German Studies Association Johns Hopkins University Press

Restoring a German Career, 1945-1950: The Ambiguity of Being Author(s): Daniel E. Rogers Source: German Studies Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 (May, 2008), pp. 303-324 Published by: Johns Hopkins University Press on behalf of the German Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27668518 Accessed: 11-10-2015 16:19 UTC

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This content downloaded from 130.92.9.57 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 16:19:35 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Restoring a German Career, 1945-1950: The Ambiguity of Being Hans Globke

Daniel E. Rogers University of South Alabama

Hans Globke, for 10 years 's Staatssekret?r and one of the most controver sial figures in the early history of the Federal Republic, struggled to restore his civil service career after 1945. He crafted an ambiguous image of himself during the Third Reich as both effective bureaucrat and daring r?sister by admitting only minor misjudgments, gathering statements of support from opponents of Hitler, and characterizing his co-authorship of a commentary on the Nuremberg race laws as an effort to lessen their impact. He had thus positioned himself to survive the ensuing attacks on his Nazi-era past.

was one most Hans Globke (1898-1973) of the powerful and controversial figures in postwar German public life.1As long-time chief of staff,political confidant, and adviser to first secretary, postwar 's chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, Globke quietly, even secretly, influenced the course and structure of the new as a democracy. He acted kind of hidden general secretary toAdenauer's party, theChristian Democratic Union (CDU).2 He led the staffingof new ministries oversaw and the development and functioning of the Federal Republic's incipi ent return was intelligence services.3 And in he almost immediately labeled a an "grey eminence," appellation targeting those who, like the original eminence are grise, Fran?ois-Joseph le Clerc du Tremblay, loathed and feared not only for their furtive power, but also for the policies, shortcomings, and failures of their bosses.4 was career Globke 's rise to such power unlikely. His might well have ended with the collapse ofNazi Germany in 1945. He had served the regime as a moderately high-ranking civil servant in the Reich Ministry of the Interior? was high enough that he subject to automatic arrest by Germany's occupiers. on Moreover, he had worked laws and regulations that discriminated against and humiliated Jews, and he had joined his boss in co-authoring a legal com on race mentary theNuremberg laws of 1935.5Tainted by this past, he might more have easily abandoned the civil service and moved into private business. resume Instead, he struggled to his interrupted professional life.He restored to career fullviability his civil service by crafting an ambiguous image of himself as during theThird Reich both effective bureaucrat and daring r?sister.His to rise prominence after 1949 could then follow, but only because Adenauer were and early postwar German society also eager to embrace the ambiguity

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surrounding Globke and many like him. Most previous writings about Globke have paid little attention to the years immediately afterWorld War II.6 Polemical and scholarly accounts of his life, work, or influence have centered on his role as Adenauer's chief of staff,the post-1950 controversies over Globke's past in theNational Socialist era, or on his activities during theThird Reich.7 Considerable factual distortions some times emerge in these works, particularly the careless assumption or outright was a allegation that he member of theNazi Party or drafted theNuremberg Laws.8 In the early 1960s, the East German communist government released new documents on him during theNazi era, but interpreted and contextualized a them in way tomake the government of the Bonn Federal Republic look as as an even unrepentantly Nazi possible.9 Documents needed for minimally career objective analysis of how Globke restored his were long either widely scattered or inaccessible. Only recently has his carefully gathered collection of personal papers become generally available in the Archives of Christian Democratic Politics at theKonrad Adenauer Foundation in Sankt Augustin.

The son of a cloth merchant, Globke had grown up as a Catholic in the Rhineland, served on the front lines ofWorld War I, and returned to attend the universities inCologne, Bonn, and finallyGie?en, where he received a doc torate in law in 1922. He began his civil service career inAachen in 1925 and ultimately landed in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior in in 1929.10 By the time theNazis took control of the German government in 1933, he had achieved the moderately high rank of Regierungsrat in the Prussian, and one thenGerman, civil service.11He had of themost prestigious careers open to a or servant never anyGerman, that of Beamter, civil who could most likely was lose his job in normal times.That status endangered by theNazis' swift promulgation of the "Law for the Restoration of a Professional Civil Service" inApril 1933, which made it possible to fire civil servants who were deemed or a racially politically dangerous.12 As member of the Catholic Center Party since 1922, Globke was not automatically suspect, as he would have been if a or he had been Social Democrat communist, but neither was he presumed politically reliable.While it remains disputed whether he had career options outside of government (some allege his-wife's family could have provided him a job in industry13) and whether he himself didn't long to try such options, everything about his career for the rest of his life indicates thatGlobke's self on as a worth depended his status and influence higher civil servant. Quitting either in 1933 or later would have meant giving up what he had worked his entire adult life to achieve. While he may, ifhis own accounts are to be cred was ited, have been tempted to resign, he blessed and cursed by requests from men in the resistance and to remain at his job and supply inside information about theNazi regime's plans and policies.14 Three young

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era children born during theNazi might also have led him to be very cautious about leaving the civil service.15 So he stayed.He was promoted to Oberregierungsrat at the end of 193 3, and received one further promotion in 1938 to the rank ofMinisterialrat. Younger colleagues continued to receive further promotions, while he remained at this one rank until the end ofWorld War II.16He was of approximately 40Minis terialr?te in theMinistry of the Interior in Berlin, working in the only initially area non-ideological ofmarital status (Personenstand)}1 Soon thisfield, mundane in other eras,would become one of the focuses ofNazi efforts to define, restrict, and humiliate Jews. In 193 5Adolf Hitler decided spontaneously to promulgate new anti-Jewish laws during the annual Nazi Party rally atNuremberg.18 Thus began the association of Globke with the city ofNuremberg that endures to this day. nor Globke did not know in advance about theNuremberg Laws of 1935, was did he help write them, although he involved in drafting ordinances to enforce the laws.19The following year, he and his boss, State SecretaryWilhelm a on Stuckart, published commentary theNuremberg Laws. Like all legal com mentaries, Stuckart's and Globke's treatise attempted to elaborate beyond the plain text of the laws in order to assist judges and others in applying the laws to precise cases whose particulars could not have been included in the actual text. a Unlike legal commentaries in other eras, theirs began with thoroughly Nazi introduction glorifyingHitler, "Aryan" racial ideology, and the subordination of law toNazism and toHitler as its leader. For the rest of his life,Globke would face the problem of all accused wrongdoers: clarifying the context of or an act later considered unethical, immoral, illegal, even evil by others who would not or could not spend the time and make an effort to understand the and circumstances in which the act occurred. precise, ambiguous, Other controversial areas occupied Globke's energies during the Third Reich. He was involved in drafting legislation that required Jews to add either "Israel" or "Sara" to their legal names in order to brand them publicly, even though he claimed his involvement served tomoderate Nazi plans thatwould have forced German Jews to surrender their entire names.20 After Germany launchedWorld War II, he traveled to several occupied countries and drafted legislation central to the annexation of territory by Germany. But throughout theNazi era, he also remained in contact with officials in theCatholic Church in Berlin, including the archbishop.21 Globke has leftbehind evidence of espionage for the Church and was later closely linked tomen who plotted the assassina tion and overthrow ofHitler in the failed bomb plot of 20 July 1944.22He fell under suspicion by theGestapo, but thanks to the protection and intervention of Stuckart with the head of theNazi security apparatus, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Globke avoided an arrestwarrant until near the end of the war.23 IfGlobke is to be believed, he survived theNazi era only due to good luck.

