JIJF§

Sven G. Ho/Ismark ......

The limits to Soviet influence

Soviet strategic interests in Norway and Denmark 1944-47

IFS Info Institutt for forsvarsstudier No. 7 -1994 Table of contents

Introduction ...... 5

Soviet strategic interests in Denmark: The Baltic Straits and Bornholm ...... 7

Soviet strategic interests in Norway: Svalbard and the northern borderlands ...... 12

Conclusion: the bureaucratic formulation of policy proposals, and the limits

to Soviet influence in Scandinavia ...... •...... •...•...... 17

Notes ...... 21 Introduction

Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, German Kriegsmarine. Denmark seemed to find Soviet strategic interests in the three Scandinavian itself squeezed between German land power and countries were limited.' One exception to this rule British naval power. Industrially and militarily was the recurrent Soviet interest in the Baltic Sweden was much stronger than its two Scandi­ Straits,2 but this did not lead to any serious attempt navian neighbours, and less inclined to look to the to force a change in the existing rules for shipping great powers for security guarantees. From the through the Straits. The other exception was the Soviet point of view Sweden was of strategic Soviet fear - basically unfounded - that Sweden significance mainly because of its assumed would join forces with Finland and the three Baltic ambition to act as a regional great power in states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) to create an anti­ Scandinavia and the Baltic area. Soviet "bloc" in the Baltic area.3 Despite this connection to the troubled relationship between the Up until 1939, Soviet policy in Scandinavia was Soviet Union on the one hand and Finland and the defensive, aimed at using the limited Soviet three Baltic states on the other, Scandinavia was leverage over the Scandinavian governments to clearly peripheral to Soviet foreign policy and impede real or imagined attempts by the other great strategic interests. The Soviet Union's military powers to increase their own political and military buildup and foreign-policy priorities in Europe predominance in Scandinavia. From the late 1920s were aimed at creating a system of political on, Soviet propaganda focused on the issue of guarantees for the country's borders on the Euro­ Scandinavian or Nordic cooperation, which up pean continent, backed up by steadily increasing until 1934-35 was seen as a vehicle for British, and ground and air forces. The Soviet state showed no thereafter German, political and military inclination towards expanding into an area where it penetration of the region. S At no point did the was politically and militarily incapable of playing a Soviets signal any ambitions of playing a military prominent role. role on Scandinavian territories or in Scandinavian waters.' During the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet Union gradually developed impressive land and air forces, The Second World War, and not least Nazi but the restricted state of its navy left it with no Germany's use of Norwegian territory for attacks other option than to accept the pre-eminence of on the lines of communication between the Wes­ Great Britain and Germany in Scandinavia. This tern Allies and the ice-free ports in Northern was true for Norway and its possessions in the Russia, brought an end to this state of relative Arctic Ocean (Spitsbergen, Bear Island and Jan innocence. The immensely enlarged scope of Mayen).4 Even on the eve of the Second World Soviet strategic interests and capabilities in Europe War, the Soviet Northern Fleet consisted mostly of which grew out of the offensive movements of the coast defence vessels which were incapable of any Soviet armies from 1943 brought the Scandinavian ocean-going offensive operations and which were countries closer to the centre of Soviet strategic no match for Britain's Royal Navy or even the interests. As the war in Europe drew to a close, the

An earlier version ofthis article was presented as a paper to the international colloqUium on "The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War (1943-1953}", organised by the Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in Cortona, Italy, 23-24 September 1994. Bent Jensen, Tom Kristiansen and Olav Riste have contributed usefol comments to the various drafts ofthe text.

IFS Info 7194 5 Scandinavian countries became part of Soviet liberation of both countries, and the Soviet foreign planning for the post-war order in Europe. The policy bureaucracy was not averse to the idea of European upheaval also created the preconditions using the presence of Soviet troops to achieve for strategically motivated initiatives which might long-term political and military goals in these entail a revision of the pre-war territorial and countries. political order in Europe. This paper will examine how the Soviets defined Sweden had been spared the ravages of war and, and partly pursued a set of strategic and political when the fighting in Europe ended, presented itself objectives in Norway and Denmark from 1944 to as a haven of political and economic stability. The early 1947. These schemes ultimately failed, and in country had also built up a strong military defence these years the ambitious ideas of the early post­ during the war, with impressive naval and air war period gradually gave way to the traditional forces. Sweden offered few opportunities, if any, and basically defensive policy of fmding ways of for far-reaching Soviet foreign policy initiatives. curtailing the rise of Western influence and control Neither Soviet policy towards Sweden as it was over these two Scandinavian countries. actually implemented in the immediate post-war period, nor the documents hitherto made available The focus of this paper is on the decision-making in Soviet archives, hint at the existence of plans process within one ofthe bureaucratic structures: which would have affected Sweden's territorial the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, renamed the integrity or its status as a non-aligned country with Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 1946.'ln no foreign military bases on its soil. Apart from the contrast to the .established image of effective and idea, expressed in particular by Alexandra deliberate centralisation, the picture I will sketch is Kollontai, the Soviet envoy in Stockholm, that one of a foreign policy bureaucracy marked by economic pressure might be used to secure for the imperfection and indecisiveness, where confusion Soviet Union a degree of "political influence" in and misinformation was part of the policy-making Sweden,7 there is no evidence that discussions of process.! will also argue that the Ministry to a high Soviet policy on Sweden in the early post-war degree allowed its middle-level staff to generate years went beyond the defensive aim of resisting and pursue their own proposals for foreign policy the further spread of what the Soviets perceived as initiatives. Some of these officials apparently the predominant Western influence there. became strongly attached to their pet projects, and continued to argue that they should be Norway and Denmark, on the other hand, did not implemented, even when confronted with a lack of escape the attention of Soviet foreign policy and interest, or even disapproval, on the part of the military strategists. Soviet soldiers took part in the political leadership.'

6 IFS Info 7/94 Soviet strategic Interests In Denmark: the Baltic Straits and Bornholm10

Soviet strategic interests in Denmark and Norway Denmark's strategic significance is defined by were linked to the need for secure lines of its role as a country which [has] the real communication between Soviet home waters and control over the shipping through the Straits, the Atlantic Ocean - part of Russia's age-old quest which are an important link in the general for secure access to the high seas. Denmark strategic situation in the Baltic theatre ofwar. attracted Soviet attention because of the country's key location at the entrances to the Baltic Sea. The power that controlled the Baltic Straits and the Denmark guarded the Belts (1be Great Belt and Kiel Canal could decide whether the Baltic should The Little Belt, in Danish territorial waters), which be an open or a closed sea. 12 are, apart from the Kiel Canal, the only entrances to the Baltic Sea navigable by major warships. It It seems reasonable to assume that this memoran­ shared the control over the shallow passage of the dum was written in connection with Molotov's Sound (Oresund) with Sweden. Soviet strategic visit to Berlin in November of the same year. In his interests in Denmark also focused on the island of discussions with Hitler's foreign minister, Molotov Bomholm, sitoated at the entrance to the narrow brought up the Baltic Straits, suggesting some sort and westernmost part of the Baltic Sea." With of internationalisation of the passages. Ribbentrop regard to Norway, Soviet attention focused on the refused to enter into a discussion of this issue, remote Bear Island and the Spitsbergen reminding Molotov that "Gennany is at war with archipelago in the high north of the Arctic Ocean, England, and therefore a number of questions and on the eastern part of Finnmark county in the cannot be solved now". Apparently, Molotov made extreme northeast of the Norwegian mainland. no attempt to press the issue." After the Gennan attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, the issue These factors induced Soviet foreign policy of the Baltic Straits became part of the ensuing strategists to argue the need for Soviet military Soviet discussions about the post-war order in bases on Norwegian and Danish territory. They Europe. When Anthony Eden came to Moscow in also led to demands for a revision of the rules December 1941, Stalin suggested that he would governing the transit of warships through the Baltic like "a guarantee by certain Powers as to the Straits, and for abrogation of the 1920 Treaty on entrances to the Baltic Sea". Apart from the issue Spitsbergen, which defmes Svalbard as a of the Straits, however, Stalin indicated that the demilitarised area under Norwegian sovereignty. Soviets felt no interest in Denmark proper, hinting Thus, the Soviets wanted to gain control over the that Great Britain might want to have military entrances to the Baltic Sea and the sea lanes from bases there after the war. The island ofBomholm the Atlantic Ocean to Northern Russia This was not mentioned in the discussions." complements their well-known attempts, starting in the spring of 1945, to gain command of the The evidence from the years 1941-1944 is still entrances to the Black Sea However, far stronger limited and inconclusive concerning the position of pressure was brought to bear on Turkey than Denmark in Soviet thinking about the post-war anything ever applied to Norway or Denmark. order in Europe. However, from the very beginning of the fonnalised Soviet planning A memorandum from October-November 1940 process, the issue of the Baltic Straits figured on defmed Soviet strategic interests in Denmark in the the list of topics to be studied. One of the bodies following simple tenns: responsible for preparing the Soviet position for

