TURKEY, the UNITED STATES, and NORTHERN IRAQ by Bill Park*

STRATEGIC LOCATION, POLITICAL DISLOCATION: TURKEY, THE UNITED STATES, AND NORTHERN IRAQ By Bill Park*

The Turkish parliament's failure, after months of negotiations, to grant U.S. ground forces access to national territory to enable a direct land assault against northern Iraq demonstrated that Washington's strategic valuation of Turkey's geographic location may not necessarily be welcomed by the country's inhabitants. Ankara's preoccupation with the implications of the conflict for Kurdish aspirations demonstrated that the U.S.'s global strategic vision can be undermined by the more parochial, regional concerns of its allies. The future of Turkish democracy, U.S.-Turkish relations, the fortunes of the Kurdish people, as well as of Iraq itself, are all now at stake.

Although for many observers the link moderate Islamist Justice and Development remains obscure, within weeks of the Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma--AKP) to terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 power. It, too, hoped that war could be (9/11), the Bush administration began avoided. However, the United States had turning its attention to the unsettled score already delayed putting pressure on Ankara of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass as a consequence both of the uncertainty destruction (WMD) program, and began to generated by Turkey's impending elections entertain the idea of 'regime change' in and the machinations of international Baghdad. As both a neighbor of Iraq and diplomacy, and so Turkey's new strategic ally of Washington, Turkey was government immediately found itself a bound to find itself in the spotlight. As it target of Washington's diplomatic emerged that Washington's preferences in attentions. any new military operation would be to use Turkish territory as a launch pad for a IRAQ'S NEIGHBOR direct land attack against northern Iraq, Ankara's unease with Washington's Ankara's opposition to war intensified.(1) approach derived in many respects from Such a scenario would more deeply the same sources that fed the broader implicate Turkey than did the previous international opposition to U.S. policy. Gulf War of 1990-1. However, Turkey had additional reasons Bulent Ecevit's coalition government for fearing a renewal of armed conflict with strenuously warned Washington of Iraq. Turkey had enjoyed broadly Turkey's opposition to war, and urged cooperative economic and political Baghdad to comply with United Nations relations with Iraq both before and since inspections and resolutions, which were the 1990-1 Gulf War. However, as a result now being revived with the unanimous of this war, the consequent closure of the passage of Security Council Resolution Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline to Turkey's 1441 in November 2002. In the same Mediterranean coast, and the subsequent month, Turkish elections brought the sanctions and impoverishment of Iraq,

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Turkey had lost its major trading partner in and contributed to the resignations of the the region and a lucrative source of foreign and defense ministers too. This revenue. Downturns in tourism, foreign raises the question of how cooperative investment and general economic Turkey would have been in 1990 if it had confidence in the wake of the 1990-1 Gulf not been for Ozal's readiness to go so far War inflicted further (though largely out on a limb.(2) Furthermore, few in indirect) blows to the already weak Turkey are convinced that Ozal's national economy. Furthermore, promises expectation that his accommodating of compensation for Turkey's war losses approach would increase Turkey's post- had failed to fully materialize. With the Cold War value to the west has brought national economy even more fragile than it tangible benefits. was a decade before, Ankara feared that a The broader international political renewal of conflict in the region would context of Turkish policy during 2002 and inflict a severe setback to the country's early 2003 is also of note in understanding IMF-sponsored economic reform program. Turkey's stand on the eve of hostilities Turkey's present domestic political between Iraq and Coalition forces. It context added an additional dimension to became increasingly evident that there the country's antiwar sentiment. The AKP would be no regional groundswell of government achieved electoral victory on a support for U.S.-led action against Iraq platform of reform and rehabilitation of the comparable to that associated with the crisis-hit and chronically sick Turkish 1990-1 crisis. Conceivably, the economy. A related priority was the international difficulties the United States implementation of an ambitious program of was having in building international political, legal, and administrative reforms support, not least in Europe, bolstered to ready the country for serious EU Ankara's readiness to resist U.S. pressure. accession negotiations. Furthermore, the It may also have inflated Ankara's AKP administration represents a estimation of its indispensability to constituency more sympathetic to Turkey's Washington. In any case, whatever the own Islamic character and to its Muslim outcome of any war, Turkish thinking neighbors, while few AKP deputies, former went, Turkey would continue to inhabit the provincial mayors and the like, have much region, and would need to rebuild any experience or interest in foreign policy fractured relationships with its neighbors, issues. With the Cyprus and EU accession Arab and Iranian. Ankara feared it might issues also demanding its attention, the become a focus of regional hostility should diplomatic plate was more than full for this it become too closely involved in U.S. war novice government. plans. Given, too, the Islamic It is also important to recall the unique fundamentalist inspired terrorist threat that role played by President Turgut Ozal in so dramatically manifested itself on 9/11, 1990-1. Ozal had stood against much of the broader anti-Americanism now so Turkey's policy elite, as well as public prevalent in much of the Islamic--and opinion, in supporting so wholeheartedly especially Arab--world, and the seeming the coalition effort against Iraq. Moreover, vulnerability of some of the region's he was willing to engage in the messy regimes to such phenomena, Turkey also politics of the Middle East, something worried about the more general Ankara generally shied away from. Indeed, implications for regional stability of any his daring approach to the crisis prompted new war with Iraq. the resignation of the Turkish Chief of the General Staff General Necip Torumtay, KURDISH RAMIFICATIONS

