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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA St. John's Road. Tyler's Greon High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR 77-31,876 GIETSCHIER, Steven Philip, 1948- LIMITED WAR AND THE HOME FRONT: OHIO DURING THE KOREAN WAR. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1977 History, United States University Microfiims International, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48io6 © Copyright by Steven Philip Gietschier 1977 LIMITED WAR AND THE HOME FRONT: OHIO DURING THE KOREAN WAR DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Steven Philip Gietschier, B.S.F.S., M.A. The Ohio State University 1977 Reading Committee: Approved By Mansel G. Blackford _ Robert H. Breimer A/. J J ]/ K » Gary W. Reichard (/ I j H • /j Adviser Department of History ACKNOWLEDGlViENTS The completion of this dissertation provides me with the opportunity to thank publicly several people who have contributed to my work. Professor Robert Bremner served as my adviser throughout my graduate education. He willingly offered his counsel and wisdom and encouraged me to develop self-reliance as a researcher. Professor Gary Reichard first suggested this topic to me and guided my work over several early rough spots. Along with Professor Mansel Blackford, he read the entire manuscript, and he criticized it v/ith thoroughness and compassion. Professor Paul Varg of Michigan State and former Ohio State Vice-President Frederic Heimberger read early drafts of Chapter IV and offered several helpful suggestions. I am grateful to the Graduate School of The Ohio State University for a University Fellowship which made my graduate education possible. I also thank the Harry S. Truman Library Institute for a grant which funded part of my research. The staff of the Truman Library was always courteous and friendly. The Honorable John W. Bricker graciously allowed me to use his papers on deposit at the Ohio Historical Society. My own colleagues at the Society were also helpful: many of them worked cheerfully to assist my research and to answer my many questions. All of these people share in whatever this study achieves; I alone am responsible for its shortcomings. I have no words to acknowledge my parents and my wife adequately. My parents have ;^tiided my life and supported me all along the way. They know what they mean to me. My Donna not only typed and read the manuscript; she also loves me enough to have sacrificed countless hours during the early months of our marriage so that I could complete this work. July 21, 1 9 ^ 8 ........ B o m - New York, New York 197 0................. B.S.F.S., Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 1 9 7 0 -1 9 7 1........... University Fellow, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1 97 1. ............... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1972-197^ ........... Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1 9 7 ^ -1 9 7 5............ University Fellow, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1975-1977 ............ Labor History Specialist, Ohio Labor History Project, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio 1977- . .......... Co-Director, Ohio Labor History Project, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, ' Ohio PUBLICATIONS Preliminary Guide to Sources in Ohio Labor Historv. With Glen A. Gildemeister, 1976. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field; American Social History American Social and Intellectual History. Professor Robert Bremner American Economie History. Professor Mansel Blackford American Constitutional History. Professor Bradley Chapin Japanese History. Professor James Bartholomew TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. VITA ................................... INTRODUCTION: AFRICA AND THE KOREAN WAR. Chapter I. LIMITED WAR, LIMITED ACCORD: OHIO ENCOUNTERS KOREA. 16 II. PRICES, PRODUCTION, AND PREPAREDNESS: MOBILIZING OHIO'S ECONOmi... ... 56 WAGES, POLITICS, AND SECURITY: OHIO LABOR AND THE IMPACT OF KOREA 99 LOYALTY AND THE UNIVERSITY: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AT OHIO STATE . 155 ENDURING THE LIMITED WAR: OHIO AFTER MACARTHUR'S DISMISSAL . 211 STRETCHING OUT THE WARTIME ECONOM: OHIO'S ROAD TO PERMANENT MOBILIZATION................... 259 CONCLUSION: OHIO DURING THE KOREAN WAR. 320 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................... 327 INTRODUCTION AMERICA AND THE KOREAN WAR But, it is probably safe to say that the middle of the twentieth century finds the citizens of the United States, despite all that good luck and good management have done for them, more conscious of tragedy and anxiety than Americans have ever been before. The year 1950 brought a special deepening of their anxiety. The cold war turned hot in Korea, and the possibility of World War III— with its threat of unimaginable destruction— became, for the first time for many people, a reality. — American Civil liberties Union, Securitv and Freedom; the Great Challenge. Thirtieth Annual Report, 1951* The Korean War jolted a bewildered America. For Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins and his wife, news of the North Korean invasion interrupted a weekend spent at their cottage retreat in Maryland. The general was roused early by a call from Washington. He dressed hurriedly, downed a cup of coffee, and was headed for the door when his wife's question stopped him short. She asked, "Does this again mean war?" Collins had no answer. Unlike World War II, Korea was not expected. There was no Pearl Harbor, no "Day of Infamy" call to arms, no immediate pronouncement of righteous, unswerving war goals. The news of the attack came not through special radio broadcasts disrupting the calm of a Sunday afternoon but quietly, in abbreviated stories in the Sunday newspapers. The horrors of this war and its meaning would sneak up on America over time. Its early events, indeed its entire course, confused Americans and frustrated more than galvanized them. Gladys Collins's question revealed this confusion. She was asking in effect, if the Land of the Morning Calm would be the place where J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime : The Historv and Lessons of Korea (Boston, I969), p. 4. Cleveland Plain Dealer. June 25, 1950, p. 1. 3 That query never received a satisfactory answer. The Truman administration's decision to respond quickly to the invasion hut to wage a limited war was an idea so new and different to the American experience that many people were left unsatisfied and querulous. Truman's announcement that Korea was not a war but a police action did more to confuse than define the issue. The invasion, in the opinion of one historian, "created a true political crisis for the Truman administration. It had to enlist popular support for a distant, costly, and seemingly minor conflict and at the same time take care not to provoke the Soviet Union into escalating that conflict into a world war."^ Truman had to persuade his countrymen that Korea was a vital and important conflict paradoxically requiring only a limited American response. The administration's strategy in Korea was inextricably bound to the entire foreign policy of Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In their view, the postwar world was a bipolar one in which the United States and the Soviet Union could not continue to be allies. The administration acted in foreign affairs under the theory expounded by diplomat George Kennan in his anonymously-published article, "The Sources of Athan Theoharis, Seeds of Repression:. Harrv S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthvism (Chicago, 1971), p. 61.' 4 Soviet Conduct." Kennan argued that capitalism and Socialism were innately antagonistic. He postulated that the Soviet Union maintained a belief in "the basic badness of capitalism" and "in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in its destruction." Furthermore, he stressed that the Kremlin had no timetable for the destruction of the West* "Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal." Kennan posited, and Acheson agreed, that the Soviet threat must be contained by a combination of military, political, and economic pressures.