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war extreme His family had sought refuge in the lastmonths of the in southern or Bavaria. When he fled Berlin to join them (under the pretext, perhaps due an area to the reality, of serious illness), he arrived in thatwould be conquered by theAmerican army inApril 1945,24He always asserted thatGestapo officers had been sent from Berlin to arrest him for his part in the plot against Hitler in 1944, but that they had been prevented from seizing him by the advance of the was American army into the area near Kochel, where his family then living.25 account While there is no independent evidence to confirm his precise and to he did not specify how he knew about the proximity of the him, neither is there evidence refuting his version. Itmay well have been better for his future political viability had theGestapo caught him and jailed him briefly, as had been the case with Adenauer. For one of Globke's chief difficulties in his self-defense is that therewas no evidence he ever suffered hardship during theNazi era. Even his family's residence inAachen survived (although their Berlin residence had been lost toAllied bombing in 1943). Globke remained with his family inKochel until 20 August 1945, when like all civil servants above a certain rank he was "automatically" arrested by American soldiers. He was taken 10miles away to Bad T?lz and interrogated on for the first time at an internment center. During this interrogation 7 September 1945, he told the story thatwould remain consistent throughout the rest of his life: he was never a member of theNazi party or S S, he was an opponent ofNazism, he worked with prominent people who had taken part in contact the conspiracy against Hitler of 20 July 1944, and he had been in with officials in the Catholic Church. He provided names of those who could vouch or for him, and over the next fewmonths he would begin to collect affidavits letters of support frommany of them.The terse evaluation of Globke in the record of his initial interrogation recommends only further investigation by his He was soon transferred to a U.S.-British contacting references.26 joint near "Ministerial Collecting Center" at F?rstenhagen, Hessisch Lichtenau in as a theAmerican zone of occupation. He spent the remainder of 1945 prisoner one there, albeit a privileged who began to receive requests for his assistance in sketching out the details of theGerman democracy planned by theUnited States and Britain. On 28 December 1945 he leftcaptivity inF?rstenhagen and moved to B?nde, one of several adjoining towns inNorth Rhine-Westphalia serving as the headquarters of the British military government. He would stay at B?nde until the end of June 1946, serving as an advisor to the British. Upon a as a his departure, British supervisor praised Globke valuable and respected advisor.He authored reports on such topics as themerits of the single-member district/majority voting system inplace inBritain, the separation of administra tive from political tasks, and the historic development of local government.27 During the period between Germany's surrender and Globke's departure a fromAllied service inmid-1946, he became quietly forceful and persistent

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own a advocate in his cause. He inaugurated three-pronged defense strategy towhich he would adhere the rest of his life: admit only minor misjudgments; as or characterize all his work for theNazis innocuous, routine, actually benefi cial to victims of racial or political persecution; and collect affidavitsof support from those who could vouch for his opposition activities or his assistance to Nazi victims.As for the firstprong, themost culpability he would ever admit for era a theNazi was mistake in judgment for staying in theMinistry of Interior: to begin with because he could not realize how long theNazi regime would last, later because he could not foresee that the regime was not there to stay after all, and finally because Church officials and others who needed his help to find out what was going on inside the ministries of theNazi dictatorship even persuaded him to remain, in themidst of very dirtywork.28 never In contrast to these minor admissions, Globke gave ground when it came to the on the Laws or other racist mea placing commentary Nuremberg a sures in context favorable to him. In the fullest autobiographical document he left to posterity, but never published in his lifetime,he ascribed the birth of the commentary to an initiative byWilhelm Stuckart, who had wanted to pre vent Rudolf Hess' office frommanaging the interpretation of theNuremberg Laws in such a radical way that even those who were considered one-fourth Jewish would have been subject to the full force of discrimination. After initial hesitation, Globke claimed, he had agreed to assist Stuckart. Globke asserted, without concrete that the he co-authored providing examples, commentary was themildest of the four that had been written on theNuremberg Laws:

es istmir auch von zahlreichen Personen best?tigt worden, dass der Kom mentar in vielen F?llen mit Erfolg zu Gunsten der von den N?rnberger es Gesetzen betroffenen Kreise verwandt worden ist. Ich glaube, kann nicht bestritten dass er von allen erschienenen Kommentaren werden, derjenige ist, der die Gesetze am g?nstigsten f?r die Betroffenen kommentiert. (It me has also been confirmed to by numerous persons that the commentary cases was successfully used inmany for the benefit of those affected by the Nuremberg Laws. I believe that it cannot be denied that of all the published commentaries it is the one that comments on the laws most beneficially for those affected.)29

According to Globke, whatever was bad about his commentary was either unavoidable due to the evil laws themselves that the commentary interpreted, or instead was solely the work of Stuckart, particularly the introduction and its zealous Nazi rhetoric.30 Globke's role in the resistance against Hitler was another prong of his strategy to defend both his decision to remain at theMinistry of the Interior and his co-authorship of the commentary. His assertions about the benign or even positive intent of the commentary would be lent immense credibility ifhe

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could somehow demonstrate that he had repeatedly risked his life in order to oppose the regime. He maintained that he had been in contact with resistance or figures from 1933 on, had used his position to help certain politically racially an persecuted persons, and had taken active role in the "planning and prepara on tion" of the 20 July 1944 conspiracy against Hitler by working the laws and to personnel to followHitler's overthrow and by funneling inside information the conspirators.31 Among the letters of support he gathered immediately after thewar, three from late 1945 would prove most helpful in restoring Globke's career: those byjakob Kaiser, , and Cardinal Konrad Preysing. Kaiser would become an early leader in the postwar Christian Democracy movement, albeit also Adenauer's major ideological and organizational rival; Lenz would become Adenauer's firstStaatssekret?r, and Preysing, the archbishop of Berlin, served as amore politically neutral authority who could attest both toGlobke's Christian beliefs and themotives behind his actions in remaining in theNazi Ministry of the Interior.32We do not know whether Globke, in approaching these men and others, sought to guide the content of the letters by describing an for them his conduct rather than asking simply for open-ended letter of reference.Whatever the case may be, each of these men attested to Globke's or opposition toNazism, the great personal risks he took by informing them by participating in the conspiracy against Hitler, and other meritorious service. as to Preysing, for example, singled out Globke's information being helpful the Church's efforts to assist Jews and those deemed to have been of partial Jewish ancestry. If it had not been for Globke's courageous work with the Berlin bishop's office, Preysing asserted, draft legislation compelling divorces in cases of "mixed marriages" between Jews and non-Jews would have become law.Globke's information to the Church had allowed it to strenuously object was to the proposed lawswhile there still time, Preysing insisted.33 The three-fold approach proved a successful basis for restoring his career, were provided theAllies and thenGerman politics and society willing to toler ate or even readmit masses of civil servants who had loyally served theNazi was a not a regime. Globke's self-exculpation only necessary pre-condition, career. sufficient one for the full restoration of his The right people and the right societal framework would also have to be present.

Like most other German adults, Globke had to fill out one or more question naires about his activities,memberships, travels, and income during theNazi on era. His answers would form the basis for his denazification. Depending what he wrote and whether he was believed, he might be totally cleared. But ifhe incriminated himself or ifhis statements were doubted, he might suffer new one or another degree of difficulty finding employment and status in the Germany. His surviving denazification questionnaires are, likehis other writings and but are also more about his true testimony, very consistent, they ambiguous