IFS Info 7/94 7 the international negotiations which would follow commission. The Soviet Union, according to after the end of the war, was the so-called Lozovskii, needed additional strongpoints in the "Commission for the preparation of diplomatic Baltic Sea between the Kiel Canal and the Aaland materials", often called simply the "Litvinov Islands. Both Litvinov and Lozovskii realised that Commission" (Komissiia Litvinova). This it might be difficult to produce a legal basis for the commission, set up in early 1942 under Molotov's demand for military bases on Bomholm, "which chairmanship, was in 1943 renamed the belongs to Denmark, with which we are not at "Commission for the preparation for peace treaties war". In the end, it was decided to accept the text and the post-war orders", and Litvinov was of the memorandum which formed the basis for the appointed its chairman. Although its direct discussion, with an addition about the possibility of influence on Soviet policy decisions is doubtful, Soviet military bases on the German island of the topics brought up by the commission and the RUgen.20 arguments employed certainly reflected the attitudes of senior members of the foreign policy A few weeks later, similar views were presented to apparatus." deputy commissar V.G. Dekanozov by the head of the NKID's 5th European Department, Pavel D. In the spring of 1942, a memorandum on the Baltic Orlov." Orlov stressed the Soviet Union's Straits was prepared for the commission by Profes­ "particular interests" in Denmark as the guardian sor Vsevolod N. Durdenevskii, a specialist on of the entrances to the Baltic Sea. Interestingly, internationallaw.16 It is unclear, however, whether Orlov's memorandum was based on the this paper came up for discussion in the assumption that the Soviet Union would take part commission. When the reorganised commission in the military liberation of Denmark from the Nazi met for the first time under Litvinov's forces." Orlov's subordinate, Tatiana Zhdanova, chairmanship on 8 September 1943, the issue of was more explicit in her interpretation of Soviet the Baltic Straits still figured on the list of tupics to aims in Denmark. She suggested that Poland (i.e. be discussed. 17 However, it was not until 22 July the Lublin committee) and France should be 1944 that a plenary session of the commission was invited to sign an inter-allied declaration on convened tu discuss Soviet interests in the Baltic Denmark. The idea of such a declaration, to be Straits and the western part of the Baltic Sea. The signed by the three major allies, had been brought task, according to Litvinov, was to formulate a up by the British. In Zhdanova's view, bringing in policy which could create maximum security for the Poles would strengthen the Soviet presence in the Soviet Baltic coast. The Soviet Union would the areas adjacent to the North and Baltic Seas, prefer to have the entrances to the Baltic Sea thereby creating a counterbalance to the "Anglo­ closed to warships of non-littoral states, and to Americans" there. As part of this scheme, Polish internationalise the Straits and the Kiel Canal. troops (from Gen. Berling's army) might take part Litvinov also held that the Aaland Islands ought to in the military operations in Denmark.21 As of be brought under Soviet sovereignty. However, December 1944, therefore, no decision had Litvinov was aware that the Soviet Union would apparently been made on the question of whether, hardly be able to achieve all this. In particular he or in what way, Soviet forces should take part in was sceptical about the chances of achieving a the liberation of Denmark. On the eve of the straits regime which would close the Baltic Sea to planned Moscow visit of representatives of the the navies of the Western great powers." Danish Freedom Council - a visit that never took place - Dekanozov added to Orlov's list of mate ri­ Deputy commissar Solomon A. Lozovskii argued als to be prepared a memorandum "on the Danes' that the Soviet Union would need military bases" attitude towards an Anglo-American occupation of on the island of Bomholm. This idea was not Denmark and to our participation in this matter". 24 mentioned in the original report prepared for the In their contacts with Thomas Dossing, the

8 IFS Info 7/94 Moscow representative of the Danish Freedom western powers' zone ofoperations and Council, Dekanozov, V.S. Semenov and other interests and that the Danish questions are of Soviet diplomats repeatedly emphasised that the no concern or interest to the Soviet Union. Soviet Union was not disinterested in Danish However, the delimitation ofthe occupational affairs. In January 1945 Dekanozov hinted to zones in Germany and the English control over Dessing that Denmark's liberation from Nazi the Kiel Canal enhance Denmark's significance occupation and the country's future political order from the point ofview ofthe security ofour (ustroistvo) were of interest not only to the Wes­ Baltic coast. 17 tern powers." It seems clear from the available elements of the Thus, there seemed to be a high degree of ensuing correspondence that the issue had not been concordance of views in the Soviet foreign policy discussed between Molotov and Dekanozov, the apparatus about the need to change the regime of deputy commissar primarily responsible for the Baltic Straits. In the fina1 months of the war, Scandinavian affairs. Dekanozov supported the issue of security in the western part of the Semenov's proposal. On Molotov's instructions a Baltic Sea was raised in several articles in Krasnyi copy of the letter was sent to N.A. Bulganin, the flot, the navy commissariat's newspaper. Apart Deputy Commissar for Defence.28 from analysing the significance of the Straits, the articles emphasised the significance of the islands Unfortunately, the ensuing sequence of events is of Bornholm and ROgen in controlling this portion still unclear. According to a Soviet source, on 23 of the Baltic.'" Then, in mid-March, the idea of April the navy commissar proposed captorlng seizing Bornholm was raised by Vladimir S. ROgen and Bornholm to the General Staff. Semenov, Kollontai's deputy at the Soviet legation According to this source, the commander of the in Stockholm who in the years to cOme was to rise Baltic fleet received the fina1 order to prepare for to prominence as a leading Soviet diplomat In a the capture ofBornholm only on 4 May.'" On 7 letter to Dekanozov Semenov wrote: May the Soviets urged the German garrison to surrender. The same day Soviet aircraft bombed In relation with the evolution ofthe military the island. When the Germans refused to capitulate operations in Pomerania, it would be to Soviet forces," Soviet aircraft repeated the appropriate for the Supreme Naval Stqff to bombing on 8 May. On 9 May a small force landed examine the possibility oflanding our troops on and received the German capitulation, and parts of the Danish island ofBornholm. Such an a Soviet infantry division established themselves operation, if it is possible from the military on Bornholm. point ofview, would be absolutely justified politically, in view ofthe fact that the island is According to the official Soviet version which the occupied by German troops and is used as a Soviets presented soon after their arrival, Born­ base against the USSR However, in this way holm was seized simply because it lay to the east of participoting in the liberation ofDanish the western limit of their zone of operations in territory and having control over the island Germany. Whatever may have motivated the (derzha v nashykh rukakb), we would acquire Soviets to bomb and capture Bornholm, the local equal rights as the allies in the settling ofall military commander was instructed to tell the matters in Denmarlc, participating in the Danes that the Soviet military presence was Control [. ..] Commission, ifsuch a body is to temporary and that the Soviet troops would be be created [' . .J. withdrawn when "military questions related to Germany" were fina1ly settled. This was done in The English persuade Danish politicians, that order to dispel any anxiety the Danes might have Denmarlc, allegedly, is altogether within the had about what the Soviets intended to do with