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The potential ramifications for the of PKK fighters. Ankara has also Kurdish issue in any war with Iraq caused maintained smaller forces in northern Iraq Ankara a still greater headache. almost continuously since the 1980s, and Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan conducted numerous air raids. It has even subsequent to the 1990-1 Gulf War cooperated with Iraqi Kurdish forces in constitute a major consideration for tracking down PKK operatives in Iraq. Ankara's policy makers. After the 1991 In Ankara's view, the Iraqi Kurdish self- uprising against Saddam failed, there was a governing arrangements pose a serious flood of approximately half a million Iraqi challenge to Turkey's hold over its own, Kurds to a zone near the Turkish border. equally sensitive Kurdish provinces. The This crisis brought the involvement of the KRG could serve as a pole of attraction, or international community, which created a model, for Turkey's restive Kurds, or the safe havens for the refugees and a 'no-fly- KRG might become emboldened enough to zone' policed from Incirlik in Turkey. lend them direct support. It could garner Following the withdrawal of Baghdad's international sympathy for the idea of forces from the area in October 1991, a wider Kurdish national self-determination self-governing Kurdistan Regional leading ultimately to a sovereign Kurdish Government (KRG) zone was established, state. Ankara suspects that full nestled against the Turkish and Iranian independence and sovereignty is the borders. The zone did not extend to the ultimate goal of Kurds on both sides of the Mosul and Kirkuk oilfields, which border. Moves towards the establishment nevertheless form part of what has been of an independent Kurdish state could traditionally regarded as Iraqi Kurdistan. create tension between the states where Although relationships between the two Kurds reside (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and main elements of the KRG--the Patriotic Syria), and could even threaten to unravel Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdish the entire region. Democratic Party (KDP)--are fragile, this Turks find it implausible that Iraqi Iraqi Kurdish experiment in self- Kurds would willingly trade much of the government and democratization created a self-government they enjoyed for tangible sense of well-being and freedom reintegration into the uncertain enterprise for the inhabitants of the area, such that of a post-Saddam Iraq. They are reinforced they would welcome neither a return of in that view by the draft KRG constitution Saddam's rule, nor any kind of wholly drawn up in late 2002, which envisaged the centralized government controlling them oil-bearing Iraqi Kurdish provinces from Baghdad.(3) becoming incorporated into any future For Turkey, the future of the Kurds is Kurdish self-governing zone within a loose seen as a vital national security issue. Up to Iraqi federal framework, with Kirkuk as its half of all ethnic Kurds, who straddle the capitol, while retaining control over its own Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian and Syrian borders, armed forces.(4) Whether by design, live in Turkey. Turkish security forces default or through opportunistic fought an almost two-decade-long war in exploitation of chaos and uncertainty, in the southeast of the country against the Turkey's view the risk of war to Iraq's, and separatist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), at perhaps ultimately Turkey's, territorial a cost of more than 30,000 lives. Over the integrity was substantial. years, Turkish troops have launched substantial raids across the border--at times NATIONAL POLICY TAKES SHAPE with the agreement of Baghdad--in pursuit