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beliefs and activities than either his self-assertions or the various affidavitshe was a or began collecting. They show that he never member of theNazi party any organization judged criminal in its entirety by the International Military Tribunal atNuremberg. On the other hand, they also disclose his membership in theNational Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK), the Reich Colonial League (Reichskolonialbund, an organization striving for the return ofGerman colonies a lost afterWorld War I), and few other auxiliary groups deemed suspicious by some among theAllies.34 His income was healthy even if itwasn't exorbitant, and he had traveled to some places in occupied Europe thatmade it appear or he might have been involved in exploiting persecuting defeated peoples.35 was a He always answered "yes" to the question ofwhether he member of any outlawed opposition party or group. His usual answer, when asked to specify the group, was "Goerdeler usw," that is, those associated with the formermayor of , Carl Goerdeler, who had been slated to take a leading role in the government thatwould have replaced Hitler if the bomb plot of 20 July 1944 had succeeded. Globke's restoration to fullprofessional viability would not have been pos one sible if of his denazification questionnaires had not been poorly constructed or was translated. Due to this mistake, he able to remain silent about one po era: tentially damning fact about his life during theNazi that he had applied a was to join theNazi party in 1940, membership application that ultimately rejected due to his suspicious lingering ties to the Catholic Center Party.36 All denazification questionnaires asked ifone had been amember of theNazi Party, but only one of the questionnaires Globke submitted asked whether one a a had also tried to become member. The English text of questionnaire presented to him in 1947 asked whether he was "a member, or a candidate for membership, in the organizations listed below," which included theNazi Party. In the corresponding German text,however, the inquiry about candidacy for was membership not translated, only the part about actual membership. He could therefore correctly choose to answer only theGerman version with the single word "nein."37His entry into the power elite of postwar Germany may have been saved more than a translator's or by nothing printer's oversight. a Nothing would have hindered Globke's chances for high-level career more or quickly than the discovery admission that he had attempted to join theNazi Party in 1940. Thus he did not volunteer the information. It would not have been seeking membership in the party alone thatwould have proven fatal to his chances; plenty of actual formerNazi partymembers were deemed to have been nominal members only and resumed their careers after thewar. a But known Nazi Party membership application along with co-authorship a of commentary on theNuremberg Laws would likely have rendered future service at the chancellor's right hand unthinkable. Long before he would work in Bonn, Globke likely sensed that ifhe wanted to keep themaximum number

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of to options, he had remain silent about theNazi Party application. Apparently no one ever asked the right question until he after had retired in the 1960s. The failure to admit his membership application casts certain defenses of a new Globke in light.He allowed those testifying to his good conduct not to state not a only that he had been Nazi Party member, but also to go beyond by creating the impression that he never tried or would have never tried to a become party member.38 In 1980, Globke's old friend and colleague from theMinistry of the Interior, Robert Kempner (laterGlobke's interrogator and one prosecutor of his boss,Wilhelm Stuckart) provided of the earliest public hints at Globke's party application. Kempner, however, mischaracterized it not as an actual as application, but Globke's investigation of the possibility of on joining theNazi Party the advice of friendswho wanted Globke to protect to himself. According Kempner, head of theNazi Party chancellery Martin Bormann "would" have rejected any such application because ofGlobke's long in membership the Center Party and his continuing contact with Center Party members.39 In fact,Globke did apply in 1940 and was ultimately rejected by Bormann in 1943.40

Even without revealing and explaining his efforts to become aNazi, Globke's and most questionnaires likely something about the way he appeared during interrogations or interviews in the fall of 1945 did not sitwell with some of or a his American British captors. Noel Annan, British military government a officer, authored scathing evaluation ofGlobke. He held Globke's voluntary membership in theNSKK and Reichskolonialbund against him.While An nan did not recommend trial or prison, he was adamant thatGlobke not be employed by the British military government.41 Annan, or perhaps some other officer, summed up Globke in 1945 with these words: "In my opinion he is a not supporter of German aggression and trustworthy," and "he only turned Hitler reasons against for of self-interest rather than because of disagreement with Nazi policy, and...he is untrustworthy."42 Such opinions were based on contact a personal with Globke and particular reading of a certain prioritized set of facts from his experiences during theNazi era. The opinions were not or shared by all in theU.S. and British military governments, by anyone who had an long knowledge ofGlobke. But something about him created off-putting first was impression. Given the alacritywith which he collecting affidavits and asserting immodestly his role in the opposition, itwas all too easy for some to see him as an opportunist without genuine democratic convictions. The need forGlobke's services and expertise became so great in 1945 that one British officer was willing to take a chance. The British (and American) occupiers had begun the reconstruction of local and regional governments and required expert assistance.43 This officerwrote: "I do not think thatGlobke's record to an is black enough prevent his being employed in advisory capacity

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under supervision. His paper on elections [draftedwhile in theMinisterial Col our no lection Center] shows that he understands purposes, and is by means same as ignorant of democratic purposes."44 The logic here isvirtually the that of the Adenauer government in the early 1950s when it chose a strategy of r?int?gration of formerNazi supporters rather than their exclusion: provided was their record not "black enough," any Germans willing to say they were now democrats could participate. All it required was a presumption thatmost Germans had been misled into supporting and did not at heart believe every aspect of its ideology to be the culmination of their deepest beliefs and a hopes. If one proceeded from such presumption, one could reasonably plan an to divert Germans into ideology of democracy and individual liberty by as treating them trustworthy unless they provided concrete evidence to the contrary. While Globke worked for the British drafting papers on election law, friends and professional contacts began seeking him out with offers for administrative jobs. The Allied-appointed mayor of Aachen was the first to offerGlobke a meaningful position, police chief.45Globke entertained thisoffer throughout the fall of 1945, but his internment by theAllies prevented acceptance. Meanwhile, other agencies pursued him. First the director of theNorth Rhine province in zone the British of occupation wrote to the British military government about acquiring Globke, then theGerman authorities inKoblenz in the French zone began beseeching Globke to join them as the chief administrator in the interior ministry there. By early 1946, his contacts inKoblenz became so convinced he would join them there that news of his appointment was released to the press.46 Still he was retained, and detained, by the British, now at theirmilitary government headquarters in B?nde, inNorth Rhine-Westphalia. His personal a preference throughout appears to have been to find good administrative posi in a tion, but ifpossible Aachen, since his family had home there already.47He was as finally freed by the British from any furtherobligations of 1July 1946, and then began almost three years service as the city treasurer ofAachen.48 This was a job noticeable step down from the level of national responsibility he had exercised in theWeimar and Nazi eras, and itwas in finance to boot, an area no a man inwhich he had experience. But for who had still not completed his were was denazification and about whom there serious lingering questions, it as good as he could do. The treasurer's role did not require decisions about or was to policy how money be spent, just accurate record-keeping and faith a was ful stewardship of limited amount ofmoney. His past less likely to raise questions about his job performance. a Globke admitted that local, non-policy position was the best he could hope for given his record.49 Communists inAachen began publishing attacks on him because of his Nazi-era activities and publications, and he ruled out a to moving up level theGerman administration ofNorth Rhine-Westphalia

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amore because he knew the vitriol would only increase in policy-oriented job at the state {Land) level.50He had no faith that theCDU at the state levelwould or could stand up for him when attacks inevitably came.51He therefore asked to be excused from consideration from a higher level job: "Please understand even that I don't want to give up my current job unless circumstances change, a if the job is not meaningful one, because it's politically peaceful."52 Globke achieved another formal requirement for the full and early res toration of his civil service career when he emerged from the denazification process in September 1947. By then, special German denazification boards a were in charge of the process. By 2 to 1vote, the board inAachen categorized or Globke in the best possible category (five), that o? unbelastet, cleared of any Nazi-era It was a that four wrongdoing. questionable outcome, given category was termed "fellow traveler." To a neutral "fellow traveler" usually observer, might have more appropriately balanced Globke's income and his services for on theNazi regime's policies of racial persecution with his efforts behalf of the Church and resistance movement and his lack ofNazi Party membership. The decision on him stated in halting English:

By the interrogation ofDr. Globke themajority of the panel-members could convince themselves that he as an adversary of theNazis has been acting very can courageously. Nothing advantigeous [sic] in theNazi-mind be proved as a in to him. Also his publications he made in his position Regierungsrat are the prussian [sic]Home Office of unpolitical kind.53

