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Download This Publication CMI INSIGHT April 2014 No 2 Roots of fragmentation: The army and regime survival in Syria The Syrian army did not turn on the regime in the face of popular protests, contrary to its Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts. Yet, the Syrian army lost its ability to keep the country together. This CMI Insight focuses on the Syrian army’s co-optive political function. Drawing on interviews with defected military officers,1 it provides a window to observe how the Assad regime has used the army to maintain stability in Syria. The interviews also help us understand the root causes of the nation’s fragmentation. Control over the repressive apparatus is the sine qua non of regime survival.2 Yet the military’s ability to maintain stability goes beyond the prevention of the occurrence of coups. This CMI Insight argues that the Syrian army has mattered for stability in ways that has gone beyond the enforcement of repression, serving as a balancing instrument and a privilege distribution tool. The army in society The Syrian army is a conscript army where their families with them and often settled in all male members of society above the age of 3 18 are expected to serve. It also offers career allowed the construction of informal housing Kjetil Selvik opportunities for volunteers who enrol in theto assist outskirts the lowerof Damascus. class families. Hafiz Access al-Assad to military or air force academies. The military health care and hospitals was relatively better Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute academy in Homs was founded in 1933 by the French and has formed generations of also obtain subsidised goods and housing Adjunct Professor at for officers and their families. They could the Department of 4 Comparative Politics, springboard for social mobility. establishment and the military housing University of Bergen. infantry officers. It became an important throughestablishment. organisations5 like the military social FROM THE PROVINCES ‘ALAWIS AND SUNNIS predominantly from the countryside. After The army offered stable income and the Officersthe Ba’thist in revolutionthe Syrian replaced army the areold prospect of a better life for young men in the provinces. It not least appealed to the traditional urban quarters in Aleppo, Homs members of the ‘Alawi community that military elite it is rare to find sons of the historically had been the country’s poorest. wasor Damascus primarily in deployed the officer along ranks. the Until border the right to buy exemption from military service civil war broke out the military personnel Whereasin force until the 1964,wealthy the took rural, advantage mostly peasant, of the with Israel. Provincial officers brought This CMI Insight is a publication from the project Everyday Maneuvers: Military - Civilian Relations in Latin-America and the Middle East. The project explores the historical, cultural and political ties between military actors and civilians. Project leader: Nefissa Naguib. Project coordinator: Iselin Åsedotter Strønen. Roots of fragmentation: CMI INSIGHT April 2014 No 2 The army and regime survival in Syria ‘Alawis saw in the army an opportunity for social to “watch everyone, including other security agencies.”11 promotion.6 They were originally concentrated in the SOCIAL COMMUNITY QUOTAS to prominence in the shadow of the lower ranks of the army but rose7 The army offered stable General Manaf Tlass, who defected According to former Brigadier- TheBa’thist military revolution career (1963-1970). was also income and the prospect attractive to members of the other fromclose theto elitethe Republiccurrent president,Guard in communities. A defected Sunni of a better life for young men January 2012 and was personally colonel from the village of Khan in the provinces. there was another key component joined the military academy in inleader the in coup-proofingthe security forces strategy: with HomsShaykhun, in 1983, north described of Hama, his who reason for enlisting as members of a differentHafiz social al-Assadidentity segment.flanked His everymain saw they were living comfortable lives and that people follows: “I used to admire officers. They were the elite. I Matawirah.recruitment Manafpools forTlass officers estimates were that,the fourout bigof Syria’s‘Alawi down the street everyone would follow him with their tribes, al-Kalbiyya, al-Khayyatin, al-Haddadin, and al- hadeyes.” esteem8 for them. When an officer came walking had crushed a Sunni Muslim brotherhood rebellion one 40,000 officers, 30,000 would be12 The‘Alawi, president 8,000 Sunnimade The fact that Hafiz and his brother Rif’at al-Assad andsure 2,000to balance from the other distribution religious of minorities posts among such the as ‘Alawi the career choice. He explained that he used to consider the Christian,tribes and Druzeother identityand Ismaili groups ones. according to an informal yeararmy earlier a national in next-door institution Hama didand not affect the officer’s “quota” system. For