Truman, Congress and the Struggle for War and Peace In
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TRUMAN, CONGRESS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WAR AND PEACE IN KOREA A Dissertation by LARRY WAYNE BLOMSTEDT Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 2008 Major Subject: History TRUMAN, CONGRESS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR WAR AND PEACE IN KOREA A Dissertation by LARRY WAYNE BLOMSTEDT Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved by: Chair of Committee, Terry H. Anderson Committee Members, Jon R. Bond H. W. Brands John H. Lenihan David Vaught Head of Department, Walter L. Buenger May 2008 Major Subject: History iii ABSTRACT Truman, Congress and the Struggle for War and Peace in Korea. (May 2008) Larry Wayne Blomstedt, B.S., Texas State University; M.S., Texas A&M University-Kingsville Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Terry H. Anderson This dissertation analyzes the roles of the Harry Truman administration and Congress in directing American policy regarding the Korean conflict. Using evidence from primary sources such as Truman’s presidential papers, communications of White House staffers, and correspondence from State Department operatives and key congressional figures, this study suggests that the legislative branch had an important role in Korean policy. Congress sometimes affected the war by what it did and, at other times, by what it did not do. Several themes are addressed in this project. One is how Truman and the congressional Democrats failed each other during the war. The president did not dedicate adequate attention to congressional relations early in his term, and was slow to react to charges of corruption within his administration, weakening his party politically. For their part, the Democrats gave HST poor advice concerning congressional involvement in the decision to take the nation to war. A number of them allowed their personal dislike for Secretary of State Dean Acheson to poison their support for the administration whenever U.S. fortunes in the war soured. Another issue was Truman’s interpretation and use of the concept of bipartisanship in foreign policy. HST generally iv manipulated the idea for political advantage. Ironically, had he listened to the counsel of an administration Republican early in the war, Truman could have mitigated the explosion over the firing of General Douglas MacArthur. A topic heretofore overlooked by historians concerns congressional peace initiatives proposed during the first half of the war. Analysis of the effectiveness of these resolutions, particularly during the heyday of McCarthyism, yields surprising conclusions. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Terry H. Anderson, for his commitment to guiding me through this project. His enthusiasm helped me persevere and continually reminded me of how much fun it is to be an historian. I also owe a word of thanks to the Harry S. Truman Library Foundation for a generous grant that enabled me to conduct some of my research at the library. The Texas A&M College of Liberal Arts and the Glasscock Humanities Center also provided funding for my research at the Library of Congress, Princeton University and Syracuse University. Without their financial help, this study would not have been possible. I also am grateful for the History Department at Texas A&M. The faculty members with whom I have studied with have been unfailingly encouraging. My fellow graduate students in the department have helped me in more ways than I can count, and I thank them for their assistance. They are true team players. Most importantly, I want to thank my family. My parents, Curtis and Carolyn Blomstedt, have been unfailingly supportive. My wife, Colleen, and my children, Elizabeth and Alex, allowed me to uproot them to enable me to pursue my dream of making a contribution to the historical profession. I cannot thank them enough, for their sacrifices allowed me to see this project through to completion. vi NOMENCLATURE AIPO Records of American Institute of Public Opinion Truman Library CAH Center for American History The University of Texas at Austin CR Congressional Record FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States HSTL Harry S Truman Library MDLOC Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. NYT New York Times PP Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman 1945-1953. Truman Library website: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/ PSF President’s Secretary’s File Truman Library SGMML Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (all citations to this source used by permission of Princeton University) SMOF Staff Member and Office Files, Truman papers. SUL Special Collections Research Center, Syracuse University Library WHCF White House Central File Truman Library WHOF White House Official File vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......................................................................................... v NOMENCLATURE.................................................................................................. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... vii LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................... viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1 II A SPORADIC ALLIANCE: HST AND HIS PARTY, 1946-1950...... 16 III A FALLEN ICON AND A LOST ELECTION, 1951-1952 ................. 60 IV ON-AGAIN, OFF-AGAIN: BIPARTISANSHIP, 1945-1950 ............. 106 V THE DEATH OF BIPARTISANSHIP, 1951-1952............................... 152 VI HARRY TRUMAN: WAR SELLER ................................................... 192 VII LET THE CHIEF TAKE THE HEAT: THE U.S. INTERVENES ...... 230 VIII CONGRESS AND THE DRIVE FOR PEACE..................................... 274 IX CONCLUSION...................................................................................... 314 SOURCES CITED .................................................................................................... 324 APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................... 347 APPENDIX B ........................................................................................................... 349 VITA ................................................................................................................ 350 viii LIST OF TABLES TABLE Page 1 Senators Serving in 81st Congress, 2nd Session-Votes on Key Foreign Policy Issues ......................................................................... 135 2 Selected List of White House Appointments with Republican Congressmen and Other Leading Republicans .................................. 150 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The United Nations Security Council held a meeting and passed on the situation and asked the members to go to the relief of the Korean Republic. It was unlawfully attacked by a bunch of bandits. And the members of the United Nations are going to the relief of the Korean Republic to suppress a bandit raid on the Republic of Korea.- President Harry S Truman, press conference on June 29, 1950. The Korean War stormed upon the world scene on June 24, 1950 when Premier Kim Il Sung launched a massive invasion by North Korea into its southern counterpart, hoping to unite the peninsula under his leadership. Neither the administration of President Harry S Truman nor the members of the 81st Congress could have known that their response to this attack would mark a monumental shift in how the U.S. government commits the nation to war. Believing that communist expansion into South Korea was a threat to American national security, Truman and Congress responded swiftly with military intervention. When China entered the war, however, HST and many American legislators became concerned that the regional conflict would escalate into a world war that they, wisely, were unwilling to wage. Instead, the Korean intervention introduced the American public to the concept of limited war, which contrasted sharply with the unconditional surrenders obtained in World War II. This conflict changed the roles of the president and Congress when committing the nation to major overseas military interventions, as chief executives dispensed with obtaining congressional declarations of war, changes that the nation later witnessed in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq. ____________ This dissertation follows the style of Diplomatic History. 2 The war in Korea unfolded quickly. News of the attack reached Truman, and within three days he had dispatched air and naval support to South Korea, inspiring House members to rise and cheer the decision. In addition, he obtained a commitment from the United Nations (U.N.) to give military support to South Korea. On June 28, Congress overwhelmingly approved the commander in chief’s order to extend the draft for one year and to call up reservists in all service branches, bolstering the manpower of an American military that had dwindled from 12.3 million at the end of World War II to 1.4 million, producing a force of 3.2 million some 15 months later. After meeting with key members of Congress two days later, Truman issued a statement approving Air Force missions over North Korea. It concluded: