria’s coast remembered being told “‘there

272 Macleod and Flamand, Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights. 273 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48. 274 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscript, Interview ID 54 (Irbid, Jordan, February 14, 2015, time unrecorded). 275 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 31. 276 Ibid., 48. 277 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48.

335 are terrorist groups coming into the country,” which received funding from Saudi Arabia,

Lebanon, and the United States.278 It seems that nearly any potential foreign enemy was named a conspirator in the uprising. As one Kurdish sergeant recalled: “‘We were told repeatedly that the protests were instigated by infiltrating foreigners, mostly supported by the U.S. and Western powers to undermine Syria, and that most of the protesters weren’t even Syrian. We were told they were Iranians, Afghanis, Americans, and Pakistanis forming these groups.’”279 Indeed, soldiers and security personnel reported receiving leaflets describing “infiltrators and salafists in the country” that had to be combatted, and who were paid by “Bandar Bin Sultan and Saad Hariri,”280 of Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, respectively.

Regime Controls Soldiers’ Access to Information

This framing of the uprising was facilitated by soldiers’ lack of access to information through the start of the revolt. Many described their feeling that they knew very little about what was happening in Syria. One deserter said bluntly: “We didn’t know anything in the beginning. We didn’t know what was happening.”281 Another explained: “Not everybody knows what is going on. I am sure that until now there are people in the army who don’t know what is going on.”282 How could this have been the case in 2011? First, the regime attempted to limit soldiers’ media consumption to state run and supported

278 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters. 279 Slater, Former Syrian Soldier Describes Life in the Army at the Start of War. 280 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters. 281 Kevin Koehler Interview with Military Deserter, Interview ID Hatay 1 (Hatay, Turkey, December 15, 2014). 282 Kevin Koehler Interview with Special Forces Deserter, Interview ID Hatay 2.

336 outlets.283 Some soldiers described having access neither to television,284 nor newspapers, radio, and the internet.285 Others explained that particular stations were forbidden

(mamnua’) once the uprising broke out.286 This lack of access to information was not limited to military conscripts, but applied to officers equally.287

Many soldiers were also hamstrung in receiving diverse sources of news about the uprising because the regime sought to eliminate access to telephones. One Military Police conscript explained that after intense protests in Deraa on March 18: “‘The very next day they confiscated our cell phones’”288 and other soldiers reported that their personal phones were taken.289 Former military personnel also explained their difficulty in communicating with their families during the revolt. “I rarely got to speak with my parents on the phone,”290 said one deserter. A Military Security conscript with whom I spoke stated that he had absolutely no communications through June 2011 and it was only then he was able to talk to his family.291 Another non-commissioned officer recalled a soldier from Rastan asking him whether he had any news of events in Rastan and questioned the NCO as to whether he could call his family; it was clear that he had been unable to communicate with them through the start of the uprising.292 Even when he could finally get in touch with his family, a first lieutenant from Deraa mentioned, it was

283 Kevin Koehler Interview with Military Deserter, Interview ID Reyhanli 1 (Reyhanli, Turkey, December 16, 2014). 284 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Interview ID 98. 285 Macleod and Flamand, Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights. 286 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscript, Interview ID 54. 287 Nir Rosen, "Syria: The Revolution Will be Weaponised," Al Jazeera, September 23, 2011. 288 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 20. 289 Rosen, Syria: The Revolution Will be Weaponised. 290 Slater, Former Syrian Soldier Describes Life in the Army at the Start of War. 291 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20. 292 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Non-Commissioned Officer with Tanks Specialty, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 28.

337 impossible to speak candidly with them. His father had told him that everything was fine in Deraa. It was only later that the officer realized his father was not giving him an accurate portrait of life in Deraa for fear of his son’s security and mental wellbeing.293

There were of course exceptions to the regime’s monopoly over information.

Soldiers described using their phones secretly despite orders not to.294 One captain argued that his elevated rank aided him in having access to a telephone and talking with a more diverse group of people.295 Others benefitted from more serendipitous circumstances. One

NCO was able to talk to his family by phone, for instance, because both he and the soldier in charge of communications were from Deraa.296 Another soldier was deployed to Damascus and able to interact with relatives there who “knew a bit more of what was going on around me,” he explained.297 Soldiers on average had limited and skewed access to information, however.

Illegitimate Tactics

Similar to the protests’ foreign patina, it was also not inevitable that the demonstrations would be characterized as employing illegitimate tactics. Spontaneous protests initially sought a peaceful uprising. Those who witnessed the initial demonstrations in Deraa, for instance, described protesters who were “often carrying olive branches, unbuttoning their shirts to show that they had no weapons, and chanting ‘peaceful, peaceful’ to indicate that

293 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 27. 294 Author Interview with Syrian Former Soldier, Interview ID 40. 295 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Interview ID 98. 296 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Non-Commissioned Officer with Tanks Specialty, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 28. 297 Kevin Koehler Interview with Military Deserter, Interview ID Reyhanli 1.

338 they posed no threat to the security forces.”298 Yet, the uprising came to be perceived as employing illegitimate tactics due to the opposition’s missteps, the apparent planting of arms by the regime, and the regime’s rhetoric painting the uprising as led by destructive terrorists.

Regime Capitalizes on Opposition Missteps

Some initial opposition missteps gave the regime fodder in its painting of the uprising as disorderly. Specifically, once the regime began using violence against the non-violent protesters, there were increasing reports that the demonstrators were picking up arms. For example, by late March 2011 some citizens in Deraa had “set several buildings on fire, including the governor’s house and the political security building, burnt Bashar al-Asad’s photo monument, and tried to topple the statue of Hafiz al-Asad. They also set several vehicles belonging to the security forces on fire,”299 and there were also reports of a demonstrator killing security force members.300 According to others, the opposition’s use of violence did not truly begin until late April, following the regime’s use of violence throughout that month.301 Indeed, late April and early May saw the development of armed resistance in Homs, Idlib, and Damascus, according to Nir Rosen.302 As one Colonel told me, the regime was able to frame this as a “terrorist” (irhabi) war because the opposition began using weapons.303 Many interviewees were also quick to tell me that the regime not only pushed the opposition to use violent tactics in reaction to the regime’s own use of

298 “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror”: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces. 299 Ibid. 300 Ibid. 301 "Q&A: Nir Rosen on Syria's Armed Opposition." 302 Ibid. 303 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29.

339 lethal force, but also that the regime specifically planted arms among the opposition to push it to use violence.304 Others have argued that the regime secretly perpetrated violent attacks that it then claimed were executed by the opposition.305

The Syrian regime exploited and highlighted the opposition’s change in tactics, and this was evident in Al-Assad’s speeches as well as state-run media. From his first announcement on March 30, the President discussed how the discontent in Syria was linked to those calling for reform and a response to their daily needs, but also elements of

“sedition.”306 These “conspirators” operated in Deraa, Latakia and elsewhere, he claimed,

“using the same techniques; murder, intimidation, and incitement.”307 The theme was further emphasized in Al-Assad’s later speeches. In April 2011 he underscored that the

Syrian security apparatus was simply working to protect protesters from those who were damaging property, undertaking sabotage, and threatening public security. He again walked a fine line, arguing that there was a group of legitimate protesters and that the government was enacting reforms to meet their needs, while pointing to those with

“intentions of creating chaos and sabotage,” who the Ministry of Interior would not tolerate. For the sake of the Syrian people, the President said, the state would combat these instigators’ chaos and reinstate law and order.308

When he spoke to the nation in June 2011, Bashar al-Assad opened his speech by saying: “Peace be upon you, upon all those who are protecting this dear and precious homeland. Peace be upon the people, the army, the security forces and all those who have

304 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Interview ID 14.; Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29.; Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 49 (Irbid, Jordan, February 7, 2015, 12:30pm).; Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Originally from Palmyra, Interview ID 96. 305 “We Live as in War”: Crackdown on Protesters in the Governorate of Homs. 306 Landis, Speech to the Syrian Parliament by President Bashar Al-Assad: Wednesday, March 30, 2011 307 Ibid. 308 "Syria: Speech by Bashar Al-Assad."

340 been working to insure the prevention of sedition; burying it in the detestable snake holes where it belongs.”309 Again, the President was reaffirming the image he had constructed: that of a country wracked by chaos but being held together by the virtuous Syrian population and particularly the country’s armed forces. Al-Assad used further imagery, painting a picture of martyrs’ blood soaking the fields due to the season “of conspiracy and killing.”310 The perpetrators of violence and unrest in Syria had hijacked peaceful demonstrations, the President explained, and attacked not only civilians but also law enforcement personnel. A long list of violations was pinned on these persons, including forcefully shutting down public life in Syrian townships, destroying property, perpetrating arson, and disrupting traffic between cities. “All of this has posed a direct threat to the normal daily life of the citizens and undermined their security, education, economic activity, and communicating with their families,” the President argued.311

These “outlaws” were in fact the more than 60,000 persons currently wanted by the

Syrian authorities, he explained, and who had exploited unrest to further their own

“illegitimate interests.” “If a few thousands of those wanted to carry weapons and engage in sabotage, you can imagine what damage can be caused to the state,” he stated.312 The

President used the threat of these destructive actors to legitimize the deployment of the military in Syria that summer. “We want a political solution and want the army to go back to its barracks as soon as possible,” he said; however, he argued: “There is no political solution for those who carry weapons and kill.”313

309 "Syria: Speech by Bashar Al-Assad." 310 Ibid. 311 Ibid. 312 Ibid. 313 Ibid.

341 Again, similar to its construction of the narrative that the unrest in Syria was instigated by foreign actors, the state also turned to its media apparatus to frame the uprising as composed of terrorists, gang members, and other disorderly elements who were employing illegitimate tactics and harming Syria. Early in the uprising, in March

2011, SANA reported that an “armed gang” had attacked a medical team in Deraa. Due to the threat, the security forces would “continue pursuing the armed gangs which terrify civilians, and execute killings, in addition to looting and burning public and private facilities.”314 State news continued to report that month on the “chaos and unrest” perpetrated by “rioters,” including property damage and arson. For this reason, law enforcement was “stepping in to protect citizens.”315 This theme was continued in

SANA’s April 2011 coverage. Gunmen were reported to have fired on civilians and law enforcement personnel in Deraa, prompting the city’s citizens to express “frustration with the state of chaos, insecurity and terrorizing of people caused by the armed groups.”316

Further acts of vandalism were perpetrated in northwestern Syria by “saboteurs” and

“armed groups on motorbikes.”317 Furthermore, criminal “terrorists and thugs” were said to have attacked Syrian soldiers in Baniyas that April,318 as well as in Homs,319 resulting in deaths and injuries. In May 2011 such reports continued. Syrian television aired a

“terrorist” group’s confession that it had perpetrated an attack on a compound housing

314 "Official Source…Armed Gang Attacks Medical Team in Daraa Killing Doctor, Paramedic, Driver, Security Member," Syrian Arab News Agency, March 23, 2011. 315 "Instigators Mingle with Crowds of Prayers Trying to Cause Chaos in Daraa & Banias," Syrian Arab News Agency, March 18, 2011. 316 "Official Source: Armed Groups Shoot Citizens, Policemen in Daraa, Claim Scores of Lives," Syrian Arab News Agency, April 9, 2011. 317 Ibid. 318 "Syrian Army Martyrs Laid to Rest... List of Names of the Injured," Syrian Arab News Agency, April 11, 2011. 319 "Armed Criminal Groups Shot and Mutilated Army Officer and His Family," Syrian Arab News Agency, April 18, 2011.

342 military families.320 And according to SANA, a military source reported that the armed forces had almost completed their mission to restore law and order in Deraa. The

“remaining armed terrorist members…terrorized people and left behind panic, destruction and killing in all neighborhoods” and would be pursued until the city was safe for civilians again.321

By June 2011, following a bloody confrontation in Jisr al-Shughour, the government “published tapped phone calls of activists in Jisr that it collected on the eve of the initial combat.” The tapes depicted activists who had constructed a plan to “tell foreigners that Syrian military personnel shot each other” and to falsely report “[w]hen enlisted men refused to shoot on unarmed demonstrators, their Alawi officers mowed them down.”322 The regime also continuously posted information regarding the number of military and security personnel who had been killed in confrontations with the protesters.

Taking the example of the Jisr al-Shughour campaign again, the regime stated that

“armed gangs” had killed 120 service members in the area.323

Similar to the regime’s framing of the opposition as foreign, there is also evidence that a section of Syrian society believed the regime’s framing of the opposition as overly violent. One extended interview I held with a Sunni whose father remained a general in the armed forces during the uprising revealed the extent that some civilians saw the revolt as using illegitimate violence in Syria. This individual mentioned multiple events near the start of the uprising that reinforced his view that it was shockingly disorderly. First, he described traveling in a military vehicle that was suddenly surrounded by armed men

320 "Syria TV Broadcasts Confessions of ‘Terrorist Group’." 321 "Official Military Source: Mission of Army Units in Daraa Nears Completion," Syrian Arab News Agency, May 4, 2011. 322 Joshua Landis, What Happened at Jisr Al-Shagour? (Syria Comment, June 13, 2011). 323 Zoepf and Shadid, Syrian Leader's Brother seen as Enforcer of Crackdown.

343 who were firing on it. This struck him with fear for the first time in his life, he said.324

Later in the uprising, his family moved to Damascus when his father was restationed. He told me that gunmen arrived at their home on the military base one day and began shooting on the complex; they injured some, including a young girl. There were no active duty personnel present as it was the middle of the work day; there were only families there at the time. He described watching videos of men being decapitated by the opposition and asked rhetorically: Do these people not have feelings?325 He told many such stories that to him reinforced the fact that the opposition was using illegitimate tactics. He was not alone in his confusion regarding the nature of the opposition. As the

International Crisis Group wrote in July 2011: “Enduring instability, heightened levels of violence and the regime’s claim that demonstrators looted private property and were motivated by sectarian concerns, as well as the overall lack of reliable information, plunged a large number of Damascenes into a state of confusion and anxiety”326 in the first months of the conflict. But again, the question was whether the regime could influence soldiers’ perceptions of the unrest and by framing the events as unnecessarily violent convince the troops to use lethal force against demonstrators.

Regime Rhetoric Targets Soldiers

Early in the uprising the regime was using the language of combatting “armed gangs,”327

324 Author Interview with Syrian Sunni Civilian Regime Supporter, Originally from Aleppo, Interview ID 15. 325 Ibid. 326 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 11. 327 "Syrian Soldiers Shot for Refusing to Fire on Protesters," The Guardian, April 12, 2011.

344 “‘agents provocateurs,’”328 “jihadis,”329 and terrorists330 to legitimize its crackdown on protesters. Soldiers were even more susceptible than civilians of believing these claims as troops were often segregated from society and had limited access to information. As one sergeant told me, soldiers only received cultivated news. The message they initially received was that the regime was putting everything down and everything was fine.331

The government television channels told viewers that those opposing the government were terrorists, members of Daesh (the Islamic State), and people who were killing civilians.332 One individual, who claimed he worked in the presidential palace’s press office, stated that at the start of the uprising he was charged with launching a “pro-regime

TV station in Aleppo” that would host guests that supported the regime.333 Individuals on government backed stations would “‘say that the massacres against men, women and children were perpetrated by armed gangs, when it was actually the Syrian regime, security forces and the Shabiha’ – the progovernment militia – ‘who were behind these horrendous acts,’” he said.334

It is again helpful to focus in on the events that took place in Jisr al-Shughour as a microcosm of these dynamics at work. Amid the confrontation in that town in June 2011, the state-backed news station reported: “‘Armed groups in Jisr al-Shughour attacked a police station to which civilians had fled out of fear of these groups, which terrorised citizens... the security forces and policemen. Violent clashes erupted between the police

328 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 10. 329 Syria: Quickly Going Beyond the Point of No Return. 330 “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror”: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces. 331 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Sergeant in 4th Division, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 24. 332 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 18. 333 Ivan Watson and Raja Razek, "Defecting Syrian Propagandist Says His Job was 'to Fabricate'," CNN News, October 10, 2012. 334 Ibid.

345 and these groups, which used medium-size firearms, machine-guns, grenades and

RPGs.’”335 The station then aired “interviews with people calling on the army to clear Jisr al-Shughour of armed gangs they said had been terrorising the place.”336 The Minister of

Interior subsequently used these assessments to justify the further deployment of the army, arguing that the institution would “‘carry out their national duty to restore security.’”337 This event reflects the regime’s general strategy of framing itself as

“persecuted by armed groups, innocent of any misdeed and striving to uphold national unity.”338

As they could only watch regime-controlled channels, soldiers were confused about what was occurring in Syria. As one Special Forces first lieutenant said, you were made to think those on the streets were members of terrorist groups.339 An officer told a journalist that one of his soldiers came to him after finally seeing Al Jazeera (more impartial) coverage of a demonstration. The soldier asked him “‘“sir is it possible this is in Syria and they are really asking for the fall of the regime?”’”340 highlighting how little some soldiers knew of the events occurring in Syria, and how they were primed to view the unrest as the work of foreign terrorists rather than Syrians inspiring peaceful political reform for the country.

In addition to their control over the popular media, the regime also sought more direct channels to influence how soldiers perceived the uprising. Soldiers described how

335 "Syria: What really Happened in Jisr Al-Shughour?" BBC News, June 7, 2011. 336 Ibid. 337 Ibid. 338 Syria: Quickly Going Beyond the Point of No Return. 339 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in the Special Forces, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 30. 340 Rosen, Syria: The Revolution Will be Weaponised.