IFS Info 7/94 9 Bornholm.31 Declarations to this effect were made Internal NKID deliberations also suggest that the during the meetings between the Soviet final decision to surrender control of Bornholm to commanders and the official Danish the Danish government was made only in the representatives in the weeks immediately after the winter 1945-46. In their memorandum to Molotov Soviets captured the island," and they were of 10 July 1945, Vetrov .and Plakhin argued that repeated in a Soviet note of24 July. Bornholm was "an iruportant strategic spot" located at the entrances to the Baltic Sea, and that Two memoranda from July 1945 presented the it might "be an iruportant link in the safeguarding views of the NKID bureaucracy on Soviet policy of our security" in the Baltic Sea. They referred to towards Denmark. Mikhail S. Vetrov, the acting Danish and Swedish opinions that Bornholm might head of the NKID's 5th European Department, and become ''the Malta of the Baltic Sea". However, his subordinate Tatiana Zhdanova, in a memoran­ the Soviet declarations made in May 1945 had dum to the deputy .commissars Andrei la. serVed to reassure the Danes. Therefore, Vetrov Vyshinskii and S.A. Lozovskii, reiterated that the and Plakhin argued, Soviet troops could remain on Soviet Union should demand a regime for the the island "for an extended period of time" Belts, the Sound and the Kiel Canal which would (prodo1zhitelnoe vremia) without any risk of close the Baltic Sea to warships of non-littoral ''political complications". They suggested reaching states." Vetrov and A.I. Plakhln, the newly an agreement with the Danish government about appointed Soviet envoy in Denmark and former the joint Soviet-Danish defence ofBornholm, with head of the NKID's Scandinavian Department, in a Soviet and Danish naval and air bases on the related memorandum repeated these island. Such bases would serve two purposes. They recommendations for the Kiel Canal, but proposed would serve Soviet security interests in the region, a somewhat different solution concerning the but would also be important in securing Soviet Straits. A regime for the Straits, according to "influence over Denmark's foreigu policy". Vetrov and Plakhin, could be created by the Negotiations about military bases should be signing of a Danish-Soviet treaty giving Soviet initiated before the Soviet troops were withdrawn - merchant and naval ships the right to pass through in this situation the Danes could be expected to be the Straits, while closing these passages to naval more accommodating. The creation of naval and vessels of non-littoral states. Such a treaty should air bases on Bornholm should be complemented by include the oblill!ition of the Soviet Union ''to the establishment of bases on RQgen." assist Denmark in the upholding (sobliudenie) of the regime" established by the treaty. Other Baltic The idea of establishing permanent Soviet bases on states should be invited to join the treaty." Finally, Bornholm reappeared in intemaJ NKID documents in a memorandum from December 1945 Litvinov throughout 1945. In December Litvinov suggested repeated the by now well-known arguments and that hints of possible Soviet demands for military proposals, by recommending that the Soviet Union bases on Bornholm, and RQgen, could be used to should try to achieve the internationalisation of the make the Western powers more accommodating Belts, the Sound and the Kiel Canal. Only the towards Soviet demands for the internationalisation Baltic states should participate in the control of the Baltic entrances and the Kiel CanaI.31 The meaning the USSR, Poland, Sweden and Denmark. Soviet government's postponement of a planned "After a certain period of time" Finland and visit to Moscow in September 1945 by a Danish Germany might be invited to take part in the government delegation apparently reflected the scheme. However, any effective control of the absence of a clear Soviet stance in the major issues Baltic entrances and the Kiel Canal would presup­ of its policy towards Denmark: the Straits and pose the creation of a system of military bases Bornholm. The available Soviet documents give no along these waterways." direct answer to the reasons for this postponement. However, a letter from A.N. Abramov, newly

10 IFS Info 7/94 appointed head of the 5th European Deparbnent, "he did not refer to bases at all", and that he only and Vetrov of 9 October 1945 sheds some light on wished to raise the question of free passage the Soviet reasoning. The Danish delegation, through the Straits." The NKID's 5th European according to this letter, was supposed to discuss Deparbnent produced, however, a draft resolution not only trade relations, but also "political issues, stipulating that the establishment of a regime for notably the evacuation of Soviet troops from the the Baltic Straits should be the task of the Baltic island of Bornholm" and repatriation questions. states: the USSR, Poland, Denmark and Sweden." The "instantsiia" - the Politburo - had decided to The draft, apparently, was not presented to the defer the delegation's visit until the spring of 1946. British and US representatives. However, the Danish government continued to urge the Soviet government to receive two of its The decision was taken to withdraw from the representatives in Moscow. Abramov, Vetrovand island. On 20 February 1946 the Danish envoy in Plakhin, the Soviet envoy in Copenhagen, Moscow, Thomas D"ssing, brought up in a supported this Danish proposal, partly because it conversation with Abramov the issue of the would strengthen the "democratic forces" as continued presence of Soviet troops on Bornholm. opposed to the "reactionary" elements in Danish D"ssing declared that the Danish army, rebuilt. politics. However, the main reason behind after the war, was now capable of taking over the Abramov's and Vetrov's support for the proposal task which had been the rationale for the presence was apparently to take the opportunity to bring up of Allied troops in Denmark. The Soviet troops on with the Danes, on a preliminary basis, Bornholm had carried out their tasks, and should now leave the island.4I A formal note to the same the initiation ofan agreement on the joint effect was delivered a week later." The next day, safeguarding (okhraruj) in the western part of i.e. on 5 March, Molotov received the Danish the Baltic Sea (the creation ofmilitary bases on envoy and delivered the following message: the island ofBornholm and the establishment of a regime for the straits}." IfDenmark is now capable ofoccupying Bornholm with its ownforces and ofsetting up The outcome is well-known: the Soviets decided on Bornholm its own administration without not to present to the Danish government their any participation whatsoever offoreign troops demands for a revision of the regime over the or foreign administrators, the Soviet govern­ Straits or for negotiations on the joint defence of ment will withdraw its troops from Bomholm Bornholm. Although the issue of passage through and hand the island over to the Danish govern­ the Baltic Straits was brought up by Molotov and ment. 43 Stalin at the conference of ministers of foreign affairs in Moscow in December 1945, the Soviets The fast response of the Soviet government made no attempt to press for a solution along the suggests that the decision to leave Bornholm had lines suggested in the numerous NKID memo­ been taken prior to the Danish demarche. The issue randa. When Stalin expressed anxiety that the had also been discussed by Vyshinskii and the Soviet Union would be confined to the Baltic in the Danish foreign minister, Gustav Rasmussen, in event of war, British foreign minister Ernest Bcvin early February." The Danish government agreed to declared that the British would oppose the the Soviet conditions in a message of 8 March, and establishment of bases in this area. Stalin said that the last Soviet troops left the island on 4 April 1946.45

IFS Info 7/94 1 1 Soviet strategic interests In Norway: Svalbard and the northern borderlands

The Soviets never tried to coerce the Danish Affairs' Scandinavian Department strongly government in to agreing to a revision of the supported the views of the Barentsburg group. In regime of the Baltic Straits or a permanent Soviet June and July NKID bureaucrats wrote several military presence on Bomholm. Soviet-Norwegian memoranda on Svalbard, stressing the area's relations evolved differently, however, and the strategic importance and providing proof that internal deliberations of NKID bureaucrats resulted Norway's claims to the archipelago, and to Bear in a Soviet attempt to achieve the revision of the Island in particular, were weakly founded. The internationally recognised regime over the Sval­ campaign culminated in early August when Pavel bard archipelago. From November 1944, when D. Orlov, the acting Head of the Scandinavian Molotov introduced the matter during a Department, recommended that the Svalbard conversation with Norwegian foreign minister archipelago should be occupied "by units of the Trygve Lie, and to February 1947, discussions of Red Army" for the duration of the war and until the international status of Svalbard were one of the the "period of complete stabilisation of internatio­ formative elements in the Norwegian-Soviet nal relations". In this he seconded strong appeals relationship. Molotov demanded inter alia that from the Soviet consul in Barentsburg, Petr 1. Spitsbergen should be transformed into a Nor­ Volnukhin." wegian-Soviet condominium, i.e. come under joint Soviet-Norwegian rule, and that Bear Island should However, the efforts of the Soviet consul in be transferred to Soviet sovereignty. There is no Barentsburg and of the employees of the Scandi­ need to repeat the story of the ensuing Norwegian­ navian Department failed to receive Molotov's Soviet negotiations: they have been discussed in support, although they were certainly brought to detail by various authors.'" I will limit myself to a his attention. One reason for Molotov's lack of discussion of the origin and the evolution of the interest may have been that the Soviet military issue within the Soviet foreign policy apparatos. disagreed on the strategic importance of Spitsber­ gen and Bear Island. This, at least apparently, was The idea of changing Svalbard's international the case in the summer of 1941, i.e. after the status in favour of the SovietUnion had surfaced German attack on the Soviet Union. At the Soviet­ on the eve of the outbreak of war. Until then Soviet Norwegian-British negotiations in July and August interests in the archipelago had been economic, not that year, the Soviets made no strong efforts to strategic. By 1939 and 1940, officials at the Soviet obtain their allies' agreement to the initial Soviet consulate in Barentsburg on Spitsbergen were idea of an Allied occupation of Spitsbergen, and at arguing in favour of extending Soviet control over no point did they hint at the possibility of indepen­ the archipelago, in order to prevent the British or dent Soviet action on Spitsbergen. Even the less the Germans from taking control. However, at that ambitious idea of arming the Soviet population in time their views did not seem to evoke much of a Barentsburg evaporated. In the autumn of 1941 the response in Moscow in terms of a profound re­ Soviets took part in the evacuation of Norwegian evaluation of Svalbard's significance - whether and Russian civilians from Spitsbergen." At the economic or strategic.47 beginning of the discussions Maiskii had declared to Anthony Eden that the Soviet government had The German occupation of Norway in the spring of "no territorial claims ofany kind upon Norway, 1940 gave substance to their warnings, and in the nor would they ever have them".'· summer of that year the Commissariat for Foreign

12 IFS Info 7/94 Thus, until Molotov's initiative in November 1944, The ensuing Norwegian-Soviet negotiations the Soviets had made no attempts on the state-to­ culminated on 9 April 1945, when the Norwegian state level to change Svalbard's international status Ambassador in Moscow delivered to the Soviet in their favour. Foreign Ministry the proposal for a Norwegian­ Soviet declaration. Article One of the draft When Molotov fmally raised the topic with Lie in declaration stated that "the defence of the November 1944, this appears to have been a last­ Archipelago of Svalbard is the joint responsibility minute decision, and the immediate background of Norway and the Soviet Union". From April was a number of memoranda which argued the 1945 until Molotov raised the matter again in the necessity of securing a stronger Soviet presence on summer of 1946, Moscow made no serious efforts Spitsbergen and Bear Island. The arguments were to finalise a Soviet-Norwegian agreement on summarised by Deputy Commissar V1adimir Svalbard. Molotov apparently felt that the Norwe­ Dekanozov in a memorandum which seems to have gian government had agreed to his most important been given to Molotov only hours before his demand - Soviet military bases on the islands. meeting with Trygve Lie. In his memorandum, Dekanozov emphasised the Soviet Union's The same group ofNKID officials who had been economic interests on Spitsbergen, but also the driving force behind the Svalbard initiative underlined "Bear Island's exceptional (iskliu­ presented and vigorously pursued a set of chitelnoe) strategic importance both for the proposals aimed at securing a military foothold for security of the Soviet mines on Spitsbergen, and in the Soviet Union in Northern Norway. These order to safeguard Soviet communications in the proposals received much stronger support from the North". Dekanozov recommended that the Soviet military leadership than the NKID bureaucrats' government should immediately reestablish its attempts to finalise the Svalbard negotiations. legal rights on Spitsbergen, but also In October 1944 a middle-level official in the [ ..] reach an agreement with the Norwegian NKID's 5th European Department, Tatiana government that the Soviet Union should have Zhdanova, presented a memorandum which linked the right, ifit deems it necessary, to organise the Svalbard issue to the futore of Northern Nor­ one or more navy and air bases [ ..] on the way. In her view, Spitsbergen constituted main Spitsbergen archipelago [ ..}. one side ofthe channel which connects the It would also be necessary to agree on Atlantic Ocean with our arctic regions. This channel used to be a very broad one, but it has the bUilding ofa naval base on Bear Island in to a Significant degree been "squeezed" by the order to defend our rights on Spitsbergen and evolution ofaviation. In this way, the question to safeguard the movements ofSoviet ships of ofreviewing our border with Norway is closely the Northern Fleet. SI linked with the review leading to a decision on the Spitsbergen question. Apart from the information contained in Dekanozov's memorandum, Molotov was not well The fact that Petsamo (pechenga) was ceded to the acquainted with the topic. After Lie had objected to Soviet Union from Finland did not, in Zhdanova's Molotov's argument that the Soviet Union had opinion, solve the problem of the "channel" to the been "forced" to accept the Svaibard Treaty of Atlantic. Thus Zhdanova argued along the lines 1920 by pointing to the fact that in 1935 the Soviet which had been introduced by the Soviet Consul in Union had acceded to the Treaty entirely Barentsburg in 1939 and 1940, but introduced the voluntarily, Molotov in a brusque manner asked development of modern aviation as an additional his subordinates to explain what had compelled reason to alter the status quo in the High North. Litvinov to make this decision.

IFS lofo 7/94 13 Zhdanova concluded: A letter of 4 June from Rear Admiral Stepan G. Kucherov, the Chief of the Navy Staff (Glavnyi Taking into account the foreign policy benefit morskoi shtab Voenno-Morskogo Flota), provided which the Red Army's participotion in the Vetrov with an opportunity to press for a more liberation ofNorthern Norway has brought us, active Soviet policy. In his letter Kucherov it would be appropriate to exploit the expressed concern about the activity of the Norwegians' need for a counterweight, through significant number of Germans who remained in friendship with the USSR, to the English Northern Norway, and about the Norwegian anempts to achieve a ''portugalisation'' of military authorities' subordination to the British. Norway. In the course ofthe war England has gained almost complete control over Norway. Kucherov proposed that the Soviet government Thus it appears that it would not be difficult for should "create a special staff in Norway, which us to reach an agreement with the Norwegians could then immediately start to work on the on cooperation on the defence ofNorthern problems which have been accumulating there". Norway; on the bUilding ofnavy and air bases, This staff should include representatives from the necessary railways etc. Otherwise the English Commissariat for Defence, from the Navy will do this. The creation ofthis kind ofclose Commissariat, from the Commissariat for Foreign postwar SOViet-Norwegian cooperation, which Affairs, and from General Golikov's Repatriation would ensure for the Soviet Union appropriate Commission which was already working in Nor­ permanent influence in Norway, would leave way." It should be noted that Admiral Kucherov the possibility ofraising the problem ofa did not suggest that the Soviet Union, for strategic correction to the Soviet-Norwegian border at a or other reasons, should expand its military more suitable moment. J2 presence in Northern Norway by establishing military bases or by expanding the area coutrolled In the months following the Norwegian draft by Soviet troops. decIaration of9 April 1945, international conferences and pressing global issues apparently removed the Vetrov, when asked to comment on Kucherov's Svalbard question, and NOIwegian affairs in general, letter, reached his own far-reaching conclusions. from the Soviet decision-maker.;' main agenda Argning that the Norwegian-Soviet agreement of However, while Molotov was concentrating on the 16 May 1944 on jurisdiction and administration in more important European and global questions, his territories liberated by Allied troops "does not limit subordinates continued to press for a more offensive the areas which can be occupied by one or other of Soviet policy towards Norway. A group of officials the Allied Powers", he supported Kucherov's plan in the Foreign Ministry's 5th European Department to create a group of Soviet representatives in made repeated attempts to convince Molotov ofthe Norway. He also suggested, however, that the need to finalise the Svalbard discussions. They based Soviet government should their efforts on the Norwegian government's draft declaration of9 April 1945, i.e. on the idea ofjoint give instructions to the General Staff ofthe Red Soviet-Norwegian defence ofSpitsbergen. From Army to immediately move troops ofthe 14th early June 1945 onwards, the same officials also took Independent Army which are stationed in various initiatives to revive Zhdanova's October Northern Norway into the north-western part of 1944 proposal for a permanent or semi-permanent Norway, up to and including Narvik. S< Soviet military presence in the northern parts of mainland Norway. The key figure was MikhaiI On his own initiative Vetrov sent to Molotov a Sergeievich Vetrov, acting head of the separate memorandum about Svalbard, suggesting Commissariat's 5th European Department. that naval units should be sent to Spitsbergen to

14 IFS Info 7/94 "create garrisons" on the island. The aim should be defence of the archipelago should be finalised to "final[y resolve the Spitsbergen question." and imp[emented."

When the Commissar for the Coal Industry, Vasilii At this point, V etrovand his colleagues received V. Vakhrushev, suggested sending a group of welcome support from the General Staff on the specialists to Spitsbergen to prepare the reopening matter of necessary changes to the Soviet-Norwe­ of the coal mines, Vetrov apparently felt that this gian border. In a letter of 14 July [945 the Deputy much less ambitious plan contradicted his own Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General N. intentions. Mo[otov, nevertheless, gave his S[avin, argued ''the necessity (neoblrhodimost) of approval to Vakhrushev's proposal, and Vetrov improving our strategic situation" in the Northern was instructed to take the necessary steps to border region. If the aim was to secure the impor­ implement the p[an." It seems that Mo[otov did not tant Soviet naval bases and ice-free ports on the respond to Vetrov's initiative. Vetrov, ordered to Ko[a peninsula, the optimum solution would be to implement a decision which might conflict with his move the Soviet-Norwegian border to the river own more ambitious scheme, made one further Tana and the Tana fjord - which would mean attempt to move the decision-makers in his transferring the whole of the Varanger peninsula direction. In a letter to Deputy Commissar So[o­ and the area south of the Varanger fjord (Varanger mon A. Lozovskii of 19 June, he emphasised that and Ssr-Varanger municipalities) to the Soviet his initiative had been taken independently of Union. Together with the presence of the Soviet Vakhrushev's letter, and that it had "political" military on Bear Is[and, this would create the rather than "economic" aims. Measures to secure preconditions for the establishment of a "huge Soviet economic interests should be employed ''to [and- and sea-based strategic defence area" implement on Spitsbergen and Bear Is[and (bolshaia sukhoputnaia i morskaia initiative,s of a political and military-strategic strategicheskaia zona prikrytiia), stretching from nature". Vetrov warned against separating the the Spitsbergen archipelago to the Ko[a peninsula. Soviet economic interests "from the question of The minimal solution would be to [ease the Varan­ creating a naval base on these islands and of ger area from Norway for a term of25-50 years." establishing our garrisons", and concluded that implementation ofVakhrushev's plan should be When the Soviet Ambassador to Norway, Niko[ai postponed." D. Kuznetsov, sent Moscow an alarming report about Norwegian activity on Spitsbergen, Vetrov Mo[otov's failure to respond did not discourage reminded Deputy Commissar Lozovskii of his his subordinates from taking further initiatives. earlier message to Mo[otov, to which he had not Vetrov and Zhdanova continued to pursue their received any response, and argued that the Soviet pet projects: a solution to the Sva[bard question Union should "immediate[y return to Spitsbergen", and the creation of Soviet bases in Northern in order to establish military garrisons on the Norway. One of their memoranda repeated island. Mo[otov, however, was not prepared to (literally) Zhdanova's arguments from October make a decision on the joint declaration on Spits­ [944, concluding that it would be easy to reach bergen or on the strategic elements of ilie various an agreement with the Norwegian government proposals which had been put forward by his on the joint defence of Northern Norway and the, subordinates. On 6 August Vetrov brought to creation there of Soviet military bases, strategic Lozovskii's attention a list of ''unresolved railways, etc. Once permanently established in questions" which needed Mo[otov's decision, Norway, the Soviet government could raise the among them Vetrov's earlier proposals for Spits­ need to revise the Soviet-Norwegian border at bergen. Mo[otov apparently responded by giving an appropriate time." As for Svalbard, they his agreement to the Spitsbergen expedition argued that the agreement with Norway on joint proposed by Vakhrushevand the Commissariat for

IFS Info 7/94 15 the Coal Industry." The expedition, which lines urged by Vetrov and his colleagues would according to available evidence was a purely have repercussions far beyond the Soviet-Norwe­ civilian affair, left for Spitsbergen in mid-Septem­ gian relationship. Increasingly, Soviet policy ber 1945. towards Norway was becoming caught up in the evolution of East-West relations, and the Soviets Thus, as of July-August 1945 the bureaucmts in the gradually realised that their room for manoeuvre Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Deputy was strictly limited. The plans for changing the Commissars dealing directly with Norway had Soviet-Norwegian border were finally rejected in produced a number of proposals aimed at a more the winter of 1946, when Molotov issued orders to active Soviet policy for Svalbard and Northern prepare the demarcation of the new Soviet-Nor­ Norway. Parts of their efforts had received strong wegian border according to the pre-war support from the Soviet military authorities, but Norwegian-Finnish border. On the bilateral level had failed to kindle Molotov's enthusiasm. the Svalbard issue was put to rest in February 1947, when the Norwegian Storting rejected the These ideas remained very much alive within the idea ofjoint Norwegian-Soviet militarisation of the foreign policy bureaucmcy. Throughout 1945 and archipelago. Although there were proposals, inter 1946 the group of activist bureaucrats continued to alia from the Soviet Ambassador to Norway, to press for a comprehensive solution involving both accept the Norwegian invitation to start general Northern Norway and Svalbard. However, there negotiations with a view to "improving" the was a growing understanding within the foreign Svalbard Treaty, Soviet policy towards Svalbard policy apparatus that Soviet proposals along the rapidly changed towards the defence of the status quo.

16 IFS Info 7/94 Conclusion: the bureaucratic formulation of policy proposals, and the limits to Soviet influence in Scandinavia

The Svalbard initiative and the NKID bureaucrats' up Soviet control over or even occupy Spitsbergen: proposals for an expansionist policy towards Molotov had no desire to armoy the Germans by an Northern Norway illustrate the crucial role of the adventurist policy in the High North. This pattern foreign policy bureaucracy in Soviet policy repeated itself from 1944 onwards, when the towards Norway in the early post-war period. expansionist ideas of the NKID bureaucrats Tatiana Zhdanova, a middle-level bureaucrat, conflicted with overall Soviet foreign policy produced proposals which would have had far­ priorities. The NKID bureaucrats were simply reaching and grave consequences for the Soviet­ unable to realise the implications of their own Norwegian relationship if they had been projects. implemented. Although Zhdanova most probably wrote her memorandum of October 1944 on the The Svalbard initialive and the plans for Northern order of or at least in full understanding with her Norway also illustrate what was in all likelihood a immediate superior, Mikhai1 S. Vetrov, who was common phenomenon in the Soviet foreign policy­ then acting Head of the 5th European Department, making process: the weak coordination with other I have not been able to fmd any documentation to bureaucratic structores. Although the reasoning of indicate that Zhdanova and Vetrov responded to the NKID diplomats and bureaucrats was replete signals from their superiors." There is evidence, with military-strategic terminology, it appears from however, that the ideas of Zhdanova and her the available documentation that the NKID colleagues in the NKID's 5th European bureaucrats did not seek the advice of the military Department were carefully stodied on the level of authorities before the issue was brought up with the deputy commissars, and were reflected in the the Norwegians. The General Staffwas asked to policy proposals which reached Molotov and the present its opinion about the strategic value of other top decision-makers. Spitsbergen and Bear Island only afterwards, and seems t6 have been unaware of the Soviet-Norwe­ gian discussions from November 1944 to April The circumstances surrounding Molotov's meeting 1945." It then turned out that the military leaders with Trygve Lie on 12 November 1944, and were much more interested in Northern Norway Molotov's behaviour during and after the meeting, than the distant Svalbard area, with the possible leave the distinct impression that this was certainly exception of Bear Island. Vetrov' s attempt in the not Molotov's own project. These ideas did not summer of 1945 to block Vakhrushev's plan of reflect a "grand strategy" on the top political level, sending a civilian expedition to Spitsbergen, was and never received much attention from Molotov. yet another example of non-coordination of impor­ tant policy initiatives among bureaucratic However, the bureaucrats who conceived and structures. elaborated the expansionist schemes had limited access to comprehensive information about the The absence of coordination between the military overall priorities of Soviet foreigu policy and the and foreign policy bureaucracies weakened the political realities in the foreign country in question, chances of Vetrov, Zhdanova and others of i.e. Norway. This can explain why Molotov did not convincing the decision-makers of the need for a react to the proposals from 1939 and 1940 to step more forceful policy towards Svalbard. As for