The nonsensical neologism "advantigeous" obscures very well whatever the board wished to say about Globke's feelings toward Nazism. The board mis statedGlobke's civil service rank,making him appear less influential than he had actually been. And the board's judgment about his writings being "unpolitical" on race can only be true if the commentary theNuremberg laws is considered was not. was an objective, non-political, scholarly treatise,which surely it There some danger forGlobke in the final recommendation: "discretionary removal recommended, nom. nazi. Cat V voting 2:1." Even though he had achieved the status of "untainted," he might still face "discretionary removal." There vote His was no explanation of the dissenting against the category five ruling. or or to denazification was either lucky negligent deliberately crafted put him in the best possible light. Globke's ambiguous image is further reinforced by the full, truthful, and nuanced evidence he provided to both prosecutors and defense attorneys in tri was als atNuremberg between 1945 and 1948.54His first testimony submitted inwriting to the International Military Tribunal that tried the accused major offenders in 1945 and 1946. He would later provide much lengthier written or case and oral testimony at the "Ministries" "Wilhelmstra?e" in 1948 and 1949, featuring as a defendant, among others, his former boss, State Secretary

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Wilhelm Stuckart. Four years Globke's junior, Stuckart had joined theNazi a Party in 1922, making him prestigious Alter K?mpfer (earlymember) in the Nazi era but a pariah in postwar occupied Germany. Like Globke, Stuckart had earned a doctorate in law.He joined the Reich Ministry of the Interior in 1935, became Globke's immediate superior, helped draft theNuremberg Laws, and took the lead author's spot on the title page of the commentary on theNuremberg Laws co-written with Globke. Stuckart was admitted into the SS in 1936 and was theMinistry of Interior's representative at theWannsee Conference of January 1942, at which the "Final Solution" was coordinated among the various Nazi Party and governmental agencies present. At that a conference, he argued for relatively less harsh treatment of certain Germans considered to be of "mixed blood," i.e., part "Jewish" and part "Aryan," as the Nazis defined these terms. But he did not dissent from the plans to murder those whose "full" Jewishness was not in dispute.55 Globke's testimony and the result of theWilhelmstra?e trial created a picture of Stuckart thatwas fortunate not only for Stuckart himself, but also forGlobke. As Globke and others portrayed Stuckart, he directed his section an of theMinistry of the Interior with eye toward efficiency, professionalism, and the rule of law.He protected his subordinates from unprincipled Nazis, and intervened on occasion to try tomoderate the effects of racist legislation on a those who might be considered less than 100 percent Jewish. As result of the testimony and other evidence, Stuckart was convicted atNuremberg, but was sentenced only to time already served and was immediately released. was While his subsequent denazification farmore difficult than Globke's had was a a career been, he able finally tomake start at in private business before dying in a trafficaccident in 1953. a Globke thus enjoyed the grace of having worked for less than fully was a compromised boss. Stuckart nothing like good Nazi who risked his life and fortune tomitigate the evil of the regime, but neither was he purely evil. He tried to ameliorate certain measures even as he believed inNazism's core principles and carried out other criminal acts without reservation.56 Perhaps no other boss than Stuckart would have enabled Globke's service in theNazi Ministry of the Interior while also preserving Globke's chances forprominence in the postwar era.With a more ferventNazi as his superior, Globke would or or have been fired, transferred, demoted, might have quit. Had Stuckart not protected Globke by interceding with the head of the security services (RSHA) Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Globke might well have been arrested and imprisoned as a co-conspirator against Hitler in 1944 or 1945. And Stuckart was out of jail by the time Adenauer called Globke to his side in 1949, meaning no one use alone as a reason to cast could Stuckart's continuing imprisonment doubt on Globke's role in theNazi era. Globke's testimony was not widely publicized. By 1948 few inGermany or

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abroad were paying attention to the trials of formerNazi officials at Stuckart's level. But the fact thatGlobke had testifiedwould become one of the chief tools a in his effort to fully rehabilitate himself and enable career at the pinnacle of power in the coming Federal Republic. The consistency of his self-portrayal, the careful nuance he was able to provide about the development of racist laws and ordinances, the immediate admission that he had known about themass a murder of Jews without having participated in it, the description of boss who came as close as one could under the circumstances to a all being good one, created a record that gave Globke's future enemies little towork with and his so future friendsmuch to exploit.57Why would he have been helpful with his testimony ifhe had had anything to hide?Why would theAllies, the zealous inventers of the hated denazification, have used Globke without charging him ifthey believed he bore any guilt for crimes? For Globke and his defenders, his testimony and the implicit credibility theAmericans lent toGlobke by relying on his word would prove valuable tools in his later defense.

IfGlobke was and remains infamous, albeit also oversimplified and misunder stood, it is solely because ofKonrad Adenauer's stubborn insistence thatGlobke serve was indispensable, and not because Globke necessarily wanted to at the new highest level of the German government. Adenauer's close adviser Her as bert Blankenhorn brought the two together in the summer of 1949 Globke a new as prepared to begin job the deputy auditor of the state ofNorth Rhine came to on Westphalia.58 Adenauer almost immediately relyheavily Globke and wanted to name him the Staatssekret?r in the chancellery, something analogous to, though not identical with, the role of chief-of-staff.Globke proved irreplace a able due to his technical, legal, and personnel knowledge, his tact (mostly via sometimes awkward silence), his discretion, and his hard work. name as Adenauer claimed to have very reluctantly agreed not to Globke his Staatssekret?r in 1949, yielding not only toGlobke's sense of propriety and his fear of attacks, but also to perceived opposition from theWestern Allies, on whose opinion Adenauer was still dependent for future advances toward case recovering sovereignty for the Federal Republic.59 A similar from 1949 illustratedAdenauer's dilemma.When Adenauer's intra-party rival Jakob Kaiser wanted to name Franz Thedieck as his Staatssekret?r in theMinistry forAll German Affairs,Adenauer initially tried to block the appointment because of Thedieck's Nazi era past in themilitary government of Belgium. Like Globke, Thedieck could provide certain evidence of anti-Nazi activities and suspicion a of himself byNazis, but potential opposition from Belgium (and probably a new desire to teach Kaiser lesson about Adenauer's supremacy in the govern ment) led Adenauer to delay formany months before acquiescing inKaiser's as insistence that only Thedieck would do his top civil service assistant. But com Thedieck did not have a paper trail like the one represented by Globke's

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on nor was mentary theNuremberg Laws, Thedieck at Adenauer's side and taking a major part in the staffingof many government ministries.60 Adenauer named Globke's supporterOtto Lenz his firstStaatssekret?r in 1950, to at was allowing Globke remain the rank o?Ministerialdirektor, which stillhigh enough to draw the attention ofAdenauer's many critics.Globke came under repeated attack in 1950 and beyond. Adenauer wished tomove the discussion out of the 's plenary sessions and into the less publicized committees if it had to be discussed at all.61 But the Social Democratic opposition, espe as a cially Bundestag deputy , who had been classified "first-degree Mischling" in theNazi era, would not relent, demanding Globke's removal as a for a new and better German defense pre-requisite government.62 Adenauer's on of Globke rested several pillars already erected by Globke himself: his clearance by theAllies, the assertions that theNuremberg Laws commentary helped rather than hurt victims, and statements from various parties about his good deeds, anti-Nazi attitudes, and lack ofNazi Party membership.63 By 1953, the German civil service, its structure, and its basis in law would reemerge in its previous form despite widespread expectation of and demands for thoroughgoing reform.64Many laws regulating the German civil service stemmed from the pre-Nazi period and could be relatively easily purged of theirNazi elements, allowing for a much smoother transition (or return) to a the appearance of body of non-political servants of a democratic order.65The question thus ultimately became not how to denazify, but how to reintegrate or compensate unemployed civil servants who had lost their jobs because they had fled from the east,were excluded due to denazification, or were members no of agencies thathad disappeared or longer needed their services.66Adenauer, one who by 1948 had become of the leading personalities on the incipient na an tional stage, became early opponent of reform, either of the underlying law or even of the personnel itself, those who had been members of theNazi Party. Adenauer held such views long before Hans Globke had been recommended to him. Adenauer would easily have subsumed Globke into the mass of civil servants whose pasts would be overlooked provided they could support the new system and had not personally committed or ordered violent criminal acts of or Adenauer's was a voice repression persecution. lonely against fundamental even own was reform within his party, but ultimately it his view that largely prevailed.67While historians may debate whether the restoration of the civil same a service in its old form, with many of the Beamten, was sellout or a neces was sity,for Globke itmeant the ground being prepared for his ascent into the administrative elite.68TheWestern Allies' half-hearted attempts at fundamental civil service reform had failed, and Adenauer effectivelymirrored those ele ments inGerman society who wished for only two categories of Germans in era: the postwar the fewhands-on criminals and everyone else.69They deplored the spectrum of greater and lesser guilt created by denazification, along with