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The July 2002 visit of U.S. Deputy appeared upbeat about the talks, declaring Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz left that 'Turkish support is assured,' Turkish Ankara in little doubt that, in the event of comment was far more circumspect.(5) The war, U.S. plans would indeed involve request to base 80,000 or more U.S. troops launching ground attacks from Turkish in Turkey was greeted particularly coolly territory. Ankara's response was to pursue in Ankara,(6) and in fact the visit the two tracks of continuing to lobby demonstrated just how far apart U.S. and against war on the one hand (which Turkish perspectives were. Ankara refused incorporated regionally-based endeavors to to give Wolfowitz the green light to U.S. find alternatives to it), and positioning access to Turkish territory.(7) Turkey to make the best of an unwanted Although Ankara had been privy to U.S. situation on the other. Three issues war planning since July, the Turks seemed emerged. First was the economic barely to have moved at all towards compensation Ankara should seek to accommodating them. Paradoxically, this extract in return for its cooperation. The strengthened Ankara's hand in the second issue was the terms under which negotiations that ensued, just as the Ankara might permit its territory to be used military timetable served to force by U.S. and allied forces. Third, Turkey's Washington's hand. It appeared to become military drew up plans to insert substantial a negotiating objective of Ankara to insist forces into northern Iraq so as to keep the on a reduction in the number of U.S. troops lid on the situation there if necessary. earmarked to enter Turkey, perhaps down Throughout the second half of 2002 and to as low as 15,000.(8) In return for into 2003, Ankara's negotiating approach allowing U.S. troops to base in Turkey, was to interconnect these issues, using Ankara wanted Washington's green light to Washington's needs as a lever to ensure a substantial Turkish move into northern Ankara's own needs were satisfied. This Iraq.(9) It was reported that the United involved driving a hard bargain with States did agree to a geographically limited Washington, to the increasing irritation of entry of Turkish troops into northern Iraq, the latter, as Ankara sought to maximize with the proviso that they steer clear of the leverage it had as a consequence of its Kurdish towns and cities. Not surprisingly, strategically vital location--or, perhaps to such a possibility was deeply upsetting to put it as many Turks would, minimize the Iraq's Kurds, who threatened to resist the damage to Turkey as a consequence of its entry of Turkish troops into the KRG location. Washington's preference for a area.(10) two-front war, the relentlessness of its In the face of increasing frustration in military build-up in the region, and the Washington, it was not until early January, very imminence of conflict, offered Ankara after weeks of foot-dragging, that Ankara considerable negotiating advantage, which, finally agreed to allow U.S. technicians to from Washington's perspective it appeared enter Turkey to assess the suitability and to mercilessly exploit. condition of bases and ports that might be used. It was not until 6 February--a date by WASHINGTON ENTERS THE which Washington had once hoped and BAZAAR expected that permission for U.S. troops to During his December 2002 trip to enter the country would already have been Ankara, Wolfowitz impressed upon the granted--that a parliamentary vote new government Washington's quest for permitted around 4,000 U.S. personnel to access to Turkish territory as a launch pad enter the country to commence the upgrade for ground attacks. Although Wolfowitz of the facilities, at an estimated cost to the

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U.S. of $300 million. Fifty AKP deputies, leadership and U.S. officials, and expressed along with the entire opposition, voted resentment at their exclusion from against the measure.(11) Furthermore, the them.(13) For their part, the Iraqi Kurdish Turkish government accompanied the vote leaderships were also initially nervous with the rider that it should not be about the prospect of U.S. action against interpreted as implying that approval for Saddam's regime. They feared that the the entry of U.S. troops, which would also considerable gains in autonomy that they require parliamentary approval, would had made over the previous decade would necessarily be forthcoming. be put at risk by war in the region, and they With the benefit of hindsight, it is suspected that, once again, Washington possible to see that these political might abandon them to their fate--in the difficulties were an indication of what was form of Turkish troops, or a new autocrat yet in store, but one does wonder whether in Baghdad, or both--once Saddam had Washington might have been able to been removed.(14) As was also the case in recognize the warning light at the time. The Ankara, however, the Kurds recognized AKP government's repeated protestations that they had to accommodate themselves that it could not guarantee to win over its to the likelihood of U.S. military action in own deputies unless Washington met northern Iraq. Turkish demands was not simply a crude However, it was as clear to the Iraqi negotiating ploy--which is how many in the Kurds as it was in Ankara that, although United States saw it. Some government the United States needed the support of figures--not least, then Prime Minister both parties, Kurdish and Turkish interests Abdullah Gul, but also the Speaker of the were almost diametrically opposed.(15) National Assembly and President Sezer-- The Iraqi Kurdish leadership, whilst remained unenthusiastic about granting the fearing Turkish involvement in their region United States military access to Turkish and repeatedly issuing dramatic warnings territory in order to open a northern front that they would resist any Turkish invasion against Iraq. The AKP leadership's of northern Iraq,(16) nevertheless uncertain control over its factionalized and appreciated that it was vital to reassure inexperienced deputies rendered doubtful Ankara that they were committed to a its capacity to deliver a parliamentary unified Iraq.(17) These reassurances failed majority on the issue. Given that opinion to reassure Ankara. A July meeting of the polls suggested that over 90% of the Turkish National Security Council population were against a war with Iraq, reportedly discussed contingencies for the and that many AKP deputies shared this entry of Turkish troops into Iraq as far view, parliamentary approval for the entry south as the 36th parallel, in the event of a of U.S. troops was far from a foregone U.S.-led military move against Saddam conclusion.(12) Regardless, Washington Hussein. In addition to Turkey's national continued to base its military planning and objectives, a Turkish military presence in build-up on the availability of Turkish northern Iraq might also be required to deal bases. with any ensuing refugee crisis, and supervise Iraqi prisoners of war, tasks for THE KURDISH CONUNDRUM which, in any case, the United States had From the outset, Ankara did not sought a Turkish contribution.(18) disguise its increasing suspicions about the In addition to the estimated 5,000 discussions that had begun taking place as Turkish troops said to already be inside early as May 2002 between the PUK/KPD Iraq and chiefly engaged in countering