346 commanders told them that protesters were out to rape women341 and that these were terrorists.342 This was conveyed in military propaganda directed towards soldiers as well as being an intrinsic part of soldiers’ orders themselves.

Military propaganda was described as political promotion (tarwij siyasi) and included special briefings, updates, radio programs, and lectures for soldiers. A general officer who worked at the nexus of the party and military described this “tarwij siyasi” and how his job had always been to work to persuade soldiers that Al-Assad was a good ruler who protected the Arabs. He admitted that he had done this job, painting this as a national regime, successfully for years. Yet the way in which this political promotion was executed changed during the uprising. One former Syrian communications officer recalled how he had worked for years writing news updates for the military. It was only after protests escalated in March 2011 that commanders provided pre-drafted announcements to him. Specifically, he said that such pre-approved statements would report, “that terrorist gangs were attacking civilians.”343 In addition to the items they read in print, soldiers were also orally briefed on terrorist threats, on what appeared to be a near daily basis. One conscript who had been serving in the suburbs of Damascus recalled how commanders led a meeting each morning in which they would talk “‘about how good Assad and his family were, and about the threats from the terrorists.”344 Other deserters have described how amid the uprising, each morning “after saluting the Syrian flag” soldiers were “told that opposition forces are fueled by sectarian hatred and want to

341 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 49. 342 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters.; Abi-Habib, Defectors Recount Tales of Conflict; 'Blood on My Hands'. 343 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 21. 344 Ibid., 20.

347 tear the country apart,”345 in other words, that the opposition was seeking to completely undermine Syrian society. This theme was repeated by a lieutenant who had served in

Damascus, who described morning guidance briefings (nasharat tawjeeh) in which soldiers were told they were facing “‘gangs and infiltrators’” and shown “‘pictures of dead soldiers and security forces.’”346

Political propaganda targeting soldiers framed the uprising as destructive, disorderly, and illegal. In addition to receiving this message through news bulletins and briefings, troops were struck by it in their very orders themselves. As one soldier said, when deployed in May 2011, his commander told the troops “‘that anyone shouting

“Allahu Akbar” from the rooftops was a terrorist’”347 and thus a target for the soldiers.

Similarly, another soldier deployed to Deraa reported that his commanders had told the rank and file, in his words, that “‘we were fighting terrorist groups and that we had to get rid of them.’”348 My interviewees repeated such stories. One sergeant, for instance, remembered his first deployment during the uprising. They were told that it would be a twenty-four-hour mission starting at night and that they were heading to a mountainous area where a terrorist group was based.349 The regime continuously promoted the image that those protesting were terrorists, a sergeant major put simply.

345 Raja Abdulrahim, "Syrian Soldiers Warned Daily of Sectarian Dangers, Defectors Say," Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2013. 346 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 21. 347 Ibid., 33-34. 348 Ibid., 37. 349 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Sergeant in 4th Division, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 24.

348 Resultant Fighting

Influence of Coercion

Clear and monitored orders, accompanied by a reliable threat of punishment, heavily influenced soldier decision-making in spring 2011 and encouraged many military personnel to remain in their posts and use lethal force to suppress Syria’s uprising. Fear operated throughout the ranks. One military conscript argued that although soldiers opposed using force against the opposition, they knew they had to do so or they would be shot.350 An Intelligence colonel related that he knew his behavior and speech were being closely monitored each day and so he did not give any indication that he supported the opposition.351 Fear was the main reason for remaining in the military, another colonel explained; any information on you and your considering desertion would lead to your death.352 The fear of one’s true preferences being detected led many to put on a public mask. One first lieutenant, for instance, explained that he would try to cover up his pro- reform feelings by using bad words to refer to events on the ground.353 As eventual deserter General Ahmed Tlass summarized: “An officer friend told me: ‘80% of us are not with Bashar al-Assad. Everyone knows that the father of Rami Makhlouf was poor and look what he has today, we have nothing to do with the murders, rapes, robberies happening today. What can we do?’”354 Soldiers felt their agency was stripped from them due to the precarious position they were put in and the sheer likelihood that any insubordination would be detected and punished.

350 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20. 351 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. 352 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29. 353 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Court, Interview ID 39. 354 Burgat, Testimony of General Ahmed Tlass on the Syrian Regime and the Repression.

349 Further evidence of the power of punishment comes by considering the fact that many soldiers were increasingly likely to desert once they felt they had insulated their families from the regime’s retribution. One civilian said simply: a soldier’s family has to be out of the country for him to defect.355 A captain agreed with this, arguing that when he decided to leave his post he had to bring his family out at the same time because he had known of deserters’ families being arrested and killed.356 As the conflict progressed and the opposition gained zones of influence in Syria, others felt that they could desert, but only if their families were within opposition-controlled territory.357 As one soldier recalled, he had been scared for his family when he considered desertion because his family was still living in regime-controlled territory.358 Another strategy to protect family members was to simply not tell them anything and instead leave the military without one’s family knowing if you had been arrested by the regime, killed in action, or deserted.

This was the approach of one Military Security conscript who deserted in April 2012. He did not inform his family of anything, hoping that this would spare them harm. He lived in Jordan for a year before contacting his relatives in Syria, and found out that his family had been questioned by the state but remained unharmed.359 A still more drastic tactic was to fake one’s death so that the soldier could feel his family had a lower probability of being targeted by the regime. These stories point to the regime and military elites’ power in coercing soldier compliance with orders to fight the unrest in the first phase of the conflict.

355 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Interview ID 16. 356 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 357 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 18. 358 Author Interview with Syrian Former Soldier, Interview ID 40. 359 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20.

350 Power of Persuasion

In addition to coercion, many soldiers were also persuaded to stay in the armed forces when the revolt began. First, Syrian military personnel were sent multiple messages that despite the presence of a segment of the population calling for constructive reform, those they were specifically deployed to combat were in fact backed by foreign conspirators or themselves foreign recruits. This led soldiers to have a greater willingness to execute their clear orders to use lethal force during the uprising. As one soldier recalled, in the first year of the conflict he was told that anyone who went out to protest was a terrorist

(irhabi) who wanted to kill the Syrian people, and that he was likely from Israel and working for the Israelis’ and Americans’ foreign agenda, so it was okay to hurt him.360 A

Kurdish Sergeant reported that he had been told that the protests were “‘instigated by infiltrating foreigners’” and that in the early stages of the uprising most soldiers “‘just accepted that foreigners were behind it all.’”361 He went on to state that when deployed:

“None of us [soldiers] had hesitated to shoot, because we all believed it.”362

The opposition’s disorderly image also influenced soldiers’ decisions to fight. It did so in two primary ways. First, and most directly, there is evidence that some soldiers simply believed that the uprising was dangerous and thus they felt justified in using force and fighting it. As one soldier who only later deserted reported, before their deployment to Deraa soldiers were made to watch two hours of state-run television each night and this is how they learned about the “‘conspiracy against Syria.’” As he explained: “‘We all believed what we saw on Dunya TV and we were eager to go and kill those people, especially after watching the reports from Deraa…It was propaganda showing gangsters

360 Author Interview with Syrian Former Soldier, Interview ID 40. 361 Slater, Former Syrian Soldier Describes Life in the Army at the Start of War. 362 Ibid.

351 and Salafi opening fire on the army.’”363 Another conscript, serving in Damascus, reported a similar process in which he and other soldiers were made to watch state television, which showed footage from Deraa and reporting that citizens were being

“‘killed by what they reported as foreign armed groups.’” After watching such programming, “‘we had the firm belief that there is a foreign conspiracy against which we need to fight and protect our people,’” he said.364 Indeed, soldiers who were being continuously told about the dangerous opposition were often extremely frightened of what they would be deployed against. As one conscript stationed near Israel said: “‘Most of us believed it [radio and television programming], and we were scared; even the movement of birds and butterflies would set off shooting.’”365 This points to the power of persuasion bolstered by coercion in Syria, which kept most soldiers in their positions despite fear of a threatening uprising.

Such propaganda not only inspired fear in recruits, particularly conscripts, but also inspired a sense of loyalty and need to protect the nation from dangerous elements.

As a Military Security conscript told me, many of his colleagues believed what the regime was telling them. When deployed to Baniyas, for instance, he would ask soldiers what they were doing there; they would reply that the Israelis and terrorists had entered

Syria by sea, and thus their operation was an anti-terrorism campaign.366 Soldiers, particularly those who had voluntarily joined the Syrian Arab Army and had perceived a long-running foreign conspiracy against Syria, were compelled to serve in such anti-

363 Macleod and Flamand, Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights. 364 Syria: Defectors Describe Orders to Shoot Unarmed Protesters. 365 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 21. 366 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20.

352 terrorism missions. For one sergeant major, when he received orders to combat “‘terrorist armed groups coming from outside Syria, terrifying people’” he simply “did not hesitate to do his duty.”367

The emotion of fear and the activation of loyalties to the nation in the face of suspected terrorists were described by soldiers across sects, but appear to have been particularly acute among Alawi soldiers. For instance, one journalist recounted an experience he had in Syria. He had been driving by car and picked up a hitchhiker, who turned out to be an Alawi soldier. The soldier was relieved that the passengers were friendly, because he had been “‘afraid of terrorists’” because “‘they’ll slaughter me,’” he said. As the journalist explained, the soldier “was hostile to all Sunnis” as he blamed

“them for the brutality with which soldiers had been killed” during the uprising.368 The same journalist met with the family of an Alawi soldier who had been killed, decapitated, and burned during the conflict. Reflecting the fears and concerns of Alawis generally and within the army, the family explained that the “‘whole village is ready to be martyrs for the country’” because they were so “worried about armed groups” emerging from

“‘sleeper cells.’”369

What I found in my research as well is that even those soldiers who did not necessarily view the uprising as overly disorderly felt that because this was the dominant narrative they had to conform to this perception and condone using force against the

“terrorist” protesters, based on the strong coercive forces within the military. As one soldier told me, throughout the first year of the uprising soldiers were told that anyone

367 Hugh Macleod and Annasofie Flamand, "Syrian Army 'Cracking' Amid Crackdown," Al Jazeera, June 11, 2011. 368 Rosen, Assad's Alawites: The Guardians of the Throne. 369 Ibid.

353 who participated in protests was a terrorist (irhabi), no matter if that person actually carried weapons or not.370 Another Military Security conscript described to me a typical day for him. He was watching television and his supervising officer was in the room too.

The officer saw that the scene on television was of Baniyas, and he knew the conscript was from that city; so, the officer asked if he might know some of the people being reported on. The conscript told me that in reality, due to his prior work in the intelligence services (mukhabarat) and based on what he had heard independently, he knew these were not terrorists. But in that moment and in public he felt he had to conform. And so he responded to his officer: Yes, he’s a terrorist! He’s a criminal!371 In this way, high coercion and high persuasion was the dominant environment for soldiers in Syria in 2011, and thus most remained in their positions and fought the unrest when ordered.

Start of the Uprising: 2011’s Limited Fleeing and Fomenting

Despite the fact that most soldiers fought, this does not discount three facts: many did not fight happily; there are some indications that particular soldiers shirked fighting while remaining in their positions; and there were a limited number of soldiers who did flee and foment at the start of the conflict.

Potential for Insubordination within the Ranks

Many people who remained in their positions and fought were not necessarily happy doing so. This is important to underline because many existing theories of soldier behavior in such conflict settings conflate feelings and loyalties, on the one hand, and

370 Author Interview with Syrian Former Soldier, Interview ID 40. 371 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20.

354 actions on the other. But = many in the Syrian military remained in their positions despite a growing desire to leave them. As one soldier told me, he estimated 75% of those serving with him began to think the military was not doing the right thing in Syria.372 On a more personal level, one member of the Air Force Intelligence’s Special Operations branch explained: “‘My unit was also involved in beating people. My heart was boiling inside, but I couldn’t show it because I knew what would happen to me.’”373 It appears to have been difficult for many soldiers to reconcile this dissonance between what they wanted to do and what they were ordered to do. In Homs between April and August 2011, for instance, eyewitnesses stated that military personnel “at least in the early stages of the protests” sometimes appeared reluctant to fire on protesters.”374

Indeed, watching videos produced by military personnel announcing their defections in the first year of the conflict indicates that as the uprising progressed soldiers’ persuasion in the military’s duty to confront the uprising was already beginning to falter.

A first lieutenant from Homs was motivated to join the rebellion because the regime used the army “to kill the people and the sons of the homeland (abna al-watan),” he stated.

The lieutenant had himself witnessed security forces killing civilians in Deraa and destroying Rastan and other areas, despite the fact that this was a peaceful revolution, he said.375 Another captain, serving in the Special Forces, fomented revolt in the early stages of the conflict because soldiers “took the oath in the military faculty to aim our weapon at the enemy in the occupied territories [Israel] and to protect our borders, and not to aim at

372 Author Interview with Syrian Former Soldier, Interview ID 40. 373 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 50. 374 “We Live as in War”: Crackdown on Protesters in the Governorate of Homs. 375 "First Lieutenant Ibrahim Eyuub defects—July 10th, 2011," YouTube, last modified July 12, 2011, accessed May 24, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ElKe7veCHA.

355 our unarmed people, or to kill children and civilians.”376 Soldiers who left the armed forces repeated this theme of “discovering the regime’s intimidation, lies, and claims about the existence of infiltrators, armed men, and Salafists” once they were actually deployed to confront the unrest.377 As one first lieutenant who defected in June 2011 described: “A girl no more than four years old died …because security forces shot her. Is this child an ‘infiltrator,’ Bashar al-Assad?”378

Interviewees mentioned to me that those who came to feel the army was doing something wrong in Syria sometimes tried to warn civilians at checkpoints,379 shoot in the air when deployed,380 or even pass information regarding potential government operations to members of the Free Syrian Army opposition.381 However, despite these examples of or potential for insubordination, the majority of military personnel ultimately executed orders to fight, feeling “they had to shoot at the protesters or commit other abuses because they thought that they would themselves be killed otherwise.”382 In other words, coercion became increasing important in ensuring fighting in 2011.

376 "Captain Ibrahim Majbur ‘defects’ 15-6-2011 Captain’s Defection," YouTube, last modified June 15, 2011, accessed May 24, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xC5y_T5Go0A. 377 "Ahmad Mustafa Khalaf, a First Lieutenant, Defects (23-Jun-2011))," YouTube, last modified June 23, 2011, accessed May 24, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSt9i8EHyl0&feature=related.; "Defector Conscript Walid Al-Qashami from the Republican Guard English Subtitles," YouTube, last modified April 30, 2011, accessed May 24, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6U1o7a2Y5-Q. 378 "First Lieutenant Amjad Al Hameed Defects, Homs, Rastan (29-Jun-2011)," YouTube, last modified June 29, 2011, accessed May 24, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3QAcFYYYkq4. 379 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel Working in Military Finance Office, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 36. 380 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Sergeant in 4th Division, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 24. 381 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. 382 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 9.

356 Initial Fleeing

The minority of soldiers chose to flee or foment the revolt in the conflict’s initial phase, despite high coercion and initially higher levels of persuasion. What is difficult is pinpointing how many did so and, in particular, separating the number of fleers from fomenters, given how imprecise reporting is on the topic. On the fleeing column, it appears that a fairly limited number of soldiers chose this option in spring and summer

2011 based on the sparse reporting and trumpeting of small incidents. The early reports of flight came in April 2011 with news that a number of Syrian soldiers in Baniyas had refused to execute orders to shoot protesters and were subsequently shot themselves.383

By June 2011, more than three months into the conflict, there were additional reports of soldiers fleeing the frontlines. This included news that some soldiers had refused their orders to shoot on opposition members in Jisr al-Shughour, leading to reported clashes between those refusing to fight and those with the regime.384 Still, the number of fleeing soldiers remained small throughout the summer, based on available data. There was an isolated report of six soldiers who had attempted to leave the military in Deraa,385 and another deserter estimated that “‘[m]aybe around 100 to 150’” privates had left their posts when deployed in the city.386 Another group of “[t]ens of soldiers” was reported to have left the military in Jisr al-Shughour in June.387 By the fall, one general stated that approximately 500 soldiers had left their posts when deployed to Homs,388 but in

September it was still news when one soldier “in Rastan publicly defected in front of tens

383 "Syrian Soldiers Shot for Refusing to Fire on Protesters." 384 Macleod and Flamand, Syrian Army 'Cracking' Amid Crackdown. 385 “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror”: Crimes Against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces. 386 Macleod and Flamand, Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights. 387 Zoepf and Shadid, Syrian Leader's Brother Seen as Enforcer of Crackdown. 388 Rosen, Syria: The Revolution Will be Weaponised.

357 of thousands of demonstrators after the noon prayers.”389 A final piece of evidence of the extent of fleeing in the early stages of the conflict is the lack of substantial soldier populations in designated facilities in border countries. As of November 2011, Camp

Apaydin in Turkey housed little more than 1,000 former Syrian military personnel.390

None of the individuals I interviewed left their posts in 2011.

Initial Fomenting

There were also reports of defections—or, soldiers joining in and fomenting revolt—in the first phase of the conflict. The first thing to note is that these defections appear to have occurred on an individual basis; whole military units did not foment revolt.