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the corresponding punishments and restrictions. Under these circumstances, as Globke's ambiguous appearance both former willing servant of theNazis was more and resistance figure than enough to allow him to take a prominent those civil servants who were able to resume or even place among improve their careers. to Had Globke's services theThird Reich tainted his ability to serve with true credibility at the highest level in the kind of democracy that the Federal Republic had to become in order to win the trust of theworld and regain its sovereignty? Or did his Nazi-era resistance activities automatically shield him or from accusations of racism careerist opportunism? Perhaps the truth lies in neither of these extremes, nor between them, but rather in both of them.The era history of theNazi offers other prominent examples of ambiguous figures as rescuer or such and Nazi Party member Oskar Schindler expelled Nazi and later S S soldier Kurt Gerstein, who witnessed Holocaust gassings and tried was to inform the world.70 While Schindler impoverished after the war and Gerstein committed suicide in French captivity,Globke's talent for survival, flexibility, and avoiding involvement in the worst of the Interior Ministry's activities served him well. They allowed him to endure the entire 12 years of a theNazi dictatorship despite prior record of politically active Catholicism so a and reemerge carefully as to be in position to climb high in a restored civil service. Globke in facthas much in common with Gerstein. Both were commit ted to their respective churches (Globke theCatholic, Gerstein theProtestant). Both should have been branded politically unreliable to theNazis ue to their pre-Nazi political associations and continuing friendships inopposite nal circles. But both nonetheless slipped past the safeguards into ideologically sensitive a areas, demonstrating ifnothing else the impossibility of dictatorship's forcing was an total conformity.Gerstein able towitness gassings as S S soldier despite as an was his earlier arrest anti-Nazi. Globke able to remain in theMinistry of even was so the Interior though he suspected of political unreliability that he was not allowed to join theNazi Party. Gerstein certainly risked his lifemore openly (even brazenly) than Globke, while Globke responded more passively to the requests of others for his help rather than taking the initiative. a Globke remains puzzling figure because we now know that he did not reveal thewhole truth about his life during theNazi era. He did not volunteer a that he had applied to become member of theNazi Party because no one ever asked him. Offering that storywould have severely limited his options and certainly, in conjunction with the commentary authorship, would have made it difficult for him to join Adenauer's staff in the late summer of 1949. saw a Globke difference between having applied and being rejected for party on membership the one hand, and actually having been aNazi Party member on the other. He could have easily imagined, however, that enough people from the political center and leftwould not see the difference and would at

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was tack and undermine his credibility in those matters forwhich he the only witness, such as his motivation in joining Stuckart to write the commentary. As a contrasting example, became federal chancellor in 1966 despite having been a member of theNazi Party, but his name was not on such a prominent document of racial persecution as a legal commentary on theNuremberg Laws. Kiesinger, moreover, had the advantage of following Globke, who with Adenauer's stubborn support had proven that long-term was political survival despite grave doubts about one's Nazi-era past possible and even likely if the right tone were adopted and maintained consistently71 a career More broadly, Globke's ability to resume without upward limita tions as part of the administrative elite formed part of the emerging consensus behind a thoroughly differentiated approach to theNazi past. This consensus as on confused and angered most abroad as well those the political left inside a Germany who had assumed theywould be leading purged, reformedGermany into a democratic socialist future. It turned out to be not enough to say or prove someone had been aNazi. Nor was it enough to allege that someone had held a core job advancing Nazi aims, even those at the racist ofNazi ideology. The were only ones to be permanently excluded or marginalized those who had or personally committed violent acts of persecution had directly ordered them. While such magnanimity tainted the Federal Republic in the eyes of many international and domestic critics,many Germans, likeKonrad Adenauer, did not believe a stable democracy could emerge without swift r?int?gration of almost all Germans into full political and social acceptability.72 As one of those even now reintegrated, Globke survived and thrived, but he also endured sav age personal attacks for the next 14 years. His reputation, now in the hands of war an historians, has not recovered. For immediately after the he had created a man image of himself as desiring to help theNazi regime's victims from the inside, an image that would both save and damn him. He revived his career and rose to high office, but has been regarded ever since by many as a part of the very evil he claimed to have been mitigating.

I would like to thank Erik Lommatzsch, Walter Peffekoven, Susanna Schrafstetter, Nicholas Lambert,Holly Gafford, theUniversity of SouthAlabama Research Council, and the anonymous reviewers of the German Studies Review for their assistance with the research and preparation of this article. 1 as one most For examples stressing Globke of the controversial figures in the early of see Die der vol. 1 history postwar Germany, Kabinettsprotokolle Bundesregierung, (1949), Ulrich Enders and Konrad Reisler, eds. (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1982), 71, n. 13; von "Hans in: in Ulrich Hehl, Globke," Zeitgeschichte Lebensbildern: Aus dem deutschen et Katholizismus des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, vol. 3, J?rgen Aretz al., eds. (Mainz: Gr? newald, 1979), 247;Norbert Jacobs, "Der Streitum Dr. Hans Globke inder ?ffentlichen Meinung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949-1973: Ein Beitrag zur politischen

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Kultur in Deutschland" (Ph.D. diss., University of Bonn, 1992), 63; Terence Prittie, KonradAdenauer: 1816-1961 (Chicago: Cowles, 1971), 217. 2 Frank Die Adenauer-CDU: und Krise einer Bosch, Gr?ndung, Aufstieg Erfolgspartei 1945-1969 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 257. 3 David Southern, "The Chancellor and the Constitution," inAdenauer toKohl: The De the German velopment of Chancellorship, Stephen Padgett, ed. (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 40; Horst Osterheld, "Der Staatssekret?r des Bundeskanzler amtes," in Der Staatssekret?r Adenauers: Pers?nlichkeit und politisches Wirken Hans Globkes, Klaus Gotto, ed. (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1980), 99-126. 4 as as to Du Tremblay is better known "Father Joseph," and served secretary Cardinal Richelieu in early seventeenth-century France. The very nickname "grey eminence" stems For from the color of Joseph's cowl. newspaper articles labeling Globke the graue see Eminenz of the Federal Republic's chancellery, the collection centered around Hans Globke in the Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hauptstaatsarchiv (hereafter: HStA) D?sseldorf, NW 216, Nr. 20. 5 vom 15. Gesetz Wilhelm Stuckart and Hans Globke, Reichsb?rgergesetz September 1935, zum vom Sch?tze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre 15. September 1935, Gesetz zum der des deutschen Volkes vom 18. Oktober Sch?tze Erbgesundheit (Ehegesundheitsgesetz) 1935: allen und den Gesetzen und Nebst Ausf?hrungsvorschriften einschl?gigen Verordnungen (Munich: Beck, 1936). 6 new as a A welcome exception, yet unpublished, is thoroughly researched and carefully argued chapter inErik Lommatzsch, "Hans Globke (1898-1973): PolitischesWirken um und Handeln" (Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 2005). Jacobs, "Der Streit Dr. contacts im Hans Globke," 44-53, also examines many of Globke's friendships and war. mediately after the 7 accounts The best brief of Globke's life, influence, and past have until recently appeared or Democratic in biographies of Konrad Adenauer histories of his party, the Christian am Union. Henning K?hler, Adenauer: Eine politische Biographie (Frankfurt Main: Pro is a on pyl?en, 1994), 725-32, self-contained, critical but balanced essay Globke, his to in Hans-Peter past, his appeal Adenauer, and his influence the incipient chancellery. Adenauer: Der 1816-1952 Deutsche Schwarz, Aufstieg (Stuttgart: Verlags-Anstalt, 1986), 659, is less critical of Globke but makes clear that he possessed precisely those was in civil servants in 1949: was qualities Adenauer seeking top he highly qualified, not a a or to former Nazi Party member, and member of the CDU sympathetic it.One in of the earliest "critical" biographers of Adenauer admitted certain exculpatory facts aNazi member not Globke's biography (never having been Party and apparently having to for defenses anything directly do with the "Final Solution," example), but still termed as a was of Globke "whitewashing" and used Globke living reminder of all that wrong A with Adenauer's "dictatorial" style of governance: Charles Wighton, Adenauer: Critical York: 196-97. See also the cover and Biography (New Coward-McCann, 1964), story criticalbiographical articleon Globke inDer Spiegel,4 April 1956,15-25. On Globke in see Erik "Hans theNazi era, the thorough and balanced article by Lommatzsch, Globke Eine 10 und der Nationalsozialismus: Skizze," Historisch-politische Mitteilungen (2003): 95-128. On the controversies about Globke after 1950, see Thomas Herz and Heiko in Boumann, "Der 'Fall Globke': Entstehung und Wandlung eines NS-Konfliktes," Diskurse ?ber den Nationalsozialismus seit Thomas Herz Umk?mpfte Vergangenheit: 1945, Mi and Michael Schwab-Trapp, eds. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), 57-108;