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PKK activity, in October, Turkish forces A more sinister twist to Turkey's on the Iraqi border were put on an approach to Iraqi Kurdistan was the increased state of readiness.(19) By occasional whiff of irredentism. For December, the Turkish troop presence on example, then-Defense Minister Sabahattin the Turkish-Iraqi border was already Cakmakoglu, admittedly a member of the perhaps as high as 50,000. Continued far right National Action Party (MHP), Turkish resistance to American suggestions chose in August 2002 to remark that Iraqi that Turkish troops in northern Iraq be Kurdistan had been 'forcibly separated' placed under U.S. command, and attempts from Turkey (by the British) at the time of to negotiate downwards the number of U.S. the Republic's foundation in 1923, and that troops earmarked for the northern front, Ankara retained a protective interest in the made both Americans and Kurds fate of the region.(23) During the previous apprehensive that Turkey might be Gulf War, Ozal had similarly mused about prepared to act quite independently of the Turkish claims to the region in the event of United States.(20) an Iraqi collapse.(24) In 1986, it also seems that Ankara warned the United States and MUDDYING THE WATERS? Iran that it would demand the return of Alongside attempts to establish some Mosul and Kirkuk in the event of disorder common understandings with the Iraqi in Iraq as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq Kurdish leadership, Ankara also sought to war.(25) Moreover, it has been reported muddy the waters for any Kurdish enclave that the then-Foreign Minister in the AKP in a future federal Iraq by championing the government, Yasar Yakis, sought legal cause of its Turkic kinsmen in the region. clarification of the status of Mosul and Senan Ahmet Aga, head of the Iraqi Kirkuk.(26) Some Turks have pointedly Turkoman Front (ITC), was a regular noted that Mosul and Kirkuk were ceded to presence in the corridors of power in Iraq, not to any Kurdish state that might Ankara--hardly a surprise to those KDP subsequently emerge.(27) officials who believed the ITC to be a Turkish nationalists had often expressed creation of the Turkish security forces. Aga resentment at the loss of Mosul and Kirkuk argued that his people--numbering as a result of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and anywhere between 500,000 and 3 million-- its confirmation by the League of Nations were discriminated against in the KDP- in 1926. This resentment is just one administered zone where they lived, and manifestation of the so-called 'Sevres that in any future federal arrangement they mentality,' based on a never-implemented too should enjoy the benefits of self- 1920 treaty that would have left no more government on the basis of their distinctive than a rump Turkish state in the wake of ethnicity, rather than incorporation into a the Ottoman collapse. This takes the form Kurdish zone. This argument has particular of a heightened sensitivity--some might say significance because of the concentration-- paranoia--concerning threats to the according to Aga, a 60 percent country's territorial integrity and preponderance--of Turkomen in the Kirkuk sovereignty. Misplaced as such a mind-set oil-bearing region of northern Iraq.(21) might appear to be, Washington has Therefore, any Turkoman element in a arguably been guilty of underestimating it federal Iraq would of course be sponsored as an underlying reality of Turkish national by Ankara and centered on oil-rich security culture. It cannot be said to Kirkuk,(22) an outcome that would be amount to irredentism, but it could in detrimental to the KDP in particular. certain circumstances provide an