IFS Info 7/94 17 Northern Norway, Molotov, as opposed to his Soviet ioterests io Denmark, as in Norway, were subordioates, must have realised that a Soviet simply not of this magnitude. The potential threat initiative along .the lioes proposed by Zhdanova, ioherent in the Soviet military presence on Danish Vetrov, Dekanozov et al. would have repercussions and Norwegian soil proved useless. In a letter to far beyond the Soviet-Norwegian relationship. Molotov of February 1946, Plakhio, the Soviet Even the fact that the General Staff supported the envoy to Denmark, hinted that the contioued idea of a system of Soviet military bases io presence of Soviet troops on Bornholm provided Northern Norway failed to convioce Molotov of the British and the Americans with an excuse to the need to put aside the political considerations maintain a military presence io Denmark proper.64 which kept him from raisiog the issue. Similarly, the Soviets gradually realised that Soviet demands with regard to Spitsbergen provided the The documentation of Soviet deliberations about Americans with welcome arguments in support of the strategic significance of the Baltic Straits and their efforts to obtain permanent military bases on Bornholm raises more questions than it answers." Greenland and Iceland. There was, apparently, unanimity withio the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy about the need to revise Therefore, the pursuit of Soviet strategic objectives the regime of the Baltic Straits, with the aim of in Denmark and Norway gradually gave way to the closing the Baltic Sea to warships of non-littoral traditional and basically defensive policy of states. The idea of establishing permanent Soviet confiniog the Western great powers' influence in naval and air bases on the island of Bornholm and control over these countri.es. Soviet diplomatic meant an additional step io the direction of !rans­ reports from Denmark and Norway in the early formiog the Baltic Sea ioto a mare clausum. The post-war years reveal a curious disparity between circumstances of the Soviet landiog on Bornholm, the dire description of the "Anglo-Saxons'" seen io conjunction with the (admittedly meagre) overwhelming iofluence and activity io these evidence on the origio of the decision to send countries, and the less-than-impressive proposals Soviet troops to the island, iodicate that this for measures to remedy the situation. In February decision was primarily motivated by political, not 1947, for instance, Plakhin reported from military, considerations. Copenhagen that British and American post-war policy io Denmark aimed at ''transformiog Den­ However, Soviet policy towards the Baltic Straits mark ioto a bridgehead against us" and securing and Bornholm does reveal the limits of Soviet power full control over the Danish straits. To underpin his and influence io Denmark. Soviet strategic ioterests argument, Plakhio presented examples of the io the country were not sufficiently strong to warrant feverish "Anglo-Saxon" activity io Denmark, in a policy which might prevent the reali7mion of more the political, military, economic and cultural fields. important Soviet objectives elsewhere io Europe, and Although Plakhin was optimistic about exploiting have the uniotended effect of pushing a frightened "existiog conflicts of interests" between Denmark Denmark even further ioto the orbit ofthe Western and the Western great powers, his specific powers. The Soviets seemed caught io an iosoluble suggestions for initiatives which would "increase dilemma: the Soviet military presence on Bornholm our influence io Denmark" clearly reveal that the was motivated by the desire to create a means of Soviet envoy realised that the Soviet Union had influenciog the Danish government Any hints of strictly limited chances of iofluencing Danish Soviet iotentions to use their troops io this role, affairs. OfPlakhio's 15 recommendations for however, would immediately compel the Danes to Soviet initiatives, 12 were io the field of "cultural appeal to the Western powers for help and support contacts and propaganda", one was of a strictly Only the achievement of superior foreign policy or formal nature (to give the legations the status of military-strategic aims could warrant the use of embassies), and the final two concerned trade military leverage. relations. There are no hints that Plakhin at this Denmark's ability to resist the British-US point was considering direct active measures to influence, and to develop economic contacts counteract the US-British military presence in between Denmark and the socialist countries." Denmark, by bringing up for instance the issue of Similar reports came from Soviet diplomatic the internationalisation of the Baltic Straits or a representatives in Oslo and Stockholm. These Soviet or joint Soviet-Danish fortification of limited foreign policy aims were a far cry from the Bomholm." The aim of Soviet policy in Denmark, ambitious initiatives which had been discussed by according to Plakhin, should be to strengthen the foreign policy-makers in Moscow in the preceding years.

IFS Info 7/94 19 Notes

I In contemporary tenninology, Scandinavia Norway and Greenland, is not part of the Svalbard comprises Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Finland group of islands. and Iceland are part of the larger community of the , Soviet attitudes to this issue, however, revealed Nordic countries. Needless to say, Soviet interests in Finland were of a different nature some conflicting teodencies or lines of thought within the Soviet foreign policy establishment Cf. 2 Cf. Kazimierz Grzybowski, "The Soviet Doetrine my above-mentioned study Enemy springboard or of Mare Clausum and Policies in Black and Baltic benevolent buffer? For a discussion of the evolution Seas", Jaurnal o/Cenlral European Affairs, vol. 14 ofScaodinavian military cooperation in the 1920s (1954-55), p. 344. For a discussion of the role of the and 1930" cf. Tom Kristiansen and Sven G. issue of the Baltic Straits in Soviet policy towards Ho1tsmark, En nordisk iII~on? Norge og milittert Denmark in the 1920s and 1930., see my study samarbeid i Nord, 1916-1940, in the series Enemy springboard or benevolent buffer? Soviet Forsvarsstudier!Dejence Studies, No. 6/1991, Oslo attitudes to Nordic cooperation, 1920-1955, in the 1991. series ForsvarsstudierlDefence Studies, Oslo 1992, pp. 25-27. • As was so often the case with Soviet perceptions of the outside world, they misinterpreted Swedish 3 Cf. Patrick Salmon, "Perceptions and attitudes. Despite Sweden's glorious past as a North Misperceptions: Great Britain and the Soviet Union European great power, Swedish "activists" had in Scandinavia and the Baltic Region 1918-1939", limited influence over the country's foreign affairs. in Contact or Isolation? Soviet-Western relations in Cr. Erik L6nnroth, Den svenalw utrikes politikens the Interwar Period, in the series Studio Baltiea historia, Vol. V (1919-1939), Stockholm 1959. Stockholmiensia, Vo!. 8, Stockholm 1991, pp. 415- 7 Cf. Kollontai's reaction when the Swedes in late 430; and contributions in the excellent vol. 3 in the 1944 offered to give the Soviet government a credit same series (Stockholm 1988), The Baltic in of one billion Swedish kroner for Soviet purchases International Relations Between the Two World in Sweden. AVPRF, f. 0140, ope 29, p. 128, d. 14, Wars. n. 14-15" Kollontai to NKID, 30 November 1944. 4 There is some confusion over the terms Spit&ber­ • The article is based on newly declassified gen and Svalbard. In Norwegian usage (since 1969) documents from the Russian Ministry of Foreign the name Spitsbergen applies only to the largest Affairs, gathered during numerous and extended island in the archipelago. Until 1969 this island was visits to the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian called Vestspitsbergen (Western Spitsbergen). Federation (AVPRF) in Moscow. I am indebted to Svalbard is the name of the whole of the Dr Igor V. Lebedev, Director of the Ministry's archipelago as dermed by the Treaty of 1920, Department of History aod Records, and to his including Bear Island which is located approxi­ Deputies and the resl of his stall; for help aod mately halfway between Spitsbergen and the North assistance during my researeh in the A VPRF. Cape. In this respect Norwegian usage is in accordance with the letter of the Treaty. The • I am weUaware of the limitations so far of both important point to bear in mind is that the tenn the documentary basis ofmy research (in particular Svalbard, in Norwegian usage and according to the with regard to Soviet policy towards Denmark), aod Treaty, covers all islands within the area dermed by of its restricted power to make generalisations about the Treaty. English speakers tend to prefer the tenn the Soviet foreign policy-making process as a Spitsbergen to the unfamiliar Svalbard, although for whole. The lack of access to the archives of Stalin instance Encyclopedia Britannica defines the tenns and the Politburo and to the Russian military in accordance with Norwegian usage. archives necessarily leaves some issues open. I am not suggesting that the materials and hypotheses Russian usage is different. "Shpitsbergen" (old presented in this paper will be representative of, name "Grumant") is used in Russian to denote the say, the making of Soviet policy towards the United "main" archipelago, while Bear Island (Ostrov States or the emerging socialist bloc after the medvezhi,) is normally listed as a separate entity. Second World War. Norway aod Denmark are small Cf. the terminology used in LD. Timchenko, powers, on the periphery of Soviet foreign policy Shpitsbergen: IstorUa i savremennost, Kharkov, interests. For strategic reasons they commanded a 1992. certain attention from the Soviet Union. However. it Jan Mayon, ao isolated island located in the seems reasonable to assume that the input and Norwegian Sea approximately midway between initiatives of middle-level foreign policy

