Project AIR FORCE THE CONFLICT OVER KOSOVO WHY MILOSEVIC DECIDED TO SETTLE WHEN HE DID STEPHEN T. HOSMER Prepared for the UNITED STATES AIR FORCE R Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hosmer, Stephen T. The conflict over Kosovo : why Milosevic decided to settle when he did / Stephen T. Hosmer. p. cm. MR-1351 Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-3003-5 1. Kosovo (Serbia)—History—Civil War, 1998– 2. Miloéeviâ, Slobodan, 1941– I. Title. DR2087 .H67 2001 949.7103—dc21 2001031973 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark.RAND’s publications do not necessarily lectref the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. © Copyright 2001 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2001 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 201 North Craig Street, Suite 102, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-1516 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: [email protected] PREFACE Since the end of the Cold War a decade ago, the armed forces of the United States have been committed to protracted, large-scale com- bat operations only twice: Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Allied Force in 1999. In both conflicts, U.S. and allied air operations played a key role in securing allied war aims with minimal friendly casualties. Because U.S. military and civilian leaders will also want to conclude future conflicts at minimal cost, it is important that they understand the circumstances and operational effects that were instrumental in producing the successful outcomes of the past. This book examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO’s conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Among other issues, the study analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic’s initial decision to defy NATO’s demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures and the resulting expectations and concerns that most heavily influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. Because bombing was the primary instrument used by the NATO allies, particular attention is necessarily given to identifying and assessing its different coercive effects on the Serb population and leadership. The book should be of interest to national security officials, military commanders, and other persons responsible for the development of U.S. military capabilities, the planning and conduct of U.S. military operations, and the formulation of strategies for bringing U.S. power to bear in the service of U.S. national interests. iii iv The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did The research, which was part of a larger RAND Project AIR FORCE study of Operation Allied Force, was conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project AIR FORCE and was sponsored by the Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe, and the Director of Strategic Planning, Headquarters, United States Air Force. Research was completed in March 2001. Comments are welcome and may be addressed either to the author or to the Strategy and Doctrine Program director, Edward R. Harshberger. Other documents published in this series currently include the following: MR-1279-AF, Command and Control and Battle Management: Experiences from the Air War Over Serbia, James E. Schneider, Myron Hura, Gary McLeod (Government publication; not releasable to the general public) MR-1326-AF, Aircraft Weapon Employment in Operation Allied Force, William Stanley, Carl Rhodes, Robert Uy, Sherrill Lingel (Government publication; not releasable to the general public) MR-1391-AF, European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation, John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, Traci Williams DB-332-AF, Aircraft Survivability in Operation Allied Force, William Stanley, Sherrill Lingel, Carl Rhodes, Jody Jacobs, Robert Uy (Government publication; not releasable to the general public) Topics examined in series documents nearing completion include: • Supporting Expeditionary Aerospace Forces: Lessons from the Air War Over Serbia • A Strategic and Operational Assessment of NATO's Air War for Kosovo • Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force Tanker Operations Preface v PROJECT AIR FORCE Project AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and analysis. It provides the Air Force with independent analyses of pol- icy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is carried out in four programs: Aerospace Force Development; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. CONTENTS Preface ......................................... iii Figure .......................................... xi Summary ....................................... xiii Acknowledgments................................. xxix Acronyms ....................................... xxxi Chapter One INTRODUCTION .............................. 1 PART I WHY MILOSEVIC DIDN’T SETTLE EARLIER Chapter Two HE ASSUMED ACCEPTING RAMBOUILLET TERMS WOULD ENDANGER HIS RULE ................... 7 Milosevic Had Major Stakes in Kosovo ............. 8 Some Rambouillet Terms Would Have Been Unacceptable to the Serb Public .............. 12 Accepting Rambouillet Would Have Been Dangerous for Milosevic ............................. 16 Chapter Three HE ASSUMED HE COULD FORCE NATO TO OFFER BETTER TERMS ............................... 19 Milosevic Had Reason to Expect the Bombing to Be Limited................................. 19 vii viii The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did Milosevic Believed He Could Force a Halt to the Bombing and Garner Better Terms ............ 22 PART II WHY MILOSEVIC DECIDED TO SETTLE ON JUNE 3 Chapter Four HE REALIZED THAT HIS HOPED-FOR LEVERAGE ON NATO HAD EVAPORATED ....................... 37 Ethnic Cleansing Did Not Produce the Leverage Expected ............................... 37 NATO Remained United and Resolute ............. 40 Russia’s Support for the FRY Dissolved ............. 42 Chapter Five BOMBING PRODUCED A POPULAR CLIMATE CONDUCIVE TO CONCESSIONS ................... 49 The Initial Public Reaction to the Bombing Was Surprise and Angry Defiance ....................... 50 After a Month of Bombing, Public Attitudes Began to Change................................. 52 Concerns About Casualties Provoked Antiwar Demonstrations in Milosevic’s “Heartland” ...... 57 Bombing Prompted Calls from Party Leaders and Elected Officials for a Negotiated Settlement ..... 60 The Final Peace Settlement Was Met with Relief ...... 63 Bombing Made Concessions Politically Feasible ...... 64 Chapter Six DAMAGE TO “DUAL-USE” INFRASTRUCTURE GENERATED GROWING PRESSURE ................ 65 The Damage to Serbia’s Infrastructure and Economy Was Becoming Severe ...................... 66 Attacks Were Perceived As Aimed at Weakening Milosevic’s Control Mechanisms .............. 71 The Bombing Imposed Stress, Hardships, and Costs on the Ruling Elite ........................... 73 Chapter Seven DAMAGE TO MILITARY FORCES AND KLA “RESURGENCE” GENERATED LITTLE PRESSURE ...... 77 NATO’s Objectives in Attacking Military Targets ...... 77 Contents ix Much Above-Ground Military Infrastructure Was Destroyed............................... 79 The Serbs Adopted Countermeasures to Reduce Damage to Their Military Structure ............ 80 VJ Armor, Artillery, and Troops Survived the War Largely Intact ............................ 82 Serb Forces in Kosovo Were Able to Carry Out Most of Their Missions ........................... 85 The Bottom Line Concerning Attacks on Purely Military Targets ................................. 89 Chapter Eight HE EXPECTED UNCONSTRAINED BOMBING IF NATO’S TERMS WERE REJECTED ........................ 91 NATO’s Terms Were Seen As a Russian-Backed Ultimatum .............................. 91 Why Serbia’s Leadership Found the Threat of Unconstrained Bombing Credible ............. 97 Milosevic Feared Unconstrained Bombing Might Endanger His Rule ........................ 103 Chapter Nine HE PROBABLY ALSO WORRIED ABOUT THREAT OF FUTURE INVASION ............................ 109 Invasion Appeared a More Distant Threat ........... 110 Indications That Ground Attack Was Being Contemplated Probably Worried Belgrade Leaders................................. 112 Serb Leaders May Have Realized That Invasion Would Be Preceded by Intensified Bombing ........... 113 Chapter Ten HE BELIEVED NATO’S TERMS PROVIDED HIM WITH SOME POLITICAL COVER ........................ 115 Rambouillet Compared to the June 10 Agreement ..... 116 Milosevic Proclaimed Victory .................... 118 PART III CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS Chapter Eleven