Much like estimating the number of fleeing troops, it is difficult to pinpoint how many left their military posts to join the opposition. But all indications suggest that defections were sparse early in the conflict. It was news in June 2011 when one conscript was reported to have defected from the Republican Guard.391 In addition, Human Rights

Watch’s contacts reported that between July and late fall 2011 the number of military defections increased such that in some areas of Homs, there were “15-20 defectors” who would “sometimes intervene when they heard gunfire against protesters.”392 The fact that it was news when one opposition armed brigade had 15 military defectors in September

2011 suggests that the number of fomenters remained limited.393 In general, these initial

389 Nir Rosen, "Armed Defenders of Syria's Revolution," Al Jazeera, September 27, 2011. 390 Adam Entous and Joe Parkinson, "Syrian Defectors Watch Civil War from the Sidelines," The Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2014. 391 Syrian Soldier Defects from Republican Guard and Calls the Military to the Revolution [ARABIC] (Al- Arabiya, June 8, 2011). 392 “We Live as in War”: Crackdown on Protesters in the Governorate of Homs. 393 Holliday, Syria's Armed Opposition, 17.

358 defections were primarily among military conscripts and low-ranking officers.394 The lack of substantial defections in this phase of the conflict lends support to my theory that when coercion is high, soldiers are unlikely to leave the military only to stay in the country and fight with the rebels.

Those who did join the revolt participated in its transition from a peaceful uprising to a militarized opposition movement. This transition was accompanied by the formation of a diverse array of fighting units, including the Homs defectors brigades,

Khalid bin al Walid Brigade of the Free Officers’ Battalion, and Salahedin Victory

Brigade.395 Eventually, many of these units joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA) umbrella, which merged with the Free Officers’ Movement in September 2011.396 Despite operating under the FSA name, each unit continued to operate with its own “local leadership” and the groups had “only limited communication with those in neighbouring towns or provinces.”397 What is important to note is that these militarized groups were not solely

(or even primarily) manned by defectors. In October 2011, for instance, one Syrian estimated that in Rastan the resistance was composed of approximately 100 former military personnel and an additional 600 individuals.398 In addition, those who did leave the military to join the opposition most often defected without bringing any weapons with them, and also left their posts on an individual basis.399

394 Ibid., 39. 395 Rosen, Syria: The Revolution Will be Weaponised. 396 "Defections from Bashar Assad’s Armed Forces are Growing," The Economist, October 29, 2011. 397 "Q&A: Nir Rosen on Syria's Armed Opposition." 398 Dominic Evans, "Syrian Army Forces Take Back most of Rastan from Deserters, Activists Say," Reuters, October 1, 2011. 399 Rosen, Syria: The Revolution Will be Weaponised.

359 Summary

There was some fleeing and fomenting in the first year of the conflict, but such evidence is limited and figures appear to be lower than even reported. In October 2011 one defector stated that to date 10,000 soldiers had left the Syrian army, although he did not specify whether that included deserters and well as defectors.400 General Mustafa al-

Sheikh, who left Syria in November 2011, “said only a third of the army was at combat readiness due to defections or absenteeism,”401 and defector Colonel Assad “boasted of some 15,000” deserters from the Syrian military.402 On the incident level, when

Lieutenant Colonel Harmoush defected in June 2011, news reports flew that he had brought “150 armed troops” with him as well.403 However, shortly thereafter, Harmoush spoke out clarifying that he had left the military individually and “admitted he had invented much of his initial story purely to keep the Syrian army at bay.”404 Such incidents have led observers to note that defections have rarely “been credibly documented.”405 Syria expert and professor Joshua Landis went as far to argue in June

2011:

There is little evidence of wide-scale mutiny of Syrian soldiers…Individual soldiers do seem to have deserted. Some turned up in Turkey. They seem to have been instructed to exaggerate the defections and to follow a common narrative of soldiers shooting each other in a large conflagration at Jisr [al-Shughour]. This story is hard to verify, making it seem dubious. Contrary to the claims of Syrian authorities, 120 Syria soldiers do not seem to have been killed. A single mass grave turned up 10 dead soldiers. Four had their heads cut off. This would seem to

400 Evans, Syrian Army Forces Take Back most of Rastan from Deserters, Activists Say. 401 Richard Spencer, "Syria's most Senior Defector: Assad's Army is Close to Collapse," The Sunday Telegraph, February 5, 2012. 402 "Defections from Bashar Assad’s Armed Forces are Growing." 403 Macleod and Flamand, Syrian Army 'Cracking' Amid Crackdown. 404 "Syria Crisis: Investigating Jisr Al-Shughour," BBC News, June 22, 2011s. 405 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow Motion Revolution, 29.

360 have been done by the militia of Jisr, which had some success in fighting the soldiers initially sent to pacify them.406

Although insubordination was rare in 2011, the coming year saw great changes in fleeing and fomenting revolt in Syria.

Devolution into Civil War: 2012-2014’s Fleeing and Fomenting

After 2011, the transforming Syrian conflict environment affected soldier decision-making. In this section I begin by showing that soldiers’ orders remained clear and monitored as the conflict progressed. However, many other factors changed, leading to an increase in the number of soldiers fleeing and fomenting revolt by early 2012. First, although orders and monitoring remained consistent, the system for communicating to soldiers what behavior was punishable or not punishable deteriorated. In effect, soldiers in the middle of the uprising increasingly became targets of repression within and from the military as they were subject to what were often random arrests and jail sentences. As troops felt themselves to be the victims of indiscriminate violence at the hands of the regime, the military’s coercive powers were undermined. For Sunnis in particular, staying in the armed forces often became as risky as shirking orders, evading monitoring, and leaving their posts. In addition, soldiers’ families became increasingly targeted by regime violence as the conflict progressed. Even though soldiers were working to support the regime and had executed its orders, that very government was soon targeting civilian areas with increasingly indiscriminate violence. This threatened and indeed harmed soldiers’ families as the conflict progressed. Similar to the regime’s inability to show soldiers that loyalty was rewarded with safety within the armed forces, the regime was

406 Landis, What Happened at Jisr Al-Shagour?

361 unable to show soldiers that their loyalty would be rewarded with keeping their families safe outside the armed forces. This encouraged many soldiers to risk punishment in leaving their posts, so that they could take care of their families.

Second, unlike the initial stage of the conflict, in 2012 the majority of soldiers viewed the opposition as in fact native. This was based on their more frequent eyewitness accounts of the conflict and also how their own families suffered. In addition, soldiers increasingly perceived that any disorderliness the uprising took on was the result of the regime’s having pushed the opposition to use violence. Feeling that those they were deployed to confront were not foreign terrorists but rather justly-angered Syrians, soldiers became less and less persuaded to use force against their fellow citizens.

Despite these changes, many soldiers remained in the Syrian armed forces through 2014. In particular, these were Sunni soldiers who feel that the risks of defying the regime’s coercive strategies was too high, despite the fact that they now perceived the uprising as having started as a domestic reform movement. In addition, there were Alawi and minority soldiers who were still persuaded to fight based on their fear of what would happen to them and their populations should the Al-Assad regime fall. In the following section I do not investigate the military populations that remained fighting amid the civil war. Instead, I focus on explaining why the second phase of the conflict witnessed so much more insubordination than the uprising’s first year. This exercise aids in evaluating the degree to which my theory about soldier responses at the start of unrest applies to explaining insubordination in full-fledged civil wars.

362 Coercion Deteriorates

Clear and Monitored Order Persist

As the Syrian conflict progressed, soldiers’ orders remained clear: they were to use lethal force to combat those they were deployed against. It does appear that the nature of command changed as the conflict became increasingly militarized. By mid-2012 in particular, analysts referred to reports from Syrian officials that lower-level officers

“were given the freedom to execute broad ‘directives’ from the regime’s top leadership without having to communicate with their superiors.”407 In this way, command and control had become more decentralized than it had been at the start of the uprising. At the same time, however, units maintained strong monitoring capacities. As one soldier who defected in January 2013 explained, many soldiers “‘would like to defect, but the shabiha

[pro-government armed militias], they stay with us, they watch us like security so we don’t go.’”408 Members of the military knew their orders to fight the rebellion, and they felt eyes continuously watching their execution of these orders and their general emotions with respect to the conflict.

Punishment Becomes More Arbitrary

What appears to have changed decisively in this later stage of the conflict, however, was how soldiers perceived the nature and likelihood of punishments directed towards them.

My interviewees, who almost exclusively left their posts in 2012, described an increasing psychological pressure—as many of them specifically described it—in this stage of the conflict. This psychological pressure was largely the result of the way in which the

407 Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 29. 408 Olga Khazan, "A Defector’s Tale: Assad’s Reluctant Army," The Washington Post, January 9, 2013.

363 military was treating its soldiers. At the start of the uprising, soldiers knew their orders and knew that although they were being monitored they would be safe within the military if they executed their instructions. In contrast, by 2012 many soldiers increasingly felt that even following their orders was not enough to keep them safe within the armed forces and free from the regime’s punishment.

In our conversations, many soldiers who ended up leaving the military began by describing their general feeling that they had become in fact targets for the regime as the conflict progressed. One Political Security officer, for instance, bemoaned the ability of a sergeant in the security apparatus to have the power to give a Division commander an order, circumventing the regular military’s chain of command and showing that no one

(no matter what his rank) was in a safe position as the uprising progressed.409 He also described how the regime and military elites indicated their distrust and loss of confidence in Sunni employees. This was clear because Sunnis were forbidden from visiting their homes unless in rare circumstances, and they were not allowed to bring their guns on leave.410 As one colonel put it, there was simply an amplified psychological pressure on him as time went on. In the months immediately preceding his desertion in

July 2012, he had individuals come up to him and ask whether they detected a change in his face, meaning, whether he was sympathizing with the revolutionaries. He lived among Republican Guard personnel and at one point they surrounded his car with their cars, surrounded his house, and questioned him: Are you going to defect?411 This pressure was felt down to the conscript level, with one stating that he ended up deserting because his colleague began making his life difficult, to the extent that he feared he would be

409 Author Interview with Syrian Former Officer in Political Security, Interview ID 99. 410 Ibid. 411 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 101.

364 imprisoned or tortured.412

The fear and reality of arrest and interrogation were made apparent as the conflict progressed, and many soldiers felt that even following the regime’s orders would not immunize them to these punishments. Soldier arrests were not absent from the first phase of the uprising. For instance, one colonel reported that he and nearly forty other officers were imprisoned at the start of the revolt, only to be released after being granted amnesty.413 However, these arrests increased with time. One captain, who served in

Palmyra, reported his impression that the prisons had become full in the town—full with soldiers suspected of defecting.414 Another colonel discussed how the fear of arrest became more and more real for him as he heard of instances of soldier detainment. First, he had a nephew, also serving as a colonel, in the Special Forces. He was arrested in 2012 and his family later received a simple notice: Come pick up his death certificate. On another occasion he was speaking with a colleague who mentioned how three people he knew had been killed. Someone must have overheard the colleague’s story, the colonel said, because this man was later questioned, arrested, and killed.415 Another first lieutenant expressed that the regime would arrest Sunnis—officers and subordinates— randomly during the revolution, such that thousands ended up being arrested. These individuals were not just detained, though; they ended up dying in jail. He had a captain friend who had been arrested in 2012, and was later killed.416 Similarly, a colonel I spoke with described how he felt intense monitoring and soon realized that many officers were

412 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscript, Interview ID 54. 413 Dale Gavlak and Jamal Halaby, "AP Exclusive: Syria Defectors Live in Secret Camp," Associated Press, August 28, 2012. 414 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Interview ID 98. 415 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. 416 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Court, Interview ID 39.

365 being arrested and kept indefinitely in jail. He mentioned that he had a relative in the military who remained in jail after his arrest. These arrests were random, he said, because the security services had the ability to arrest anyone they wanted and many of these people died as a consequence. The colonel mentioned that he had not been arrested before leaving the military. However, he was investigated many times. For instance, he once attended a ceremony for a cousin who had died and was then ordered to report to military security.417

What I came to find in my interviews was that arrest or fear of arrest was commonly cited as direct trigger for leaving the military. When I asked former military personnel what happened the month before they left their posts, many had been threatened with arrest, felt they would be arrested, or were recently released from arrest.

This was true of a sergeant major who was arrested in April 2012,418 for instance. It was also the case for a Political Security officer who was arrested the month before he left the military. In his view, the majority of the soldiers arrested were brought in on charges of

“participating in demonstrations,” which was something the regime would claim if a soldier was simply on the street at the same time a protest was taking place.419 Another captain described deserting because he had found out he would soon be arrested. The officer had borrowed the phone of a higher-ranking member of the Security Headquarters

(maqar al-amn) and when using the phone, he saw an incoming message. The message asked the colleague to keep the captain (him) at the station because they were going to arrest him. He erased the message, told his superior that he was going to the supermarket,

417 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 49. 418 Author Interview with Syrian Former Sergeant Major in Air Force Security, Interview ID 51 (Irbid, Jordan, February 7, 2015, 2pm) . 419 Author Interview with Syrian Former Officer in Political Security, Interview ID 99.

366 and left the service.420 The regime accused a colonel I spoke with of supporting the Deraa protests. They badgered him to confess and to inform them with whom he was collaborating. The colonel knew it was the mukhabarat trying to get to him. In the end, a sergeant from Deraa warned him to hurry up and leave because they were planning to arrest him imminently.421 These are just a few examples of many soldiers who left the military after being arrested or when fearing arrest.

Diving into the story of one first lieutenant teaching English in a military academy shows the process by which the threat of arrest prompted soldiers to risk punishment for desertion or defection. In spring 2012, between January and April, this junior officer witnessed about fifteen Sunni officers arrested in the academy. Intelligence personnel had previously taken away students; now, they were arresting his friends and colleagues as well. In January 2012 intelligence had brought him in for questioning and accused him of agitating within the military college. He laughed, but they warned him not to. The first lieutenant responded that the charges were simply wrong, but the interrogators continued with their accusations, and argued that he wanted to kill all Alawi officers and students. During that visit, the Intelligence personnel brought in one of his former students and asked him whether the first lieutenant was the same officer he mentioned in his report. When the student said that he was not, intelligence released him.

After that experience, the officer confided to his father that he wanted to leave the military. But his father did not seem supportive. The situation in Syria was not clear, his father said, and there had not been many officer defections. But for the first lieutenant, the psychological pressure was mounting. He heard tanks firing in Homs, where he was

420 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in the 52nd Mechanized Brigade, Originally from Damascus, Interview ID 22 (Amman, Jordan, August 19, 2014, 12:30pm). 421 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29.

367 based, and he also learned more about the demonstrations over time. The next month, in

February 2012, the Homs intelligence branch again brought him in for questioning. This time he was charged with working to weaken and control the psychological environment of cadets so that they would turn against the regime. When the intelligence personnel tried to intimidate them, he retorted: Be respectful; I am an officer. But his interrogator’s flippant response was simply: Okay, officer, you will see. This time he was again fortunate to be released. However, he soon found out that a number of his close friends were picked up by intelligence. Throughout spring 2012 the increasing psychological pressure of being observed, questioned, and accused of crimes he had not committed weighed down the first lieutenant. Finally, he and four other officers decided to flee their positions. As he put it, they simply wanted “to rescue our own lives” because these other arrested officers were taken and never returned; otherwise, he thought, they will take us too.422

Regime Fails to Protect Military Families

In the first phase of the conflict, soldiers were coerced into fighting not only for fear that their own disloyal behavior would be punished, but also for fear that retribution would be sought by way of harming their families. An additional erosion to coercion as the conflict progressed was the fact that soldiers who remained fighting—and whose kin did not participate in the rebellion—had families who were increasingly targeted by the regime’s own violence. Since fighting did not ensure the regime would be able to discriminate in its use of lethal force against one’s family, soldiers had less incentive to remain in the

422 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 27.

368 armed forces.

Fear for one’s family’s safety influenced one’s support for the Al-Assad regime in

Syria. One sergeant noted to me that as the conflict escalated in Ghouta and Homs in

2012, and as populations reported massacres, many became scared of the regime and worried it would kill their sons.423 But in addition to this general concern, soldiers expressed their specific fears of loved ones being targeted by regime violence—the very regime they were lending support to. When I asked one first lieutenant what happened the month before he left the military, he told me a detailed story of his family’s home being stuck in heavy shelling in summer 2012. After the regime had been targeted by opposition bombs, its forces entered his neighborhood to clear it of “Free Syrian Army” actors. Yet, the regime used a degree of violence that in no way matched that of a rebel group. In doing so, the regime destroyed citizens’ homes on his main road. He and his family spent two days indoors and he could not even communicate with his office to let them know he would not be in. He fled the military shortly after the experience.424

Another soldier described to the press the experience of a police officer colleague who left his position when he returned to Baba Amr and found that his home had been rocketed and four of his cousins had been killed.425 Similarly, a brigadier general left his post in January 2012 when he witnessed the regime’s crackdown on Homs city, his hometown.426

Soldiers’ families were at risk, as many were physically in danger in Syria as the

423 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Sergeant in 4th Division, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 24. 424 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Court, Interview ID 39. 425 "‘Alawi’ Officer, Defector from the Syrian Regime: Areas of ‘Free Syrian Army’ Control Include Cities [ARABIC]." 426 Gavlak and Halaby, AP Exclusive: Syria Defectors Live in Secret Camp.

369 civil war progressed. However, there were particular reasons that this influenced soldiers’ decision-making regarding whether to stay in their posts and execute the regime’s orders.