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underpinning for what might otherwise As KDP-PUK cooperation intensified in appear as pure opportunism. anticipation of a U.S.-led attack on the Iraqi regime during the autumn of 2002, KURDS, TURKS AND AMERICANS manifested by discussions over a draft Washington now found itself involved constitution for the Kurdish zone and the in intractable, unenviable three-way talks reopening of the KRG parliament,(33) with Ankara and the Iraqi Kurds about Washington also found itself maneuvered arrangements for the northern front. into recognizing the cause of the Iraqi Tension between Ankara and the Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF) in the face of KDP Kurds was particularly high concerning the opposition. Thus, in Autumn 2002, the ITF fate of the northern Iraqi oilfields,(28) but was belatedly incorporated into the U.S.'s Ankara was also worried about any 1998 Iraqi Liberation Act, and was for the suggestion that Kurdish forces might play a first time allowed representation at a major part in the overthrow of the Iraqi September meeting of the Iraqi opposition regime.(29) Ankara became increasingly in New York. The KDP clearly did not nervous about the possibility of the United welcome this step, and continued to resist States arming Kurdish fighters, particularly ITC involvement, its claims to Kirkuk and were it to involve heavy equipment, and to a federal zone of their own. Indeed, the insisted that any arms distributed to them ITC's suggestion that the Kurdish be collected at the earliest possible parliament should be a temporary measure opportunity. Washington's negotiators and might in time be superceded by the found themselves obliged to offer establishment of a central Baghdad reassurances to both sides: to Ankara, parliament in post-Saddam Iraq dovetailed Washington pledged its commitment to nicely with Ankara's preferences.(34) Iraq's territorial integrity; and to the Kurds, that their aspirations for autonomy within a MONEY federal structure would be met. As U.S.-Turkish talks on access to bases Washington agreed that it would fall to and territory became increasingly earnest in U.S. troops to take the Mosul and Kirkuk late 2002, the two sides became oil fields, thus denying both Turkish and increasingly tangled up in parallel Kurdish forces the opportunity to negotiations over the amount of economic determine the fate of the oil-bearing compensation Turkey should receive for its region.(30) During his December visit to cooperation. Although the figures under Ankara, Wolfowitz was careful to insist consideration were not officially made that post-Saddam Iraqi oil resources would public, it quickly became evident that the belong to the Iraqi state as a whole.(31) In two sides were very far apart. From an attempt to coordinate operations, a Ankara's perspective, and particularly that three-way U.S.-Turkish-Iraqi Kurd of an AKP government flying in the face of committee was established at the very end Turkish public opinion, the opinion of its of 2002, with Zalmay Khalilzad acting as own parliamentary deputies, as well as that the U.S. interlocutor.(32) However, open of most of the region, the broader political expressions of mistrust of the U.S.-Kurdish as well as economic price Turkey would relationship continued to be voiced in have to pay helped both to justify its tactics Ankara, and the Turkish press even and strengthen its will to hold out. The reported an allegation that U.S. officials twists and turns of these negotiations, and had entered into talks with the PKK behind in particular Ankara's determination to Turkey's back. obtain watertight assurances before any

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) 17 Bill Park firm commitments were entered into, were As February 18 approached, Ankara in themselves a contributory factor to the was still haggling over the U.S. offer of developing ill-feeling between Washington financial compensation, despite an and Ankara. It appeared to many in increased offer from $4 to $6 billion in aid Washington that money was Ankara's and up to $20 billion in grants and loans. paramount concern, as if the Turkish Ankara was also resisting Washington's approach was purely a mercenary one. attempts to ensure that the terms of the deal However, although there is little doubt that should fall within the IMF rescue package Ankara has sometimes exaggerated the for Turkey, and was introducing to the economic costs to Turkey both of the 1990- agenda items such as duties on Turkish 1 Gulf War and of any new conflict over textile exports to the United States and the Iraq, the belief that Turkey was a net loser requirement that the aid package have a from its cooperation in the earlier coalition written guarantee attached in the hope that effort runs deep, and fed much of the any future Congressional opposition might popular--and governmental--opposition to be overcome.(37) In any case, with four or involvement in any new adventures. For five U.S. ships carrying tanks and other their part, Turks resented the American heavy equipment for the 4th infantry implication that Turkey was prostituting division sitting helpless off the Turkish itself. coastline, and another 30 or so ships on their way, the Turkish government declined COMING TO A HEAD to put the issue to a vote, arguing both that In the wake of a National Security it was not yet content with the progress of Council meeting on January 31, the the talks, and that the Turkish parliament Turkish government finally agreed that on would in any case not be prepared to accept February 18 it would seek parliamentary what was being offered.(38) approval for the entry of U.S. troops into Reaching agreement on the related Turkey. The vote would be linked to issues of U.S. and Turkish troop approval for the dispatch of Turkish troops involvement appeared no less problematic. to Iraq. However, the financial package, the Amid reports that the two sides were number of U.S. troops to be allowed in, and nearing agreement that 47,000 U.S. troops the terms of Turkish entry into Iraq, had might enter Turkey, there was still tension not yet been settled to Ankara's complete over the number of Turkish troops that satisfaction.(35) Against the dramatic might enter into Iraq, what their mission backdrop of raging diplomatic fallout in might be, and how much freedom of action NATO over the dispatch of Patriot air they might enjoy.(39) Not surprisingly, as defense systems, AWACS aircraft, and rumors circulated that Washington was chemical and biological defense units to making concessions in order to reach Turkey, an increasingly impatient United agreement with Ankara, Iraqi Kurdish States was obliged to engage in frustrating objections became ever more strident.(40) and sometimes bizarre last-minute Turkey was still insisting that any Kurdish negotiations with Ankara over these fighters armed by the United States should outstanding issues. Even the terms be disarmed as soon as possible,(41) and governing the U.S. personnel involved in that Turkey would retain command of its upgrading bases was still a source of a own forces in Iraq. great deal of technical, legal and financial With a transparent lack of enthusiasm, haggling before they were actually able to with U.S.-Turkish differences concerning begin work.(36) the role of Turkish troops and the terms of the aid package still in the open, against a