IFS lofo 7/94 21 bureaucrats were more prominent in the elaboration under Molotov's leadership in 1942; only after the of Soviet policy towards Norway and Denmark than reorganisation in 1943 did it sIaJt regular work from they were in the fonnation of policy towards the September that year. Apart from Litvinov, the major powers Or key allies. commission included senior diplomats Boris Shtein and lakov Surits, the depoty commissars SA " I am indebted to professor Bent Jensen, Odense Lozovski~ the former Comintern secretary D.Z. University, for his useful comments on this part of the Manuilski~ and the histurian E.V. Tarle. paper. I am aware that a study on a similar topic is about to be published in Denmark. Unfortunately, I 16 Infonnation about Durdenevskii's paper in did not receive the author's permission to make use of AVPRF, f. 0512, op. 2, p. 8, d. 6,1. 6. The paper itself the materials in that article, which, like the present has not been located. study, is based on research in the Foreign Policy 17 AVPRF, f. 0512, op. 2, p. 8, d. 4,1. 1-7, minutes Archives of the Russian Federation. from the commission's first meeting, on 8 September 11 The issue of the Baltic Straits and Bomhoim is 1943. mentioned in the international literature on Soviet 11 AVPRF, f. 0512, op. 2, p. 8, d. 4,11. 89-98, foreign affairs, cf. for instance Vojtech Mastny, protocol from the commission's 8th meeting, on 22 Russia's Road 10 lhe Cold War. DiplomllCY, Warfare, July 1944. and lhe Politics ofCommunism, 1941-1945, New York 1979, pp. 31, 269-70, 273, 278-79. A less " What Lozovskii had in mind was certainly naval or reliable account is given in Gunnar Alexandersson, air bases, although this particular document uses the The Baltic Straits, The HaguelBostunlLondon, 1982. general expression "military bases" (voiennye bazy). The most complete discussion to be found is in the 2D AVPRF, f. 0512, op. 2, p. 8, d. 4,11. 89-98, following works by Danish authors: Mary Dau, protocol from the Litvinov Commission's meeting Danmark og Sovjetunionen 1944-49, Copenhagen no. 8 on 22 July 1944. 1%9; the same author's "The Soviet Union and the Liberation of Denmark", in Survey. A Jl1UJ'naI of " In the years covered by this paper (1944-1947), Soviel and Easl European Studies, No. 76, summer Scandinavian affairs were the responsibility of the 5th 1970, pp. 64-81; Bent Jensen, Tryk og tiIpasning. European Department, under the directors P.D. Orlov, SOIIietunionen og Danmark siden 2. verdenskrig, M.S. vetrov (acting head) and A.N. Abrarnov. Copenhagen 1987. "AVPRF, f. 085, p. 120, d. 5,11.17-19, Orlovto IZ AVPRF, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 24, 11. 1-21, Dekanozov, 15 Aogust 1944. The memorandwn Zhdanova's and Adornov's memorandum "Baltiiskoe commeoted upon the British note to the Soviet more i baltiiskie prolivy", most probably from government of9 August about the elaboration of a October-November 1940. Cf. the discussion in Toivo common Allied policy during the liberation of Miljan, "The Baltic Sea: Mare Clausum or Mare Denmark. Orlov emphasised the need to strengthen Liberum?", in Cooperation and Coriflicl, Vol. IX the authority of the Danish Freedom Counci~ aod to (1974), pp. 19-28. ask this body to take upon itself the mlministration of the country until the recstablishment of 13 Pavlov's minute from Molotov's conversation with "constitutional power". Ribbentrop on 13 November 1940, as published in Navaia i noveishllia isloriia (Moscow), No. 511933, " AVPRF, f. 085, op. 28, p. 120, d. 5, I. 16, pp. 92-93. The Gennan version of this publication is Zhdanova to Orlov, 29 August 1944. published in Documents on Germlln Foreign Policy, 14 AVPRF, f. 085, op. 28, p. 120, d. 5, 11. 22-23, D, Vol. XI, pp. 562-569. Semenov and Vetrov to Dekanozov, 15 December 14 PRO, Prom 4 3/8, record of Eden's conversation 1944, with Dekanozov's handwritten commeots. with Stalin on 16 December 1941. 25 Bent Jensen, "Dmising og Dekanozov - set fra " To my knowledge, there has been no in-depth study Moskva", in Struktur ogfon/aion. Feslskrift til Erling of the commission, its tasks and inlluence. So far, Ladewig Pe/ersen, Odense 1993, pp. 283-284, based Aleksci Filitov's paper "Problems of the Postwar on the Soviet minutes ofD"ssing's conversation with Order in Soviet Conceptions of Foreign Policy during Dekanozovon 17 January 1945. According to the Second World W.," seems to be the most D"ssing. Dekanozov said that Denmark after the war extensive examination of the topic. Filitov's paper would become the Soviet Union's "direct neighbour", was presented at the Ninth International Colloquium and that there would be ''no competitors to the Soviet on "The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War Union in the Baltic Sea", cf. Bent Jensen, Tryk og (1943-1953)", organised by the Fondazione tiIpasning. Sovjetunionen og Danmark siden 2. Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in Cortona, Italy, 23-24 verdenskrig, pp. 48-49. In the above-mentioned September 1994. The commission met only once article, and based on the comparison with the Soviet