First, soldiers expressed to me their shock and horror that the regime they were working for did not discriminate between their family members—the relatives of those “loyal” soldiers in the military—and what the regime termed revolutionaries and terrorists. One non-commissioned officer told me that roughly three weeks before he left the military his town of Ghabaghib, in Deraa governorate, was very dangerous. This NCO’s home was hit, and so they moved to his brother’s house. The NCO expressed his disdain: He was serving the regime and at the same time the regime was shelling his house! He explained that anyone living in areas occupied by “the rebels” was considered a target, no matter what that individual family was doing.427

Officers appear to have felt particularly disrespected when the regime targeted their families. One Druze colonel told me that officers had strong emotions when their houses were targeted by the regime. He recalled the story of one retired officer who had two sons also serving as officers in the military. Regime forces stormed his home. He told them he was a retired officer and had sons serving, but the men did not have any respect for him and instead threw him to the ground and beat him. These officers, who were serving the military establishment, had their dignity persecuted. They began to see that they were serving a regime that was in fact persecuting them and their families, and so they increasingly left the military, this colonel explained.428 Another colonel told his own, similar story. He was serving in Damascus while his family lived in Deraa. One day,

427 Author Interview with Syrian Former Non-Commissioned Officer in Military Judiciary, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 38. 428 Author Interview with Syrian Druze, Former Colonel, Interview ID 45 (Irbid, Jordan, January 31, 2015, 1:30pm).

370 security forces arrived at the Deraa home. When they were outside the home, they asked who lived there and his neighbors responded—it belongs to an important man in the army, he is a director of operations (rais ‘amilyat). Despite knowing that, the security forces used a battering ram to open the locked door. Even though they knew an army officer’s family lived there, they searched the home under the pretext of “terrorism” (irhab), he said with contempt.429

Soldiers reported how concern for their homes’ physical security also coincided with fears that relatives were in danger of arrest and torture. One colonel described how by late 2011 the regime was using military forces to attack villages, and that eventually his own home was targeted and his relatives killed. He said that you could not witness this kind of “oppression” (thulm) and remain silent. By mid-2012 he had left the military and worked to get his family out of Syria.430 Another intelligence officer described his similar experience. He had fought to quell the uprising for months when he received leave to return to Deraa, his hometown. On that visit he learned that his brother had been arrested, his cousin killed, and relatives questioned. He ultimately left the military.431 As one lieutenant colonel said simply: “‘I fought until they locked up my father, interrogated my sisters and burned down my house.’”432

Persuasion Falters, for Sunnis

Uprising No Longer Perceived as Foreign and Employing Illegitimate Tactics

Soldiers were often catalyzed into leaving the armed forces because they felt that

429 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. 430 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 49. 431 Abi-Habib, Defectors Recount Tales of Conflict; 'Blood on My Hands'. 432 Ibid.

371 remaining in the military and potentially being subjected to arrest was just as dangerous as leaving their position and risking detection and punishment. Many ultimately decided to risk desertion also because their perceptions of the uprising changed over time. The longer the conflict remained unresolved, the more diverse information soldiers received on the uprising and the less the regime could maintain its monopolization on the conflict’s narrative. Once soldiers were increasingly deployed or witnessed the conflict, they spoke of coming to seek and hear the truth of a homegrown and just uprising.

Although the regime continued to frame protesters as foreign-backed terrorists, soldiers saw over time the regime’s targeting of their own hometowns and family members, which could not be more native-Syrian in their minds. As a result, soldiers increasingly felt that any disorderliness that characterized the opposition—such as its use of violence as the uprising progressed—was simply a consequence of the regime’s reaction to the revolt rather than a defining feature of Syria’s native uprising. These changing dynamics as the conflict progressed led, particularly Sunni, soldiers to view the uprising as having roots in Syria and not being overly disorderly, resulting in their decreased willingness to fight against those on the streets.

Seeing and Hearing the Truth once Deployed

We saw with our own eyes what was happening.433 This was a theme repeated by interviewee after interviewee. Once the Syrian regime deployed its military personnel for longer and longer spells, soldiers were increasingly likely to view the uprising differently.

Whether it was a captain tasked with manning checkpoints, who realized these were just

433 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 101.

372 normal people he was being sent to observe and suppress,434 or a soldier who witnessed the shelling of civilian quarters outside Damascus,435 it became more and more difficult for many military personnel to believe the regime’s rhetoric that the armed forces were deployed against an external, violent enemy.

One sergeant major, for instance, reported that he initially believed the regime when it stated soldiers would be facing foreign “terrorists” when deployed to Baniyas.

However, he reported: “‘When we went to Baniyas we didn’t find any terrorist groups.

We found only peaceful demonstrations…Some of the young men had bare chests. And all the chants were for freedom and reform.’”436 Although the sergeant major had been told that there were thousands of armed fighters in the town to which he would be deployed, he reported: “‘we didn’t find any fighters, nor armed people, nor any weapons at all.’”437 A sniper told of a similar experience. “‘It took us a couple of days to understand that the people we had been told were terrorists were just normal citizens protesting peacefully,’” he said.438 Similarly, in Human Rights Watch’s conversations with military deserters, the group found many “defected when they realized that their commanders were ordering them to shoot at unarmed protesters as opposed to the ‘armed gangs’ that they had been told to expect.”439

Targeting of Soldiers’ Hometowns Undermines Regime Narrative

As the conflict progressed, it was common to hear stories about how soldiers learned

434 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in the 52nd Mechanized Brigade, Originally from Damascus, Interview ID 22. 435 Kevin Koehler Interview with Special Forces Deserter, Interview ID Hatay 2. 436 Macleod and Flamand, Syrian Army 'Cracking' Amid Crackdown. 437 Ibid. 438 Macleod and Flamand, Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights. 439 “By All Means Necessary”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes Against Humanity in Syria, 9.

373 more about the ways in which the regime’s response to the uprising was harming their own hometowns and families. One way in which soldiers gained this new information was being granted leave and visiting their hometowns. On such trips many came to the

“realization that close relatives and friends were participating in the protests and had been attacked by the security forces,” which “convinced many that the government’s claims were false.”440 For instance, one Army Intelligence officer reported fighting for the regime for months in Homs before gaining leave in July 2011. When he visited his hometown of Deraa he discovered that his brother had been arrested, his cousin killed, and his town showed physical signs of the siege. “The officer then realized he hadn’t been fighting terrorists, but his own people, he said. ‘I have innocent blood on my hands.’”441

Others learned news of their hometown and families by gaining access to telephones. One non-commissioned officer recalled phoning his family in Deraa in May

2012 and being struck with news about how the Syrian regime was dealing with the people; he deserted later that year.442 Another sergeant described being able to talk to his sister by phone during the uprising. It was his sister who told him about the revolutionaries marching in Tadmur, their home province. In fact, he said he was on the phone with her when he heard people screaming “Allah Akhbar!” and he later learned how his friends in the town had died in confrontations that day. After hearing this, he decided to leave the military. It was difficult to learn of a friend or family member

440 Ibid. 441 Abi-Habib, Defectors Recount Tales of Conflict; 'Blood on My Hands'. 442 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Non-Commissioned Officer with Tanks Specialty, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 28.

374 martyred at the hands of the regime (nitham), he said.443 As one general put it, it was unacceptable to stay with the military when the regime was slaughtering people, your village was being shelled, and you were considered a killer or an implementer of killing.444 Ultimately, these visits to hometowns and conversations with trusted friends and family members reframed how soldiers viewed the uprising. What is the revolution

(al-thawra)?, one captain posed rhetorically. It is our people, and in my hometown people are moving from house to house to avoid barrel bombs, he said.445

Once Resistance Loses Foreign Framing, Soldiers Less Willing to Fight

Many soldiers felt that as the uprising progressed they came to see the truth: that the

Syrian uprising was a homegrown revolution. Soldiers then became increasingly angry when they felt they knew the truth of the uprising but operated in an environment (the military) that labeled this movement’s participants as foreign and traitors. One captain described this mounting pressure during his military service:

When we were sitting together among officers we were always referring to the protestors as traitors. Whole cities were called traitors. They were saying that these were all traitors, that they had betrayed the nation. But I knew them, they were people from my village. They just wanted their freedom. This made me angry.446

With greater opportunities to see and hear the realities of the conflict—during deployments, trips home, and conversations with family and friends—soldiers gained more information to question the regime’s framing of the Syrian uprising. Anger then

443 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Sergeant in 4th Division, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 24. 444 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48. 445 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 446 Kevin Koehler Interview with Military Captain Deserter, Interview ID Reyhanli 5 (Reyhanli, Turkey, December 16, 2014).

375 made soldiers less willing to participate in fighting the Syrian citizens they came to view as nationalists. As one colonel said, he did not want to kill anyone because these people were just asking for their freedom, he realized.447 Indeed, an International Crisis Group report from November 2011 detailed the fact that: “There are signs the regime’s formula no longer is working. Its failure to shore up its legitimacy coupled with the gap between its narrative (in which the state fights to restore law and order in the face of terrorist attacks) and everyday reality (in which security forces make no distinction between peaceful protesters and armed groups) has produced a growing number of military defectors.”448

At the start of the conflict, the regime had success in influencing soldiers’ perceptions of the uprising as foreign-backed. By late 2011 and especially the militarization of the conflict in 2012 I argue that this monopolization on shaping soldiers’ perceptions of the opposition became untenable for the regime. Ironically, however, just as the regime lost the ability to control soldiers’ information on the uprising that very uprising was itself increasingly internationalized. In early 2012 there were reports of foreign fighters entering Syria to fight in the conflict,449 and by 2013 there was increasing evidence of weapons smuggling from Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey into Syria.450 However, what I found in my interview research was that soldiers came to view the root of the uprising as Syrian. Many had family and friends who had either participated in protests or whose towns were affected by the ensuing conflict. What soldiers knew was that Syrians

447 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Training Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 33. 448 Uncharted Waters: Thinking through Syria’s Dynamics, 2. 449 Kim Sengupta, "Syria's Sectarian War Goes International as Foreign Fighters and Arms Pour into Country," The Independent, February 19, 2012. 450 Holliday, Syria's Armed Opposition, 31.

376 were being killed by the regime; as that became their reality, they were less likely to stay in the ranks and fight with Al-Assad.

Any Disorder is Regime-Created

In 2012 a powerful shift also occurred in soldiers’ perceptions of the opposition’s disorderliness. Again, as a result of being deployed, taking leave to their hometowns, and talking to their close contacts, these military personnel felt a new picture was being painted in front of their eyes. Rather than terrorists who were seeking to indiscriminately harm Syria and Syrians, these native citizens on the streets were using justified means to achieve their ends. As many soldiers told me, they came to realize that the regime had forced the opposition to turn to violence, by itself using violence against peaceful protesters; embedding thugs disguised as protesters among the opposition; and planting arms among the opposition. Soldiers also drew inferences about the opposition based on the regime’s tactics and targets. As they saw and heard of women and children killed in regime attacks, and as they themselves participated in indiscriminately shelling civilian areas, it became more difficult for soldiers to believe the regime’s rhetoric that they were being deployed to confront dangerous and violent terrorists. This change in soldiers’ perceptions was another factor reducing their willingness to fight with the regime and continue to suppress the resistance.

Regime Forced Opposition to Turn to Violence

Defectors articulated that with time they perceived that it was actually the regime that pushed the protests to any violence they ultimately employed. Many soldiers felt that the

377 people’s demands were initially limited and justified. For instance, “freedom, freedom” not the fall of the regime, was what the people were first asking for, discovered one colonel.451 These limited demands were complemented by the opposition’s initial emphasis on non-violent resistance. As one civilian who was in Deraa at the start of the uprising described, the people maintained primarily non-violent strategies for the first five to six months of the conflict. However, when the regime treated them with disrespect and deployed armed men against them, the opposition felt it had to shoot back.452 As soldiers learned more about the nature and origin of the uprising, they were critical of the regime’s response to it. The people had not even demanded the fall of the regime (isqat al-nitham) at the start of the revolt, said one colonel, and so there was no reason for the regime to use such force against this peaceful uprising.453 A Druze colonel reflected that while the regime was telling soldiers that those on the streets were terrorists, it was in fact the regime that shot randomly on the streets, and regime elements were killing people. It was the regime’s use of violence that caused protesters to escalate their demands, he said.454 The government was accusing the revolutionaries of carrying weapons, but they did not in fact; it was only after months of the regime’s intimidation and people’s suffering that the protesters changed their demands, remarked a warrant officer.

In addition to the regime’s own use of violence against protesters, soldiers also felt the regime forced the opposition to use violence by virtue of its tricking that opposition. Soldiers would describe rumors that the regime had embedded thugs among protesters so that these men would use violence and escalate encounters with regime

451 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 49. 452 Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Who Witnessed Events in Deraa March 2011, Interview ID 31. 453 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Engineering, Interview ID 44. 454 Author Interview with Syrian Druze, Former Colonel, Interview ID 45.

378 forces. A colonel, for instance, recalled how a security officer told him that half of the people on the streets were demonstrators and the other half actually undercover security officers.455 Others spoke of the regime planting arms among the opposition, to tempt them to turn to violence. One Military Security conscript related that in Deraa it was in fact the regime that distributed arms to the people, people who were not weaponized in the first days of the conflict.456

Soldiers were often cloistered at the start of the uprising and did not have a clear sense of what was happening. With time their perceptions changed from thinking they might be deployed to combat terrorists to instead perceiving that they were being used against an uprising that was initially non-violent and only turned to violence once forced by the regime’s own tactics. In one conversation, a colonel drew a comparison to the

Orange Revolution, an uprising that was launched in 2004 in Ukraine. Similar to that revolution, the Syrian revolt had also started with peaceful chants. Yet the Syrian revolution was forced into employing violence, he said, as a matter of self-defense.457 The revolution was moderate, said another colonel, and did not take up arms until it was forced to.458 Protesters who turned to violence were simply protecting their towns and families because the military was killing their women, said another soldier. These citizens were not dangerous; they were just working to clear their areas from the regime’s aggression. They were working defensively, not offensively.459 As another colonel explained in more detail, the army had told him to kill people on the streets because they

455 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel Working in Military Finance Office, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 36. 456 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20. 457 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29. 458 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 49. 459 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel Working in Military Finance Office, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 36.

379 were terrorists. Then, it told him to hurt other people who it said were harboring terrorists.

But he started to ask himself: Why are these people even using weapons? He felt that for the first six months of the revolution the opposition was nonviolent and that it was only the regime’s response that necessitated the turn to lethal force. Those he was being asked to kill were not really terrorists; they were innocent people.460

Regime’s Tactics and Targets Incompatible with Counterterrorism Claim

The regime’s transition to a “military solution” also appears to have undermined its claim that soldiers were facing disorderly terrorists. A common theme that emerged from my interviews was that as the regime began to use overwhelming and indiscriminate force against the opposition it was harder for soldiers to believe they were being deployed for a counterterrorism mission. One captain working with the Military Police reflected on how the military was using tanks and weapons that injured civilians, not simply those the regime claimed were armed and dangerous.461 A Special Forces first lieutenant recalled being stationed at a military checkpoint in Homs as the uprising progressed and being stunned at how the city changed significantly in those months as many buildings had been destroyed.462 The targeting of civilians and entire city quarters had a great impact on military personnel’s views of the uprising. As one colonel asked: What president uses his navy and rockets against his own civilians? The regime was dropping bombs on civilians.

He saw dogs eating corpses on the streets. Halab, a city of 7 million people, he said, was

460 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. 461 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 462 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in the Special Forces, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 30.

380 80% destroyed.463 The regime simply reacted without discriminating464 and responded to a “terrorist attack” in one location by attacking the entire area,465 said men who ultimately left their positions. Another colonel expressed his disgust with the regime, which used barrel bombs against civilians and worked to starve the people.466 Soldiers may have been more likely to believe regime claims that their mission was to crack down on terrorists at the beginning of the uprising, when soldiers were deployed in limited missions. However, with the transition to a “military solution” and the regime’s accompanying use of indiscriminate violence—including shelling and barrel bombs—soldiers saw entire towns and cities targeted by regime aggression. Their observation of these regime tactics was incompatible with the government’s story that soldiers were tasked with cracking down on a terrorist threat.

Another factor supporting this change in perception was soldiers’ increased access to information about the number of civilians and specifically “innocent” populations killed in the regime’s attacks. A colonel mentioned how the regime had injured the elderly as well as children in Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus.467 Likewise, one lieutenant discussed serving in Damascus during the uprising, but reading news about what was happening in Rastan and the fact that 100 women had been arrested.468 A lieutenant serving as an engineer described one incident that led him to defect: “I saw the security forces dragging a woman after stripping her naked. She was being cursed and

463 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29. 464 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 465 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48. 466 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Training Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 33. 467 Ibid. 468 Author Interview with Syrian Former Lieutenant in the 1st Corps, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 25.

381 accused of calling Al Jazeera…. I saw many young men and elderly getting killed when they left the mosque after Friday prayers.”469 Similarly, a first lieutenant recalled his work in the military courts and specifically one incident in which someone in his eighties was brought in chains to the court among those accused of being political criminals and harming national security.470 One general described the regime’s degree of violence as crazy, pointing to massacres and barrel bombs that killed civilians, women, and children every day. The military was using a tank to attack a sparrow, as he put it.471 These observations of the regime’s abuse of women, the elderly, and children did not fit in with the regime’s story that dangerous terrorists were on the streets.