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chael "Kulturelle und Handeln. Der Fall Globke: Schwab-Trapp, Ordnung politisches " 'Einige emigrierten, andere blieben. Nicht alle konnten emigrieren', ibid., 109-38; and Jacobs, "Der Streit um Dr. Hans Globke." 8 most recent was a The glaring example of incorrectly implying Globke Nazi Party in a member appeared report issued by the U.S. National Archives. See http://www. 2 In archives.gov/press/press-releases/2006/nr06-114.html, accessed 5August 2007. this "a Nazi in report, Globke is called highly placed former the Adenauer government." a a Nazi in This piece is apparently responsible for renewed bout of labeling Globke as can seen one one enters the media, be by the newspaper references finds when the at search string "globke nazi" (without the quotation marks) http://www.google.com. was in as In 1966, Globke incorrectly described Israel the "author of the Nuremberg some Laws" by who opposed the visit of Konrad Adenauer. On this issue and the general as see question of the misidentification of Globke the author of the Nuremberg Laws, im Yeshayahu A. Jelinek and Rainer A. Blasius, "Ben Gurion und Adenauer Waldorf vom in Astoria: Gespr?chsaufzeichnungen israelisch-deutschen Gipfeltreffen New York am 14.M?rz 1960,"Vierteljahrshefte f?r Zeitgeschichten (1997): 320, especiallyn. 37.And was not a was a servant although Globke Nazi Party member and fairly obscure civil an who only occasionally exercised important influence, he is, for example, accorded entry inRobert Wistrich's Whos Who inNazi Germany (New York:Macmillan, 1982), 93-94. By contrast, the racial affairs director (Rassereferent) in the Ministry of the no Interior who actually helped write the Nuremberg Laws, Bernhard L?sener, has entry inWistrich's reference work. 9 case was The East German against Globke published by the Ausschuss f?r deutsche Globke und die der die verbrecherische des Einheit, Ausrottung Juden: ?ber Vergangenheit Staatssekret?rs imAmt des Bundeskanzlers Adenauer (: Ausschuss f?r deutsche Einheit, 1960) and idem, ImNamen der V?lker, imNamen der Opfer:Ausz?ge aus dem Protokoll des Prozesses gegen Dr. Hans Globke vordem Obersten Gericht der DDR (East Berlin: A Ausschuss f?r deutsche Einheit, 1963). collection of documents and photos published inWest of similar is Dr. Hans Globke: Germany purport Aktenausz?ge?Dokumente, & Reinhard Strecker, ed. (Hamburg: R?tten Loening, 1961). 10 For a brief sketch of Globke's career, see Lommatzsch, "Hans Globke und der Na tionalsozialismus," 96-97. 11 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 266, claims thatGlobke draftedantisemitic regulations in 1932, beforethe Nazis came to power. 12 text at See the of the law the web site of the German Historical Museum, http://www. dhm.de/lemo/html/dokumente/berufsbeamten33/index.html, accessed 29 November 2006. 13 Hehl, "Hans Globke," 2 51 ;Curt Garner, "Public Service Personnel inWest Germany in on the 1950s: Controversial Policy Decisions and Their Effects Social Composition, Gender Structure, and the Role of Former Nazis," inWest Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in theAdenauer Era, Robert G. Moeller, ed. (Ann Arbor, MI: University ofMichigan Press, 1997), 150. 14 at in on 12 See Globke's testimony the "Wilhelmstra?e" trial Nuremberg August in to a as to in 1948 response prosecutor's direct question why he stayed theMinistry of Interior despite his misgivings: National Archives and Record Administration, Col at lege Park, Maryland, U.S. Military Trials N?rnberg, Record Group 238 (hereafter:

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NARA RG 238),M897, Roll 15,15874. 15 two sons a Hans 24 Globke and his wife Augusta had and daughter: Joseph, born June 1935;Marianne Sophie, born 13October 1939; andWerner Hans, born 27March 1942. 16 Lommatzsch, "Hans Globke und der Nationalsozialismus," 101. 17 in 249. Globke, "Aufzeichnung," Staatssekret?r, 18 recent Laws in a more por discussion of the Nuremberg and their origins planned see Die des Rassenwahns context, Cornelia Essner,D/e N?rnberger Gesetze,'' oder, Verwaltung 1933-1945 (Paderborn: Sch?ningh, 2002). 19 accounts the that For thorough of the origins of Nuremberg Laws clearly support to in see Uwe Globke's testimony that he had nothing do with the legislation advance, Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitikim Dritten Reich (D?sseldorf: Droste, 1972), 125-31; Karl to Schleunes, The Twisted Road Auschwitz: Nazi Policy toward German Jews, 1933-1939 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1970, reprinted 1990), 120-24; and Saul Years vol. 1 o? Nazi and the Friedl?nder, The of Persecution, 1933-1939, Germany Jews (NewYork: HarperCollins, 1997), 146-49.Globke's boss at the time,Wilhelm Stuckart, in Laws. On Globke's was, however, fully involved drafting theNuremberg participation on see in discussions the ordinances that followed the Nuremberg Laws, Lommatzsch, "Hans Globke und der Nationalsozialismus," 100. These ordinances provided the rules, used to enforce the regulations, and procedures that would be actually Nuremberg on a Laws day-to-day basis. 20 in "Hans Globke und Globke, "Aufzeichnung," Staatssekret?r, 254-55. Lommatzsch, a Interior der Nationalsozialismus," 117, provides documentary analysis of Ministry in a to records demonstrating Globke's involvement altering proposal require German to names new ones as or As Jews take double last including such "Judd," "J?d," "Itzig." as name "Israel" or "Sara" to humiliating the forced addition of the ultimately proved more to be, Globke and others believed itwould have been far damaging have forced Jews to take double last names. 21 der Vatikan und der Holocaust Michael Phayer,"Die katholische Kirche, 1940-1945," in Der mit dem Holocaust: Rolf ed. Umgang Europa?USA?Israel, Steininger, (Vienna: B?hlau, 1994), 138. 22 numerous See the affidavits of support (Bescheinigungen, Best?tigungen, orErkl?rungen) in the Archives for Christian Democratic Politics, Sankt Augustin, Germany (hereafter: ACDP), 0-070-071/1 and Staatssekret?r,2 59-71 and 274-80. Globke wisely did not rely on to as a his association with the 20 July plot alone portray himself risk-taking, fully engaged opponent ofNazism. Others who had willingly servedHitler when thingshad as Erwin Rommel or commander of been going well (such Field Marshal Arthur Nebe, one racial murder in the Soviet also of the Einsatzgruppen squads Union) participated or were to in close the 20 July plot, after all. 23 Globke's testimonyatthe"Wilhelmstra?e"trial, 10August 1948,NARARG238,M897, Roll 14, 15426.Kaltenbrunner headed theReichssicherheitshauptamt within the SS. 24 Globke also had a "Marschbefehl" ("marchingorder," dated 12April 1945) ordering to Interior in miles from him join the evacuated Ministry of the Garmisch, only 17 Kochel. ACDP 070-071/2. 25 statement Hans in ACDP See by Kettner, Stuckart's personal assistant, 1-070-071/1, arrest warrant 11 n.d. Kettner dates the 15 April 1945. See also Globke's affidavit of August 1947,ACDP 1-070-083/2.