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backdrop of intense U.S. frustration, and by a comfortable margin in the Turkish with concerns now being voiced by the parliament, the deal also incorporated Turkish President, the Parliamentary permission to the Turkish army to enter Speaker and others over the legality of the northern Iraq. U.S. assault troops were not procedure, on February 26 the government to be allowed onto Turkish territory, introduced a measure to parliament that however. Turkey was the last NATO ally would permit the entry of 62,000 U.S. to grant overflight rights to the United troops--a higher figure than had been States. expected--255 jet aircraft and 65 helicopters, for a period of 6 months. On CONCLUSION March 1, after more delays and in the Time will tell whether the issues raised immediate wake of a National Security by Washington's attempt to secure Turkish Council meeting at which the powerful cooperation in the war with Iraq will be Turkish military had remained more substantial than the issues over which emphatically mute, parliament rejected the the war itself was launched. The future of measure, which would also have allowed U.S.-Turkish relations, of Turkey's an unspecified number of Turkish troops relations with Iraq, of the Kurdish into northern Iraq, by a margin of just three aspiration for self-determination, of the votes. future of Iraq, of regional stability, and of Although U.S. military and civilian Turkish democracy, are all now likely to be officials sought to put a brave face on the different, perhaps substantially so, than outcome, U.S. war planners were now left what they would have been otherwise. in something of a quandary, compounded The incorporation of a $1 billion by the apparent absence of any plans to supplement into the war budget sent to resubmit the bill to the Turkish parliament. Congress by the Bush administration, Such was the progression towards war that coupled with Secretary of State Colin time alone precluded the implementation of Powell's 'kiss and make up' visit to Ankara the original plan for a substantial and heavy in early April, are early indications that all infantry assault from Turkish soil. Amid is not lost in U.S.-Turkish relations. hints that the aid package would now be Powell's visit sealed Ankara's agreement withdrawn, and emphatic warnings to that the Special Forces and airborne troops Turkey not to intervene in Iraq unilaterally, deployed to northern Iraq were supplied U.S. thinking now shifted towards the from Turkish territory. As the United States possibility of mounting a lighter and finds itself drawn ever more towards the smaller attack against northern Iraq with political and resource issues of the broader forces that might be flown directly to air Middle East region, Turkey remains a bases there. This, plus air attacks against strategically located NATO ally. Regime Iraq, would also require Turkish change in Iraq will intensify Turkey's own parliamentary approval that the U.S. be development as a major oil and gas transit granted overflight rights. Even now it took route. The United States will remain substantial pressure from Washington, Ankara's most important strategic, including from President Bush, as well as economic and political sponsor. In the the belated intervention of the Turkish wake of the failure to settle the division of Chief of General Staff, before the issue was Cyprus in accordance with the most recent put before the Turkish parliament. On UN plan, a failure generally laid at the door March 20, on the very day that the war of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and its commenced, overflight rights were granted supporters and allies within Ankara's

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) 19 Bill Park military and bureaucratic elites, the EU has the claims of genocide put forward by the rarely looked less likely as an alternative to Armenian lobby. Turkey's close relationship with the United Turkey's failure to permit U.S. troops to States. enter Iraq from the north resulted in the On the other hand, the Pentagon, ultimate irony. America's thinly spread and hitherto Ankara's most ardent advocate in relatively lightly armed forces were left Washington, is arguably the most frustrated with no option but to rely on Iraqi Kurds with Ankara's behavior. Its war plans were more than either Ankara or Washington in effect sabotaged by Turkey's behavior. would ever have desired. American Bases and ports were upgraded at U.S. promises to take Mosul and Kirkuk and to expense but to no avail. The equipment for keep the Kurds away from these cities, as a the U.S. Fourth Infantry, earmarked to sweetener to encourage Ankara to enter northern Iraq across the Turkish cooperate with Washington, amounted to border and left floating off the Turkish nothing as the United States was left with coast for weeks waiting for what turned out no choice but to regard its Kurdish allies as to be a failed parliamentary vote in Ankara, indispensable force generators in the north. spent most of the war transiting by sea to Ankara's more overbearing threats to act southern Iraq and was thus unavailable to unilaterally also became more muted once the theatre command. Logistic supplies that the fighting started, as Ankara was forced had entered Turkey had to be withdrawn. to appreciate that it had lost whatever room Instead, airborne forces were parachuted for maneuver it had formerly enjoyed, in into northern Iraq as much to signal to light of the clear U.S. warnings not to Ankara not to intervene unilaterally as to intervene in Iraq. The United States is now fight against Saddam. As a consequence of more indebted to the Iraqi Kurds, and the absence of a real second front in Iraq's Ankara is less well placed to have a say in north, Mosul and Kirkuk--and Tikrit-- post-Saddam arrangements in Iraq, as a remained unconquered even as coalition consequence of Turkey's failure to forces were entering the downtowns of cooperate. Baghdad and Basra. Yet, although their numbers have been While things could have been worse, reduced since Saddam's fall, Turkish troops there will be many in the Pentagon who remain poised on the Iraqi border, and the will remain conscious of the consequences situation in Iraqi Kurdistan is surely of Turkish non-cooperation. For America's shaping up to confirm some of Ankara's military planners, what good is Turkey's very worst fears. A possibly serious clash strategic location if it is unavailable to U.S. between Ankara and Washington over the troops? Furthermore, should a stable and future of Iraqi Kurdistan looks likely pro-western regime emerge in Baghdad, before long. In such an eventuality, Iranian Iraq could offer Washington an oil-rich, and Syrian involvement cannot be ruled grateful and still more strategically located out. Washington's best way to avoid such a regional alternative to Turkey. In the clash, as well as to satisfy the likely wishes foreseeable future, it is less likely that the of any future Iraqi government too, might Pentagon will be quite so willing to lobby be to rein in its Kurdish allies. This would on Turkey's behalf. It is also less likely that pose an awful dilemma. Ankara did warn Washington will speak up for Turkey quite Washington of the possible implications of so strongly with the EU or the IMF, or that war for Iraq's territorial unity, and of its the White House will be quite so prepared likely regional ramifications. In issuing to dampen preoccupations on Capitol Hill such warnings, Turkey was acting as an with Turkey's human rights records or with integral part of the region, not as a