A process similar to that of soldiers’ changing perceptions of the uprising’s degree of foreignness occurred for soldiers in relation to their perception of the uprising’s tactics. Soldiers began to disbelieve that protesters were terrorists. Bashar al-Assad was playing games when he called these people terrorists and dropped barrel bombs on them, said one Intelligence colonel, when in reality it was children he was striking.472 As a sergeant put it, the regime claimed that each person it faced on the streets was a terrorist

(irhabi). But, as he asked me, am I irhabi if I need to do good things for my country?473

Soldiers’ observations led them to shed perceptions that opposition members were using violence illegitimately. One general described his growing cynicism with the regime’s propaganda. Each morning the “news” would be read to the troops, and this news was filled with lies about the president’s heroism. But the soldiers saw that Bashar was not

469 King, Interviews with Syrian Army Defectors. 470 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Court, Interview ID 39. 471 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48. 472 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. 473 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Sergeant in 4th Division, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 24.

382 doing anything good and instead was simply destroying everything in Syria. In this general’s view, the “true terror” (al-irhab al-haqiqi) in Syria was the regime and its partner—Iran.474 The media continued to spread fabrications about the opposition, said a colonel, but you started to be able to find bits of truth because the media could not hide everything.475 As a Military Intelligence deserter described his morphing perception over time: “At one point you know what it means when they speak about fighting terrorists on national TV. We understood that when they say terrorist groups, these are not actually terrorists, but Syrian brothers.”476 Another captain agreed. After watching Al-Jazeera during home leave, he said, “I started to just replace the word ‘terrorists’ in the official media with the word ‘FSA’ [Free Syrian Army].”477

As soldiers developed new perceptions of the uprising, and saw it as legitimately turning to violence rather than beginning as dangerous terrorist networks, this led them to confront difficult emotions. One first lieutenant described the psychological pressure he felt mounting when he heard the regime firing on the local community from the Homs military college at which he was stationed.478 These changing perceptions and mounting emotions encouraged soldiers to stop fighting. A conscript described how he saw events unfold in Deraa, and how the hospitals were filled with injured women, children, and the elderly. How could he be in the army while it was doing these things?, he asked himself.479 Another Political Security officer described his own breaking point. He was deployed to Yarmouk Camp and ordered to fire on anything that moved. The people were

474 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48. 475 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. 476 Kevin Koehler Interview with Military Intelligence Deserter, Interview ID Reyhanli 2 (Reyhanli, Turkey, December 16, 2014) . 477 Kevin Koehler Interview with Military Captain Deserter, Interview ID Reyhanli 5. 478 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 27. 479 Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscript, Interview ID 54.

383 demonstrating about the lack of gas, but he was being armed and instructed to fire randomly among the crowd of innocents. That was when he resolved to leave the military, he said.480 Seeing children die at the hands of the regime is what completely broke down the wall of fear for one non-commissioned officer.481 As a former sniper explained: “‘The decision to desert the army was a life and death decision for me,’ he said. ‘It was impossible for me to continue watching people dropping dead in front of my eyes every day - even if they were not killed by me.’”482 Or, as an Intelligence colonel put it to me, he saw desertion and defection as a humanitarian duty. If you respected human rights, you had to leave this criminal military.483 Once soldiers felt they were not being deployed against dangerous terrorists, but rather against innocent civilians and clear non- combatants, their resolve to fight waned and increasing numbers left their posts. This, in combination with deteriorating coercive pressures in the military, encouraged insubordination.

Resultant Insubordination

As the Syrian uprising progressed into its second year, many soldiers no longer felt that simply executing the regime’s orders would ensure their own safety—or that of their families. Moreover, as more and more time elapsed, the regime lost its grip on the conflict narrative and service personnel soon doubted they were facing foreign-backed terrorists. Instead, many formed their own narrative of the uprising: one that was

480 Author Interview with Syrian Former Officer in Political Security, Interview ID 99. 481 Author Interview with Syrian Former Non-Commissioned Officer in Military Judiciary, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 38. 482 Macleod and Flamand, Seeing Syria through the Sniper's Sights. 483 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35.

384 homegrown, initially peaceful, and only resorted to violence as a consequence of the regime’s own escalatory actions. Although my theory went relatively far in suggesting how a transitioning coercive and persuasive environment influenced soldiers’ willingness to fight even as the uprising progressed, it is less helpful in explaining why soldiers who rejected fighting later in the conflict chose to flee rather than foment revolt. In this section I first grapple with estimations as to how many service personnel fled versus fomented revolt from 2012 onward. Then, I describe why my theory for soldier behavior at the start of a conflict explains increasing insubordination (non-fighting) as the conflict progressed, but does not provide a compelling prediction regarding who would flee the conflict entirely versus join in the revolt in the height of the civil war. The section closes with an inductive assessment of factors that seem to have distinguished fleers and fomenters in 2012 and beyond.

Insubordination Estimates

It is always difficult to identify the number of individuals who have deserted a military, and this is true of the Syria civil war case study as well. News reports and analyses on the conflict often use the word “deserter” and “defector” interchangeably, making it impossible to distinguish how many people fled the conflict versus actively joined the opposition. In summer 2012, a former Syrian officer who had previously served as director for the Air Force Intelligence’s Office of the Chairman of the Special Operations

Section, estimated that 100,000 of 450,000 troops had left their posts.484 That same summer, the Institute for the Study of War estimated that 60,000-90,000 of 300,000

484 "‘Alawi’ Officer, Defector from the Syrian Regime: Areas of ‘Free Syrian Army’ Control Include Cities [ARABIC]."

385 troops had stopped fighting, based on estimates from deserters and Turkish intelligence.485 As I showed earlier in the chapter, by the end of 2011 a scant number of soldiers had left their positions. This suggests that in the first half of 2012 alone, at least

50,000 more soldiers left the Syrian armed forces.

We can gain additional insight by investigating estimates that aggregate insubordination with military casualties. In 2014, the Center for Strategic and

International Studies estimated 147,000 troops to have left the military or died since the start of the uprising,486 and a journalist provided the range of 90,000-150,000 desertions and casualties after comparing “estimates from analysts, diplomats and security officials.”487 By 2015, the range of combined desertions and casualties was 100,000 according to low estimates488 and 200,000 according to high ones.489 These figures, which aggregate insubordination and death tolls, are likely to shed more light on levels of fleeing and fomenting rather than regime casualties. Regime death tallies were not incredibly high until the conflict entered its military solution phase. They numbered 500 in November 2011, more than 1,000 in early 2012, and more than 2,300 in June 2012.490

Ultimately, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated 55,000 regime soldier deaths from the start of the conflict through March 2015.491 This leaves us estimating that at least 100,000 Syrian military personnel left their posts from 2012 onward, with another

55,000 suffering death. In other words, at least half of Assad’s military personnel had

485 Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 27. 486 Abdulrahman, Syria Army’s Weakness Exacerbated by Draft Dodgers. 487 Westall, Assad's Army Stretched but Still seen Strong in Syria's War. 488 Barnard, Saad and Schmitt, An Eroding Syrian Army Points to Strain. 489 Abdulrahman, Syria Army’s Weakness Exacerbated by Draft Dodgers. 490 Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, 28. 491 About 2 Millions [Sic] and Half Killed and Wounded Since the Beginning of the Syrian Revolution (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, March 15, 2016).

386 fled, fomented, or died and the vast majority of these people did so beginning only in

2012.

It is difficult to put an estimate on the number of military personnel who fled versus actively joined in fomenting revolt. One clue, however, may be gleaned from rebel death statistics. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has recorded the death of

2,574 defected soldiers, as compared to the death of 41,201 Kurdish, rebel, and Islamist fighters (and in addition to the reported death of 37,010 foreign rebel fighters).492 Based on these statistics, defectors accounted for less than 6% of Syrian rebel forces. Again, it is difficult to assess the cumulative strength of rebel forces in Syria. But by the end of 2013 an estimated 100,000 were fighting as rebels.493 If we make the significant assumption that all rebel fighters die at equal rates, then no more than 6,000 rebels were former military personnel. Although this is an exercise in estimation, what seems apparent is that of the estimated 100,000 persons who left the Syrian army at the height of the conflict, the vast majority fled rather than fomented revolt.

What is even clearer is that individuals who fled and fomented revolt were primarily conscripts and lower-ranking officers. A Carter Center researcher found that the first Syrian general defected in October 2011, and that by summer 2012 twenty-seven generals had joined the Free Syrian Army.494 Senior officer desertions and defections numbered only eighty-two by May 2013,495 and there are indications that the majority occurred in 2012.496 Prominent deserters and defectors included Brigadier General Manaf

492 Ibid. 493 "Guide to the Syrian Rebels." 494 Christopher McNaboe, The Growth and Current Status of the Free Syrian Army (Unpublished Manuscript, July 20, 2012). 495 "Interactive: Tracking Syria's Defections." Al Jazeera, May 11, 2013. 496 Jonathon Burch, "About 9,000 Refugees, 26 Officers Flee Syria to Turkey," Reuters, November 9, 2012.

387 Tlass (July 2012), who had been ordered to quell the uprising around Damascus497 but appears to have been ordered to stay in his quarters after questioning the regime’s response to the uprising;498 Major General Abdul Aziz Jassem al-Shallal (December

2012), Chief of Military Police;499 and Brigadier General Mohammed Nour Ezzedeen

Khallouf (March 2013), the army’s chief of supplies and “who previously commanded the Palestine Branch of the military intelligence Department” logistics.500 These senior officers defect as a “‘last resort,’” in the words of one deserter, only when they became concerned for their own lives and felt “the regime can no longer protect them.”501

To Flee or Foment?

Those who chose to leave the military but not join actively in the opposition gave many reasons behind their decision-making. One set of reasons related to these soldiers’ perceptions of the uprising as it evolved. Although they now viewed the opposition as initially peaceful and homegrown, many became disenchanted and did not think it stood a fighting chance against the regime amid the civil war. As one colonel said, some officers who initially fled Syria went back to fight. But most did not, because they “didn’t want to go into battle with only a rifle and be used as cannon fodder.” He went on to explain:

“‘We wanted to fight, but the plan had to be something worth dying for—which never

497 Neil MacFarquhar, "Confidant of Syria’s President is Said to have Defected and Fled to Turkey," The New York Times, July 5, 2012. 498 "The Story Behind the Defection of Syrian General Manaf Tlas," Al Arabiya, August 21, 2014.; "Asharq Al-Awsat Talks to General Manaf Tlass," Asharq Al-Awsat, July 26, 2012. 499 Kareem Fahim and Rick Gladstone, "Syrian General Whose Task Was Halting Defections Flees," The New York Times, December 26, 2012. 500 Anne Barnard, "Assad Issues a Worldwide Plea as a Top Syrian General Defects," The New York Times, March 16, 2013. 501 Fahim and Gladstone, Syrian General Whose Task Was Halting Defections Flees.

388 came.’”502 Others I spoke with described their similar process of questioning the efficacy of joining the opposition. One first lieutenant initially fled Syria simply because he did not want to kill any other Syrians. However, he said once he arrived in Jordan he considered returning to fight with the FSA. In the end, he told me he stayed in Jordan because the situation had become too vague in Syria; he felt all that was happening was simply destroying the country.503 Another captain provided a similar opinion. Many military personnel began with the plan to flee Syria temporarily, he said, and then to perhaps go back to fight with the resistance. However, once they left Syria and saw the geopolitical situation—and that the Free Syrian Army had little power and weapons, and that the opposition was completely disorganized—most simply remained outside the country.504

Interviewees also communicated to me that they not only questioned the efficacy of the opposition, but also whether these rebel groups respected military defectors.

According to one captain, the FSA had no respect for officers because of its hatred (hiqd) for the regime military.505 Others questioned the structure of the rebellion and felt they, as trained military personnel, could not fight in such an unorganized force. The FSA had no structure, said one Political Security officer, and was simply a bunch of armed groups fighting for personal reasons.506 Another captain criticized the FSA, saying that you could only trust 1 in 100 of its members.507 Higher-ranking personnel doubted the resistance’s

502 Entous and Parkinson, Syrian Defectors Watch Civil War from the Sidelines. 503 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 27. 504 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. 505 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in the 52nd Mechanized Brigade, Originally from Damascus, Interview ID 22. 506 Author Interview with Syrian Former Officer in Political Security, Interview ID 99. 507 Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Interview ID 98.

389 leadership. One colonel commented that most FSA leaders were civilians without extensive military training. These civilians, particularly those supported by foreign actors, did not have an interest in incorporating military personnel into their leadership as well.508

As another colonel working in intelligence emphasized, he was not interested in joining the rebellion because there was no one umbrella that united the multitudinous groups. As an experienced staff officer, he needed to be operating under one policy, one administration, otherwise it would be chaos.509

Others left the military without joining the opposition due to considerations outside that of the government-rebel dynamic. For many, their families asked them not to foment revolt,510 or they themselves decided to leave the country with their families to take care of them.511 At least one soldier described wanting to join the Free Syrian Army but being denied because his military specialization had not included weapons training.512

Finally, one colonel told me that because he was older and more logical than young men, he decided to just flee so as to avoid further death and destruction.513

As mentioned earlier, a minority of soldiers who chose not to fight decided to foment rebellion by joining actively in the opposition. A lieutenant told me he joined the

Free Syrian Army because he was young and in good shape to kill Bashar al-Assad.514

508 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. 509 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. 510 Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20.; Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Non-Commissioned Officer with Tanks Specialty, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 28; Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscript, Interview ID 53. 511 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel Working in Military Finance Office, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 36. 512 Author Interview with Syrian Former Non-Commissioned Officer in Military Judiciary, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 38. 513 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29. 514 Author Interview with Syrian Former Lieutenant in the 1st Corps, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 25.

390 Another lieutenant, who had served in the Special Forces, originally fled Syria. But he returned to fight with the FSA due to boredom, only leaving Syria once again when he was injured.515 Others described feeling a sense of duty to use their military skills to help civilians in their rebellion. A colonel fought with the FSA in Deraa for eight months because he felt ashamed that the rebellion was being led by civilians without military training. However, he ultimately left the country because he did not approve of the disorganized opposition structure, and the fact that each unit received support from a different outside actor.516 In this way, the complexity of the civil war environment resulted in a variety of factors influencing former military personnel’s decision regarding whether to flee or foment revolt.

Chapter Summary

In my interviews with Syrian military deserters and defectors, many spoke passionately about their grievances against the regime and how it came to use unprecedented forms of violence against its own citizens, and particularly women, the elderly, and children. But there was only one deserter who pointed out the question lingering in the back of my own mind. He described how the timing of his desertion meant he had stayed in the military through the first year and a half of the conflict. As he himself confessed, he saw massacres, arrests, Syrian children crying, old women going

515 Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in the Special Forces, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 30. 516 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34.

391 without food, children without schools because they had been destroyed in airstrikes. So, he asked rhetorically, what was I waiting for?517

This was the exact question that had been coursing through my own mind. From existing arguments about military behavior, I expected Sunni soldiers to be more sympathetic with the uprising, which was largely composed of Syria’s Sunni majority community. I also expected conscripts to be the most prone to desertion and defection, because these low-ranking personnel had few economic incentives to remain in the military. And I anticipated that because the Syrian uprising espoused non-violence, it would attract the sympathies of military personnel who would be hesitant to shoot on unarmed civilians.

And yet most soldiers reacted to the uprising as did the reflective Intelligence colonel—they stayed in their positions and fought. This trend continued throughout the initial phase of the conflict. Why? In this chapter I brought to light evidence that a few key factors explained why soldiers who objectively may have had an interest in leaving the military stayed in their positions and used lethal force against their fellow citizens.

First, these soldiers were given clear orders to use “any means necessary” to contain and suppress the revolt. More importantly, the execution of these orders was closely monitored and soldiers took threats of punishment—from arrest, to torture, to their death, to their families’ persecution—seriously. This may have been the single most important reason soldiers were coerced into fighting at the start of the uprising. However, the regime also worked to complement coercion by preventing the development of sentiments of support for the opposition. It did so by controlling soldiers’ access to

517 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35.

392 information, and then painting the uprising as hijacked by foreign and disorderly elements in state-backed media outlets, military propaganda, and in deployment orders themselves. As a result of these two trends, only an estimated 10,000 soldiers had left the large Syrian armed forces by the end of the first year of the conflict.

Things changed with time. As the uprising entered its second year and the regime shifted to a “military solution,” so too shifted soldiers’ decision-making environments.

Soldiers like the Intelligence colonel still had clear and monitored orders to crack down on the demonstrators. But now, many felt that regardless of their actions they and their families were in danger of dire punishment. With the threat of random arrest and imprisonment—a death sentence, for many—the risks of remaining within the military began to approach those of fleeing or fomenting revolt. This change was complemented by adjustments in soldiers’ perceptions of the uprising. With time, it became more difficult for the Syrian regime to control soldiers’ access to information. Whether through their own witnessing of the opposition when repeatedly deployed, visits to their hometowns on the rare occasions when leave was granted, or in phone calls eventually snuck with family members, soldiers developed greater awareness of what was happening in Syria. Many, particularly Sunnis, who initially had believed regime rhetoric that the armed forces were facing foreign terrorists now viewed those rebelling as Syrians who had been pressured into using violence by the regime’s own response to initially peaceful demonstrations. Knowing that the opposition was homegrown and had been pressed into violence led many soldiers to form a true preference for siding with the opposition.

Acting in concert, these factors prompted at least 100,000 Syrian military personnel to leave their posts starting in 2012.

393 It is difficult to assess how many of these insubordinate troops fled versus fomented revolt. But based on an overview of existing evidence, it appears that the vast majority of former military personnel simply left their posts and did not join in the armed rebellion. My theory for soldier responses to the start of an uprising is that soldiers with clear orders but who view an uprising as homegrown and not disorderly will be most likely to flee. This appears to do a fairly good job explaining soldier decision-making as the conflict progressed. However, we should also take into account the additional factors that led soldiers during the civil war to flee more than foment revolt, including their perceptions of the efficacy of uprising and concern for their families.