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26 L. "Preliminary Interrogation Report," Major Edmund King (conducted by 2nd Lieutenant Kurt Klein), Headquarters, Third United StatesArmy, 7 September 1945, "Prisoner: Globke, Dr. Hans." National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland, Records of theWar Department General and Special Staffs, Record Group 165, StackArea 390,Row 35, Box 708,MIS-Y, SAIC-PIR, AIC 1855. 27 Dr. on "Paper by Globke, ex-Ministerialrat of the RMdl, the Segregation ofAdministra tiveTasks fromPolitical Tasks," 14May 1946,National Archives of theUnited Kingdom (Kew,England; hereafterUKNA, formerlythe Public Record Office). Records of the Foreign Office (hereafterFO) 1049/477; "Report prepared by Dr. H. Globke on the historical development of German local government," 17May 1946, ibid., and "Actual Problems ofGerman Right ofVoting," 19November 1945, ibid.Globke's highly criti on cal views the proportional voting system of theWeimar Republic and his support a for the British single-member district system would later be noted by the authors of profileof Globke inDer Spiegel,4 April 1956, 20-21; theSpiegel article impliesGlobke won favor with the British for supporting their system while other German advisors to representation. clung28 proportional Although itwas writtenmuch later (1956),Globke's extended report ("Aufzeichnung") on in era accounts his activities the Nazi is perfectly consistent with all earlier he had an to own case. provided and offers excellent summary of how he attempted make his commen Globke, Staatssekret?r, 247-59. A similar earlier self-defense by Globke of the tary can be found in Globke to unnamed "Herr Minister," 17 December 1947, ACDP 0-070-071/2: "Aber dann sagte ich mir, dass sich durch den Kommentar eine einmalige Chance b?te, vielen rassisch Diskriminierten zu helfen. Dies ist auch erreicht worden.... man Oder glaubt etwa, ich h?tte den rassisch Verfolgten dadurch helfen sollen, dass ich in aus die N?rnberger Gesetze einem Kommentar dazu humanit?ren ?den sonstigen Gr?nden abgelehnt h?tte?" Lommatzsch, "Hans Globke und der Nationalsozialismus," to 109-12, demonstrates the plausibility of Globke's claims have written the mildest one most to commentary and the helpful the victims of the legislation. 29 in Hans Globke, "Aufzeichnung," Staatssekret?r, 251-52. K?hler, Adenauer, 727, notes to on also that Globke failed provide examples of harsher commentaries the Nuremberg Laws. 30 zu "Richtig ist, dass die Einf?hrung dem Kommentar typisch nationalsozialistische stammt von von Gedankeng?nge wiedergibt. Diese Einf?hrung nicht mir, sondern dem Mitverfasser." Globke, in Staatssekret?r, 253. 31 "Aufzeichnung," Globke, appendix 1 to his denazification questionnaire of 17 July 1947,HStA D?s seldorf,NW 1079/5476. 32 Preysing's affidavit, in Staatssekret?r, 266-61; Lenz's, ibid., 260-62; Kaiser's, ibid., 259-60. 33 in Preysing's affidavit, Staatssekret?r, 261. 34 A as a British Military Government report defined the NSKK's training "of military were were nature" and stated that "all the members vetted for political reliability and active protagonists ofNazi ideology." Of its estimated 220,000 members, however, only commencement 300 fell into the "automatic arrest" category upon of Allied occupation. UKNA FO 1050/140,n.d. 35 two The main locations of the surviving copies of Globke's denazification question are naires in HStA D?sseldorf, NW 1079/5476, and in Globke's personal paper col lection,ACDP 1-070-071/2

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36 " Lommatzsch, "Hans Globke und der Nationalsozialismus," 104. Lommatzsch, Hans Globke (1898-1973)," 173; Jacobs, "Der Streitum Dr. Hans Globke," 37. Liste ist ob Sie einer der 37"In der folgenden anzugeben, Mitglied angef?hrten Orga nisationen waren..." HStA D?sseldorf, NW 1079/5476. 38 on See forexample the affidavitof supportfor Globke byEduard Schick, the letterhead of "Der Regens der Bisch?flichen Priesterseminars in Fulda," 16 January 1946,HStA er in D?sseldorf, NW 1079/5476: "Dass trotz seiner hohen Beamtenstellung nicht die seiner innersten wie er mir ?fters Partei eingetreten ist, ist Ausdruck ?berzeugung, assertion in his to the collection versicherte." Schick later strengthened this contribution war nie und w?re aus innerem of essays honoring Globke: "Hans Globke Parteimitglied von Anstand dazu auch nie bereit Schick, "Ein Leben im Spannungsfeld " gewesen." Christentum und Politik, in Staatssekret?r, 45. See also Gustav Stein, "Hans Globkes von Humanit?t und Staat: Eindr?cke einer in Vorstellungen langj?hrigen Begegnung," auf christlicher Staatssekret?r, 64: "es lag in der Konsequenz dieser Entscheidung [Politik nach 1933 den Beitritt zur NSDAP zu Grundlage mitzugestalten], verweigern." 39 Hans Robert M.W. Kempner, "Begegnungen mit Globke: Berlin?N?rnberg?Bonn," in Staatssekret?r, 225. See Bormann's letter to the Reichsschatzmeister explaining the rejection, 30November 1941,ACDP 1-070-071/2. 40 Lommatzsch, "Hans Globke und der Nationalsozialismus," 104. 41 Lt. Col. NG. Annan, toPolitical Division,Main HQ CCG(BE), L?bbecke, 17Novem ber 1945,UKNA FO 1049/61; copy of same inHStA D?sseldorf, NW 1079/5476. 42 action 2 9 Unidentified British military government officer, Fragebogen sheet, October Public Min 1945; and unidentified British military government officer, Safety Branch, isterialCollecting Centre, 14December 1945,HStA D?sseldorf, NW 1079/5476. 43 reconstruction of administra For complementary views of the motives behind the see Rebecca L. A Priorities: Democratic tive and political bodies, Boehling, Question of in Postwar and under Reforms and Economic Recovery Germany: Frankfurt, Munich, Stuttgart RI: and Daniel E. U.S. Occupation, 1945-1949 (Providence, Berghahn, 1996); Rogers, Politicsafter Hitler: TheWestern Allies and theGerman PartySystem (New York:New York University Press, 1995). 44 C.E.D. Administration and Local Government Brigadier Bridge, Branch, CCG(BE), 7 December 1945,HStA D?sseldorf, NW 1079/5476. 45 Oberb?rgermeister der StadtAachen Rombach toGlobke, 22 August 1945,ACDP 0-070-071/2. 46 Franz JosefWuermeling toGlobke, 21 January 1946, ibid. 47 Globke toOberstadtdirektor (Aachen), 15June 1946, ibid. 48 as treasurer came from the Oberstadtdirektor on 29 The job offer Aachen city April to sort assurance the 1946, but Globke wasn't able give any of that he could take job until 15 June 1946. See relevant correspondence, ibid. 49 Lommatzsch, "Hans Globke (1898-1973)," 160 and 164. 50 12 Globke to "Herr Ministerpr?sident" (presumably of North Rhine-Westphalia), August 1947,ACDP 0-070-071/2. 51 Globke had joined theCDU in 1946. See Lommatzsch, "Hans Globke (1898-1973)," 119. 52 Globke to unidentified "HerrMinister," 17December 1947,ACDP 0-070-071/2. 53 Dr. 23 HStA "Case Summary, Subject: Hans Globke," September 1947, D?sseldorf, NW 1079/5476.