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bystander. The Turkish government's government and the military believed that recent overtures to Syria and Iran, which the United States had no choice but to offer have aroused Washington's suspicions, whatever Ankara asked for, and to wait offer an additional reminder of Turkey's until Ankara was ready. In failing to regional preoccupations. Washington might recognize that Washington would resort to still have to reap what it has sown in a 'Plan B,' both the military and civilian Kurdistan. elements of the government overplayed It is reasonable to surmise that Turkey's their hand. At the same time, there was an domestic political ground has shifted too. element of defiance in the behavior of the In the negotiations that preceded March AKP deputies, and perhaps of the 1st, Washington sometimes behaved as if government too. Ankara's resistance to the Turkish General Staff was the main U.S. pressure played well to the domestic conduit to Turkish decision-making. In the and regional audiences. This expression of past, this has been a fairly well founded Turkish democracy has not been to the presumption. However, the AKP liking of the military, and also caused government, and its parliamentary deputies problems for the United States. It may even more so, proved to be less predictable continue to do so. Should Turkey's Islamist and less malleable than expected. Of democrats persist in their efforts to cement course, Turkish governments have rarely relations with neighboring states and been as compliant as is sometimes exploit populism at home, this whole saga supposed. Ankara's concerns were real and, might come to be considered as part of a from the outset, forcibly expressed. broader set back for Turkey's secularist Nevertheless, Washington elected to approach to both domestic and foreign downplay their significance. policy issues. For its part, the military in Turkey was remarkably quiescent. The explanation for *Bill Park is Senior Lecturer, Defense this remains obscure, but the early Studies Department, War Studies Group, indications are that the General Staff was King's College, London. happy to stand back and allow a government it despised to demonstrate its NOTES incompetence. The AKP government duly 1. For early examples of press reports on obliged, but the eventual outcome was not U.S. military thinking, see "US Plans one that the military either expected or Massive Invasion of Iraq," UPI desired. The Turkish General Staff is now Washington Politics and Policy Desk, July extremely constrained in its freedom of 10 2002; "US Plan for Iraq is Said to action with respect to northern Iraq, and Include Attack on 3 Sides," New York can only watch while the Iraqi Kurds seek Times, July 4, 2002. to call in their debts with Washington. The 2. For Turkish policy during the 1990-91 Turkish military's stock in the Pentagon has war, see William Hale, “Turkey, the fallen considerably, that of the Iraqi Kurds Middle East, and the Gulf Crisis,” has risen, whilst the AKP government has International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 4, behaved in accordance with the wishes October 1992, pp. 679-692; Sabri Sayari, both of the Turkish people and a majority "Between Allies and Neighbours: Turkey's of Turkey's Muslim neighbors. Burden Sharing Policy in the Gulf There was an element of miscalculation Conflict," in Andrew Bennett, Joseph on Ankara's part during the negotiations Lepgold, and Danny Ungar, Friends in with the United States. Both the