example, in that he had believed the regime’s designating generals for the army’s account of the battle in Hama as a The president made sure to seven divisions he would prefer 9 There was to have a Kalbiyya, a Khayyatin, a an effective state media monopoly balance the distribution of Haddadin, a Matawirah, a Sunni, a fightin Syria against in 1982. terrorism. posts among the ‘Alawi tribes Christian,in the security and services.a Druze. The same Balancing instrument and other identity groups principle would apply for officers according to an informal The balancing system was also Syria and the Ba’th party in a coup enforced within the military units. Hafizhe called al-Assad the “corrective gained control movement” over “quota” system. If the head of a division was Sunni, his deputies would typically be an ‘Alawi and a Christian, but never forceof 1970. commander He had and climbedestablished the a power base in the air other Sunnis. Their deputies again would be Sunni, military ranks to the post of air 13 The army structure was in other words based on internal force intelligence division. His take-over was the last in a Druze,contradictions Ismaili orto prevent‘Alawis fromconcerted different movement tribes. from tamingseries of the coups military in the where 1950s others and 1960s had failed that beforeempowered him. below. Short of orders from the man on the top, any officers with a rural background. Hafiz succeeded in COUP-PROOFING its falling apart. In a frequently referred to article on the topic, James attempt to mobilise the army from within would provoke GROWING IMBALANCE T. Quinlivan described the essence of Hafiz al-Assad’s “coup-proofing”of multiple security as: theservices. exploitation10 of special loyalties; AccordingBashar reduced to Manaf the presence al-Tlass, of theSunnis internal in the balancearmy’s presidentthe creation relied of parallel on members militaries; of andhis thefamily, establishment tribe and was upset after Bashar al-Assad came to power. religious community to control The the first security implied apparatus. that the commanding positions which in the defected brigadier- general’s view was a fatal mistake: Hafiz entrusted the most central armed forces to persons whoParallel were military tied to units him by were blood established such as his to brothers, counterweight Rif’at For 30 years Hafiz al-Asad was commander- theand regular Jamil al-Assad,armed forces. and Andhis thecousin, president ‘Adnan created al- Assad. four in-chief of the army, surrounded by two Sunni parallel security agencies—the General Security, Political Thedeputies, two were Mustafa rivals, Tlass competing from Rastan with and each Hikmat other. Security, Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence— HeShihabi also frommaintained al-Bab, the in theSunni Aleppo Najib countryside. Jamil from 2 Roots of fragmentation: The army and regime survival in Syria CMI INSIGHT April 2014 No 2 of the Syrian economy to privilege members of the thesupreme outskirts commander. of Deir-e His Zour minister in a ofprominent defence, were prevented from importing goods in their names ‘Aliposition. Habib, In was 2009, an Bashar‘Alawi andal-Asad so waswas histhe deputy,army’s butsecurity would apparatus enter into ininformal business partnerships transactions. with Officerstraders again ‘Ali ‘Ayyub. The chief of staff of the armed who gained access and support (wasta of power. Together they were able to evade Syria’s heavy trade regulations, as a defected major elucidated:) in the corridors forces, Dawud Rajiha, was a Christian while his deputies, ‘Asif Shawkat and Munir Adnuf, were I imported women’s cosmetics from Dubai in both ‘Alawis. The first Sunni to 14appear in this cooperation with a Hama trader. I did not only hierarchy was Fahd Jasim al-Freij as the seventh or eighth most influential person. the capital. We imported the goods through Privilege distribution tool contribute the wasta but also 50 per cent of The informal quota system did more than preventing the occurrence of coups. It also provided a system for the thea company import tax. controlled The goods by were Rami imported Makhluf to andthe Maher al-Assad so that we did not have to pay a clientelist political strategy that involved the generation distribution of “rewards.” Hafiz al-Assad used the army in Syrian Free Zone where the company would up served to generate rents in the sense that it increased whichtake charge was theof bringing regular themimport in. fee.We paidIn this $6,000 way and distribution of economic rents. The military build- directly to Rami Makhluf instead of $20,000 the quality of our products was Syria’s strategic importance to great powers like the we acquired competitivenesssought after. 17in the market, and roleformer of “frontlineSoviet Union state” and with regional Israel The informal quota system powersand the likeWest Iran. and Syria would gained request the The major explained that he would did more than preventing the have to bribe the security services militaryat bay.
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