The pattern of military decision-making during Syria’s uprising has had significant effects. First, the majority of soldiers remained in their positions and fought through the first phase of the conflict. This helped the regime stay in power, though it did not ensure that Al-Assad was able to successfully repress the opposition. As demonstrations spread and escalated, the regime implemented first a security and then a military solution to the conflict. By 2012, large numbers of Syrian military personnel were fleeing their positions, with some joining the now armed uprising. As Professor and

Syria expert Florence Gaub noted, “Desertions mainly show that the troops are not in sync with the institution’s task or the way it performs that task. But absconders do not necessarily jeopardize a force’s operational capacity.”518 This was indeed what happened in Syria. The trickling of desertions did not result in the collapse of the Syrian armed forces, as might have been the case if the majority of military personnel had made the near simultaneous decision to desert the regime at the start of the uprising. Instead, some,

518 Florence Gaub, Syria's Military: Last Man Standing? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 29, 2014).

394 like Gaub, have even argued that: “Desertion has left the armed forces with the most committed troops and, paradoxically, has therefore strengthened cohesion in the remaining ranks rather than weakened it.”519 The particular pattern in the breakdown of the military in Syria led the Assad regime to fill gaps in its coercive apparatus by increasingly relying on citizen militias and foreign forces.

These changes within the military had an inevitable effect on the trajectory of the

Syrian conflict. As the Institute for the Study of War noted, the pattern of desertions in

Syria differed greatly from others in the Arab Spring. The Syrian revolution did not receive entire, armed deserting military units. As a result, “the [Syrian] resistance has not been able to hold terrain from which it can operate and organize, unlike Libya’s rebels, who enjoyed a liberated Benghazi in which to organize.”520 This may mean that Syria escaped the kind of fully militarized civil war and contested sovereignty that has plagued

Libya since 2011. However, the differing pattern of desertion in Syria has not left it in any better of a situation. The continuing civil war has claimed the lives of at least

470,000,521 displaced 6.6 million internally,522 and pushed more than 4.8 million Syrians to migrate outside the country’s borders523 as of 2016. In sum, the leaking of the Syrian military was not swift and consequential enough to turn the tide of the conflict. Instead, the pattern of soldier fighting, fleeing, and fomenting contributed to the prolongation and internationalization of the conflict.

519 Ibid. 520 Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011: An Operational and Regional Analysis, 17. 521 Barnard, Death Toll from War in Syria Now 470,000, Group Finds. 522 Key Figures: People Internally Displaced by Violence. 523 Syria Regional Refugee Response: Total Persons of Concern.

395 Chapter 7: Conclusion

Soldiers make decisions when confronting civil unrest based on ideas about what the conflict represents and how it relates to a soldier’s duty, but also based on the soldier’s position in a military hierarchy. Such an understanding of coercive apparatus responses to unrest transforms our understanding of these regime crisis moments.

Existing studies of military cohesion and behavior during civil unrest often point to single factors said to influence soldier decision-making, including whether the military is institutionalized, indoctrination has occurred, soldiers share protesters’ ethnicity, and soldiers are materially rewarded for their service.

These explanations do not wholly miss the mark in describing soldiers’ interests amid unrest, but they do fail to account for the complex environment in which soldiers operate during these unique events. Soldiers’ perceptions of their interest in fighting are not directly influenced by any one variable at such times. Instead, a variety of factors influence troops’ views of what the conflict represents, and whether it is their duty to fight. At the same time, soldiers do not make decisions in a vacuum and are not exclusively driven by their preferences for fighting, fleeing, and fomenting. To the contrary, they are also heavily influenced by the structure of the military hierarchy and stringency of command. In its focus on both persuasion and coercion this study provides a theoretical architecture for explaining how a variety of factors influence soldier decision-making at such times.

This chapter summarizes the study’s results before considering the extent to which the findings can be generalized. It then assesses the research’s contributions and policy implications, as well as areas for future research.

396 Results

Summary of Theory

Soldiers who face domestic uprisings operate in a complex environment. Their propensity to use the necessary force to quell the uprising may be affected by the way events unfold on the streets, fear of being deployed, and fatigue if unrest continues. These variables influence an individual soldier’s inclination to fight, flee, or foment unrest.

However, as I have argued throughout this study, two factors go far in influencing soldiers’ behavior during these events: whether the soldier is persuaded that it is his duty to quell the uprising, and whether the soldier is coerced into staying in line and doing so.

Persuasion matters because soldiers who feel it their duty to fight are more likely to do so. As I argued, two factors with a great deal of influence on a soldier’s perceptions of the uprising are his perspectives on whether it is connected to foreign interests and employing illegitimate tactics. An uprising is seen as foreign-connected if it is viewed as populated by foreign nationals, receiving funds from foreign entities, or serving as the conduit for foreign interests. In addition, unrest participants are seen as employing illegitimate tactics if they use indiscriminate violence and target civilians, for instance. A regime’s effort to monopolize the information environment, the opposition’s own missteps, and foreign actors’ unilateral intervention in the conflict may all influence whether an uprising narrative is construed as foreign and disorderly. When this is the case, soldiers are likely persuaded of the need to fight because their sense of duty to protect the country from external interference and threats to national security is activated.

Yet, persuasion is often not enough to keep soldiers in their positions, given the persistence of everyday grievances, increased fear and fatigue when facing mass unrest,

397 and the specific terror that may be inspired in the ranks if the opposition comes to be viewed as foreign and disorderly. Thus, coercion is necessary to ensure that troops who either question the necessity of cracking down, or who believe it is necessary but may be afraid in the moment to do so, stay in their positions to fight. Coercion at such times is underpinned by the soldier receiving clear orders so that he knows what is expected of him. Subsequently, the soldier must perceive that he is being monitored for potentially violating those orders, and feel that any detected insubordination will be punished.

Persuasive and coercive influences interact to produce patterns in fighting, fleeing, and fomenting unrest. I argued that a regime can rest most assured that it deploys a strong fighting force against an uprising when it maintains both strong persuasive and coercive influences over the armed forces. Not only is the soldier more likely to view the uprising as harming national security, but he also stays in his position and fights because he feels that failing to do so will result in his inevitable punishment. In contrast, regimes face the greatest challenge when they have neither the persuasive nor coercive infrastructure to compel soldiers to quell the unrest. In such cases, soldiers are in fact most likely to actively foment revolt because they likely view the uprising as homegrown and legitimate and feel they will face no recourse for failing to perform their soldierly duties.

When persuasion and coercion are split, soldiers are most likely to flee the conflict environment. On the one hand, when persuasion is high but coercion is low, soldiers are likely to flee because even though they view it as within the military’s mandate to suppress the unrest, the lack of command and control within the armed forces means they are unlikely to take the initiative and enter a contentious conflict environment on their own orders and without monitoring. On the other hand, when persuasion is low

398 but coercion is high, soldiers may fight or flee the revolt. This is the most difficult position to be in as a soldier. The individual in unconvinced that those on the streets represent an external or security threat to the country. However, the soldier is given clear orders to repress the unrest, and is being monitored and threatened with punishment for insubordination. As a result, my theory anticipates that soldiers in such circumstances may very well fight the unrest, based on coercive pressures. However, if soldiers have strong perspectives on the nature of the unrest (leading to extremely low persuasion), or, if they are deployed for prolonged periods of time (continuously exacerbating cognitive dissonance) they will be increasingly likely to flee the conflict environment.

Summary of Evidence

The theory was tested drawing evidence from both historic and contemporary cases of unrest in the Middle East, and there was significant support for the argument that persuasive and coercive influences interact to affect soldier decision-making in such circumstances.

In the majority of the cases researched, a portion or all of the armed forces remained in position and fought domestic unrest. In each instance of fighting, soldiers were influenced by both the perception that those they faced in the streets were a threat to national security, but also by strong coercive capacities within their units. In the first case examined, the majority of the military fought the Palestinian nationalist movement in

Jordan during Black September in 1970. Many soldiers—both of Jordanian and

Palestinian descent—came to perceive the uprising as a foreign-backed effort that was no longer employing legitimate tactics to press for the liberation of Palestine, but instead

399 utilizing illegitimate tactics to gain increasing autonomy within Jordan. The Hashemite monarchy sought to underscore these elements of the resistance in its general rhetoric as well as its direct communication with soldiers. It was greatly helped in forming such a narrative. The resistance movement’s lack of organization, increasing militarization within Jordan, foreign ideology, and courting of international supporters provided ample fodder for a regime seeking to legitimize its deployment of troops to combat the resistance. In addition, the threat of Iraqi interference and the immediate intervention of

Syrian armored brigades in Jordan’s North made real the regime’s claims that the resistance was impinging on Jordan’s sovereignty and not operating solely in the interest of Palestinian liberation. Despite these substantial persuasive influences, it may have been the case that Palestinian soldiers in the Jordanian armed forces still would have been loath to use force against their coethnics. The nature of the fight in 1970 dictated that guerilla warfare be used, which may have endangered Palestinian civilian communities in which commandos were based. The reason the vast majority of the armed forces remained in its fighting position, however, was that persuasive influences were complemented by high levels of coercion. In particular, this case illustrates how a regime that has a firm plan for confronting unrest is better able to communicate to soldiers what is expected of them, and what will be punished as insubordination. As a result of overlapping persuasive and coercive influences, the Jordanian military remained largely cohesive in 1970, despite the weak foundations of King Hussein’s rule at the time, substantial threat posed by the uprising, and interference of an external power.

A similar pattern of soldier behavior was evidenced in the Republican Guards’ deployment to confront “The Page of Treachery and Treason” in Iraq in 1991. By the end

400 of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s subsequent invasion of Kuwait, and the country’s defeat at the hands of an international coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, the Republican Guard remained perhaps the only organization within the Iraqi coercive apparatus over which the regime effectively maintained persuasive and coercive influence. The Guard was primed through its training to view disturbances within and outside Iraq as threatening to the state’s national security. Indeed, Republican Guard reports from the conflict reveal that the national uprising was perceived as populated by foreign saboteurs and mob elements. In addition to the average Guardsman’s perception that it was his duty to use force against the uprising, coercive influences were maintained over the Republican

Guard units. After action reports from the 1991 uprising indicate that these units received clear orders to use all force necessary to put down the spreading revolts and mobile command centers supervised the execution of such orders. The steadfastness of the

Republican Guard units during the crisis allowed the Hussein regime to regain control over a country that had been largely in the hands of rebels that spring.

The Bahraini military exhibited a similar pattern of fighting when confronting the

Pearl Revolution in 2011. In this case, the opposition’s fragmentation, its increasing use of violence as the uprising progressed, and references to Shia tradition and foreign Shia actors laid the groundwork for the regime’s painting of the uprising as, if not lead, then exploited by foreign-backed terrorists. This narrative was also aided by the actions of external actors—from hostile regional competitors, such as Iran, who denounced the

Bahraini regime’s response to the unrest, to mass demonstrations in southern Iraq condemning the Al-Khalifa monarchy. These factors overlapped to influence soldiers’ perceptions of the uprising as imperiling national security, a theme repeated again and

401 again not only in the government’s own statements, but also those made by the Bahraini

Defense Forces. What has not received as much attention by scholars and observers, however, is how these persuasive influences were reinforced by the high degree of coercion regime and elite military commanders exerted over their subordinates in Bahrain.

Soldiers not only received clear orders regarding their role in confronting the unrest, but also felt they were consistently monitored and would be punished severely should they refuse to fight. As a result, the Bahraini regime weathered an uprising that had brought out more than a fifth of its citizens protesting against the regime.

The vast majority of the Syrian armed forces also fought that country’s uprising in

2011. At the start of the unrest, the Syrian regime worked hard to dominate the narrative of the uprising so as to persuade soldiers that it was their duty to follow deployment orders. The regime achieved this, to a large extent, based on its monopolization of soldiers’ access to information. In addition, the orders given to soldiers framed demonstrators as saboteurs and puppets of foreign powers. As the uprising grew more violent, the regime cited this as further evidence of the need to defend Syria’s national security. Such persuasive efforts were reinforced by high levels of coercion within the armed forces. There is extensive evidence that soldiers received clear orders governing their use of force during deployments. In addition, Syrian deserters and defectors described the psychological pressure they were under during the unrest due to what they perceived as pervasive monitoring and the immediate threat of punishment should they refuse to fight. As a result, the bulk of the armed forces—including the primarily Sunni conscript corps—fought the largely Sunni uprising in 2011. With time, fewer Sunni troops, but the bulk of Alawi and minority troops, continued to fight the now armed

402 resistance between 2012 and 2014. Many minority troops appear to have fought continuously because they were persuaded that the uprising presented an existential challenge to the Syrian state and their personal survival. The Sunni troops who remained fighting, in contrast, no longer viewed the opposition as illegitimate, but some felt that the regime’s monitoring and punishment capacity was too high and were thus coerced into continued fighting.

Second, the cases analyzed provided many instances of soldiers fleeing unrest. In

Jordan in 1970, soldiers fled the military because although coercion levels were high, for a minority of soldiers persuasion levels were extremely low. A segment of the Jordanian armed forces felt the Palestinian resistance movement was using legitimate tactics in

Jordan. These fleeing soldiers described their view that although the resistance may have overstepped in the Hashemite Kingdom, it represented the Palestinian people and was working towards a noble end; it did not deserve to be hammered by the Jordanian military. These soldiers were highly sympathetic to the fedayeen’s cause and, indeed, the vast majority fled to Syria where they formed a brigade that would fight with the

Palestinian resistance in Lebanon. However, they did not join directly in fomenting revolt in Jordan. My theory anticipated that soldiers deserting from militaries that exerted high levels of coercion would flee rather than fight, and this was the case in Jordan. These deserters explained that they did not switch sides to foment revolt in Jordan because they knew that the Jordanian rank and file were under orders to do what they did, and therefore did not want to harm their former comrades who were simply following instructions to fight.

403 The fleeing circumstances were slightly different in Iraq in 1991, and Syria between 2012 and 2014. In these cases, persuasion was also low among fleeing troops; however, coercion was as well and this facilitated insubordination. During Iraq’s intifada, the Kurdish troops in 1991 largely fled the revolt that swept through northern Iraq. In the

1980s, the Kurdish National Defense Battalions had been deployed to use lethal force against fellow Kurds, who the regime painted as saboteurs and collaborators with Iran.

By the Gulf War, Kurdish troops still perceived that the Kurdish populations, and particularly the political parties, had connections to foreign actors. However, it was also the case that the Kurdish rebellion employed relatively organized violence directed primarily against local Baathist officials and was viewed as a spontaneous revolt. In this way, the Kurdish troops likely were operating with “medium” levels of persuasion during the conflict. Yet, at the same time, these forces also experienced a complete lack of coercive influences in 1991. The Battalions were not only loosely organized, but also there were no orders for them in 1991, no perceptible monitoring of their behavior, and therefore no reasonable expectation that they would be punished for standing on the sidelines of the conflict. The Kurdish troops were not fully convinced that the Kurds were starting a homegrown rebellion, but they also lacked coercive influences over their behavior. As a result, fleeing was attractive to many in this segment of Saddam’s coercive apparatus.

A significant proportion of Sunni soldiers also left the Syrian military between

2012 and 2014. By the second year of the conflict, the regime’s ability to monopolize troops’ information environment deteriorated. As more Sunni soldiers came to see their hometowns targeted with overwhelming violence, and increasingly viewed the uprising

404 as originally homegrown and peaceful but simply driven to armed resistance due to the regime’s tactics, persuasion no longer convinced these soldiers of the need to fight. A simultaneous trend, however, goes far in explaining not only why many Sunni soldiers developed the interest in insubordination by 2012, but also took the steps to act on their changed perceptions. Whereas soldiers at the start of the conflict had a reasonable assurance that following orders would keep them and their families safe during the uprising, by 2012 it was increasingly the case that soldiers could be arrested and punished on baseless charges. In addition, a soldier remaining in the fighting position no longer could be assured that his family would be kept safe from the regime. As Al-Assad grew to rely on the indiscriminate violence of artillery and barrel bombs, “loyal” soldiers saw family members die and homes destroyed as the crisis persisted. Soldiers lacking the conviction to fight, and the coercive influences to keep them in their place, increasingly fled the conflict.

Finally, actively joining in fomenting revolt was a rarer phenomena in the cases studied. When confronting an uprising in southern Iraq in 1991, many Shia soldiers did join in the revolt. The spontaneous nature of the uprising, and the fact that soldiers witnessed it first hand as they retreated from Kuwait through southern Iraq, was a first step in their forming a perception that the uprising was homegrown. In addition, the regular army troops retreating from the war were primarily Shia. These troops were often from the Shia-majority southern cities, and did not have cause to assume their fellow

Iraqis and townspeople were anything but genuinely protesting and demonstrating against the regime—the same regime that soldiers felt had failed them in the very war from which they were returning. With desperately low levels of persuasion, soldiers also

405 experienced a lack of coercion. The retreat from Kuwait was chaotic and these soldiers were neither embedded in coherent units, nor did they receive clear orders regarding how to confront the uprising. As a result of this low-level of control over the troops retreating through Iraq’s South, many actively joined in fomenting what they perceived as a legitimate, national uprising.