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54 can in Globke's testimony be found in part his personal papers, ACDP 0-070-081/2 and 0-070-083/2, and in full inNARA RG 238,M897, Rolls 14 and 15. 55 Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of theFinal Solution:The Evolution ofNazi JewishPolicy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln,NE: University ofNebraska Press, 2004), 412. 56 as Twice Stuckart has been portrayed by filmmakers courageously battling security at in to save services chief Reinhard Heydrich theWannsee conference of 1942 order the lives or those of "mixed of so-called Mischlinge, blood," part Jewish, part "Aryan." See Heinz Schirk'sDie Wannseekonferenz(1984) and Frank Pierson's Conspiracy(2001), both made for television. 57 For Globke's denials both of knowledge about the Holocaust before it began and of in see at his direct participation the genocide, his testimony the "Wilhelmstra?e" trial, 11August 1948,NARA RG 238,M897, Roll 14, 15617, andKempner, "Begegnungen mit Hans Globke," in Staatssekret?r, 226. 58 und im von der Bizonen- zur Rudolf Morsey, "Personal- Beamtenpolitik ?bergang Kontinuit?t in Bundesverwaltung (1947-1950): oder Neubeginn?" Verwaltungsgeschich te: ed. & Aufgaben, Zielsetzung, Beispiele, Rudolf Morsey, (Berlin: Duncker Humboldt, n. und Zur Geschichte 1977), 223, 123; and Udo Wengst, Staatsaufbau Regierungspraxis: der der Deutschland 142. Verfassungsorgane Bundesrepublik (D?sseldorf: Droste, 1984), K?hler, Adenauer, 725, demonstrates that Globke and Adenauer likely had much earlier, contact. but also very superficial, 59 Ulrich Nach und in Brochhagen, N?rnberg: Vergangenheitsbew?ltigung Westintegration der Ara 182. Adenauer (Hamburg: Junius, 1994), 60 See the correspondence between Adenauer and Kaiser regardingThedieck and Globke in theBundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter:BAK), Nachlass JakobKaiser (NL 1018)/89. 61 1 as in Die der Ursula Adenauer, June 1951, cited Kabinettsprotokolle Bundesregierung, H?llb?sch, ed., vol. 4 (1951) (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1988), 413. 62 on see to Of Arndt's many public attacks Globke, especially the speech the Bundestag on 12 des Deutschen I. Univer July 1950, Verhandlungen Bundestages. Wahlperiode (Bonn: sit?ts-Buchdr?ckerei,1950), 2633-2634. See also Dieter Gosewinkel, AdolfArndt: Die des Rechtsstaats aus dem Geist der Sozialdemokratie Wiederbegr?ndung (1945-1961) (Bonn: Dietz, 1991), 241-43. 63 in to See examples of Adenauer's defenses of Globke his speech the Bundestag, 30 March des Deutschen I. and on 31 1950, Verhandlungen Bundestages. Wahlperiode, 2055; des Deutschen I. Universit?ts May 1951, Verhandlungen Bundestages. Wahlperiode (Bonn: to Buchdruckerei, 1951), 5772. Adenauer sometimes liked attack opponents indirectly by claiming he had heard from unnamed but important third parties information that to made his opponents look bad, thereby avoiding having explain himself and open to to himself up counterattack. See, for example, his letters , reproduced to in Enders and Reisler, eds., Kabinettsprotokolle, vol. 1, 56-57; and Jakob Kaiser, 9 December 1949,BAK, NL 1018/89.Jeffrey Herf, DividedMemory: TheNazi Past in the Two s MA: Germany (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1997), 290, fully elaborates on sees the defenses of Globke's conduct and lends them credit, but also them setting a "remarkably low standard" for the incipient democracy. 64 Garner, "Public Service Personnel inWest Germany in the 1950s," 140. 65 Ulrich Deutsches und britische und Politik Reusch, Berufsbeamtentum Besatzung: Planung 1943-1941 (Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta, 1985), 376.

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66 Beamtentum zwischen und Tradition: in der Udo Wengst, Reform Beamtengesetzgebung Gr?ndungsphaseder Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1948-1953 (D?sseldorf: Droste, 1987), 58. 67 Der um die Curt Garner,'"Zerschlagung des Berufsbeamtentums?' deutsche Konflikt Dienstes 1946-1948 am Neuordnung des ?ffentlichen Beispiel Nordrhein-Westfalens," Vierteljahrsheftef?r Zeitgeschichte39 (1991): 58. 68 1960s often cast such revivals as Globke's The historiography of the and early 1970s as part of a "restoration" of an older, anti-socialist, anti-democratic order. See Rolf Bad st?bner, Restauration inWestdeutschland 1945-1949 (Berlin: Dietz, 1965); Ernst-Ulrich Huster et al., Determinanten der westdeutschen Restauration 1945-1949 (Frankfurt am Der Main: Suhrkamp, 1972); Ute Schmidt and Tilman Fichter, erzwungene Kapitalis mus: Klassenk?mpfein den Westzonen 1945-48 (Berlin:Wagenbach, 1971); and Eberhard Die 1945 bis 1952: Zur um die De Schmidt, verhinderte Neuordnung Auseinandersetzung der in den westlichen und in der mokratisierung Wirtschaft Besatzungszonen Bundesrepublik am Deutschland (Frankfurt Main: Europ?ische Verlagsanstalt, 1970). 69 A a of convincing study that places Adenauer's policies within larger framework off und "amnesty, integration, and blocking [the past] ^Amnestie, Integration Abgren zung^] , seeNorbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik:Die Anf?nge der Bundesrepublikund die Deutscher Taschenbuch 14. NS'-Vergangenheit (Munich: Verlag, 1999), 70 on to The literature Schindler is voluminous due the Oscar-winning film glamor M. Oskar izing and exaggerating his wartime activities. See especially David Crowe, Schindler:The UntoldAccount ofHis Life,Wartime Activities, and theTrue Storybehind the List MA: On Kurt see Saul Kurt (Cambridge, Westview, 2004). Gerstein, Friedl?nder, Gerstein:The Ambiguityof Good (New York: Knopf, 1969). 71 Daniel E. Rogers, "The Chancellors of the Federal Republic of Germany and the in The Nazism: New on the Political Legacy of the Holocaust," Impact of Perspectives Its E. Steinweis E. NE: Third Reich and Legacy, Alan and Daniel Rogers, eds. (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 236. 72 German Jeffrey Herf, "Multiple Restorations: Political Traditions and the Interpre tation ofNazism," CentralEuropean History 26/1 (1993): 44; Diethelm Prowe, "The 'Miracle' of the Political-Cultural Shift: Democratization between Americanization and in Miracle Years: A Cultural West Conservative Reintegration," The History of Germany, 1949-1968, Hanna Schissler, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), Fatherland: German Veterans the 455; James M. Diehl, The Thanks of the after Second WorldWar (Chapel Hill, NC: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1993), 239; Robert a G Moeller, War Stories: The Search for Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley,CA: University ofCalifornia Press, 2001), 24-25; Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik, 27; Herf, DividedMemory, 6-1; 203; and 267.

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