22 IFS Info 7/94 minutes, Bent Jensen questions the reliability of University, who made me aware of the Rasmussen­ Dl!ssing's reports from his conversations with Soviet Vyshinskii conversation. diplomats in late 1944 and early 1945. ., Prior to their withdrawal, the Soviet troops on " Mary Dau, SOlIjetunionen og Danmark, pp. 107- Bornholm consisted of one rifle division of 6600 109. meu, with 170 gons and mortars, 7500 tons of munitions and supplies, and a number of transport 27 AVPRF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 32, d. 443, I. 2, Semenov to vehicles. AVPRF, f. 06,op. 8, p. 33, d. 518, I. 16, Dekanozov, March 1945. Antonov to Molotov, 14 March 1946. " AVPRF, f. 06, op. 7, p. 32, d. 443, 1. I, Podtserob 46 For a more detailed discussion of Soviet policy to Bulganin, 12 March 1945. towards Svalbard and Northern Norway during and 29 A. Basov, "Desant na ostrov BomhoIm", Voienno­ after the Second World War, cf. Sven G. Holtsmark, istorichesldi zhurnal, vol. 8 (1966), no. 5, pp. 29-30. A Soviet Grab [or the High North? USSR, Svalbord, and NorthemNorway 1920-1953, published as No. '" The Gennan forces in Denmark, including 711993 in the series ForsvarsstudierlDefence Studies. Bornholm, capitulated to the British on 5 May. The Svalhard's role in international politics has been British, however, deliberately sent no forces to studied by a number of authors. For the period up to Bornholm to receive the German capitulation. 1925, the basic work is Trygve Mathiseu, Svalbard i 'I A VPRF, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 24, 11. 49-60, inlernasjonalpolitikk, 1871-1925, Oslo, 1951. For Vetrov and Plakhin to Molotov, 10 July 1945. the wartime period the most detailed study is Olav Riste's discussion in the second volwne afhis "Mary Dau, Danmork og Sovjetunionen, p. 118. "London-regjeringa", Norge i krigsa//iansen 1940- II A VPRF, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 24, 11. 46-47, 1945, Oslo, 1979. The best coverage of Norwegian Vetrov and Zhdanova to Vyshinskii and Lozovskii, 2 policy in the years 1945-47 is in Knut Einar Erikseu, July 1945. "Svalbardspl!l"SlDA!et fra krig til kald krig", in Historiker og veUeder. Festskrift til Jakob Sverdrup, 34 AVPRF, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 24, U. 49-60, Oslo, 1989. RolfTamoes has given a aynthesis of Vetrov and Plakhin to Molotov, 10 July 1945. Svalbard's place in great-power strategy in a long­ " AVPRF, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 24, 11. 61-64, term perspective, cf. his Svalbard og stormakJene. Litvinov til Molotov, 18 December 1945. Fro ingenmannsland til KIlld Krig, 1870-1953, in ForsvarsstudierlDefence Studies, No. 7, Oslo, 1991. 36 AVPRF, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 24, 11. 49-60, Another important aynthesising study is Nils Morten Vetrov and Plakhin to Molotov, 10 July 1945. Udgaard, Great Power PolUies and Norwegian J7 AVPRF, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 24, 11. 61-64, Foreign Policy. A Study o[Norway's Foreign Litvinov to Molotov, 18 December 1945. Relations November 1940-February 1948, Oslo, 1973. The most recent and comprehensive Russian " AVPRF, f. 085, op. 29, p. 121, d. 8. 1. 2, Abramov work on Svalbard from the perspective of intematio­ and Vetrov to Novikov, 9 October 1945. nallaw, is L.D. Timchenko's, Shpitsbergen: Istoriia i " Knut Einar Eriksen, "Great Britain and the Problem sovremennost, Kharkov 1992. For attempts at ofBases in the Northern Area, 1945-194T', in aynthesis, see also various works by Willy 0streng, ScandinavianJOIII"na/ o[History, Vol. 7 (1982), No. for instance Det politiske Sva/bard, Oslo, 1975. 2, p. 152; and Mary Dau, Danmark og Sovjetunionen, 47 Sven G. Holtsmark, A Soviet Grab [or the High p.122. North? USSR, Svalbard and Northem Norway 1920- " AVPRF, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 24, I. 66, draft 1953, pp. 36-38. resolution for the conference of the ministers of "Ibid., pp. 38-43. foreign affairs. 49 Volnukhio's report about the evacuation is found 41 AVPRF, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 32, 11. 11-12, in the AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 230, p. 1230, d. 1,11. 1- Abramov's minute from conversation with Dassing 12. Cf. also Martin Kitcheu, British Policy Towards on 20 February 1946. the Soviet Union During the Second World War, "AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 33, d. 518, 11.1-2, London, 1986,p.87. Dl!ssing's note of28 February 1946, delivered to "Olav Riste, Svalbardkrisen 1944-1945, in Vyshinskii on 4 March. Minute of the conversation in ForsvarsstudierlDefence Studies 1981, Oslo, 1982, f. 085, op. 30, p. 123, d. 30, 11. 6-7. p.32. 4J AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 33,d. 518, 11. 6-10, minute 'I AVPRF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 62, d. 936, 11. 40-48, "Po from Molotov's conversation with Dessing on 5 voprosu 0 Shpitsbergene i Medvezhem ostrove", 11 March 1946. November 1944 . .. I am grateful to Professor Bent Jensen, Odense "AVPRF, f. 116, op. 28, p. 20, d. 5, 11.1-18,

IFS Info 7/94 23 "Kratkaia spravka k voprosu 0 russko-norvezhskoi granitse", signed by Zhdanova on 27 October 1944. references to the militaIy authorities in the MID documents, and on a letter from the General StaIf " AVPRF, f.. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 11, 11. 234- from January 1945. In this letter the Deputy Chief 236, Kucherov to Dekanozov, 4 June, 1945. of the General StaIf supposed that the Soviet Union should demand "long-term lease" of certain "AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 10,1.15, Norwegian territories as compensation for Soviet vetrov to Lozovski~ 8 June, 1945. losses during the liberation of Eastern Finnmark. " AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 23, p. 123, d. 13, 1. 6, Although the general included Bear Island on his Vakhrusbev to Molotov, 8 June, 1945. list of areas where the Soviet Union ought to have militaIy bases, there are no hints in the letter that " AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 22, 11. 7-8, Antonov was aware of the Soviet-Norwegian Vetrov to Lozovskii, 19 June, 1945. negotiations already in progress. AVPRF, f. 012, "AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 5, 11. 33-35, op. 6, p. 81, d. 168, 11. 6-9, Antonov to Dekanozov, "Spravka K voprosu: 0 sozdanii voenno-morskikb 24 January 1945. Later correspondence between the i vozdushnykb baz SSSR v Sevemoi Norvegi~ kak General StaIf and the NKID seems to confirm this zvcna v obshchei sisteme bezopasnosti", 3 July, impression. 1945. " This may partly be due to the fragmentaIy nature "AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 127, d. 22, 11.16-18, of the archival source materials on Soviet policy "Spravka K voprosu: Ob olmene Parizbskogo towards Denmark in the early post-war years. This Dogovora 0 Sbpitsbergene i 0 sovmestnoi zasbchite directly reflects the amount oftime the author of Shpitsbergena i ostrova Medvezhii Sovetskim this article spent in the AVPRF doing research on Soiuzom i Norvegiei", 4 July, 1945. Soviet policy towards Norway and Denmark respectively. "AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 20, 11.10-12, Slavin's memorandum ofl4 July, 1945. .. AVPRF, f. 06, op. 8, p. 33, d. 512, 11. 2-19, Plakhin to Molotov, 19 February 1946. "AVPRF, f. 0116, op. 27, p. 128, d. 22, 1. 30, Vetrov to Lozovskti, 6 Augns~ 1945; and 1. 31, "AVPRF, f. 085, op., 31, p. 125, d. 4, 11. 8-14, Vetrov to LozovskU, 9 Augus~ 1945. Plakhin to Molotov, 16 April 1947.

61 It is possible that Zhdanova wrote her October .. AVPRF, f. 085, op. 31, p. 125, d. 4,11.17-21, 1944 memorandum for the Litvinov Commission. Katalev's "annotatsiia" on the legation's report for 1946,20 June 1947. " This judgement is based on the complete lack of

24 IFS Info 7/94