As the Syrian uprising devolved into civil war, a minority of soldiers, predominately Sunni, also chose not only to leave the military but to actively fight in the growing armed rebellion. As this was the middle of an ongoing conflict, my theory did a poorer job of predicting why some troops fomented rather than fled the revolt. These soldiers gave many reasons for their desire to actively fight against the regime and its military. Some pointed to their youth as a reason to lend physical support to the armed opposition and others highlighted their military background, and said it was their duty to lend such expertise to the primarily civilian-staffed resistance brigades. In all, the case studies showed that the theoretical architecture proposed in this study can go far in unraveling military decision-making during domestic conflict.

Generalizability and Limitations

There are indications that this theory and the study’s findings will help elucidate soldier decision-making in a broader set of unrest events. First, although all located in the

Middle East, the cases researched in depth in this study are substantially different from one another. The uprisings faced were both spontaneous, but also highly anticipated; initially peaceful, and violent from the start; beginning in the country’s capital, and starting on the periphery. The regimes confronting unrest were both monarchies and

406 republics; they were Western-backed, and virulent opponents of the West; they were regimes that had previously weathered challenges to their rule, and also those recently defeated in a major capacity. In addition, the events themselves took place both during and after the Cold War, and were embedded in a variety of intra-regional geopolitical contexts. Despite these substantial differences in the environments in which soldiers were situated, the study found that the logic of persuasion and coercion’s interaction had a significant influence on their decision-making in each case.

Another indication of the argument’s ability to travel is initial evidence that these cases illuminate the dynamics at work in military reactions to uprisings in different regions. In developing the argument at the start of the study, I drew on numerous empirical examples of the power persuasion and coercion in influencing soldiers’ behavior, from the French Revolution, to the American Civil War; in the Allied and

Wehrmacht militaries during World War II, and for both the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong resistance in the Cold War era.

This study also revealed the limitations inherent to the theory, which help set scope conditions for its future application to explain or predict soldier decision-making during unrest. There were three key circumstances where the theory came up short. First, the Bahrain case revealed how ruling family dynamics may influence the processes emphasized in this study. Ruling family members staff virtually all high-level positions in the Bahraini armed forces. This is in contrast to military promotions in another regional monarchy—Jordan. In Bahrain, the ruling family’s reliance on the continuation of the Al-

Khalifa monarchy’s largesse in purveying such positions and their privileges undoubtedly influenced these individuals’ decision-making during unrest. Second, the Bahrain case

407 also revealed another coercive actor operating in some unrest contexts—mercenaries. My theory emphasizes the degree to which soldiers are persuaded that those on the streets should be repressed. However, in the case of mercenaries, these individuals have already chosen to fight for a foreign power and so are more likely to be influenced by the benefits of service and the coercion exercised over them, rather than persuasive influences. I argued that on average material interests should not represent the primary factor determining soldier behavior in the circumstances studied, because these individuals are more significantly influenced by questions regarding their mandate to use force and also the degree of coercion governing their actions. However, these two unique military populations—royal family members and mercenaries—are likely to operate with a slightly altered decision-making process. Both will question, in particular, to what extent the uprising fundamentally challenges their existence, job security, and privileges. In future applications of this theory, special attention should be given when these specific actors are part of the coercive apparatus being studied.

Finally, the third limitation raised in the study was the ability to predict fleeing versus fomenting revolt as the conflict progresses. An advantage to studying the Syria case was that it allowed for a comparison of soldier behavior at the start of a conflict to that during a subsequent civil war. As was seen in the case, this research’s argument is powerful in explaining why troops largely fought in the first phase of the conflict. In addition, the power of persuasion and coercion were clearly linked to why soldiers either remained subordinate or insubordinate as the conflict devolved into civil war. However, in this later stage of the Syrian conflict, the theory was less powerful in explaining why soldiers chose a specific form of insubordination—why exactly some soldiers fled versus

408 fomented revolt. As I discovered when researching that case, and speaking with former military personnel who had both deserted the country and joined the armed resistance, their motivations for doing so were complicated by 2012. What I found was that the vast majority of Sunni soldiers experienced low persuasion by the second year of the conflict; thus, when coercion eroded, they had every incentive to leave the armed forces. They perceived that the uprising began as a peaceful, national movement, and also perceived that the regime was using overwhelming violence not only against the resistance but also

Syrian civilians. However, this did not mean that the soldiers wanted to physically support the armed resistance amid a full-fledged civil war. By 2012 and 2013, the resistance was funded by foreign actors and facing not only the Assad regime, but the regime’s international backers. The resistance remained only loosely united, sharp differences developed among fighting units of differing ideologies, and the opposition became largely painted as corrupt and inefficient. In sum, the complicated nature of civil war changed how soldiers decided whether to join in fomenting revolt. This suggests that my theory works best in explaining fighting, fleeing, and fomenting at the start of a conflict, and then simply fighting versus insubordination as a conflict progresses.

Contributions

Theoretical

A more thorough understanding of military behavior during unrest enhances scholars’ understanding of military cohesion, the connection between coercive power and regime strength, and the efficacy of mass mobilization and trajectory of political violence.

409 This study was inspired by a curiosity in why some militaries, and some units within those militaries, remain more cohesive than others during particularly stressful periods of domestic unrest. Existing accounts have focused on the power of either intra- military factors or extra-military forces in explaining how soldiers respond to unrest. Yet this study theorized that organization-level arguments relating to the military’s degree of institutionalization, indoctrination, and socialization were neither likely to explain an individual soldier’s decisions when confronting a civil uprising, nor were they able to explain within-military variation in soldiers’ behavior during these events. This study also revealed that although many of these variables are related to soldier decision-making during the conflicts studied, they are important in a way that is different from originally theorized. In particular, studies that have focused on the specific influence of ethnic identity and protester non-violence in spurring military desertions have been able to explain broad patterns in soldiers’ loyalties during the circumstances studied. However, they have also left us puzzling over the many cases in which soldiers use force against coethnics, and in which soldiers crack down on peaceful protesters. In this study, I stepped back to consider how such discrete variables are part of the broader persuasive environment in which a soldier operates, and how rather than directly predicting soldier behavior, scholars have to consider under what circumstances such variables influence a soldier’s perception that the uprising represents a homegrown cause employing legitimate tactics. In many cases, the incoherence of opposition groups, regime framing, and external intervention can undermine the expected power of ethnicity and nonviolence.

Moreover, the study has continuously underscored that even soldiers who are persuaded

410 of the uprising’s national character can refrain from deserting or defecting if they are under enormous strain due to strict monitoring and punishment.

Second, I initially pursued this study given the clear connection between coercive power and regime strength. What I found in the course of the research, however, is that this relationship is not direct. A military that largely remained fighting, such as in Jordan in 1970 and in Bahrain in 2011, was associated with regime re-stabilization in the face of a significant challenge to the status quo. Yet, additional cases revealed that the relationship between military behavior and regime stability is more nuanced. In the case of Syria in 2011, the vast majority of soldiers remained in their positions and fought at the start of the conflict. Despite this, the uprising continued, though it did not bring down the regime as the conflict entered into a civil war. In contrast, the Iraqi military fractured in 1991 such that only the Republican Guard divisions could be relied upon to roll back an uprising that had spread to fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. Despite the proportionally small number of military personnel who remained fighting, the Hussein regime re-stabilized and recovered from the domestic unrest event. What these studies show is that a complete fighting force may be most strongly associated with regime durability; however, having a core fighting contingent may be enough for regime re- stabilization, and often this is conditioned in any case on the nature of the threat being confronted.

This study contributes to scholarship on the efficacy of contentious politics and trajectory of political violence as well. A substantial scholarship seeks to pinpoint why some social movements and mass mobilization campaigns are more successful than others. Such work often focuses on the tactics participants employ and political

411 opportunity structures which they may exploit. The current study’s findings imply that to a great extent, mass movements that challenge the regime are also highly influenced by the state’s coercive apparatus and how it reacts to events as they unfold. Indeed, previous work has investigated how, for instance, protesters can employ nonviolence to spur military defections,1 or how protesters might coordinate directly with security forces to turn their loyalties.2 This research, however, underscores the reality that although persuasive influences are one component affecting soldier decision-making during unrest, oftentimes soldiers are equally or even more so influenced by coercive pressures to remain fighting. Moreover, although movement cores may work to construct a narrative of the unrest as employing legitimate means to support the national interest, movements do not operate in an information vacuum. Regimes are often adept at capitalizing on opposition missteps or fissures within the opposition movement to paint it as threatening.

In addition, outside actors may intervene unilaterally and brand the movement not as homegrown but as serving foreign interests.

Finally, the current study contributes to this mass movement and broader political violence scholarship by shedding light on why some civil unrest events are quelled in a relatively short period of time, whereas others transition into continued contentious politics, and still others devolve into full-fledged civil wars. As is evident in the cases, a largely fighting force has the ability to quell unrest quickly, although more minor disturbances continued in both Jordan and Bahrain even after initial military deployments.

In contrast, militaries that “leaked” troops—such as in the Iraqi and Syrian armed forces—were less able to suppress their unrest events quickly and with minimal use of

1 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. 2 Binnendijk and Marovic, Power and Persuasion: Nonviolent Strategies to Influence State Security Forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004).

412 force. The Iraqi military could only rely on its Republican Guard, which was able to quell the unrest in a matter of weeks but with significant use of force and at the cost of killing and displacing thousands of Iraqis. In Syria, although the military remained fighting at the start of the conflict, unrest continued. As the uprising progressed, more soldiers fled or actively fomented revolt. However, these desertions and defections occurred on an individual basis. The lack of significant unit defections to the opposition meant that although the regime’s military manpower was slowly sapped, the lack of a sudden change in the balance of power allowed the regime to build up alternative sources of strength— including its recruitment of civilian militias and the incorporation of foreign fighters. In this way, significant but slow-trickling desertions and defections contributed to Syria’s devolution into civil war. This suggests that the pattern of soldier decision-making at the start of the conflict, but also as it progresses, influences the trajectory of political violence in civil conflict.

Empirical

This research presents substantial empirical contributions to political science and

Middle East studies as well. First, the case studies examined document a currently opaque aspect of civil conflict—the thoughts soldiers have and the decisions they make during domestic unrest. Existing work on civil conflict has thoroughly researched the dynamics of civilian mass movements and armed rebel groups, as well as regimes’ calculus in deploying their coercive actors during unrest. Yet there is relatively little research conducted on the attitudes and actions of soldiers themselves during these conflicts. Moreover, those studies that do focus on the military have not often dug into

413 the intra-military divisions that often unfold during these events to better explain how soldiers’ and units’ behaviors vary during such crises. In particular, by conducting interviews with military fighters, fleers, and fomenters I have contributed to a thicker narrative of soldier decision-making during domestic crisis.

In addition, the study provides data on uprising events that have not received extensive study. The history of the Palestinian movement has garnered significant attention in Middle East studies; however, there is no single, extensive study of Black

September and the Palestinian challenge to King Hussein. Similarly, although the Iraqi uprising threatened a regime already imperiled by its defeat in international conflict, there are no definitive accounts of the uprising—much less the military’s response to it. By drawing on interviews with military personnel and conflict witnesses, I have enhanced our understanding of these unrest events. In addition, in accessing three United States- based archives to research the Iraq case, I have brought to light Arabic-language documents from the Saddam Hussein-era not yet utilized in academic research. The Arab

Spring has drawn more scholarly attention than the historical cases of unrest studied in this research. Still, few academic works delve deeply into the Gulf Kingdom of Bahrain.

Moreover, the case study presented on Syria draws on novel data gathered in the field by conducting in-depth interviews with former military personnel themselves. It is hoped that the empirical material contained in this study can be applied to diverse research agendas related to civil conflict and political-military relations.

414 Policy Implications

As a result of its theoretical and empirical contributions, this study has a number of policy implications. First, the study speaks to officials and analysts who seek to assess whether foreign regimes are durable, or whether they might fall during a domestic crisis.

This research suggests what such policy officials might focus on when trying to anticipate regime strength. In advance of an uprising, these individuals would do well to observe the degree of coercive influence regimes and their military elites exert over their soldiers. What is the record of command and control within the armed forces? Are particular units better organized than others? And, is there a history of strong command, communication, monitoring, and punishment within the military? The research is particularly relevant for analysts tasked with updating assessments of regime strength once a crisis erupts, and for officials charged with advising on policy during an unfolding conflict. Among the many potential factors on which one could focus, this study’s findings suggest these officials concentrate particularly on the persuasive and coercive environment in which soldiers find themselves. Such observation should include an assessment of the extent to which opposition moves, regime rhetoric, and external actors influence whether an uprising is perceived by soldiers as foreign-backed and disorderly.

In addition, ongoing observation can strive to understand whether soldiers have been provided clear orders for confronting the unrest and, moreover, whether they are being consistently monitored for insubordination and whether punishment threats are credible.

This will help analysts and officials more accurately anticipate patterns in military fighting during such conflicts. Although this does not directly predict regime strength during unrest, it will be a key factor influencing that outcome.

415 The policy community will further benefit from this study’s focus on the differences between fleeing and fomenting revolt. Although observers traditionally ask whether the military will defend or defect from a challenged regime, the case studies presented here show the diverse actions soldiers can take during these crises. When persuasive and coercive influences interact to produce fleeing, the military loses manpower that it is not automatically transferred to the opposition. In contrast, soldiers who foment revolt not only deprive the military of their support, but actively lend their martial strengths to the opposition. In addition, the timing and nature of such desertions and defections influence the trajectory of the conflict. When such insubordination occurs over time and on an individual basis, as was the case in Syria, regimes have a greater ability to buttress their own forces. In contrast, when entire units desert, such as in northern Iraq in 1991, this can result in significant political concessions for the regime, even if it does not fall.

The present study also has implications for policy officials working in post- conflict settings. The research has focused on the causes of different patterns in military cohesion’s resilience and breakdown during civil crises. Understanding the origins of these cohesion outcomes influences how policy officials might anticipate the political- military environment of a post-conflict setting. Those involved in political power negotiations, transitional justice, and security sector reform will necessarily require an assessment of the state’s military organization during the conflict so as to anticipate the balance of power and potential for continued violence past the immediate crisis.

416 Areas for Future Research

This book asked a big question: Why do some soldiers remain in the military and fight domestic unrest, whereas others flee their positions, and still others actively join in fomenting revolt? The argument answering this question as well as the findings illuminated a number of significant remaining questions that are promising areas for future research. First, although observers have noted that regime power is underpinned by coercive strength, this study suggests that the two do not move in lock-step as observers have previously assumed. In many cases, only a core of the military need fight to secure the regime’s strength. In other cases, even an entirely fighting force is not enough to quell the unrest in the conflict’s first phase. Future research might explore the conditions under which the pattern of initial fighting does indeed end the unrest, and also the circumstances under which only a fraction of the military need fight to secure the regime’s strength.

Second, a limitation of the current study is its focus on decision-making at the start of the conflict. As mentioned when analyzing and discussing the contemporary

Syrian case study, it appears that although persuasion and coercion still explain broad patterns in fighting versus insubordination even as a conflict develops, the argument is less well suited to divining why some soldiers flee rather than foment revolt during civil war. Although there has been substantial research on rebel group side-switching and demobilization in these circumstances, little work has been conducted on soldier desertions versus defections in civil wars. This is a promising area for further research.

Finally, this study has presented two broad axes of influence over soldiers during civil unrest: persuasion and coercion. The study proposed that whether an uprising is

417 viewed as foreign, and whether it is perceived as employing illegitimate tactics, go far in explaining when soldiers are persuaded it is their duty to use force against it. In investigating further incidents of mass unrest, are these two factors uniformly influential in persuading soldiers, or are other attitudes influential in convincing soldiers of the need to fight? In addition, the case studies in this research illustrated that it is often a combination of opposition missteps, regime rhetoric, and external interference that influence a soldier’s perception of the mass movement. A number of questions can be opened up for future research. For instance, under what circumstances is the regime’s rhetoric more or less likely to be persuasive to soldiers, and when and for how long are regimes able to monopolize a conflict narrative, particularly in an age of distributed media? Better understanding the circumstances that facilitate persuasion will allow for an enhanced ability not only to explain soldier decision-making in hindsight, but predict it before a crisis erupts and as it unfolds. It may also inform opposition group and mass movement strategies that aim to reach the soldier.

418 Bibliography

Author Interviews

Author Interview with Bahraini Civil Society Member, Interview ID 4. Manama, Bahrain, March 12, 2013, 5pm.

Author Interview with Bahraini Close to Police Officer Who Defected and is in Prison, Interview ID 9. Manama, Bahrain, March 15, 2013, 6:45pm.

Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 10. Manama, Bahrain, March 18, 2013, 3pm.

Author Interview with Bahraini Defense Lawyer, Interview ID 7. Manama, Bahrain, March 14, 2013, 1:15pm.

Author Interview with Bahraini Former Officer in Bahrain Defense Force, Interview ID 1. Manama, Bahrain, March 10, 2013, 12pm.

Author Interview with Bahraini Journalist, Interview ID 2. Manama, Bahrain, March 11, 2013, 12:30pm.

Author Interview with Bahraini Moderate Government Support Working in Government, Interview ID 5. Manama, Bahrain, March 14, 2013, 11:30am.

Author Interview with Bahraini Officer in Bahrain Defense Forces, Interview ID 13. Washington, DC, April 5, 2013, 11am.

Author Interview with Bahraini Political Society Member, Interview ID 12 Manama, Bahrain, March 19, 2013, 6:30pm.