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Need: Burden Sharing in the Gulf War, 15. Jim Muir, "Kurds Reconciled," Middle (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 197-218. East International, No. 685, October 11, 3. For further details on the KRG zone, see 2002; Nicole Pope, "Cross Border Tim Judah, "In Iraqi Kurdistan," Survival, Concerns," Middle East International, No. Vol. 44, No. 4, Winter 2002-3, pp. 38-51; 683, September 13, 2002. Carole A. O'Leary, "The Kurds of Iraq: 16. See, for example, comments made by Recent History, Future Prospects," Middle the KDP leader Massoud Barzani, as East Review of International Affairs, Vol. reported in Pope, op.cit: and in Gorvett, 6, No. 4, December 2002. op.cit. 4. Chris Ktchera, "Iraqi Kurds agree to 17. "Turkey Cannot Stay Impartial," TDN, agree…for now," The Middle East, March 6, 2002. December 2002, No. 329, pp. 25-27. 18. See Nihat Ali Ozcan and Ersel Aydinli, 5. "US Officials Confident of Turkey's "Sealing the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Support," Washington Post, December 5, Partnership Through Cooperation in Iraq? 2002; "US to Discuss Upgrading Turkish A View from Ankara," Policywatch 651, Bases 'ahead of war'," Financial Times, The Washington Institute for Near East December 5, 2002. Policy, August 22, 2002. 6. "Key Aide Seeks Military Pledge from 19. 'Turkey Plans Thrust into Iraq to Stop Turkey," Washington Post, December 3, any Kurd War Refugees," International 2002; "Turkey's Offer of Military Bases Herald Tribune (IHT), November 25, 2002. Widens America's Options," Guardian, 20. "Turkey Deploys Troops Near Iraqi December 4, 2002. Border," and "Kurds Deny U.S. Military 7. "US: Will Turkey Tag the Line on Iraq?" Buildup," TDN, December 17, 2002; Turkish Daily News (TDN), December 4, "General Staff Denies Reports of 2002; "Turkey Has Conditions for Support Extraordinary Buildup on Iraq Border," of War," Washington Post, December 4, TDN, December 19, 2002. 2002. 21. Saadet Oruc, "Iraqi Turcomans 8. "Turkey, U.S. Near Accord on Concerned About Security," TDN, March Deployment," Washington Post, January 18, 2002. 17, 2003. 22. "Ziya: Turkey Won't Give Kirkuk up, 9. "Turks Open Borders to 20,000 Troops," Even if We Do," TDN, June 13, 2002. Daily Telegraph, January 28, 2003. 23. See Pope, op.cit., p.11; Gorvett, op.cit, 10. "Americans in Talks on Turkish p. 11; and Bill Park, "Bridgehead or Troops," International Herald Tribune, Bridge?" The World Today, Vol. 58, No. February 7, 2003; 'US Troop Deal Alarms 10, October 2002, p. 8. Kurds," Guardian, February 10, 2003. 24. Hale, op.cit., p. 691. 11. "Turks Say U.S. Can Upgrade Bases 25. Robert Rabil, "The Iraqi Opposition's There," Washington Post, February 6, Evolution: From Conflict to Unity?" 2003. Middle East Review of International 12. Jon Gorvett, "A Hugely Unpopular Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4, December 2002. War," The Middle East, No. 328, 26. Nicole Pope, "Eyes on Turkey," Middle November 2002. East International, No. 691, January 10, 13. For example, see "Ecevit: We are 2003, pp. 14-15. Unhappy with U.S. Activity on Northern 27. Gunduz Aktan, "If Iraq Operation Iraq," TDN, August 2, 2002. Takes Place," TDN, November 20, 2002. 14. Roddy Scott, "Kurds Nervous over 28. "Crucial U.S. Allies on Iraq Fall Out U.S.'s Plans for Iraq," Jane's Intelligence Over Oil,' Guardian, November 1, 2002. Review, April 2002.

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29. "Kurdish Leader Offers to Help U.S. with Iraq Invasion," Guardian, August 15, 2002. 30. "Americans May Takeover Kirkuk and Mosul to Ease Concerns of Ankara," TDN, September 17, 2002. 31. "US: Will Turkey Tag the Line on Iraq?" TDN, December 4, 2002. 32. "Turkey, Iraqi Kurds and U.S. to Set up Coordinating Committee," TDN, December 30, 2002. 33. Muir, op.cit. 34. "Aga: Only a Central Parliament May Prevent Civil War in Iraq," TDN, November 22, 2002. 35. "US Prodding Turkey to be 'more active'," TDN, February 3, 2003; "Ankara Urged to Back 'military measures'," Financial Times, February 3, 2003. 36. "Legal Haggles Snag Deployment to Turkey," Washington Post, February 9, 2003; and "Work Can Begin on Bases," Washington Post, February 10, 2003. 37. "Yakis, Babacan Return from Washington Talks," TDN, February 17, 2003. 38. "Turkey Stalls Approval for U.S. troops," Guardian, February 18, 2003. 39. "War on Two Fronts," Newsweek, February 24, 2003. 40. Ibid; see also "Explosive Ingredients," Guardian, February 13, 2003; "Turkey Puts Focus on Future of Kurds," Financial Times, February 24, 2003; "Kurds 'terrified' at Prospect of Turkish Invasion," Independent, February 24, 2003; "Vote is Nearing in Turkey on American Use of Bases," IHT, February 24, 2003. 41. IHT, op.cit., February 24, 2003.

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