Author Interview with Bahraini Secular Opposition Figure and Human Rights Activist, Interview ID 3. Manama, Bahrain, March 11, 2013, 2pm, Follow up March 13, 2013, 2pm.

Author Interview with Bahraini Think Tank Researcher, Interview ID 11. Manama, Bahrain, March 19, 2013, 2:30pm.

Author Interview with Iraqi Former General, Interview ID 108. Amman, Jordan, August 15, 2015, 5pm.

Author Interview with Iraqi Former Lieutenant General, Interview ID 88. Amman, Jordan, March 26, 2015, 10am, follow-up May 5, 2015, 12pm.

419 Author Interview with Iraqi Former Senior Staff Officer in the intelligence Directorate, Interview ID 107. Amman, Jordan, August 14, 2015, 6pm.

Author Interview with Iraqi Former Soldier, in Baghdad in Spring 1991, Interview ID 109. Phone interview, Author in USA, Interviewee in Iraq, October 19, 2015, 9:30am.

Author Interview with Iraqi Shia Former General, Interview ID 94. Amman, Jordan, May 6, 2015, 12:45pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian Close to Political and Military Figures in 1970, Interview ID 103. Amman, Jordan, May 14, 2015, 4pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian Civilian of Palestinian Origin, Interview ID 84. Amman, Jordan, March 23, 2015, 11am.

Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 106. Amman, Jordan, August 13, 2015, 9am.

Author Interview with Jordanian Former Diplomat, Interview ID 57. Amman, Jordan, February 24, 2015, 4:30pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian Former Officer, Interview ID 64. Amman, Jordan, March 5, 2015, 1pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political and Military Figure, Interview ID 60. Amman, Jordan, March 2, 2015, 10:30am.

Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 56 Amman, Jordan, February 22, 2015, 7pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian Former Political Figure, Interview ID 59 Amman, Jordan, March 1, 2014, 4:30pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian General Speaking of Experience as Civilian Youth in 1970, Interview ID 102. Madaba, Jordan, May 13, 2015, 10am.

Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Joined the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 104. Amman, Jordan, May 16, 2015, 11am.

Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 74. Ramallah, Palestine, March 16, 2015, 1pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Left the Jordanian Military in 1970, Interview ID 82. Amman, Jordan, March 21, 2015, 11am.

420 Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as a Diplomat, Interview ID 95. Amman, Jordan, May 6, 2015, 11am.

Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Served as Fatah Commander in Jordan, Lebanon, and Elsewhere, Interview ID 83. Amman, Jordan, March 21, 2015, 1pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who was a Political Figure in Jordan, Interview ID 90. Amman, Jordan, April 3, 2015, 4pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian of Palestinian Origin Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 63. Amman, Jordan, March 4, 2015, 3pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Brigadier General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 105. Amman, Jordan, May 17, 2015, 11am.

Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in Armored Brigade, Interview ID 91. Al-Salt, Jordan, April 6, 2015, 10:30am.

Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General in the Special Forces, Interview ID 62. Amman, Jordan, March 3, 2015, 1pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian Retired General, Interview ID 58. Amman, Jordan, February 26, 2016, 10am.

Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Intelligence Directorate Official, Interview ID 92. Amman, Jordan, April 29, 2015, 10am.

Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General in the Air Force, Interview ID 86. Amman, Jordan, March 24, 2014, 10am.

Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Lieutenant General, Interview ID 17. Amman, Jordan, August 10, 2014, 12:30pm.

Author Interview with Jordanian Retired Major General in the Air Force, Interview ID 87. Amman, Jordan, March 25, 2015, 10am.

Author Interview with Jordanian Who Left in 1970, Interview ID 93. Amman, Jordan, May 2, 2015, 3pm.

Author Interview with Palestinian Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 71. Ramallah, Palestine, March 15, 2015, 12pma.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Fatah Fighter, Interview ID 76. Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 9:30am.

421 Author Interview with Palestinian Former Fatah Political Figure, Interview ID 78. Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 11am.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 81. Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 5pm.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Member of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Who Fought in Jordan, Interview ID 79. Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 12pm.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Officer in Security Services, Interview ID 72. Ramallah, Palestine, March 16, 2015, 11am.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Member, Interview ID 69. Ramallah, Palestine, March 12, 2015, 10:15am.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter Aligned with Fatah, Interview ID 68. Ramallah, Palestine, March 12, 2015, 2pm.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview ID 85. Amman, Jordan, March 24, 2015, 12pm.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter, Interview ID 66. Ramallah, Palestine, March 11, 2015, 8pma.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter, Interview ID 67. Ramallah, Palestine, March 11, 2015, 8pmb.

Author Interview with Palestinian Former Resistance Fighter, Interview ID 73. Ramallah, Palestine, March 16, 2015, 12:30pm.

Author Interview with Palestinian Political Figure, Interview ID 65. Amman, Jordan, March 9, 2015, 10am.

Author Interview with Palestinian Who Studied in Syria, Interview ID 70. Ramallah, Palestine, March 15, 2015, 12pm.

Author Interview with Palestinian Who Worked in Fatah's Media Department, Interview ID 89. Amman, Jordan, April 1, 2015, 12pm.

Author Interview with Palestinian Who Works in Human Rights, Interview ID 75. Ramallah, Palestine, March 17, 2015, 4:30pm.

422 Author Interview with Palestinian, Interview ID 77. Ramallah, Palestine, March 18, 2015, 10am.

Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Who Previously Served as Military Conscript, Interview ID 21. Amman, Jordan, August 19, 2014, 12pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Who Witnessed Events in Deraa March 2011, Interview ID 31. Irbid, Jordan, August 25, 2014, 1:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Working for Human Rights Organization, Interview ID 26. Irbid, Jordan, August 23, 2014, 12:45pm, follow-up August 25, 2014, 12pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Civilian Working in Charitable Organization for Syrian Refugees, Interview ID 19. Irbid, Jordan, August 15, 2014, 3pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Interview ID 14. Amman, Jordan, June 28, 2014, 7pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Interview ID 16. Amman, Jordan, July 25, 2014, 9pm, follow-up interview August 1, 2014, 9pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 18. Irbid, Jordan, August 15, 2014, 1pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 42. Irbid, Jordan, January 31, 2015, 11am.

Author Interview with Syrian Civilian, Originally from Palmyra, Interview ID 96. Ramtha, Jordan, May 7, 2015, 1:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Druze, Former Colonel, Interview ID 45. Irbid, Jordan, January 31, 2015, 1:30pma.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Interview ID 98. Ramtha, Jordan, May 7, 2015, 3:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in Military Police, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 37. Irbid, Jordan, January 24, 2015, 10am.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Captain in the 52nd Mechanized Brigade, Originally from Damascus, Interview ID 22. Amman, Jordan, August 19, 2014, 12:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 101. Irbid, Jordan, May 9, 2015, time unrecorded.

423 Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Air Force, Interview ID 49. Irbid, Jordan, February 7, 2015, 12:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Foreign Intelligence and Who Worked Primarily in Damascus, Interview ID 35. Irbid, Jordan, January 17, 2015, 12:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Engineering, Interview ID 44. Irbid, Jordan, January 31, 2015, 1:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in Military Training Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 33. Irbid, Jordan, August 25, 2014, 3pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the 4th Division, Interview ID 34. Irbid, Jordan, January 17, 2015, 9:30am.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel in the Air Force, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 29. Irbid, Jordan, August 25, 2014, 11am.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Colonel Working in Military Finance Office, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 36. Irbid, Jordan, January 17, 2015, 2:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscript, Interview ID 53. Irbid, Jordan, February 14, 2015, time unrecorded.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscript, Interview ID 54. Irbid, Jordan, February 14, 2015, time unrecorded.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Non-Commissioned Officer with Tanks Specialty, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 28. Irbid, Jordan, August 23, 2014, 3:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Conscripted Sergeant in 4th Division, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 24. Amman, Jordan, August 20, 2014, 7:30pm, follow-up May 7, 2015, 2pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Academy, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 27. Irbid, Jordan, August 23, 2014, 2:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in Military Court, Interview ID 39. Irbid, Jordan, January 24, 2015, 2pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former First Lieutenant in the Special Forces, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 30. Irbid, Jordan, August 25, 2014, 1pm.

424 Author Interview with Syrian Former General in Political Administration in Air Force, Interview ID 48. Irbid, Jordan, February 7, 2015, 10am, follow-up February 14, 2015, 10:15am.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Lieutenant in the 1st Corps, Originally from Homs, Interview ID 25. Amman, Jordan, August 21, 2014, 9pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Military Security Conscript, Originally from Baniyas, Interview ID 20. August 18, 2014, 6pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Non-Commissioned Officer in Military Judiciary, Originally from Deraa, Interview ID 38. Irbid, Jordan, January 24, 2015, 12:30pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Officer in Political Security, Interview ID 99. Irbid, Jordan, May 9, 2015, 10:15am.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Sergeant Major in Air Force Security, Interview ID 51. Irbid, Jordan, February 7, 2015, 2pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Soldier, Interview ID 40. Amman, Jordan, January 30, 2015, 6pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Former Warrant Officer First Class in Air Force Security, Interview ID 50. Irbid, Jordan, February 7, 2015, 2pm.

Author Interview with Syrian Sunni Civilian Regime Supporter, Originally from Aleppo, Interview ID 15. Amman, Jordan, July 1, 2014, 8pm.

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Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated April 28, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455- 0002-0206, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated March 24, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455- 0002-0339, BRCC-Boxfiles.

425 Baath Party Central Bureau for the Professional and Popular Organization, to the Secretariat, Reported Disseminated March 24, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455- 0002-0351, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Baath Party National Security Branch Command, to the Organizational Command of the Baghdad Bureau, Report Disseminated March 12, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01- 3455-0002-0456, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Baath Party Organizational Command of the Baghdad Bureau, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated March 11, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0517 to 0518, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Baath Party Organizational Command of the Baghdad Bureau, to the Secretariat, Report Disseminated March 24, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0335, BRCC- Boxfiles.

Baath Party Organizational Command of the South Bureau and Wasit Branch Command, to the Organizational Command of the South Bureau, Report Disseminated March 30, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0144, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Baath Party Secretariat Report Disseminated March 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455- 0002 BRCC-Boxfiles.

Baath Party Secretariat to the Special Security Apparatus, Report Undated itself but Detailing Information Received on March 30, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455- 0002-0302, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Baath Party Secretariat, Deputy Secretary, Report Disseminated April 2, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-2765-0000-0257 to 0268, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Baath Party Secretariat, to the General Intelligence (Mukhabarat) Apparatus, Report Disseminated March 13, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0501, BRCC- Boxfiles.

Baath Party Secretariat, to the General Intelligence (Mukhabarat) Apparatus, Report Disseminated March 15, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0478, BRCC- Boxfiles.

Baath Party Secretariat, to the Presidency of the Republic, Secretary of the Presidency of the Republic for Party Affairs, Report Disseminated March 13, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0239, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Baath Party Secretariat, to the Presidential Diwan, Report Disseminated August 18, 1992 (Electronic Record), 01-3607-0000-0285, BRCC-Boxfiles.

426 Baath Party Secretariat, to the Special Security Apparatus, Report Disseminated April 28, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3455-0002-0209, BRCC-Boxfiles.

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Handwritten Letter by Party Member Addressed to the General Director of the Secretariat, Signed March 2, 1991, (Electronic Record), 01-2211-0001-0034 to 0035, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Handwritten Letter from a Military Colonel from the Training Center in Al-Basra, to the Baath Party, Signed may 8, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0366, BRCC- Boxfiles.

Handwritten Letter from Arbil Comrade, to the Baath Party, Dated May 8, 1991 (Electronic Record), Box 01-3185-0003-0215 to 0219, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Handwritten Letter from Military Colonel, to the Baath Party, Dated May 11, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0349 to 0350, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Handwritten Letter from Military Lieutenant Colonel Comrade, to the Baath Party, Signed May 8, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0493 to 0494, BRCC- Boxfiles.

Handwritten Letter from Military Major Comrade Who Served as a Doctor, to the Baath Party, Signed May 8, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0447, BRCC- Boxfiles.

Handwritten Letter from Military Major, to the Baath Party, Dated May 11, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-3185-0003-0348, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Handwritten Letter Signed by Individual from the Organizational Command of the Euphrates Bureau and Addressed to the General Director of the Secretariat, Dated March 3, 1991 (Electronic Record), 01-2211-0001-0036, BRCC-Boxfiles.

Letter Addressed to Saddam Hussein, Written by the Family of a Martyr in Al-Muthanna, Dated May 24, 1991 (Electronic Record), 039-01-06-237, BRCC-Boxfiles.

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428 University of Colorado Boulder, Iraq Secret Police Files Archives, Accessed September 2015 (continued).

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Selections from: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, edited by Qaimmaqami, Linda W., Adam M. Howard and Edward C. Keefer. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2008.

"208. Paper Prepared by the NEA Working Group in the Department of State Operations Center, September 7, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Drafted by Albert A. Vaccaro (INR/RNA/NE) and Peter A Sutherland (NEA/ARN) and Cleared by Seelye."

"210. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan,” September 8, 1970, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12, Secret, Immediate, Nodis, Drafted and Approved by U. Alexis Johnson and Cleared by Sisco and Eliot."

"214. Minutes of a Combined Washington Special Actions Group and Review Group Meeting, September 9, 1970, Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Nodis, this Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room, Kissinger is Not Listed as a Participant but He Chaired the Meeting."

"216. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 9, 1970, Source, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Sent for Information, Haig Initialed for Kissinger, the Date and Time are Handwritten at the Top of the Page, A Notation on the Memorandum Indicates that the President Saw It."

"217. Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State, September 9, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Immediate, Nodis, Received at 8:20 P.M. it was Repeated to Tel Aviv."

"222. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, September 10, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, the Meeting Took Place in the White House

429 Situation Room, Kissinger is Not Listed as a Participant but He Chaired the Meeting."

"239. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 14, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, the Time is Handwritten at the Top of the First Page."

"240. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 14, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Sent for Information, the Time is Handwritten at the Top of the First Page."

"246. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 15, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Sent for Information."

"248. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 16, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 331, Subject Files, Hijackings, Secret, Printed from an Uninitialed Copy."

"253. Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 17, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/17/70 AM, Secret, Sensitive, the Time is Handwritten at the Top of the First Page, Printed from an Uninitialed Copy."

"254. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting. September 17, 1970. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret; Sensitive, Nodis, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room."

"263. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 18, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V, Secret, Sensitive."

"264. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, September 18, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Sensitive, Nodis, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room."

430 "272. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 19, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/19/70, Secret, Sensitive, an Attached Map is Not Printed."

"275. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 20, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V, Secret, Sensitive, Sent for Information, the Time is Handwritten at the Top of the First Page."

"280. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 20, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/20/70, Top Secret."

"295. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation among the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and Secretary of State Rogers, September 21, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files, no Classification Marking, the Time, “prob. about 6:15 Am,” is Handwritten, all Brackets are in the Original."

"303. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, September 21, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970, Top Secret, Sensitive, Nodis, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Situation Room."

"305. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 21, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/21/70, Secret, Sensitive."

"313. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, September 22, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H- Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970, Top Secret, Sensitive, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Cabinet Room."

"316. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, September 23, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–076, Washington Special Actions Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East 9/23/70,

431 Secret, Nodis, the Tabs are Attached but Not Printed, all Brackets are in the Original."

"318. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, September 23, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H- Files), Box H–109, NSC Meeting Minutes, NSC Minutes Originals 1970, Top Secret, Sensitive, the Meeting Took Place in the White House Cabinet Room."

"328. Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, September 26, 1970, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V, Secret, Nodis, the Time is Handwritten, A Stamped Notation Indicates the President Saw the Memorandum."

"329. Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, September 26, 1970, National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN, Secret, Exdis, Drafted by Sisco and Davies, Cleared by Seelye, and Approved by Davies, it was Sent Priority to Amman, and was also Sent to Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, Tripoli, Benghazi, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, and USUN."

Palestinian Archival Documents

"348. Speech of the Official Spokesperson of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Concerning Jordan Events [ARABIC], Al-Hadaf, Issue 46, Beirut, June 11, 1970." Palestinian Arab Documents, 1970, edited by Nasrallah, George Khoury. Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972.

"382. Message from the Jordanian King Hussein to the Prime Minister of Jordan Al- Talhumi on Current Issues (Excerpt), Amman, September 13, 1968." International Documents on Palestine: 1968, edited by Diab, Zuhair. Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies and University of Kuwait, 1971.

"403. News Conference Statement and Remarks by the Jordanian King Hussein on the Clashes between Security Forces and a Commando Group (Excerpts), Amman, November 6, 1968." International Documents on Palestine: 1968, edited by Diab, Zuhair. Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies and University of Kuwait, 1971.

"686. Appeal from the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Iraqi Forces in Jordan [ARABIC], Fatah, September 18, 1970." Palestinian Arab Documents, 1970, edited by Nasrallah, George Khoury. Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972.

432 "706. Statement of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization Concerning a Group of Officers from the Jordanian Military Joining the Palestinian Revolution [ARABIC], Fatah, September 19, 1970." Palestinian Arab Documents, 1970, edited by Nasrallah, George Khoury. Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972.

"719. Order Published by Mr. Yasser Arafat, Commander in Chief of the Forces of the Palestinian Revolution, to the Officers and Soldiers of the 40th Brigade in the Jordanian Army [ARABIC], Fatah, September 21, 1970." Palestinian Arab Documents, 1970, edited by Nasrallah, George Khoury. Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972.

All Additional References

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